The Greensboro Massacre: a Challenge to Accepted Historical Interpretations Jason Kops East Carolina University Faculty Mentor: Wade Dudley East Carolina University

The Greensboro Massacre: A Challenge to Accepted Historical Interpretations Jason Kops East Carolina University Faculty Mentor: Wade Dudley East Carolina University

ABSTRACT The Greensboro Massacre, a tragic event in the historical narrative of North Carolina, remains controversial in regards to the root causes and apportionment of culpability. By removing the multiple levels of rhetoric and bias pertaining to the highly charged social groups involved and by analyzing a broader depth of historical documents, the Greensboro Massacre can be examined more objectively. The evidence will demonstrate that the day of the rally did not go as planned according to any par- ticipant, and that the communist victims possibly contributed to their own demise. executed a calculated assault on civil rights he killings in Greensboro, North protestors. Allegedly, both local and federal TCarolina on November 3, 1979 are law enforcement agencies participated mired in controversy arising from the in the assault and cover-up. Allegedly, political and emotional atmosphere of defenseless protesters died fighting for the the time. Even the common moniker, rights of minorities. the Greensboro Massacre, projects bias Members of the Communist Workers through its implications of the innocence Party (CWP), the primary proponents and of those departed and the inhumanity of organizers of the “Death to the Klan” the aggressors. The level of polarization march, largely bear responsibility for the relating to those groups involved thickens tragedy. Negligent of their own safety and the shroud of bias, attenuating objectivity. without reguard to the safety of others, they Despite a plethora of documentation incited violence by aggressively provoking on the Communist Workers Party’s now the white supremacists. Moreover, members infamous “Death to the Klan” march, of the CWP demonstrated a pattern of common misconceptions of this event hijacking social causes for the advancement continue to proliferate. Social bias in North of their own communist agenda. The Carolina has tinted the lens of perception, communists promoted revolution through allowing for the easy reception of whichever the exploitation of the victims of social opinions tend to be loudest. Unfortunately, pathologies that they claimed to champion. the most extreme participants voice their Surviving members of the Communist arguments at the highest volume. There Workers Party have vociferously described exist numerous allegations that are not the killings as a concerted political only unsubstantiated but also contradicted assassination by trained paramilitarists. by the evidence. Allegedly, Ku Klux Klan This hyperbolic assertion is undermined (KKK) and affiliated Nazi sympathizers by the broader historical evidence that will

76 Jason Kops be examined. The documentation will members of the CWP engaged in a pattern support the conclusion that the Klansmen of commandeering social causes in order did not conspire to commit murder, and, to disseminate their political ideology and that while the white supremacy movement recruit soldiers for their revolution. increasingly adopted a militant identity For many years prior to November throughout the 1970s, the Klansmen did 3, 1979, the Greensboro community not execute a paramilitary operation on considered Nelson Johnson, prominent November 3. member of the CWP and key organizer of the anti-Klan rally, to be a source of social The Undisputed Facts unrest. A lengthy history of promoting During the late hours of the morning, violence and being arrested induced many on November 3, 1979, members of the to view Johnson as “alienated.”1 Johnson Communist Workers Party, including first achieved notoriety for his involvement prominent members such as Nelson in student protests in Greensboro in 1969. Johnson, Paul and Sally Bermanzohn, and The student council at Dudley High Signe Waller, held a “Death to the Klan” School controversially excluded a student rally in the Morningside Homes housing from the election for class president due to project in Greensboro, North Carolina. A his ties to black militancy. Administrators caravan of cars carrying Klansmen and believed this student was under the heavy affiliated Nazi sympathizers drove into influence of Nelson Johnson, a campus the starting point of the march, at the leader of black militancy at North Carolina corner of Carver Drive and Everitt Street. A&T.2 Johnson seemed to take advantage Upon arrival and before the rally officially of the backlash to the election at Dudley started, violence erupted. A meaningful and organized protests and boycotts at police presence was completely absent. the high school and university. As a result Lasting only eighty-eight seconds, the riot of Johnson’s aggressive tactics, casualties imparted devastating consequences on the mounted: one student was killed and participants and the city of Greensboro. numerous others were injured or arrested. As a direct result, five members of the After more than two weeks of unrest, the CWP, James Waller, Sandy Smith, Bill mayor declared a state of emergency. The Sampson, Michael Nathan, and Cesar National Guard arrived and restored some Cauce, were killed. Numerous others were semblance of peace, but the damage to injured and arrested. Greensboro was evident.3 Several years later, many future members A Pattern of Exploitation of the Communist Workers Party first Leading to, during, and after the anti- became acquainted at Duke University. Klan rally, members of the CWP can be characterized as acting recklessly, 1 Jim Schlosser, “Leaders Are No Strangers Here,” exacerbating tensions and promoting Greensboro Record, November 5, 1979. violence. They pursued their revolutionary 2 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: political agenda at all costs, negligent Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), to the potential for harm. They 185. attempted to exploit the disenfranchised 3 North Carolina State Advisory Committee to the black community in Greensboro by United States Commission on Civil Rights, Trouble in manipulating racial tensions. However, the Greensboro: A Report of an Open Meeting Concerning Greensboro Massacre was not an isolated Disturbances at Dudley High School and North example of this behavior. The leading Carolina A&T State University (Greensboro, NC: NC Advisory Committee on Civil Rights, 1970), 1-11.

