Contents High-wing aircraft and stall/spin accidents
3 High-wing aircraft and stall/spin accidents Aviation Safety Digest is prepared by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation in pursuance of Regulation 283 of the Air Naviga 7 Va and aircraft weight tion Regulations and is published by the Australian Govern A response to inquiries concerning the statement in ment Publishing Service. It is distributed free of charge to Aviation Safety Digest 116 that Va decreases with Australian licence holders (except student pilots), registered aircraft weight. aircraft owners and certain other persons and organisations having an operational interest in Australian civil aviation. 8 Out of trim leads to out of control A Beech 36 experienced severe pitch oscillations after Unless otherwise noted, articles in this publication are based takeoff and finally crashed out of control. The prime on Australian accidents or incidents. cause of the accident was the pilot's failure to I complete preflight vital actions. Readers on the tree list experiencing problems with distribu tion or wishing to notify a change of address should write to: 10 Incorrect glider launch The Publications Distribution Officer, 11 Keeping out unwelcome visitors Department of Aviation, Mud-dauber wasps are active in nest building during P.O. Box 18390, Melbourne, Vic. 3001. the warmer months of the year. Aviation Safety Digest is also available on subscription from 12 Hearing conservation the Australian Government Publishing Service. Enquiries and The Department of Aviation initiated a survey of noise notifications of change of address should be direc ted to: levels inside light aircraft . Results showed that the Pitts S1 and agricultural and glider towing types pose Mail Order Sales, an immediate hearing risk if operated without ear Australian Government Publishing Service, protectors. P.O. Box 84, Canberra, ACT 2601 13 Let George do it - but watch him! Subscriptions may also be lodged with AGPS Bookshops in all A DC-10 entered a full aerodynamic stall while climbing capital cities. through 27 500 feet. The crew had mistakenly placed the autopilot system in a vertical speed mode rather Reader contributions and correspondence on articles should than an airspeed or Mach command mode. be addressed to: 14 Bird proofing parked aircraft The Director, Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, 15 Operations from dirt airstrips P.O. Box 367, Canberra City, ACT 2601. 16 Use your P-charts Accidents which are attributable to a pilot's failure to © Commonwealth of Australia 1983, use performance charts are an unfortunately persistent RM81/30216(1) Cat. No. 83 3758 2 feature of Australian General Aviation. The use of P-charts is vital in preflight planning, since small Printed by Ambassador Press Ply. Ltd. changes in operating conditions can often significantly 51 Good Street, Granville, N.S. W. 2142. reduce an aircraft's capabilities. 20 An ill wind A careful assessment of wind velocity - that is, both direction and speed - is essential before any landing is attempted. 22 Door open in flight (reader contribution) Covers 23 Aircraft tyre care l The Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority has been 23 You were saying .. .? operating the Britten-Norman Islander featured on the covers for seven years. Since 1958, the Aircraft Branch of the 23 In brief Authority has ferried personnel, stores and equipment I throughout the Snowy Mountains area. Bushfire spotting and j SAR operations have also been conducted. Aviation Safe1J1 Digest 93 contained a n account of a n accidents had occurred u nder similar circumsta nces. All acciden t in which a C essna 150 d ived near vertically were fatal but only one occu rred during m ustering Aircraft operated by the Authority have included the Beaver, Aero Commander, Grand Commander, Piaggio, Comanche into the ground during m uste ring operations. A pilot operations. The others were, however , associated with and Porter. By the time this issue of the Digest is contribution in the same issue referred to two other low flying. It seems significant that a ll of the aircraft distributed, the Islander should have been replaced by a GAF accidents u nder sim ila r circumstances. All of the involved in the accidents were high-wing types. An Nomad N22B. accidents fo llowed a steep clim b from a low pass, with examination of the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation's the aircraft apparen tly fl icking into a dive off the top of The Aircraft Branch is based at Polo Flat airstri p, near computer records for a 10-year period revealed that Coo ma. the clim b or out of a wingover or si milar manoeuvre. on ly high-wi ng types were involved in this sort of (Photograph by Kevin Ginnane) U p to the time this article was written six more accident during that period. (continued overleaf)
2 I Aviation Safety Digest 118 Aviation Safety Digest 118 I 3 In one of these accidents, of which the accompanying At high cruising speeds, the positive angle of attack photographs show the final disastrous result, the aircraft required is quite small, but as airspeed is decreased , the h ad several times overflown a group of stockmen at a angle of attack necessary to provide lift increases water bore, at a height of about 50 feet. On what rapidly towards the critical point. turned out to be the final pass, the aircraft fl ew over the bore at a low height, the engine power was heard to increase and the aircraft started to climb. The nose rnse sharply and the aircraft clim bed steeply to almost 250 Angle of bank and load factor feet. The left wing then dropped and the aircraft d ived Stall speed, of course, is always raised when the aircraft vertically, spiralling to the left. It struck the ground wing is banked, since ban king increases the total load nose first, crushing the forward sections of the cabin factor of the aeroplane. (The load factor is the resu lt of and wings and, after impact, remained poised in a gravity forces plus any centrifugal forces acting on the vertical attitude. The r eason for the flight is not known, aircraft.) In shallow turns of 30 degrees or less, the although it does seem as though the decision to overfly additional load factor imposed by the centrifugal fo rce the stockmen was taken on the spur of the moment. of the turn is almost negli gible - only 0.154 at a Two aspects of this type of accident are significant: 30-degree bank angle . Any steeper bank raises the load only h igh-wing aircraft have been involved, and the factor from centrifugal forces very sharply. At 45 impact with the ground has often been near-vertical. degrees the total load factor is 1. 414 and at 60 degrees These factors suggest the following explanation for such it is 2.0. This is illustrated in Figure 1. accidents: T he load factor for any aircraft maintaining level W ith a high-winged aircraft a pilot flying close to the ground flight with a constant angle of bank is the same, often has to 'lift' a wing with aileron to maintain or regain regardless of airspeed; for example, the load factor in a visual contact with a ground Jea-lure. During either steep 60-degree bank is always 2g regardless of airspeed or turns with a high g-loading or wingovers, this 'lifting' of the aircraft type. You can calculate the stall.speed for any wing will involve a height gain and speed loss which could aeroplane at any degree of bank if you understand that place the aircraft in a potential stall/spin situation. The normal stalling speed increases always in p roportion to danger inherent in this will be exacerbated if the pilot is still the square root of the load factor. In the 60-degree concentrating on looking for ground features. bank angle cited above, the load factor is 2g, the square In analysin g an acciden t of this type, an experienced root is 1. 415: if the aircraft has a normal stalling speed m ustering pilot postulated the following sequence of of 48 knots, it will stall at 68 knots in a 60-degree bank. events: In simpler terms, it rriay help to remember that a A steep climbing turn was probably commenced with a 60-degree bank will raise your stalling speed by nearly nose-up attitude of about 15 degrees. I believe that instead 50 per cent. Careful pilots carry a safe-over-stall margin of allowing the nose to drop away, the pilot, who almost of airspeed whenever executing turns, especially near certainly would have been looking back at the ground, the ground. A table of typical stalling speeds for a 1 1.00 1.06 1.31 2.00 5.76 continued to hold on back elevator until , at about 40 knots and with a steep angle of ba nk, the aircraft stalled. The single-engine GA aircraft is al Figure 2. Note the effect upper or outside wing would have stalled first and the of fl ap. aircraft would have flicked out of the turn into a 90-degree bank in the opposite direction. The nose would then have fallen away to the vertical and, in this attitude, the aircraft would have struck the ground. Angle of attack ANGLE OF ATTACK 10° T he crucial factor here is that, in the first instance, Some of the more common m isconceptions about stalls ANGLE OF ATTACK 10° the aircraft stalled. All stalls do not culminate in spins, involve a confusion of the two terms, pitch attitude and but an aircraft must be stalled before it will spin. All angle of attack. Pitch attitude is the angle formed by ~LEOF:TACK10" ,. pilots must be aware o f the factors associated with the longitudinal axis of the aircraft with respect to the stalling, so th e discussion below addresses the most horizon - when the nose of the aeroplane points at the pertinent of these. Note that althou gh this article had its horizon , the pitch attitude is always zero, regardless of FLIGHT PATH ~ origin in relation to accidents involving high-wing which direction the aircraft is moving, whether it is ·~ aircraft, the discussion of the factors inherent in stalling climbing or descending, etc. The angle of attack is 'the and spinning are valid for all aircraft types. acute an gle between the chord or an airfo i.I (essentially 2 the wing) and the relative airflow' . T his has nothing necessarily to do with the horizon. It is possible, by the J. application o f back pressure on the elevator , to produce a high angle of attack in an aircraft in any attitude. An Figure 1. Size of arrows and figures beneath show how wing load factor increases with bank angle. PowerOff STALLING SPEEDS KTS-IAS The aerofoil aircraft may be sta lled at any attitude if the critical angle of attack is exceeded. See Figure 3. ANGLE OF BANK Most of today's General Aviation aircraft have Figure 2. The angle of attack is the angle between the wing Gross Weight chord and the flight path (not the ground). 16001bs aerod ynamically efficient, high-speed wing sections with (co11ti11ued 011 page 6) i --- ~ nearly identical curvature on both upper and lower Figure 3. Stall speed varies with flaps and bank angle. CONDITION oo 20° ~o /so 0 surfaces. T his m eans that a zero angle of attack may {Speeds are representative only.) give zero lift. Aircraft with such a wing must be flown Flaps ...... 48 50 55 at a positive angle of attack at a ll times to maintain UP 68 positive lift. For an y aerofoil the lift produced increases Flaps with the angle of attack until the critical point is 20° ~ 43 44 49 61 reach ed , at which stage separation of air from the u pper Flaps surface results in the win g stalling and a drastic 40° , 42 43 47 58 red uction in lift. 3
