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American security policy getting it far too wrong
Mauk, John
Awarding institution: King's College London
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Download date: 27. Sep. 2021 American Security Policy:
Getting It Too Far Wrong
Degree: PhD Department of Defence Studies SSPP King’s College London
Candidate: John A. Mauk
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Abstract
American Security Policy: Getting it Too Far Wrong
The outcomes of U.S. policy and strategy decisions to use military force in
Afghanistan and Iraq demand a critical assessment of U.S. strategic decision- making. Presidential decisions to commit military force in these nations did not achieve U.S. objectives nor did they serve to protect vulnerable populations, or reduce terrorist threats, nor set the conditions for a better peace. These policies sought ambiguous, open-ended political objectives that could not be achieved despite vast economic capacity and unmatched military capabilities.
The undesirable outcomes of these conflicts naturally invite scrutiny of the policy decisions that led to them. Academic analysis of foreign policy decisions is traditionally done through the lens of theories that consider the rationality of choices or in terms of human or socio-structural factors influencing them to understand why actors decided as they did. However, there is another perspective to be considered from the field of decision science that has developed a systematic approach to analyze complex problems and identify, risk-informed choices.
This Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) methodology is a prescriptive approach that focuses on the soundness of analytical procedure used to develop decision criteria and is widely employed across many professions including business, finance, and industry. This methodology focuses on what was considered to underpin decisions as opposed to why decisionmakers chose as they did. In fact this prescriptive approach is the primary methodology for decision analysis within the
U.S. military who must implement the policies of presidents. Given the prevalent use of this highly developed procedure, it is perplexing then that the National Security
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Council (NSC) does not appear to employ this approach when considering complex security policy problems. This is surprising as the NSC was created to assist presidents for this very purpose. It is similarly puzzling that the field of Foreign Policy
Analysis (FPA) does not appear to embrace this approach to analysis in a meaningful way.
This study will apply a prescriptive ADA methodology to consider the decision analysis procedures of successive presidential administrations to understand what they considered in forming policy decisions to use military force. The decision procedures of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama NSCs are evaluated here to identify key influencing factors, patterns and potential gaps, and characterize their implications for policy performance in addressing the central question this study:
How might an ADA perspective enhance understanding of presidential decision- making procedures on vital national security issues and can this prescriptive perspective add value to mainstream FPA approaches?
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Table of Contents:
American Security policy – ‘Getting it Too Far Wrong’: ...... 1
Abstract: ...... 2
Contents: ...... 4
Note on Abbreviations and Language: ...... 9
Abbreviations: ...... 10
Chapter I – The Study...... 12
Overall Structure: ……………...... 13
The Research Question: ………………………...... 13
Research Design and Choice of Cases: ...... 13
Limitations: ...... 20
Validation: ...... 21
Methodological Challenges: ...... 22
Chapter II – A Review of FPA Literature: ...... 26
Alternative Approaches to Policy Analysis: ...... 26
Foreign Policy Analysis: A Review of the Relevant Literature: ……..…………... 28
Rational Actor Model: ...... 29
Bureaucratic Politics Model: ...... 30
Organizational Process Model: ...... 32
Inter-Branch Politics Model: ...... 33
Political Process Model: ...... 34
The Intersection of Decision Theory and Psychology in Policy Decisions: ….… 35
Prospect Theory: ...... 36
Ellsberg’s Experiments: ...... 38
Groupthink: ...... 38
Constraints Model of Policymaking Processes: ………..……………...... 40
Bounded Rationality and the Cybernetic Model: ...... 42
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Cybernetic Paradigm: ...... 42
Cognitive Processes Model: ...... 42
Poliheuristic Theory: ...... 43
The Gap Between Normative and Descriptive FPA Theories: ...... 45
Foreign Policy Analysis Summary: ...... 47
Chapter III – Decision Theory and Applied Decision Analysis: ...... 50
An Introduction to Applied Decision Analysis and Systems Thinking...... 50
Prescriptive Model Limitations: ...... 58
Applied Decision Analysis Summary: ...... 62
Chapter IV – A Conceptual Framework for Applied Decision Analysis in FPA: ...... 64
An Applied Decision Framework for Analysis of Foreign Policy Decisions: ...... 64
Analytical Framework Summary: ...... 81
The Case Study Approach: ...... 81
The National Security Council: A Brief History: ...... 82
Evolution of the NSC and Its Shortcomings: ...... 84
War Powers: The Constitutional Debate: ...... 87
A Flawed U.S. National Security System: ...... 89
Definitions: ...... 94
Chapter V – 2001 Invasion of Afghanistan: …..…..….….….……..……..……….…. 105
Define the Policy Issue: …...... 108
Interests At Stake: …...... 111
Understand the Decision Environment: ...... 113
Key Stakeholders: Foreign and Domestic: …...... 122
Develop Objectives: ...... 125
Policy Objectives: …...... 130
Key Assumptions: …...... 135
Define End State Conditions & Measures of Policy Success: …...... 139
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Develop Policy Options: ...... 142
Analyze Options: …...... 145
Analysis of Uncertainty and Consequences: …...... 151
The President’s Decision: ...... 157
Assess Policy Effectiveness: …...... 158
Findings and Conclusions: ...... 160
Findings: …...... 160
Conclusions: …...... 163
Chapter VI – 2003 Invasion of Iraq: ...... 172
Define the Policy Issue: …...... 179
Interests At Stake: …...... 181
Understand the Decision Environment: ...... 185
Key Stakeholders: Foreign and Domestic: …...... 196
Develop Objectives: ...... 207
Policy Objectives: …...... 207
Key Assumptions: …...... 211
Define End State Conditions & Measures of Policy Success: …...... 213
Develop Policy Options: ...... 216
Analyze Options: …...... 219
Coercive Diplomacy: …...... 219
Invasion: …...... 221
Analysis of Uncertainty and Consequences: …...... 223
The President’s Decision: ...... 228
Assess Policy Effectiveness: …...... 229
Findings and Conclusions: ...... 233
Findings: …...... 233
Conclusions: …...... 237
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Chapter VII – 2009 Afghanistan Surge: ...... 247
Define the Policy Issue: …...... 250
Interests At Stake: …...... 251
Understand the Decision Environment: ...... 254
Key Stakeholders: Foreign and Domestic: …...... 266
Develop Objectives: ...... 271
Policy Objectives: …...... 272
Key Assumptions: …...... 278
Define End State Conditions & Measures of Policy Success: …...... 280
Develop Policy Options: ...... 282
Status Quo Plus – The Initial Obama Policy: ...... 286
Afghanistan Good Enough: …...... 287
Analyze Options: …...... 288
Analysis of Uncertainty and Consequences: …...... 290
The President’s Decision: ...... 292
Assess Policy Effectiveness: …...... 295
Findings and Conclusions: ...... 296
Findings: …...... 296
Conclusions: …...... 300
Chapter VIII – Findings and Conclusions: ...... 306
Value of an Applied Decision Science Approach to Policy Analysis: ...... 310
Key Findings: ……………………………...... 311
Conclusions - Advancing the Body of Knowledge: ...... 319
2001 Decision to Invade Afghanistan: ...... 320
2003 Decision to Invade Iraq: ...... 325
2009 Decision to Surge Forces in Afghanistan: ...... 333
Systemic Challenges in U.S. National Security System: ...... 338
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Bibliography: ...... 342
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Note on abbreviations, language, and references:
This dissertation is written in the field of strategic studies, a field with its own lexicon of abbreviations and acronyms. For reasons of fluidity, I have chosen to introduce the full term initially and then subsequently provide only the acronym or abbreviation. A list of the abbreviations used is provided in the introduction.
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Abbreviations:
AMUF Authorization for the Military Use of Force ANSF Afghan National Security Forces DC Deputies Committee DOD Department of Defense DOS Department of State ESG Executive Steering Group CBO Congressional Budget Office CIA Central Intelligence Agency CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff COIN Counter Insurgency CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CT Counter Terrorism CRS Congressional Research Service FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FPDA Foreign Policy Decision Analysis GWOT Global War on Terror IPCs Interagency Policy Committees IR International Relations ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria MDMP Military Decision-Making Process MODA Multi-Objective Decision Analysis MOE Measure of Effect MOP Measure of Performance NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSA National Security Advisor NSC National Security Council NSS National Security Council Staff ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan PC Principals Committee PCC Policy Coordination Committee PCTEG Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group
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PDD Presidential Decision Directive PNSR Project on National Security Reform PPD Presidential Policy Directive SECDEF Secretary of Defense UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution UN United Nations USAWC United States Army War College USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Chapter I
The Study
The outcomes of decisions to use military force in Afghanistan and Iraq demand a critical assessment of U.S. policy decision-making. Presidential decisions to commit military force in these cases did not achieve U.S. objectives nor did they serve to protect vulnerable populations; reduce terrorist threats; or set the conditions for a better peace.1 These policies were characterized by ambiguous, open-ended political objectives that could not be achieved despite vast economic capacity and unmatched military capabilities.2
Given the costs both in lives and resources, when security policy fails, it is imperative to understand why. As this research will demonstrate, the decision- making procedures of successive administrations reflect deeply flawed analysis of the security problem and a failure to adequately consider the risk implications of their decisions. George W. Bush’s decisions to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of flawed policy objectives that were not militarily achievable, and where inadequate analysis of assumptions and consequences of actions led to strategic failure.3 Barrack Obama’s 2009 decision to surge forces in Afghanistan reflects similarly flawed decision-making that led to failed policy.
1 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (Faber and Faber, 1954), 308. Hart observes that "The higher level of grand strategy [is] that of conducting war with a far-sighted regard to the state of the peace that will follow." 2 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018) Staff affirmed that they understood the military limitations in both Afghanistan and Iraq and highlighted incongruence between policy objectives and both military capabilities and resources to pursue them. They observed that Afghanistan required them to both deny a Taliban insurgency with inadequate forces while at the same time pursuing a militarily impossible task to “defeat” Al Qaeda which entailed defeating a violent Jihadist ideology. These same staff observed the unachievable requirement to both secure Iraq with inadequate forces while pursuing Al Qaeda under politically imposed constraints. 3 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351. Hart emphasized subordinating the military objective to the political one: “The military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence 12
As this study will argue, these security policy decisions are indicative of systemic flaws in NSC decision-making procedures that represent causal links to unsatisfactory policy outcomes.
Overall Structure
First, I will explain the research design of this study. I then explore and compare the academic body of knowledge on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with that of Applied Decision Analysis (ADA), a decision science methodology underpinning the analytical framework of this research. I then explain how the analytical framework of this study was developed. I will then evaluate the three cases
I have selected in terms of the prescriptive ADA framework. The ADA methodology employed in this research focuses on the components and completeness of the analytical procedures used by the presidents and their NSCs, and specifically on what was considered in terms of decision criteria. This research emphasis on what was considered centers on identifying key factors, recurring patterns, and systemic issues with NSC decision-making procedures that represent causal factors in the policy outcomes and might serve to focus further descriptive FPA consideration on why presidents made the choices they did.
The Research Question
National security problems are typically complex issues involving many actors and interests where many competing factors influence decision-making under
the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily—that is practically—impossible." 13 conditions of significant uncertainty and risk. 4 These characteristics typically mean the complexity of the issue exceeds the experience and intellectual capacity of any one individual to resolve them alone. Recognition of this fact and a compelling need to assist presidents in developing informed decisions on these types of problems led to the development of the NSC system following WWII.5 The National Security Act of
1947 formally recognized the need for forward thinking in planning for, and securing,
U.S. national interests and to mitigate against strategic surprise like that of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.6 In addition to the NSC, this act created a supporting staff as well as formalized a National Military Establishment to advise presidents on national security matters.7
Given this level of government emphasis, it is reasonable to expect that NSC deliberations on decisions to go to war are appropriate, proportional, and underpinned by a level of analytical rigor commensurate with national security interests and the lives at stake to secure them. In considering this system it is important to note that the U.S. Constitution and Congress have afforded presidents tremendous latitude and empowerment to conduct foreign policy.8 In this system
Presidents define the composition of their NSC, choose its members, and define the
4 Judith Stiehm, U.S. Army War College: Military Education In A Democracy, (Temple University Press, 2002), 6. VUCA is term coined by U.S. Army War College faculty in describing the uncertainty resident in the post-Cold War security environment. 5 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America, (Princeton University Press, 2008), 2-3.; Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, The Whittaker, Alan G., Brown, Shannon A., Smith, Frederick C., & McKune, Elizabeth, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System. (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2011), 6; Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, History of the National Security Council 1947-1997, (United States Department of State, 1997), accessed March 2016, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm. 6 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America, (Princeton University Press, 2008), 2-3. 7 The National Security Act of 1947 – July 26, 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758. 8 The National Security Act of 1947 – July 26, 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758. 14 process by which their national security policy formulation process will function.9 The
NSC is in essence an unelected yet highly influential group who serve as the fulcrum about which U.S. security policy and strategy functions. This Executive latitude is enabled by gray areas in Constitutional authorities where Presidents may make policy decisions to commit military force with relatively little input from the Legislative branch of government that represents the will of the American people and who possess the Constitutional authority to declare war. More specific to the focus of this research, there are no formal statutory requirements for administrations to satisfy specific decision criteria as a mechanism for Congressional approval to enter into conflict.10 This topic will be further discussed in Chapter IV.
Academic analysis of foreign policy decisions is traditionally done through the lens of theories that focus on the rationality of choices or that view decisions in terms of human and socio-structural factors that influence them in order to understand why actors decided as they did. There is another perspective to be considered through prescriptive approaches to decision analysis. The field of decision science forwards a well-developed body of knowledge and a systematic approach by which to analyze complex problems and identify risk-informed choices. This Applied Decision Analysis
(ADA) methodology is a prescriptive approach that focuses on the procedure used to develop risk-informed decision criteria and is prevalent across many professions including business, finance, and industry. In fact this prescriptive approach is the primary methodology for decision analysis within the U.S. military who must implement president’s policy decisions to enter into conflict. Given the prevalence of
9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, History of the National Security Council 1947-1997, (United States Department of State, 1997), accessed March 2016, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm. 15 this highly developed methodology, it is notable that the National Security Council
(NSC), a body created to assist presidents for this very purpose, does not formally employ this approach when considering complex security policy problems.
Similarly, a review of the prevalent literature within the field of FPA indicates that contemporary ADA methods have not been fully embraced or systematically applied in academic analyses. This may be due in large measure to the fact that contemporary prescriptive methodologies are typically looking forward at a pending decision where FPA methodologies are typically looking backward to understand decisions already made. This research study will attempt to demonstrate that a prescriptive ADA methodology applied to decisions made has significant potential to enhance traditional FPA. To achieve this I will apply a prescriptive ADA methodology to consider the efficacy of the decision analysis procedures of successive presidential administrations to understand what they considered in forming policy decisions to use military force.
The decision procedures of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama NSCs are evaluated here to identify key influencing factors, patterns and potential gaps, and to characterize their implications for policy performance in addressing the central question this study: How might an ADA perspective enhance understanding of presidential decision-making procedures on vital national security issues and can this prescriptive perspective add value to mainstream FPA approaches?
Research Design and Choice of Cases:
This research seeks to analyze presidential decisions through a prescriptive framework to understand what was considered in NSC analysis thereby identifying causal links to outcomes, and whether this approach has utility within the broader academic field of FPA. This prescriptive approach reflects the application of
16 contemporary decision science that is grounded in theories and methods drawn from psychology, economics, philosophy, statistics, and management science.11 The utility of a prescriptive methodology in evaluating foreign policy decisions is that doing so readily emphasizes the differences between normative models of decision making that are logically consistent and reflect our conceptions of rationality, and the reality of practitioners who must address real-world decisions that do not typically conform to purely rational choices.12
Though some may understandably associate formal ADA with quantitative analysis, this methodology first and foremost stresses a fundamentally important qualitative analysis of the problem by which development of objectives and alternatives to achieve them are accomplished. It is only after this critical qualitative analysis that alternatives may then be quantitatively analyzed to further characterize their utility in satisfying objectives. This qualitative analysis of security problems is the primary role of the NSC and therefore provides a useful focus to interrogate the broader research question. The theoretical basis for this ADA approach will be described in Chapter III, Decision Theory and Applied Decision Analysis.
Three cases were selected for this research from among the many presidential decisions to employ military force. An approach to maximize cases across multiple administrations was considered for its utility in expanding the basis of comparison. However, since this research was focused on both evaluation of administration procedures and investigation of systemic challenges across administrations, it made good analytical sense to select cases representing
11 Leigh Buchanan, Andrew O’Connell, A Brief History of Decision Making, (Harvard Business Review, 2006), accessed November 2015. Available at: https://hbr.org/2006/01/a-brief-history-of- decision-making. 12 David Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky, Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 243. 17 contemporary policy challenges that spanned successive administrations where each considered a common problem set about which to form decisions on the use of military force. Successive NSCs in the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations were considered as each deliberated over a common security problem with the Vietnam War. However, some forty years removed, research into the NSC procedures of each presented a challenge as there are few remaining members of these administrations who could speak authoritatively on the details of their deliberations that were not captured in official documents. The George H.W.
Bush and William Clinton administrations were considered as both contended with
Saddam Hussein. These were ruled out as the Clinton administration did not engage in direct military actions that required a substantial deployment of forces and ground warfare.
Ultimately assessment across a number of cases led to focus on the 2001
George W. Bush decision to invade Afghanistan; the 2003 George W. Bush decision to invade Iraq; and the 2009 Barack Obama decision to surge forces in Afghanistan.
This approach enabled consideration of recent cases in which successive administrations dealt with a common problem set where the strategic implications continue to play out today. It allowed for interrogation of three interconnected cases to identify gaps, patterns, and trends while also enabling consideration of the influencing factors of the broader national security system and systemic challenges that shaped policies. This approach is the inverse of Graham Allison’s approach to analysis of the Kennedy administration’s decision-making in the 1962 Cuban Missile
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Crisis where he held the problem constant and considered it through various models.13
In applying the ADA framework, research into these cases considers the degree to which decisions to use military force were taken in priority and in balance with broader U.S. interests, and in proportion to other available instruments of power.14 This research likewise considers the degree to which administrations considered the viability of their objectives and adequacy of available strategies as these were necessary to understand the scope of effort and resources required to achieve policy objectives. These considerations speak to an administration’s capability to respond both proportionally and appropriately.
Finally, this study considers the viability of policy decisions in terms of their implications to military leaders and their ability to translate policy goals into complementary and achievable military objectives. While this research does not decisively settle what happened and why in these cases in a historical sense, it highlights a previously under-emphasized focus on analytical capacity and rigor within the NSC, and reveals insights into the causal implications of NSC analysis to policy outcomes while offering insights into the utility of ADA to enhance mainstream academic approaches to interrogating and analyzing key security policymaking decisions.
This study is enabled by the substantial historical record developed over a period of seventeen years where policy decisions have been interrogated, and where numerous members of these administrations have detailed much about the decision
13 Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 689-718. 14 Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (Faber and Faber, 1954), 188. "...fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy. This should take account and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least, ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will.” 19 procedures employed through published memoirs and discussion in public fora. A robust public record of documents, statements, and actions also provided a significant basis of reference. These were complemented by the personal insights of
National Security Staff (NSS) members and senior military leaders in each case.
Analysis of these cases is further underpinned by a heavily researched and extensively detailed body of knowledge on the U.S. national security apparatus and supporting organizational processes.
Limitations
The nature of this study involved a substantial literature review to understand the existing bodies of knowledge on Foreign Policy Analysis, Decision
Theory, and the U.S. national security system. The research also demanded a deep exploration of the decision-making environments, actions, methods, and individual perspectives in each case. The literature review likewise assessed a broad representative body of knowledge on alternative models used for decision analysis that might specifically fit the purpose of security policy analysis. Howard observed that the challenge in developing security strategy in this environment, is “to not get it too far wrong.”15 Howard’s observation eludes to the uniqueness and complexity of security problems in terms of the number of competing interests and actions involved. In this environment, a policy decision is unlikely to satisfy all objectives and certainly not all interests. In these cases a reasonable, that is a proportional and appropriate policy response is the goal.