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Jim Waller, Cesar Cauce, Mike and Marty of whom obtained impressive degrees Nathan, and Paul and Sally Bermanzohn in higher education, made a conscious connected through their experiences at decision to work at the textile mills. If they Duke’s medical center in Durham. In lost their job, they had the ability to acquire 1976, communist activists, including the work elsewhere. On the contrary, the Bermanzohns, pushed for unionization average worker possessed minimal skills and for service workers at Duke. However, education, with severely limited options for infighting amongst rival communist factions employment. Being terminated from work derailed the effort. The activists failed to would bear more devastating consequences agree on a plan of action for the union for them than for the communists. The drive and prioritized their political agenda members of the CWP failed to take this over the needs of the employees. The public fact into consideration. dispute between the communists involved In addition to unionization efforts, the increasingly radical rhetoric that further communists with a medical background discouraged employees from supporting assisted in the organization of the Brown unionization.4 Lung Association (BLA). Once again, their Members of the CWP also focused radical politics created more division than heavily on unionization efforts at several unity. The primary organizers of the BLA Cone Mills locations in North Carolina. were aware of the communist tendencies They believed the textile plant floors of the CWP doctors and attempted to would serve well as recruiting grounds. mitigate their espousement of political The endgame of the communists included propaganda. They failed. The communist revolution and inversion of the status quo, doctors, intent on building the communist achieved by leading a unionized army.5 party, focused on educating their patients During the late 1970s, they successfully on the connection between capitalism and infiltrated several mills and union their health condition. The retired textile organizations. Protests were devised, and workers rejected their political rhetoric strikes were coordinated. Friction emerged and became reluctant to participate in the between the local unions and their parent organization.7 organizations, and negotiations with plant Publicity arose surrounding the political management regressed.6 Predictably, ideology of the doctors that tainted the entire the vociferous and radical nature of BLA campaign. Companies, on the verge the communists repelled potential allies of conceding to the BLA’s demands, took and emboldened adversaries. Again, to the offensive. Because of the communist the workers suffered, as their legitimate stigma, the BLA lost all bargaining power. concerns were eclipsed by the politics of Many of the BLA organizers blamed the the CWP members. communist activists for undermining their Moreover, the unionization efforts legitimate health concerns with Marxist were more perfidious to the average mill ideas of revolution. Members of the CWP worker than to members of the CWP. readily parted ways with the BLA in order The communist organizers, the majority to focus on the active workforce, a more fruitful source of recruitment than the pool of sick, retired laborers.8 While the BLA 4 Bermanzohn, 132-133. achieved future success in establishing new 5 Waller, 103-105.

6 William March, “WVO ‘Targeted’ Cone, Other Mills 7 Wheaton, 54-55 for Infiltration,” Greensboro Daily News, November 5, 1979. 8 Ibid., 57-58.

