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BANNING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

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BANNING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

THE OTTAWA TREATY1 EXPLAINED

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) acts to help all victims of war and internal violence, attempting to ensure implementation of humanitarian rules restricting armed violence. The ICRC has called on all States worldwide to adhere to the Ottawa treaty, which bans the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines.

For more information about mines and the Ottawa treaty, consult the ICRC Web site at www.icrc.org

International Committee of the Red Cross Mines-Arms Unit 19 Avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland T +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57 E-mail: [email protected] www.icrc.org

© ICRC, 1998

1 The official title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction. BANNING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

THE OTTAWA TREATY 1 EXPLAINED

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

1. The landmine problem and progress towards a ban treaty 2 1.1 The need for a ban treaty 2 1.2 The existing law 3 1.3 The Ottawa process 4

2. The Ottawa treaty 5 2.1 What is an anti-personnel mine? 5 2.2 The elements of a comprehensive ban treaty 5 2.2.1 An end to use 6 2.2.2 A prohibition on development and production 6 2.2.3 A prohibition on stockpiling 6 2.2.4 A prohibition on transfer 6 2.2.5 Other prohibited activities 6 2.3 Addressing the problem: mine clearance and assistance to victims 7 2.3.1 Clearing mined areas 7 2.3.2 Assisting the victims 8 2.4 Entry into force 8 2.5 Ensuring compliance with the treaty 8 2.5.1 Reporting on implementation 8 2.5.2 Settling disputes 9 2.5.3 Resolving doubts about compliance 9 2.5.4 National efforts to prevent violations 9 2.5.5 Reviewing implementation of the treaty 10 2.5.6 Strengthening and updating the treaty 10 2.6 Reservations 10 2.7 Withdrawal 10

3. Beyond the Ottawa treaty 11

Annex I: Glossary of legal and technical terms 12

Annex II: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction 13

Annex III: List of Signatories as at 1 March 1999 21 INTRODUCTION

The Ottawa treaty is part of the international response international standard against anti-personnel mines, to the humanitarian crisis caused by the global the Ottawa treaty represents a decisive first step in the proliferation of anti-personnel mines. Millions of long-term goal of addressing the scourge of land- these deadly weapons are already contaminating mines and clearing the world of these horrific more than 70 countries, creating one of the most weapons. serious man-made problems of our time. Their long- This paper provides a brief overview of the landmine term impact upon individuals, communities, and problem, the ‘‘Ottawa process’’ and the content of the entire societies is startling. Recognizing the serious- Ottawa treaty. It is not intended to be a record of the 1 ness of the problem, countries from all regions of negotiating history or a commentary on the legal the world voluntarily came together in 1997 and aspects or implications of the treaty. Rather, it negotiated the Ottawa treaty, an international agree- presents and explains the treaty’s major elements ment comprehensively banning the development, and accomplishments. It has been written with the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti- non-specialist in mind and is therefore not overly personnel mines, and requiring their destruction. This burdened with international legal terminology. Where treaty is an outstanding achievement because it marks use of such terminology has been unavoidable, the the first time that countries --- through international specific word or phrase is underlined and is explained humanitarian law --- have agreed to ban completely a in a glossary at the end. A copy of the treaty is also weapon already in widespread use. In setting a clear attached for information.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 1. THE LANDMINE PROBLEM AND PROGRESS TOWARDS A BAN TREATY

1.1 The need for a ban treaty to ensure mobility, but their loss of dignity and their Landmines are powerful and unforgiving devices. psychological distress must also be addressed. Few Unlike other weapons of war, most of which must be survivors have access to such long-term care and aimed and fired, anti-personnel landmines are assistance programmes. Even if rehabilitated, many ‘‘victim’’ actuated. That is, they are designed to be victims are disabled, cannot work or provide for their detonated by a person stepping on or handling the families, and are likely to suffer intense anxiety, with device, or by disturbing a tripwire attached to it.2 little hope of improving their situation. Once emplaced, anti-personnel mines are indiscrimi- 2 In addition to the devastating impact on individual nate in their effects and, unless removed or deto- lives, mines also have severe social and economic nated, long lasting. Even today, landmines laid during consequences, particularly for a country attempting to the Second World War continue to be discovered and, rebuild after the end of an armed conflict. The on occasion, to kill or wound, more than 50 years presence of mines can leave large portions of the after the end of the conflict. Landmines cannot national territory unusable. Farmland, grazing pas- ‘‘distinguish’’ between the soldier and the civilian. tures and other food-producing areas may be They kill or maim a child playing football just as rendered inaccessible and, as a result, the ability of readily as a soldier on patrol. Especially in post- a community to feed itself is impaired. Mined roads conflict societies, it is most often the civilian going and railways make the movement of persons and about his or her daily activities that is the unfortunate goods, including the delivery of humanitarian aid, victim. extremely difficult. Mine clearance, although essen- While all war wounds are horrific, the injuries inflicted tial, is a slow, dangerous and expensive process. by anti-personnel mines are particularly severe. These Although international humanitarian law and tradi- weapons are designed to kill, or, more often, to tional military doctrine have set clear requirements for disable permanently their victims. They are specifi- the ‘‘responsible’’ use of anti-personnel mines, too cally constructed to shatter limbs and lives beyond often these rules have not been implemented. repair. The detonation of a buried anti-personnel Research conducted on behalf of the International ‘‘blast’’ mine rips off one or both legs of the victim and Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by military experts drives soil, grass, gravel, metal, the plastic fragments has shown that in 26 conflicts since the beginning of of the mine casing, pieces of the shoe, and shattered the Second World War, anti-personnel mines have bone up into the muscles and lower parts of the body. only rarely been deployed in accordance with the Thus, in addition to the traumatic amputation of the existing legal and military requirements. Even well- limb, there is a serious threat of secondary infection. trained professional armies have found it extremely As wounds such as these are not often seen by civilian difficult to use mines correctly in combat situations. doctors, treating a mine-injured patient can be a Furthermore, mines have increasingly been used as challenge to the most competent surgeon. part of a brutal and systematic war against civilians, If they survive a landmine blast, the victims typically especially in the bitter internal conflicts that have require multiple operations and prolonged rehabili- come to characterize warfare in the late twentieth tative treatment. Unfortunately, most mine accidents century. occur in countries with limited medical and rehabi- litative resources. Access to proper treatment and care It is these tragic realities which make the anti- is thus difficult or impossible. Moreover, transporta- personnel mine a particularly abhorrent weapon tion to a medical facility immediately following an and which have led the ICRC and many other accident is often arduous. In some countries it may organizations and individuals to call for its prohibition take victims between six and 24 hours to get to a and stigmatization. The use of poison gas and hospital capable of treating them. Many die before exploding bullets has already been stigmatized and reaching any medical facility. condemned by the international community. Both are weapons of war that are considered as violating the Following the provision of medical care, most mine most basic principles of humanity however and victims will require extensive rehabilitative treatment. whenever they are used. Now, with the adoption of Not only must amputees be fitted with artificial limbs the Ottawa treaty, anti-personnel mines will also be