15 Sir Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace”, (RUSI, A Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Vol. 119, 1974), 3-9. 20
This literature review revealed contemporary ADA methodologies as a compelling capability to account for the various competing factors resident in policy decisions and understand how they were treated in forming a decision. In this way a prescriptive approach to decision analysis directs focus on specific criteria underpinning the decision. The ADA perspective represents an auditable procedure but does not imply a rational decision, rather it represents a rational procedure for arriving at a reasonable decision. Characterizing what reasonable means in this context is also detailed in chapter IV, Conceptual Framework.
Most importantly to the purpose of this research, the ADA framework represents a useful tool by which to understand what was considered in administration decision-making and what was not. In this capacity the methodology is structured to answer the ‘what’ questions with regard to analytical order and the decision criteria considered in forming a policy choice. This suggests that a framework focused on analytical order and formulation of decision criteria may not be well suited to explain ‘why’ presidents and their NSC’s chose as they did.
Nevertheless, in enumerating the criteria that informed presidential decisions and the omissions and flaws in their analysis, an ADA approach may represent a useful aperture by which to focus further interrogation on why these occurred through mainstream FPA perspectives.
Validation
Validation of the study was pursued through multiple sources of evidence derived from historical documents, data, interviews, and observations from the public record. This involved careful organization of data for analysis, including detailed transcription of interviews, making electronic records of material and field notes, and
21 categorization of data according to their source and case. Further validation was pursued through comparison and corroboration of data, findings, patterns, themes, and alternative explanations across the three cases.16 The applied decision analysis framework employed provided an interpretive methodology by which to capture the relevance and comparative value of findings consistent with an ADA approach advocated within the literature. This analytical approach has likewise been validated by extensive use in business, industry, finance, and military sectors.17
Methodological Challenges
A comprehensive literature review and interviews revealed significant differences in the specific NSC procedures, and the decision methodologies administrations used to inform policy decisions in each case. The studies indicate there was no structured analytical procedure to which either administration adhered.
In fact research suggests that the last administration whose records indicate some regular, formal requirement for analysis to precede and support recommendations, was the Nixon administration that ended in 1973.18 In short, while Presidential memoranda routinely described the roles, responsibilities and the procedures for
NSC meetings, there were no formal, prescribed analytical procedures defined by which the NSC or committees were to develop the key decision criteria underpinning security policy recommendations. Further, there were no criteria developed by which to scope the ways and means necessary to achieve policy objectives in any case.
16 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, (SAGE Publications, 2d Edition, 2003), 195-199. 17 Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: A personal account of how it got started and evolved. (Operations Research, 50(1), 2002), 179; Gerlad J. Lieberman, and Frederick S.Hillier, Introduction To Operations Research 10th Edition, (McGraw-Hill, 2005), 3-4. 18 Blair D. Hydrick, Paul Kesaris Ed., Documents of the National Security Council, Sixth Supplement, (University Publications of America, 1993), vii. 22
More broadly, the U.S. constitution provides little or no guidance governing policy decisions to enter into conflict.19 There are relatively few statutory requirements beyond the language of the National Security Act of 1947 that prescribe the basic roles and functions of actors in the national security system.20 A review of title and statute reveals little indication of legal responsibility beyond stipulations on separation of powers, where the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and the Congress has purview to both raise and fund armies, and to declare war.21
Lack of specificity in the Constitution or legislation means Presidents are empowered with great latitude to create their own security policy system; some approaching policy formulation more formally than others. However, none have prescribed a formal, prescriptive analytical procedure to guide NSC deliberations.22 A key point of emphasis is that interviews with NSC staff reveal that they invariably equate the NSC Committee process to analysis. The committee process is not an analytical one and this points to a rather significant lack of understanding within the very organization intended to perform detailed analysis. The committee process is a hierarchal, politically driven process where committees debate issues and propose
19 The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8, describes the Congress’ responsibility for raising armies and funding them, and the power to declare war; Article II, Section 2 empowers the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Accessed 7 March 2017. Available at: https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript 20 The National Security Act of 1947, (Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758., 1947). The Act provides very general language for the NSC to “assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security; for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and; to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.” 21 United States Constitution, Article I, Legislative Branch, Section 8: Powers of Congress; United States Constitution, Article II, Executive Branch, Section 2; Van Jackson, I Got A Story To Tell: Who Does What In National Security Policy?, (War On The Rocks, 2017), accessed 7 March 2017. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/i-got-a-story-to-tell-who-does-what-in-national- security-policy/; U.S. Code Title 50. War and National Defense, Chapter 33, War Powers Resolution, Section 1541, Purpose and policy, (Public Law 93–148, 2, 87, Stat. 555, 1973) 22 Christopher C. Shoemaker, The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, (Westview Press, 1991), vii. 23 recommendations to the president and principals. This bureaucratic process may imply analysis is involved but, absent formal structure and direction to do so, the system actually depends upon the actors in it to understand what the president needs. In the absence of prescribed analysis, policy formulation then largely relies on the experience, judgment, and intuition of those in the system.
This is a rather startling fact. The NSC, which is the fulcrum about which the most serious national security decisions are formed and enacted, goes about this task absent a statutory requirement for development of analytical criteria and risk assessment to justify policy decisions that are elsewhere required to pass the most basic environmental, food, safety or health legislation.
It is hardly melodramatic to assert that security policy decisions, particularly those that commit military force, demand a level of analysis commensurate with the gravity of the lives and national well-being at stake.23 This requirement places great emphasis on the rigor of NSC analytical procedures in these cases. The lack of any formally defined analytical process in either administration represented the key challenge to evaluating and comparing administration decision procedures.
Therefore, to assess the utility of an ADA model, this absence of a formally defined analytical process necessitated developing a bespoke model for this research based on ADA principles.
An additional methodological challenge at play in these cases is that NSC members often act outside formal staff processes, making decisions voiced via email, telephone, and facsimile. As a result, the actual specifics of what factors informed a decision are often not well documented. In addressing these knowledge
23 Sir Winston Churchill, My Early Life: 1874-1904, (Touchstone, 1930), 246. “The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.” 24 gaps, relevant information informing this study was gleaned from interviews and personal recollections of those familiar with a particular NSC decision procedure.
Where interviews could not be obtained to inform first-hand knowledge of how a decision was informed, interviews with staff and interagency officials with intimate knowledge of the procedure were employed to develop an accurate understanding.
Linking NSC Principal’s public statements and documents to characterize and explain actions and outcomes were also used to enhance the study.
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Chapter II
A Review of FPA Literature
In this chapter I will first differentiate between theoretical approaches in terms of normative, descriptive, and prescriptive theories to characterize their intent and methods of analyzing policy decisions. I will then provide a review of traditional FPA perspectives in order to describe a gap between normative and descriptive theories that contemporary prescriptive methods might be of utility to bridge.
Alternative Approaches to Policy Analysis
Addressing this study’s central question required a methodology suitable for interrogating the structure, composition and completeness of the analytical procedures used to inform presidential choices. This requirement led to a review of various methods of analysis and consideration of them in terms of their specific suitability for this research. Among the various approaches to decision making, three prominent perspectives typically frame analysis, those being normative, descriptive, and prescriptive approaches.24
The normative perspective focuses on how people should make decisions and codifies this notion mathematically in rational choice models of decision-making under conditions of risk and uncertainty. These models assert that humans act in their own self-interests making choices with the highest expected utility.25 Von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s Expected Utility model and Savage’s Subjective
Expected Utility model are commonly cited normative frameworks.26 Probability
24 David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa, Amos Tversky, Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 9. 25 Ibid, 9-10. 26 John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, (Princeton University Press, 1944), 15-17; Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, (Wiley, 1954). 26 theory, particularly Bayesian statistical methods form the normative basis for these models.27
The descriptive perspective focuses on how people actually think and behave endeavoring to understand why they choose as they do. Descriptive analytical perspectives comprise the majority of FPA approaches. It is noteworthy that various theorists have developed mathematical models of behavior to support descriptive analysis, however the strength of these models must be judged by how well their ability to predict corresponds to actual choices individuals made. Among the many descriptive models developed over time, a representative body of knowledge is described later in a review of FPA literature.
Prescriptive models are based on both the theoretical foundation of normative theory in combination with the observations of descriptive theory. More specifically, the prescriptive perspective focuses on helping individuals or groups make evidence- based decisions by blending elements of normative models with consideration of human factors that influence decisions.28 Prescriptive models recognize that decisions are often based on incomplete information and unknown consequences, thus assuming a degree of uncertainty. This perspective recognizes that a completely “rational” decision is not reasonable and requires identification and consideration of the key uncertainties and factors to derive a reasonable solution at acceptable risk. In this sense the goal of a prescriptive approach is not a rational choice but rather a rational procedure by which to develop ‘reasonable’ choices.
27 Jorge López Puga, Martin Krzywinski & Naomi Altman, Corrigendum: Bayesian statistics, (Nature Methods, Vol.12, 5, 2015), 377. Accessed 12 June 2016. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/nmeth.3368.pdf. Bayesian statistics is a theory in the field of statistics based on the Bayesian interpretation of probability where probability expresses a degree of belief in an event. The probability of a future event may be inferred from updated probabilities after obtaining new data. 28 Ronald A. Howard, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Operational Research, Decision analysis: Applied Decision Theory, (Wiley-Interscience, 1966), 98. 27
Foreign Policy Analysis: A Review of the Relevant Literature
The review considers various FPA models and theories. This body of literature has largely defined the approach to questions about why states pursue certain foreign policies, and it has largely set the parameters for academic debate when considering areas like the national security system. The actor-specific focus of
FPA considers the decision procedure as a key element of analysis and does so in terms of cognitive, organizational, political, or socio-structural theories. In other words, these theories view decision-making as a function of the human element in the procedure.29
By design, theories and models derived from them, attempt to go beyond single instances and generalize across cases, proposing that when certain conditions exist, certain phenomena or behaviors are likely to occur.30 In this way
FPA theories posit that recognizing certain conditions in a case might enable us to predict how elements of a nation’s foreign policy might perform if we observe the same conditions in a new case.31
There has been a long period of intellectual debate over the inadequacies of normative theories to explain real-world decision-making. Over the course of this debate, the field of FPA has moved steadily away from normative models and is now dominated by competing descriptive theories, but identification and acceptance of a suitable, unifying framework has been elusive.
Among the descriptive FPA theories developed, they may be characterized in terms of their focus on human behavioral, structural, and political influences that
29 Schafer, Mark; and Scott Crichlow, Groupthink Vs. High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations, (Columbia University Press, 1983), 8. 30 Neack, Laura, Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 1. 31 Ibid, 11. 28 shape decisions. Among these competing theories, where Allison, for example, might explain policy decisions in terms of strong political or structural influences,
Kahneman, Tversky, and Steinbruner might explain the same decisions in terms of the cognitive factors influencing the decision maker. 32 In fact, Kahneman, Tversky, and Steinbruner forwarded theoretical frameworks demonstrating that cognitive factors alter decision making such that two individuals may view the same problem with the same information and methodology, and yet arrive at two different solutions.33
A representative discussion of prominent descriptive perspectives is summarized next as they provide a broad understanding of competing perspectives in the FPA literature. These approaches direct intellectual effort towards certain ways of understanding decision-making on complex problems and why decision makers chose as they did. This discussion of FPA frameworks begins with a summary of the rational actor model and the alternative descriptive frameworks that introduce political and socio-structural factors that undermine purely ‘rational’, utility- maximizing choices.
Rational Actor Model
A widely referenced model is Graham Allison’s characterization and criticism of the rational actor approach to foreign policy decisions.34 This perspective derives
32 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 689-718; Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Science, New Series, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974), 1130; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 88-106, 112-139. 33 Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Science, New Series, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974), 1130; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 88-106, 112-139. 34 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 691. 29 from rational choice theory and assumes the state is a unitary actor and that the decision maker is a rational individual who, with complete information, can be relied on to make informed, calculated decisions that maximize value and perceived benefits to the nation.35 Allison described the basic elements of a maximizing decision procedure in his characterization of the rational actor model as 1) Identifying goals and objectives, 2) Identifying the spectrum of possible options, 3)
Consideration of consequences resulting from execution of each alternative, and 4)
A choice that is a function of “value-maximizing.”36
Allison challenged this model’s assumption of complete information by which to optimize decision making. He pointed out the flaws of this model in instances of incomplete information where individuals must make decisions under conditions of significant uncertainty. As Allison argued, this model fails to consider the presence of political, structural, and human cognitive factors that constrain optimal or maximizing choices.37
Bureaucratic Politics Model
Allison described the influence of political leaders at the top of government and those leading critical organizations who form the key influences in shaping a policy decision. Allison asserted that this apparatus “constitutes a complex arena for the intra-national game” where Government behavior can be understood “not as organizational outputs, but as outcomes of bargaining games.”38
35 Joe A. Oppenheimer, Rational Choice Theory (Sage Encyclopedia of Political Theory, 2008), 1, Accessed March 2015: http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/oppenheimer/research/rct.pdf. 36 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 694. 37 Ibid, 694-695. 38 Ibid, 707. 30
This model considers the nature of government where implementation of policy relies on the decentralized decisions of leaders who operate with a significant degree of independence. In this perspective power is shared and naturally leads to disagreement where leaders “fight for what they are convinced is right.”39 The bureaucratic politics model then analyzes decisions on the premise that actions are the product of these leaders who bring their own values to the decision-making procedure. This means that each bureaucratic entity attempts to satisfy its goals and any collective action is contingent upon successful negotiations between parties to achieve consensus.40
The factors considered in this model are those that influence each party’s decision-making and how each achieves their goals. These characteristics include the relative power and degree of influence of each party on the broader decision process, where each may have opposing viewpoints and desired outcomes.41
Success in achieving consensus or certain goals may require some parties to make concessions. This dynamic often results in decisions that are seen to benefit one or more parties over others. The need for consensus can also lead to bargaining, resulting in a decision that is not what any intended. These collective factors undermine purely rational or maximizing solutions and in fact, this model is useful in explaining why states sometimes act contrary to our perceptions of ‘rationality’.
There are several complementary models to Allison’s that are not described in detail here that similarly characterize the influence of politics on foreign policy decisions including perspectives from Morton Halperin, I.M. Destler, and Alexander George.42
39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid, 710. 42 Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Brookings, 1974); Destler, I.M., Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, (Princeton University Press, 1972); George, Alexander L., The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Foreign Policy, (American Political Science Review, 1972). 31
The bureaucratic politics model has been subjected to criticism on the grounds that it doesn’t account well for situations of highly concentrated power, particularly on occasions where a president is intrinsically involved in the policy decisions.43 For example, Houghton observed this shortcoming arguing that, rather than policy formulation, this model performs best when analyzing policy implementation where “leaders struggle to maintain control over their decisions.”44
Organizational Process Model
In contrast to the two previous approaches, the organizational process model views government as a group of organizations working together rather than as individuals or partisan entities. Allison described this concept where decisions are
“less as deliberate choices of leaders and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.”45 This model then analyzes foreign policy decisions as made within the constraints of organizational structures and operating procedures, where actions are governed by a chain of command and actions are taken only with authorization.46 This is very similar to the bureaucratic politics model but operates at a level under the top leaders. Under this structure leaders delegate elements of the issue to committees, departments, and other bureaucratic entities.
Though its utility to explain decisions within the U.S. government is well established, there is some tension in Allison’s description of this model. Allison argued that leaders “cannot substantially control the behavior of these
43 Houghton, David P., The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 32-34. 44 Ibid, 252. 45 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. 46 Ibid. 32 organizations,” while his model also assumes individuals act within organizational constraints and this limits their ability to act unilaterally.47 This assumption does not account for strong or independent personalities as will be characterized in the case studies. Like the bureaucratic politics model, this framework applies more readily to the decentralized implementation of policy where members of organizations, with a few possible exceptions, have limited input into significant policy formulation or actual decisions. This is particularly true of decisions in the U.S. government regarding the commitment of military forces.
Inter-Branch Politics Model
This model is similar to the organizational and bureaucratic politics models in that it considers the roles of separately defined groups or entities in policy formulation, but where the executive and legislative branches dominate.48 Tan presents this model through analysis of US-China policy from three perspectives where he applies Allison’s bureaucratic politics and rational actor models along with his inter-branch politics framework. Like Allison, Tan uses his model to interrogate actions and their outcomes based on the combined efforts and cohesiveness of different groups and their progress toward achieving collective goals. In this perspective bureaucratic and organizational actors do not operate with complete independence, but rather interact and influence each other.
A criticism of Tan’s model is that he applies it to only cases where the executive and legislative branches came to firm agreement on a policy. 49 In this
47 Ibid. 48 Tan, Qingshan, The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-cold War Era, (Rienner, 1992), 179. 49 Fayyaz, Shabana, Washington's China policy, (Pakistan Journal of American Studies, Vol. 14-1, 1996), 61. 33 approach he failed to consider cases where the executive and legislative branches disagree and where the executive exercises its authority unilaterally, or the Congress overrides executive intent.50 This model represents a rather incremental progression of Allison’s models and like them, this framework applies more readily to the decentralized implementation of policy where members of organizations, with a few exceptions, have limited input into significant national security policy decisions.
Political Process Model
Hilsman’s model expands on Allison’s, developed around the notion that a large number of actors are involved in the foreign policy decision-making process across all levels of government.51 Hilsman describes the political process in terms of concentric rings of power centered around the president.52 Similar to Allison,
Hilsman’s model emphasizes bargaining and the presence of various power centers pursuing their respective goals, naturally relying on consensus. 53 This model differs from the bureaucratic politics model as it focuses more on the individual participants and their personal goals and world view rather than organizations and groups as a whole. Hilsman emphasizes the ideology of each political actor as one of the most important factors in both determining and explaining decision-making.54 This intent somewhat diminishes the applicability of his model to cases of security policy development where his attempt to finely distinguish actors requires a level of access and documented historical evidence of the decision process that is rarely available for academic research. For example, Hilsman treats the president and his personal
50 Ibid. 51 Hilsman, Roger, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics, (A Pearson Education Company, 1993), 85-89. 52 Ibid, 85. 53 Ibid, 83. 54 Ibid, 86. 34 staff as separate power centers when they are often difficult or impossible to differentiate without direct access to routinely classified meeting minutes and the actors themselves.55 A more general criticism is that Hilsman’s model largely represents another incremental progression of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model.
The Intersection of Decision Theory and Psychology in Policy Decisions
The preceding models describe foreign policy decisions largely in terms of socio-structural influences on choices. In each instance, the models reflect a decision procedure that does not conform to purely rational axioms. The influence of bureaucracy and organizational structures explain some deviations from rational axioms, but cognitive factors also play an influential part in foreign policy decisions.
Research in this area led to an integration of decision theory and behavioral psychology resulting in a number of descriptive decision theories to further explain how people make choices.
Descriptive decision theory is concerned with characterizing and explaining how people actually make decisions and what will occur.56 This perspective must be distinguished from a closely related branch of decision theory that is a normative approach which seeks to define how decision-makers should choose. Normative theories will be further discussed in chapter III, Decision Theory and Applied
Decision Analysis.
Much of the work in descriptive decision theory has been devoted to the developing and testing of models that attempt to improve on the descriptive
55 MacKinnon, Michael G., The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend?, (Routledge, 2000), 5-6.
56 Chandler, Jake, Descriptive Decision Theory, (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Accessed 2 January 2018, available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi- bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=decision-theory-descriptive. 35 adequacy of Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility theory.57 Briefly, Savage’s theory of decision making under uncertainty describes outcomes as the product of subjective probabilities. He reflects these probabilities in his theory as representing the decision maker’s beliefs.58 The next set of perspectives summarize some significant contributions of this field of descriptive decision theory to FPA.
