Fire Refuge Revieiw I Examiníng the Role of Fire Refuges in Helping People Mínímise the Rísks of T Bushfire in Victoria

WIT.4000.001.0055 t t Fire Refuge Revieiw I Examiníng the role of Fire Refuges in helping people mínímise the rísks of t Bushfire in Victoria. I I I I t I April2001 T SHIRE @ o/vqRRA City o/ Whittlesea T I BåNcrs

þ MORNINGTON PEN¡N5ULA..rl--"' Shirc Cotncìl ! Nat¡ral Resor¡rccs and Environmcnt ¡r EN ¡r Developed bY the Fire Refuge Revíew Working PartY (a Local Governmetú multi-agency Committee) WIT.4000.001.0056

April 2001

CONTENTS Pase INTRODUCTION

1 PURPOSE OF REPORT 3 ., EXECUTTVE SUMMARY 4 BUSHFIRE IN VICTORIA I 3.1 How a Bushfire Works I 3.2 Bushfire Fuel 9

BUSHFIRE FATALITIES t2 4.1 Losses due to Bushfire 1,2 4.2 How Deaths Occur 13 4.3 Damage to Property 13 4.4 Hierarchy of Risk to People T4 4.5 Risk to Property t4

5. PERSONAL SURVTVAL TECHNIQUES IN A BUSHFIRE 15 5.1 Leave the Area Early 15 5.2 Stay and Defend t6 5.3 Alternative Shelter before the Fire Front Arrives t6 5.4 Seeking Shelter in a Formal Designated Fire Refuge t7

CURRENT ISSUES }VTTH FIRE REFUGES t9 6.1 1997 Dandenong Ranges Fires Coronial Inquiry t9 6.2 Purpose of a Refuge 20 6.3 PerformanceCriteria 20 6.4 Fire Refuges - A Greate¡ þanger or a Greater Benefit? 2t

7. ISSUES CONCER¡IING THE ROLE OF AGENCIES 7) 7.l Dependency on Authorities during Bushfires 22 7.2 The Management and Resourcing of Designated Fire Refuges 22 7.3 Authority to determine a Designated Fire Refuge 23 7.4 Proposed Role of Agencies 24

8. CONCLUSIONS 26

9. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 28

10. THE NEXT STEPS 30

11. REF'ERENCES 3l WIT.4000.001.0057

April 2001

INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared by a working Party auspiced by the Víctorian Emergency Management council and comprises representatives from:

Name Organisation

Paul Gabriel Department of Justice

Bernard Barbetti Department of Natural Resources and Environment

David Craven Victorian State Emergency Service John Hendrikson Victoria Police (Lilydale) Murray Adams VictoriaPolice (Melbourne) Jon Boura CountryFire Authority (Yarra Area - Region 13) Peter Murphy City of Whittlesea

Nick Haslinghouse Macedon Ranges Shire Council GrahamRobertson MomingtonPeninsulaShireCouncil

Sam De Gabrielle Mitchell Shire Council Norman Golgerth Nillumbik Shire Council Cr David Hodgett Shire of Yarra Ranges

Bob lforner Victorian Rural Fire Brigade Association Brian Hine Dept. of Infrastructure - Local Govt. Division

Lex Ritchie Shire of Yarra Ranges

Noreen Krussel CountryFire Authority Headquarters

Duncan Maughan CountryFire Authority, Headquarters

Terry Wilkinson Shire ofYarra Ranges

Norm Free Shire ofYarra Ranges John O'Donoghue Municipal Association of Victoria WIT.4000.001.0058

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I.. PURPOSE OF REPORT

'HistoricalÍy, the Australían Cammunity l¡as afways faced 'wildfire' in the büst¡ vironment. This wîlI not çhange. Wíth the increasrng desire af Í*dividuals ta li in ptaces of rural and bash beauty {sucÍr as fñe Ðandenang Ranges} ffre errt rísr< sf fire nrüsf be managed. Fire management will învaríably need to balanced wíth the compúing requirement of erntironmental cantrols. Eecause of thesfieer magnitude and potentiat widespread destruction af 'wíÍdfire' the managernent of its risks lras to öe both a cammunìty and tlsemi gtluernfirettt age*q¡ responsibility.' Caroner, 1$97 Ðandenong Ranges Fires, Coronial. lnquest,2S:June 1999, Pa

Communities across Victoria have to deal with bushfre.

Bushfires can cause significant loss of life as well as personal injury, damage to property and emotional distress for people faced with being caught in the path of a fierce and threatening bushflre, or losing family or friends as a result of such a disaster.

The last major bushfues in the Dandenong Ranges occurred rnlanuary 1997.

After the event, under the auspices of the Victorian EmergencyManagement Council (VEMC), the Shire ofYarra Ranges, in May 1998, called together the agencies and councils who have a responsibility to plan for emergencies caused by bushf,re.

The meeting was attended by numerous agencies and local governments, including the Country Fire Authority (CFA), Victoria Police, the Victorian State Emergency Service (VICSES), the Shires of Macedon Ranges, MorningtonPeninsula, Mitchell, Nillumbik, Whittlesea and Yarra Ranges and State Government representatives from the Office of Local Government and the Department ofJustice. The task of the meeting was to commence the process of reviewing the role of fire refuges as a safety strategy in a bushfire.

Specifrcally, the Shire wished to examine the value of Designated Fire Refuges as a suitable strategy in helping people minimise their risk of exposure to bushfire. .Working As a result of this meeting a Party was formed to prepare a background paper and a set of proposals on fire refuges which would improve community safety. The Working Party was also required to develop a set ofrecommendations on the procedures required to achieve effective implementation of the proposals.

The essential question for the Working Party was:

"What gives our community the best chance of survival in a high intensíty bushfire?n' WIT.4000.001.0059

April 2001

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In May 1998, in the wake of the Dandenong Ranges bushfires, over 30 Victorian agencies, authorities and councils met to consìder the role of fìre refuges in helpíne oeople minimise the risk of bushfires. The task of the working Party was to answer the question:

"What gives our community the best chance of survival in a high intensity bushfîre?"

After three years of investigation the Working Party was able to reach a number of conclusions regarding bushfires. These are:

The majority of fires are oro'low ìntensífit' (refer Table 1. Page 1l) and can be suppressed without loss to life and property.

The majority of property damage and death in a bushfire occurs with,,very Hìgh to Extreme fntensíþ' bushfires (refer Table 1. Page 11). Such fires are difficult to predict and there is usually little opportunity to provide adequate early warning to the community in the vicinity of where the fire starts.