4 I Avia tion Safety Digest 718 Aviation Safety Digest 118 I 5 Pilot quiz Comment Listed below are six questions related to stalling which Many air safety investigation reports include the Va and aircraft weight all pilots should be able to answer . R ead the questions statement that a n accide nt occur red because the pilot and determine your response before checki ng the 'failed lo m aintain airspeed and the aircraft sta ll ed ' . An article in Aviation Safety Digest 116 discussed airspeed limitations for flight in turbu lence. answers a t th e end of the a rticle. Pilots need to understand the facto rs affecting stalling Among other things, that article briefly discussed the relationship between an aircraft's speed and speed and to conduct regula r stall ing practice in a range weight. The Digest has received a considerable number of inquiries concerning the statement in the of aircraft confi gurations. Only by doing this arc they article that Va decreases with aircraft weight. The following more detailed account of the Va/aircraft likely to be able instinctively lo a void or compen sate fo r Questions weight relationship is printed in response to those queries. situa tions, conditi ons a nd attitudes which may lead to a 1: Must a n aircraft be fl ying at a relatively low stall - even u nder the stress and duress o f the airspeed in order to stall' additional problems that we all in variably encounter on 2: H ow does weight and balance affect stalling speed ? some occasion in fligh t. This r equ iremen t is particularly 3: Can turbulence affect sta ll tendencies? Positive stall at Va importan t fo r p ilots or high-wing aircraft involved in and reduced weight 4: Unco-ordinated flight does not affect the stalling low-level opera tions. T raining is extremely important, . speed of an aircraft - true or false? as low-level m anoeuvring even by a piJot trained for the 5: Can the buildup of foreign matter (e .g . mud or ice) I task contains an elem en t o f r isk, but fo r pilots with little A + I A D on a wing affect stalling speed? experie nce at low flying it often ends tragicall y. 1 6: Does the indicated airspeed at which an aircraft For a concl ud ing comme nt , the expe rienced stalls vary with altitude? / : mustering pilot mentioned earl ier offe rs some sound I advice to those involved in low-level opera tions. a: Posi tive stall / I Turning quickly is frequently necessary in mustering but I ~ (wing-flaps / , I Positive limit Maintaining currency would stress that the safest way to Oy under these exacting ~ retracted/ i conditions is never to pull unnecessary g fo1·ces. Flying an n load factor All pilots practise recovery from stalls when training fo r aircraft fi tted wi th a g meter I have fou n c:J. that it is not 1 a private pilot' s licence, but how many ever contin ue necessary lo pull more than 2g in normal mustering operations. It is a very steep dive and recovery indeed that this practice on their own? W hen did you last spend 1·0 will pull 3g. Pilots engaged in mustering operations need to g ---*----+------half a n hour a t it? The operations tha t a pilot conducts routinely in the course of fl ying his aircraft increase his be very careful in applying back elevator. Many will argue about other factors, but it is the heavy-handed use of back ~ +t / i skill and awaren ess, but those which he merely keeps in > I stick which produces high g forces and the situation which ::> Ql'i::------~------~ ~~,,,--=-~--..____ _ --1.__ ~ _ the back of his mind, like stall r ecovery, grow rusty LU Negative stall (wing - flaps retracted) SPEED OF FLIGHT leads to an 'outside nick' in a steep cl imbing turn. 0 with time . The argument is sometimes made that since Unfo rtunately there are no pilots who have experienced z - i E (E.A.S.) most fatal stall accidents occur n ear the ground, the re is this particularly deadly manoeuvre under 300 fee t and
6 I Aviation Safety Digest 118 A viation Safety Digest 118 I 7 Out of trim leads to out of control
At some stage during the preflight, before start and overcome and the aircraft eventually taxied for an Analysis Comment before takeoff checks, all aircraft checklists stipulate engine run-up. The pilot then performed the before Post-accident investigation revealed that the Bonanza's The prime cause of this accident was the pilot's fail me that pilots must complete certain checks on the takeoff checks without using a written checklist. elevator trim was set to the full nose-up position. The to positively check the trims, for both function and aircraft's trim system. Just when these checks are The aircraft commenced its takeoff roll and became system was fully serviceable. As the pilot had not been correct setting, prior to takeoff. The possibility was carried out varies slightly depending on the aircraft airborne at about 60 knots. The nose rose higher than able to alter the setting of the elevator trim in flight, it raised that the letter 'U' (for UP) on the elevator trim type, but they invariably include two essential normal and the stall warning horn started blowing. is apparent that she must have taken off with full nose position indicator may have been mistaken by the pilot elements: Pushing the nose down against considerable 'backstick' up trim set. for a zero if the lubber line happened to be • a full functional test of the trims, and pressure, the pilot tried to trim out the forces but was Further investigation brought to light the fact that the superimposed over the 'U' (see photograph). Even if • positive confirmation that all trim controls are set unable to move the trim wheel. The aircraft began to pilot who had flown the aircraft on its previous sortie this were the case, it was a mistake which would have to the takeoff position. experience pitch oscillations and, as the airspeed usually landed with fu ll nose-up trim applied and was been realised had a full functional check of the trims As the pilot of a Beech 36 found out, these vital increased, the force on the control column became not in the habit of re-setting the trim to the takeoff been completed. A written checklist may have helped in actions are prescribed for very good reasons, and if heavier, which in turn made the pitch oscillations more position after landing. Indeed, both he and another this regard. they are not completed thoroughly, the consequences pronounced. Power was reduced, but this appeared to pilot who flew the aircraft frequently had on different can be disastrous. make the back pressure on the controls worse, so it was occasions taken off with excessive nose-up trim set, but reintroduced. The pilot asked the passenger in the both had been able to maintain control by rapid The accident right-hand pilot's seat (the holder of a restricted private application of nose-down trim. licence) to retract the undercarriage and to trim the The Bonanza was to convey the pilot, four passengers In this case the pilot was unfamiliar with the aircraft's nose down, but the passenger was unfamiliar and their luggage to a seminar. Some difficulty was Bonanza: she had only 21 hours on type and had not with the aircraft and was unable to assist. experienced in starting the engine but this was fl own it for six months. Subsequent discussions with her Realising that the situation was becoming desperate made it clear that, because of her lack of recency on the the pilot grabbed the microphone and tried to transmit Bonanza, when she tried to apply nose-down trim she a distress call. While the transmission was unintelligible in fact attempted to rotate the trim wheel in the wrong the Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Unit nevertheless - that is, the nose-up - direction. However, full nose turned out when they heard it. Seconds later the up trim was already set; hence her inability to move the Aerodrome Controller activated the crash alarm. trim wheel. By now the pilot could no longer hold the control Beech Aircraft Corporation completed a computer forces and m ade a desperate turn back towards the profile on the Bonanza's expected takeoff performance airfield with the aircraft virtually out of control. To and an assessment of control column forces to be The habit of the other pilot in leaving the elevator observers the turn looked like a stall turn. T he aircraft's expected when full nose-up pitch trim is selected. They trims set in the full nose-up position was poor nose was well below the horizon at the completion of found that 55 pounds force were required at 70 knots airmanship. This practice had in fact been discussed the manoeuvre. Engine power was again reduced by and 97 pow1ds force at 90 knots, with the force with him on occasions but nothing had been resolved; the pilot but as once more this made pitch control even required increasing rapidly with increased airspeed. as a consequence, the practice ultimately contributed to more difficult it was reapplied. This was the pilot's final Rudimentary tests showed that an adult male a major accident. While light aircraft checklists vary in attempt to try to do something positive to retrieve the experiences considerable difficulty in holding 55 pounds content and quality, it remains good airmanship to situation. force for any length of time, let alone a rapidly 'clean up' the cockpit after flight by switching off all Out of control, the aircraft struck trees on the bank increasing force. The pilot in this case simply was not equipment and resetting controls - including the of a creek and was engulfed by fire as the right wing physically capable of controUing the aircraft Jong trims. separated. The aircraft yawed through 180 degrees enough, particularly when she was unable to relieve the A final word on rescue services is warranted. This before hitting the water tail first. The Aircraft R escue trim forces. While reducing engine power would have accident proved yet again the value of letting someone and Fire Fighting Unit, who were mobile before the alleviated some of the forces, it seems probable that know about your emergency. While the pilot's radio Bonanza actually crashed, arrived at the scene only 3 when the pilot removed one hand from the control transmission may have been unintelligible, the tone it minutes later. They rescued the four passengers from column to operate the throttle, the extra load her other obviously conveyed was sufficient to 'scramble' the the creek and cut the pilot free from the wreckage of arm then had to cope with initially gave her the airport rescue services, and as a result those services the cockpit. Remarkably, all survived, albeit with erroneous impression that reducing power was arrived at the crash site within minutes, thereby greatly serious injuries. exacerbating her problem; therefore, she reapplied increasing the accident victims' chances of survival • power. Adding to the pilot's difficulties was th.e aircraft's loading. It was calculated that the aircraft took off 38.3 kilograms over the allowable maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), and that its centre of gravity was 6.35 millimetres aft of the rear limit allowable at MTOW. W hen combined with the out-of-trim takeoff, these factors became significant. None of the luggage was tied down or restrained.
