AT-RISK and NSA PPT Template

Thwarting the Modern Terrorist at Hotels and Special Events Agenda

. Introduction . Attacks on Special Events . Attacks on Hotels . Diagnosis of Tactics Utilized . Mitigation Strategies . Questions . Closing

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Special Event Attacks

Bataclan Theater – Paris, France San Bernardino • Multiple Attackers • Military Tactics Used • Attacked security & LEO • Employee/Contractor – insider knowledge • High Caliber weapons used Cricket Team Lahore, Pakistan Nice, France • Suicide vests • Vehicles • Explosives

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Impact on Special Events 44% . Anticipate changes to meeting and event industry . More destination research and 15% communications regarding risk 5% . More attendee screening . Provide more employee training 19% . Updating procedures and contingency plans 9% . Adding more security staff 15% . Working with local and federal law enforcement 5% . Developing new security plans 14% . Predict no changes 27%

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 MPI Meetings Outlook, Winter 2016 Impact on Economy and Business Revenues

. Egypt 2013 – 11% of countries GDP tied to tourism . 2014 – tourism reported slumps of almost 31%, industry earnings only $5.9bn. Egypt Tourism . Sinai hotel occupancy has 20000000 plummeted and as of January 15000000 2016 it is estimated to cost 10000000 $230-$300 million per month to 5000000 the economy 0 2010 2011 2012 2013

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 The Mumbai Attack

. India’s 26/11 . One of the best planned terrorist attacks - audacious and ambitious . Multiple attacks at different locations prevented authorities from developing an overall assessment of the situation . The first “active shooter” type terrorist attack . Precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation both physical and mental . Terrorist reconnaissance done in late 2007 – consistent with other large scale terrorist operations . Terrorist planners stayed in the hotel during their recce and took a guided tour through the hotel, videoing the tour . Terrorists entered at the famous Leopold Café and moved to the rear entrance of the Taj . Walked through the grounds and ground floor of the hotel . Then swiftly moved to the upper floors causing confusion and delaying rescue operations . Suicide attackers who were able to operate effectively over an extended period of time . Heavily armed – assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, hand grenades, improvised explosive devices. . Additional supplies were placed around the hotel

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Multiple Attacks

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Taj Mahal

. Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Mumbai, India . 26 November 2008, approx. 8:30pm . NSA 7 dinner in the Souk Restaurant on the 25th floor . Approx. 30 fellow diners in the restaurant – Americans, Europeans and Indian elite

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Overview

. Heard a commotion advised that a fight had broken out between two rival gangs . NSA team and diners received word that the hotel was under attack by terrorists . Nobody was responding so Bob assumed leadership role . The restaurant was not safe – surrounded by windows . Found a supply of ‘weapons’ in the kitchen so armed with meat cleavers and carving knives . Informed that terrorists were making their way to the top of the hotel . No defence and nowhere to go AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Reaction

. NSA 7 found a conference venue on the same floor that could be secured . Established a ‘holding area’ and moved the restaurant patrons there . Already 120 people there – we were now 150 people . Barricaded the doors . Brought up the elevator and jammed it open . Took out the lights near the entrance . Positioned near each entry point . NSA team member in the ceiling . Addressed the group after every explosion or noise or at 20 min intervals . See the attackers / hear shots and explosions / see and hear activity at the nearby Trident hotel . Stayed in “holding area” for 5 ½ hours . Moved the group down 25 floors as a fire had broken out below that was moving towards the holding area . One floor at a time over 1 ½ hours until a safe route out was found

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Run

. Group not under actual attack in the restaurant . We believed that the terrorists were heading towards us . Left the secured area only when the threat of fire became imminent . Move slowly down 25 flights of stairs – took about 2 ½ hours . It took 7 ½ hours to get out . 150 people were rescued

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Hide

. Terrorists were shooting anyone they could see . We were relatively safe - out of sight and they didn’t know we were there . Occasionally spotted some of them but had no idea how many there were . Sophisticated, well-planned attack on multiple venues . Found a hiding place and secured the area

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Fight

. We were armed with ‘weapons’ . ‘Element of surprise’ should a terrorist locate us . We were ready to fight . We had a fighting chance

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Lessons Learned

Communications Control . 2 people called 3 numbers . Who’s in charge? continuously / hotel lobby, security manager and the Mumbai police . Getting info from our own people in India as well as in South Africa . Pros and Cons of Broadcast . Information received was invaluable . BIGGEST CHALLENGE WAS TO REMAIN UPDATED

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Analysis of Attack Strategies

. Armed assailants – Small team tactics used to storm facilities, creating panic, driving evacuations to secondary attacks . Multi-stage bombing attacks & personnel flow during evacuation – Use of suicide vests as last resort weapons – Placement of VBIED near evacuation locations

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Emerging Strategies

. Use of Drone to carry payload of explosives or chem/bio into unsuspecting crowd at event or venue . Weaponization of chemical/biological materials . Re-emergence of “Sniper Attacks” . Nice, France vehicles used as weapons . Targeting of senior executives in their homes – i.e. cripple Marriott by executing the leaders

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Mitigation Strategies

. "Layers of security” – beyond the building perimeter . Lessons from Marriott . Alternate or backup CCTV rooms . Maps or 3D walk-through models of the hotel . Train your staff to recognize surveillance and limit how much information is public. . Surveillance Detection Strategies . Protective Intelligence . Trained and Practiced Threat Assessment Programs

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Mitigation Strategies

. Thorough searches at entry points to the location . Where possible, create buffer / reaction zones . Communications - crisis communication strategy and information management plan . Leadership . Communication training of all hotel staff . Train all staff in evacuation skills and crisis management . Empower staff to handle crises . Appoint key reaction staff on each floor . Ongoing drills and training . Plan for emergencies AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Back to Basics – Event Security

. Dynamics of event security are changing Assess . Basics still apply Open Plan

Credential Secure

Post Clear

AT-RISK International & Nicholls Steyn & Associates 2016 Ask Us a Question Thank you for attending.

Bob Nicholls Chuck Tobin Director Chairman & President Nicholls Steyn and Associates AT-RISK International [email protected] [email protected] +27 (11) 462-7540 +1-561-998-0064