While property damage and death is caused by a number of components of a very high to extreme intensity bushfÌre most fatalities result from radiant heat, which is emitted from flames. It is therefore important that people place a barrier or space between themselves and the radiant heat as the fire front passes over or around them.

Fire suppression is usually effective on low intensity bushlires. It becomes less effective as the intensity of fire increases. Other options are needed to protect the community and travelling public from very high to extreme intensity bushfires. Designated fire refuges is one such option that has been promoted.

Studies indicate that in Victoria since 1962, the single greatest cause of death in a bushfire is likely to be from radiant heat when people are caught in the open or in their car fleeing from the fire.

A study of the loss of houses from bushfires indicates that embers are the greatest cause and that if people are informed and well prepared to stay and defend their property there is every chance their property will be saved.

The Working Party developed a hierarchy of rísk to people and property on dhe basis of all the evidence before it (Refer section 4.4 page l4).

In summary those who are physically able and well prepared can probably survive a very high to extreme intensity bushfire and save their property if they stay and defend it. Those who are unable to do this should leave their arcaby early morning on a high-risk day that a bushfire is likely to occur (eg Total Fire Ban Day).

A desígnatedfre refuge ís usually ø buílding thaÍ ís sígned or otherwße þrmøtly identijìed ìn advønce as a refugefor use by the publìc. WIT.4000.001.0060

April 2001

Buildings can be used as refuges as they provide a barrier between people and radiant heat. However they need to be in close proximity so that people can get to them quickly on foot when a bushfire occurs. Conversely, buildings can pose a risk to life through asphyxiation from smoke as well as from the flames so they need to be properþ prepared, ventilated, well clear of any vegetatior¡ unlocked and accessible. People can shelter in them as a fire front passes and then move outside to defend the property from ember attack.

Local open spaces that are ideally free of firel and put sufficient space between people and radiant heat can also act as refuges and reduce the risk. These informal places of shelter may be sports ovals, neighbour's tennis courts, a beach or the main street of a shopping centre where the distance ûom the flames and smoke is suffrcient to protect those assembled from radiant heat and asphyxiation.

At greatest risk from a bushfire are those who plan to stay, then later decide to flee, either out o'safer" of the bushfire area or to a location that they need to drive to. This means that the distance to a designated fire ref,rge, further than a short trip by foot, creates ahazardto those fleeing the bushf,ne. People run the risk that they may be caught in the open or in their car on their journey to the refuge.

In respect of fi¡e refuges the Working Party concluded that:

The current formal designation of public refuges in some parts of the state is untenable and dangerous in the context of very high to extreme bushfires because:

Refuges have neither been selected nor maintained in accordance with any performance criteria or standards; Many refuges are located so far from their population catchment that people would need to drive to them - an extremely dangerous practice; Most refuges could not cope with their current population catchment; Adjacent vegetation or the refuge being locked when needed could compromise their safety.

Municipal councils are exposed to the risk of liability by designating public refuges. If councils were indemnified in respect of such liability, they could not guarantee safe shelter during very high to extreme bushfires in designated lire refuges.

Even with discontinuance of the use of fire refuges, the inappropriate legal exposure of eouncils needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

VÍsÍtors and other non-residents need special consideration in bushfire safety. It is assumed that they do not know the location of designated fire refuges nor access routes.

Local, well chosen, informal places of shelter (particularly as part of a personal survival strategy) offer people of Victoria a better chance of surviving a hÍgh intensity bushfire than designated /formal fire refuges.

The best chance to survive a bushfire Ís through community education to understand the need for, and the development of, a personal survival plan. Through their planning, o'leuve people will decide to "støy ønd defenû' or eørly". If they decide to stay, their plan

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will help them to prepare their property to minimise the risk and assist them to locate an open space or building where they can shelter by or with their neighbours as the fire front passes through.

In the light of these findings the Working Party makes these recommendations:

Recommendation 1. That the State Government release frrnding immediately for a community education program to be conducted by the CFA, with the support of local councils and other agencies. The program should work in local communities to ensure that all residents have a personal survival plan and that they have familiarised themselves with their local area to identify an informal place of shelter where they will meet to support each other as the fire front passes through.

Recommendation 2.That firnding be made available for information materials and programs to educate workers in and visitors to bushfi¡e prone areas, on how to behave on days ofrisk from high intensity bushfires. The State agencies and the CFA with the support of the local councils and local employers should undertake this work.

Recommendation 3. That the Victoria Emergency Management Council undertakes the preparation of Guidelines for Local lnformal Places of Shelter.

These guidelines should be framed to assist people who are planning to stay and defend their property to identifu a place in their immediate neighbourhoods to shelter with neighbours while the fire front passes through.

Recommendation 4.That due to the risks associated with designated fire refuges, the Victoria Emergency Management Council:

remove all reference to designated formal fire refuges in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria;

acknowledge that designated refuges have never been a valid means of providing the best chance ofsurvival in a bushfire; advise councÍls that the references to designated refuges (togo) have been removed from the Emergency Management Manual VÍctoria and other official publications.

Recommendation 5. That the State Government amend the Emergency Management Act 1986 to provide an appropriate indemnity to Councils, to complement the provisions in section 94 of the country Fire Authority Act. 1958 along the following lines:

A Municipal Council, Councillor or member of staff of a Municipal Council or a Committee of Management is not subject to any action, liability, claim or demand for any matter or thing done or omitted to be done or contract entered for or in connection with: an emergency management plan; the suitability or availability of any venues mentioned or referred to in any emergency; management plan; WIT.4000.001.0062

April 2001 injuries or damage sustaÍned in attemFting to reach or in.taking refuge within any venue mentioned or referred to in any management plan; any communication or community educatíon; if the action taken or omitted to be taken by the Council, CouncÍllor or the member of council staff or the Committee of Management was taken in good faith for the purpose of carryÍng out a power or duty of a Council under this .A,ct or Regulations or any other Act or Regulations. WIT.4000.001.0063

April 2001

3.BUSHFIRE IN VICTORIA

If we are to give people their best chance of survival, we need to understand the nature of bushfi¡es and how they impact on communities. In this anaþis the word 'bushfi¡e' refers to fires in all vegetation types eg. forests, grasslands, heathlands.

Bushfnes are rated in terms of their intensity. This is a measurement of the amount of energy released per metre of fire front and is a major determinant of the damage likely to be caused by the bushf,re.