1,,. ~ -r:f. I( Aviation Safety Digest 118 I 9 I .. ~? I I, Incorrect glider launch Keeping out unwelcome visitors
At a height of about 300 feet during a winch launch , an and minor porpoising was experienced. Frequent publicity is given to the attempts - many ICA IS-29D glider was observed to be experiencing The following day the visiting pilot made a brief of which are successful - of aviators of the feathered instability in pit.~ h , yaw and roll. The winch operator, flight in the IS-29D. A winch launch was carried out variety to set up house in the vehicles of those who considering that the pilot was in difficulty, closed the and he experienced porpoising during the launch. He wish to emulate the birds. In other words, we all winch throttle and applied the cable brake. returned for landing via a low right-hand circuit know that birds build nests in aircraft. On occasions The cable was seen to release and fall away to the pattern, instead of the normal left-hand pattern, and these nests have posed serious safety threats by airstrip. The glider stalled and entered a rapid spin to during the landing roll experienced directional control jamming fl ight or engine controls or by providing the right. It briefly recovered from the spin at a very difficulties. A collision with a parked vehicle was flammable material where none should be. The low height but then entered a further spin to the left. narrowly avoided. Shortly afterwards the pilot propensity of some insects to build homes in pitot Ground impact was in a steep nose-down attitude, undertook a second flight. Once more porpoising heads is also well known: hence the pitot cover. 72 metres north of the airstrip and about 430 metres occurred during the winch launch and on the return to I A reader recently discovered another type of from the point where takeoff had commenced. The land the pilot forgot to lower the landing gear, even unwelcome construction activity going on in his glider was destroyed and the pilot killed. though the gear warning horn sounded, until reminded ai1·craft. It is probably not as well known as the of his oversight by a radio call from an observer on the J others but it could pose just as great a threat to flight Background ground. safety. The pilot had travelled to the scene of the accident to After this flight the pilot advised his companions that The pilot had not flown his aircraft for one month participate in a gliding competition. He brought the he was unhappy with his performance and would not and during his daily servicing found that there was glider with him. fl y solo again that day. He expressed the intention of ver y little movement in the ailerons. He traced the This glider was constructed with two towing hook arra!lging a check fli ght with an instruct:pr. problem to the port wingtip where he found that attachment points: a forward point for aero-tow Another pilot then flew the IS-29D and experienced mud-dauber wasps had built a nest on the balance launching and a rear point for winch or auto-tow porpoising during the winch launch. H e considered it arm (see the p hotographs). The nest was a very solid launches. The glider's flight manual states that if winch was caused by excessive speed on launch. He also construction and required considerable effort to or auto-tow launches are made utilising the forward tow thought that a takeoff without flaps might reduce the remove it. The pilot believed he could not have point, and full elevator deflection is applied during porp01smg. operated the ailerons simply by using the control barriers such as netting, covers, caps and plugs. launch, then pitching instability (porpoising) may At this stage the pilot who was subsequently involved column. Good housekeeping around hangars and parking occur. To counter this a reduction of airspeed or in the accident decided that, contrary to his previous Research by the Aviation Safety D igest staff came up areas is also important: not allowing taps to drip, for elevator deflection is recommended. At its home base decision not to fly solo again that day, he wanted to with the following information. A number of species example, will deny the mud-daubers one part of this particular glider was normally operated by an undertake a third fligh t. The other pilot agreed, and of wasps belong ing to the family Sphecidae are likely their building material. aero-tow launch , and only the forward hook was fitted. passed on his assessment of the cause of the porpoising. to be involved in incidents of this type. All of the There is more to keeping out unwelcome visitors A cover plate had been fitted over the rear attachment The glider was prepared for a launch in to a head species are active in nest building during the warmer than pretending you are not at home when your point. wind of about 10 knots. After boarding the glider the periods of the year. relatives arrive unexpectedly. For pilots and aircraft T he pilot was familiar with winch and auto-tow pilot spoke by radio to the winch operator and asked The application of insecticides to discourage mud mechanics, the little bit of extra effort involved in procedures but had not used either for several years: all that the launch be made at reduced power . A member wasps is unli kely to be successful, for the only adopting an active preventive maintenance program his recent flying had been associated with aero-tow of the local gliding club who heard this exchange then suitable chemicals would degrade, and lose their against the kind of hazard discussed in this article procedures. To refresh himself on winch launch intervened to advise that the standard procedure was to effectiveness, if exposed to the elements. The best can be repaid many times over in terms of flight procedures he carried out a dual flight with an call 'slower, slower' on the radio if the launch was too deterrence is provided by the regular use of physical safety • instructor in a two-seat glider shortly after his arrival at fast and ' faster, faster' if it was not fast enough. The the competition airstrip. On the same day another pilot pilot acknowledged this advice. made two flights in the IS-29D. Auto-tow launches The ground roll and initial climb appeared normal to using the forward hook were made for these two flights ground observers. As requested by the pilot, winch (co ntinued on page 11) Incorrect glider launch (co111i11ued) power was applied slowly and then reduced when the Thus, when porpoising did occur, attempts were glider was airborne. After reaching a height of made to overcome it by experimenting with flap approximately 300 feet above the ground, the pilot settings, winch power and airspeed. Eventually, the called 'slower, slower' over the radio and the winch experiments went too far and the glider stalled and operator reduced power even further. The disastrous spun, from which dire situation the pilot was unable to sequence of even ts detailed at the start of this article recover. The fact that the glider initially spun to the then eventuated. right, recovered briefly and then spun to the left, suggests that the pilot's spin recovery technique may Analysis have been faulty. The main factor which emerged during the I t seems likely that a second factor was the investigation into this fatal accident was that the glider psychological condition of the pilot. For reasons which was configured for aero-tow launching with the tow remained undetermined, he had experienced difficulties hook on the forward attachment point, and the hook during his two earlier flights: he almost collided with a was not repositioned to the rear attachment point for vehicle on his first sortie and almost landed wheels-up the winch operations. Because they d id not check the on the second. Possibly he had been unsettled by the fli ght manual, the pilot involved and his companions porpoising. were not aware of this requirement. They were also not In view of these occurrences, his initial decision not aware that the flight manual stated that porpoising to fly solo again that day was prudent. Regrettably, he could occur if w inch launches were made using the subsequently changed that decision, with disastrous .Glider being towed by belly hook position. Forward hook is circled. forward attach ment point. consequences •
10 I Aviation Safety Digest 118 Aviation Safety Digest 7 78 I 11 Hearing conservation Aircraft accident information
The noise levels associated with aircraft operations have been a cause of concern for many years. reports Any hearing loss which may result from an individual's exposure to excessive noise is undesirable in itself; while in relation specifically to flying, a satisfactory level of hearing is obviously essenti~I SECOND QUARTER 1983 for a pilot to operate safely. An intensive effort has been made by manufacturers of Regular Public Transport (RPT) aircraft to reduce noise inside those aircraft. However, the same effort has not been applied to light aircraft because of technical and economic constraints. Prepared by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation The Standards Associa1ion of Australia (SAA) has It was found that the noise produced by multi recommended a program which is designed to protect engine, propeller-driven aircraft can be substantially people who are occupationally exposed to noise. As far reduced through engine speed and propeller as pilots are concerned, an important element of this synchronisation. This can contribute significantly to the The following information has been extracted from accident data files maintained by the Bureau of program is the formulation of an acceptable Daily conservation of hearing. Air Safety Investigation. The intent of publishing these reports is to make available information on Noise Dose (DND). An individual will sustain a DND There were some aircraft types or operations which Australian aircraft accidents from which the reader can gain an awareness of the circumstances and to the value of 1.0 if he is exposed to a noise level of 90 exceeded the acceptable noise levels. conditions which led to the occurrence. decibels (dB) for eight hours. A DND of 1.0 is The Pitts Sl aircraft tested poses a very real risk of At the time of publication many of the accidents are still under investigation and the information considered to be acceptable. Pilots are, of course, hearing damage since at takcoff with full engine power contained in those reports must be considered as prel iminary in nature and possibly subject to subjected to noises other than those from aircraft during applied it registered 114.25 dB. This is very close to the amendment when the investigation is finalised. the day, all of which add to their DND. level commonly accepted ( 115 dB) as the threshold for Readers should note that the information is provided to promote aviation safety - in no case is it A DND of 1.0 is predicted to cause 46 per cent of the onset of permanent damage. As high power settings intended to imply blame or liability. the population ' significant hearing loss' by the age of 65 arc frequently used during aerobatic manoeuvres, Note 1: All dates and times are local years after forty-five years of five days a week in the immediate damage is inevitable unless good ear Note 2: Injury classification abbreviations workforce. Noise is the decisive factor in determining protectors are used . C = Crew P =Passengers 0 =Others N =Nil this degree of impairment in the majority of cases. Agricultural aircraft also were found to pose a risk. F =Fatal S =Serious M =Minor 'Significant hearing loss' is identified as the point at During the spraying seasons pilots tend to work long e.g. C1S, P2M means 1 crew member received serious injury and 2 passengers received minor which speech comprehension in a quiet environmen t is hours in aircraft which produce a cabin noise in excess injuri es. impaired and is defined as 25 dB Average Hearing of 100 dB. This noise level results in a DND of 1.0 Loss. One hundred and fifteen decibels is generally within about thirty minutes. Although agricultural Note 3: The format of record numbers has been changed. accepted as the maximum allowable noise level for any pilots wear helmets the sound attenuation produced is Preliminary report number 210013 from the previous Summary will become final update duration of exposure, however short. unlikely to be ver y high. Pilots involved in agricultural number 83 21001 in this issue. It was against this background that the Department operations are likely to regularly exceed a DND of 1.0 of Aviation initiated a survey to provide data and to with consequential hearing loss. establish what hearing or operational problems may Two aircraft, a Piper Super Cub and an Auster arise as a consequence of noise levels inside ligh t Aiglet, belonging to a gliding club and used for towing, aircraft. This survey, conducted by the Department's were tested and were also found to present a risk due to Advanced Planning and Technology Branch at the the nature of the opcralion. An individual pilot could PRELIMINARY REPORTS (The fol lowing accidents are still under investigation) request of the Aviation Medicine Branch, was designed be exposed to the high noise levels ( 105 dB and 118 dB Date Aircraft type & registration Kind of flying tn;uries to cover the following classes of aircraft and operations for the respective types) for long periods in a busy day. Time Location Departure point/Des tination Record number applicable to the Australian environment: Saving factors arc short recovery periods between tows 01 Apr Piper 23-250 VH-DCO Non-commercial-pleasure Un known • General Aviation aircraft and, usually, weekend activity only. Unknown Brisbane, Qld. Unknown/Unknown 8311022 • aircraft types involved in lengthy flights During in vestigation of a malfunctioning undercarriage-indicating lig ht, the aircrafl engineer discovered unreported damage to • agricultural aircrafl Summary the wing in lhe vicinily of the undercarriage leg. • hel icopters Of the aircraft tested, the Pitts Sl and the agricultural 01 Apr • Departmental aircraft Piper 32 R300 VH -EMD Non-comm ercial-pleas ure C1N, P5N and glider towing types pose an immediate hearing risk 1405 Li smore, NSW 4N Schofields, NSW/Coolangalla, Old. 8321034 Measurements were taken next to the pilot's ear and if operated without ear protectors. The helicopters and The pilot decided to divert lo a nearby aerodrome because the fu el gauges ind icated low. Shorlly after commencing the diversion at selected passenger positions. The measurements were light-to-medium aeroplanes tested represent a noisy but the engine failed. During the ensuing forced landing, the aircrafl slruck a fence post, overlurned, and slid inverted for 100 m. taken in straight and level flight during climbing steps acceptable environment. They do, however, contribute to the normal cruise altitude, and repeated on the significantly to a pilot's total DND, bearing in mind 01 Apr Beech A36 VH·EUM Non-commercial-pleasure C1N, P5N descent leg. Noise levels during takeoffs and landings that pilots are exposed to other noise sources in addition 1500 Nundroo, SA Ceduna, SA/Coorabie, SA 8341012 were also recorded. Thirty different aircraft types were to their flying activities. The pilot had previous ly discussed lhe strip wil h lhe slalion owner bu l had not ascertained its length. On overflying, the pilot used to produce the data. assessed its lenglh as 600 m, and afler checking the P-chart he calculaled thal 500 m was needed for a landing. Th e pi lot stated Operators requiring information on the effectiveness thal he crossed the lhreshold al 65-70 kt with fu ll flap selected. Ground marks indicated that the aircrafl touched down 195 m past of various hearing protectors should consult the lhe lhreshold and bounced lwice before overrunning lhe strip. National Acoustic Laboratories' booklet Attenuation of The survey Hearing Protectors (3rd edition), which is available at 04 Apr Piper 24 VH-KLM Non-commercial- pleasure C1N , P3N As was mentioned above, an individual who is exposed Australian Government Publishing Service Bookshops 1444 Parafield, SA Paraf ield, SA/Parafield, SA 834 1011 to 90 dB for eight hours will sustain the acceptable in all capital cities. Specialist advice is also available During the circui t when the gear was selecled down it failed to ex lend. The gear circuit breakers were resel and the gear extended upper limit DND of 1.0. In general, most of the normally. On lhe following circuit, the pilol was unable to establish lwo·way communications with the tower. Pre-landing checks from the Department of Aviation, Aviation Merlicine were completed afler lurning back, however the pilot slill concenlraled on establishing conlacl with the tower. The aircraft aircraft tested (single engine, light twins and Branch, P .O. Box 367, Canberra City, A.C.T. 2601 • landed wi th the gear relracled. helicopters) produced levels of 90 dB, thus allowing an occupant to sustain a full eight-hour day exposure 05 Apr Partenavia P68 B VH-PFQ Charter-cargo C2N throughout a working life span with acceptable hearing 1750 Karumba, Old. Norman to n, Old ./ Karumba, Qld. 831 1020 loss. This situation is further eased by the restriction on In an atlempt to avoid a flock of birds on short final, the pilol sideslipped lhe aircrafl. Both main wheels struck lhe underrun pilot's flying time to 900 hours per year, an average of heavily, bending lhe left main gear, and the pilot carried oul a go·around. When lhe lefl main wheel contacted lhe runway on the landing roll, the lyre deflated and lhe aircraft veered lo lhe lefl of the runway before coming to resl. 2 Y2 hours per day.