Prospect Theory
Similar to Allison’s observed flaws in rational choice theory, Kahneman and
Tversky forwarded their prospect theory as an alternative framework to rational choice and expected utility-maximizing approaches to decision-making. Their theory introduced the implications of human reasoning and judgment under conditions of uncertainty.59 This theory characterizes human reasoning and judgment in explaining how individuals consider and choose between available alternatives, and why people consistently deviate from predicted choices deemed to be ‘rational’.
Kahneman and Tversky describe a decision framing effect that refers to ‘‘the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice.”60 More simply, where rational choice theory assumes a reasonable person will behave rationally most of the time, prospect theory assumes that people value losses and gains differently, and thus often choose alternatives based on their perceptions of potential gains and losses.61 The concept holds that, given a choice of equal probabilities, a majority of people will choose to retain the
57 Savage, Leonard J., The Foundations of Statistics, (Wiley, 1954). 58 Ibid, 20. 59 Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, (Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1979), 263. 60 Amos Tversky, & Daniel Kahneman, The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice, (Science, 1981), 453. 61 Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, (Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1979), 263; John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, (Princeton University Press, 1944), 9. 36 assets that they already have, rather than risk the chance to increase their current assets. In this way people are usually averse to the possibility of losing, such that they would rather take a risk to avoid a loss rather than take a risk to make an equivalent gain.62 These experiments demonstrate clear deviations from a purely rational maximizing approach to decisions. In this way a decision-maker’s judgments may be influenced before they enter into the decision-making procedure. A related finding on the differences between individuals, Kahneman and Tversky’s experiments demonstrate that two individuals faced with the same problem and same information, may interpret information differently and choose differently.63
In light of these findings, Kahneman and Tversky argue normative theories are inadequate to explain actual decision behavior because they do not adequately consider perception and judgment.64 The implication is that descriptive and normative theories cannot be combined into a single model of choice adequate to explain all behavior.
Their argument is bolstered by works like that of Robert Jervis who observed that decision-makers’ perceptions of the world and other actors influence their decisions. He explored the cognitive psychology of political decision-making, analyzing the methods by which decision-makers process information and form, maintain, and change their beliefs about international relations and other actors. 65
His findings reflect the manner in which decision-maker’s cognitive processes lead to misperceptions.
62 Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, (Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1979), 267. 63 Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Science, New Series, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974), 1130. 64Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, (Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1979), 263. 65 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976), 28-29. 37
Ellsberg’s Experiments
Daniel Ellsberg’s experiments complement Kahneman and Tversky’s and his work similarly disputes both rational choice and Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility theories. With these experiments Ellsberg introduced the notion of reasonableness as opposed to rationality in decision making in the presence of uncertainty and ambiguity. He prefaced his experiments with the notion that in order to act reasonably, one must judge actions by their consequences, and where the consequences are not known, one must decide on what a reasonable choice might be.66 Ellsberg’s testing of problem solving under uncertain, ambiguous conditions reveals that reasonable decision makers will often reject “numerically determined probabilities,” consciously making reasoned choices influenced by other values that weighted their decisions.67 His experiments demonstrate that people faced with a choice between a bet with known odds and an equivalent bet with unknown odds often pick the former. Ellsberg referred to this behavior as ‘ambiguity aversion’ and observed that while these decisions violate the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility, they were reasoned decisions based on known information where the decision maker weighted their choices on the known rather than the unknown.68
Kahneman, Tversky, and Ellsberg’s arguments against a priori approaches to choices lead to consideration of additional theoretical concepts that emphasize the human psychological element in decisions. These include Janis’ observations on group dynamics, Simon’s notion of Bounded Rationality, Steinbruner’s Cybernetic
Paradigm and Cognitive Process Models, and Mintz’s Poliheuristic framework.
66 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001), 1. 67 Ibid, 155-156. 68 Ibid, 205-206 38
Groupthink
Irving Janis proposed that group decision-making dynamics make participants susceptible to “concurrence-seeking”, where they tend to conform to the group’s preferences while suppressing their own opposing views.69 Janis described
Groupthink as a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people in which the desire for agreement or conformity results in a dysfunctional or irrational decision. He used case studies to demonstrate how group members may minimize conflict and reach a consensus without critical evaluation of alternative perspectives or accurate assessment of consequences. Janis argued this may be the result of members or leaders actively suppressing dissenting opinions or the group’s isolation from outside influences.
Groupthink has been critiqued from a number of quarters. For example,
McCauley observed what Janis might characterize as groupthink is more likely a result of structural and procedural faults. More simply, others viewed some instance of groupthink described by Janis as merely compliance of subordinates to a decision-maker’s intent.70
Constraints Model of Policymaking Processes
Irving Janis proposed this model asserting that policy makers are capable of effectively using a high-quality or “vigilant” decision procedure but may only do so after they first consider the importance of the decision.71 He further asserts that
69 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A psychological study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 7-8. 70 Schafer, Mark, Scott Crichlow, Groupthink vs. High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations, (Columbia University Press, 2010), 27-30. 71 Irving L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, (The Free Press, 1989), 21. 39 decision makers will only undertake the time and effort of a high-quality decision analysis when they perceive that all attendant constraints are manageable.72 Janis includes cognitive factors and complex relationships as some of the constraints that might make problems appear too difficult to manage and the decision-maker will resort to more simplistic heuristic decision rules. The implication of his model is that, unless policy makers perceive an issue to be critically important, they will not dedicate the time and energy on a comprehensive analytical procedure to resolve it.
If they fail to apply analytical rigor the quality of their policy decision suffers, and this may lead to failure.
Janis developed his Constraints Model to evaluate the causal linkages between the rigor in policy decision analysis and outcomes.73 He evaluated a significant number of cases where his findings reflected the application of a high- quality decision procedure as one of the major determinants of satisfactory outcomes.74 Conversely, lack of diligence in the decision procedure resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes.75 Janis is very clear that his elements of a high-quality decision procedure represent a descriptive rather than a prescriptive model, as he asserted no acceptable integrated model for decision making had been developed.76
He developed these steps after canvassing the decision procedures of senior executives, government policymaking organizations, and business leaders.77 The key elements of Janis’ model include: 1) Surveying a wide range of objectives to be fulfilled; 2) Canvassing a wide range of courses of action (COA); 3) Intensively
72 Ibid. 73 Ibid, ix. 74 Ibid, 126-128. 75 Ibid, 134. 76 Ibid, 90. Janis developed and published this theory in 1989. This coincides with the timeframe where Ronald Howard, Howard Raiffa, David Bell, Amos Tversky and other pioneers of Decision Theory were developing their Applied Decision Analysis methodology that was not yet well known. 77 Irving L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, (The Free Press, 1989), 30. 40 searching for new information relevant to evaluating the alternatives; 4) Correctly assimilating and taking into account new information or expert judgments, even that which is not supportive of a preferred COA; 5) Reconsidering positive and negative consequences of alternatives originally regarded as unacceptable; 6) Carefully examining the costs and risks of negative and positive consequences and; 7) Making detailed provisions for implementing and monitoring the chosen course of action with consideration of contingencies should the consequences of known risks be realized.78
There are of course critics of Janis’ vigilant decision process. Tversky and
Kahneman have argued that advocates of vigilant decision making underemphasize the advantages of simple decision rules, asserting that the adoption of heuristics in decision making leads to more efficient use of time.79 Suedfeld and Tetlock have questioned whether vigilant decision making necessarily increases the likelihood of success. For example, they argued that “integratively complex” decision making characterized by Janis’ vigilant process is not always superior to simpler strategies and the emotional costs entailed by complex decision-making procedures often do not warrant the effort.80 Nevertheless, Janis clearly understood the causal relationship between comprehensive analysis of the decision problem to the likelihood of successful outcomes.
78 Ibid, 30-31. 79 Tversky, Amos, Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, (Science, Vol. 185, 1974), 1124–1131 80 Peter Suedfeld, Philip Tetlock, Psychological advice about political decision making: Heuristics, biases, and cognitive defects. In Peter Suedfeld and Philip E. Tetlock (Eds.), Psychology and social policy, (Hemisphere Publishing Group, 1992), 51–70. 41
Bounded Rationality and the Cybernetic Model
One of the early critiques of rational choice theory were Simon’s insights into the cognitive responses of decision makers to simplify complex problems and, in the absence of complete information, seek satisfactory rather than optimal solutions.81
Simon referred to this dynamic as “Bounded Rationality” where cognitive limitations and computational capacity result in satisficing solutions.82 Simon asserted that these limitations cause people to reduce decisions to relatively simple heuristic rules of thumb. These observations are certainly contrary to the axioms of Subjective
Expected Utility that Simon characterized as ”convenient assumptions” that do not typically fit with reality. Simon’s observations on the human tendency to reduce complexity in terms of heuristics are affirmed by others like Irving Janis and John
Steinbruner.
Cybernetic Theory
Steinbruner expanded on Simon’s notion of bounded rationality with his
Cybernetic model that posits decision makers lack the cognitive skills to derive solutions that conform to our perceptions of rationality. He explained that complex problems and uncertainty are often so overwhelming that individuals are not able to clearly grasp the state of the environment, identify available alternatives, or even assess the consequences of a particular alternative. 83 He argued that in these cases
81 Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, (Psychological Review, 63, 2, 1956). 129–138. 82 Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality. In: Eatwell J., Milgate M., Newman P. (eds) Utility and Probability, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 15. 83 Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Political Decision Analysis, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 14. 42 decision makers avoid complexity and instead approach problems incrementally, and utilize information selectively, thus avoiding the need to have perfect information.84
Cognitive Processes Model
Complementary to Jervis, Kahneman, Tversky’s and Simon’s work,
Steinbruner also described a cognitive processes model where information is often processed prior to and independently of conscious direction.85 He observed that although decision makers regularly operate in conditions of significant uncertainty, they also often maintain strong beliefs and act on them despite the risks involved. As a result, they make decisions about what they desire or what they perceive as attainable and do not alter them even when subsequent evidence contradicts them.86
In other words, decision makers become ‘married’ to certain objectives or options and do not consider trade-offs necessary to achieve a more optimal or reasonable solution. This represents a common violation of rationality where the desirable dominates recognition of the feasible. Like Kahneman, Tversky and Simon,
Steinbruner’s core argument is that normative rational theories should not be relied upon as a basis for analysis because they cannot account for the cognitive factors in decision making.87
Poliheuristic Theory
Contrary to Kahneman and Tversky’s argument that descriptive and normative theories are not congruent, Alex Mintz argued that both cognitive and rational factors coexist in policy decisions. He posited a poliheuristic theory to
84 Ibid, 47-49. 85 Ibid, 112-139. 86 Ibid. 87 Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 14. 43 explain both the "how" and "why" of decision-making, proposing that policy makers approach complex decisions in a two-stage process. In the first stage Mintz’s term
“poliheuristic” refers to the way in which individuals use cognitive mechanisms to first simplify complex decisions and reduce available alternatives, similar to Simon’s and
Steinbruner’s observations.88 Many of these heuristics compensate for incomplete information providing cognitive shortcuts to complex situations.89 A key assumption of Mintz’s theory is that “political leaders measure success and failure, costs and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards using political terms.”90 In the second stage, he argued that decision makers enter into a more analytical procedure, applying rules of choice in order to characterize risk and maximize benefit.91
Mintz also refers to his assumption that political leaders form decisions in a political context, as a “non-compensatory principle” where leaders are unlikely to make choices that harm them politically.92 Mintz’s model suggests that decisions to use force are typically based on a non-compensatory strategy where alternatives viewed as politically unacceptable are eliminated. In this way the decision-maker employs heuristic decision rules that do not require complex analysis, and identify alternatives based on very few criteria.93 Mintz’s hypothesis complements Ellsberg’s
88 Alex Mintz, Nehemia Geva, The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decisionmaking, in N. Geva & A. Mintz (Eds.), Decisionmaking on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate, ( Lynne Rienner, 1997)., 81-101. 89 Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice, (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19. 90 Mintz, Alex, Nehemia Geva, Steven B. Redd, and Amy Carnes, The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform, (American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, 1997), 554. 91 Alex Mintz, How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective, (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48: 3, 2004), 3-4. Accessed 12 January 2016. Available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002703261056. 92 Ibid. 93 Mintz, Alex, The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making, (The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4., 1993), 595-596. 44 testing that suggests decision makers will at times eschew numerical probabilities in favor of other influences.94
The Gap Between Normative and Descriptive FPA Theories
The preceding perspectives represent descriptive approaches to decision making that have proven highly useful to explain the many factors influencing why decision-makers chose as they did. These models are representative of a steady movement away from normative approaches deemed incompatible with human reasoning, a movement driven largely in response to experiments revealing significant deviations of actual human behavior from classical rational theories of decision making. The result has been a weakening of the assumptions underpinning normative theories leading to the development of new ones like prospect theory and others that incorporate the cognitive and structural factors influencing decision makers.
These various models illustrate the gap between normative and descriptive approaches. As noted earlier, while descriptive perspectives are very useful in explaining how people think and why they chose as they did, they are less useful in describing the decision-making procedure and key evidence-based criteria that actually underpinned their choices. For example, Allison’s models focus not so much on the way problems were analyzed but rather on the influences of politics, bureaucracies, and government organizations on choices, and why these do not conform to normative theories.
94 Alex Mintz, The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making (The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1993), 595. Accessed 4 January, 2015, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/174541?seq=1 45
This movement away from normative approaches does not obviate the underpinning notion that is a natural desire to achieve the best outcome possible in whatever terms the decision maker perceives as “best.” It is in this sense that various theorists like Janis and Mintz refer to the presence of both descriptive elements and normative, or a priori approaches to decision making.95 The broadly refuted practicality of normative approaches begs the question on the degree to which they retain relevant utility in FPA.
Though it is well established that decision-makers do not make choices in a purely normative fashion, the proliferation of decision support tools indicates that they intend to make the best decision possible and want help in doing so. Since their underlying intent is to act ‘rationally,’ a comprehensive and systematic approach to information processing and analysis is necessary in addressing complex, non- repetitive problems involving uncertainty. The identified gap between normative and descriptive theories, suggests the possibility that a prescriptive approach to decision making that integrates aspects of both would be valuable and compels further assessment of research methods, as Hudson and Vore acknowledge in their review of FPA literature, “in the study of foreign policy decision-making, the issues are not theoretical but methodological.”96
Descriptive FPA frameworks certainly acknowledge that the components of a decision-making procedure are important to understanding how policy choices are formed, (Allison, Mintz, Jervis, Hilsman, et al). It is then notable that academia has
95 Mintz, Alex, Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions; Policy and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Symposium, (International Studies Perspectives, 2005) 95; Irving L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, (The Free Press, 1989), 96. 96 Valerie M. Hudson, and Vore, C.S., Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, (International Studies Quarterly 39, 1995), 221. 46 not fully explored the capacity of decision science to enhance understanding of foreign policy decisions.
While FPA has moved away from normative approaches, the field of decision science has emphasized the maturation of prescriptive approaches to decision making. The decision science perspective maintains that a prescriptive procedure that integrates behavioral, social, and structural factors is fundamentally important to the decisionmaker’s understanding and insight into the decision problem.97 In this sense contemporary decision theory employs the notion that a purely rational, maximizing solution is not reasonable, but a prescriptive approach to the decision- making process itself represents procedural rationality.98
It is along this line of thinking that this research seeks to identify and apply a prescriptive, yet qualitative methodology by which to interrogate NSC decision procedures. Doing so is based on a recognition that improved understanding of the criteria developed to underpin choices reveals both causal links to outcomes and provides insights into the potential utility of prescriptive methods to focus and enhance further descriptive analysis of deviations from both substantial and procedural rationality.
Foreign Policy Analysis Summary
FPA has traditionally centered on normative and descriptive theoretical approaches to decision making. While normative theories might represent an ideal, descriptive approaches dominate analysis, making important contributions to improved understanding of how politicians actually behave and how governments
97 David Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky, Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 9-30. 98 Tsoukiàs, Alexis, From decision theory to decision aiding methodology, (LAMSADE - CNRS, 2003), 21. 47 operate in forming policy decisions that can have significant international implications. Several were characterized here as representative of the FPA body of knowledge. Each offers a unique set of benefits and potential shortcomings.
While these are important to our understanding of political, social, cognitive, and structural influences on decision makers, analysis by any one of these frameworks predictably yields varying and often divergent explanations of how and why policy makers decided as they did. Allison’s use of different models to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis is clear evidence not only of the flaws in normative models, but of inconsistent interpretations of the same decision by descriptive models. The cited models likewise provide insights into cognitive factors proven to alter decision making, such that two individuals may view the same problem with the same information and methodology, and yet arrive at two different solutions.99 These reinforce the fact that the world is a messy place where the unique nature of issues and actor’s behavior conspire to resist prediction.
These varying interpretations are useful to gain clear insights into the many factors influencing why they do not adhere to purely normative axioms. However, in attempting to explain why decision maker’s chose as they did, these perspectives do not fully explain the gap between normative, maximizing solutions and the actual choices of decision makers. This gap between a normative maximizing approach and the actual approach shaped by political, behavioral, and structural factors is one that a prescriptive approach might be of value to address. Prescriptive approaches are useful in understanding the procedure that decision makers used to define and discern between choices giving us critically important insight into both what was
99 Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Science, New Series, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974), 1130. 48 considered and equally important, what was not. Doing this provides insights into decision-makers deviations from normative axioms that serve to focus analysis on explaining why they did so.
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Chapter III
Decision Theory and Applied Decision Analysis
This chapter introduces a prescriptive methodology in Applied Decision
Analysis and explores its origins in decision science. ADA enables a specific inspection of the order and completeness of analytical procedures. Doing so enables explanation of decisions in terms of key criteria while emphasizing procedural flaws and omissions. These collectively provide insight into causal links to policy performance and potential outcomes. In this way a prescriptive analysis represents potential utility to FPA by helping to identify specific deviations from a rational procedure representing direct causal links to outcomes that may be explained in detail by descriptive frameworks.
An Introduction to Applied Decision Analysis and Systems Thinking
A formal field of study in decision theory began in the 1960s. Decision science focused on expanding and refining approaches to inform decision-making in the presence of randomness or uncertainty.100 This field grew out of normative procedures, acknowledging the many criticisms of the assumptions that accompany rational choice and expected utility theories. Its maturation has involved steady progress on integrating the many factors that undermine formulation of optimal choices.
Decision theory represents a formal procedure of logic to distinguish between what is feasible and what is desirable. In other words, discerning between “what one
100 Ronald A. Howard, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Operational Research, Decision analysis: Applied Decision Theory, (Wiley-Interscience, 1966), 97-98. 50 can have versus what one wants.” 101 Confusing feasibility and desirability represents a fundamental violation of rationality. The ability of the decision-maker to recognize the difference between the feasible and the desirable represents the crux of most decisions. This rational approach to decisions takes on particular importance when they include the use of military force as a mechanism to pursue goals.
Formal decision science grew out of the field of Operations Research (OR) that originated in the UK early in World War II. This field of research began with efforts to integrate new radar technology into air combat operations that led to the term “operational research.”102 This early work was pioneered by scientists like
Patrick Blackett who advocated for the use of scientists to advise on strategy and tactics.103 In this sense OR was not originally viewed as a collection of mathematical techniques but rather an approach to complex, strategic decision making.104
Integration and advancement of OR techniques are predominant today in areas like management, systems and industrial engineering, manufacturing, and logistics supply chain problems.105
Widely recognized as the originator of the term “Decision Analysis,” Ronald
Howard forwarded a formal application of decision theory in Applied Decision
Analysis. This was an approach to management problems where he defined a structured decision procedure including deterministic, probabilistic and post-mortem phases he characterized as “a logical procedure for the balancing of the factors that
101 Itzhak Gilboa, Maria Rouziou, and Olivier Sibony, Decision theory made relevant: Between the software and the shrink, (Research in Economics, 72, 2018) 241. 102 Joseph F. McCloskey, The Beginnings of Operations Research: 1934-1941, (Operations Research Vol. 35, No. 1, 1987), 143. 103 The Operational Research Society, About OR, accessed November 2015. Available at: https://www.theorsociety.com/ 104 Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: A personal account of how it got started and evolved. (Operations Research, 50(1), 2002), 179. 105 Gerlad J. Lieberman, and Frederick S.Hillier, Introduction To Operations Research 10th Edition, (McGraw-Hill, 2005), 3-4. 51 influence a decision.”106 Each of these phases is composed of several components describing discrete considerations with a focus on guiding the decision maker.