The bushfire history in Victoria is characterised by many low intensity, small consequence bushfires and a few large, high consequence (high intensity) bushfires. Although high intensity bushfres represent a small percentage of all bushfires that occur in Victoria, they result in the majority of damage and deaths.'

3.1 HOW A BUSIIFIRE WORKS

High intensity bushfires occur with extreme weather conditions such as high temperatures, low relative humidity and high wind speeds. They are more likely to occur during drought conditions. They are also more likely to occur on, but not limited to, days of Total Fire Ban. High intensity bushfires require an ignition source, which can vary from lightning to arson. This makes them very hard to predict, and there is usually little opportunity to provide an effective early warning to the community in the vicinity of the fire start.

People and property are at risk from various components of a bushfire. The three main elements that make up a bushfire are:

3.1.1 Flames and Radiant Heät

Flames from a bushfi¡e form what is known as the jire front. The flames emit heat which is known as radiant heøL

Radiant heat is responsible for the majority of fatalities caused by bushfre. It is the energy emitted from flames and burning vegetation. Most people know radiant heat as the heat they experience as they stand in front ofa radiator.

Radiant heat has the following characteristics: t It decreases with distance from the source. For example, by doubling the distance from the source, the amount of radiant heat is approximately decreased to one quarter.

c The effects of radíant heat are significantly decreased with the placement of a barrier and/or distance between people and the heat energy source. These solid obiects absorb heat energlt, which significantly increases the chance of survival.

Radiant heat can cause heat stroke, heat stress, dehydration and ultimately death because the human body needs to retain a fanly constant internal temperature. Pushing

' Loane and Gould 1986

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the human body beyond normal limits of adjustment with too much heat input results in death.

3.1.2 Ember Attacks

Ember attacks are characterised by embers or burning material being thrown up to hundreds of metres or several kilometres from the fire front causing spotting, or the ignition of new fires.

Ember attacks can occur before, during and after the fire front passes. The most cornmon cause of house loss during a bushfire is when burning embers land on or near a building, and no one is present to extinguish fires caused by those burning embers. In some cases the fire front may not even pass the property that is lost or damaged.

Residents, and those assisting them, play a major role in controlling ember attacks that occur before the fire front arrives or after it passes.

3.1.3 Smoke

Production of large quantities of smoke is an inevitable consequence of bushfire. This smoke is detrimentai to human safety in two main ways:

o Disorientation The most common impact of smoke in a bushfire is to discomfort and disorientate people. This can reduce their ability to protect themselves and defend their homes. Smoke across roads can lead to car accidents, leaving the occupants exposed to the radiant heat of the fire front.

o Asphyxiatíon For asphyxiation to occur smoke needs to replace oxygen for a period of several minutes. In the open air this is most unlikely to happen as the hot smoky air is rising away from the ground and being replaced with clean air. Where bushfre smoke fills a confined space asphyxiation can occur.

3.2 BUSHFIRE FUEL

In addition to extreme weather conditions a high intensity bushfire occurs where there is ample fuel, particularly fine firel such as fallen leaves, bark, small twigs and general undergrowth and also where there is an ignition source.

When the quantity of fine fuel in a given area is increased, the speed with which a bushfire travels through the area and the height of the flames also increases. WIT.4000.001.0065

April 2001

3.2.1 Fuel Management

There are three types of f,rel management applied to reduce bushfire loss. They are:

o Large scalefuel reduction An example is the forest fuel reduction program. This is aimed at reducing the spread of a fire. This approach is beneficial when combined with suppression operations. Large-scale fuel reduction is often adopted at locations adjacent to specific land uses (eg. housing areas). However, in the urban bushland interface it can be difficult to apply. This is due to the steeper topography, amenity, the physical location of people and their houses and other environmental considerations.

t Middle scalefuel reduction Examples are roadside slashing, creating fire-breaks and bufÏer zones. These techniques attempt to reduce fire intensity and aid in suppression operations. This approach is usually unsuccessful at stopping the spread of high intensity bushfne but can aid in asset survival.

o Small scalefuel reduction This applies to individual residential blocks and involves landowners managing fure fuel (grasses, bracken and twigs) near houses to reduce the likelihood of direct flame contact, or radiant heat igniting the house. This approach can be a valuable treatment when applied in conjunction with other approaches such as community education.

3.2.2 Suppression

Bushfires can be characterised by their intensity, that is the amount of energy being released per metre of fire perimeter (kw/m). See Table 1. Fire intensity is related to the ability of fire services to control a bushfne.

The vast majority of bushfires are of relatively low intensity and are suppressed with little impact upon the community. As intensity increases the ability to suppress becomes more difficult. The table on the next page demonstrates this.

Suppression is not a viable option for community safety in those relatively rare, extremely high intensity fires that claim lives and significant amounts of property. In these conditions alternative strategies are required.

Designated fire refuges are one altemative strategy that has been used. If fire refuges are to be effective they need to enhance community safety under conditions of extreme fire behaviour where fire suppression will be ineffective.

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I'able 1: ot ¡-¡re {t ¡-orest ßlre B€havioür GUIDE TO TYPICAL FOREST IMPLICATIONS EXAMPLES WILDF'IRE FIRE BEIIAVIO{IR SEVERITY Flames < 2 m First suppression attack always Controlled "Loil' Rate ofspread < 0.1 successful fuel reduction Intensity <500 kW/m kmlhr Minimal property damage only, e.g. burn scorchins Flames < 6 m First suppression attack usually "Moderate" Rate ofspread < 0.3 successful Intensity 500-2,500 km/hr Minor property damage only, e.g. fence kWm Flames < 20 m Fire managed over time "High" Rateofspread< l km/hr Isolated house loss possible but not Intensity 2,500-l 0,000 probable kWm Flames>30mcrown Fire attack ineffective until intensity Dandenong 'VeryHigh" fire drops Ranges 1997 Intensity I 0,000-30,000 Rate of spread < 2krn/hr House loss probable but mainly remote Arthurs Seat kWm Likelihood of signifi cant homes or boundary areas 1997 spotting Isolated fatalities possible but not nrobable Crown fire Fire attack irrelevant and dangerous, Sydney 1994 "Extreme'o Fire storm at upper forces overwhelmed (-40,000 Intensity > 30,000 intensities Widespread house loss probable kWm) kWm Massive spotting likely throughout interface or rural villages Ash (maximum - 110,000 Rate of spread > Zlçnlhr Multiple fatalities possible, probable at Wednesday kWm) upper intensities 1983 (> 100,000 kWm)

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4. BUSHFIRE FATALITIES

Current understanding of high intensity bushfire fatalities is based on research into the Victorian Ash Wedne^sday fires of 1983 and has been reinforced by formal reviews of subsequent bushfi¡es.2 The findings of this research assist in understanding the main reasons why fatalities occur during bushfires and offer guidance on the strategies and actions which can be taken to improve public safety and survival during such events.