2 Anti-vehicle mines, on the other hand, are designed to be detonated by the weight of a vehicle. When left on roadways that are not used solely by military personnel, they also take their toll on civilian lives and injuries. Anti-vehicle mines are discussed further below, see p. 6.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS considered as a weapon which carries a level of was the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conven- humanitarian costs that far outweighs their limited tional Weapons (CCW).3 Protocol II of this treaty military value. specifically regulates mines, booby-traps and other devices. Since this is an international legal agreement, 1.2 The existing law as opposed to international customary law, it applies only to those countries which agree to be bound by its In 1990, the ICRC and other humanitarian organiza- terms. tions began to document a dramatically high number of civilian mine casualties. Many of the victims were As the civilian impact of landmines grew more 3 wounded during periods when no fighting was taking apparent, it became evident that existing provisions place or after the end of hostilities. Subsequently, the of the CCW were too weak and were not being ICRC, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies adequately followed in many of the recent conflicts and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines where mines were being used. Following a formal (ICBL) --- an international coalition of non-govern- request by France in 1993, governments agreed to mental organizations --- began efforts to raise aware- ness about the devastating effects of these weapons meet and review the treaty and, in particular, to strengthen the provisions of Protocol II dealing with and press for an end to their use. During the years anti-personnel mines. Following two years of meet- leading up to the conclusion of the Ottawa treaty in ings of government experts in Geneva, the Review 1997, these efforts were the dominant force in mobilizing public opinion, stimulating military and Conference of the CCW opened in Vienna in September 1995. Hopes were high that substantial political debate, and ensuring that the plight of the and meaningful prohibitions and restrictions on victims and communities living under the threat of landmines would be agreed by the governments landmines was not forgotten. taking part in the negotiations. However, although the The use of anti-personnel landmines is restricted by Conference successfully adopted a new protocol international law, specifically international humani- banning the use and transfer of blinding laser tarian law, which contains several general rules weapons, talks to prohibit or strictly limit the applicable to these weapons. Two of the most production, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines important provisions are derived from the customary became deadlocked and the conference was ad- rules of warfare and are consequently binding on all journed without any new limitations being placed on sides in every situation of armed conflict: these weapons. a) Parties to a conflict must always distinguish The Review Conference was reconvened in Geneva between civilians and combatants, and civilians for two sessions in 1996. Although this time changes must not be attacked. In accordance with this to the mines protocol were agreed upon, the ICRC, principle, any weapon that is inherently indis- the ICBL and many governments considered the criminate must never be used. results disappointing and inadequate. The provisions b) It is prohibited to use weapons which are ‘‘of a drafted were extremely complex and many doubted nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary whether they would or even could be effectively suffering’’. This means that any weapon designed implemented in most situations of armed conflict. to cause more injury than required to take a Few believed that the amended protocol would be soldier ‘‘out of action’’ (i.e. one intended to inflict sufficient to stem the proliferation of the weapon and gratuitous suffering), even when directed solely consequently to reduce the number of civilian land- against combatants, is unlawful and must not be mine casualties. At the closing session of the Review used. Conference, the Canadian government announced its intention to invite pro-ban countries and interested In addition to these general customary rules, more organizations and agencies to attend a conference detailed provisions specific to anti-personnel mines later in the year convened to develop strategies aimed are contained in various international agreements. at effectively ending the affliction caused by land- Prior to the conclusion of the Ottawa treaty, the mines. The scene was set for the beginning of what principal agreement governing the use of landmines would be termed the ‘‘Ottawa process’’.

3 The full title is the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 1.3 The Ottawa process against anti-personnel mines and others who con- The Canadian-sponsored strategy conference, To- sidered effective verification mechanisms to be wards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines, took essential to the success of the treaty. place in Ottawa in October 1996 with the active The formal follow-up to the 1996 Ottawa conference support of 50 governments, the ICRC, the ICBL and took place in Brussels from 24-27 June 1997. The the United Nations. On 5 October 1996, the con- Brussels International Conference for a Global Ban on ference adopted the Ottawa Declaration, which Anti-Personnel Mines was attended by representa- committed the participants to carrying out a plan of tives of 154 countries. It was the largest gathering of 4 action intended to increase resources for mine governments to date for a conference devoted clearance and victim assistance and to working to specifically to the issue of landmines. On the closing ensure that a ban treaty was concluded at the earliest day, 97 governments signed the Brussels Declaration, possible date. At the closing of this Conference, the launching formal negotiations on a comprehensive Canadian government once again seized the initiative landmine ban treaty, greater international coopera- by inviting all governments to come to Ottawa in tion and assistance for mine clearance and the December 1997 to sign a treaty prohibiting the destruction of all stockpiled and cleared anti-person- production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti- nel mines. The Declaration called for the convening personnel mines. The ‘‘Ottawa process’’ had been of a diplomatic conference in Oslo to negotiate such a officially launched. treaty on the basis of the draft prepared by the Austrian government. International support for a ban on landmines continued to build. In December 1996, the UN In accordance with the Brussels Declaration, which General Assembly passed Resolution 51/45S, which by now had been signed by 107 countries, formal called upon all countries to conclude a new interna- treaty negotiations took place from 1 to 18 September tional agreement totally prohibiting anti-personnel 1997 at the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an mines ‘‘as soon as possible’’. A total of 157 countries International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land voted in favour of this resolution, none opposed it, Mines, hosted by the Norwegian government. and only 10 abstained from the voting. To support the Ninety-one countries took part in the negotiations as Ottawa process, the Austrian government prepared a full participants and 38 countries were present as draft text of the ban treaty and circulated it to observers, as were the ICRC, the ICBL and the UN. interested governments and organizations. This draft, which was subsequently revised a number of times, The Oslo Diplomatic Conference proved to be a was the basis of the ban treaty concluded in Oslo in tremendous success. Propelled by its South African September 1997. Chairman, Ambassador Jakob Selebi, on 18 Septem- ber the Conference solemnly adopted the Convention International discussion on the draft text began in on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production Vienna in February 1997 at a meeting hosted by the and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Austrian government. In its address to the meeting, Destruction --- the ‘‘Ottawa treaty’’. The treaty was the ICRC called for a comprehensive ban treaty based opened for signature at a ceremony on 3 and 4 De- on an unambiguous definition of an anti-personnel cember 1997, when representatives from a total of mine. In April 1997, the German government hosted a 121 countries signed it on behalf of their govern- special meeting to discuss possible verification ments. It came into force on 1 March 1999, the fastest measures to be included in a total ban treaty. Views entry into force ever for a multilateral arms-related were divided between those who stressed the central treaty. An overview of the content of the treaty is set importance of establishing a humanitarian norm out in the pages that follow.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 2. THE OTTAWA TREATY