Howard was one of the early pioneers of a field dominated by a few notable practitioners including Bell, Hammond, Raiffa, Keeney, and Tversky. In particular, the contributions of Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa are significant to the analytical methodology employed in this research and are further detailed in this chapter. This group’s outsized contributions to collective ADA techniques have been integrated into all manner of industry, business management, finance, and government applications, and are widely used to guide decision making.
Each of these sectors have evolved prescriptive decision procedures focused on their needs, adopting and integrating methodologies from a variety of mathematical methods such as linear programming, inventory theory, queuing theory, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT), and systems thinking.107 Howard referred to these tools as a capability to enable decision makers to analyze “one-of- a-kind” problems where experienced judgment, intuition and historical analogy are insufficient to address the risk involved in uncertain decisions.108 Ulvila and Brown refer to this treatment of unique problems as “personalized” decision analysis.109
The field of Decision Science is an interdisciplinary one that seeks to understand and improve the judgment and decision making of individuals, groups, and organizations who must decide in an uncertain environment. The general
106 Ronald A. Howard, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Operational Research, Decision analysis: Applied Decision Theory, (Wiley-Interscience, 1966), 97. Howard’s procedure was significantly more detailed than the basic steps of a decision Allison depicted in his components of a rational choice. 107 Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs, (Cambridge University Press, 1993), xv. 108 Ronald A. Howard, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Operational Research, Decision analysis: Applied Decision Theory, (Wiley-Interscience, 1966), 113. 109 Jacob W. Ulvila and Rex V. Brown, Decision Analysis Comes of Age, (Harvard Business Review, 1982). Accessed 6 July, 2015. Available at: https://hbr.org/1982/09/decision-analysis-comes-of-age. 52 methodology uses prescriptive, that is systemic analysis to help individuals clarify a choice from among potential “pre-specified” alternatives.110
A structured, prescriptive procedure is useful to help the decision maker: frame the right problem; discretely articulate what is to be achieved by the decision; describe what success looks like; and consider the validity of their assumptions and the implications of uncertainty to potential choices.111 The utility of prescriptive decision making is in its ability to bridge the gap between normative theorists who derive models of decision making that are logically consistent and reflect our conceptions of rationality, and practitioners who must address real-world decisions that do not typically conform to purely rational choices.112
Contemporary decision science is grounded in theories and methods drawn from psychology, economics, philosophy, statistics, and management science.113 A common mapping of the field, characterized by Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky, focuses on three main aspects of decision analysis: (1) normative analysis, creating formal models of choice; (2) descriptive research, studying how cognitive, emotional, social, and institutional factors affect judgment and choice, and (3) prescriptive methods, to guide improved judgment and decision making.114 Returning to an earlier discussion, normative theories are evaluated in terms of their adequacy in reflecting the axioms of rational choice. Descriptive theories are evaluated in terms of empirical validity and should be validated by the degree to which their predictions correspond
110 Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradefoffs, (Cambridge University Press, 1993), xv. 111 Ralph L. Keeney, Decision Analysis: An Overview, (Operations Research, Vol. 30, No. 5., 1982), 808. Accessed June 23 2014, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/170347?seq=1 112 David Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky, Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 243. 113 Leigh Buchanan, Andrew O’Connell, A Brief History of Decision Making, (Harvard Business Review, 2006), accessed November 2015. Available at: https://hbr.org/2006/01/a-brief-history-of- decision-making. 114 Dietrich College of Social Science and Humanities, Description of Decision Science, (Carnegie Mellon University, 2018), Accessed November 2018. Available at: 53 to actual behavior. Prescriptive approaches are more difficult to evaluate. Their potential pragmatic value is in realization of desired outcomes and improved ability to assess risks that are often subjective and are judged in terms of the decision maker’s perception.115
A key concept within ADA is systems thinking. Systems thinking has its origins in System Dynamics created at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1950s and focuses on integrating the simultaneous elements of a process toward a common end. This approach was designed to improve understanding of the structure and dynamics of complex systems. System Dynamics is based on the logic of causality and understanding complex environments by which to design sustained improvements and positive change. Systems thinking is explained as a way to consider 'the whole' and understand interrelationships, competing influences and patterns of change.
An important contribution that underpins this research is Senge's work on an evolving concept derived from System Dynamics called Qualitative System
Dynamics (QSD). QSD provides an approach to thinking about systems that does not require quantitative modeling. Wohlstenholme and Coyle introduced the term
QSD to describe the nature and elements of qualitative models and an iterative procedure for model development and analysis. In defining all components of a system or procedure, this approach enables better understanding of competing relationships and influences at play in complex systems.
Extensive research and experimentation along this line of thinking has played a key role in evolving ADA methods for applicability to complex systems like the
115 David Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky, Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 243-244. 54 national security system, an environment complicated by incomplete information and randomness. At the same time, practitioners of applied mathematics and OR have pushed the important evolution of prescriptive quantitative methods to improve analysis of subjective decisions. These are characterized by comparison and contrast of multiple alternatives and many possible outcomes.116 This led to a maturation in approaches derived from predominantly normative methods, that is deterministic and stochastic models, resulting in approaches that blend both quantitative and qualitative techniques.117
Among the many advancements in ADA, management science and military decision making are of the most relevant value to this research. Faced with the reality of imperfect decision making in complex environments, these sectors have focused on ADA methodologies to guide development of acceptable or reasonable outcomes.118 Both sectors have refined methodologies to a sophisticated level, offering prescriptive approaches as a useful complement to foreign policy decision analysis.
This background on the origins of ADA is intended to characterize the important maturation of analytical procedures from normative models based in Bayesian analysis and classical statistics, to prescriptive methodologies stemming from
Howard’s “Decision Analysis Procedure.”119 Contemporary ADA procedures have evolved beyond focus on either normative or descriptive analysis to a mix of detailed
116 Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: A personal account of how it got started and evolved. (Operations Research, 50(1), 2002), 164-185. 117 Ibid, 164-166. 118 Jacob W. Ulvila and Rex V. Brown, Decision Analysis Comes of Age, (Harvard Business Review, 1982). Accessed 6 July, 2015. Available at: https://hbr.org/1982/09/decision-analysis-comes-of-age. 119 Ronald A. Howard, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Operational Research, Decision analysis: Applied Decision Theory, (Wiley-Interscience, 1966), 98. Howard described the components of a decision analysis procedure in phases 1) Deterministic Phase, 2) Probabilistic Phase, and the 3) Post-Mortem Phase. His deterministic phase was composed of defining the problem and then jumps directly to identifying alternatives. 55 qualitative and quantitative procedures. These emphasize the full spectrum of the decision-making procedure, from definition of the problem through implementation and consideration of feedback by which to adjust implementing strategies and objectives as needed. The advances in qualitative analysis were specifically important in identifying an appropriate prescriptive framework for analyzing the decision procedures of the NSC.
While the field of ADA is most often associated with quantitative approaches to decision analysis, this methodology emphasizes the critically important qualitative steps that must precede quantitative assessment. Howard Raiffa explained the importance of this and his experience in a field overly focused on the power of the mathematical aspects of OR. He recalled that in their focus on developing applied mathematics, he and his peers mistakenly ignored the critically important nonmathematical underpinnings of: how to identify the right problem to be analyzed, how to discern and articulate key objectives, and how to develop and define the alternatives to be analyzed.120
On this point Keeney, one of the early and most prominent pioneers of ADA, observed that while most decision analysis literature focuses on quantitative analysis, doing so is only appropriate after essential qualitative analysis that leads to meaningful alternatives is completed.121 Keeney also observed that, over his more than sixty years of practical experience, a common pitfall to quality decision making is that decision-makers begin with developing alternatives before the fundamental analysis of the problem and objectives to address it are formed. He referred to this as “Alternative-focused thinking” and instead advocates a “Value-focused Thinking”
120 Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: A personal account of how it got started and evolved. (Operations Research, 50(1), 2002), 178. 121 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), Preface. 56 approach.122 A general ADA framework, evolved from the collective work of Raiffa,
Keeney and Hammond, reflects a stepwise approach consisting of the following:123
1) Define the Decision Problem– this entails framing the decision problem as key
to identifying the right objectives. Doing so requires deliberate avoidance of
unvalidated assumptions and option-limiting biases.
2) Specify Fundamental Objectives – this effort involves identification of
fundamental objectives that specify the central values most important to the
decision maker. Identifying fundamental objectives is the act of distinguishing
ends objectives from means objectives, where means objectives merely
represent progress towards ends. Defining fundamental objectives first is
necessary for meaningful evaluation of alternatives.
3) Create Alternatives – this entails creating a range of alternatives that
represent the various courses of action available to achieve fundamental
objectives. The measure of utility of a particular alternative lies in its ability to
achieve all fundamental objectives.
4) Analyze Alternatives – comparing and contrasting alternatives requires
interrogating the likely consequences of actions as this helps to characterize
how well an alternative satisfies fundamental objectives. This is first a
qualitative effort that is then further analyzed by quantitative methods. The
qualitative analysis requires identification of tradeoffs among objectives as
they often conflict with one another, and there is rarely a perfect alternative to
achieve all of them. In this sense decision makers may have to sacrifice
supporting objectives to maintain their fundamental objectives. This requires
122 Ibid. 123 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 4-9. 57
setting priorities. This analysis likewise requires characterization of risk
through understanding of key uncertainties by considering consequences of
actions and their likelihood. Recognition and pragmatic characterization of
uncertainty is important in choosing the right alternative that meets a decision
maker’s tolerance for risk.
5) An Informed Decision – this is the culminating step of choosing a particular
alternative informed by the previously developed criteria and understanding
that decisions involve uncertainty, and there may be unforeseen
consequences. This step also entails close monitoring of implementation to
recognize where adjustments must be made to assure progress towards
fundamental objectives.
While this approach makes good sense, ADA experts observed over decades of practice that the most common shortcoming to good decision making is that most professionals are not trained in decision making methods.124 These observations are particularly pertinent when considering the responsibilities of the Executive branch of the U.S. government where analysis to inform important policy decisions represents the core functions of the NSC system.
Prescriptive Model Limitations
There are several limitations to prescriptive approaches that should be acknowledged. Prescriptive methods appear useful to answer the ‘what’ questions with regard to identification of key criteria and analytical factors that shaped decisions.. However, this understanding on what specifically underpinned a policy
124 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 3. 58 decision does not fully satisfy our understanding and need to answer the ‘why’ questions that might explain the cognitive, political, or structural influences shaping choices.
A reasonable criticism of prescriptive approaches is that government decisions are inherently political ones where powerful bureaucratic factors, conflicting values and ideals drive conflict and undermine consensus building. The result of this is often a compromise that does not represent the full interests of any involved. A reasonable response is that the more systematically logical the decision- making procedure, the more difficult it is for political factors to distort it. This leads to a second limitation to prescriptive methodology, that a disciplined, systemic procedure does not guarantee a good outcome. This requires us to make a distinction between a good decision and a good outcome. The decision maker has control over the quality of the decision but cannot exert the same over the outcome.
A good decision is a logical, reasonable, and acceptable one that considers the decision maker’s values, preferences and the attendant uncertainties.125 While a good outcome is the goal, no desired outcome is assured in an uncertain environment. A fitting analogy is an investment where one can diligently consider all the available market research and make an informed decision, only to lose money in the proposition. Conversely, a poorly informed investment decision may yield a positive return. This speaks to the uncertainty associated with the many market factors in play. Uncertainty means that the decision maker must rely on the quality of the decision, not the quality of the consequences.126 In this paradigm, a logical, structured decision analysis procedure represents the portion of the decision over
125 Ibid, 111. 126 ibid. 59 which the decision maker exerts the greatest control and yields the best chance for a satisfactory outcome. It is important to re-emphasize that the realistic objective of such a procedure is not a rational choice, rather it is to base ones choice in a rational procedure.
Another potential limitation, as behavioral scientists have demonstrated, is that people routinely violate norms of rational thinking in confronting problems, often making theoretical decision tools impractical. This might suggest that only certain types of problems, as in mechanical systems where all the variables and inputs are known, may be effectively addressed by decision tools and algorithmic solutions.
However, there is little to argue that decision science offers efficient algorithms to reveal decision rules and clarity between alternatives, or that a logical, structured analytical procedure disciplines thinking, or that statistics provide imminently useful analysis of complex data.
One has only to consider the imperative to remain competitive to understand the costs businesses and financial professions bear to achieve operational and financial efficiencies. Competition drives their demand for reliable models to optimize operations, portfolios, and returns on investment while minimizing their exposure to risk. This would suggest that decision makers indeed attempt to maximize expected utility in a rational manner when it is possible and practical. In fact, most executives would very likely agree in principle with the basic axioms of rational decision making.
In other words, it is unlikely that a decision maker would not want to pick an alternative that results in higher payoffs where such an alternative exists. Even if some find formal decision theory, in particular contexts, impractical, it represents an ideal model of how decision makers could or should make choices.
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Application of a systems thinking approach to decision making likewise comes with a limitation. The principle limitation is encapsulated in the intent to understand the entirety of a system by examining all of the linkages and interactions between the elements that compose it. This is possible only when one controls the entirety of the process. But, the great number of environmental factors at play in strategic problems makes understanding of all factors and linkages an unrealistic task. A complicating factor is the political nature of this environment where human interactions present unique challenges where all variables and their interactions are not knowable or controllable.
This limitation does not diminish the utility of systems thinking approaches in the absence of better ones. There are many applications of blended systems thinking and ADA methods employed across the security and defense sectors to evaluate complex issues involving multiple, competing objectives where solutions are unlikely to satisfy all stakeholders.
An additional consideration in security policy issues is the imperative to minimize loss of life. These considerations add significant pressure to decisions, particularly those driven by crisis scenarios where policy makers lack the time for lengthy deliberation. These effectively compound the cognitive challenges to address complex problems appropriately yet effectively. Ellsberg eloquently addresses this limitation in observing that the uncertainty of strategic decisions denies the decision maker the ability to know what choices are truly reasonable. This notion of reasonableness is a critically important consideration in making choices to commit military force where domestic and international actors will judge the acceptability and appropriateness of actions. In this environment there is constant tension between desired goals and reasonable outcomes.
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Applied Decision Analysis Summary
Analysis of foreign policy decisions have traditionally been the product of two distinct theoretical perspectives, those being normative and descriptive. The normative approach addresses how people should make decisions in keeping with our conceptions of logical, rational behavior. The descriptive approach focuses on how people actually make decisions in terms of cognitive, social-structural, and political factors that affect choices, while emphasizing the many discrepancies between actual decisions and normative axioms.
Decision science forwards a third prescriptive perspective on decision- making. This perspective describes how people could make better decisions by following methods that incorporate normative theories with considerations of the many human factors that influence decisions. The intent is to help decision makers avoid cognitive, structural, or political pitfalls that might undermine a quality decision.
It is important here to reinforce that use of a prescriptive approach does not mean decision makers will avoid pitfalls as strong political, structural, and cognitive influences persist.
A prescriptive ADA method could offer utility to analysis of foreign policy decisions enabling a specific inspection of the order and completeness of analytical procedures employed within the NSC to inform presidential choices. Where descriptive FPA models would explain these decisions in terms of how decision makers responded in the presence of cognitive, structural, or political influences, a prescriptive perspective explains them in terms of procedural flaws and omissions that represent causal links to policy performance and potential outcomes.
In this way a prescriptive analysis could complement FPA perspectives by focusing further analysis on specific deviations from normative approaches that had
62 causal implications to policy performance. Central to the purpose of this research is that a prescriptive methodology enabled scrutiny of NSC decision procedures of different administrations from a common framework. This enabled comparison of what presidents considered in forming policy decisions with what decision science experts indicate should be considered to assure a quality decision. It is through this approach that this research endeavors to further expand the FPA tool kit with prescriptive practices and thereby further bridge the gap between normative and descriptive methods of analysis.
The preceding discussion characterized prescriptive methods as particularly important in evaluating the early portion of problem definition, where Mintz asserts decision makers resort to cognitive heuristics to simplify complex problems; where
Jervis argues that decision makers enter into decisions influenced by prior perceptions and misperceptions; and where Kahneman and Tversky assert cognitive factors cloud reasoning and judgment. These refer to the critically important requirements to accurately define the problem, develop viable objectives to resolve the issue, and understand the implications of assumptions and potential consequences to intent, prior to formal analysis of alternatives and decision.
These collective considerations form the basis of a quality decision from an
ADA perspective. This approach makes good sense when considering the requirements of a foreign policy decision, particularly ones that consider the use of military force where the consequences of actions can have long lasting effects on the health and wellbeing of nations.
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Chapter VI
A Conceptual Framework for Applied Decision Analysis in FPA
In this chapter I will detail a prescriptive ADA framework designed to evaluate presidential decisions to use military force to achieve their objectives. I will then provide a short history of the NSC and its challenges as the organization’s origins and its evolution over time represent essential context for understanding present-day
U.S. security policy formulation challenges. Lastly, I will define terms employed in this research, commonly used among the fields of Security Studies, FPA and
Decision Science, but which may have differing interpretations.
An Applied Decision Framework for Analysis of Foreign Policy Decisions
In developing an analytical framework for use in this research it is important to offer a reminder of the purpose of such a model. Analysis of decisions here with an
ADA framework is not undertaken to argue the validity of the model for use within the
NSC. Rather the purpose is to enable comparison of the decision procedures of successive administrations with one that decision science indicates as representative of a quality procedure designed to form evidence-based decisions involving uncertainty and risk.
A reasonable premise for any decision when considering entry into military conflict is that the decision maker seeks the best possible option that minimizes risk while attempting to maximize the achievement of policy objectives. This implies an underlying procedural requirement for rational analysis to identify viable options and then choose one in accordance with some consistent criteria.
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Key characteristics of a formal procedure are the use of formal language to reduce ambiguity and a prescribed order to analysis that assures systemic, deductive reasoning.127 Formal language assures the participants in a decision procedure converse in the same lexicon, thereby improving transparency of the procedure and perhaps increase participation.128 Formal procedure, that is a specific order of analytical steps, enables structuring of the decision problem which then enables the re-use of procedures and models.129 Formal language and procedure together serve to minimize the biases of human reasoning that may be attributed to education, values or tradition.130 Formal language also plays a central role in avoiding common errors attributable to an informal use of formal methods. In more general terms, formal language and procedure enable us to better analyze, understand, and explain a problem. Equally important they enable us to better justify a solution.
These characteristics are important to any model guiding policy decision making to mitigate the challenges of human behavior that often conflict with the most basic axioms of rational choice. These considerations led me to consider ADA methodologies designed to guide decision making under conditions of uncertainty, where there are multiple objectives to consider, and where solutions must be viewed in terms of what is acceptable and reasonable. This means a realistic and acceptable decision is one that has considered what is feasible versus what is desirable which also typically means a sub-optimal solution. ADA methods were
127 Alexis Tsoukiàs, From Decision Theory to Decision Aiding Methodology, (LAMSADE - CNRS, Université Paris Dauphine, 2008), 2-3. 128 C.A. Bana e Costa, F.N. da Silva, and J.C. Vansnick. Conflict Dissolution in the Public Sector: A Case Study, (European Journal of Operational Research,130, 2001), :388–401. 129 Alexis Tsoukiàs, From Decision Theory to Decision Aiding Methodology, (LAMSADE - CNRS, Université Paris Dauphine, 2008), 21-23. 130 Patrick Rivett, The Craft of Decision Modelling, (J. Wiley, 1994), 5. 65 developed to aid just this type of decision making and thereby, represent a useful aperture by which to consider the completeness and rigor of NSC decision making procedures.