4.I LOSSES DUE TO BUSHF'IRE

For high intensity bushfires the traditional methods of managing a fire are ineffective or of limited benefit. Often the head fire spread cannot be stopped by suppression methods (whether from the ground or in the air), f,re breaks and other small fuel managed areas.

Management of such bushfires can be very complex and dangerous with significant loss of human life and damage to property resulting. Potential life and property loss, as a result of a high intensity bushfire, is greatest in locations where human populations will be directly impacted. From past bushfire events, the greatest losses occur in locations that are referred to as urban-bttsh interface areas. Interface areas refer to the integration of areas of substantial population with areas of grass and forest. Throughout these areas the potential for loss due to bushfire is high because of the combination of abundant fuel quantities and population densities. Several interface areas are well known from previous high intensity bushfire events, particularly Ash Wednesday.

Table 2: Bushfïres in Victoria since 1962 which have resulted in serious losses

YEAR F'IRE LTVES HOUSES LOST

t962 Dandenons Ranses T4 454

t965 Lonswood t2 53 t969 Lara 22 230 1977 Western Districts 5 t23 1983 Ash Wednesday 47 2090

1985 Central Victoria 6 r02

1990 Strathbosies 1 l7

r995 Berrinsa-Enfield 9 1997 Dandenons Ranses J 4t

1998 Sprins Hill 11

1998 Linton 5 2 TOTAL 1ls 3132

' Boura, 1995, Boura ef a/., 1995; CFA and NRE, 1997; Boura ef a/., 19g8. t2 WIT.4000.001.0068

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4.2 HOW DEATHS OCCUR

If we trace back to where deaths occurred, there a¡e a number of factors that influence bushfire fatalities. Table 3 examines the location of bushfire fatalities.

Table 3: Location of victims in recent and fatal bushfires in Victoria, 1962-1998

Table compiled tom CFA records.

The evidence from this table shows that:

Just over half of deaths occurred when people were caught eíther in the open, or in their vehicles, by the fire front. Many of these people made late attempts to evacuate from the fire. These deaths were probably caused by radiant heat;

Just under one quarter of deaths are firefighters who have died either while in the firefighting vehicle or on foot in the open. These people are susceptible to radiant heat, work related accidents, and heart attacks;

Around I in7 deaths occurred to people inside their homes. The elderþ or disabled are particularly vulnerable in these locations, as they are often unable to either prevent or extinguish structural ignitíons, or to leave the burning structure.'

4.3 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

The most coÍlmon cause of house loss is fires started by burning embers landing on or near the buildingo. CSIRO studies and CFA field surveys have found that:

Houses not experiencing direct flame contact or high levels of radiant heat, and which are located in areas where fine fuel reduction practices have occurred on a regular basis have a high probability of surviving the passage of the fire front.

Houses experiencing ember attacks, which occur before, during and after the fire front passes, are defendable by having able bodied, and well-prepared residents defend them. Research indicates that many houses, which survive the passage of the fire front, burn down in the hours afterwards if there is no-one present to extinguish the burning embers5.

3 Krusel, N. and Petris, S. (1992). Staying Alive: Lessons learnt from a study of civilian deaths in the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. Fire Management Quarterly,2, 1-20. * Lazarus and Elley, 1984; Wilson, 1984;Wilson and Ferguson, 1984; Ramsay et a1.,1987 'Boura, 1995; Boura ef a/., 1995; CFA and NRE, 1997; Boura ef a/., 1998

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4.4 HIERARCITY OF RISK TO PEOPLE

The pattem of fatalities due to bushfires in Victoria indicates that the greatest dangers to human safety, in order from greatest to least risk are:

4.4.I Exposure to Radiant Heat Being susceptible to radiant heat and the trauma of a bushfire, with no option of shelter or evacuation.

4.4.2 Caught in a vehicle or on foot fleeing the lire front Fleeing the bushfire and being caught in a vehicle as the fire front passes. People who leave it too late to evacuate from their homes or elsewhere can place themselves at risk, as they will often be leaving in a vehicle or perhaps on foot.

4.4.3 Sheltering in indefensible buildings Sheltering in a structure such as a home, club-house or hall which is not properþ prepared for a bushfire. These are known as indefensible buildings. They are identified by lack of vegetation clearance around the property, inappropriate design, combustible material stored close to the house, combined with high-risk positioning on the site.

4.4.4 Staying home but not defending your shelter Sheltering in a defensible building and not defending or not being able to defend it - especially from ember attacks.

4.4.5 Sheltering in a defensible building Sheltering in a defensible building and defending it against bushfire provides the least risk ofproperty damage. It is also a much safer option for people than those listed above. If you prepare in advance to stay and defend your home, you may have shelter from radiant heat as the fne front passes through. You will probably not be at risk from getting caught in the open or in a vehicle and be able to defend ember attacks on your home before and after the fire front passes.

4.4.6 Sheltering in an open space Sheltering in an open space whichprotects you from the fire Aont by virlue of the distance, and the absence of combustible materials, is a safer option for people who don't wish to stay and defend their homes.

4.5 RISK TO PROPERTY

Whilst leaving early on high-risk days prior to a fire starting provides the least risk to life, it presents a high risk of damage to property. The most coÍrmon cause of house loss during a bushfire is from ember attacks that cause spot fires. Residents play a major role in controlling ember attacks that may occur before and after the fire front passes.

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5. PERSONAL SURVIVAL TECHNIQTJES IN A BUSHFIRE

A CFA surveypublished in 20006 of residents living in a high fire risk area asked them which strategy they would adopt for a bushfire event. The responses were as follows:

41.60/0 - do as much as possible to protect the house but leave if threatened by the fire 32yo - stay and defend their homes from the fire 4.4oÁ - wait and see what happens but leave if threatened by the fire 15.60/0 - leave as soon as they are âware of the fire 4.5o/o - would leave the area on days of high fìre risk l.$Yo - other

Whilst one third of the respondents to the survey chose the 'stay and defend' option, unless they are well prepared with a plan to put into action if a bushfi¡e is approaching, then they too are at risk. These figures show that 61.6% ofpeople will wait and see how "bad" the fire is before they will decide whether they will stay or go.

