Special report

March 2011 — Issue 38

A better fit National security and Australia’s program

Report of an Independent Task Force

Chairs’ introduction

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute and How far the should the Foundation for Development Cooperation use our aid to pursue security interests was a recently convened an independent task key issue examined by the task force. There’s force to consider the relationship between certainly scope for greater integration of the Australia’s national security and our official work of the Department of Foreign Affairs development assistance. and Trade, the Department of Defence, the Australian Federal Police and AusAID when it The Australian Government is committed to comes to aid for priority countries. increasing the aid program until it reaches 0.5% of gross national income by 2015–16. We hope that this report will better inform That’s likely to double our spending on aid. our official aid planners and national security AusAID will be one of our biggest spending decision-makers on how best to leverage aid government agencies. to advance Australia’s security interests.

How this large increase in development We would like to thank the task force assistance advances our national security members for their constructive input and should be an important matter for debate. dedication; the principal project manager, Anthony Bergin from ASPI; and the rapporteur Our foreign aid should contribute to regional for the group’s work, Stewart Firth. Professor stability and be part of our strategy to Firth produced an excellent preliminary address problems that might cause Australia discussion paper that informed the task security concern. force’s deliberations. The names of all Aid, by promoting prosperity, can assist members of the task force are at the end of regional states to become our trading this report. partners. Aid helps countries whose interests align with Australia’s to increase their national Peter Abigail, Executive Director, ASPI and capacities in key areas, such as human Sean Rooney, Executive Director, FDC security. In that sense, our aid’s a strategic investment; it strengthens our security by Task Force Chairs assisting friendly states that we believe are important to us. 2 Special Report

Executive summary quadrennial diplomacy and development review, as the US has done A new international consensus is emerging • give official development assistance a on the place of aid and development in the ministerial portfolio of its own within the national security of major OECD donors. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade key elements of the new consensus are: • maintain the new focus on aid to Africa, • making the promotion of development a but in the context of a heightened more important foreign policy objective awareness of security issues • identifying national security more closely • recognise the importance of Australia’s with increasing aid, encouraging global strategic interests in development and bringing security to and the South Pacific fragile states • recognise climate change affecting • giving aid agencies more say in decisions neighbouring countries as a potential about national security national security problem for Australia • boosting civilian–military cooperation and • consider creating a separate security sector integration in delivering aid and security. in the aid budget Australia has in some respects anticipated • develop a coherent strategy for this new approach, especially in civil–military whole‑of‑government delivery of cooperation in delivering aid to fragile states aid in permissive and non-permissive and in humanitarian emergencies. This environments, given the extent to which report acknowledges Australia’s good record effective cooperation between different of achievement in the field, but we need to government agencies remains problematic. do more.

The governments of Britain and the US Background are already moving to integrate aid and A new international consensus is emerging security. The United Kingdom’s 2010 National on the place of aid and development in the Security Strategy and President Obama’s national security of major Organisation for recent presidential policy directive on global Economic Co‑operation and Development development both recognise the need to see (OECD) donors and on the agenda of aid through the prism of security, and vice international organisations, such as the UN versa. USAID, Washington’s equivalent of our Security Council and the World Bank. AusAID, has a seat on the US’s National Security Council when security and aid concerns For Australia, this new policy agenda are intertwined. may be described as ‘securing aid’. Its key elements are: The report recommends that Australia should: • to make the promotion of development a • maintain the official objective of the more important foreign policy objective aid program, but put more effort into explaining how Australia’s aid contributes • to identify national security more closely to national security with increasing aid, encouraging global development and, where necessary, • increase the accountability of the aid bringing security to fragile states program, for example by giving AusAID’s by humanitarian and longer term Office of Development Effectiveness development intervention a statutory role and by instituting a A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 3

• to give aid agencies more say in decisions for the way foreign policy and development about national security interact. These debates about policy have • to boost civilian–military cooperation and been mirrored elsewhere, notably in the integration in delivering aid and security United Kingdom, where policymakers have focused on the consequences of orienting • to research an evidence-based framework development programs to achieve ‘maximum for, and to institutionalise, civilian–military possible contributions’ for national security. cooperation • to recognise the complexity of fragile The United Kingdom situations in foreign states and the shared challenges to genuinely empower local The UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy calls authorities and build sustainable and for a ‘radical transformation in the way we constructive partnerships with fragile and think about national security and organise conflict-affected countries. ourselves to protect it’. The strategy argues that, while some developing countries such as In some respects, Australia has anticipated and will lift millions out of poverty this new policy approach: first, in the by achieving economic growth in the coming way we’ve responded to security crises decades, fragile states will benefit much less and development challenges in regional from future growth: states since 1997; and second, in fostering cooperation between AusAID, the Australian The world’s poorest people live on less Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian than $1000 a year. Around half currently Federal Police (AFP) in regional states and in live in Asia and half in Africa but by humanitarian emergencies. 2030 the clear majority of those living on less than $3 a day will be in Africa. The international context Compounded by other drivers such as climate change and resource scarcity, Many Western governments recognise the this increases the likelihood of conflict, need for closer coordination of diplomatic instability and state failure. and developmental strategies in a world filled Britain’s response to this will be a whole- with new threats, new players and new ways of-government approach ‘based on a of engaging with friends and foes. Globally, concept of security that goes beyond the costs of conflict, crisis and state weakness military effects’ and on tackling ‘the causes continue to deprive many nations of stability of instability overseas in order to prevent and prosperity. Military and civilian missions risks from manifesting themselves in the are increasingly overlapping in response UK’. For that reason, it envisages British to these and other issues, particularly to development professionals working with acute natural disasters and humanitarian diplomats and intelligence agencies to emergencies. As a result, government stabilise fragile states, and foresees ‘occasions agencies that once had an exclusively when it is in our interests to take part in domestic focus are now working abroad. humanitarian interventions’. The British and American governments At the centre of the new British approach is have recently produced important policy the recently established National Security documents that aim to address this shifting Council, which brings together key ministers context. Of particular interest is the US, where and military intelligence chiefs for regular major policy reforms have been earmarked meetings (Australia’s had such an institution 4 Special Report