78 Jason Kops safety standards for employees, members textile mill in the nation. The communists of the organization never forgave the CWP. considered the environment “ripe” for When reports aired that some of the slain unionization. Defeating the Klan and victims of November 3 were organizers creating a union stronghold would serve in the Brown Lung Association, the BLA a dual-edged purpose. They supported an quickly distanced themselves from the organized march to confront the Klan, but communists.9 disapproved of using explosives, as some China Grove, the Greensboro Massacre, locals suggested. Concerns of serving and the Aftermath Prior to the November time in jail, not producing casualties, 3 rally, the Communist Workers Party ultimately dissuaded proponents from deployed a barrage of media attacks using explosives.12 against the Klan in a successful attempt When protest marchers arrived at the to emasculate them publicly. Earlier in library, the Klansmen realized they were 1979, Klansmen scheduled a showing of heavily outnumbered, but not out-gunned. the controversial film, Birth of a Nation, Both sides initially refused to back down, at a public library in China Grove, North but, at the behest of local police, the Klan Carolina. The use of public facilities for retreated inside the building. They later the proliferation of racist ideas incensed left quietly. Joe Grady, a Klan spokesman members of the Communist Workers Party, present at the China Grove event, claimed then known as the Workers Viewpoint that the Klansmen were well prepared Organization.10 They distributed a flier to establish firing lines, but opted for describing the Klan in the most pejorative the more peaceful solution. Even the and crude of terms. The leaflet overtly Klansmen believed that the communists encouraged blacks and union workers to were exploiting the local protesters as violently confront the Klan during their “cannon fodder.”13 While members of the planned event. It also prominently displayed CWP actively participated in the protest the slogans “Smash the Klan” and “Death at China Grove, a local resident, Paul to the Klan.” Of course, the authors Lucky, primarily directed the response to intertwined communist propaganda with the Klan.14 Afterwards, the CWP hijacked their anti-Klan rhetoric.11 the incident as by publicly purporting to be The confrontation at China Grove on July responsible for the success over the Klan. 8, 1979, while almost devoid of violence, The communist agitators exploited was a major catalyst in the development the widely perceived public defeat of the of tragedy in Greensboro. Believing the Klan at China Grove and the Klanmen’s First Amendment should be selectively subsequent embarrassment. A leaflet applied, members of the CWP planned to distributed by the CWP, once again, disrupt the Klan activity held at the public encouraged readers to “Smash the facility. In addition to the scheduled Klan Klan,” adding that “armed self-defense” event, China Grove housed the largest and “correct understanding” would be necessary. The CWP publishers claimed responsibility for chasing the Klan from 9 “Claim Disputed,” Wilmington Morning Star, November 24, 1980. 12 Waller, 184-186. 10 Sally Bermanzohn, Through Survivors’ Eyes: From the Sixties to the Greensboro Massacre (Nashville: 13 “Klan Rally and Film Protested,” Lexington Vanderbilt University Press, 2003), 184. Dispatch, July 9, 1979.