From the hierarchy of risk we can determine that there are only four safe personal survival techniques in a bushfire. Each of these techniques assumes that a person has prepared their personal fire protection plan prior to a fire outbreak. The techniques are:

5.1 LEAVE THE ÄREA EARLY

Leaving early means that people should get out of a high-risk area prior to the commencement ofa fire.

Because of the unpredictable elements and speed of a high intensity fire this usually means that people who choose this option should leave by mid moming on a day when such a fire may occur.

Experience has shown that many people do not know what the early warning signs of a bushfire are. Even if they are aware, they do not take note, or respond to the early warning signs, such as extreme fire weather conditions or fife brigade activity. There is also often a lack of preparedness to deal with possible events. This includes the many people who do not prepare a personal fire protection plan. This is a critical issue for cornmunity education.

Often people have little knowledge about the location of the fue, limited understanding of likely fire behaviour and rely upon personal judgements and local knowledge to cope with the event. This generally results in late, and often disorganised, evacuation during which people are potentially exposed to dangerous levels of radiant heat and arc at ahigh risk in terms of their personal safety and well-being.

u CFA, Education of Bushfire Blitz, 2000

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RECOMMENDATION:

If people are not weII prepured, or conJident enough to stay ønd defend their property or they think they might get nervous as the ftre øpproaches, evucaate løte and be øt greøter risk, then the only safe optionfor thetn ís to leave the øreø early.

5.2 STAY AND DEFEND

The legislation governing bushfire management in country areas of Victoria, ie. the Country Fire Authority Act. (1958) and the Emergency Management Act. (1986), clearly prohibits emergency service personnel from directing any person with a pecuniary interest in a property to leave that property. This right of residents, to decide for themselves whether they will evacuate or stay with their homes, is firther reinforced in CFA policy (CFA 1995) and the Emergency Management Manual Victoria (Department of Justice, 1997).

Failure to prepare a house from bushfire, means that the house could potentially be affected by direct flame contact and high levels of radiant heat, which potentially leads to fatalities. The risk can be reduced by, regular fuel reduction practices and various landscaping technþes.

It is essential that people en$re there is a physical barrier such as the wall of a house separating them from the radiant heat or that there is enough distance between them and the radiant heat. This is most commonly achieved by vegetation clearance around the house.

When people realise that they are in danger and decide to make a late evacuation, or when they are ill-prepared and yet still stay and defend their homes, they are most vulnerable to bushfire.

RECOMMENDATION:

OnIy ahle-bodíed people who øre well prepøred, weør øpproprìate clothing ønd tøke shelter ín their homes fron rødíant heøt øs the jïre front passes, should stay ønd defend their property. Not only do they have ø good chønce of surviving a bushftre, but they øre líkely to be able to extínguísh øny small Jíres that begín from ember øttøcks, hefore and øfter theJire front pøsses, therehy savíng their homes.

5.3 ALTERNATIVE SHELTER BEFORE THE FIRE FRONT ARRTYES

Those people who have not left their homes prior to the fire starting and who are unable to stay and defend their homes are at significant risk. This risk will be reduced if they have earlier identified a local place to shelter. This must be within walking distance to minimise the amount of time they are out in the open.

This local place of shelter may be a large, open non-flammable area or a solid structure such as a neighbour's house. It could be on the beach. Most importantly, atthe chosen place of shelter the risk of exposure from the fire front and the radiant heat will be reduced.

Seeking refuge in a safer, nearby location during the fire front means that people will be able to defend their property from ember attacks both before and after the fire front passes. t6 WIT.4000.001.0072

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It needs to be understood that a local shelter cannot be a guaraalggd safe place given the unpredictable nature of high intensity bushfires and other considerations.

RECOMMENDATION:

últhen prepøring ø personal ftre preventíon pløn people must ídentífy an alternative site of locøl refuge ín case they have not left theír home prior to a bashJîre commencíng, or they decide they øre unable to støy ønd defend their propefi,

The designated place of shelter mast gíve protection from exposare to radíant heøt and should minímíse the tíme spent în the open. If you need to drìve avehìcle to the pløce of shelter it ís not local enough.

5.4 SEEKING SHELTER IN A FORMAL DESIGNATED FIRE REFUGE

When people decide to evacuate from an area due to bushfire they usually require safety and security ûom the fire front, information about which direction to go to seek refuge, and some familiarity with the area so as to f,rnd a safe place. The community currently has the option of going to an officialdesignatedfire refuge rnthe area. A typical sign used by many municipalities is shown to the right.

5.4.1 Definition of a Fire Refuge

The Emergency Management Manual Victoria defines a community fire refuge as:

'a buildingwhere people may seek shelterfrom the danger of a bushJìre. A building constntcted or designated as q Fire Refuge should have consideration given to its wlnerability to wildfire, parkingfor users, availability of water, telephone and electric power, location and accessibility in relation to its service qree.'

5.4.2 Baekground to Formal Designated Fire Reftrges

During the Ash Wednesday fires several instances were identified where groups of people successfully sheltered in well-constructed buildings, most notably the kindergarten at Cockatoo and the hotel at Mt. Macedon. This prompted the inquiry chaired by Miller, S.L, (1984), entitled Report of the Bushfire Review Comrnittee on Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Responses in Yictoria, to propose the adoption of designated fire refuges as part of the emergency management approach for Victoria.

The Miller Report stated that:

'under local disaster plans, consideration should be given to designating buildings which could serve qs emergency communal shelters. Such buildings would need to be assessed by a competent authority for their fire-resistønt capøbility and for availability of firefighting equipment and water ntpply.'

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This recommendation has only been partly implemented: o The competent authority has not been identified c Some of the designatedfire refuges do not comply as they are not buildings o No resources have been provided by the State Governmentfor these designøted bldldings

5.4.3 Definition of an Emergency Relief Centre

It is important to understand the difference between a designated fire refuge and an Emergency Relief Centre as there is some confusion about the roles of these two different facilities. A Relief Centre is always set up outside the high-risk area while the location of a Fire Refuge may be inside the high-risk area.