While the security of those living in mine-contami- That is, they are designed to be detonated by both nated regions will remain threatened until the mines people and vehicles. The treaty prohibits any dual- are destroyed or removed from the ground, ending purpose mine or any anti-vehicle mine if one of its the use of anti-personnel mines is central to efforts to functions is to be detonated by a person. The sole spare future generations from the horror of these exception to this is an anti-vehicle mine equipped weapons. The Ottawa treaty is an important step with an anti-handling device. An anti-handling device towards this goal because it establishes a compre- is a mechanism attached to the mine which causes the hensive ban on the devices. That is, it not only mine to explode when a person attempts to remove, prohibits the use of anti-personnel landmines in all disturb or tamper with it.4 These mechanisms are 5 situations, it also forbids their development, produc- increasingly being fitted to anti-vehicle mines to tion, stockpiling, and transfer. In addition, it requires prevent their removal or clearance and are a the destruction of such mines, whether held in particular danger to soldiers and deminers. stockpiles or already emplaced in the ground. The definition of an anti-personnel mine contained in the Ottawa treaty is significantly stronger than the 2.1 What is an anti-personnel mine? formulation found in amended Protocol II to the The Ottawa treaty only prohibits anti-personnel CCW. The Protocol defines an anti-personnel mine as mines. A distinction is therefore made in the treaty ‘‘a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the between mines designed to kill or injure people --- presence, proximity or contact of a person and that anti-personnel mines --- and those designed to destroy will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons’’ tanks or vehicles --- anti-vehicle mines, also com- (emphasis added). The use here of the word monly referred to as anti-tank mines. Anti-personnel ‘‘primarily’’ is one of the Protocol’s significant weak- mines are generally small devices, containing be- nesses. It creates a major ambiguity in the definition, tween 10 g and 250 g of explosive substance, that will which could thus be interpreted as excluding ‘‘dual- detonate under 0.5 kg to 50 kg of pressure. Anti- purpose’’ munitions even if one of the purposes is to vehicle mines, on the other hand, are larger than anti- serve as an anti-personnel mine. The absence of the personnel mines, containing between 2 kg and 9 kg of word ‘‘primarily’’ in the Ottawa treaty definition explosive, and are normally activated by 100-300 kg removes this undesirable ambiguity. The new defini- of pressure. Generally, the large amount of tion is indeed an important accomplishment of the pressure needed to activate anti-vehicle mines, Ottawa process: a clear definition of the weapon combined with the fact that they are used in smaller being prohibited is the foundation of a comprehen- numbers and are easier to locate, has made them less sive ban treaty. of a threat to the civilian population. However, in many areas anti-vehicle mines placed on roadways Although not within the ambit of the Ottawa treaty, all used by civilians still pose a serious threat to the anti-vehicle mines capable of detonation only by civilian population. vehicles or tanks are nonetheless covered by the rules established by customary law and Protocol II to the The definition of an anti-personnel mine laid down in 1980 CCW. Governments must ensure that such the Ottawa treaty (see Art. 2, paras 1 and 2) covers all mines, especially when remotely delivered and ‘‘person’’-activated mines irrespective of whether they equipped with anti-handling devices, are used are placed in the ground in marked minefields or responsibly in accordance with international humani- remotely delivered over large areas. It also includes tarian law and established military doctrine. so-called ‘‘smart’’ anti-personnel mines---mines which have the capacity to self-destruct or self-deactivate 2.2 The elements of a comprehensive ban treaty (i.e. mines that are programmed to automatically explode or become inert after a set period of time). The Ottawa treaty is unique because it seeks to eliminate the anti-personnel mine as a weapon from However, owing to recent developments in landmine the arsenal of fighting forces. In order to achieve this technology, the traditional distinction between anti- goal, the treaty identifies and prohibits a wide range personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines is becoming of activities, specifically the development, produc- blurred. Several types of mines have been developed tion, stockpiling, transfer and use of the weapon. This which can be considered to have a ‘‘dual purpose’’. comprehensive approach is a welcome innovation in

4 Art. 2, para. 3, of the Ottawa treaty defines an anti-handling device as ‘‘a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine’’.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS international humanitarian law. Specifically, the treaty Furthermore, any existing stocks must be destroyed provides that: within four years of the date on which the treaty enters into force for a given country (see Art. 4). States Each State Party undertakes never under any requiring assistance in order to ensure the destruction circumstances: of anti-personnel mines within the specified time (a) to use anti-personnel mines; period may apply to other States Parties to the treaty for such assistance (see Art. 6). (b) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 6 stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, However, a country is permitted to retain or transfer a directly or indirectly, anti-personnel land- limited quantity of mines for training in mine- mines; detection, mine-clearance, and mine-destruction techniques. The number of mines kept shall not (c) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary anyone to engage in any activity prohib- for such purposes (see Art. 3, para. 1). At the time of ited to a State Party under this Convention the adoption of the treaty in Oslo, a number of (see Art. 1, para. 1). governments declared they would retain no more Each of these elements is briefly explained below. than a few thousand mines.

2.2.1 An end to use 2.2.4 A prohibition on transfer Each country adhering to the Ottawa treaty obliges The final component of the comprehensive ban itself ‘‘never, under any circumstances’’ (empha- established by the Ottawa treaty is a prohibition on sis added) to use anti-personnel landmines. This transferring anti-personnel mines. A country is not includes all situations of armed conflict --- whether allowed, in any way or under any circumstances, to between countries (international armed conflict) or a transfer anti-personnel mines either directly or civil conflict (internal armed conflict) --- as well as indirectly. According to the treaty, the term ‘‘‘transfer’ troubles of a lesser intensity commonly referred to as involves, in addition to the physical movement of internal unrest or civil disturbances. All offensive and anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, defensive usage is prohibited. Moreover, any resort to the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but the weapon during peacetime is also proscribed. A does not involve the transfer of territory containing country cannot deploy anti-personnel mines to fortify emplaced anti-personnel mines’’ (see Art. 2, para. 4). its borders as a means of preventing unwanted persons from entering its territory or to protect The prohibition on transfer covers import and export important military or other installations. In ratifying as well as transfer of ownership of mines. In order to the Ottawa treaty, a country accepts that mines are no facilitate mine detection, destruction and clearance, longer a legitimate weapon to be used either in there are, however, a small number of narrow peacetime or in time of war. There are no exceptions exceptions to this prohibition. First, countries are to this rule. permitted to transfer anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction. Second, they may transfer the 2.2.2 A prohibition on development and production limited number of mines allowed to be retained for The Ottawa treaty prohibits the development and training purposes. Any other exchange of anti- production of anti-personnel mines (see Art. 1, para. 1 personnel mines beyond these exceptions is forbid- (b)). A country cannot manufacture the devices, nor den. As the definition above makes clear, the transfer can it initiate any projects intended to improve current of territory containing anti-personnel mines does not models, develop new models, or generate any such constitute a ‘‘transfer’’ of those mines for the purposes weapons in the future. of the treaty.

