July 2013

Taliban Raids Observation Post in

Nari District,

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)

[Type the author name] United States Army 6/1/2012 OEA Team Threat Report

Purpose

 To inform the Army training community about a raid on an (ANA) outpost in Nari (sometimes spelled Naray) District, Kunar Province, .  To provide information about Observation Post Mace and the Nari District in Kunar Province.  To provide information on Taliban tactics, techniques, and procedures during the raid.

Executive Summary

 On 12 April 2013, Taliban forces conducted a raid on an observation post in Nari District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan.  Taliban fighters numbering 100-200 attacked the outpost from at least three sides.  ANA soldiers, numbering 12-15, held out for at least five hours before being overcome by significantly larger numbers of Taliban fighters.  Whether or not the ANA soldiers were able to communicate to their higher headquarters, the outpost received no support to repel the insurgents.  The Taliban fighters killed all of the ANA soldiers at the outpost and took weapons and ammunition before retreating.

Cover photo: Afghan National Army assumption of sole command of Observation Post Mace, DVIDS, 21 December 2010.

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Map

Figure 1. Map of Nari District, Kunar Province

Introduction The 2013 Afghanistan fighting season has begun in earnest with multiple complex attacks already this year. The Taliban, realizing the less experienced and capable Afghanistan security forces will be taking the lead in military operations, will begin taking advantage of the transition seam by increasing attacks. The publicly announced withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan will simultaneously increase the tension and fears among Afghans and embolden insurgent forces. Every defeat of Afghan security forces by the Taliban will decrease an already unstable and fragile Afghanistan and provide propaganda fodder for the insurgency. On 12 April 2013, the Taliban captured an observation post in the Nari District of Afghanistan’s hotly contested Kunar Province. Open sources did not specify the observation point (OP) by name, however, there are indications the location of the attack was OP Mace. The attack resulted in the death of all 13- 15 Afghanistan National Army (ANA) soldiers manning the outpost by 100-200 Taliban insurgent 3 UNCLASSIFIED

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guerrillas. The guerrillas burned the outpost, stole weapons and ammunition at the outpost and retreated. The firefight lasted at least five hours with no support from other ANA units before it was completely overtaken by the Taliban attackers. While the casualty number was small, the Taliban added another victory to their information warfare (INFOWAR) campaign.

Nari District Afghanistan The Nari District is a mountainous region located in the most eastern part of Kunar Province. It borders to the west, to the north, to the east and Dangam District to the south. Nari’s population is approximately 24,500, 60% of whom are Pashtun. The district center is the village of Nari which lies in a river valley. The arable land is not enough to support the population. Residents supplement their incomes by selling wood. Many people find work in Pakistan.

The Kunar Province, in general, is made up of tall, arid mountains that rise successively and then drop into narrow, heavily wooded valleys that provide excellent cover for guerrillas and smugglers. These valleys, riddled with caves and rugged terrain, have been the site of some of the most difficult fighting of the war. The Nari District, lying on the border Figure 2. Taliban infiltration routes and safe havens with Pakistan, is a critical insurgent and smuggling route into Afghanistan from Taliban safe havens in northern Pakistan. The Nari District, and the Kunar Province in general, have been a challenge for both NATO and Afghan forces trying to secure Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. Figure 2 illustrates both the insurgent infiltration routes and safe haven areas in Kunar Province.

Nari district borders Bajaur, a Pakistani tribal agency that is infested with Taliban fighters. Pakistani officials routinely allege that the Taliban find safe haven in Kunar, while Afghan officials claim that attacks in Kunar come from fighters based in Bajaur. They are both right, as Kunar and Bajaur are home 4 UNCLASSIFIED

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to both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban fighters, as well as other jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Observation Post Mace While not definitively named in open sources, evidence points to OP Mace being the location of the Taliban attack on 12 April 2013. These sources indicate OP Mace is near the village of Anchgul and

Figure 3. Anchgul village security checkpoint Mirza Ali in the Nari District of Kunar Province. OP Mace sits on a rocky outcrop with a flattened area below the OP cleared for landing helicopters. The outpost is positioned to overlook the valley below and observe insurgent activities along one of Kunar Province’s insurgent infiltration routes.