The Emergency Management Manual Victoria defines anEmergency Relief Centre as: 'A building or place established to provide emergency relief for persons affected by, or responding to, an emergency. "

Emergency Relief Centres are required to have support services whereas designated fire refuges are not required to provide these types of services. The Victorian State Emergency Service is responsible for coordinating emergency relief with this role delegated to local councils at the municipal level.

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6. CURRENT ISSUES WITH FIRE REFUGES

The bushfires in the Dandenong Ranges in January 1997 tnggercd a review of the viability and effectiveness of designated fire refuges. An evaluation of the Coronial Inquest resulting from the fatalities caused by these bushfires and discussions with involved parties has led to the identification of several key issues about the concept of designatedfire refuges.

6.1 1997 DANDENONG RANGES FrRES CORONTAL TNQUTRY

During the Dandenong Ranges fi¡es in 1997 the following incidents occurred:

At Ferny Creeþ several hundred people chose to evacuate to the Ferny Creek Ilorticultural Centre which was a desígnøtedftre refuge. The evacuees were at that location for a number of hours before those coordinating the emergency services became aware of their presence. A number of people also chose to evacuate to the Ferny Creek Primary School which was not a designated fire refuge. fn the Kalorama area, people chose to evacuate to the Kalorama Recreation Reserve and the Mt Dandenong Hotel. These locations were not desìgnøtedfre refuges but people were able to access them to survive the fire.

The Coronial Inqury after this fire raised several concerns relating to fire refuges including the following: oMany residents were unsure of the location of the emergency shelters and relief centres. There is a lot of confusion in relation to what a fire refrrge is and what an emergency shelter is. Many residents self evacuated to locations that were not designated evacuation centres which placed them at risk as no police or other support services knew that they were there and therefore could not assist or register same.' [Page 281 oOne of the most important issues for the effective management of large numbers of people during a major 'wildfire' emergency is the provision of safe community fire refuges and emergency shelters. Currently there is a multi-agency committee reviewing the provision of refuges for the community during a fire or major emergency.' [Page 441 oln addition, it is important to ensure that any designated 'fire refuge' or 'emergency shelter' is in fact sa;þ for the community in the event of bushfire.' [Page 45]

There are many interpretations of what these terrns, emergency shelters, assembly areas and f,ne refrrges mean. The confrrsion exists even within the various authorities responsible for assisting the public during a bushf,ire.

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6.2 PURPOSE OF'A REFUGE

The primary purpose of a refuge is to provide short-term shelter from the fire front. It is almost always within the fire front area.

However, the community has an expectation that at designated fire refuges they will be provided with food and drinks, counselling, information regarding the bushfire, co-ordination and registration, communications (telephone and radio), fire suppression equipment, staff etc. Many designated fire refuges are not resourced with the types of services which people may expect or need at the time of bushfires.

These services can only be provided at Emergency Relief Centres which must be located outside the fire area. These centres are properþ equipped to meet a variety of needs that people expect to find, but are unavailable at a designøtedfire refuge.

Designated fire refuges are not always an adequate size to provide for the population catchment, whicþ on the day, could include workers, visitors and tourists to the area. The facilities are often basic and may not be open, particularly if the bushfire occurs on a day which is not a Total Fire Ban Day or is a holiday.

There is also some confusion amongst members of the local community and, in general, visitors to the area as to where designated fire refuges are located. This places them at risk if they are out in the open searching for an official refuge when the bushfire is in the vicinity.

After two years of thorough investigation the Working Party has determined that a designated fire refuge is not necessarily a safe place. It may only reduce risks in the short term for those who arrive there safely. In addition, there are still no guidelines for refuges which are areas other than buildings.

6.3 PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

There are places identified as designated fire refuges that do not fulfill the definition in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria.

Due to the lack ofperforrnance criteria for selecting official designatedfire refuges, it is possible that some existing designated fire refuges would not survive the passage of bushfîre, or shelter occupants from dangerous levels of radiant heat. Due to this, some authorities are reluctant to approve the designation of fire refuges at all.

Other factors will influence the location, suitability and use of fre refuges in a municipality. These include: o local area characteristics in terms oftopography and standard ofroad access; O changes in the total population levels of an area including permanent and non permanent residents as well as tourists; o public visibility and easy identification of fire refuges within aflarea o general community awareness as to locations of fire refuges; a public education programs informing people about the most sensible and safest actions to take during a bushfre; the direction of the bushfire.

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6.4 FIRE REFTIGES . A GREATER DAII{GER OR A GREATER BENEFIT?

Some members of the community believe tl:øit designated fire refuges provide a 'last minute' haven for residents who choose to evacuate at the last minute. However, research indicates that late evacuation Aom a wildfire is a very high-risk strategy for the community in terrns of their safety and well being. People are at greater risk because they are out in the open, some travelling considerable distances. Once they get there, they may not be able to get access.

tr'or these reasons the Working Party is of the view that fire refuges have a high level of risk for residents.

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7. ISSUES CONCERNING THE ROLE OF' AGENCIES

The role that relevant agencies and authorities play in the management, resourcing, funding and designation of fire refuges has caused much confusion since they were introduced.

The agencies have formed a working party to resolve these issues.

The Fire Refuge Working Parfy determined that a multi-agency approach was required to review fire refuges in Victoria. This approach received support from the former Minister for police and Emergency Services, the Honorable 8il1 McGrath, the Chair of the Victorian Emergency Management Council and the State Coroner.

Issues relating to the role that agencies play tn designatedfire refuges include:

7.I DEPENDENCY ON AUTIIORITIES DURING BUSHFIRES

Over reliance or dependency on authorities by the local community can detract from selÊreliance and self-help strategies within the community during bushfîre. It can also mean that members of the community do not devise a well-prepared survival strategy. Instead they rely on the authorities to deal with all of the issues related to bushfire. Communities need to understand that bushfire outbreaks are a coÍtmunity-wide problem that warrants community support and co- operation.

7.2 THE MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCING OF DESIGNATED FIRE REFUGES

Concerns also arise as to who is responsible for opening and staffing fire refuges during bushfire events. Designatedfire refuges cannot guarantee 100% safety frombushfire. As many of these refuges are vested in local government, the issue of potential liability for the council, councillors or council staffin relation to council performance of duties and responsibilities related to flre refuges has been raised as an important issue. Further investigation has shown that there is no legislative protection for councils, councillors or staff in the area of designating, operating or managing fire refuges.