since 1996). And to implement the National Flowing from this conviction is an intention Security Strategy the British Government expressed in both policy documents to will establish a ‘cross-departmental elevate development to become a core pillar Implementation Board chaired by the of US foreign policy and to amplify the voice Cabinet Office and attended by lead officials’. of the United States Agency for International The board—the equivalent of a high‑level Development (USAID) through greater interdepartmental committee in the representation in interagency policymaking Australian system—will report to the Prime processes. The presidential policy directive Minister and the National Security Council. foreshadows a number of changes to The International Development Secretary, both US strategy and the management of who now sits on the National Security international development: Council, participated in the formulation of the • The Administrator of USAID will be 1 National Security Strategy. included in meetings of the National Security Council where appropriate. The United States • An Interagency Policy Committee will In 2010, the Obama administration be established, to be led by the national made explicit its view that international security staff and responsible to National development is partly an instrument of US Security Council deputies and principals. national security, as well as being a strategic, • A US Global Development Strategy will economic and moral imperative. Two policy be submitted to the President every documents were inaugurated: four years. • the Presidential policy directive on global • A US Global Development Council development, released in September will be created, consisting of experts • the Quadrennial diplomacy and from the private sector, academia and development review (QDDR), a major policy other parts of civil society. The council blueprint released in December after a will provide high‑level input on US number of delays. development policies.

This paragraph from the presidential policy • Greater attention will be given to directive is emblematic of current US balancing civilian and military power Government thinking: in conflict and humanitarian crises and the importance of linking short‑term Development is … indispensable in the investments in those contexts with forward defense of America’s interests long‑term development strategies. in a world shaped by growing economic integration and fragmenting political The QDDR outlines an ambitious reform power; by the rise of emerging powers and agenda, emphasising systematic change the persistent weakness of fragile states; within USAID rather than simply reviewing by the potential of globalisation and risks service delivery. It places high value on from transnational threats; and by the transparency, innovation, monitoring and challenges of hunger, poverty, disease, evaluation, multi‑year planning in close and global climate change. The successful coordination with recipient states and pursuit of development is essential to rebuilding the core capacity of USAID. It also advancing our national security objectives: determines that USAID should take the lead security, prosperity, respect for universal on presidential initiatives related to food values, and a just and sustainable security and global health. international order. A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 5

In the area of national security, the QDDR The USAID workforce looks set to grow in signals closer strategic planning between the coming years, with the creation of new the State Department and USAID, and the expert positions and a tripling of mid‑level potential creation of a unified national hires in its Development Leadership Initiative, security budget. It states that both from 30 to 95 per year. The QDDR underlines organisations should ‘both rationalize and the need to draw upon in‑house expertise improve’ planning and budgeting processes, before turning to specialised contractors for referring to the need to develop a joint USAID diplomacy and development initiatives. And, – State Department strategic plan through to enhance competition for contracts, USAID collaboration between the two organisations’ will make ‘smaller and more targeted awards’. policy planning offices. The joint strategic The agency will also promote increased use of plan will aid chiefs of missions—the principal local partner country systems. officers in charge of US diplomatic missions The document highlights innovation as and US offices abroad, which the Secretary a driver of sustainable development and of State has designated as diplomatic in calls for the establishment of Development nature—in putting together integrated Innovation Ventures. Borrowing from the country strategies, which will be the basis for private venture capital model, Development mission and bureau budget requests. Figure 1 Innovation Ventures seek ideas from inside is reproduced from the QDDR. and outside USAID to invest resources in 6 Special Report

promising high‑risk, high‑return projects. National security motivation One such project already underway in India Typically, donor states expect their aid supports women in rural areas who act programs to produce not just development as health educators in their communities. but also the political stability that comes with A Massachusetts-based company, DigiMac, development; and political stability, especially has spent the past two and a half years in nearby states, is reckoned to increase the developing a software platform for mobile donor state’s national security. In Australia’s phones to allow health-care workers to collect case, the Colombo Plan pioneered by Sir Percy data, monitor the health of new mothers and Spender in the 1950s was still paying security log household visits. dividends for Australia forty years later at the The QDDR also recommends that USAID time of the Asian financial crisis, the end of expand its fellowship program (including by the Soeharto era and the tension in relations the creation of an Innovation Fellowship) to with that followed the intervention attract professionals from leading academic in Timor‑Leste in 1999. Effective aid programs institutions, social entrepreneurial ventures underpin the national security of donor states. and the private sector to work with the This broad link between development and agency. In an effort to increase government Australia’s national security underlies the transparency, the government will create entire aid program, most of which isn’t a new internet-based ‘dashboard’ that will characterised by direct connections between publish data on State Department and USAID aid and security. AusAID operates largely foreign assistance. without the assistance of the military forces or the police in most of the countries that Australia’s aid–security model receive Australian development assistance. A consideration of the relationship between A random survey of recent aid would reveal Australia’s aid program and our national projects supporting Indonesia’s program security must take into account both the to improve maternal and neonatal health nature of the nexus between the two and the in Nusa Tenggara Timur province; assisting historical evolution of cooperation between , , , and Australian security and aid agencies. in reducing their vulnerability to climate change by funding the replanting of coastal The dimensions of the aid–security mangroves and strengthening disaster nexus preparedness; assisting to rehabilitate people injured by landmines; There are four dimensions to the aid–security and working with Electricity of to nexus: increase the capacity of electricity distribution • national security motivation in that country. None of those projects • civil–military cooperation in aid delivery to requires the assistance of the ADF or the AFP, fragile states and they’re more typical of Australian aid than those that do. • civil–military cooperation in humanitarian emergencies Situations where aid–security cooperation • a security-oriented development predominates in Australia’s aid program are partnership between Australia and fragile confined to those where states are weak and states following intervention. conflict has occurred, or to cases of natural disaster and humanitarian emergency. A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 7

Civil–military cooperation in aid delivery states and maintaining stability through to fragile states development assistance.