2.2.3 A prohibition on stockpiling 2.2.5 Other prohibited activities In addition to prohibiting the development, produc- In addition to the prohibitions discussed above, each tion and use of anti-personnel mines, the Ottawa country agrees never under any circumstances to treaty precludes a country from stockpiling them (see assist, encourage or induce anyone, whether or not Art. 1, para. 1 (b)). A country is not allowed to they are bound by the treaty, to engage in any purchase, procure, or otherwise obtain the devices. prohibited activity. This reinforces the effectiveness of

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS the treaty’s comprehensive ban on anti-personnel cleared, or marked, fenced and monitored to ensure mines. the effective exclusion of civilians.

2.3 Addressing the problem: The treaty recognizes that some mine-affected mine clearance and assistance to victims countries may not be in a position to clear and By proscribing the production, stockpiling, transfer destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under their and use of anti-personnel mines, the Ottawa treaty jurisdiction or control within 10 years. Such countries takes an important step in preventing the future may therefore request that the other States Parties deployment of these weapons. Yet, until the millions accord them an extension period of up to 10 years 7 of anti-personnel mines already in the ground are (see Art. 5, para. 3). Requests are to be made at a cleared and destroyed, these devices will continue to meeting or review conference of the States Parties and pose a serious threat to populations in many regions the decision to grant or reject a request for additional of the world. time is to be made by a majority of those countries present and voting (see Art. 5, para. 5). An extension period may be granted more than once. This offers an 2.3.1 Clearing mined areas opportunity for States requiring assistance to present The Ottawa treaty obliges each State Party to clear all their case and to seek appropriate help, whether in anti-personnel mines already in the ground within a terms of financing, human resources or technical aid, period of 10 years following its entry into force for that in their mine-clearance efforts. This opportunity is country. Specifically, the State must destroy all anti- reinforced by the obligation on States able to do so to personnel mines in ‘‘mined areas’’ under its jurisdic- provide international cooperation and assistance for tion or control. This covers not only a country’s own mine clearance (see Art. 6). territory but also territory which it may be occupying. The treaty defines a mined area as: Pending the clearance of mined areas and irrespective an area which is dangerous due to the of any extension granted, each country ‘‘shall make presence or suspected presence of mines (see every effort’’ to identify all areas under its control Art. 2, para. 5). known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. Once an area has been identified as possibly This includes all territory known to contain mines, containing such weapons, action must be taken to such as minefields, which are defined areas where ensure that civilians are prevented from entering it. these weapons have been systematically laid in such The perimeter must be marked, monitored and places as national borders and tracts around military protected, by fencing or other means. The method installations. It also includes all other public or private chosen must ensure the effective exclusion of land known or believed to contain the devices. A civilians. A country has a responsibility not only to mine may travel long distances owing to floods or the close off the area, but also to make certain that the movement of desert sands. It is irrelevant how the barriers remain in good condition and do not mines came to be in a particular area, and a country deteriorate, become damaged, or otherwise disinte- assumes responsibility for clearance whether the grate. The protections put up are to remain in place mines were laid by its own military units or by other until all of the anti-personnel mines have been forces. destroyed. In marking an area, certain minimum standards set out in the amended version of Protocol An area is considered to be ‘‘mined’’ if it is thought to II of the CCW must be met. These standards include contain either anti-personnel or anti-vehicle/anti-tank but are not limited to the following: mines. Since anti-personnel mines are often used to prevent the removal or deactivation of anti-vehicle --- signs should be used to mark mined areas and mines, if an area is suspected of containing anti- should be placed at a distance sufficient to ensure vehicle mines it will often also contain anti-personnel their visibility at any point by a civilian approach- mines. If this is found to be the case, all anti-personnel ing the areas; mines in the area must be destroyed. There is no obligation in the Ottawa treaty to remove or destroy --- the marking should be of a distinct and durable the anti-vehicle mines. However, they remain regu- character; lated by the relevant provisions of Protocol II to the CCW, which require that as soon as possible after the --- all feasible steps should be taken to ensure that cessation of active hostilities all mined areas be either the means used to establish the perimeter of a

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS mined area are not removed, concealed or Burkina Faso in September 1998 and, in accordance destroyed. with Article 17, the treaty entered into force six months later and will apply indefinitely. 2.3.2 Assisting the victims States which have the treaty signed but not yet Regrettably, for thousands of men, women and submitted an instrument of ratification to the UN children killed or injured by mines, the Ottawa treaty Secretary-General are not bound by its provisions. A comes too late. The mine-injured, especially ampu- State’s signature is not of itself enough to bind the tees, face a difficult future in many countries. They are 8 signatory to respect all of its provisions. Signing a often ostracized by a community unable to shoulder treaty does, however, signal the intention to adhere the burden of caring for them, and they are distressed formally at a later date (through ratification, approval by their own inability to contribute effectively to or acceptance) and international law requires that a improving the conditions of life of their family and signatory must not do anything that undermines the society. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges now ‘‘object and purpose’’ of the treaty. The two-stage facing the international community with respect to process of signature followed by formal adherence is mines is how adequately to address the needs of the intended, for instance, to allow national parliaments mine-injured in general, and specifically amputees, or legislatures to debate the treaty and its implications who form a significant percentage of the war- for the country before a final decision is made wounded. whether or not to become bound by its provisions. Recognizing this challenge, the treaty calls upon all Following its entry into force on 1 March, the Ottawa countries able to help to do their utmost to ensure the treaty is no longer open for signature. Nonetheless, care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims. countries which have not signed it may still formally A specific role in this process is accorded to the adhere to it by a one stage process called accession. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Any State may accede directly to the treaty in place of Each State Party in a position to do so shall signature and ratification, thereby binding itself to provide assistance for the care and rehabilita- respect its provisions. tion, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness 2.5 Ensuring compliance with the treaty programs. Such assistance may be provided, Regrettably, even formal adherence to a treaty in inter alia, through the United Nations system, force is not always enough to guarantee that all of its international, regional or national organiza- provisions will be fully respected. For this reason, the tions or institutions, the International Com- Ottawa treaty provides for a number of mechanisms mittee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and to promote implementation and resolve disputes. Red Crescent societies and their International These include a requirement for each country to Federation, non-governmental organizations, report regularly on action taken to implement the or on a bilateral basis (see Art. 6, para. 3). obligations laid down in the treaty: a duty to The ICRC, for its part, will continue to work with its cooperate in settling disputes; legal, administrative partners to improve the assistance rendered to all and other measures to be taken nationally to prevent war-wounded people and particularly mine victims, violations; and regular meetings to review the who both need and deserve a lifetime of care and effectiveness of the treaty and its implementation assistance.5 (see Arts 7 to 13).