John O'Donoghue, legal consultant at the Municipal Association ofVictoria has advised that: "It would seem that the retention of fire refuges expose councils to unrealistic potential liabilities in that:

¡ their mere designation engenders in the community some sense that they will be available as a safe refuge; ¡ the council (at least to some extent on the basis of "expert" advice provided ) encourages a fîre announcement response which might be inconsistent with the CFA/SES preferred option; o late evacuees expose themselves to risk in attempting to reach the fre refuges (and perhaps do so at a time later than they would do if the refuges were not designated); r the perception of safety at the fire refuges might well be misplaced; ¡ the users or potential users of fire refuges do so or attempt to do so in the belief that the f,rre refuges provide a safe and proximate avenue for protection.,'

There appears to be an expectation among the agencies and authorities involved that the opening of designated buildings during ñre danger periods is a local government t"rpo*ìbility. However, many of these buildings designated as fire refuges are run by committees of management or schools and not by the local council itself.

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7.2.1 This issue can be illustrated with the case of the Shire of Yarra Ranges advising the governing bodies of their obligations in relation to designated Jìre refuges. The Council had requested that these bodies ensure buildings are opened on days of Total Fire Ban. However, this request resulted in numerous concerns including: . during school hours there is a conflict inuse, as only children and teachers are catered for and the buildings are designated to cater for their needs and not additional numbers ofpeople;

. concern by committees of management about security and availability of someone to unlock buüdings and watch over possessions;

. concern that people on these committees of management were otherwise committed during the bushfire event and could not guarantee their availability to unlock buildings and stay on the premises on days of Total Fire Ban.

The costs associated with upgrading and maintaining designated fire refuges is a concern to the relevant authorities. Many reñrges are primarily designed to and actually serve another purpose in the community. They are likely to be in general use and controlled by another organization e.g. football club. The lack of State Government funding combined with budgetary constraints within local councils may restrict fire refuges from meeting performance standards, as there is simply inadequate funds available for councils to bear sole responsibility for upgrading these premises which have largely been chosen almost entirely on the basis ofproximity.

7.3 AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE A DESIGNATED FIRE REFUGE

There is no clear definition of who is responsible for determining those places that are most suitable as designated fire refuges.

Many local councils, some with the aid of expert advice from police, fre and emergency services, have identified available sites within their municipalities as designated fire refuges. In some instances this may be appropriate. These designatedfire refuges have been selected largely on the basis of reasonable proximity to the population to be served rather than by a set of agreed performance criteria, which applies across Victoria.

If designated fi.re refuges are to be retained, there needs to be performance criteria standards set for the responsible agency to follow when assessing a location for suitability as a designated fire refuge. The responsible agency would need to be identified in legislation and provided with appropriate legal protection.

The standards need to ensure the necessary safety requirements are met in terms of safety, the location and nature of the refuge facility, and that the equipment, infrastructure and finances are available to meet that criteria.

The possibility of setting these standards is complicated by the fact that local government exposes itself to a duty of care and all the legal implications that follow. Bushfires can be unpredictable and whlle designated fire refuges can provide a degree of safetS they cannot be guaranteed as a safe place to shelter.

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7.4 PROPOSED ROLE OT'AGENCIES

Should the current function of Fire Refuges continue, there are a number of separate roles that would need to be shared across the agencies. The following allocation of roles is suggested.

7.4.1 Councils

That councils will be responsible for assisting other agencies in providing: o local fire refuge plans r community education programs ¡ signage for travellers/visitors who may not know thet way to fre refuge locations o education and assistance for owners preparing their properties to minimise the risks from bushfire r post-fire management, including relief recovery assistance for the community.

7.4.2 Countrv Fire Authoritv

That the CFA should share responsibility for:

o local fire refuge plans o communityeducationprograms o assistance to travellers and visitors who may be in the bushfire area o private preparation o advising Police of information on fre front o post fire management including relief recovery operations.

7.4.3 Victoria Police

That Victoria Police should have responsibility for providing:

. emergency response coordination . public warnings to travellers and visitors to the bushfire area . registration of evacuees r provide public way

7.4.4 Department of Justice:

That DOJ should be responsible for:

o endorsing the policy framework o providing funding for community education programs o detennining the performance criteria for refuges o setting standards for facilities etc. and o providing post fire management and private preparation assistance.

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7.4.5 VictorianEmersencvManagement Council:

That VEMC should be responsible for:

o endorsing the policy framework o determining perforrnance criteria for refirges / standards for facilities

7.4.6 Denartment of Natural Resources & Environment:

That DNRE should be responsible for:

. properþ managing risk on the land for which it is responsible and o negotiating with landowners whose property borders its land o the safety of visitors to their Parks

7.4.7 Department of Treasurv & Finance

That Treasury is responsible for funding:

. pre fire management publicity and protection activities including fire refrrges e post fire management operations including recovery and relief o infrastructure according to the set standards

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8. CONCLUSIONS

At the original Fire Refuge Workshop in May 1998 a strong view was expressed by more than thirty agencies and councils in attendance that the provision of designated fire refitges within an area makes communities:

Iess self reliant; more likely to evacuate an area late, in the knowledge that there is a designøted fire refuge within driving distance; more prone to seek help from and even blame the relevant emergency authorities if something goes wrong.

It has been shown in the report of the Coroner's Enqury into the Dandenong Ranges Fires 1997 , that the existenc e of designated fire refuges in an area ,actively encourages people to leave their homes as late as possible, thinking that they will be able to easily access a nearby refuge and be safe from a bushfire.

This attitude, held by many members of the public, is highly dangerous. However, taking away these refirges does not guarantee there will be fewer fatalities resulting from bushfire. People still refuse to listen to the advice of the CFA and other authorities when dealing with bushíres and place themselves at risk when they do leave their homes seeking a place of refuge.

The provision of either:

informal local fire refuges, selected by a neighbourhood community as a place of mutual support, or

desígnøtedftre refuges, selected as a safe haven by the authorities,

may not in fact be safe.

The key to improving public safety and minimising loss to life and property, is having a more informed public, achieved as a result of inter agency co-operation and community education. Ifpeople have a better understanding of the preparation required to survive a bushfire and defend their homes, and they are physically and mentally ready when a fire occurs they will have the best chance of survival regardless of whether they use informal or designated fire refuges. Therefore community education programs are fundamental to the issue of public safety during bushfire events.