This dimension arises from the special The 2008 National Security Statement circumstances of international relations in our argued that: era. The aid relationship between donors and Australia has made major long term recipients has been extended since the 1990s commitments to help resolve conflict in to encompass military intervention and state and Timor‑Leste. But the building in fragile and post‑conflict situations, risk of fragile states disrupting stability and that’s happened principally because, in an and prosperity in our region is an ongoing age of terrorism and unregulated movements challenge. The humanitarian implications of people across national borders, weak and for the people affected in these conflicts fragile states are seen as potential threats are also of concern to Australia’s national to global, regional and national security. The security and foreign policy interests. We focus is on making development possible by expect to make practical contributions ‘securing development’. in times of crisis, commensurate with Australia’s approach to ‘securing our role in the international community. development’ has been crafted in accordance Failure to do so at source also runs the with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid risk of refugee outflows to neighbouring Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda states, including Australia.2 for Action, which commit us to the principle Critics have raised doubts about civil–military of country ownership of aid programs and cooperation in aid delivery. Sharar to strengthening the capacity of developing Hameiri from Murdoch University’s Asia countries to lead and manage development, Research Centre points out that the AFP while reducing the fragmentation of has become important in both designing aid. Australia has also accepted the 2007 and implementing Australia’s regional OECD Principles for Good International interventions. He sees what Australia is Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, doing in Timor‑Leste and Solomon Islands which call upon donor states to recognise as undermining their sovereignty and the links between political, security and interfering in their politics while engaging development objectives. in an unwarranted extension of Australian In cases where Australia is securing influence beyond our borders.3 Sinclair Dinnen, development, the aid program serves the senior fellow with the State, Society and national security both of fragile states Governance in Melanesia Program at the and of Australia. This second dimension Australian National University, focuses on of the aid–security nexus gives rise to a the practical difficulties of state building, policy equation accepted by Australian and points to ‘the very real dilemma of governments for the past two decades. how donors can engage in state building in Governments from Hawke and Keating fragile environments without simultaneously (Cambodia) to Howard (Timor‑Leste, , “crowding out” or marginalising local actors Solomon Islands and ) and Rudd who ultimately will have to take responsibility and Gillard (Timor‑Leste, Solomon Islands for running the state.’4 and Afghanistan) have believed that Australia On the other hand, regional leaders have enhances its national security by addressing generally welcomed the Australian aid and conflicts, building capacity in fragile security presence. The Solomons prime 8 Special Report

minister from 2007 to 2010, Derek Sikua, the role of their security sectors, financing consistently supported the Australian-led issues and civilian oversight. Any project or regional mission to his country. The President program is meaningless if it isn’t requested of Timor‑Leste, José Ramos-Horta, told and part of a wider development strategy. Australian journalists in 2010 that his Resources are stretched and developing country’s recovery from instability was ‘in countries have to make drastic choices on large measure … thanks to the contribution of their budget allocations based on their needs, Australian Army, New Zealand, as well as AFP weaknesses and strengths. With relevant work, together with other members of the advice, they can also prioritise the sectors international community’.5 that will trigger private sector development, capacity enhancement and effectiveness. Civil–military cooperation in humanitarian emergencies The evolution of Australian Aid–security cooperation is a natural fit for aid–security cooperation disaster relief. When a tsunami struck in the Australia draws upon more than a decade Indian Ocean at the end of 2004, Australia of experience in whole-of-government responded with a cooperative effort that responses to intervention and development brought together the ADF, AusAID and in fragile states: AusAID’s been called upon Emergency Management Australia. The ADF many times to participate in complex quickly established a water purification plant international operations involving extensive in Banda Aceh, together with a field hospital military–police–civilian cooperation. jointly operated with the New Zealand Experience in Bougainville, Timor‑Leste, Defence Force. HMAS Kanimbla lay offshore Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq as a floating support base for the operation. has refined cooperation between the ADF, Australia’s extensive reconstruction and the AFP and AusAID, as well as between medical assistance helped to restore good them and other agencies of government relations with Indonesia after a period of such as the Australian Customs and Border bilateral tension. The Samoa tsunami of Protection Service, the Australian Maritime September 2009 brought a prompt response Safety Authority and Austrac, Australia’s from Australia involving the ADF, the AFP, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism AusAID and Emergency Management financing regulator. What the World Bank calls Australia. The RAAF and the RAN delivered ‘accidental partners’—that is, development relief supplies, while medical personnel and security actors working together in performed numerous surgical operations post-conflict situations—aren’t accidental in and treatments. AusAID later supported the Australia but reflect a consciously planned non‑government organisation (NGO), Caritas, response by government. in rebuilding homes for those whose coastal villages were devastated. The 2009 Defence White Paper captured the essence of the Australian approach: A security-oriented development [S]ecurity objectives in intra-state partnership between Australia and fragile conflict situations are increasingly states following intervention interdependent with broader political, When security is restored, Australia needs to humanitarian, economic and development engage in a policy dialogue with the partner goals. These operations require a governments on their security expectations, ‘whole‑of‑government’ response on the A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 9