Aviation Safety Digest 778 I i 12 I Aviation Safety Digest 118 PRELIMINARY REPORTS (The following accidents are still under investigation) PRELIMINARY REPORTS (The fol lowing accidents are still under investigation) Date Aircraft type & registration Kind of flying Injuries Date Aircraft type '& regis tra tion Kind of flying Injuries Time Location Departure point/Destination Record number Time Location Departure point/Des tination Record number
08 Apr Piper 30 VH-DRD Non-commercial-pleasure C1N 02 May Cessna 172 N VH-WXK Non-commercial- business C1 F 1328 Coolangatta, Old. Archerfield, Old./Coolangat ta, Old. 8311021 1832 Narrogin, WA 10S Kalanning, W A/Jandakot, WA 8351015 The aircraft touched down normally, however during the landing roll the landing gear collapsed. Examination has indicated that After d iverting from track because of deteriorating weather, the pilot was unable to locate a suitable landing area. Ena of daylight the nosewheel retract mechanism failed to lock down at the completion of the extension cycle prio r to landing. The gear down was approaching and after being advised of the nearest aerodrome with runway lighting, t he pilot diverted to that aerod rome. The light micro swilch had activated. aircraft was later observed operating at low level in the vicinity of the aerodrome. It was I hen observed to climb slightly from 50 ft agl, turn abrupt ly to the right and impact the ground in a nose down attitude. 08 Apr Piper 25 235/A5 VH-WSM Commercial-aerial agriculture/baiting C1N 0830 Foster, Vic. 12S · Foster, Vic. 12S/Foster, Vic. 12S 8331011 03 May H ughes 269 C VH-CHN Commercial-aerial mustering C1 M, P1M River-Lea Station/Riverside Station 8311027 The strip used for takeoff was located in a large paddock in which a herd of Hereford steers was grazing. Because of a hump in 0920 Comet, Qld. 10NE the strip, the full length was not visible from the takeoff end. As the aircraft passed the hump the pilot saw a steer on the strip Th e helicopter was weaving back and forth driving cattle. Height was about 30 ft and airspeed about 25 kt. The pilo t heard a loud ahead. He continued the lakeoff and at about lift-off the right wing struck the steer. The pilot dumped the load and, after checking bang and believed the engine had fai led. An auto-rotation was carried out into trees. the handling of the aircraft, continued to a safe landing at Latrobe Valley. 05 May Beech 95 C55 VH-FDT Charter-passenger C1 N, P4N 09 Apr Beech 95 B55 VH-FDG Non-commercial-pleasure C1N 1714 Beermullah, WA Geraldton, WA/Perth, WA 835101 6 1250 Maitland, NSW Bankstown, NSW/Maitland, NSW 8321036 Whilst cruising at 7500 ft, the pilot became aware of a fire behind the throttle quadrant. An immediate descent was commenced The pilot stated that he selected the landing gear down during the pre-landing checks and obtained a down and locked indication. and attempts by passengers to ext inguish the fire were unsuccessful. A ft er landing the occupants evacuated the aircraft and However, the aircraft contacted the runway with the landing gear retracted. • were again unsuccessful in ex linguishing the fire . 09 Apr Beech 58 VH-EZB Charter- passenger C1 N, P5N 07 May Cessna 210 L VH-BEV Non-commercial- pleasure C1N,P1N 1330 Wyndham, WA Kununurra, WA/Wyndham, WA 8351013 1500 Tumut, NSW Tumut, NSW/Tumut, NSW 8321 039 Attempts to lower the undercarriage by both the normal and emergency systems were unsuccessful. The undercarriage was Aircraft was landed w ith t he undercarriage retracted. observed to be partially down and could not be raised. On landing the undercarriage collapsed. 08 May Cessna 150 G VH-RZS No n-commercial - pleasure C1F 10 Apr Romainian IS-28B2 VH-CQD Non-commercial-pleas ure C1N, P1N 0730 Du nedoo, NSW 4E " Curragundi" Slrip/"Tooraweenah" Strip 8321 040 0956 Bathurst, NSW 7NW Bathurst, NSW 7NW/Bathurst, NSW 7NW 8321035 After becoming ai rborne the aircraft struck two trees situated 155 m beyond the deparlure end of the strip. Th e aircraft impacted Just after takeoff the engine cowl on the tug aircraft opened. At 100 ft agl the tug pilot signalled the g lider pilot to release the tow. the ground in a nose down attitude 70 m past the trees. The tug pilot reduced airspeed and landed the tug without further incident. The glider was turned to the right for a landing in an adjacent paddock. The glider touched down heavily, short of the paddock boundary, bounced and struck the fence with t he left Commercial-assoc. agricultu re/bailing C1N wing. The glider came to a stop after a ground loop. 10 May Hughes 269 C VH-ARG 0630 Canungra, Qld. Coolangatta, Qtd./Canungra, Qld. 8311029 The pilo t landed the helicopter on an earthen dam wal l. Wh ile the main rotor was wind ing down the landing skid heels sank into 11 Apr Cessna 310 R VH-DVN Charter-passenger C1 M, P3M, P1 N the wall which had been softened by recent rain. The tail rotor contacted the water of the dam resulting in damage to t he tail rotor, 1235 Canberra, ACT Canberra, ACT/Cudal, NSW 8321037 tail rotor gearbox and d rive shaft. Moderate rain was falling at the time of the occurrence. The takeoff run was commenced bu t at a reported speed o f 80 kt the pilot considered that the aircraft was not accelerating and he decided to abort the takeoff. The aircraft overran the runway, became Non-com mere ial- pleasure C1 N airborne for 120 m in order lo clear a ditch, then collided with the airport boundary fence before stopping o n a road. 10 May Cessna 182 Q VH -MJZ 1830 Hamilton Downs, Qld . Corella Park, Qld./Ham ilton Downs , Qld. 8311 028 The pi lot, who did not ho ld an ins trument rating, arrived at his destinat ion shortly after last light. An approach was made to the 14 Apr Partenavia P68 B VH-IYL Charter-passenger C1M,.P5N unlit slrip, but on to uchdown the aircraft was not aligned with the st rip direction. Corrective aclion including t he application of 1312 Mary Kathleen, Old. Longreach, Qld./Mary Kathleen, Qld. 8311023 full power was unsuccessf ul, the nosegear collapsed and the aircraft overt urned. After touchdown the pilot applied light braking, but when he realised the aircraft would not stop before t he end of the st rip he applied heavy braking. The aircraft overran the strip and continued for a further 50 m before coming to rest. 10 May Piper 32 Rt300 VH-RH F Non-commercial - pleasure C1F, P5F 1231 Port Moresby 30N Port Moresby, PNG/Madang, PNG 8391001 18 Apr Piper 28 R180 VH-CHI Instructional-solo-supervised C1N,01N The pilot intended to depart al 0800 hours, but due to equipment unserviceabilities departure was delayed for 4 hours. Weather 1642 Cessnock, NSW Sydney, NSW/Cessnock, NSW 8321038 conditions on the planned track were reported to be adverse, and the pilot advised that he would track via an alternative route. No The pilot of the first aircraft was returning from a solo navex. He cancelled SARWATCH and reported entering the circuit on further communications were received from lhe aircraft, and after a search lasting 6 days the wreckage was located in a blind downwind. The pilot of the second aircraft was carrying o ut solo circuit practice; he heard the first pilot cancel SARWATCH but valley at an altit ude of 7900 ft. not the downwind report. The first aircraft completed a normal circuit and as it touched down the second aircraft, having completed a glide approach, landed on top of the first. They continued for 140 m before coming to rest. 17 May Cessna 182 P VH-THC Non-commercial- pleasure C1 N, P1N 1211 Arapunya Sln., NT Alice Springs, NT/Arapunyah, NT 8341015 21 Apr Mooney M20 J VH-MOP Non-commercial- pleasure C1N, P1N The landing was made on a short st rip in gusty conditions. During the flare the aircraft dropped heavily to the ground and 0821 Alice Springs, NT Alice Springs, NT/Leigh Creek, NT 8341013 bounced. The second touchdown was on the nosewheel, which broke off. Th is led to a third touchdown during which the When taxiing for takeoff, the aircraft nosewheel ran over a taxiway centre light and the nosegear collapsed. nosewheel strut dug in and the ai rcraft s tood on its nose and right winglip before settling back on the main wheels and nose.