To date councils have acted on the expert advice provided to them in not just the selection of "ftre refuges" on the basis of availability and proximity, but in educating their communities about the location and role of fre refuges. Although councils have acted in good faith and consistent with expert guidance, it is now suggested that continuance of the existing policy is neither safe nor in the best interests of the community.

There will be a lead time before any decision regarding the future of designated fire refuges and subsequent revised policies can be made.

Throughout this time councils will remain exposed to legal liability, arising from their willingness and the legal obligation placed on them to participate in emergency management techniques under the guidance of the'oexperts".

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Given the variety of environments that are at risk of bushfire throughout Victoria, a flexible approach is required within a consistent statewide polioy framework. Eaeh environment needs to be assessed on risk and the suitability of tlre various teatments. Each council needs to be provided with appropriate finance and expert advice to fornrulate its strategy and deternrine the nrost appropriate treatments given its local envi¡onment.

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9, PROPOSEDRECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations result from the anaþis presented in this Background paper.

Recommendation 1. That the State Government release firnding immediately for a community education program to be conducted by the CFA, with the support of local councils and other agencies. The program should work in local communities to ensure that all residents have a personal survival plan and that they have worked in their local area to define an informal place of shelter where they will meet to support each other as the fire front passes through.

Recommendation 2.That funding be made available for information, materials and programs to educate workers in and visitors to bushfire prone ¿ueas, on how to behave on days of risk from high intensity bushfires. The State agencies and the CFA with the support of the local councils and local employers should undertake this work.

Recommendation 3. That the Victoria Emergency Management Council, undertakes the preparation of Guidelines for Local Informal Places of Shelter.

Recommendation 4.That due to the risks associated with designated fire refuges, the Victoria Emergency Management Council:

remove all reference to designated formal fire refuges in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria. acknowledge that designated refuges have never been a valid means of providing the best chance of survival Ín a bushfïre advise councÍls that the references to designated refuges (logo) have been removed from the Emergency Management Manual VictorÍa and other official publications.

Reeommendation 5.

That the State Government amend the Emergency Management Act 1986 to provide an appropriate indemnity to Councils, to complement the provisions in Section 94 of the Counqv Fire Authorit]¡ Act. 1958 along the following lines:

an emergency management plar¡ a the suitability or availability or any venues mentioned or referred to in any emergency management plarq injuries or damage sustained in attempting to reach or in taking refuge within any venue mentioned or referred to in any management plan, any communication or community education,

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If the action taken or omitted to be taken, by the Council, Councillor or the member of council staff or the Committee of Management, was taken in good faith for the purpose of carrying out a power or duty of a Council, under this Act or Regulations or any other Act or Regulations.

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10, THE NEXT STEPS

The procedures for dealing with this report and recommendations are as follows: STEP I: That consultation occurs with parties represented on the Working Party and this report is discussed by the emergency agencies, the State Government and local councils to inform and provide feedback on this Background Paper and its recommend.ations.

STEP 2: That after this process the document is submitted to the Victorian Emergency Management Council for their action.

STEP 3: That a separate Implementation Committee is formed to implement the proposals, assuming that it is supported by the VEMC.

STEP 4: That the Inrplementation Committee consider the following in terms of implementing the proposals:

any amendments required to legislation;

any amendments required to the Emergency Management Manual;

the timeframe for councils to complete the assessment of their local environment.

design of community education material to support the implementation;

any further research that may be needed to support implementation of the recommended procedures (for example: research into social behaviour during high intensity bushfire).

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11. REFERENCES

Boura, J. (1995). Analysis of fire protection strategies in the Moggs Creek wildfire 19.11.1994. Fire Management Department Internal Report,Coan!ry Fire Authority, Melbourne.

Boura, J., Wassing, M., Silberbauer, G. and Jerome, H. (1995). Analysis of CFA Fire Management Strategies in the Beninga-Enfield wildfire 25-26.02.199J. Risk Managanent and Headquarters Operations, Country Fire Authority, Melbourne.

Boura, J., Reinholdt, S., Boxelaar, L., Jenkins, A. and Rhodes A. (1998). Analysis of Fire Prevention and Community Safety at the Spring Hill Fire of 22March 1998. Internsl Report. Risk Management Department, CFA Melbourne.

CFA andNRE (1997). Review of the Significant Fires of January 20 and 21, 1997. CountryFke Authority and Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Melbourne.

Country Fire Authority Act, 1958. No. 6228/1958, Støte of Victoria. Emergency Management Act, 1986. No. 30/1986, State of Victoria. Emergency Management Maruml Victoria, 1999. Johnstone, G. (1999). Inquests into the deaths of Jenniftr Louise Lindroth, Grsham Kingsley Lindroth and Genevieve Erin during afire at Ferny Creek andþur otherfires in the Dandenong Ranges on 21 January 1997. Coroners Report, Colonial Services, Melbourne

Lazarus, G. and Elley, J. (1984). A study of the effect of household occupancy during the Ash Wednesday bushfire in Upper Beaconsflreld, Victoria, February 1983. NCRFR Technical Paper No.3, National Centre for Rural Fire Research.

Loane, I.T. and Gould, J.S. (1986). Aerial Suppression of Bushfires: Cost-Benefit Study for Victoria. National Bushflre Research Unit, CSIRO, Canberra. Miller, S.I., Carter, W. and Stephens, R.G. (1984). Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on Bushfire Preparedness in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash Wednesday Fires l6 February 1983. Government Printer, Melbourne. O'Donoghue, J. (1998). Letter, fire refuges and Legal Liability. Municipal Association of Victoria, Local Government Centre, Melbourne. Ramsay, C., McArthur, N.A. and Dowling, V.P. (1995). Planning in fire-prone areas: Building survival. In Browr¡ C. And Tohver, L, (eds) Bushfire ! Looking to the Fuhre. Nature Conservation Council of NSW Sydney. Reinholdt, S. , Rhodes, A. and Scillio, M. (1999). Stay or Go: Understanding Community Responses to the Threat of Hazards. CFA-EMA Draft Reporl, Emergency Management Australia, Canberra.

Shire of Yarra Ranges (May 1998) Fire Refuge Workshop, Notes of worlæhop held on 13 may 1998 at Lilydale, Melbourne Wilson, A.A.G. (1984). Assessing the bushfire hazard ofhouses: A quantitative approach. NCRFR Technical Paper No. 6, National Centre for Rural Fire Research. Wilson, A.A.G. and Ferguson, I.S. (1984). Fight or flee? A case study of the Mount Macedon bushfire. Australian Forestry, 47, 230-236.