part of military and civilian agencies, participate in the monitoring teams because extending beyond individual agency of local sensitivities about Australia’s previous operations, and integrating security and support for the PNG Government in the civil other objectives into comprehensive war with Bougainville. Instead, from the PMG political–military strategies. The ADF’s Logistics Support Base near Arawa equipped capacity to deploy rapidly and establish with four‑wheel drive vehicles, helicopters a basic level of security at the outset and communications facilities, they supported of a crisis situation will often be an the peace monitoring conducted by unarmed essential element of any comprehensive military personnel from New Zealand, Fiji and approach—but it will, in nearly all cases, Vanuatu and by public servants, including not be a sufficient response in itself.6 women, from AusAID and other government agencies. At the same time, AusAID managed Cambodia a number of rehabilitation projects, among them the rebuilding of the main coastal The origins of Australia’s aid–security road on the island of Bougainville. The experience of development assistance were PMG was led by a military officer, and the in Cambodia in 1991 and 1992. An Australian, second‑in‑command was an Australian Lieutenant General John Sanderson, was the civilian, with experience of the region, called a commander of a 16,000-strong peacekeeping ‘chief negotiator’. force in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Australia sent senior ADF The ADF supported unarmed military and staff for the UNTAC headquarters, 460 troops, civilian peace monitors, including monitors a small group of AFP officers, and staff from from AusAID. The ADF and AusAID cooperated the Australian Electoral Commission. closely in Bougainville; in , Defence and the Department of the Prime Minister Bougainville and Cabinet worked with the Department The ADF and AusAID cooperated in of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and its Bougainville from 1997 to 2003. Australia was agency, AusAID, to manage the enterprise, intimately involved in the 1997 negotiations which is widely regarded as a notable 7 that brought peace to Bougainville, and led achievement in regional peacemaking. the regional Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) Defence and the ADF, together with their that followed. More than 5,000 troops and New Zealand counterparts, were ‘deeply civilians from Australia, New Zealand, Vanuatu involved and highly influential, in decision- 8 and Fiji served as unarmed peacekeepers making processes’. in Bougainville over the six years of peace monitoring that ended in 2003. They oversaw Timor-Leste the ceasefire, the repatriation of displaced The Timor‑Leste interventions of 1999 and villagers, the reconciliation of former enemies, 2006 led to closer aid–security cooperation, the disposal of weapons and the return especially between AusAID and the AFP. of government services in a part of Papua Australia’s commitment of troops to New Guinea (PNG) that had been wracked Timor‑Leste in 1999 was its largest since the by eight years of armed conflict. Typically, Vietnam War, and on a scale large enough about 300 peacekeepers from the PMG to change decision-making structures and were in the field at a time, patrolling the refashion relationships between different villages and assigned to different parts of the parts of the bureaucracy. AusAID needed province. Australian military personnel didn’t to work more closely than ever before with 10 Special Report

the departments and agencies that are the armed force, the F-FDTL (Falintil–Forças de traditionally responsible for national security Defesa de Timor‑Leste), while that of the AFP is policy—DFAT, Defence and the Department to train the police, the PNTL (Policia Nacional of the Prime Minister and Cabinet—and de Timor‑Leste). became more conscious of its national security role. Defence created two new Solomon Islands organisations to manage the intervention: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon the Timor‑Leste Policy Unit and the INTERFET Islands (RAMSI), which began in 2003, was (International Force in ) branch of Australia’s first true ‘whole-of-government’ the Strategic Command Division. The AFP, intervention in a foreign country, and has called upon at short notice to provide police been characterised by close coordination for overseas deployment, embarked on an between the ADF, the AFP and AusAID. In expansion that led to the formation of the order to avert the collapse of Solomon Islands International Deployment Group in 2004. as an effective state, Australia led RAMSI As government came to regard the AFP as a into the capital, Honiara, in 2003. RAMSI was prime instrument for securing development planned and executed as an interagency in fragile states, the AFP’s budget grew from intervention, with close cooperation between $385 million in 2001 to $1.84 billion in 2010, the ADF, the AFP and AusAID under the of which $361 million was for international overall supervision of DFAT in the person of deployments.9 And AusAID also grew as the Special Coordinator. Australia’s show of Australia’s official development assistance force, which initially included an Australian (ODA) budget increased from 2003. warship, had the effect of intimidating The disorder in Timor‑Leste in April and May militants, facilitating numerous arrests 2006 demonstrated that security was a (more than 6,000 by 2006) and easing fundamental prerequisite for development the way for the recovery of weapons. As a and prompted the return of Australian way of re-establishing law and order, the security forces in large numbers. By the end combination of police-led intervention and of June, Australia had 2,650 ADF personnel military backing was highly effective, and, and about 200 police in Timor‑Leste, a by comparison with multilateral missions commitment greater than those made at in other parts of the world (for example, in any time to Iraq or Afghanistan.10 In reduced Bosnia–Herzegovina and Timor‑Leste), RAMSI form, the International Stabilisation Force was well coordinated. of Australians and New Zealanders remain RAMSI is distinctive in three ways: in Timor‑Leste in 2011 as one of Australia’s • It was Australia’s first true ‘whole- significant foreign military deployments. of-government’ intervention in a The force is in support of but not part of foreign country, because it involved the United Nations Integrated Mission in not just the ADF, AFP, DFAT and AusAID Timor‑Leste (UNMIT), whose mandate has but other Australian Government been regularly renewed since 2006. AusAID departments as well, including describes Australian development assistance Treasury and Finance. Participating to Timor‑Leste as being ‘primarily delivered departments and agencies engaged in by AusAID and the Australian Federal Police’,11 intensive predeployment planning to and the AFP’s operations there are paid for facilitate coordination in the field. from the AusAID budget. The main task of Australian soldiers in Timor‑Leste is to train A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 11

• RAMSI has the legitimacy that comes Afghanistan from being a regional mission, not In Afghanistan, AusAID has both a multilateral just an Australian mission. It’s a and a bilateral aid program, and the ADF partnership between Solomon Islands independently engages in development and fifteen Pacific countries, including assistance projects of its own, but critics say Australia, and it has the backing of the that stabilisation’s being hindered by the close Pacific Islands Forum. identification of aid with security. • RAMSI changes in response to changing circumstances. The 2006 Australia sent 150 Special Air Service troops to riots in Honiara re-emphasised the Afghanistan in 2001 as one element of a larger importance of security as Australian force of about 1,500 deployed in Afghanistan, soldiers returned in large numbers. Kyrgyzstan and the Persian Gulf as part of the The 2009 Partnership Framework US’s Operation Enduring Freedom to destroy between RAMSI and Solomon Islands the al‑Qaeda terrorist network and drive prepares the way for RAMSI’s eventual from power the Taliban militia that hosted withdrawal and aligns its priorities it. The government withdrew the special with those of the government. operations troops from Afghanistan in 2002, only to send them back in 2005 to combat the The mechanisms of successful state-building Taliban‑dominated insurgency. In 2006, the aren’t well understood, and judgment on ADF Special Operations Task Group was joined whether RAMSI has been a long-term success in Uruzgan Province by the Reconstruction in building the Solomon Islands state remains (and later Mentoring) Task Force that was suspended. The widespread popular support deployed as part of the Netherlands Task for RAMSI in the Solomons may show either Force Uruzgan following the NATO-led that it’s worked, or that Solomon Islanders International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fear its departure would precipitate a return expansion into southern Afghanistan. to earlier divisions and hostilities. Only time will tell. The Rudd government increased the commitment from 1,100 to 1,550 troops in On the other hand, most observers regard April 2009. Australia’s currently the largest the Bougainville intervention as a success, non‑NATO contributor of military support to bringing permanent peace and providing Afghanistan and the tenth largest contributor a stable foundation for development and overall in the forty‑eight member ISAF further injections of aid. And a similar, if coalition. The focus of the coalition’s main less certain, judgment applies to Australia’s effort is to conduct ‘shape–clear–hold–build’ interventions in Timor‑Leste. Our aid to operations to secure the most populous and Timor‑Leste was worth more than $1 billion threatened districts, and thus drain away between 1999 and 2010, and a further insurgent influence in southern Afghanistan. $103 million was budgeted for 2010–11. While In practice, this involves a mix of targeting it’s true that only two of the Millennium Taliban command and control, providing Development Goals—universal primary population security, conducting security education and promotion of gender sector reform and governance capacity- equality—are likely to be achieved by 2015, building, and economic development. there’s general agreement that a significant degree of political stability has been The key mission of the ADF is to train established in that country. and mentor the Afghan National Army’s Uruzgan-based 4th Brigade 205th Corps as 12 Special Report