Commercial- power/pipe line patrol C1N, P2 N 22 Apr Piper 28 235 VH-EVL Non-commercial - pleasure C1 N 17 May Hiller UH12-E VH-AGL Hoxton Park, NSW/Hox ton Park, NSW 8321 041 1745 American RVR, SA American RVR, SA/American RVR, SA 8341014 1456 Sydney, NSW 11SW • Whilst on cruise al 1000 f t agl, the aircraft experienced a sudden loss of height. T he pilot carried out an auto rotative landing on The pilot landed long on his property strip to avoid some sheep grazing on the approach end o f the strip. During the landing roll the starboard main landing gear was torn off when it struck a sheep. The starboard wingtip contacted the ground and the aircraft river mud f lats. During the landing the tai l rotor struck the water. slewed to rest. 18 May Partenavia P68-C VH-AJX Non-com mercial- corporate/execut ive C1N, P6N Mt. Magnet, WA 8NW Perth, WA/Blackcat Mine, WA 8351 017 23 Apr Beech A36 VH-DAJ Non-commercial-pleasure C1 F, P4F • 1110 0927 Mt. William, Vic. Moorabbin, Vic./Sydney, NSW 8331012 The pilot established the aircraft on final w ith full f lap at 90 kt. Just before commencing the landing flare the pilot observed the airspeed drop to 70 k l and a high sink rate developed. The main wheels s truck a windrow before the strip threshold and the right The pilot submitted a VFR flight plan indicating that the first leg, Moorabbin/Mangalore, wo uld be OCTA below 5000 ft. Some 24 main gear was torn o ff. The aircraft continued down the strip and the left main gear collapsed before the aircraft came to a halt. minutes ater departure the pilot reported poor weather in the Kilmore Gap area and advised he would return to Moorabbin. He also reported unsure of position and requested a bearing. Attempts to assist the pilot were unsuccessful and the ai rcra ft struck the cloud-covered slopes o f Mt. William at about 2000 ft amst. Fire broke out on impact. 23 May Mitsu MU2B-60 VH -MLU Charter- cargo C1F 0459 Bargo, NSW 2E Sydney, NSW/Melbourne, Vic . 8321042 26 Apr Cessna 182-R VH-PJV Non-commercial- pleasure C1 N The aircraft was c leared· via a Standard Instrument Departure with an unrestr,icted climb to FL220. The aircraft c limbed on track at 1740 Glenmore Sin., Old. Vanrook Station, Qld./Charlers Towers, Qld. 831 1026 an average rate of 1300 ft/min until FL 130. The rate-of-c limb then reduced to 350 ft/min until FL 140, when the rate-of-climb increased to 1800 f t/min. At FL 160 the aircraft entered a near vertical descent and radar conlact was lost one m inute later at 3100 The pilot made a precautionary landing on a road because of deteriorating weather. During the landing roll the starboard wing was damaged when it struck a sapling o n the edge o f the road. ft. The aircraft impacted the ground in a near-vertical attitude. ii I Aviation Safety Digest 118 A viation Safety Digest 118 I iii PRELIMINARY REPORTS (The following accidents are still under investigation) PRELIMINARY REPORTS (The following accidents are stil l under investigation) Date Aircraft type & registration Kind of flying Injuries Date Aircraft type & registration Kind of flying Injuries Time Location Departure point/Destination Record number Time Location Departure point/Destination Record number
26 May De Hav C2 VH-IDU Commercial-aerial agriculture/baiting C1N 12 Jun Cessna P206 D VH-DPU Non-commercial-pleasure C1M, P1M 1121 Gembrook, Vic. 5E Gembrook, Vic./Gembrook, Vic. 8331014 0715 Mt. Isa, Old. Mt. Isa, Old./Sweers Island, Old. 83 11036 During spreading operations, the engine suddenly lost power due to mechanical failure. The pilot carried o ut a successful forced The pilot was unable to start the engine wil h lhe starter. He set the park brake, explained to his passenger the' fool brake landing up a steep slope, the only clear area within range. The aircraft came to rest on the slope then began to slide backwards, operation, and briefed her to slightly open the throttle if the engine looked like s topping after lie had it start ed by hand-swinging with wheels locked, on the wet grass surface. The pilot released one brake and turned the ai rcraft across the slope but it the propeller. As the engine s tarted the ai rcraf t moved forward. The passenger inadvertently fully opened the throttle, the aircraft continued to slide until it struck a ridge, and the left main gear was torn off. collided with a fence and hangar door before coming to rest embedded in the side of the hangar. 02 Jun Bell 206 B VH-AJI Commercial- construction (rotorcraft) C1M 1607 Mt. Perisher, NSW Perisher Valley, NSW/Perisher Valley, NSW 8321044 12 Jun Ex permtl Aero VH-FMK Non-commercial-pleasure C1N 1600 Wedderburn, NSW Bankslown, NSW/Wedderburn, NSW 8321048 The pilot landed the aircraft on snow-covered ground to allow lhe external load to be released manually, as the normal release system would not function. After the system was rectified and the load reconnected, the back of the left skid settled in the snow. The pi lot misjudged the al titude on final approach and, before he initiated the land flare, the aircraft struck the ground heavily. The pilot attempted to correct the situation but the main rotor struck the ground and the aircraft rolled over. The landing gear collapsed and the aircraft slid to a stop on the strip.
04 Jun Beech A23 A VH-DEX Non-commercial-business C1M, P1M 15 Jun Piper 31 350 VH-DVX Charter- passenger C1S, P1F, P2S 1115 "Nimmie Stn.", NSW " Nimmie Sin.", NSW/"Nimmie Sln.", NSW 8321045 11 40 Moomba, SA 9E Moomba, SA/Du llingari, SA 8341020 Immediately after becoming airborne the pilot turned the aircraft to the right. At 250 ft agl the flaps were retracted and the aircraft J Shortly after takeoff, at about 500 ft agl, both engines began to loose power. As the airspeed decayed the pilo t was unable to rolled right and the nose dropped. The pilot applied full left rudder and aileron and pushed the control column forward. The maintain straight and level flight, and inilialed a descending right turn. A t about this lime lhe right engine fai led completely. The aircraft struck the ground with the wings level and bounced 28 m before coming lo rest. l ai rcraft then impacted with the ground at a relatively slow speed and caught fire after a groundslide. 05 Jun Cessna 182 P VH-IRL Non-commercial-pleasure C1N, P1N 17 Jun Cessna 404 VH-ARO Scheduled passenger service- commute C1N , P10N 1125 Brunette Downs, NT Tennant Creek, NT/Brunette Downs, NT 8341016 1620 Coolangalta, Old. Lismore, NSW/Coolangatla, Old. 8311037 After crossing the threshold at 75 kt power was reduced to idle and a landing flare commenced al about 25 ft agl. The ai rcraft On approach the undercarriage down indications were normal. H owever, when the nosewheel was lowered after touchdown, the floated for some distance before the nosewheel contacted the ground heavily 400 m from the threshold. A bounce ensued nosewheel leg collapsed and the nose section impacted the runway. followed by a further heavy touchdown on the nosewheel which then collapsed and was torn off as the aircraft slid on its nose for 98 m. 17 Jun Cessna 310 0 VH-RIX Charter-cargo C1N 0735 Exeter, NSW Sydney, NSW/Canberra, ACT 8321 050 05 Jun Bell 47 J2A VH-DMR Commercial-aerial mustering C1M, P1M The pilo t was unable to proceed to his planned destination because of fog at that aerodrome and had diverted to another that he 1324 Dagworth Stn., Old. Galloway Stockyard/Galloway Stockyard 8311 032 believed was suitable. Whilst on a descent below lowest safe altitude in cloud, the top of the fin and rudder of the aircraft struck Whilst cattle mustering al approximately 100 ft agl the pilot heard a loud metallic no ise. Au lo-rotation was commenced but during lhe lower two cables of an array of eight power cables. The approximate heighl of the cables struck was 23 ft agl. the final stages of the approach the tail rotor struck a tree. The right skid then struck an anthill and the aircraft rolled over throwing the seat containing the pilot clear. After the passenger freed himself from the wreckage, fire broke out and the aircraft 18 Jun Beech A36 VH-BFB Instructional- dual C2N, P1N was destroyed. 1204 Coifs Harbour, NSW Coifs Harbour, NSW/Coffs Harbour, NSW 8321049 The student was undergoing instruction for his initial check on a retractable undercarriage type. During the circuit training, 06 Jun Piper 25 235 VH -CPU Commercial-aerial agriculture/baiting C1N touch-and-go landings were carried out, with the instructor calling he had identified the flap lever an d selecting it up. Alter the 1400 Naracoorte, SA 15S Bool Lagoon,SA/Bool Lagoon, SA 8341017 second landing lhe instructor called and selected the flap up. However, the student attempted to select flaps up but inadvertent ly The agricultural strip used for this operation was situated on the top of a ridge and contained three bends in it s 395 m length. The selected the undercarriage up and the aircraft settled on the runway. average width of the strip was 8 m, the sides then falling away at an average angle of 25 degrees. After a takeoff run of 225 m the aircraft left the strip at the second bend, continued down the steep slope and became airborne just before colliding with trees. 20 Jun Bell 47 G5A VH-AAW Ferry C1F 0715 Normanton, Old. 59S Mogoura Sin., Old./Washpool Camp, Old. 8311038 06 Jun Hiller UH12-E VH-MKZ Commercial-aerial agriculture/baiting C1N The helicopter was cruising at approximately 200 ft agl. An observer saw an object fly horizontally from the helicopter. The 0930 Tingoora, Old. Tingoora, Old./Tingoora, Old. 8311034 helicopter then turned th rough 90 degrees to the left, rolled to the left and spun through 360 degrees before impacting the ground On the completion of each spray run the pilot was flying under power lines. On this particular run the pi lot diverted the aircraft inverted. The helicopter exploded on impact. slightly to avoid a vehicle. The main rotor blades struck the power lines. 20 Jun Embraer 110 P2 VH-MWW Inst ruclional- check C3N 07 Jun Piper 28 R180 VH-PFB Non-commercial - pleasure C1N, P3N 1255 Sydney, NSW Sydney, NSW/Bathurst, NSW 8321051 1255 Cessnock, NSW 4E Warnervale, NSW/Moree, NSW 8321046 Just after takeoff the top right engine cowl separated from ils mountings and struck the right horizontal stabiliser. The cowl While the aircraft was cruising at 2000 ft amsl below an overcast at 2500 ft amsl, a large bird struck the outer leading edge of the remained attached to the stabiliser causing severe buffeting and a s ubstantial loss of pitch control. The aircraft was landed left wing. immediately on a c ross runway.
08 Jun Piper 28-1 61 VH-AAS Instructional-solo- supervised C1N 26 Jun Cessna 182 P VH-PKM Non-commercial -pleasure C1N, P3N 1630 Alice Springs, NT Alice Springs, NT/Alice Springs, NT 834101 8 1545 Flinders Is., Tas. Flinders Is., Tas./Flinders Is., Tas. 8331016 The student pilot carried out two dual, left-hand circuits before being sent solo again. On the first solo circuit of the consolidation The pilot was conducting practice c ircuits. On the fourth landing the aircraft bounced twice. The pilot at tempted to go around, a right-hand pattern and an extended downwind leg were required by the controller, due to other traffic. On final approach the but the engine did not respond before the aircraft again contacted the ground. The nosewheel was dislodged and the nosegear aircraft was above the normal path and on level-off the aircraft ballooned. On touchdown the aircraft bounced and then touched leg was torn off during the ensuing slide. down nosewheel first. The nose strut broke off and the aircraft slid to a halt. 27 Jun Cessna 182 G VH-D FO Non-commercial- pleasure C1N 09 Jun Piper 28 235 VH-BUJ Non-commercial-pleasure C1N, P1N 1608 Coolangatta, Old. 4N Redcliffe, Old./Lismore, NSW 15E 831 1039 0945 Bathurst,, NSW Bankstown, NSW/Bathurst, NSW 8321047 Whilst cruising at 1500 ft amsl the engine began to run roughly and backfire. The pi lot was unable to recti fy the problem and shut While the aircraft was taxiing along a road after landing, its left wing struck a fence post. The aircraft tu rned to the left and the the engine down. A forced landing was carried out on a beach and after landing the pilot found a fire in the engine compartment. propeller also struck the fence. J He was unable to extinguish the fire until the arrival of a fire tender from a nearby airport.
09 Jun Cessna A188B A1 VH-EJU Commercial- assoc. agriculture/baiting C1N 30 Jun Cessna 180 D VH-WFZ Non-commercial-practice C1N 1700 Hyden, WA 13NW Hyden, WA 15NW/Hyden, WA SNEE 8351018 ) 1635 Bundaberg, Old. Bundaberg, Qld./Bundaberg, Old. 3311040 Shortly after takeoff the pilot noticed that there was no indication of airspeed. The pi lot pushed the control column forward and The pilot had recently purchased the aircraft and had then completed a period of d ual instruction to re-fam iliarise himself w ith the aircraft collided with the ground causing the right main gear to detach and strike the right tailplane. The aircraft bounced back tail wheel aircraft. To consolidate this instruction the pilot was to carry out a period of solo circuits. On the first landing, just aft er into the air and climbed steeply before the pilot was able to lower the nose by a combination o f forward control column and touchdown, the aircraft veered to the right and the left wing an d elevator struck the ground. The aircraft came to rest on the reduced power. The aircraft crashed 200 m farther on from the initial impact point. runway, heading 90 degrees from the land ing direction.