Figures 4 through 8 are pictures from a video taken during the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) assumption of sole command of OP Mace on 22 December 2010. Figure 4. Ground View of OP Mace

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Figure 5. Air view of OP Mace Figure 6. OP Mace helipad

Figure 7. OP Mace overlook Figure 8. OP Mace soldier

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3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 201st Corps On 22 December 2010, OP Mace was handed over to the ANA’s 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 201st Corps, one of only a handful of Afghan Army battalions rated by the United States military as independent and able to operate on its own without foreign advisors. It was one of two such battalions that had been recently deployed without advisers in Kunar Province. The Third Battalion was assigned to hold the Nari District, a rugged, mountainous area near the Pakistani border, on an important insurgent and smuggling infiltration route.

OP Mace Attack The attack began sometime in the early morning of 12 April 2013 when 100-200 Taliban fighters attacked the 13-15 ANA soldiers manning OP Mace. The Taliban opened fire with 20 rockets from heavily wooded areas outside the outpost. The fighting continued for at least five hours before the ANA

Figure 9. Possible raid configuration on 12 April 2013 (terrain is representative of OP Mace)

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succumbed to the overwhelming Taliban force. One report stated that at least some of the ANA soldiers were burned to death during the attack. The Taliban burned and destroyed the outpost and took two RPGs, a heavy machinegun, and twelve rifles before retreating. Afghan officials claimed 12 ANA soldiers were killed while Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid claimed 15 ANA soldiers were killed. Some reports indicated as many as three ANA soldiers may have been taken prisoner which may account for the difference in KIA numbers. Five Taliban fighters were reported killed in the raid.

There is no evidence the ANA soldiers contacted their higher headquarters to request support. If the defenders did, no support arrived before the conclusion of the attack. A firefight lasting in excess of five hours should have given time for mobilization of a quick reaction force to support those manning OP Mace. No support came before OP Mace was overrun and weapons taken by the Taliban fighters. The lack of response may have been complicated by Afghan and NATO forces conducting operations elsewhere in Kunar Province. Regardless of the reason, there was a decided flaw in the plan to reinforce OP Mace in the likely event of an attack on the outpost.

Analyst Assessment While there are limited details about this raid, it is clear that a small OP was overrun by a significantly larger force. Such an attack should have been anticipated as the OP lies in a fiercely contested area on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Taliban forces attacked from at least three sides with rockets and mortars, showing an ability to communicate and coordinate fires. The ANA soldiers were able to hold out for at least five hours before they were overtaken by the Taliban fighters, indicating the ANA soldiers were capable of repelling a large force from a defended position long enough for support to arrive. In the end, the ANA soldiers were overcome by significantly larger numbers and no support. There is no open source indication that the ANA soldiers notified their higher headquarters. If they did, no support was mobilized to repel the Taliban fighters. The reason for the lack of support is unclear, but was germane to the defeat of the OP. This relatively simple raid allowed the Taliban fighters to capture weapons and ammunition and score INFOWAR points with relatively few casualties. This small raid, added to other attacks, is cumulatively important for the Taliban as they take advantage of the transition seam. It is highly probable that 2013 will see an increase in direct assaults on Afghan security units as NATO forces withdraw into advisory roles. Every small Taliban success chips away at the confidence the Afghan people have in their security forces.

Training Implications  Outposts, particularly in hotly contested areas, need clear procedures to communicate with their higher headquarters.

 Rugged and difficult terrain will require added measures to ensure OPs can be reinforced in the event of an attack. 8 UNCLASSIFIED

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 Insurgents will increase the number of direct attacks on Afghan security units as NATO forces withdraw to advisory roles.

 Even small enemy successes can be effectively used in Taliban INFOWAR campaigns to demonstrate that Afghan security forces are incapable of providing security.