It is rather obvious and redundant to say that the nature of the contemporary security policy environment is a dynamic, fast paced one characterized by complex issues involving many stakeholders and competing interests.131 The reality is that security policy issues are typically “wicked” problems that are rarely solved; rather their volatile and uncertain nature relegates decision-makers to finding the least bad option. Rittel and Webber attribute this lack of clear resolution to the fact that theoretical approaches are inadequate by themselves; intelligence is never complete; the realities of politics mean that multiple equities must be accommodated; and the result is that these problems resist purely rational approaches.132 In this environment decision-makers do not possess the ability, time or resources to derive optimal solutions.
Camillus similarly observed that wicked problems possess five elements that are consistent with the problems the NSC faces: 1) they involve many stakeholders with different values and priorities; 2) their causes are complex; 3) they are difficult to understand and change unpredictably with attempts to address them; 4) there is no precedent on which to refer; and 5) there is no way to be certain of an effective response.133 In the absence of a formal decision procedure to guide analysis, this environment leaves decision makers little choice but to rely on cognitive shortcuts
131 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, (Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008), ii. 132 John C. Camillus, Strategy as a Wicked Problem, (Harvard Business Review, 2008), 2-4.; Horst W.J. Rittel, Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, (Policy Sciences Volume 4, 1973), 160-161. 133 John C. Camillus, Strategy as a Wicked Problem, (Harvard Business Review, 2008), 2-4. 66 and judgment to identify alternatives and discern a viable solution among them.134
These circumstances describe the decision environments associated with persistent
Al Qaeda and Taliban threats in Afghanistan and resolving the unknowns of Iraqi
WMD capabilities, and regional geopolitics, that are the focus of the case studies.
Acknowledging that there is no ideal decision procedure that will ensure the perfect solution, Keeney provided a grounding ADA approach in ‘Value-focused’ thinking by which to consider these types of complex security problems. His methodology has been applied extensively to support decision making in a broad range of real-world issues from conflict management to military, environmental, and medical problems.135 This methodology is particularly relevant to this research providing a qualitative methodology for analysis of policy decisions where value is stated in terms of interests. The qualitative steps in this value-focused methodology are wholly appropriate for NSC use in policy decisions. The methodology likewise provides an analytical approach that aligns with NSC deliberations that must consider not only the primary effects of their decisions, but also the secondary and third order effects to include, social, political, economic, and moral consequences.
The search for an appropriate ADA framework for use in this research began with practitioners focused on real-world problems. Identification of an appropriately focused ADA approach to national security problems naturally necessitated an audit
134 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organizations, (The Free Press, 4th Edition, 1997), 118. 135 Baker, S. F., S. G. Green, J. K. Lowe, and V. E. Francis, A Value-Focused Approach for Laboratory Equipment Purchases, (Military Operations Research, Vol. 5, No. 4., 2000). 43-56; R. C. Burk, and Gregory S. Parnell, Evaluating Future Space Systems and Technologies, (Interfaces. Vol. 27, No. 3, 1997), 60-73; Stephen Chambal, Mark Shoviak, Alfred E. Thal Jr., Decision Analysis Methodology to Evaluate Integrated Solid Waste Management Alternatives. Environmental Modeling and Assessment, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2003), 25-34; Ralph L. Keeney, Creativity in Decision Making with Value-Focused Thinking, (Sloan Management Review; 35, 4, 1994) 35. Accessed December 2015. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284662663_Creativity_in_decision_making_with_value- focused_thinking 67 of the ADA practices of various professions that routinely deal with wicked problems.
While economic, engineering and business sectors employ ADA procedures to solve complex problems, they do not typically consider lives and livelihoods in the balance as defense and intelligence professionals must.
Defense sector decision procedures were obvious choices to consider in identifying a procedure of appropriate scope and focus, as these professionals must always consider the consequences and uncertainty associated with conflict and loss of life in their calculations. Defense sector experts have evolved sophisticated ADA methodologies to address military issues in the most complex and dangerous of environments.
The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and Operational Design are two prevalent procedures many armed forces use to analyze and understand the conflict environment and their mission objectives in developing courses of action.
The MDMP was designed to facilitate collaborative and parallel planning across staff elements and organizations in a manner the NSC intends to achieve across government.136 The MDMP follows a series of steps that result in specific outputs leading to the next step of the procedure. An evolution of this procedure is
Operational Design.137 This procedure leverages the tenets of systems thinking and
ADA to address complex security issues and minimize risk to human life in doing so.138
The Operational Design procedure is a component of Joint Operations
Planning that generates options, or 'courses of action', based on analysis of the
136 Military Decisionmaking Process: Lessons and Best Practices, (U.S. Army Center for Combined Arms Handbook 15-06, 2015), 3. 137 Deputy Director, J-7, Joint Staff, Planner's Handbook for Operational Design, Version 1.0, (Joint and Coalition Warfighting, 2011), II-1. 138 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, (Department of the Army, 2008), 4-5. 68 competing causal factors that will influence mission accomplishment. The U.S.
Army's Training and Doctrine Command further describes Operational Design as
"...a specific methodology for creating a systemic and shared understanding of an operational problem and a broad approach to its solution."139 This procedure acknowledges that outcomes are rarely optimal and that a sub-optimal but acceptable course of action is often the best available, in other words a satisficing alternative. For example, a commander confronted with a time-sensitive situation might choose a course of action that accepts the likelihood of more casualties to achieve an objective most rapidly.
A shortcoming of these methods for the purposes of this research are that they are tailored to and solely focused on, the employment of the military instrument of power. Security policy issues invariably have strategic and political objectives that require consideration of all instruments of national power.
Further review of defense sector approaches at the strategic level of military planning included consideration of those employed on the Joint Staff and in the
Geographic Combatant Commands. These approaches were largely high- operational employment of Operational Design and also focused too narrowly on the military instrument of power.
The search then progressed to the Senior Service Colleges and more academic approaches to evaluate strategic problems. The search was narrowed to some relevant examples designed specifically for policy and strategy-making purposes. A National Defense University model for policy decision making was
139 Ibid. 69 considered as was the U.S. Army War College’s 'Policy Formulation Model,' among others.140
The term 'model' is potentially problematic here as it implies that these schema have been tested, verified, and validated towards their intended purposes.
There is no documented evidence that this is the case for the academic approaches reviewed. This research also does not attempt to verify or validate them in any formal sense, but this does not obviate a particular model's use. Each was developed by professional practitioners to understand the elements of security policy decisions considered to be essential to comprehensive consideration of problems.
Further, Snyder and Bruck assert any interpretive scheme must meet three kinds of tests: operational, predictive, and efficiency. They describe this as the extent to which a scheme enables interpretation and greater understanding of existing data, provokes further research, and reveals empirical questions about the research topic that would not otherwise be revealed.141
These particular models meet these criteria. Each was designed to consider and understand key strategic elements, develop specific criteria, and understand particular aspects of the decision-making environment. Each enables predictive assessment of options, and each represents as useful a schema as are currently available to assess real world policy issues.
The National Defense University and Army War College models were likewise developed by senior practitioners from across the military and the interagency.
140 White Paper: Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” (The White House, 1997), Annex A; Paul Thompson, “Core Course 5603 Syllabus, The National Security Process,” (National Defense University, 2000), 7; Alan G. Stolberg , Chapter 4: Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century, U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy And Strategy, 5th Edition, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 42. 141 Richard Carlton Snyder and Henry W. Bruck, Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, (Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 25. 70
While the National Defense University model provides general categories for consideration, it does not offer a specific, stepwise approach to analysis. In accordance with the ADA approach, the specific order of problem solving is essential to analytical progression, as one step predicates subsequent development of key criteria.142 The Army War College model details specific decision criteria and follows the order of an ADA procedure. Alan Stolberg, who authored the original framework, indicated that students ordered the model steps in a logical fashion based on their experiences and expertise. This ordering then is likely the result of military and defense sector practitioners replicating the steps of Operational Design with which they were familiar. Stolberg did not necessarily assert a specific order to analysis, rather that all steps are completed to develop policy.143 The completeness and ordering of analytical considerations in Stolberg’s model represented a good starting point for use in this research.
The goal in evaluating these competing models was to identify the essential elements of security policy decisions to be analyzed and included in a tailored analytical framework for evaluating executive decisions in the selected cases. These models were compared with Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa’s “PrOACT” model that serves as a grounding approach. PoOACT defines five specific steps to analysis of any decision including: accurately defining the Problem, specifying Objectives, developing Alternatives, understanding Consequences, and identifying potential
Trade-offs among objectives.144
142 David Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky, Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 243. 143 Alan G. Stolberg , Chapter 4: Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century, U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy And Strategy, 5th Edition, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 42-43. 144 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 4. 71
This model has been applied broadly to a variety of dissimilar real-world problems of varying complexity.145 In comparing the PrOACT model with other normative models as well as the National and U.S Army War College decision models, five common and essential qualitative steps of a prescribed policy decision analysis framework were identified including: 1) Define the right problem and frame the issue accurately; 2) Clearly define political objectives, analyze key assumptions, and articulate end state conditions that indicate successful achievement of objectives; 3) Develop a range of options that may realistically achieve objectives; 4)
Analyze alternatives in terms of objectives and consequences; and 5) Effectively articulate the Policy Decision.
The framework in Figure 1 reflects these five common analytical steps in the specific order of a prescriptive ADA procedure, each representing the essential elements of decision criteria and the key considerations informing each that will be used for comparison with NSC procedures in the cases. With these five key elements of decision-making as a lens, each of the steps identified as essential to a quality policy decision are further defined here for the purpose of clarifying the security policy context necessary for evaluation, and comparison of real-world
145 Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: A personal account of how it got started and evolved. (Operations Research, 50(1), 2002), 182-184. 72 decisions in the case studies.
Decision Criteria Specific to Key Considerations: Security Policy Analysis: Define the Policy Issue - Did the President clerly articulate what was at stake to the nation? (Interests at Stake) - Did procedure consider the priority of the threat in context of competing interests?
- What were the key disagreements? How were they adjudicated? (Understand the Decision Environment) - What were laws, organizations and institutions, policies, strategies, and treaties that influenced policy development? - What were key motivations influencing actions and reactions (such as strategic culture, cultural identity, political or ideological culture, resilience)? (Key Stakeholders Foreign and Domestic) - To what extent did staffs consider foreign and domestic stakeholders, audiences, and policy communities who have influence in the scope and nature of the policy decision?
Develop Objectives - What was the President's guidance, intent?
(Policy Objectives) - How were policy objectives developed and were desired end state conditions defined?
(Key Assumptions) - Did the NSC analyze key assumptions, stated and unstated, and factors shaping policy objectives?
(Define End State Conditions & - Did the NSC define how policy success/failure would be evaluated? Measures of Policy Success)
Develop Policy Options - Did NSC consider a range of options that may satisfy the policy objectives?
Analyze Options - How were policy options analyzed and validated?
(Identify Both Expected and Potential - How were consequences assessed and risk articulated? Consequences)
(Identify Key Uncertainties) - What uncertainties exist adding risk to the decision? - How were policy options compared and contrasted by the President?
The President's Decision - What were the trade-offs and deciding factors in the President's decision? Criteria - How effectively was the policy decision communicated to key audiences/stakeholders?
- How did the President assess policy effectiveness and whether adjustment was required?
Figure 1.
Define the Policy Issue. An appropriate, proportional, and reasonable decision begins with a clear understanding and definition of the problem that attempts to avoid unstated assumptions and biases that might limit options.146 Clear definition and common understanding among NSC members are critical to effectively shape further analysis.
In the case of security policy, problem definition typically begins with defining the specific threat or threats to national interests. Evaluation of NSC procedures will
146 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 15. 73 consider how each administration articulated interests and their relative intensity that informed the scope and priority of their policy response. This also requires understanding the degree to which NSCs considered the relative capacity of the nation to address the problem in terms of ways and means. This consideration provides insights into NSC member’s understanding of competing priorities, proportional response, and the limits on available instruments of national power, not the least of which are limited resources. This understanding is based in the premise that the utility of any policy course of action developed later depends on the viability of the strategy and resources to achieve it.
An appropriate and proportional response required that NSC members assessed and understood the strategic context surrounding the security problem.
This context is informed by an understanding of the competing factors that elevated the threat for NSC attention; identification of the relevant stakeholders in any policy response, both foreign and domestic; as well as other key constituents who exert influence on both the policy decision and successful implementation of it.
Much like interests, not all stakeholders or constituents are equal. Among the many actors impacted by a policy decision, the implications of actions must be weighed, and inevitably hard choices made that may result in strained relationships, lack of support, even active efforts to undermine the policy. Understanding the strategic and historical context is then essential perspective, helping to ground realistic objectives and options to achieve them.
Recalling the limitations from chapter I, legislative constraints on official records somewhat limited access to some primary material in these cases,
74 specifically NSC meeting minutes, that might provide a richer historical context.147
However, eighteen years of detailed history on these cases provided a rich understanding. The historical record, enriched by interviews, was more than sufficient to understand the decisions made, the actions and statements taken in response to them, personal memoirs detailing actions, and the public record of the policy performance. Use of memoirs necessitated cross-referencing with interviews and secondary sources given the sometimes ‘self-serving’ nature of personal accounts.
Develop Objectives. Since policy will specify what is to be done with regard to a particular interest or security issue, problem definition must be followed by grounded assessment of the specific objectives for addressing it, accompanied by specific articulation of the desired outcome. This statement of political objectives in turn drives definition of implementing military objectives and strategies.
When forming clear objectives, a prescriptive approach indicates a necessity to distinguish means objectives from fundamental ones.148 Most objectives are means to an end where a fundamental objective represents an end in itself. A distinguishing characteristic of fundamental objectives is they represent the broadest objectives directly influenced by alternatives.149 A technique to distinguish them from means objectives is to continually ask why each is important.150
Key elements of interest in each case then include: how the NSC developed fundamental or ends objectives; the degree to which presidents provided specific
147 Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978, 44 U.S.C. ß2201-2209, accessed 12 April 2017, https://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html; The Presidential Records Act protects access to classified details of NSC records for a period ranging from five to twelve years following the end of an administration. 148 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking, A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 34. 149 Ibid 150 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 39. 75 guidance and intent to the NSC on what policy was to achieve; the relative influence of key NSC Principals on both formulation of objectives, and their influence on the procedure itself; and the degree to which the NSC defined end states that would characterize successful achievement of objectives. These objectives and end states will be used to evaluate each alternative the NSC considered in each case.
As previously discussed, there are clear and vital links between political objectives and supporting military ones.151 These objectives and end state conditions collectively enable definition of performance measures that will guide proportional adjustment of strategies and resources over time to account for unforeseen changes in the security environment.
A key point of evaluation in this step is the degree to which the NSC underpinned objectives with assumptions, both stated and unstated, that would later shape the viability of options. Evaluation is primarily focused here on the degree to which NSC members culled out and deliberated over the validity of their assumptions.
Develop Policy Options. The national security system exists to provide presidents viable options to achieve their objectives. A prescriptive procedure emphasizes the importance of developing multiple options. The premise driving this is that one cannot choose an option not considered, and any option chosen can be no better than the best of those considered.152 Additionally, a single option may not achieve a president’s objectives, in fact, multiple alternatives may fail in this regard.
This means that a blending of them may be necessary to achieve most of what a
151 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351. 152 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 47. 76 president intends.153 This requirement demands leveraging the creativity and the varied experience of NSC members and importantly, the broader perspectives provided by the Committee process that leverages a wide body of expertise and experience across the government.
Analyze Options. Comparison and contrast of available options required administrations to first qualitatively consider the degree to which each satisfied the stated political objectives.
The most critical element of analysis in this effort is to consider each alternative in terms of the potential consequences of action. Consequences characterize how well an alternative satisfies objectives. This analysis is essential to understand the implications of actions, to identify and reduce uncertainty, and to characterize risk for the president.
A time tested technique for analyzing alternatives is to pose the question of
‘how?’ to each of the stated objectives.154 Consideration of how objectives will be achieved serves to focus on the means to do so, thereby prompting refinement of objectives into achievable terms. 155 This technique also often results in identification of additional alternatives.156
Since administrations in the case studies relied largely on military capabilities and strategies to achieve security policy objectives, this technique of ‘how’ takes on considerable importance. As will be demonstrated in the case studies, it is in this
153 Gregory S. Parnell, Andrew Loerch and Larry Rainey (Editors), Chapter 19, Value-Focused Thinking Using Multiple Objective Decision Analysis, Methods for Conducting Military Operational Analysis: Best Practices in Use Throughout the Department of Defense, (Military Operations Research Society, 2007), 1. 154 Ronald A. Howard, Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Operational Research, Decision analysis: Applied Decision Theory, (Wiley-Interscience, 1966), 99-100. 155 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 50-53. 156 Ibid, 50. 77 assessment that senior military advice and counsel to the NSC plays a critically important function in understanding consequences and thereby shaping alternatives.
Understanding of consequences often reveals unsatisfactory alternatives that may be eliminated or adjusted.157 The uncertain nature of decisions to use military force means that no matter how thorough the analysis, some consequences are not knowable until after acting, therefore, some risk remains. In order to characterize risk for a president, an informed decision requires enumeration of various outcomes and consideration of both their likelihood and impacts.
Characterizing remaining uncertainty in this effort enables trade-offs that will invariably be necessary to achieve both fundamental objectives, and to gain support for a policy. Again, the likelihood that presidents will have to adjust their objectives necessitates identification of multiple alternatives that enable a president to borrow from each in order to define a policy that maintains objectives fundamental to the policy intent.
Evaluation of how NSCs went about consideration of alternatives will be done in this study in terms of each alternative’s feasibility, acceptability, and suitability
(FAS). This approach considers utility of each alternative in terms of consequences.
Feasibility refers to an alternative’s ability to achieve the desired end state in terms of the consequences associated with it and the available resources to implement it; the authority to implement and enforce the policy; and whether a policy is sustainable for its anticipated duration.
Acceptability refers to the proportionality of the intended response in terms of moral, ethical, and international considerations versus the anticipated gain. Gain in this sense is most readily assessed in terms of the stated national interest.
157 Ibid, 83. 78
Suitability refers to the degree to which an alternative is likely to achieve the desired objectives in terms of collective consequences, costs, and time. In this sense suitability has a proportionality and a risk element to the assessment of consequences and costs, in comparison to the security benefit desired.
As discussed earlier, this is the stage of analysis where quantitative comparison of alternatives typically begins and is of most value to a decision maker.
This is often done via a value function where relative weights of the decision maker’s values; restraints and consideration of uncertainty may be applied. Doing so provides decision makers with key insights into how their biases, values, restraints, and tolerance for risk influence each alternative’s ability to achieve their goals. While this quantitative analysis is enlightening and important, it is of little value without a clear qualitative understanding of objectives, consequences, and the key uncertainties associated with a given option.158
The President’s Decision Criteria. A key point of interest in this study is understanding how presidents treated the decision criteria provided to them while comparing and contrasting policy options. As policy decisions often involve multiple objectives, these type of decisions typically necessitate trade-offs among competing objectives to maintain those of fundamental value to the president.159
The specific elements of comparative analysis of interest in the case studies then include the degree to which presidents understand the viability of their options in terms of the likely consequences of actions considered; and the resident
158 Gregory S. Parnell, Andrew Loerch and Larry Rainey (Editors), Chapter 19, Value-Focused Thinking Using Multiple Objective Decision Analysis, Methods for Conducting Military Operational Analysis: Best Practices in Use Throughout the Department of Defense, (Military Operations Research Society, 2007), 1; Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 3. 159 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 88-89. 79 uncertainty and the related risks that may have precipitated trade-offs among objectives.
This attention to trade-offs acknowledges that a policy singularly focused on
American interests is unlikely to succeed and presidents typically make compromises to gain support for the core objectives they seek. This environment entails a degree of negotiation and accommodation where a president is almost certain to accommodate allies to gain international agreement. This consideration provides important insight into each president’s tolerance for risk.