11 Jun Cessna 172 N VH-TEU Non-commercial-pleasure C1M, P2N 30 Jun Cessna A188 A2 VH-KVA Non-commercial-agriculture/survey C1 N 1017 lnjune, Old. 70NW Archerfield, Old./Bandana, Old. 8311 035 1415 Perth, WA 275NNE Goodlands Farm, WA/Goodlands Farm, W A 8351019 The pilot became unsure of her position and decided to land in a paddock near a homestead to confirm the location. The paddock The landing was made on a private strip in strong gusty crosswind conditions. About 150 m after touchdown lhe aircraft swung to was 270 m long and studded with a number of large trees. The aircraft touched down well into the paddock and the right w ing the right and ran off the s ide of the strip on to newly cultivated soil. The left main wheel was torn off and the propeller bent. struck a tree and was torn off. The left wing then struck another tree and the aircraft turned to the left and rolled inverted before ~o ming to rest. iv I Aviation Safety Digest 118 Aviation Safety Digest 118 I v FINAL REPORTS (The investigation of the following accidents has been completed) FINAL UPDATES (The investigation of the fol lowing accidents has been completed. The information is Date Kind of flying Injuries additional to that previously printed in the preliminary report) Time Aircraft type & registration Departure/Destination Recorded Date Record number Pilot licence Location Age Hours Total Hours on Type Ra ting number Pilot licence Age Hours Iota! Hours on type Rating 02 Apr Beech C23 VH-SHP Non-commercial-pleasure C1 N 02 Jan 8321001 1034 Jandakot, WA Quairading, WA/Jandakot, WA 8351012 Private restricted 21 64 11 None Private 41 135 4 None The pilot did not initiate a go-around. On the first landing attempt the aircraft was flared too high and settled heavily on to the runway. The pilot carried out a go-around. On the second approach the pilot again flared too high resulting in a heavy bounced landing, during which the nosewheel struck 04 Jan 8311002 the runway with sufficient force to collapse the nose strut. Private 40 415 300 Instrument Rating Class 4 The pilot, who was inexperienced in judging local conditions and effects, had underestimated the wind strength. The downwind 14 Apr Cessna 172-P VH-JRC Non-commercial- aerial mustering C1 N component for landing was 10 to 15 kt. Although the aircraft floated well beyond the target touchdown point the pilot did not 0820 Cue, WA 111W Meka Station, WA/Meka Station, WA 8351014 initiate a go-around. Private 20 228 177 None Whilst sheep spotting at 500 ft agl, the pilot turned the aircraft in an attempt to keep the sheep in sight. He progressively 07 Jan 8311 003 tightened the turn until the aircraft was in a steep turn with a nose-low attitude. The pilot attempted to recover from the I urn but Commercial helicop. 29 3860 2640 None the aircraft struck the ground. • Fuel lines to two cylinders were found abraded by their c lamps and one line was fractured. The pilot was operating just above the The investigation established that the aircraft was stalled while in a steep turn in close proximity to the ground. trees and he was unable to manoeuvre for a successful landing due to the lack of engine power.
16 Apr Hiller UH12-E VH-FXX Commercial-aerial mustering C1N, P1S 07 Jan 8321005 1120 Byerwen Sin., 13S Byerwen Stn., Qld./Byerwen St n., Qld. 8311024 • Pri vate restricted 20 236 190 None Commercial Hel icopter 47 3500 2000 None There was ample space to land on either side of the next glider to be towed. By making a maximum performance landing in the The helicopter was climbing to about 20 ft agl and entered a hover under overhanging branches o f a tall eucalyptus tree. There short distance behind the flider, the pilot gave himself little room to manoeuvre, to correct for the disturbance caused by the was a loud bang and the helicopter began to vibrate and rotate to the right. The pi lot was unable to regain control and the willy-w illy. helicopter landed heavily in a nose-down attitude. A witness reported seeing a large dead branch fall from the tree into the main rotor system. 17 Jan 8351002 Glider 35 933 250 Glider Rating ' C1N 30 Apr Airparts 24 950 VH-KSF Commercial-aerial ag riculture/baiting Following !he low pass, the glider was too slow to make a normal circuit. A irspeed was further reduced as the pilot attempted to 8331013 1230 Dysart, Tas. Dysart, Tas./Dysart, Tas. manoeuvre for a landing on one of the s trips. There were c lear paddocks, suitable for landing, adjacent to the aerodrome but the Commercial 50 20 OOO 7000 Agric. Class 1 rules required that the landing be on a s trip for the record attempt to be valid. On climbout to the spreading area on the second flight of the day the pilot saw power lines ahead. He attempted t o fly below them, but the aircraft struck the lines and dropped to the ground coming to rest on its wheels in a turnip field. 23 Jan 8331002 Although the pilot had operated from the strip many limes over nine years, he was unaware of the power lines. He did not see Commercial 26 1800 80 Instrument Rating 1 st or Class 1 and the lines during an aerial inspection or on the first spreading flight. The lines were strung across a valley between a pole hidden Flight Instructor by trees at the top of a ridge and a pole lower down on the other side. The span was 900 m and light conditions were dull. 29 Jan 8341 002 29 May Beech E33 VH-BZQ Non-commercial-pleasure C1 N, P2N Private restricted 30 400 80 None 1530 Hebel, Qld. Hebel, Qld./Mungindi, Qld. 831 1030 Examination of the engine found no reason for the reported rough running. Private 37 500 330 None The pilot intended using one stage of flap and rotating at 60 kl due to the soft condition o f the strip. The gear was retracted just 09 Feb 8311008 after the aircraft became airborne and the aircraft sank back to the ground. Commercial 58 3000 2700 Instrument Rating Class 4 The gear was retracted prior to a positive rate-of-climb being established and at a speed such that the changes in trim and drag The low performance detected by the pilot was caused by poor seating of an exhaust valve and the associated reduced power had a marked effect on aircraft performance. output.
01 Jun Hughes 269 C VH-CHV Ferry C1 N 10 Feb 8311009 1720 Highbury O.S., Qld. Drumduff Outstation/Highbury O.S., Qld. 831 1031 Private 60 1500 600 None Commercial Helicopter 26 763 763 Inst. Rat. Class 4 Investigation failed to reveal evidence o f an engine material failure. Atmospheric conditions at the time were conducive to The pilo t was positioning the helicopter for a periodic check on the following day. During his approach he saw the toolboxes to be carburettor icing, and the aircraft flew close to operating watersprinklers on the strip during the low pass. used, and decided to land near them. A dusty area was en countered so the pilot moved towards a grassed area. The main rotor struck a branch and the pilot instinctively acted to move the helicopter away from the tree, but this caused the rotor to move up 14 Feb 8311011 and strike a large branch. Private restricted 34 73 6 None In attempting to ease his engineer's workload the pilot had positioned the helicopter under tree branches and he had fai led to 21 Feb 831 1014 no tice one large branch protruding from the main foliage. Private 35 650 Unknown None 06 Jun Cessna R182 VH-TMJ Non-commercial- business C1 N, P3N 06 Mar 8331005 1650 Toowoomba, Qld. Thallon, Qld./Toowoomba, Qld. 8311033 Private 24 306 84 Instrument Rating Class 4 Private 41 250 24 None On landing the aircraft bounced and the nosewheel tyre deflated. As the pilot was turning the aircraft off the runway the 10 Mar 831 1018 nosewheel strut entered soft ground and collapsed. Private 66 3326 2594 None The pilo t had misjudged hi s landing flare, probably because sunglare had restri cted his forward visibility. The wi nd at the time was light, and a runway not affected by sunglare was available for landing.
21 Jun Beech 36 VH-FWL Instructional-solo -supervised C1 N 1203 Moorabbin, Vic. Moorabbin, Vic./Moorabbin, Vi c 833101 5 Commercial 19 272 1 Instrument Rating Class 4 and Flight Instructor The pilot decided to practi se some touch-and-go landings because he had not flown an aircraft for some considerable lime. During the landing roll of the second touch-an d-go the pi lot inadvertently selected gear up instead of flap up. The aircraft stopped after sliding 70 m on the partially retracted landing gear. Subsequent examination established that both the landing gear squat switch and landing gear unsafe warning horn were serviceable. It is probable that there was insuffic ient weigh t on the landing gear to operate the squat switc h.
vi I Aviation Safety Digest 118 Aviation Safety Digest 118 I vii ~et George do it - but watth him !