11 Greensboro Police Department, Appendix A. 14 Waller, 185-186.

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China Grove and insinuated there would completely absent from the rhetoric and be future acts of aggression. The leaflet actions of the communists.19 culminated in an attack on the press for In addition to a campaign to goad the being a tool of the bourgeoisie.15 “Correct Klansmen into a violent confrontation, understanding,” a subtle and misleading members of the Communist Workers moniker, refers to embracing Marxist Party engaged in other activities that ideology and the party line. directly endangered the public. Assuming The CWP published similar leaflets a confrontation would take place, the advertising a rally on November 3, CWP placed members of the community persisting in their assertions that armed at risk by planning a march that traversed conflict was the only method to successfully several public housing projects. Believing quell the growing public threat of the the security would be inadequate at the KKK. They also continued to utilize the march, the CWP relied on the community incident at China Grove as an example as an auxiliary defense. They produced of their commitment to protecting the fliers that solicited residents to defend the people from the overpowering forces of the march through an armed presence on their capitalist aggressors. Issuing an open letter porches.20 Although the CWP failed in its to members of the Klan, the CWP again attempt to make soldiers out of unwilling accused them of being a tool for capitalism participants, the membership succeeded in and encouraged them to settle their converting a peaceful neighborhood into a differences through physical confrontation battlefield. at the rally in Greensboro.16 They goaded Many of the decisions made on the Klan through television exposure as November 3 by members of the CWP well. seemed to contribute to the increased While the Communist Workers Party potential for disaster. The Klansmen’s distributed leaflets declaring “Death to the arrival alone was an act of aggression, Klan,” the Klansmen were reluctant to use but the anti-Klan demonstrators initiated death in their propaganda.17 Critics may violence by assaulting the caravan of argue for a metaphorical interpretation of cars. The Klansmen drove to Greensboro the employment of the word death. However, with malicious intentions, but they were an open letter from the CWP to the Klan woefully unprepared for the mass of on October 22, 1979 supports the more protesters that violently swarmed them. literal definition. The intent of the “Death Contrary to the stipulations of the parade to the Klan” rally is described, in part, as permit, many CWP protesters transported “to organize to physically smash the racist firearms to the rally. Klansmen fired the KKK.” Again in the letter, the inevitability first shots, but the CWP’s use of firearms of the Klan being “smashed physically” induced a more forceful response from is reiterated.18 The conscious decision their counterparts. Many Klansmen intent by the Klan to exclude the word "death" on fisticuffs scrambled for their firearms from their fliers seems to demonstratedat after perceiving the communists to be least some level of restraint, which seems heavily armed.21 Curious residents, not affiliated with 15 Greensboro Police Department, Appendix A. 19 Wheaton, 120-121. 16 Ibid., Appendix B. 20 Waller, 211. 17 Workers Viewpoint Organization, “Death to the Klan Flier” in J.A. Armfield Papers. 21 Jack Scism, “Four Die in Klan-Leftist Shootout,” Greensboro Daily News, November 4, 1979. 18 Waller, 203-204.

80 Jason Kops either faction, lined the streets when disruptions during court proceedings and the confrontation erupted. With plenty held numerous public demonstrations. Due of outlets for retreat, members of the to the belief that the system was rigged, they Communist Workers Party exchanged refused to testify in any trial.27 Members gunfire and punches with the Klansmen, of the CWP were oblivious to the damage increasing the prospect of collateral they inflicted. Their radical public displays damage.22 Jim Waller, prominent member further marginalized their cause amongst of the CWP and casualty of the rally, the community. In the absence of survivor supplied at least one protester, untrained in testimony, the deceased members of the firearms, with a loaded pistol.23 A mortally CWP lacked a personal and emotional wounded Bill Sampson, another member presence in court. of the CWP, selflessly relinquished his pistol to another injured demonstrator. However, The Klan the pistol contained incorrect ammunition, The embarrassment of the Klansmen at leading to the near-death of its bearer.24 China Grove, North Carolina, where they After the tragic rally, the Greensboro retreated from a large and hostile crowd, community did not converge in defense motivated them to attend the “Death to the of the protesters. The communists Klan” march in Greensboro. They assumed perpetually, and grossly, miscalculated that the rally would largely be attended by their connection with and support from the blacks, not whites, including many of those local citizenry. Residents were angered by present at China Grove. This presumption the violence. They insisted, justifiably, that fueled much of the internal Klan rhetoric the communist and supremacist outsiders and agitation.28 Race played a major role were responsible for the carnage in their in encouraging the Klansmen to act on streets. Some community leaders regarded their impetus for violence. the incident as white-on-white violence, In addition to confronting the Klan at unrelated to the civil plight of blacks.25 China Grove, members of the Communist Others defended the conduct of police. Workers Party nearly monopolized media Despite the heavily charged atmosphere, exposure, preventing the Klansmen almost everyone urged for calm and reason from achieving the press coverage they to prevail.26 desperately desired.29 Certainly, the The surviving members of the CWP Klansmen intended on skirmishing with pushed for upheaval, not peace. They the communists, whom they viewed as engaged in an “Avenge the Murder of the source of their public embarrassment. the CWP 5” campaign, similar to guerilla Despite claims to the contrary, the Klansmen advertisement, encouraging violent envisioned a “knock-down, drag-out fight,” resistance. Survivors created constant not an exchange of bullets. They expected to brawl against several hundred protesters, 22 Winston Cavin, “Without Warning, the Shooting mostly large blacks, and believed that the Started,” Greensboro Daily News, November 4, 1979. police would be irrelevant in a fistfight. 23 Wheaton, 129. The Klansmen originally decided against