part of the coalition’s overall objective of the challenges posed by the Dutch departure a conditions-based transition of the main is very much a work in progress. responsibility for security to the Afghan The Australian Government’s concept Government by the end of 2014. The ADF’s of operations in Uruzgan is consistent also engaged in the development line of with the overall ISAF strategy, which calls operations in Uruzgan through its program of for a ‘comprehensive approach’. That managed and delivered works. However, it’s approach entails a move beyond Australian unclear how much Defence spends on those integration to see us working closely with reconstruction projects or what proportion coalition partners, the Afghan Government, of the $1.6 billion Operation Slipper military multilateral bodies and the NGO community budget (for the 2010–11 financial year) in support of Australia’s objectives in they represent. Afghanistan: denying a sanctuary to In the 2010–11 federal budget, Afghanistan’s transnational Islamist terrorists and the fourth largest recipient of Australian ODA supporting our ANZUS alliance partner. ($123 million). The Australian Government Many NGOs object to interweaving aid is committed to channelling 50% of ODA and security so closely in Afghanistan. through Afghan Government programs, in The Australian Council for International line with undertakings made at the January Development, the peak body for development 2010 London Conference, provided necessary NGOs, argues that the involvement of accountability measures and reforms are in many military forces in aid projects, and the place. Right now, much of the AusAID-sourced close identification of aid and security in development assistance to Afghanistan Afghanistan, have removed the ‘independent is allocated multilaterally through the and impartial space’ for NGOs and might well Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, be self-defeating: administered by the World Bank. AusAID’s bilateral aid projects are found throughout Increased funds to NGOs linked to political the country; only about 10% is spent in and military objectives is decreasing Uruzgan Province—Australia’s national area the opportunities for sustainable and of responsibility. comprehensive community-based, needs‑driven aid and development The percentage of Australia’s ODA outcomes to be achieved across disbursed in Uruzgan is set to rise to 20% Afghanistan. This undermines long-term following the August 2010 transfer of stabilisation objectives.12 command of the erstwhile Netherlands Task Force Uruzgan from the Dutch to the The Australian response so far multinational Combined Team Uruzgan, in which ADF personnel now comprise Aid programs aren’t simply a response to the greater proportion of coalition forces poverty wherever it might be. Geostrategic operating in that insecure province. In considerations help to determine where most addition to more onerous security sector aid donor countries direct their aid, and no reform activity, the full implications of donor country—with the possible exceptions Australia’s new responsibility for leading of the Nordic countries—devises its aid the Uruzgan Provincial Reconstruction program without taking into account its Team within Combined Team Uruzgan own security situation. For example, the top are still being realised. Indeed, Australia’s four recipients of USAID development funds whole‑of-government response to meeting are Afghanistan, , the Palestinian A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 13

territories and Egypt, all of which are central small-scale reconstruction efforts and to the security concerns of the US. The top strengthening nodes of governance. Despite four recipients of bilateral Australian aid those initial successes, observers within and are Indonesia, PNG, Solomon Islands and outside government have highlighted areas Afghanistan, all of which are important to in need of improvement if parallel/integrated Australia’s security, whether by virtue of civilian–military operations are to be effective. strategic proximity or terrorist potential. In our own region, the Australian Government Except for Timor‑Leste, the 25 countries at has responded to the need for better the bottom of the UN Human Development civil–military cooperation and whole-of- Index are all in Africa, so a much greater government responses to conflict and disaster proportion of our development assistance by establishing the Asia Pacific Civil-Military would go to African countries if the sole Centre of Excellence in 2008. The centre’s criterion of Australia’s aid program were the mission is ‘to support the development of relief of global poverty. Instead, Australian national civil–military capabilities to prevent, governments have for many years believed prepare for and respond more effectively that our aid is best spent in countries in our to conflicts and disasters overseas’, and it’s immediate region, concentrating programs in promoting best practice in civil–military– partner countries and subregions that have police engagement in conflict and disaster the best chance of producing development management by developing strategies to gains, and also investing significant funds enhance multi-agency cooperation.13 via multilateral development agencies. Given AusAID programs will continue to deliver the large increase in Australia’s aid budget post-conflict state-building assistance in over the next five years, the government has difficult environments. This includes the decided that there’s room to significantly ability of civilian agencies to maintain, increase our aid to other areas of the globe mobilise and deploy necessary resources and without affecting our core regional programs. skilled personnel for a variety of operations in The government categorises aid by ‘sector’. conflict-affected areas. Apart from humanitarian and emergency relief, the key sectors are governance, Recommendations on national education, infrastructure, health, rural security and the aid program development and the environment. The governance sector of aid has been the This section outlines the task force’s largest for many years. To AusAID, improving recommendations for realigning Australia’s ‘governance’ means making public sectors in approach to aid and security to acknowledge developing countries work more effectively, the emerging international consensus on the strengthening legal systems and law relationship between the two. enforcement, developing civil society, fostering better economic and financial Maintain the official objective of management, and bolstering democratic the aid program systems of government. ‘Security’ is not Despite the growing identification of national a separate sector, but is encompassed security with aid, the objective of the by ‘governance’. Australian aid program should remain as it is, Civilian–military teams in Afghanistan and with a primary focus on development and the elsewhere have enjoyed a measure of success alleviation of poverty in developing countries in enhancing local security, conducting understood within the wider context of 14 Special Report