Related Products Follow these links to view related products:  Abiding Threat at Camp Chapman (March 2013)  Taliban Attacks in Kandahar (June 2011)  Camp Bastion Attack (October 2012 Update)  Operational Environment Assessment: Afghanistan See also the Red Diamond Newsletter, which contains current articles on a variety of topics useful to both soldiers and civilians ranging from enemy TTP to the nature and analysis of various threat actors. For detailed information on weapons and equipment, see the Worldwide Equipment Guide. AKO: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp

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POCs

OEA Team 913-684-7929 (COMM) 552-7929 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) 803 Harrison Drive, BLDG 467 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

References “13 Afghan Soldiers Killed in Ambush, Official Says,” CNN, 12 April 2013. “13 Afghan Soldiers Killed in Attack on Outpost,” Irish Sun, 12 April 2013. “13 Afghan Troops Killed in Army Post Ambush,” The Peninsula, 13 April 2013. “Afghan Soldiers Killed in Taliban Attack,” Radio Free Europe, 12 April 2013. “Afghanistan Attack: Taliban Raid ‘Kills 13 Soldiers,’” BBC News Asia, 12 April 2013. Agarwal, Rajeev, “Taliban’s Spring Offensive and the Consequences,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 3 June 2013. Arian, Farhad, “Taliban Kill 13 Afghan Soldiers,” The News Tribe, 12 April 2013. Farmer, Ben, “Taliban Militants Kills 13 Soldiers in Dawn Attack,” The Telegraph, 12 April 2013. Gamel, Amir Shah Kim, “Taliban Attack Kills 13 Afghan Soldiers,” Gateway News, 12 April 2013. Ghanazida, “Heavy Clashes in Kunar Leaves 13 Afghan Soldiers Dead,” Khaama Press, 12 April 2013. GlobalSecurity.org, “At Least 13 Afghan Soldiers Killed in Taliban Attack,” Iran Press TV, 12 April 2013. “Kabul: Taliban Attack Kills 13 Afghan Soldiers,” Dawn.com, 12 April 2013. Lovelace, Elwyn, “Sniper at OP Mace,” DVIDS, 25 November 2011. Nordland, Rod and Azam Ahmed, “Taliban Attack Highly Regarded Afghan Army Unit,” The New York Times, 12 April 2013. Roggio, Bill, “Taliban Overrun Afghan National Army outpost in Kunar,” Threat Matrix, 12 April 2013. Salawarzai, Khan Wali, “12 ANA Troops, 5 Rebels Dead in Kunar Clash,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 12 April 2013. Shah, Amir and Kim Gamel, “Taliban Attack Kills 13 Afghan Soldiers,” Salon, 12 April 2013. Shaw, Michael, “Getting Killed Out There,” BagNews, 13 June 2013. Shinn, Peter, “Afghan Army Takes Charge at Border Outpost,” U.S. Department of Defense, 22 December 2010. Shinn, Peter, “Images: Afghan National Army Takes Charge at Observation Post Mace,” DVIDS, 20 December 2010. Stanikzai, Jawed, “Kunar Attack Supported by Foreign Insurgents: MOD,” Tolonews, 16 April 2013. “Taliban Attack Kills 13 Afghan Soldiers,” mail.com, 12 April 2013. “Taliban Attack Kills 13 in Afghanistan,” World News NBC, 13 June 2013.

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Figure Credits Figure 1. Map of Nari District, Kunar Province. Wikipedia, 2013. Figure 2. Taliban Infiltration Routes and Safe Haven Routes. The Long War Journal, 22 March 2012. Figure 3. Anchgul Village. Humanitarian Response: Humanitarian Portal for Afghanistan, 2013. Figure 4. Air View of OP Mace. DVIDS, 21 Dec 2010. Figure 5. OP Mace Helipad. DVIDS, 21 Dec 2010. Figure 5. OP Mace Overlook. DVIDS, 21 Dec 2010. Figure 7. OP Mace Soldier. DVIDS, 21 Dec 2010. Figure 8. Ground View of OP Mace. DVIDS, 21 Dec 2010. Figure 9. Possible raid configuration on 12 April 2013 (Terrain is representative of OP Mace). Created by OEA Team, TRISA-CTID, June 2013.

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