2.4 Entry into force 2.5.1 Reporting on implementation The Ottawa treaty entered into force, that is, became In order to promote openness and confidence that the binding international law, on 1 March 1999. For that to treaty is being implemented, each country adhering to happen, 40 States had to deposit an instrument of it must provide the UN Secretary-General with an ratification with the Secretary-General of the United annual report concerning the action it has taken to Nations as notification of their consent to be bound by comply with its provisions (see Art. 7). This report the treaty. The 40th ratification was submitted by must include the following information:

5 For an overview describing the medical and rehabilitative needs of mine victims and the difficulties in providing care, see Assistance for victims of anti- personnel mines: needs, constraints and strategy, ICRC, Geneva, 1997.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS . the total number and the types of anti-personnel consider the matter (see Art. 8, paras 3 and 5). In mines it has stockpiled; both instances, the countries attending the meeting . the progress of its mine-destruction programmes, will examine the information submitted and decide including the total number and the types of mines by a majority vote if further action is necessary (see destroyed; Art. 8, para. 6). . the total number and the types of mines kept for If additional information is required, a fact-finding training purposes; mission may be sent to the country (see Art. 8, . the technical characteristics of each type of mine para. 8). The fact-finding team will consist of up to 9 it has produced in the past; nine experts whose task is to collect information . the location of all mined areas under its jurisdic- directly related to the allegation. Its members are tion or control; information on the type, quantity appointed by the UN Secretary-General and drawn and age of the mines laid there (to the extent from a pool of previously submitted names. The known); and the measures taken to warn the country that is the object of the inquiry is consulted on civilian population; the selection of the experts. The nationals of the . the national measures, such as legislation or country requesting the fact-finding mission or any administrative regulations, taken to prevent and country directly affected by it cannot participate in the suppress violations of the treaty. mission (see Art. 8, paras 9 and 10). The first report must be submitted as soon as The country under examination is obliged to accom- practicable, but no later than 180 days after the date modate the fact-finding mission and ensure that it is on which a country becomes a State Party to the given the opportunity to speak with all persons and treaty. visit all areas relevant to the inquiry (see Art. 8, paras 11 to 14). Such access, however, may be subject 2.5.2 Settling disputes to arrangements made by the country to protect its Furthermore, countries are encouraged to consult and national security, the safety of fact-finding personnel, cooperate with each other in order to settle any and the proprietary and constitutional rights of its disputes which may arise (see Art. 10, para. 1). In citizens. Unless otherwise agreed, the fact-finding addition to issues of compliance, any disputes mission will not remain in the country for more than concerning the application or interpretation of the 14 days nor stay at any particular site for more than treaty may also be brought before the meeting of seven days (see Art. 8, para. 15). States Parties. A country participating in the meeting The fact-finding mission reports the information it has can offer its services to mediate or States Parties may gathered to the UN Secretary-General who will recommend ways to resolve the disagreement (see forward it to the meeting, or special meeting of States Art. 10, para. 2). Parties (see Art. 8, para. 17). After reviewing the report, countries may suggest ways to resolve the 2.5.3 Resolving doubts about compliance issues. In extreme cases this could include referring Another mechanism established by the Ottawa treaty the matter to the UN Security Council or adopting to promote confidence in its implementation is an other enforcement measures provided for by the UN enquiry process to be used in the event that a State Charter. Any decision taken at this stage is made by Party is suspected by another State Party of having consensus or, if that is not possible, by a two-thirds failed to respect the provisions of the treaty (see majority of the countries present and voting (see Art. 8). The process begins with a ‘‘request for Art. 8, para. 20). clarification’’, which is passed on to the country under suspicion through the UN Secretary-General. 2.5.4 National efforts to prevent violations Once the request has been received, that country has 28 days within which to respond to the allegation (see A State Party must do all it can to prevent and put an Art. 8, para. 2). end to violations of the treaty on territory over which it has jurisdiction or control, or by persons over whom If no response is received within that time period, or if it has jurisdiction or control (i.e. not only its own the response is deemed unsatisfactory, the issue may citizens but also those of other countries present on its be presented to the next meeting of States Parties. If, territory) (see Art. 9). It is also required to adopt however, the issue is considered urgent, a ‘‘special national laws or enact other administrative or meeting of States Parties’’ may be convenedto regulatory measures to prevent and punish prohibited

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS activities. Such action should, where appropriate, the Secretary-General will convene an Amendment include criminal penalties for violation. Conference to which all States Parties will be invited. At the amendment conference, the proposed amend- 2.5.5 Reviewing implementation of the treaty ments will be discussed and voted upon, and then The treaty also provides for a series of regular adopted if approved by at least two-thirds of the meetings of States Parties that will enable the States Parties present and voting. However, support countries concerned to discuss its implementation. for the proposals at the conference is not enough for There are four types of meetings referred to in the them to become binding on the States Parties. 10 treaty: meetings of the States Parties (see Art. 11), Following the conference, countries must inform the special meetings of the States Parties (see Art. 8), UN Secretary-General that they agree to be bound by review conferences (see Art. 12) and amendment the amendments, which only come into effect once a conferences (see Art. 13). In summary, the meeting majority of State Parties have made this notification of States Parties is convened to review the status of and then only for those States (see Art. 13, para. 5). the treaty’s application and implementation. Such a Once in force, the amendments do not apply to any meeting will be held annually for, at least, the first four country that has not ratified them. Nonetheless, these years after the treaty enters into force. There, States will remain bound by the original text. countries can raise issues concerning implementation of the treaty and try to resolve any disputes on its 2.6 Reservations interpretation. As outlined above in the section on No reservations are possible to any of the treaty’s ‘‘Resolving doubts about compliance’’, the special provisions (see Art. 19). This means that at the meeting of States Parties is an extraordinary moment of signature or subsequent adherence, a measure to examine a specific concern about possible government is not entitled to make a unilateral non-compliance. Five years after the treaty’s entry declaration that it will not respect one or more of into force, probably around the year 2004, a full these provisions. In the negotiations, it was felt that review conference will be held. In addition to the option of making reservations would inevitably providing a forum to discuss treaty implementation, it create confusion and frustrate the object and purpose may also determine how often meetings of States of the treaty, which is to impose a total ban on anti- Parties will be held in the future. Further review personnel mines. Prohibitions on reservations are conferences may be convened at the request of any unusual in international humanitarian law, although State Party at intervals of, at a minimum, five years they are included in some arms-control agreements. (see Art. 12, para. 1). 2.7 Withdrawal 2.5.6 Strengthening and updating the treaty As is the case with many other international legal Although the Ottawa treaty is a very strong legal agreements, a country is permitted to withdraw from instrument, certain refinements may in future need to the Ottawa treaty. To do so, it must give notice of its be made. To ensure that the treaty can be adapted to withdrawal to the UN Secretary-General, other States address a changing world situation and evolving Parties and the UN Security Council. However, the technologies, there is a specific provision for its withdrawal does not take effect until six months after amendment at any time after it enters into force (see such notice is received. If, however, at the end of this Art. 13). Proposals for amendments may be submitted six-month period the country is involved in an armed by any State Party. They must be sent to the UN conflict, the withdrawal is not effective until after the Secretary-General, who will circulate them to all the end of the armed conflict. Without a prohibition on States Parties. These countries must, within 30 days, withdrawal during armed conflicts, the treaty’s indicate if they support discussing the proposals protections would risk expiring just at the moment further. If a majority of countries respond favourably, they are most needed (i.e. in wartime).