Australia’s national interests. Those interests Increase the accountability of the encompass the advancement and protection aid program of our national security, but the appropriate At the 2010 federal election, both the Labor place to show their connections to the aid Party and the Liberal–National Coalition program is in the National Security Statement. recommitted to the policy aim of boosting The official objectives of Australia’s aid Australia’s ODA/GNI (ODA as a proportion program have always, explicitly or implicitly, of gross national income) from 0.33% included the advancement of national to 0.50% by 2015–16. The Coalition also security, but the primary focus has been on pledged to create a Minister for International development and poverty alleviation. There Development. This bipartisan commitment are good reasons for this. Australians give to the Millennium Development Goals generously to help those in need overseas, is valuable for the long-term planning of and internationally we rank highly for Australian aid. The Labor government has individual generosity, as in our response to provided for an increase in ODA/GNI from the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. Many people 0.33% to 0.50% by 2015–16 in the budget believe that Australia, a wealthy country, forward estimates. Depending on Australia’s ought to be helping poorer countries, and that economic growth, ODA in real terms is belief’s important in sustaining public support likely to double in the next four years. Some for the aid program. The objective of aid, for politicians, talkback hosts and commentators the Howard government, was ‘to advance find spending to help others beyond our Australia’s national interest by assisting shores an easy target, especially at times developing countries to reduce poverty and of natural disaster in Australia. Therefore, achieve sustainable development’14, and that’s accounting for what Australia spends on remained the objective of the aid program aid matters more than ever, because public ever since. For the current government, it’s ‘to support for the program must be maintained assist developing countries reduce poverty not only to alleviate poverty internationally and achieve sustainable development, in but also to protect Australia’s national line with Australia’s national interests,’15 and security and our broader national interest. it should continue to be expressed in those A number of mechanisms, some world-class, broad terms. already exist to provide that accountability. However, the government should put more All ODA expenditure, whether by AusAID or effort into explaining how Australia’s aid not, must be authorised by the Development contributes to national security by preventing Effectiveness Steering Committee, which the development of potential threats to brings together AusAID, DFAT, Finance and Australia. That will help to ensure longer Treasury and coordinates all activities that term public support for our development qualify as ODA as defined by the OECD’s assistance program. Development Assistance Committee in Paris. AusAID’s own Office of Development In accordance with the Paris Declaration and Effectiveness produces an annual review the Accra Agenda, Australia should also give of development effectiveness that’s often higher priority to security in its aid initiatives critical of aid performance in particular areas, in those cases where fragile states ask and the Australian National Audit Office for security. examines a part of the aid program each year to assess its efficiency. A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 15

Yet more is needed: position within formal decision-making • The Office of Development Effectiveness processes. AusAID now has the independence should have a statutory role. of an executive agency, but its location within DFAT deserves reassessment, and ministerial • The Parliamentary Joint Committee arrangements need to be reconsidered: on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade should establish a subcommittee • As it grows, the aid program will matter on the aid program to provide more for national security—not least parliamentary oversight. because of the enlargement of civil– • Australia should follow the example of the military cooperation in delivering aid. US in conducting a quadrennial diplomacy It requires independent representation and development review, which would at the highest levels, including, either enable government to re‑examine the routinely or by invitation, in the National aid program every four years, paying Security Committee of Cabinet. attention to: • ODA is a whole-of-government exercise - development effectiveness involving a number of departments and - the success of whole-of-government agencies, so the new ministerial portfolio mechanisms in delivering ODA should be one that covers international development assistance whether - civil–military cooperation in disaster delivered by AusAID or not, as happened relief with the parliamentary secretaryship - civil–military cooperation in from 2007 to 2010. state-building in permissive and non-permissive environments • AusAID will be the fifth largest ‘department’ in terms of expenditure - the links between the overall ODA by 2015, a consideration that by itself effort and national security suggests the need for a dedicated - the future direction of the aid aid portfolio. program.

Delivering ODA requires experience and Maintain the new aid commitment mechanisms in areas such as finance, to Africa, but not at the expense of procurement, design, quality control, the Asia–Pacific region, and in the resources allocation and internal coordination. context of a heightened awareness This should all be under one agency to of security issues manage ODA processes. A single organisation The Australian Government will double should be accountable; the technical Australia’s bilateral development assistance assessment and support should be spread to African countries from $70.6 million across other relevant agencies, which should in 2008–09 to $139.2 million in 2010–11. stick to their core functions and expertise. Total Australian ODA to Africa for 2010–11 is $200 million, and the government has Establish a new ministerial portfolio announced expenditure of $347 million over for official development assistance four years. The aid focuses on projects in in DFAT agriculture, maternal health, water and the AusAID’s central role in whole-of-government regulation and management of mining. activities across the security–development The renewed commitment to Africa needs spectrum necessitates a rethinking of its to be placed in context. The scaling up of 16 Special Report