24 Ibid., 147. 27 Waller, 268-278 25 Martha Woodall and Greta Tilley, “Melee Angers Residents,” Greensboro Daily News, November 5, 1979. 28 Elizabeth Wheaton, Codename GREENKIL: The 1979 Greensboro Killings (Athens, GA: University of 26 Dwight F. Cunningham, “Residents Pleading Keep Georgia Press, 2009), 110-111. Radicals Out,” Greensboro Daily News, November 7, 1979. 29 Ibid., 120.

81 Explorations | Humanities transporting firearms to the rally.30 for their hostile actions and utter disregard The decision of whether to carry guns for human life. The physical blood, long became a heated topic of discussion for removed from their hands, continues to the Klansmen preparing for the march. metaphorically stain them. All agreed that an effort would be made to produce more noise than the protesters, Law Enforcement which would inevitably lead to a physical Members of law enforcement passively confrontation. However, conflicting contributed to the Greensboro Massacre, opinions arose regarding firearms. Some but the claim that they colluded in the Klansmen believed that carrying a firearm killings and participated in a massive cover- would demonstrate their fear of the up is contradicted by the documentation. protesters, unnecessarily emboldening The Greensboro Police Department them. The pro-gun camp decidedly won undertook several precautions leading the argument, mainly for concerns about to the anti-Klan rally, well aware of the defense. Arguably, uncertainty and fear impetuous nature of the social factions to ultimately compelled the Klansmen to be in attendance. However, confusion about proceed heavily armed.31 details and failures of communication Additionally, the Klansmen’s claims of plagued the officers assigned to the march. self-defense bear some credibility, lending The Greensboro Police Department doubt to the assertion that they planned (GPD) held a debriefing on the morning a shooting spree. They transported a of November 3. The officers in charge majority of their firearms in one car’s disseminated several key pieces of trunk, demonstrating a lack of intent to information during this meeting that they use them.32 Upon arrival, the protesters believed to be true. An unknown number violently swarmed the Klan caravan. of Klansmen assembled at a location The lead car stopped, trapping the relatively close to the planned route of the subsequent cars in the caravan. Panicked, march, and at least some of them possessed the Klansmen reacted with an innate and firearms. The Klansmen planned to heckle animal instinct.33 the protesters as they marched by hurling On November 3, the Klansmen eggs and insults. They intended to confront behaved as a disorganized and non- the protesters at the end of the march. cohesive group, united primarily by their Supervising officers briefed their bigotry and propensity for violence. As subordinates on state and local laws that a collective unit, they acted haphazardly would possibly need to be enforced during and without foresight. While they are not the rally. They directly assigned twenty-six guilty of all charges made against them, personnel to the event. The commanders they are culpable on numerous levels for advised all units to be in their assigned the tragedy that unfolded. The white locations no later than eleven-thirty that supremacists deserve more than contempt morning and granted permission to eat lunch beforehand. This decision later 30 Ibid., 111-112. haunted them. The parade permit issued designated the starting location as the 31 Ibid., 114-115. intersection of Everitt Street and Carver 32 Ibid., 144. Drive in the Morningside Homes housing 33 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, project. The permit listed the starting time Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission as noon. When Nelson Johnson, who filed Report (Greensboro, NC: Greensboro Truth and the parade permit, picked up the official Reconciliation Commission, 2006), 6.