A commercial D C-10 departed Frankfurt at about 2200 The flight data recorder indicated that the' aircraft's hours local time on an IFR flight plan to Miami. There airspeed continued to decrease during the climb. The were 295 passenger s, three crewmembers and 13 fl ight stall speed of the D C-10 for its climb weight was attendants on board. Ground operations, take-off and determined to be 203 knots and the buffet onset speed the ini tial portion or the en route cl imb were was apprnximately 234 knots. According to the flight u neventful. Air T raffic Control cleared the trijet to recorder, the aircraft was operated below 234 knots for cl im b at 283 knots, the appropriate speed for the heavy over 40 seconds while climbing above 26 OOO feet. For weight of the aircraft. The captain controlled the half of this period, the airspeed was below 203 knots. aircraft manually to 10 OOO feet. According to the crew, The minimum speed recorded during this portion of the after reaching 10 OOO feet the autopilot (AP) was climb was 176 knots, well below the stall speed. The engaged in the ind icated airspeed (IAS) hold mode and National Transpo1·tation Safety Board (NTSB) the autothrottle system (AT S) speed selector was set at concluded that the DC-10 entered a full aerodynamic 320 knots. Climbing through 14 OOO feet the autopilot stall. disengaged, and was quickly re-engaged by the pilot. Why would an experienced, professional flightcrew A few m inutes later, while climbing through 27 500 unknowingly allow a DC-10 aircraft to fly into a full feet about 100 miles west of the departure airport, the aerodynamic stall? Evidence clearly indicates the D C-10 started to vibrate slightly which, within seconds, aircraft was maintaining a constant vertical speed increased in in tensity. The crew suspected an abnormal (1200 feet per minute) during the period immediately vib ration in n u mber th ree engine, elected to reduce preceding the stall, and thrust from all three engines power and then to shut it down. As soon as they was at an autothrottle limiting value for several minutes red uced power on n umber three engine, the autopilot during which pitch attitude increased and airspeed d isengaged, the aircraft rolled first right, then left, and decreased. Here the D C -lO's autopilot system was then the nose sudden ly pitched down and they started commanding aircraft pitch attitude and the autoth.rottle to lose altitude r ap idly. system was controlling thrust during the climb. T he As the aircraft's nose continued to drop, the captain aircrew had mistakenly placed the autopilot system in a deployed the spoilers to arrest the impending overspeed vertical speed mode rather than an airspeed or Mach condition created by the aircraft's nose-low attitude. command mode. This was contrary to both the airline's The Dight recorder readout showed the recovery normal procedures and the manufacturer's prescribed starting at 23 900 feet with vertical acceleration normal operating procedures and recommendations. reaching a maximum of 1.68g during the recovery. The From the time the pilot re-engaged the autopilot, up crew regained full con trol of the aircraft at about to the point the aircraft stalled at 28 800 feet, the 18 OOO feet. D C -10 was in this vertical speed mode. Meanwhile, Shortly after recovering control of the DC-10, the airspeed was bleeding off and the aircrew were not cr ew restarted number three engine and it appeared to aware of it. The autopilot was commanding an fu nction normally. T hey had requested a diversion to increasing pitch attitude necessary to achieve the Madrid, but since all systems appeared normal, the selected vertical speed, 1·egardless of the aircraft's crew elected to continue to Miami as if nothing had airspeed or pitch attitude (which increased to 14 degrees happened. T he fl ight landed at Miami at 0105 local nose up). Add the DC- lO's stickshaker alert (which time. investigators determined was indeed activated) to the After shutting down , the captain asked maintenance situation and you have m ultiple warnings available to personnel to visually check the aircraft's exterior. alert an aircrew of an impending stall. Maintenance found that the 4 feet of each outboard The Safety Board concluded that the crew's attention elevator ti p and the aircraft's tail-area-lower-access door must have been diverted from the control of the aircraft were missing. The DC-10 was grounded at Miami and from instrument scan soon after re-engaging the where it un derwent a thorough examination . All autopilot at 14 OOO feet. Believing that the autopilot was systems that could have induced the condition effectively maintaining a satisfactory climb attitude and experienced by the crew during the incident were speed, they were probably quite surprised at the onset fu nctionally checked. These included the flight control of sudden vibrations, buffeting, and activation of the systems, the autothrottle system, the night control column 'stickshaker' . They consequently d irector/autopilot and the number three engine. No misinte1·preted the cues as an engine problem. When malfunctions were found. they retarded the number three engine throttle, the resultant decrease in total thrust along with the thrust Analysis asymmetry only aggravated the aircraft's entry into a full stall. The aircraft's fl ight control systems and power plants operated norma ll y both before and after the incident. Probable cause T here was no evidence that any malfunction of the aircraft systems had occurred. The structural damage, The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this which was lim ited to the empennage and aft fuselage, occurrence was the failure of the flight crew to follow was attributed to th e application of high loads caused standard climb procedures and to adequately monitor by the stall buffet. No indication of pre-existing fatigue the aircraft's flight instruments. Their inattention cracking was discovered. (continued on page 15) viii I Aviation Safety Digest 718 Aviation Safety Digest 118 I 13 Let George do it - but watch him! (continued from page 13) Bird proofing Birds build ing nests in the various nooks and crannies resulted in the jetliner entering a prolonged' stall buffet of aircraft remain a persistent problem. While the which placed the aircraft outside the design envelope. parked accompanying photogr aphs of a prospective tenant A lthough the crew failed to recognise the approach checking o ut its new home may appear amusing, the and entry to the stall they did, after approximately 1 aircraft pilot who finds his controls jammed inflight is anything minute, recognise the aircraft's stalled condition. They b u t amused (sec Avialion Safety Digest 107, page 28). also responded with proper control inputs to recover the Obviously, it is impossible to block off all available aircraft. A full minute for stall recognition is excessive, nesting sites, bu t the Latrobe Valley Aero Club, for however, and at a lower altitude it could have very well one, has taken a positive measure to deny birds entry to caused the destruction of the aircraft and the deaths of the engine area - one of the most popular places for hundreds of passengers. nests. This consists of using blanks which fit in to the The Safety Board also believed either a visual or engine cooling openings in the engine cowls. Details of aural warning device for the DC-10 would have aided the blanks are as follows: the crew's stall recognition problem and might have • made from low-density polyurethane foam prevented the material damage to the aircraft by • cut out with the aid of a template and an electric causing the crew to react faster. carving knife In this mishap the crew flew a transoceanic crossing • red ribbons attached as warning flags. to their destination after the occurrence. T he violent The blanks can be inserted after allowing a few and unexpected nature of the stall and recovery m inutes fo r the engine to cool and are especially useful manoeuvre and the crew's lack of understanding as to during the spring and early summer when starlings are why it happened should have been sufficient reason to nesting. T he use of such blanks or covers would never, get the plane on the ground as quickly as possible. of course, obviate the need fo r a detailed visual check of Normal caution should have dictated this action. possible nesting sites • In this case, ' letting George do it' would have been fine if someone had taken a more active interest in what 'George' was doing • Adapted from The M ac Flyer - Going••. * * * Operations from dirt airstrips
A brief item on page 18 of Aviation Safety Digest 11 6 mentioned the danger of mud collecting in aircraft wheel fairings. The item outlined the case of a PA28 which had been operating from a dirt airstrip and which, d uring a wheel and brake inspection, was found to have nearly 10 kilograms of dirt caked inside each fairing. Clearly, this constituted a possible impediment to wheel rotation and braking. Since that item was written, a Jodel fitted with spats and operating from a wet, black soil strip nosed over on takeoff. The spats had filled with mud during the takeoff roll and prevented wheel rotation. While damage was minor, the incident could have had far more serious consequences. Had the aircraft become airborne just before the spats filled, the black soil may well have solidified during flight, setting up the aircraft for an immediate noseover on landing, with all its attendant dangers fo r the pilot. As the item in Digest 116 suggested, for sustained soft-fi eld operations, temporary removal of wheel fairings should be considered. If this is done, engineering regulations, and the effect of removing the fairings on weight and balance, must be taken into account. If removal of the fairings is impractical, then a thorough visual inspection should be completed before (Tha11ks to the L atrobe Valley Aero Club for this contribution.) each flight •
Aviation Safety Digest 118 I 15 Use your P-charts There was no flight manual in the aircraft so the pilot 'eyeballed' the length of the strip aud decided it was adequate ...
. . . takeoff weight exceeded the climb weight limit stipulated in the P-charts ...
. .. the pilot did not use his P-charts correctly ...
A Cessna 210 was substantially damaged when it ran Accidents which arc attributable to a pilot's fa ilure to o ff the end of a land ing area and down a gully. use performance charts are an unfortunately persistent Although the land ing area was 600 metres long, its feature of Australian General Aviation. Of these effecti ve length for takeoff and landing was reduced to accidents, those related lo inadequate takeoff or landing 450 metres because o f the infringement of trees on the distances are the most p1·evalent. approach /departure paths. Fmther, the area sloped down in the d irection the pilot landed at an average ... this ALA was too short for the gradient of m inus 2 per cent. T he pilot later recalled P-charts particular aircraft to use for takeoff . that he had used an approach speed of about 85 knots, Basically there are three publications to which a pilot and thought that he crossed the threshold 10- 15 feet may refer to obtain performance information for his high at about 75 knots . aircraft. T hese are: The landing distance actually required was • the owner's manual subsequently calculated from the aircraft's flight manual • the pilot's operating handbook using the following info rmation: • the flight manual issued and approved by the aircraft landin g weight 1446 kg Department of Aviation airfield pressure height 600 feet The owner's manual and pilot's operating handbook temperature 33°C are produced by the aircraft manufacturer and include strip gradient minus 2 per cent performance information fc.ll" a range of situations - h eadwind component 7 knots range, endurance, en route power settings etc. They The distan ce req uired under the above conditions also include takeoff and landing data, but it is most was fo und to be 633 metres and the approach speed important to note that this particular information is not 69 knots; that is, the landing distance available was authorised for Australian operations. The only 183 metres shorter than that based on a speed some approved takeoff and landing data a re those in the ... aad this one too short for landing. 6 knots slower than the actual approach speed flown. flight manual issued by the Department of Aviation, H ad the pilot consulted his aircraft's landing chart and it is those landing weight charts and takeoff weight during h is p refl ight plan ning, he would have been charts - generally referred to as P-charts - which aware o f th is, and the accident could have been pilots must consult to determine their aircraft's takeoff avoided. and landing distance/weight limits.
16 I Aviation Safety Digest 118 A viation Safety Digest 118 I 17 OlllC IUUNO. It is a requirement of the Air Navigation Regulations those in flight manuals. In this case the p ilot wishes to S/ Gl /1S that the fiighL manual be carried in the aircraft at all land on a strip 600 metres long. Following the example 1!11!.L THC GftOSJ NCLGHT Ill LANOJ ..G 5Hll ll UGT [);C£CD THE LE!S£11 times. From the information it contains a pilot can through, the pressure height of the strip is 6500 feet , or- uu 1040 1e1 determine the suitability of an aerodrome for the temperalure +5°C, the strip is level and there is zero operation of his aircraft, or the maximum weight at wind; therefore, the maximum landing weight at which which he can operate the aircraft from a given runway the aircraft can be flown in to the strip is 1330 kg. A 01· strip. flap setting of 30 degrees and an approach speed of 800 77 knots IAS are stipulated. LANOINC 750 Note that density height and climb weight limit 10000 OIJHINC( information is also included on this chart. The climb llYAllAIU When to use P·charts HETftE. weight limit is important should a baulked approach be .... ' 700 In the majority of accidents like the one described al H>-""' the start of this article, the basic problem arises when a necessary as, for a given pressure height, it defi nes the 1000 6,0 maximum weight at which the aircraft will achieve the ""' pilot does not check his P-charts and/or does not obtain "uoo ~ 600 stipulated climb gradient of 3.2 per cent at takeoff an accurate measurement of the strip length. ' 550 power, in the landing configuration, and at a speed not .... It is not, of course, necessary to consult the charts exceeding 1.3Vs. In the example, with a pressure L before every llight. Obviously if you are taking off or 5 height or 6500 feet , this maximum allowable weight is " " 10000 l UJ landing on a 3000 metre runway in a light airci-aft there ""' " 1360 kg. t11NOUIC WEICHT ICC.) '""' is no need to check takeoff or landing data charts. But ,..,. where is the dividing line - 700, 1000 or 1500 metres? Takeoff weight charts. Like the landing P-chart, the takeoff chart allows for a 50 foot obstacle clearance and This will be decided by a large numbe1· of variables, "00 and only by reference to the P-charts can the safety - includes a safety factor of from 1.15 to 1.25 (depen'ding or otherwise - of that particular phase of fl ight be on maximum certified takeoff weight). In addition to properly determined. the variables included in the landing chart, the takeoff Any time there is the sl ightest doubt about your chart provided as an example at Figure.2 also makes aircraft's performance capability, the charts must be allowance for the nature of the airstrip's surface. used. You may be concerned by any one of a number Following the example through, the airfield pressure of factors: the length and/or· condition of the runway, a height is 2200 feet and the temperature + 30 °C. The ...., TT high-density altitude, a recognition of your own strip is 600 metres long, its surface is short wet or long limitations or a lack of familiarity with the equipment dry grass, and it is level. With a l 0 knot headwind , the Figure 1 you are flying are just some factors which may create maximum permissible takeoff weight is 1320 kg. Note doubt. In all cases, those doubts can be alleviated by that takeoff power and fl ap setting are stipulated, while refe1·ence to the P -charts. They will give you the a takeoff safety speed o f 75 knots is also defined (this is the speed to which the aircraft m ust be accelerated in CArE AMENO information you need to enable you to p lan your 4-4-7S -- operations to cater fo r the prevailing conditions. For establishing the takeoff d istance required). , .,Ulll'ACr: I I SLOl"I ~... Pf~CENT I example, it may become apparent to you by consulting Note also that a cl imb weight limit is defined (in this • NDT E : I.) "T\IE GROSS WflGMT AT example, 1550 kg). T his is the max imum weight at TAKE - OFF SIULL HaT your P-charts that the load you intend carrying is EXCFEO THE: LESS!R excessive for the conditions, and that either passengers, which, for a given ai rfield density height, and in the OF (A) AND ( a ) . cargo or fuel will have to be off-loaded. Indeed, it may takeoff configuration with the landing gear extended, 2.) SMORT ~y GRASS the aircraft will be able to achieve the stipulated climb 4PPLIU FOR EARTH even become clear - as it has after the event to some Oil ~RA.VCL SURfACfS. pilots - that a strip you would like to use is inadequate gradient of 6 per cent at takeoff safety speed and takeoff regardless of your aircraft's all-up weight. power. The fo llowing sections of this article discuss the use of P-charts in aircraft with a maximum AUW of less than Summary 5700 kg. There are sometimes minor differences The use of P-charls is vital in p refl ight planning. It may between the P-charts issued for different aircraft types, be tempting to 'eyeball' the variables affecting your but those used here remain representative of the fligh t and decide that your aircraft will be able lo give common format. you the performance you need, but the fact is that small changes in operating conditions can o ft en significantly reduce an aircraft's capabili ties. Pilots must be Using the P-charts thoroughl y familiar with the charts applicable to their aircraft, and they must consult them on any occasion Landing weight charts. The key information which TAKE-OFF the sli ghtest doubt exists regarding their aircraft's SAFETY can be obtained frofI1 your aircraft 's landing weight SPHD chart is that of the m aximum landing weight at which capabilities in any given situation. Preflight preparation 77 l
18 I Aviation S afety Digest 7 78 A viation Safety Digest 7 78 I 19 An ill wind
wind velocity 30knots 15knots
Description W ind speed (knotJ) Visual clues Calm 1 C alm ; smoke rises vertically. Light air 1-3 D irection of wind shown by smoke-d ri ft but not by wind vanes. Gentle breeze 7- 10 W ind extends light fl ag; leaves and small twigs in constant motion. Moderate breeze 11-16 Raises d ust and loose paper; small branches are moved. Fresh breeze 17-21 Small trees in leaf begin to sway; crested wavelets form on inland waters. Strong breeze 22- 27 Large branches in motion. Near gale 28-33 Whole trees in motion. G ale 34- 40 Breaks twigs off trees. Note that if it is possible to determine the wind speed, then the direction should be obvious.