aid to Africa is taking place within a rapidly importance as an aid donor, investor and growing aid budget, and the Asia–Pacific trade partner, while others—the United region will remain, overwhelmingly, the main Arab Emirates, Russia and Georgia, for focus of Australian ODA. Total aid to PNG example—are creating new Pacific links for and the Pacific in the current financial year themselves with small aid commitments. is estimated to be $1,085.4 million, of which Australia has compelling security interests in $457.2 million is for PNG and $225.7 million is remaining predominant in this region. for Solomon Islands, including the costs of Several Pacific countries are too small and the AFP. Rough estimates of per capita aid to isolated for the standard development the Pacific give a figure of $135 for the region models to be applicable to them. What they as a whole, $410 for Solomon Islands and $70 need are multiple links to the prosperous for PNG. The equivalent per capita figures countries nearby, Australia and New Zealand, for Australian aid to Africa are unknown and in a project of economic integration that difficult to calculate because the aid program enables them to share our prosperity. That is small and targeted at particular projects, means revisiting the Pacific Seasonal Worker such as health and education in Zimbabwe. pilot scheme, under which Australia was We can say with certainty, however, that to recruit Pacific islanders to relieve labour they’d be much lower than for the Pacific. shortages in the horticultural industries. The Australian mining ventures are becoming scheme hasn’t worked well enough. While its more important on the African continent. New Zealand counterpart has been a success, And Australia, as an Indian Ocean state our scheme needs to be reformed. Australia’s and one that’s committed to combating strategic interests also dictate a long-term terrorism, has broader national security reconsideration of immigration policy, which interests at stake in Africa and the Middle prevents unskilled Pacific islanders from East. Somalia, where an Australian battalion accessing our labour market and identifying joined the Unified Task Force of Operation their interests with ours. Restore Hope in the early 1990s, is a country without an effective government; for that Recognise Australia’s enduring reason, Australia would encounter difficulties strategic interests in Papua in returning to it but may be able to do so New Guinea, and its unique under the right conditions. Yemen, a new development problems base for Islamist terrorist groups and a PNG’s strategic importance to Australia is country with considerable development considerable and enduring. Our aid to PNG is challenges, might well deserve Australian set to rise by as much as 50% over the next development assistance that could directly four years, and we should remain committed benefit our national security. Our new AusAID to that growth, even though PNG’s current office in Addis Ababa could attend to both policy is to phase out aid in a way that doesn’t countries, particularly in food security and prejudice its development. agriculture assistance. The vast liquefied natural gas project that’s Recognise Australia’s enduring transforming parts of PNG and may double strategic interests in the South its GNI and boost development also has Pacific, and the region’s unique destabilising potential. development problems PNG receives less aid than its African The island Pacific is becoming a more counterparts. Benin, Uganda, Mozambique contested space. China is fast growing in A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 17

and Eritrea all receive considerably more from leveraging the special strategic role development assistance as a proportion of of many Australian resource companies GNI than PNG. operating overseas.16

Recognise that climate change in Consider creating a separate Australia’s region is a potential security sector in the aid budget national security issue Security sector reform, a central ODA The Garnaut Climate Change Review activity of the AFP, is currently included in concluded that the weight of scientific the governance sector of the aid program. evidence was that climate change is inevitable Creating a separate security sector of the aid and will be damaging. The Secretariat of the budget should be considered: Pacific Regional Environment Program argues • to recognise the increasing importance that climate change has arrived in the Pacific of aid–security cooperation in the aid in the form of coastal erosion, soil salinity program, as in security sector reform and higher sea levels. A number of Pacific • to make ODA expenditure by agencies island countries consist entirely of low-lying such as the AFP more transparent atolls—spits of sand raised slightly above the sea—while others have atoll regions. • to provide greater clarity about objectives The in the Indian Ocean face the and activities in ‘securing development’ same problem. Over a period of decades, • to define the rest of the governance sector entire national populations of atoll countries more clearly. in the Pacific and Indian oceans may need to migrate, and the international community Develop a coherent strategy may expect Australia to play its part in for whole-of-government accepting them. delivery of aid in permissive and non‑permissive environments An increasing aid program provides the opportunity to expand Australia’s spending Australia has a good international reputation on climate change adaptation initiatives in for civil–military cooperation in the delivery of Pacific countries, especially atoll countries. We aid. Our experience of whole-of-government need to strengthen AusAID’s Vulnerability and involvement in aid and emergency projects Adaptation Initiative, which currently operates over the past decade has also built a valuable in six Pacific countries, by increasing funding reservoir of regional knowledge and expertise and extending the scheme to other countries across the Australian Public Service. Key in the region. international institutions regard Australia as a model for others to follow. The OECD, Australian resource companies often operate in a 2006 report, commended the way in locations that are highly exposed to the Australia organised RAMSI.17 The World Bank adverse impacts of climate change. As those recently found many lessons for itself, the impacts become more pronounced, those UN and NATO in the Australian approach to companies can play a valuable collaborative intervention and state building in Bougainville role in humanitarian assistance. Because and Solomon Islands.18 And the Asia Pacific many mining operations already provide Civil-Military Centre of Excellence is working essential services in communities, they’re with departments and agencies to facilitate strategically placed to help communities civil–military cooperation. adapt. AusAID’s development assistance in adaptation planning would benefit 18 Special Report

Gratifying as our reputation may be, however, as putting together a country team consisting practitioners in the field report continuing of all relevant stakeholders (for example, difficulties in achieving effective cooperation agencies and government departments). between government agencies with different Such shared responsibility would be an institutional cultures, in both permissive and incentive to share assessments and outcomes. non-permissive environments. Those outcomes should include community empowerment, long‑term sustainability Procedures are well established in Canberra. and greater ownership of projects by For example, when a major conflict or local communities. disaster occurs overseas, DFAT establishes an interdepartmental emergency task force What’s needed is a coherent government with representation from Defence, AusAID, strategy to enhance civil–military cooperation the AFP, the Attorney-General’s Department as the aid budget grows. The Asia Pacific and Finance. The task force is responsible Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, which is for advising the government through the already developing such a strategy, will play National Security Committee of Cabinet. a key role in fashioning an effective whole- of-government response to conflict and The problem arises in the field, where issues disaster management, but all departments of interoperability, institutional culture and and agencies will need to adjust their cultures lines of command have the potential to and responses to the needs, in particular hamper the whole-of-government response. the security needs, of a new era in the There are also problems when security is aid program. restored and there’s a need to shift security operations and transition interventions into Endnotes long-term programs and partnerships. 1 A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: the National Security Strategy, CM 7953, For example, a gulf in cultures separates the October 2010. ADF from the NGOs that appeared in their 2 The first national security statement to the hundreds in Aceh after the tsunami; and, Australian Parliament, address by Prime although the first phase of RAMSI worked Minister Kevin Rudd, 4 December 2008. well, the ADF and the AFP were finding their 3 Shahar Hameiri, ‘Governing disorder: the way to cooperation while in the process of Australian Federal Police and Australia’s new bringing peace to Solomon Islands. Similar regional frontier’, The Pacific Review, 2009, 22(5):549–574. problems arose in southern Iraq and have emerged in Afghanistan, where AusAID 4 Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth, eds, Politics and state-building in Solomon officers need considerable military protection Islands, Asia Pacific Press and ANU E Press, to move around, and where AFP officers 2008, p. 10. approach their task in a different spirit from 5 Prime Minister, Transcript of joint press soldiers. The Australian Civilian Corps, in its conference with His Excellency Dr José infancy but growing, may point the way Ramos-Horta, President of Timor‑Leste, Canberra, 23 June 2010, available from http:// towards a new, less constrained civilian pmrudd.archive.dpmc.gov.au/node/6847. response to emergencies. 6 Defending Australia in the Asia–Pacific Staff working on a specific country usually century: Force 2030, Australian Government, Canberra, 2009, par. 2.26. share objectives, and to increase efficiency they should avoid duplicating their efforts. A 7 Anthony J Regan, Light intervention: lessons from Bougainville, United States Institute of number of initiatives could enable this, such Peace Press, Washington DC, 2010, pp. 65–71. A better fit: National security and Australia’s aid program 19