82 Jason Kops approval, a police commander requested right to peacefully assemble. Arguably, the they meet at Morningside Homes thirty Klansmen could have been arrested on minutes prior to the start of the rally in charges of conspiracy as they gathered. order to coordinate their actions. Johnson Regardless of the potential success for never agreed to the meeting. conviction, arrests had the potential to be Not every police officer assigned to justified and to avert disaster. the march took a lunch break before the In addition, the police should have taken protest. Some searched for Nelson Johnson action to prevent an illegal double standard. prior to the march. They failed to observe In accordance with the agreement in the any activity at Everitt and Carter, just after parade permit, transporting firearms to the ten in the morning, and proceeded to the rally would have been a violation of the law. Windsor Community Center, arriving The police, aware of the Klansmen’s intent around ten-thirty. The officers encountered on being both armed and in attendance, a hostile group of protesters preparing for possessed a foundation to detain the the march. Having failed to locate Johnson Klansmen and search their vehicles for and having further agitated the crowd, the weapons. At the very least, the police could officers decided to pursue a lower profile. have searched the Klansmen for eggs. They assumed that the protesters would The police commander who approached congregate at Windsor and march to the Nelson Johnson on November 1 about start of the rally. This assumption led to meeting to coordinate the protest march the distraction of many police units from activities could have been more thorough the Morningside Homes area. in establishing a concrete time and place. At 11:13 AM, Detective Jerry Cooper, The officers searching for Nelson Johnson the police officer surveilling the caravan of on November 3 claimed to be ignorant Klansmen, radioed the communications of Johnson’s appearance, which hindered center and informed them that the caravan their efforts. However, as police are often was mobile and headed towards the rally responsible for locating people who do not site. Two minutes later, the radio operator wish to be located, additional resources relayed this information to all channels. could have been utilized in their quest for At this time, many police units were Johnson. enjoying their lunch, thus tragically out of Distractions foiled the police department position. Even worse, key officers involved in their performance of duties. At no point were intermittently out of radio contact, should officers have been allowed to take a fettering the coordinating efforts of the lunch break without relief officers in place. police. Cooper first radioed reports of Given the history of animosity between heckling at eleven-twenty-two. During the the Klansmen and the protesters, most next minute, he followed with reports of notably the China Grove incident earlier fighting and shots fired. Not yet in position, that year, officers should have maintained many officers were helpless to intervene. a heightened state of attentiveness and With the information available, the performed more diligently. In organizing Greensboro police should have enacted an operation consisting of twenty-six stronger measures of prevention prior to men, superior officers being outside of the Klansmen’s arrival at the rally. The radio contact provided for an ineffective act of throwing eggs would constitute response.. assault. Furthermore, any physical act of Planning and executing a successful aggression directed at the protesters would demonstration required cooperation constitute infringement upon their civil between the local police and the protesters.