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 3. BEYOND THE OTTAWA TREATY

While the negotiation of the Ottawa treaty is an Although countries from all regions of the world historic landmark in the battle against the scourge of supported the Ottawa process, some of the world’s landmines, a tremendous amount of work remains to major landmine producers, exporters and users did be done before the threat of these weapons and their not actively participate in the negotiation of the appalling humanitarian consequences are effectively Ottawa treaty and have not yet signed it. Every effort tackled. Countries must be encouraged (1) to adhere must be made to encourage these countries to join to the treaty and implement its provisions, and (2) to ranks with the rest of the international community and increase their support for mine-clearance and victim- prohibit anti-personnel landmines so that the Ottawa assistance programmes. As has been seen, the Ottawa treaty is universally respected in the near future. 11 treaty requires a State Party to undertake a wide range The Ottawa treaty is only one of the essential of activities. Among other things, the country must measures needed to address the landmine contami- ensure that anti-personnel mines are no longer used nation problem. Vast numbers of people continue as weapons by its armed forces, end the development to live in mine-affected areas under daily threat from and production of these devices, destroy any stock- these weapons. Most landmine victims continue to piles, and identify, mark, and clear mined areas. In have unmet medical, rehabilitative, social, and many countries, implementing these obligations will economic needs which must be dealt with effectively. require significant technical, legal and financial Landmines are a man-made epidemic. Similarly, assistance. the solutions to this epidemic lie in our own On 9 December, the UN General Assembly adopted hands. The Ottawa treaty is an important step, but Resolution 52/38A, which urged all States to sign and only a first one. ratify the Convention and to contribute towards its full realization and effective implementation.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS ANNEX I GLOSSARY OF LEGAL AND TECHNICAL TERMS