8 Regan, Light intervention, p. 80. Acronyms and abbreviations 9 AFP budget, 2010–11, available from ADF Australian Defence Force http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp/ AFP Australian Federal Police accountability-requirements/budget- statement.aspx AusAID Australian Agency for International Development 10 Letter dated 27 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Australia DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and to the United Nations to the President of Trade the Security Council, UNSC S/2006/440, GNI gross national income 29 June 2006, available from http://www. laohamutuk.org/reports/UN/UNDocs/2006/ NGO non‑government organisation S2006_440.pdfp://www.abc.net.au/pm/ ODA official development assistance content/2006/s1647641.htm [accessed 17 OECD Organisation for Economic July 2010]. Co‑operation and Development 11 http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country. PMG Peace Monitoring Group cfm?CountryID=911&Region=EastAsia. (Bougainville) 12 Australian Council for International PNG Papua New Guinea Development, In it for the long haul? Delivering Australian aid to Afghanistan, QDDR Quadrennial diplomacy and October 2010. development review (US) RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to 13 Australian Government Asia Pacific Civil‑Military Centre of Excellence, Solomon Islands Strengthening Australia’s conflict and disaster UN United Nations management overseas, Canberra, 2010. USAID United States Agency for 14 Better aid for a better future: seventh International Development annual report to parliament on Australia’s development cooperation program and the government’s response to the Committee of Task Force members Review of Australia’s Overseas Aid Program, 18 November 1997, p. 3. Chairs 15 Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness: terms of reference, available from http:// Peter Abigail, Major General (Retd), Executive www.aidreview.gov.au/index.html Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,

16 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, A case Sean Rooney, Executive Director, Foundation for collaboration: enhancing the development outcomes of Australian resource companies’ for Development Cooperation. operations overseas, special report 32, 2010, available from http://www.aspi. Participants org.au/publications/publication_details. aspx?ContentID=256. Mélanie Aube, Senior Operations Officer, 17 OECD, Whole of government approaches to Foundation for Development Cooperation. fragile states, Paris, 2006, p. 33. Anthony Bergin, Director of Research 18 Karene Melloul, Accidental partners? Listening to the Australian Defence and police Programs, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. experience of the security–development nexus in conflict-affected and fragile states, a Graeme Dobell, Foreign Affairs and Defence work product of the Trust Fund cooperation Correspondent for Radio Australia, 1978–2008, between AusAID and the World Bank’s now a contributor to The Interpreter, Lowy Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group prepared on behalf of the World Bank, Institute for International Policy. October 2010. Stewart Firth, Visiting Fellow, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. Formerly Professor of Politics, University of the South Pacific, Fiji. 20 Special Report

Peter Leahy, Director of the National Security About the Organisations Institute, University of Canberra. Formerly The Foundation for Development Cooperation Chief of Army. is an independent, not-for-profit international Bob Lyon, Chairman, the Foundation for development organisation which seeks to Development Cooperation. Formerly improve the lives of poor people in developing Managing Director and Chairman, ANZ countries. Banking Group, Pacific. ASPI is a leading Australian think tank in the fields of strategic, defence and security affairs. Alan McCagh, Chief Operating Officer, Global Justice Solutions specialising in law and justice capacity building projects in developing countries. Important disclaimer This publication is designed to provide Bob McMullan, Adjunct Visitor, Crawford accurate and authoritative information School of Economics and Government, in relation to the subject matter covered. Australian National University. Minister It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering for Arts and Administrative Services any form of professional or other advice and Minister for Trade in the Keating or services. No person should rely on government, and Parliamentary Secretary for the contents of this publication without International Development Assistance in the first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person. Rudd government.

Camilla Schippa, Director of the Institute About Special Reports for Economics and Peace and Senior Vice Generally written by ASPI experts, Special Reports are intended to deepen President, Global Peace Index . Formerly understanding on critical questions Chief of Office, United Nations Office facing key strategic decision-makers for Partnerships. and, where appropriate, provide policy recommendations. In some instances, Bob Sercombe, Federal Member for material of a more technical nature may Maribrynong, 1996–2007, former Shadow appear in this series, where it adds to the understanding of the issue at hand. Special Minister for Overseas Aid and Pacific Reports reflect the personal views of the Island Affairs. author(s), and do not in any way express or reflect the views of the Australian Michael G Smith AO, Major General (Retd), Government or represent the formal Executive Director, Asia Pacific Civil-Military position of ASPI on any particular issue. Centre of Excellence. Formerly Deputy ASPI Force Commander for the UN Transitional Tel +61 2 6270 5100 Administration in East Timor. Fax + 61 2 6273 9566 Email [email protected] Carl Ungerer, Project Director, National Web www.aspi.org.au Security Program, Australian Strategic © The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Policy Institute. Limited 2011 This publication is subject to copyright. Mark Vaile, Director, Vaile and Associates. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act Deputy Prime Minister in the Howard 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, government, Deputy Leader and Leader of photocopying, recording or otherwise) be the National Party as well as Minister for reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or Trade, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries transmitted without prior written permission. and Forestry and Minister for Transport and Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Regional Services.