T he effect of wind on the landing p erformance of the wind speed. H owever , the pilot was confident that Based on the approach air speed of 80 knots, the situation, then the above table showing how to assess aircraft is one of the first and most fundamental conditions would be sati sfactory as he had spoken by aircraft would have normally achieved a threshold speed wind speed may be of use. T his table is an extract of lessons of flying taught to all pilots. As an telephone to the property manager and another pilot of about 75 knots. In normal circumstances, assuming a information provided to meteorological observers by the individual's exp erience level and skills increase , so earlier in the morning and both had reported the 10 knot headwind, the aircraft's groundspeed just Bureau of Meteorology. too does his or her ability to safely accommodate weather as fin e. befo re touch 20 I Aviation Safety Digest 118 A viation Safety Digest 118 I 21 approach, or that the door might come loose on landing and damage the landing gear. Consequently, I elected Aircraft tyre care ~ea@i to continue to Moorabbin and advised M elbourne of my intentions. Ground-air communication remained Maintaining the correct inflation pressure in an very difficult - as did that inside the aircraft - aircraft tyre is one of the most essential factors in Door open in flight because of the high noise level. . . . obtaining maximum safe service life. Inner' tubes ' I tracked to Moorabbin OCTA, avo1dmg built-up and tubeless tyre liners used in most automotive areas as far as possible. A straight-in landing for tyres are made of butyl rubber. Most aircraft Runway 17C was approved, and 20 degree~ of flap only inner tubes and tubeless tyre liners, on the other was selected to minimise aircraft configuration changes. hand, are made of natural rubber to satisfy The landing was poor because of my nervousness and extreme low temperature performance An article in Aviation Safety Digest 11 5 discussed the 'At this stage I remembered my rear-scat passenger the fact that I did not trim out the drag-induced yaw on requirements. Natural rubber is a poor air difficulties faced by the pilot of an aircraft on which and, looking back over my right shoulder, was reli eved fi nals but rather tried to hold the aircraft in balanced retainer when compared with butyl rubber. This a door came open in flight. He suddenly found to sec that he was still there. I declared a PAN to fl ight' by use of the rudder. Although the landing was accounts for the comparatively high daily air himself operating in a very noisy and disturbing Melbourne Flight Service, advising them that I thought not as smooth as I would have wished, it was safe pressure loss and need for frequent pressure environment, allowed himself to become distracted the left-hand door had completely separntcd from the enough, and I was able to taxi the aircraft to its tie checks of aircraft tyres. from his prime task - that of completing a safe aircraft. Just after this R/T call I noticed that the door down point. Daily inspection of tyres includes checking the landing - and so his problems compounded. was still with us; it was hanging by its restraining strap ' Post-flight inspection revealed that the hinge pin on pressure. This can only be done properly with Subsequent to printing that article, the Digest (which is meant to prevent the door from opening too the upper door hinge had sheared, allowing the leading calibrated gauges. Do not let an improperly received a reader contribution concerning a similar far) and appeared to be resting on the undercarriage leg edge of the door to protr ude into the airflow; the serviced tyre cause an aircraft accident/incident or incident, and from which several valuable lesson s or the wing strut. T he combination of these restraints 140 knot slipstream had then " peeled" the door open. injury to personnel. Ensure that tyre-servicing can be drawn. Of particular interest is the way in and the airloads seemed to be holding the door in place. The restraining scrap stopped the aft movement of the equipment is in good working condition and which the pilot assessed his situation, determined However, I noticed that when I applied rudder to door, while the wing strut stopped it dropping properly calibrated • courses of action open to him and then made his correct the aircraft 's skid , the door began to flap downwards. It was also interesting to note that in its decisions. alarmingly. Needless lo say, I did not persist with final position, the door was acting to " scoop" air into * * * attempts to remove the skid . the cabin. ' I was returning from Condobolin to Moorabbin in a 'The only other thought I have had on this . ? Cessna 182RG with two passengers. The weather occurrence which may be of use to other pilots concerns You were saymg .... fo recast had been satisfactory and I had filed and flown the temperature in the aircraft's cabin. When the door A Flight Engineer Union representative in the a VFR plan without any difliculties. We had passed came off the outside air temperature was plus 20 U .S.A. was appearing before a Presidential Kilmore, planning to track to Moorabbin via Yan degrees Celsius. Had the door come off where the committee enquiring into airline flight crew Yean. C ruise alt it ude was just below 3000 feet , while a aircraft was not in warm, dry air and only 20 minutes complements. After describing the necessity for a 65 per cent power setting of 23 inches manifold from landing, the wind-chill aspects may well have had 'third pair of eyes' in the cockpit, the pressure and 2100 RPM was giving us the advertised an important bearing on the outcome.' representative stood up and walked into a broom lAS of 135-140 knots. The only cloud was high above closet on his way out of the hearing • us, while there was slight to moderate convective turbulence. The wind was steady from the north-west at 10-1 5 knots. ' Immediately before the incident we unexpectedly In brief encountered heavy convecti ve turbulence whi ch resulted A Cessna 172 RG was contracted lo fly two in the Cessna sustaining two or three rapid and very passengers from an international airport to a large hard applications of positive g. These applications were country town. Arrangements at the airpor t did strong enough to make the aircraft's structure creak. At not proceed according to plan, with the result that that time I had my lefr hand on the control wheel and the pilot became distracted and completed his was resting my left elbow on the doo1·-mounted arm preflight inspection in a piecemeal fashion. While rest, while my right hand was on the throttle. Because the engine run-up and takeoff were normal, at of the severity of the turbulence, it was my intention to 400 feet on the climb-out the pilot noticed a high close the throttle and reduce IAS. cylinder head temperature. The pilot then realised 'Suddenly, there was a very loud, sharp noise and a 'The fact that the door was still on the aircraft that he had forgotten to remove the engine covers flood of light poured into the cabin. The cockpit was introduced a new factor as well as those I already had (inserts into the cowl openings) used to prevent scoured by a blast of air and a deafening roar; papers to assess before deciding what to do. Specifically, I was birds from nesting in the aircraft. He turned back and loose clothing started flying about. This was now concerned that if the restraining strap broke the immediately and effected an uneventful recovery. accompanied by the aircraft yawi ng and rolling to the door might fly rearwards and strike the empennage, t- As a sequel to this, the pilot concerned has left. At the same time -1 was startled to notice that there making the aircraft uncontrollable. There was also the since taped the engine covers to the pilot head was nothing between me and the ground - the left possibility that the door could injure someone on the cover to make them more obvious. The incident hand side of the aircraft seemed to have disappeared. ground if it fell away. In an attempt to circumvent both also confirmed the value of a ' M y first thought was that the aircraft had suffered a of these possibilities I removed my leather trousers belt, temperature/pressures check soon after takeoff. structural failure , particularly as it did not immediately passed it through the door handle and knotted it around respond to control inputs (later I concluded that this the aircraft's scat belt attachment. * would* like* to thank this pilot for * * * was probably due to th e effect of the conti nued ' I was now in a position to consider how best to get Aviation Safety Digest Shortly after takeoff, smoke became visible in the turbulence). In an attempt to regain control I closed the the aircraft on to the ground. Whittlesea airstrip was relating his experience for the benefit of other readers. cockpit of a Cessna 206. The smoke disappeared Reader contributions are generally well received by throttle, extended the landing gear and slowed to 90 the closest available; however, I was not familiar with while the aircraft was returning to base. The those who read the most of us can relate to knots. Having established control I started a descent, the airfield, and did not know the radio frequency for Digest - engine had just undergone a periodic inspection, put the mixture to rich , applied power, lowered 10 its traffic. Further, Whittlcsea does not have the them. If you believe you have had an incident with a including the replacement of No. 2 cylinder. It fl ight safety message for the rest of us, then please send degrees of flap and maintained 85 knots. Although emergency services that are available at Moorabbin, seems probable that a few drops of oil entered the it in, even though you may have already submitted an skidding to the right, the aircraft remained controllable. and I was concerned that the disturbance to the airflow exhaust heater shroud at that time. • The noise level was very high. caused by the door might create difficulties in the air safety incident report • Aviation Safety Digest 118 I 23 22 I A viation Safety Digest 118