From a broader perspective, the cases are evaluated in the context of a president’s acknowledgement of priorities among interests and level of focus on a proportional commitment of resources in forming a decision.
As effective implementation required that those playing a role in implementing and supporting a policy understood the intent, an element of evaluation in each case includes how presidents articulated their policy intent to the various audiences who would influence policy success or failure.
A final bit of evaluation of the cases is on how presidents considered policy implementation over time and adjusted to changing environments. This required
NSCs to have developed adequate measures by which to characterize policy performance. Assessing and characterizing performance of implementing strategies toward political objectives and understanding when adjustment is necessary is fundamental to policy success. Conversely, these same measures may be indicative that objectives may not be achievable with available ways or at acceptable cost.
80
Analytical Framework Summary
These five criteria and considerations under each compose a prescriptive methodology for evaluation of policy decisions, specifically those taken to use military force in the case studies. Application of this ADA framework enabled a detailed analysis of each administration’s analytical procedure by comparing what presidents considered in their decisions, with the considerations decision science indicates inform a quality decision. More specifically, this methodology provided insights into analytical flaws or omissions and revealed systemic issues in NSC procedures representing causal links to policy performance.
The Case Study Approach
I will use the ADA framework to evaluate security policy decisions from successive administrations in terms of the key five criteria and primary considerations associated with them to understand what each considered in forming their policy decisions. In the process of evaluating what was considered, I will also consider NSC composition as well as presidential empowerment of the NSA and the committee process. These serve to characterize each administration’s capacity and propensity to leverage all available capabilities to inform an appropriate, proportional policy decision. I will then summarize each case and offer conclusions on the efficacy of each NSC procedure in terms of objectives and outcomes as well as what the case study indicates with regard to the utility of the ADA methodology as an enhancement to mainstream FPA models.
81
The National Security Council: A Brief History
This study’s use of decision-making procedures in the NSC requires a brief historiographical understanding of the impetus for its creation. This likewise required understanding of the NSC’s evolution over time and the ongoing friction between the
Executive and Legislative branches over its role. It was also important to understand key characteristics in its composition and Executive prerogative that influence the body’s capacity to analytically inform presidential decisions. These collectively provide necessary context into how the NSC addressed the contemporary security issues in the case studies.
The language of the U.S. Constitution implies that the power to go to war is shared by the Executive and Legislative branches.160 Each branch’s powers defined in Articles I and II have been traditionally interpreted to mean that, while the president commands the armed forces, Congress is responsible to approve U.S. involvement in foreign wars.161 However, presidents have largely dominated foreign policy decision-making and are responsible for the key decisions during war as
Commander-in-Chief.162
In World War II members of both the Executive and Legislative branches recognized a need for institutional reform and began to consider a more integrated approach to military, intelligence and national security in general.163 Up to this point, president’s had largely informed security policy decisions through formal and
160 United States Constitution, Article I, Legislative Branch, Section 8; United States Constitution, Article II, Executive Branch, Section 2. 161 Ibid. 162 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America, (Princeton University Press, 2008), 43-44. 163 Ibid, 2-3. 82 informal cooperation among various committees.164 An example was the 1944 State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee focused on diplomatic-military coordination.165
Following the end of the war, both branches began to develop concepts and after two years of debate, the National Security Act of 1947 was Congress’s attempt to “provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.”166 While the Soviet Union was certainly a central security concern at that time, this legislation was largely a response to the strategic surprise of the 1941
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The intent was to put a system in place to constantly evaluate the security environment in order to anticipate and to prevent another incident like it.167 Along with the NSC, the act created the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and unified the armed services under the civilian control of the Department of Defense (DOD), both of these falling under the purview of the president.168
While President Truman supported Congress’s intent to establish a centrally managed intelligence community and a unified Department of Defense, he was
164 Anthony Wanis-St. John, The National Security Council: Tool Of Presidential Crisis Management, (Journal of Public and International Affairs, vol. 9, no. 1, 1998), 103. 165 James S. Lay Jr. Robert H. Johnson. Organizational History of the National Security Council During the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, (National Security Council and House Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 1960), 2. 166 The National Security Act of 1947, (Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758., 1947). The Act provides general language for the formation of the NSC to “assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security; for the purpose of making recommendations to the President.” 167 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America, (Princeton University Press, 2008), 2-3.; Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, The Whittaker, Alan G., Brown, Shannon A., Smith, Frederick C., & McKune, Elizabeth, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System. (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2011), 6. 168 The National Security Act of 1947, (Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758., 1947). 83 dubious about their intent to establish a security policy advisory council.169 However,
Congress imposed this intent creating the NSC to ensure integration and coordination of policies.
Truman, protective of executive authority, initially resisted using it. When
North Korean forces invaded the south in 1950, he eventually came to recognize the value of the NSC to support his decision-making.170 What was viewed as an imposition and threat to presidential prerogative, the 1947 Act in essence formalized
Executive authority over foreign policy that has become increasingly powerful over time.
Evolution of the NSC and Its Shortcomings
Exercising latitude and prerogative over the national security system, succeeding presidents from Dwight Eisenhower through Barack Obama have evolved and morphed the NSC to suit their needs. Eisenhower dramatically grew the staff and the NSC’s roles. Among significant changes, he created the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that eventually became known as the National Security Advisor.171 Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, developed the now familiar staffing function that involved a systematic process for departments to push policy issues up for NSC consideration and the president’s decision. Cutler effectively restructured Truman’s
NSC construct and replaced it with what was commonly known as Eisenhower’s
169 Robert C. McFarlane, The National Security Council: Organization for Policy Making. In The Presidency and National Security Policy, edited by R. Gordon Hoxie, (Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984), 261–273; Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America, (Princeton University Press, 2008), 115-116. 170 Paul S. Stevens, The National Security Council: Past and Prologue, (Strategic Review, 1989), 56- 57 171 Ibid. 84
“policy hill.” In this structure he divided the responsibilities of the NSC between a
Policy Board to deal with broad and long-term strategic issues, and an Operations
Coordinating Board to ensure operational implementation of NSC decisions.172
In contrast, Presidents Kennedy, and Johnson, uncomfortable with
Eisenhower’s large staff and committee system, adopted an informal approach of direct communication with Department Secretaries and a small staff of selected experts.173
Nixon again formalized the system exerting unprecedented control over national security and dominating foreign policy.174 Nixon was intimately involved and his empowerment of Henry Kissinger largely marginalized his Secretaries of State and Defense.175 In this administration policy making authority was pulled under the purview of the NSA, creating friction over the statutory role of the Department of
State and the non-statutory intent for the NSA. In this role Kissinger shaped policy decisions in close coordination with the president at the expense of the Department of State.
Jimmy Carter again sought to reduce the role of the NSA in favor of departmental roles in policy making. While Reagan also stated this intent, he appointed and empowered the NSA early in his administration and successive NSA’s became increasingly active in forming policy.
A key shortcoming and ongoing Congressional concern has been the potential for abuse of power under the purview of such broad Executive authority.
172 Joseph G. Bock, Duncan L. Clarke, The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decisionmaking and Domestic Political Considerations, 1947-1984 (Presidential Studies Quarterly, XVI, 2, 1986), 260-261. 173 Carnes Lord, The Presidency and the Management of National Security, (The Free Press, 1988), 71-72. 174 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The NSC’s Midlife Crisis, (Foreign Policy, 69, 1987), 86-88 175 Carnes Lord, The Presidency and the Management of National Security, (The Free Press, 1988), 73-74; Zbigniew Brzezinski, The NSC’s Midlife Crisis, (Foreign Policy, 69, 1987), 86-88. 85
This was most clearly illustrated during the Reagan administration where his lack of direct oversight enabled activist agendas within the National Security Staff (NSS), resulting in scandal. Reagan’s inattention enabled the Iran-Contra Affair where NSS members coordinated the delivery of arms to Iran in exchange for their continued cooperation against the Soviet Union and their help in the freeing of American hostages held in the Middle East. The involvement of successive National Security
Advisers, Robert McFarlane, and Admiral Poindexter, was exposed through records of funds transfers from arms sales to Nicaraguan "Contras.”176
Both Congress and a presidential commission investigated, and the Tower
Commission determined that NSS members had over-stepped their policy coordination role in formulating and implementing policy without presidential approval.177 Reinforcing Executive authority in foreign policy, both investigations concluded that the mistakes of Iran-Contra were the result of inappropriate decisions by individuals. These flaws were not attributed to the structure or functions of the national security system, but rather attributed to poor management.178
The modern incarnation of the NSC was formed under George H.W. Bush who, having witnessed the Iran-Contra scandal as Reagan’s Vice President, instituted the committee structure as we know it today. Under this model a Principals
Committee determined the issues for NSC consideration, the Deputy National
Security Adviser managed the Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordinating
Committees assumed regional and functional responsibilities. The Clinton, Bush and
176 Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, History of the National Security Council 1947- 1997, (United States Department of State, 1997), accessed March 2016, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm. 177 Report of the President’s Special Review Board (otherwise known as the Tower Commission), (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987). 178 Ibid. 86
Obama administrations have expanded membership under this basic structure, but the organization remains fundamentally the same.
The 9/11 attacks demonstrate that Congressional intent in 1947 to mitigate against strategic surprise has not been achieved over the intervening seventy-odd years. In fact, the findings of the 9-11 Commission, found that the same critical failures of intelligence to assess and anticipate strategic threats in 1941 were again responsible for failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks.179
War Powers: The Constitutional Debate
Abuse of executive authority that resulted in the 1973 War Powers Act, emphasizes the incentive for the Legislative branch’s ongoing tug-of-war with the
Executive for shared authority over security policy decisions.180 A principal point of contention in this debate is the role of the NSC. Although legislated into being by
Congress, the NSC serves at the discretion of the president. An important consideration, the NSA and NSS are selected by the president and are not subject to
Congressional confirmation.181 A constant challenge for administrations is defending against critics who argue the NSA and NSS, who are not subject to Congressional oversight, effectively manipulate the work of the interagency that is subject to oversight.182 When empowered by the president, this staff can exert significant power over implementation of foreign policy and use of military force.
179 Philip Zelikow, Bonnie D. Jenkins, Ernest R. May, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: The 9/11 Commission Report, (W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 180 Public Law 93-148, War Powers Resolution (also known as the War Powers Act), (United States Congress, 1973), 555–560. 181 Richard A. Best Jr., The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment, (Congressional Research Service, 2011), 24-26. 182 Anthony Wanis St. John, “The National Security Council: Tool Of Presidential Crisis Management,” (Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 9, 1, 1998), 110. 87
Recalling the Iran-Contra Affair, a continuing concern is that NSS members act parochially and pursue activist or organization influenced agendas. Since neither the NSA or NSS members testify before or brief Congress on substantive issues, legislators naturally chafe at their use of Executive authority in implementing decisions to go to war.183 NSS empowerment remains a genuine concern. Barack
Obama’s Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates complained about NSS members coordinating and influencing policy directly with military staffs rather than communicating through the Secretary’s office. This particular example may reflect more impropriety than an actual abuse of authority, but it reemphasizes the overarching concern that is, government agencies and departments have statutory authorities to act, the NSS do not.
The larger concern is the trend where presidents have made decisions to employ military force without first consulting Congress. This is no more clearly illustrated than the instances in which Truman sent forces into Korea and Kennedy deployed forces into Vietnam without Congressional approval.184 Members of
Congress have constantly challenged presidents but, while presidents have continued to exert their authority, Congress has gradually ceded its power taking few substantive actions to curb them.
An exception was the 1973 War Powers Resolution. The act was designed to limit U.S. president’s ability to initiate conflict or escalate military actions abroad without consultation and approval of Congress. The law requires that presidents notify Congress after deploying the armed forces, and limits how long forces can remain without congressional approval. While this was intended to impose checks
183 Ibid, 26. 184 Legal Information Institute, Executive Power: An Overview, (Cornell Law School), accessed 11 June 2018. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/executive_power 88 and balances on president’s authority, Congress has since repeatedly undermined its intent, instead enhancing Executive power through a mix of Joint Resolutions and
Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).185
Congressional attempts to limit Executive latitude with the War Powers
Resolution were inadequate. The act merely requires a president to justify actions to
Congress after the decision has been taken. Presidents continue to enjoy virtually unlimited latitude to do as they deem necessary, absent a specific legislative requirement for basic decision criteria as a pre-requisite for Congressional approval.
The expanding, and largely unchecked use of Executive power and NSC roles in decisions to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq raise concerns about the procedures employed in forming policy decisions that, ultimately, have performed so poorly. This is hardly a new concern, but recent studies do not provide clear answers.
A Flawed U.S. National Security System
It is well established that the U.S. national security apparatus is challenged to respond effectively in a fast paced 21st century environment. Several prominent studies on the U.S. national security policy apparatus provide insights into the structural shortcomings of the national security system. Among these studies, the
Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) released a 2008 report, “Forging a New
Shield” that describes troublesome structural and process issues: 'Real "course of action" strategy is infrequent and limited to key high-level officials, so the system cannot fully support strategy formation or implementation. Interagency planning is
185 Constitutional Daily: When Congress last used its powers to declare war, (National Constitution Center, 2018), accessed 12 June 2019. Available at: https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/when- congress-once-used-its-powers-to-declare-war 89 irregular, resisted by individual agencies, and too slow and laborious to keep pace with the environment. Implementation is often poorly resourced and poorly integrated. The system militates against rigorous evaluation. The net result is a significantly reduced ability to adapt and respond to a rapidly changing world."186
The report emphasizes that "While formal processes are followed in the main, actual decision-making often takes place through informal processes."187 “Process” in this context is again a mislabeling of the nature of executive decision-making whether achieved through a small number of trusted staff or the bureaucratic committee system. The report also identified a disturbing inability to share intelligence, and chronic inability to match resources to objectives.188
Other studies reflect similar shortcomings and forward common recommendations to address them, including the need for systemic changes, reorganization, restructuring and redefinition of authorities as keys for making the system more responsive. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, asserted the need for reform and offered specific recommendations on how to reorganize and restructure the U.S. government to become more agile in decision-making. The 9/11
Commission Report forwarded several recommendations for organizational and structural reform. Similarly, the Princeton Project on National Security: Forging a
World of Liberty Under Law, offered relevant assessments that recommend
186 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, (Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008), 254. 187 Ibid, 258. 188 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, (Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008). 90 organizational and structural changes intended to improve the U.S. national security system’s ability to anticipate, mitigate and respond to security challenges. 189
While these recommendations have strong merit, they largely sidestep a key shortcoming that has fundamentally undermined U.S. policy success, which is the quality of NSC decision support. It is principally the NSC that acts as a president’s brain-trust in assessing problems and developing policy recommendations to secure interests. Additionally, when policy decisions make military conflict likely, senior military leaders and their staffs play a central role in advising policy and must satisfactorily interpret political objectives into supporting military ones that can achieve policy intent. They must also be forceful in advocating revision when they cannot do so. Thus, policy objectives and options to address them are the collective problem-solving focus of the NSC, the committee system, and the senior military leaders who advise them.
Ideally a president’s appointees provide a circle of expert policy and strategy advisors spanning governmental functions. However, the political nature of appointments does not assure sufficient analytical skills. In practice, the intelligence community and the departments, particularly State, Defense, and Homeland Security provide the preponderance of analysis intended to inform NSC understanding of issues.190 The results are predictably stove-piped intelligence assessments and department-centric analyses of issues that must be integrated into a cohesive, unified executive branch understanding. This integration is to be done within the
189 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 and Phase 2 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004 and 2005 respectively); The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (Government Printing Office, 2004), 399-423; The Princeton Project on National Security: Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, U.S. National Security In The 21st Century (The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006) offers two relevant assessments, Strategic Planning for U.S. National Security: A Project Solarium for the 21st Century and, Report of The Working Group on Foreign Policy Infrastructure and Global Institutions. 190 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 91 committee process but NSS indicate it is not consistent and bureaucratic tensions inhibit effectiveness.191
Cohesiveness within the NSC is also not assured as the competing nature of the departments and agencies for budget and influence over policy is an undermining dynamic.192 This naturally results in bureaucratic competition that inhibits a cohesive, integrated effort to resolve policy issues.193 Thus adjudication within the NSC committee process requires a capable and sufficiently empowered
NSA and NSS.194
While the specific composition of the NSS is not a point of focus in this study, it is important to understand the roles NSS members performed as contributing factors in policy success or failure in the selected cases. Since NSS composition and empowerment are subject to presidential prerogative, it stands to reason that their influence varies from administration to administration.
The NSS is intended to perform several functions including administration; policy coordination; supervision; adjudication; formulation; advocacy; and crisis management.195 Specific to the decision-making procedure, their formulation function depends solely on executive empowerment. Their key function is to manage the committee process and upon decision, monitor policy implementation and performance.
In the event a president does not fully leverage the committee process, decision analysis acumen among NSC principals becomes a key point of interest.
191 Ibid. 192 Christopher C. Shoemaker, “The NSC Staff: Rebuilding the Policy Crucible,” (Parameters, 1989), 21. 193 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 707. 194 Ibid, 22. 195 Ibid, 22. 92
This is certainly not assured as, much like other professions and sectors, few are actually trained in how to make decisions on complex issues.196 This is of particular importance when confronted by contemporary security policy problems characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.197
The persistent threat from Al Qaeda, the ongoing Taliban insurgency, the Iraqi civil war, and the rise of ISIS illustrate that security policy decisions are often 'wicked' problems where clear solutions are elusive. A further challenge, is that these types of problems might be addressed through multiple strategies whose consequences are difficult to forecast.198 It is therefore necessary to consider NSC composition and their capacity to provide the analytical rigor these problems demand.
NSC principals typically change with each administration, and despite professional members who span administrations, the majority of NSS also changes.
This practice creates breaks in continuity and understanding of issues, thereby imposing a steep learning curve for new administrations. The George W. Bush NSC experienced the 9/11 attacks in their first nine months. The Barack Obama NSC entered office to immediate strategic reviews on Iraq and Afghanistan, while a dire financial crisis competed for the president’s attention. In this environment it is reasonable to assert that new administrations will be prone to mistakes.
Nevertheless, when confronted with a flood of competing issues and the fast pace of 21st century information flow, administrations must be capable of responsive decision-making. In this environment decision-makers must rapidly identify and often
196 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 4. 197 Judith Stiehm, U.S. Army War College: Military Education In A Democracy, (Temple University Press, 2002), 6. VUCA is term coined by U.S. Army War College faculty in describing the post-Cold War security environment. 198 Horst W.J. Rittel, Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, (Policy Sciences Volume 4, 1973), 160-161. 93 choose between sub-optimal, hedging options laden with compromises. Their challenge is “...to not get it too far wrong.”199
In this environment it is easy to neglect extensive analysis and instead consider security issues through reference to history and personal experience.
Historical context and experience are certainly invaluable in understanding the nature of an issue and in avoiding past mistakes. However, reliance on historical reference and experience can quickly lead to over-simplification and conflation of issues. Reliance on experience and judgment alone are insufficient as doing so assumes the current problem is similar to past problems such that experience, and intellect are sufficient to address them. This assumption requires that all actors behave similarly, that all interests are known and that these are collectively similar to past problems such that judgments about them are reasonable. This is a significant oversimplification as complex problems, specifically contemporary security issues, are typically unique such that they defy historical analogy. Yet, it is under this construct of ‘experienced judgment’ that the National Security Council and committee system largely functions.
Definitions
The term ‘policy’ is employed widely across many fields and there are many definitions forwarded in literature. A policy is generally understood as a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government, party, business, or individual.200 Thomas Dye described policy simply as “anything a government
199 Sir Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace”, (RUSI, A Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Vol. 119, 1974), pp. 3-9. 200 Thomas A. Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and Models of Public Policy Making, (Routledge, 2015), 3. 94 chooses to do or not to do.”201 Among the various definitions, the key elements are that policy describes what is to be done. It is interrogation of the analytical procedures by which administrations formulated decisions on what was to be done about security problems that is the focus of this research.