Accession --- A one-step process for becoming bound a country, guerrilla forces, or other organized armed by a treaty for countries that have not signed it before groups participating in the hostilities. it enters into force. Once a treaty is in force, States may only ‘‘accede’’ to it and do not need to sign. Ratification, acceptance, or approval --- Formal consent to be bound by a treaty following signature. Adherence ---Ageneral term meaning that a country In the case of the Ottawa treaty, a country must has followed the necessary procedure in order to bind deposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance or itself to a treaty. approval with the depositary of the treaty, which is the UN Secretary-General. 12 Entry into force --- The point in time when a treaty becomes legally binding on a particular State. The Self-deactivating mine --- A mine designed to render Ottawa treaty will enter into force six months after 40 itself inert after a certain time period, normally by countries have formally consented to be bound by it. exhaustion of the battery connected to its fuse. At that time the treaty will become legally binding only for those 40 countries. For countries adhering at Self-destructing mine ---Amine designed to blow a later date, the treaty will enter into force six months itself up after a specific time period. after formal consent has been given. Signature --- Once a treaty has been negotiated and International humanitarian law --- The body of the final draft adopted, it is open for signature to those international law governing armed conflict. It includes countries involved in the negotiations. Generally, rules on the conduct of hostilities and related issues signature does not bind the country to the treaty, but which may arise, such as the protection of prisoners only indicates that it approves of the final text, agrees of war and civilians not involved in the fighting. This not to do anything to undermine the purpose of the law derives from customary practices and interna- treaty, and intends formally to accept its provisions in tional treaties. Traditionally, it was referred to as the the future. Formal consent to be bound by the treaty ‘‘law of war’’ or the ‘‘international law of armed following signature is referred to as ratification, conflict’’. acceptance or approval. Parties to a conflict --- The opposing sides in an State Party ---Acountry for which a treaty has armed conflict. They can include the armed forces of formally entered into force.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS ANNEX II 18 September 1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Preamble Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging The States Parties, the international community to negotiate an interna- Determined to put an end to the suffering and tional and legally binding agreement prohibiting the casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti- or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly personnel mines, innocent and defenceless civilians and especially Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adher- children, obstruct economic development and recon- ence of all States to this Convention, and determined struction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and 13 to work strenuously towards the promotion of its internally displaced persons, and have other severe universalization in all relevant fora including, inter consequences for years after emplacement, alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarma- Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute ment, regional organizations, and groupings, and in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional throughout the world, and to assure their destruction, Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and Basing themselves on the principle of international economic reintegration of mine victims, humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that would also be an important confidence-building prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of measure, weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibi- warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, distinction must be made between civilians and annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or combatants, Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Have agreed as follows: Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling Article 1 for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States General obligations which have not yet done so, 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly circumstances: Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all (a) To use anti-personnel mines; States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally- binding international agreement to ban the use, (b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly landmines, or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the (c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, a State Party under this Convention. stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure mines, the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering accordance with the provisions of this Conven- the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for tion. a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Article 2 Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the Interna- Definitions tional Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous 1. ‘‘Anti-personnel mine’’ means a mine designed to other non-governmental organizations around the be exploded by the presence, proximity or world, contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines Article 5 designed to be detonated by the presence, Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to 1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure a person, that are equipped with anti-handling the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as as a result of being so equipped. soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that 2. ‘‘Mine’’ means a munition designed to be placed State Party. 14 under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, 2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle. all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to 3. ‘‘Anti-handling device’’ means a device intended be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas attached to or placed under the mine and which under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter- activates when an attempt is made to tamper with marked, monitored and protected by fencing or or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained 4. ‘‘Transfer’’ involves, in addition to the physical therein have been destroyed. The marking shall movement of anti-personnel mines into or from at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol national territory, the transfer of title to and on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of control over the mines, but does not involve the Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as transfer of territory containing emplaced anti- amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the personnel mines. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 5. ‘‘Mined area’’ means an area which is dangerous May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to due to the presence or suspected presence of Have Indiscriminate Effects. mines. 3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti- Article 3 personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within Exceptions that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review 1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Conference for an extension of the deadline for Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of completing the destruction of such anti-personnel anti-personnel mines for the development of and mines, for a period of up to ten years. training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The 4. Each request shall contain: amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the (a) The duration of the proposed extension; above-mentioned purposes. (b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including: 2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the (i) The preparation and status of work con- purpose of destruction is permitted. ducted under national demining programs; (ii) The financial and technical means avail- Article 4 able to the State Party for the destruction of Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines all the anti-personnel mines; and (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party the State Party to destroy all the anti- undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all personnel mines in mined areas; stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as (c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and possible but not later than four years after the entry environmental implications of the extension; into force of this Convention for that State Party. and (d) Any other information relevant to the request tance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds for the proposed extension. that deal with demining. 5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review 5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall Conference shall, taking into consideration the provide assistance for the destruction of stock- factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the piled anti-personnel mines. request and decide by a majority of votes of 6. Each State Party undertakes to provide informa- States Parties present and voting whether to grant tion to the database on mine clearance estab- the request for an extension period. lished within the United Nations system, 15 especially information concerning various means 6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of submission of a new request in accordance with experts, expert agencies or national points of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting contact on mine clearance. a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what 7. States Parties may request the United Nations, has been undertaken in the previous extension regional organizations, other States Parties or period pursuant to this Article. other competent intergovernmental or non-gov- ernmental fora to assist their authorities in the Article 6 elaboration of a national demining program to International cooperation and assistance determine, inter alia: 1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention (a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel each State Party has the right to seek and receive mine problem; assistance, where feasible, from other States (b) The financial, technological and human re- Parties to the extent possible. sources that are required for the implementa- 2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall tion of the program; have the right to participate in the fullest possible (c) The estimated number of years necessary to exchange of equipment, material and scientific destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined and technological information concerning the areas under the jurisdiction or control of the implementation of this Convention. The States concerned State Party; Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and (d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the related technological information for humanitar- incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths; ian purposes. (e) Assistance to mine victims; 3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall (f) The relationship between the Government of provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, the concerned State Party and the relevant and social and economic reintegration, of mine governmental, inter-governmental or non- victims and for mine awareness programs. Such governmental entities that will work in the assistance may be provided, inter alia, through implementation of the program. the United Nations system, international, regional 8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance or national organizations or institutions, the under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate International Committee of the Red Cross, na- with a view to ensuring the full and prompt tional Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and implementation of agreed assistance programs. their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis. Article 7 4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall Transparency measures provide assistance for mine clearance and related 1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary- activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter General of the United Nations as soon as alia, through the United Nations system, interna- practicable, and in any event not later than 180 tional or regional organizations or institutions, days after the entry into force of this Convention non-governmental organizations or institutions, for that State Party on: or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the (a) The national implementation measures re- United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assis- ferred to in Article 9; (b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel fusing, explosive content, metallic content, mines owned or possessed by it, or under its colour photographs and other information jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown which may facilitate mine clearance; and of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot (i) The measures taken to provide an immediate numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine and effective warning to the population in stockpiled; relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2ofArticle 5. (c) To the extent possible, the location of all 2. The information provided in accordance with this mined areas that contain, or are suspected to 16 Article shall be updated by the States Parties contain, anti-personnel mines under its juris- annually, covering the last calendar year, and diction or control, to include as much detail reported to the Secretary-General of the United as possible regarding the type and quantity of Nations not later than 30 April of each year. each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced; 3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States (d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot Parties. numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and Article 8 training in mine detection, mine clearance or Facilitation and clarification of compliance mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the 1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate institutions authorized by a State Party to with each other regarding the implementation of retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in the provisions of this Convention, and to work accordance with Article 3; together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obliga- (e) The status of programs for the conversion or tions under this Convention. de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine 2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and production facilities; seek to resolve questions relating to compliance (f) The status of programs for the destruction of with the provisions of this Convention by another anti-personnel mines in accordance with State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary- Articles 4 and 5, including details of the General of the United Nations, a Request for methods which will be used in destruction, Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such the location of all destruction sites and the a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate applicable safety and environmental stand- information. Each State Party shall refrain from ards to be observed; unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a (g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel Request for Clarification shall provide, through the mines destroyed after the entry into force of Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 this Convention for that State Party, to include days to the requesting State Party all information a breakdown of the quantity of each type of which would assist in clarifying this matter. anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, 3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a if possible, the lot numbers of each type of response through the Secretary-General of the anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction United Nations within that time period, or deems in accordance with Article 4; the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through (h) The technical characteristics of each type of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary- known, and those currently owned or pos- General of the United Nations shall transmit the sessed by a State Party, giving, where reason- submission, accompanied by all appropriate ably possible, such categories of information information pertaining to the Request for Clari- as may facilitate identification and clearance fication, to all States Parties. All such information of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this shall be presented to the requested State Party information shall include the dimensions, which shall have the right to respond. 