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Arguably, a mutual distrust, deeply rooted superiors failed to adequately communicate in the political ideology of those two with local law enforcement and relay groups, sabotaged efforts to coordinate. information pertinent to successfully The communist organizers maintained mitigating potential violence. a distant relationship with the police in The performance and effectiveness of regards to the march, and many key officers the BATF was perhaps hindered by their assigned performed ineffectively in their tunnel-vision. Their desire to procure professional duties. charges stemming from firearms violations In their allegations, surviving members obscured the evident warning signs of of the CWP also implicated the federal impending violence. Despite their failure to government, specifically the Federal serve the greater public good, agents of the Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Bureau BATF actively engaged in tactics designed of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), to disrupt the illegal trafficking amongst in conspiring against them. At the time, white supremacists, not the activities of the the FBI had a well-established reputation communist revolutionaries of disrupting social movements through As conspiracy theories proliferated after extra-legal means. In addition, the FBI and the tragedy, many people failed to notice the KKK shared a common enemy, thus an the irony in accusations of collusion. While allegiance of sorts, in fighting communism the communists maintained that agents of in the years following WWII. the capitalist government employed the However, the attention of the FBI KKK in an effort to crush their Marxist became heavily focused on the rising revolution, Klansmen believed that the influence of white supremacy groups. government was being manipulated by Starting in the mid-1960s, the FBI pursued Zionist forces in an attempt to spread an official agenda of aggressively disrupting communism. The FBI did engage in Klan and Nazi activities, attaining high hostile activities directed towards social levels of success towards the end of the movements deemed subversive, including decade. Their actions created blowback the aforementioned, but they never allied within the white supremacy community themselves with any radical organization and fostered an increasing hatred and pertaining to the Greensboro Massacre. mistrust of the government, perceived to Arguably, members of local and federal be under the manipulation of communist law enforcement were complicit in tragedy, and Zionist forces. Regarding the killings not conspiracy. While their negligent in Greensboro, the FBI intervened in the actions fostered an atmosphere conducive aftermath in order to provide security to precludable tragedy, the warring and pacify the volatile atmosphere, not communist and supremacist factions would participate in a cover-up. not be deterred in their pursuit of violent Unlike the the FBI, the BATF had an confrontation. Thus far, the members of the undercover agent planted amongst the Communist Workers Party have attempted Klansmen well before the confrontation in to avoid a significant apportionment of Greensboro. Bernard Butkovich infiltrated blame in the public arena. Nevertheless, as the white supremacy groups associated they arguably orchestrated the “Death to with the United Racist Front (URF) in an the Klan” rally, they arguably orchestrated attempt to intercept illegal firearms. He the violence that ensued. attended numerous rallies and meetings Conclusion where Klansmen made preparations for Throughout the decade prior to the November 3. Agent Butkovich and his Greensboro Massacre, members of the Communist Workers Party engaged in a

84 Jason Kops myriad of smaller social movements in the tragedy while hurling allegations of order to leverage their political capital. conspiracy and assassination. This analysis The communists’ lack of subtlety and of historical documents also revealed desire for control debilitated the efforts of no evidence of conspiracy among law many organizations in their attempts to enforcement, but rather that the members redress genuine grievances. The negative of law enforcement involved performed consequences of CWP involvement seem their duties ineffectively. They acted in to consistently outweighed the benefits a manner bereft of collusion and malice. of their call to action. Ultimately, the The Klansmen did arrive in Greensboro revolutionary agenda of the communists with violent intentions. However, they failed; perhaps they were blinded by their responded to direct incitement from the own exceptionalism. CWP and, in some unjustifiable capacity, As with their other activities, the acted as they had in similar situations. The surviving members of the Communist members of the Communist Workers Party Workers Party viewed the riot on November did not deserve their fatal consequences, 3, 1979 through a distorted lens. They but they certainly set the stage for a high rejected any guilt or responsibility for probability for violence and death.

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Bibliography Primary Sources

Bermanzohn, Sally. Through Survivors’ Eyes: From the Sixties to the Greensboro Massacre. Nashville: Vanderbilt Press, 2003.

Greensboro (N.C.) Daily News, 1979.

Greensboro Police Department. An Administrative Report of the Anti-Klan Rally, Greensboro, North Carolina, by William E. Swing. Greensboro, NC: Greensboro Police Department, 1979.

Greensboro (N.C.) Record, 1979.

Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. Greensboro, NC: Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2006.

J.A. Armfield Papers. Greensboro Historical Museum. Greensboro, NC: University of North Carolina Greensboro, 2012. http://library.uncg.edu/dp/crg/collection.aspx?c=69 (accessed on April 22, 2012).

Lexington (N.C.) Dispatch, 1979.

North Carolina State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights. Trouble in Greensboro: A Report of an Open Meeting Concerning Disturbances at Dudley High School and North Carolina A&T State University. Greensboro, NC: NC Advisory Committee on Civil Rights, 1970.

Waller, Signe. Love and Revolution: a Political Memoir: People’s History of the Greensboro Massacre, its Setting and Aftermath. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002.

Wilmington (N.C.) Morning Star, 1980.

Secondary Sources

Chafe, William H. Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black Struggle for Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Drabble, John. “From White Supremacy to White Power: The FBI COINTELPROWHITE HATE, and the Nazification of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1970s.” American Studies 48, no. 3 (Fall, 2007): 49-74.

Wheaton, Elizabeth. Codename GREENKIL: The 1979 Greensboro Killings. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008.