Having defined policy it also makes sense to define related terms employed by the communities of scholarship and practice in formulating or analyzing policy and strategy. This is necessary, as in the course of conducting this research, variations, or conflation of these terms across fields of study and across political administrations continually reoccur. These terms are used prominently and with specific meaning in this research.
The term ‘analytical process’ is not used consistently within the broad body of
FPA, security studies, and decision science literature nor in the National Security
System. While both the literature and the historical record liberally employ the terms
‘analysis’ and ‘process,’ these terms are often conflated and used to describe organizational and hierarchal staffing procedures as opposed to an actual analytical methodology. This is an important point of distinction for the purposes of this study.
The literature review and interviews indicated that scholars and practitioners use the term ‘process’ liberally with somewhat differing levels of specificity and intent. Common usages are in terms of progress, as in the process of time; or in reference to gradual changes that lead toward a particular result such as the process of biological growth. Others refer to process as a function of some psychological activity or influence. Still others refer to process to describe the whole course of proceedings such as a legal or political action. These last two uses of process are most common in the lexicon of FPA where decisions are evaluated as a function of
201 Dye, Thomas R. Understanding Public Policy (Prentice-Hall, 1972), 2. 95 cognitive, social-structural, or political influences or in holistic terms of a political action.
There is another more formal use of process as a noun that is reference to a series of discrete actions or operations conducing to an end. This use of process refers to specific analytical deliberations undertaken to derive decision criteria and inform a decision or action. In this context, were all cognitive, structural, and political influences to be stripped away, a decision remains the product of a series of discrete deliberations. The rationale for focus on this formal usage is detailed later in this chapter. In the interest of clarity and differentiation from competing or ambiguous references to ‘process’, reference to the analytical process informing a policy decision will be its synonym ‘procedure’ or otherwise referred to as an analytical framework. Use of procedure is ubiquitous in decision science.
The term ‘strategy’ is also ubiquitous across the fields of security studies, business, and political science. The intersections of FPA, security studies and decision science reveal a frequent conflation of strategy with policy. The two terms have distinctly different meanings. Having described policy as defining what is to be done, strategy is used here “….to describe the use of available resources to gain any objective….‟202 In this context, policy describes what is to be achieved in terms of objectives, and strategy describes how objectives are to be achieved. As this research is focused on security policy decisions to employ military force, a specific definition of military strategy is also required. Given the purpose of military strategy is to achieve political objectives, the definition of strategy employed in my research is
202 Howard, Michael, The Causes of Wars and Other Essays, (Harvard University Press, 1983), 36. 96 the process of utilizing force or the threat of force for the purpose of achieving political ends.203
Politicians, government functionaries and military professionals apply varying definitions and levels of specificity to the term 'objective' when discussing policy and strategy. When articulating their intent to enter into conflict politicians often define policy goals in aspirational terms that appeal to their constituencies. These are useful politically, but commitment of military force requires a more practical definition to guide development of military objectives. This requires differentiating the military objective from the political. Basil Liddell-Hart distinguished the two observing:
"In discussing the subject of “the objective” in war it is essential to be clear about,
and to keep clear in our minds, the distinction between the political and the
military objective. The two are different but not separate. For nations do not wage
war for war’s sake, but the pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the
means to a political end. Hence the military objective should be governed by the
political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand
what is militarily—that is practically—impossible."204
This distinction between political and military objectives is important in understanding how members of the NSC and military planners interpret presidential intent and implement policy. A relevant example of this difference in the Bush administration was articulation of their objective for the Global War on Terror
(GWOT): “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
203 Gray, Colin S., Modern Strategy, (Oxford University Press, 1999), 17, Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, 1976), 178. Gray’s interpretation of Clausewitz centers on his observation of war as an extension of politics. 204 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351. 97 defeated."205 This was an aspirational objective that appealed to the sentiments of a nation reacting to the 9/11 attacks. However, pragmatically speaking, a policy objective requiring military defeat of terrorism was not practical as terrorism is by definition a tactic that may employed by anyone. Defeat of terrorism then depends upon addressing the motivations for its use.
Reference to the GWOT and George Bush’s intent for its scope and enduring nature necessitates consideration of the term ‘Grand Strategy.’ There are many competing academic definitions of grand strategy. On the whole they describe it on a level above specific strategies intended to secure specific objectives, and above the use of military power alone to achieve political objectives.206 A reasonable way to understand grand strategy is to consider long-term national actions as defined by a nation’s enduring, core security interests and how a nation secures and advances them over time. In this perspective National Security Strategies and National Military
Strategies, among others, are intended to support an overarching grand strategic intent.
205 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (The White House, 2001), accessed March 21, 2015, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (The White House, 2001), accessed March 21, 2015, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 206 Defining grand strategy is a challenge and is characterized differently among noted academics. Sir Hew Strachan sees grand strategy as forward looking, aspirational, and oriented on preventing or managing great power decline. Colin Gray defines it as the “purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community.” Christopher Layne calls it simply “the process by which the state matches ends and means in the pursuit of security.” Edward Luttwak is more opaque: “Grand strategy may be seen as a confluence of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level . . . with the varied external relations that form strategy’s horizontal dimension at its highest level.” Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (November 2011), 1281–1296; Colin Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (New York: Routledge, 2007), 283; Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defense,” International Security 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991), 7; Christopher Layne, “Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the 21st Century,” World Policy Journal 15, no. 2 (November 1998), 8; ; and Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 179. 98
The term national interests is commonly referenced in foreign policy and security sector lexicons with varied conceptions.207 In a security policy context, political objectives are typically stated in terms of desired outcomes to secure specific national interests. Politicians are traditionally quite confident in articulating their policies in terms of national interests and typically do so to inspire public support in broad, aspirational terms. However, in a national security context, not all interests are equal, nor are all threats to them. The competing nature of resource constraints and the challenge to marshal and sustain national will to secure them, mean that administrations must differentiate between and prioritize among competing interests. It is necessary then to clearly define national interests and their relative importance to guide proportional and appropriate security policy decisions.
The concept of ‘national interests’ is rather vague, assuming various meanings and used in varying contexts. Krasner defined them simply as “the objectives sought by the state.”208 Morgenthau described them in more specific terms of survival that is “the protection of physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states.”209 These varying definitions lead to consideration of their potential uses. Rosenau described two general uses, one being “to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy,” and the other “an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies.”210 Yet Frankel asserted that
207 Nuechterlein, Donald E., National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making (British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1976), 246. Nuechterlein observed that various actors wrongly assume all understand and agree with their use of the term as though “…all know precisely what they mean and will draw correct inferences from their use of the term.” 208 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Material, (Princeton University Press, 1978), 5-6. 209 Hans J. Morgenthau, The Moral Dilemma in Foreign Policy, The Yearbook of World Affairs, vol 5 (Stevens & Sons, 1951), 12-36. 210 James N. Rosenau, National Interest, (International. Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. 11, Free. Press, 1968), 36. 99
Rosenau’s definitions do “not offer the means for further logical analysis or for empirical investigation.”211 Frankel’s observations imply there must be a necessary differentiation between interests to enable rational comparison. A common approach to differentiate is by the use of the terms ‘vital’ and ‘fundamental,’ however, these also require clear definition.
Nuechterlein offered a useful approach by which to characterize levels of interest that enables prioritization, providing a specific definition of their relative intensity or risk that is useful to this research.212 Nuechterlein’s definitions provide a basis for comparison categorizing interests in basic terms and then employs a transitory approach to enable prioritization according to the amount of value or level of intensity a nation invests in them. He forwarded four basic categories of interests, listed in priority, that are constants:
1. Defense of the Homeland;
2. Economic Well-being;
3. Favorable World Order; and
4. Promotion of Values.
Given these, Nuechterlein’s transitory scale of priority is useful to define the level of intensity or value associated with a basic interest:213
1. Survival Interest: “. . . where the very existence of the nation is in peril.”
2. Vital Interest: “. . . where probable serious harm to the security and well-being of the nation will result if strong measures, including military ones, are not taken by the government within a short period of time.”
211 Frankel Joseph, National Interest: Key Concepts in Political Science, (Palgrave Macmillan,1970), 15-16. 212 Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: U.S. National Interests in the 1980s, (University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 9. 213 Ibid, 9-10. 100
3. Major Interest: “. . . where potential serious harm could come to the nation if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad.”
4. Peripheral Interest: “. . . where little if any harm to the entire nation will result if a
‘wait and see’ policy is adopted.”
These definitions are useful in characterizing the differing interpretations of interests between administrations in the decision cases. It is not surprising that interpretation of levels of intensity associated with any interest may change from administration to administration.214 Presidents define and value interests in varying ways, depending on their own personal values and ideals, their perception of national values, and the competing political interests that influence their behavior.
This means that an administration may view an interest as vital to the nation while their political opposition may view the same interest differently. The value of
Nuechterlein’s approach is it provides a discrete basis for comparison in the decision cases.
When considering the various threats to U.S. interests during the Bush and
Obama administrations, it is fair to observe that none met the “survival” definition.
While various actors possessed nuclear and conventional capabilities that could cause devastating harm, none threatened the United States directly. In this sense the state of nuclear-capable and conventional threats at the time may be reasonably characterized in terms of vital interests. Whether or not terror threats emanating from points on the globe represented vital national interests remains a point of debate.
The challenge for the Bush and Obama administrations was in how best to characterize terrorist threats to interests and appropriate urgency in addressing them. Both administrations characterized the threat posed by Al Qaeda as vital to
214 Ibid, 9. 101
U.S. security interests.215 Yet it is precisely the uncertainty and complexity associated with characterizing threats that poses difficultly in formulating appropriate policies to address them. The sense of immediacy and level of intensity associated with threats drives the policy response. In this sense formal prioritization often gives way to the immediacy of a threat as will be case in the Bush response to the 9/11 attacks.
Both academics and practitioners make liberal use of the terms ends, ways and means when discussing policy. Reference to ends, ways, and means in this study is done in terms of Harry Summer's interpretation of Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity." Summers interpreted this trinity where national leadership is responsible to define political ends as outcomes of conflict; governmental departments and agencies are responsible to define an integrated strategy, or the way in which the government will leverage all applicable instruments of power to achieve political outcomes; and Congress is responsible to provide the means in terms of national will and sufficient resources. 216 This interpretation may invite criticism for over simplifying Clausewitz's intent but, for the purposes of this study, this definition suffices.
This research employs a decision science use of the term value-focused thinking. This is a tenet of applied decision methodologies requiring distinction from other uses of the term ‘values.’ Value-focused in this usage does not refer to idealistic, values-based approaches to foreign policy where policies are intended to
215 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (The White House, 2001), accessed March 21, 2015, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; Barack Obama, A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, 2009), accessed June 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/03/27/a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 216 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Presidio Press, 1982), 26-27. 102 reflect and pursue specific moral and ethical principles.217 Value-focused thinking as used in this study is a term emphasizing the need to identify and focus on what is valued by the decision maker, that is a statement on what specifically the policy is to achieve. In terms of security policy this statement of value is stated in terms of a specific political objective or goal that represents the central and guiding focus of strategy development, not the least of which is military strategy.218
Finally, this study will assess policy decisions made under conditions of significant uncertainty through an analytical perspective that considers assumptions and consequences, and their associated risk implications to realization of objectives.
This assessment then requires a definition of both risk and uncertainty which are often used interchangeably but are decidedly different. Statisticians and mathematicians generally define risk in terms of a measurable chance or the degree of probability a hazard occurs.219 Risk then means a sufficient evaluation may be done to enable informed judgment on the likelihood of a hazard occurring. These same disciplines also describe uncertainty in terms of a lack of any quantifiable knowledge about some possible occurrence. 220 This definition acknowledges some degree of ignorance, a limit to knowledge, and a degree of unpredictability of future events. In other words there is not sufficient information available with which to make an informed judgment about it. In this sense 'risk reduction' is sort of a misnomer.
One does not reduce risk; one reduces uncertainty about it.
Understanding and informing judgments on risk under conditions of uncertainty then means detailed analysis of the consequences of action and the
217 John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University Press, 1999), 273 218 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 281. 219 Ibid. 220 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, ( Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), 19-20. 103 potential implications of flawed assumptions. This analysis of potential hazards is a fundamental task of the NSC, essential to enable presidents to apply informed judgments in determining whether intended actions represent acceptable risk.
People employ risk assessment in this way every day, most times intuitively.
Deciding whether to carry an umbrella or risk getting wet is a common example of a risk assessment people perform as a matter of routine where the consequences do not warrant extensive analysis. However, the implications and gravity of security policy decisions demand deliberate analysis of assumptions and the consequences of actions. This is rather easier said than done.
The complexity of security policy decisions is such that the great number of variables and stakeholders in play make risk assessment exceedingly difficult.
Likewise, while informed judgment about security policy actions is the goal, time constraints that often accompany security decisions makes informing risk a genuine challenge. The reality is decision makers are left to make decisions under conditions of significant uncertainty. In this environment, even the best-informed decisions can have bad consequences. Anyone who has invested in the stock market understands that unpredictable market forces mean that even the most well analyzed investment could result in loss. This reality demands that decision makers judge decisions under uncertainty by the quality of the decision-making, not the quality of the consequences.221 It is the quality of the decision procedure that the decision maker may control. That is, one cannot make uncertainty disappear completely and so one must account for it in the decision-making procedure and rely on the quality of the analysis to inform judgments.222
221 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 111. 222 Ibid, 111. 104
Chapter V
2001 Invasion of Afghanistan
The manner in which George W. Bush and his NSC responded to the 9/11 attacks and discerned what to do about Al Qaeda is evaluated here. This analysis attempts to understand what an ADA methodology codified in Figure 1 might reveal about the quality of NSC decision support, the causal factors affecting policy performance, and how this might focus and enhance further FPA that might better explain why the Bush administration decided as they did in forming policy for
Afghanistan.
Decision Criteria Specific to Key Considerations: Security Policy Analysis: Define the Policy Issue - Did the President clerly articulate what was at stake to the nation? (Interests at Stake) - Did procedure consider the priority of the threat in context of competing interests?
- What were the key disagreements? How were they adjudicated? (Understand the Decision Environment) - What were laws, organizations and institutions, policies, strategies, and treaties that influenced policy development? - What were key motivations influencing actions and reactions (such as strategic culture, cultural identity, political or ideological culture, resilience)? (Key Stakeholders Foreign and Domestic) - To what extent did staffs consider foreign and domestic stakeholders, audiences, and policy communities who have influence in the scope and nature of the policy decision?
Develop Objectives - What was the President's guidance, intent?
(Policy Objectives) - How were policy objectives developed and were desired end state conditions defined?
(Key Assumptions) - Did the NSC analyze key assumptions, stated and unstated, and factors shaping policy objectives?
(Define End State Conditions & - Did the NSC define how policy success/failure would be evaluated? Measures of Policy Success)
Develop Policy Options - Did NSC consider a range of options that may satisfy the policy objectives?
Analyze Options - How were policy options analyzed and validated?
(Identify Both Expected and Potential - How were consequences assessed and risk articulated? Consequences)
(Identify Key Uncertainties) - What uncertainties exist adding risk to the decision? - How were policy options compared and contrasted by the President?
The President's Decision - What were the trade-offs and deciding factors in the President's decision? Criteria - How effectively was the policy decision communicated to key audiences/stakeholders? - How did the President assess policy effectiveness and whether adjustment was required?
Figure 1.
During the 2000 campaign for president, George W. Bush responded to the following question “How would you project us around the world, as president?”:
105
“It really depends upon how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're
an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll
welcome us. And it's -- our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms
of power, and that's why we have to be humble. And yet project strength in a
way that promotes freedom. So I don't think they ought to look at us in any way
other than what we are. We're a freedom-loving nation and if we're an arrogant
nation they'll view us that way, but if we're a humble nation they'll respect
us.”223
Bush’s response, like many positions candidates may espouse in the campaign, was tempered by the complexity of the real world once in office. His position on the use of American power prior to entering office included his campaign criticisms that Bill Clinton’s use of military power for peacekeeping and nation- building purposes were unacceptable, and he asserted the military’s purpose was to fight and win wars only.224
During the campaign Bush also offered very specific intent for how he would use the military, emphasizing that American leaders must “use our military power wisely, remembering the costs of war.” He went on to explain that using this power wisely meant replacing “uncertain missions with well-defined objectives,” asserting that “the problem comes with open-ended deployments and unclear military missions…in these cases we will ask, what is our goal, can it be met, and when do we leave?"225 These statements were pragmatic notions the would be tested by the
223 George W. Bush, Transcript: The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000), accessed on 22 January 2015: http://www.debates.org/?page=october- 11-2000-debate-transcript 224 Ibid. 225 George W. Bush, A Period Of Consequences, (The Citadel, 1999), accessed 23 June 2016, http://www.citadel.edu/root/pres_bush. 106 realities of leadership in complex, uncertain circumstances where the heat of emotion and conflicting interests muddy perspectives.
Bush’s agenda when entering office was largely domestically focused while he advocated a foreign policy agenda of selective engagement in foreign affairs and defense build-up, while reducing U.S. commitments to international institutions that he asserted constrained autonomy.226 George Bush’s intent was violently altered on
September 11, 2001. Following the terrorist attacks on New York City and
Washington, DC, the administration’s foreign policy actions might be best described as employing a clear strategy of primacy, particularly with regard to countering terrorism.
The U.S. response to Al Qaeda and the Taliban was widely viewed both domestically and internationally as a just response. Still, some foreign policy experts asserted that the Bush administration reacted emotionally without full consideration of the consequences precipitated by invading Afghanistan.227 Criticisms aside, an objective analysis of the Bush decision to invade Afghanistan must be done with focus on the sense of urgency that permeated the security environment immediately after the attacks, and the information available to the administration at the time of decision.
As a basis for comparison, George H.W. Bush’s response to Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War is often held up as an example of a proportional and effective policy response characterized by a limited, achievable foreign policy objective to eject Iraqi Forces from Kuwait. This objective likewise articulated a clear military end state. As will be discussed, the political-strategic objectives for Afghanistan were not
226 Christopher P. Banks, David B. Cohen, John C. Green, The Final Arbiter: The Consequences of Bush v. Gore for Law and Politics, (State University of New York Press, 2005), 174-175. 227 David J. Rothkopf, National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear, (PublicAffairs, 2014), 23. 107 quite so clear, leading to challenges in both military strategy and in resourcing policy success.228
The crisis environment created by the 9/11 attacks demanded a quick response by the Bush administration who expected further attacks. In accordance with this study’s prescriptive approach, the NSC would first define the specific security problem in terms of the interests at stake.
Define the Policy Issue
Defining the security problem accurately sounds straight forward, but it is this focused statement of the issue that enables collective understanding, and drives development of viable policy objectives as well as the strategies to achieve them.229
Defining the security problem required the NSC to first gain an understanding of the full threat Al Qaeda posed, both domestically and to U.S. interests abroad. While the
9/11 attacks revealed glaring domestic security weaknesses, addressing those weaknesses only addressed part of the security problem. A second vital security interest was denying Al Qaeda the capacity to plan and carry out future attacks, making it necessary to address both challenges at once.
A common response at this point, particularly in urgent situations, is for decision makers to quickly focus on alternatives and go directly to discerning how to resolve the problem. Prescriptive approaches however emphasize focusing first on
‘what’ to do in response to the problem before considering how to go about it.230 This
228 U.S. Central Command staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), USCENTCOM staff indicate that the objective to help a democratic government emerge was not an original objective and that it was added after the invasion. The firm guidance from the administration was that U.S. forces would not engage in nation-building missions and USCENTCOM planned accordingly. 229 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 19-25. 230 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), vii-viii. 108 logical approach places identification of objectives first as they describe what is valued in terms of security interests or benefit. Alternatives merely represent potential ways to achieve objectives. In other words the policy goal or objective must lead the strategy to achieve it.