4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned 10, may collect additional information on the spot may request the Secretary-General of the United or in other places directly related to the alleged Nations to exercise his or her good offices to compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control facilitate the clarification requested. of the requested State Party.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through 9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall the Secretary-General of the United Nations the prepare and update a list of the names, nation- convening of a Special Meeting of the States alities and other relevant data of qualified experts 17 Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary- provided by States Parties and communicate it to General of the United Nations shall thereupon all States Parties. Any expert included on this list communicate this proposal and all information shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all missions unless a State Party declares its non- States Parties with a request that they indicate acceptance in writing. In the event of non- whether they favour a Special Meeting of the acceptance, the expert shall not participate in States Parties, for the purpose of considering the fact-finding missions on the territory or any other matter. In the event that within 14 days from the place under the jurisdiction or control of the date of such communication, at least one-third of objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, declared prior to the appointment of the expert to the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall such missions. convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this 10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the Meeting shall consist of a majority of States States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties. Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the re- 6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special quested State Party, appoint the members of the Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, mission, including its leader. Nationals of States shall first determine whether to consider the Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or matter further, taking into account all information directly affected by it shall not be appointed to submitted by the States Parties concerned. The the mission. The members of the fact-finding Meeting of the States Parties or the Special mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities Meeting of the States Parties shall make every under Article VI of the Convention on the effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, all efforts to that end no agreement has been adopted on 13 February 1946. reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting. 11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the 7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of Meeting of the States Parties or the Special the requested State Party at the earliest opportu- Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of nity. The requested State Party shall take the its review of the matter, including any fact-finding necessary administrative measures to receive, missions that are authorized in accordance with transport and accommodate the mission, and paragraph 8. shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible 8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of while they are on territory under its control. the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mis- 12. Without prejudice to thesovereignty of the sion and decide on its mandate by a majority of requested State Party, the fact-finding mission States Parties present and voting. At any time the may bring into the territory of the requested State requested State Party may invite a fact-finding Party the necessary equipment which shall be mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take used exclusively for gathering information on the place without a decision by a Meeting of the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States mission will advise the requested State Party of Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, the equipment that it intends to utilize in the consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and course of its fact-finding mission. 13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to consideration, including the initiation of appro- ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the priate procedures in conformity with interna- opportunity to speak with all relevant persons tional law. In circumstances where the issue at who may be able to provide information related hand is determined to be due to circumstances to the alleged compliance issue. beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special 14. The requested State Party shall grant access for Meeting of the States Parties may recommend the fact-finding mission to all areas and installa- appropriate measures, including the use of tions under its control where facts relevant to the 18 cooperative measures referred to in Article 6. compliance issue couldbeexpectedtobe collected. This shall be subject to any arrange- 20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special ments that the requested State Party considers Meeting of the States Parties shall make every necessary for: effort to reach its decisions referred toin paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise (a) The protection of sensitive equipment, infor- by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present mation and areas; and voting. (b) The protection of any constitutional obliga- tions the requested State Party may have with Article 9 regard to proprietary rights, searches and National implementation measures seizures, or other constitutional rights; or Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, (c) The physical protection and safety of the administrative and other measures, including the members of the fact-finding mission. imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and In the event that the requested State Party makes such suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory demonstrate through alternative means its compli- under its jurisdiction or control. ance with this Convention. Article 10 15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the Settlement of disputes territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more 1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate than seven days, unless otherwise agreed. with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the 16. All information provided in confidence and not interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party related to the subject matter of the fact-finding may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of mission shall be treated on a confidential basis. the States Parties. 17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the 2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute Meeting of the States Parties or the Special to the settlement of the dispute by whatever Meeting of the States Parties the results of its means it deems appropriate, including offering its findings. good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their 18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special choice and recommending a time-limit for any Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all agreed procedure. relevant information, including the report sub- mitted by the fact-finding mission, and may 3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions request the requested State Party to take meas- of this Convention on facilitation and clarification ures to address the compliance issue within a of compliance. specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in Article 11 response to this request. Meetings of the States Parties 19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special 1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the consider any matter with regard to the application States Parties concerned ways and means to or implementation of this Convention, including: further clarify or resolve the matter under (a) The operation and status of this Convention; (b) Matters arising from the reports submitted (d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report under the provisions of this Convention; conclusions related to the implementation (c) International cooperation and assistance in of this Convention. accordance with Article 6; (d) The development of technologies to clear 3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as anti-personnel mines; the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organiza- (e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; tions, the International Committee of the Red and Cross and relevant non-governmental organiza- (f) Decisions relating to submissions of States 19 tions may be invited to attend each Review Parties as provided for in Article 5. Conference as observers in accordance with the 2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be agreed Rules of Procedure. convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force Article 13 of this Convention. The subsequent meetings Amendments shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the 1. At any time after the entry into force of this United Nations annually until the first Review Convention any State Party may propose amend- Conference. ments to this Convention. Any proposal for an 3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties. Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to 4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as consider the proposal. If a majority of the States the United Nations, other relevant international Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days organizations or institutions, regional organiza- after its circulation that they support further tions, the International Committee of the Red consideration of the proposal, the Depositary Cross and relevant non-governmental organiza- shall convene an Amendment Conference to tions may be invited to attend these meetings as which all States Parties shall be invited. observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international Article 12 organizations or institutions, regional organiza- Review Conferences tions, the International Committee of the Red 1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Cross and relevant non-governmental organiza- Secretary-General of the United Nations five tions may be invited to attend each Amendment years after the entry into force of this Convention. Conference as observers in accordance with the Further Review Conferences shall be convened agreed Rules of Procedure. by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if 3. The Amendment Conference shall be held so requested by one or more States Parties, immediately following a Meeting of the States provided that the interval between Review Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority Conferences shall in no case be less than five of the States Parties request that it be held earlier. years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference. 4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States 2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be: Parties present and voting at the Amendment (a) To review the operation and status of this Conference. The Depositary shall communicate Convention; any amendment so adopted to the States Parties. (b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States 5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of force for all States Parties to this Convention Article 11; which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the (c) To take decisions on submissions of States Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a Parties as provided for in Article 5; and majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the that State has deposited its instrument of ratifica- date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance. tion, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 14 Article 18 Costs Provisional application 1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Any State may at the time of its ratification, Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will Conferences and the Amendment Conferences apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this 20 shall be borne by the States Parties and States not Convention pending its entry into force. parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of Article 19 assessment adjusted appropriately. Reservations 2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the reservations. costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Article 20 Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropri- Duration and withdrawal ately. 1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 15 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national Signature sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such with- This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 drawal to all other States Parties, to the Deposi- September 1997, shall be open for signature at tary and to the United Nations Security Council. Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United explanation of the reasons motivating this with- Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December drawal. 1997 until its entry into force. 3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months Article 16 after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of 1. This Convention is subject to ratification, accep- that six-month period, the withdrawing State tance or approval of the Signatories. Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end 2. It shall be open for accession by any State which of the armed conflict. has not signed the Convention. 4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this 3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, ap- Convention shall not in any way affect the duty proval or accession shall be deposited with the of States to continue fulfilling the obligations Depositary. assumed under any relevant rules of international law. Article 17 Entry into force Article 21 1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first Depositary day of the sixth month after the month in which The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, designated as the Depositary of this Convention. approval or accession has been deposited. 2. For any State which deposits its instrument of Article 22 ratification, acceptance, approval or accession Authentic texts after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts this Convention shall enter into force on the first are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the day of the sixth month after the date on which Secretary-General of the United Nations. ANNEX III List of Signatories as at 1 March 1999 *

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Norway, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Coˆte Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 21 El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

*Anadditional two States (Equatorial Guinea and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) acceded directly to the Convention without first signing it.

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MISSION The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Ottawa_cover_E 3.8.2005 13:35 Page 1

BANNING ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

THE OTTAWA TREATY EXPLAINED 0702/002 07/05 1000