The Bush administration response at this point represents the first deviation from a prescriptive approach. George Bush quickly decided to attack Al Qaeda where their leadership were based. This appears a natural response and perhaps reasonable given the circumstances. However, Bush’s response also violated his own position on use of American military power and his was an emotional response that biased thinking towards how to prosecute an invasion before considering what was to be achieved by doing so.231
The president addressed Congress on September 20, 2001 articulating a bold, aspirational objective that “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."232 His ambitious response was accompanied by what may be viewed as an admonition to certain states saying, “…either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”233
In security policy terms, accurate definition of threat(s) to specific interests enables focused objectives. Evidence that members of the Bush NSC understood this is found in Donald Rumsfeld’s observations that “If we did not clearly define who exactly we were at war against, it was harder to define the parameters of victory.”234
231 The Bush objectives for Afghanistan would not be identified until after the military strategy was defined and planning was well under way. 232 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (The White House, 2001), accessed March 21, 2015, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 233 Ibid. 234 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 353. 109
Rumsfeld made this observation in the context of his dislike of the term ‘war on terror’ in defining the U.S. response very early in the planning. He disliked the term because ‘war’ he believed overemphasized the use of military power when other elements of power could be as or more effective in certain aspects. He discerned early on that this was a campaign to defeat an ideology and military force was but one tool to do so.235
Rumsfeld’s observation was focused on what the administration attempted to frame as a broader war on terror, and not necessarily on Afghanistan. However, his observation certainly pertained directly to the U.S. policy and strategy formulated for
Afghanistan.
Rumsfeld’s focus on defeating an ideology did not become the anchor of U.S. policy. His concerns about clear definition of the broader war on terror were legitimate ones that were not adequately resolved during the Bush administration.
The military was only capable of achieving so much with regard to combatting terror.
Nevertheless, the military instrument of power for which Rumsfeld was responsible dominated Bush’s foreign policy approach over the next seven years.
As is often the case with security policy decisions, this first step in the decision procedure occurred in a crisis situation that added pressure and inhibited clear thinking. Multiple perspectives become increasingly important in this environment in order to overcome the natural cognitive limitations of a single decision maker, particularly one who feels extreme pressure to act.236
235 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). An NSS member noted Rumsfeld offered this observation but there was not extended NSC discussion on it and Rumsfeld did not forcefully pursue it in within the NSC.
236 Mona Riabacke, A Prescriptive Approach to Eliciting Decision Information, (Stockholm University 2012), 12. Accessed 9 November, 2015, available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cbc7/c0121eb0185eb333ac59c036e7d107baef7b.pdf 110
Referring back to the workings of the U.S. National Security System, the committee process is where an issue might best be exposed to competing perspectives; the process is typically the focal point for deliberate security issue debate and policy development. In a crisis situation like 9/11, time to respond was deemed critical and the focus of policy response shifted to the formal NSC and the principals. This meant that the Deputies Committee (DC) and Policy Coordination
Committees (PCCs) had a very limited role in key decisions on the invasion of
Afghanistan.237 This situation then denied the president a fully informed interagency perspective. A like-minded group within the NSC would then define the security issue, the interests at stake and the U.S. response.
Interests at Stake
The 9/11 attacks made brutally clear the security implications of an open, democratic society. The attacks quickly elevated Al Qaeda and counter-terrorism above other vital interests in terms of immediacy of the threat to U.S. security, both domestically and abroad.238 The president articulated the core interest at stake in what he viewed as his most fundamental obligation “…to protect our people and defend our freedom...”239 This was both the overarching security and political objective upon which the policy response would be anchored. Implicit in the president’s statement was to rapidly put into place a capability and capacity to prevent further attacks.
237 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). A key NSS member affirmed the NSC Principal- centric nature of the response to 9/11. The president wanted quick action and this urgency drove a process that did not include extensive committee input into the decision to invade Afghanistan. This NSS member was candid that, as a senior member of the NSS, neither he nor other NSS members had input into the decision to go to war. 238 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 129. 239 Ibid, 129. 111
Over the course of the next few weeks the president and his NSC determined that the best response in protecting the homeland, beyond improved domestic security measures, was to plan and then preemptively strike terrorist threats abroad.240 It is again important to note that at this point they had not specifically defined what the use of military force was to achieve.
The general policy statement to pursue all terrorist groups wherever they may be with all elements of U.S. power was quickly narrowed to identifying Al Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attacks and focus on Afghanistan. NSC staff indicate this reduction in scope was the natural response to a truncated planning effort under pressure to act.241
It is important to note at this point that attacking Al Qaeda in Afghanistan had little to do with the practicalities of improving domestic security or denying the intent of other Al Qaeda operatives who might already be in the U.S. Expectation of further attacks drove an urgency to respond that trumped deliberate consideration of competing interests and priorities. It was not until after the war in Afghanistan was under way that Rumsfeld directed his staff on 15 October to begin thinking about a broader national interests assessment.242
With the intent to invade, President Bush would respond to Al Qaeda differently than his predecessors with a committed military response. Prior use of military force had been limited to the Clinton administration launch of cruise missiles targeting Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan as a response to the 1998
George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 129. George Bush writes that “…we had to devise a strategy to bring the terrorists to justice so that they would not strike again.” 241 NSC Staff, (Interview, 2017). Staff recalled that discussion on the broader GWOT was short and NSC principals followed the president’s quick narrowing of focus on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 242 Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Archive, First Full Tranche of Snowflakes, Subject: NSC, Briefing Book #615, Edited by Nate Jones, (George Washington University, 2018), 535. Accessed 24 January 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4357755-11-L-0559-First-Release-Bates-1- 912 112 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.243 George W. Bush resolved that, to reduce Al Qaeda’s ability to attack again, a stronger, more deliberate use of military force was required.244
Understand the Decision Environment
There are of course competing narratives on the Bush policy response to the
9/11 attacks and debates over his decisions. One narrative is that of a reckless, unilateral rush to punish the perpetrators of the attacks by a neo-conservative dominated administration predisposed to attack, that failed to consider the full consequences of war.245 An opposing narrative is one oriented around defense of a necessarily fast-paced, but deliberate and just response.246
One’s perspective on the Bush policy response of course depended largely on where one sat at the time of decision. The accuracy of these competing narratives can be fairly characterized by a deliberate analysis of administration decision making. When the Bush administration’s policy decisions are considered through the lens of a prescriptive decision analysis procedure, elements of both narratives have merit emphasizing the nature of addressing complex problems.
When confronted with a complex problem, framing the issue clearly is a good decision-making practice by which to characterize the key factors that will influence the policy decision. This effort would ideally include various perspectives as each
243 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (Government Printing Office, 2004), 117-119. 244 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 135. 245 David Ray Griffin, Neocon Imperialism, 9/11, and the Attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, (Information Clearing House, 2007), 1. Griffin offers a popular argument that events of 9/11 merely enabled the neo-conservative agenda of global hegemony. 246 Doug Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (HarperCollins, 2008), xii. Feith describes a deliberate, comprehensive procedure to develop policy. 113 may view the problem differently according to perceptions, bias, and assumptions.247
A deliberate effort to frame the problem accurately and reexamine the definition as analysis proceeded was critically important to evolve perceptions and judgments and to either validate or invalidate assumptions.248 As observed earlier, deliberate framing was a challenge in a rushed crisis situation where perspectives were limited to NSC principals who had very little time to deliberate and seek outside expertise.
It is relevant to again emphasize the emotional response these attacks evoked. The U.S. homeland had not been attacked by a foreign entity since the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in 1941. The nation had enjoyed nearly sixty years of relative safety from external threats and the vast majority of Americans were not alive at the start of WWII to have experienced the fear and sense of vulnerability precipitated by an attack on the homeland. This was a very new feeling to a younger generation of Americans who felt vulnerable and angry on an overwhelming scale for the first time.
Fears of new attacks and administration urgency to respond were amplified by the arrival of anthrax laden envelopes in Senate and news media offices beginning on September 18th. The anthrax threat claimed the lives of five Americans and another 17 were infected in the worst biological attack in U.S. history.249 While the source of the anthrax threat turned out to be the work of a U.S. citizen, the timing of this incident of domestic terrorism amplified fears and made the wicked problem of combating terror all the more complex and challenging.
247 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, (Science, Vol. 211, 1981), 453. 248 Ibid. 249 Department of Justice, Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation, (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008), accessed 2 February 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/anthrax- amerithrax. 114
George W. Bush recalled his shock at the initial notification of the 9/11 attacks and he immediately determined the nation was going to war.250 Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward observed that the president made this decision without consulting his Vice President or his Secretaries of State and Defense.251 This characterization is not quite correct as George Bush did consult his NSC prior to formally deciding to go to war.252 Nevertheless, Woodward’s insight was illustrative providing a window into the president’s personality and his subsequent approach to decision making.
The national reaction mirrored the president’s and this emotion paved the way for the Congress to give George Bush broad powers, passing an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AMUF) on September 18th, 2001.253 President Bush was well aware of the compressed decision cycle he had imposed and worried his cabinet did not have adequate time to thoroughly debate and analyze the problem and develop options.254
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld described the uncertainty in this same period of “…discovery—of seeking elusive, imperfect solutions for new problems that would not be solved quickly.”255 Identifying Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attacks presented a challenge in how to pursue
250 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 129. 251 Bob Woodward, Bush At War, (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 30. 252 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway Books, 2011), 79-80. Rice details three NSC meetings on 11 and 12 September and she notes the President told the NSC Principals on 12 September that the U.S. would invade Afghanistan. 253 Joint Resolution, Public Law 107–40, 107th Congress, (Government Printing Office, 2001), accessed 4 April, 2016, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. The Joint resolution reads: “That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” 254 Bob Woodward, “Bush At War,” (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 62. 255 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 352. 115 them in a remote sector of the globe with no country or capital, and no armies to attack in a conventional sense. Despite a compressed decision cycle Condoleezza
Rice asserted the NSC pursued a deliberate procedure to characterize the threat and develop an appropriate response.256
NSC planning began with Donald Rumsfeld informing the president that military planning for Afghanistan was unsatisfactory and that developing new ones and deployment could take several months.257 DOD had no formal plans for
Afghanistan beyond the previous administration’s target sets for cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda training camps. President Bush was clear that he wanted to mount a forceful response much sooner beyond just attacking camps.258 New plans were developed rapidly.
In framing the decision environment within the Bush NSC it is necessary to consider NSC members and their experience. The statutory members included the
President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. Non- statutory staff typically present in the Bush NSC included the National Security
Advisor and White House Chief of Staff. Statutory advisors included the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was a group
256 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway Books, 2011), 79-96. Rice details daily NSC meetings from 11 September through early October preceding the invasion of Afghanistan; National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017), NSS indicated that NSC Principals met daily with most meeting including the president. However, this staffer characterized the meetings as focused on how to get military forces into Afghanistan quickly as the decision to invade was already made. This characterization detracts from Rice’s assertion of their debate over an “appropriate” response. 257 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 346; National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017), NSS validated Rumsfeld’s characterization of military planning to the president. 258 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 190-191; National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017), NSS characterized Bush’s emphasis on direct military action and his insistence that any response had to disrupt Al Qaeda’s capability to plan further attacks from Afghanistan. He insisted this could not be achieved through bombing targets. 116 of seasoned professionals meeting with the president on the evening of September
11 who understood and largely agreed with the president’s sense of urgency to act.
Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld had all served presidents in the NSC and the DOD and each possessed a wealth of security policy decision making experience. These three highly accomplished professionals came to the Bush NSC with clear views on their responsibilities and the roles and functions of the NSC.
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had come to the NSA position from academia. She possessed some national security credentials having served on the George H.W. Bush’s NSS where she worked under a respected NSA, Brent
Scowcroft. Rice’s experience on the NSS did not however equate to managing a national security crisis and the need to coordinate an integrated effort. The need to manage strong personalities including Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld and CIA Director,
George Tenet made her task all the more difficult.
Recall that the 1947 Act that established it indicates basic responsibilities of the NSC but does not prescribe a formal procedure on how issues are to be analyzed. As discussed in Chapter IV, the NSC composition, committee process and decision-making procedure are formed largely at the discretion of presidents to suit their decision-making style. President Bush codified how he intended the NSC to work in National Security Presidential Directive 1.259
This directive specified the various committees and members but did not specify a decision support or analytical procedure beyond direction to ensure
“necessary papers are prepared.”260 Actual analysis was then dependent on the
259 George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 1: Organization of the National Security Council System, (The White House, 2001). 260 Ibid, 3. 117 experience and judgment of NSC principals and their staffs as to what analysis was necessary and when. Bush described the importance of having appointed experienced advisors like Rumsfeld, Powell, Tenet and Cheney and relied on their experience and judgment.261 It is important to reiterate that experience and judgment, while invaluable, are not adequate substitutes for discrete analysis and development of risk informed policy recommendations.
While all of these professionals agreed forceful action against Al Qaeda was required, there was not clear agreement between principals on the scope and approach of the U.S. response. Donald Rumsfeld naturally played a key role in this deliberation and two weeks in he expressed concern to his staff that the NSC was thinking tactically instead of strategically.262
Among the NSC principals, Rumsfeld was the voice articulating the need for a broader, strategic global response that included multiple efforts to reflect U.S. commitment to confront terror. 263 Rumsfeld also viewed military roles in defeating an ideology as limited while other elements of national power could be leveraged with great effect. This perspective led Rumsfeld to suggest considering the administration look at states that sponsored terrorism including Iraq, Libya, Iran,
North Korea, and Syria. The president’s Chief of Staff, Andy Card, also voiced favor for simultaneous operations against known terror organizations to demonstrate the global nature of the campaign.264
261 Bob Woodward, Bush At War, (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 74. 262 Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Archive, First Full Tranche of Snowflakes, Subject: NSC, Briefing Book #615, Edited by Nate Jones, (George Washington University, 2018), 506. Accessed 24 January 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4357755-11-L-0559-First-Release-Bates-1- 912 263 NSC Staff, (Interview, 2017)1. NSC staff largely validate other accounts of Rumsfeld’s recommendation on a broader strategy. 264 Bob Woodward, “Bush At War,” (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 91. 118
Rumsfeld also cautioned against acting before the administration had a solid strategic plan supported by addressing some key intelligence gaps on terrorist organizations and state sponsors. He proposed a deliberate build-up of forces in the
Middle East first to create pressure on state sponsors of terror.265
Much has been made of then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s suggestion to include Iraq in the initial U.S. military response. Rumsfeld’s characterization was that, given Saddam Hussein’s history of supporting terrorists it would have been “irresponsible for any administration not to have asked the question.”266 This sounds reasonable but it is noteworthy to add that the president had directed his Counter-terrorism expert, Richard Clarke, to investigate Iraqi links to the attacks but none were identified.267
The president and remainder of the NSC wanted to narrow focus on Al
Qaeda. Dick Cheney viewed Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as a priority that capitalized on the opportunity to form a coalition of predominantly Muslim nations who might not join the coalition if Iraq were included in the U.S. response.268 Colin Powell was also clear in his preference to establish priorities and focus on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan first. He held the Cheney view that coalition partners from Muslim nations were necessary and that pursuing military options against Iraq would push them away.269
George Tenet, while a vocal advocate of a global response, agreed with the president that Iraq was not the issue and initial focus should be on Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan.270
265 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 266 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2001), 347. 267 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, (Simon & Schuster, 2004), 32. 268 Ibid. 269 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 189. 270 George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, (HarperCollins, 2007), 465. 119
It makes sense here to consider the significant personalities beyond the NSC
Principals who were influential in forming and implementing security policy. At Bush’s suggestion, Rumsfeld had selected Paul Wolfowitz as his Deputy. Rumsfeld described Wolfowitz as one of “the Vulcans” who had advised the Bush campaign.271
Wolfowitz in turn recommended Doug Feith as Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.272
It is also relevant to distinguish the Rumsfeld perspective on transformation from those of Wolfowitz and Feith. Donald Rumsfeld joined the administration to implement Bush’s desire to transform the DOD. He was singularly focused on transforming the services to be lighter, more responsive, and lethal, able to more rapidly project power globally.273 Accelerating this transformation would dominate his approach to military conflicts and this approach would have important implications to
U.S. ability to achieve policy objectives.274
In addition to his focus on military transformation was Rumsfeld’s intent to make the largely civilian DOD workforce a more lean, responsive, and efficient enterprise. In this effort he was openly skeptical of Pentagon management referring to it as “a relic of the Cold War” likening it to the Soviet bureaucracy.275 His approach to his own staff was no different. His mistrust of the bureaucracy of which many on his staff were a part, would have repercussions in impeding the committee process.
Hiring Wolfowitz and Feith effectively surrounded Rumsfeld with Deputies who held transformational perspectives similar to the president’s. Their view on
271 Ibid, 292. 272 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 42. 273 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 293-294. 274 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 294. 275 Jim Garamone, Rumsfeld Attacks Pentagon Bureaucracy, Vows Changes, (American Forces Press Service, 2001). Accessed 9 July 2017. Available at: https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44916. 120 transformation was an ideological one asserting that American security could be better achieved through democratic reform across the globe.276 They held this to be particularly true in the Middle East.277 Borrowing Houghton’s characterization of
“Homo Bureaucraticus”, Wolfowitz and Feith would impose their views on policy implementation and would influence the military’s ability to achieve political objectives for Afghanistan.278
In addition to DOD influence, Cheney’s unusually powerful role as Vice
President also served to complicate and undermine NSC effectiveness.
Condoleezza Rice referenced an effort by the Vice President to co-opt leadership of the NSC Principals Committee and arguments with Cheney in debate with the president. 279 NSC Staff also point to the assertive role the Vice President’s Assistant
National Security Affairs, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, in promoting the Vice President’s agenda in Deputies Committee meetings. It merits noting that he held equal status in the Deputies Committee with Deputy Secretaries from the Departments who were
Senate confirmed where Libby was not.280
These actors played significant roles in shaping both policy formulation and implementation. This review of the environment and actors within the NSC reflects a natural framing and reframing process that led to a rapid reduction in scope from
276 David J. Rothkopf, Running the World, (PublicAffairs, 205), 396-397. Rothkopf refers here to Wolfowitz’ relationship with and signatory on the Project for the New American Century’s 1997 “Statement of Principles” reflecting a transformational approach to foreign affairs to “"shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests;" promotion of "political and economic freedom abroad;" and assertion that the United States should preserve and extend "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles." 277 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway, 2011), 324-328. 278 David P. Houghton, The Decision Point, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 30-31. Houghton summarizes the view that states are not unitary actors and that bureaucratic politics play a significant role where individuals and organizations often pull in different directions and decision makers hold different views. 279 Ibid, 17-18. 280 National Security Council Staff, (Interview 2017). 121 desire for a broader response to terror, to one focused on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
While the scope of response narrowed, there was little or no discussion on whether invading was the right response.
Key Stakeholders: Foreign and Domestic
Responding to the 9/11 attacks abroad required consideration of key stakeholders who could influence policy success or failure. The president certainly enjoyed the immediate support of key domestic audiences including the general population, media, and the Congress. The administration likewise expended considerable effort to engage key international stakeholders who could provide significant support and legitimacy to military actions.
Domestic support for a military response was immediate and overwhelming.
In a demonstration of national unity, members of the Democratic opposition were quick to articulate support to the president.281 Congress’s rapid and overwhelming support for an AMUF and increased powers to implement intelligence and domestic security measures are ample evidence that the polity supported actions that were to this point largely undefined.
Insight into the broad media sentiment is reflected in widely supportive articles and editorials. On September 12, 2001, the New York Times published an editorial
“The War Against America; The National Defense” in which the paper argued that
America must be prepared for a long conflict and to do what was necessary to combat terrorism globally. The editorial was also forceful that allies could not “stay on the sidelines,” asserting that U.S. responses in the past had been undermined by
281 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 344-345. Rumsfeld provides insights into then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin’s support indicating the senate would be “totally arm in arm” with the DOD. Levin also dropped Democratic opposition to the president’s defense budget and supported an increase. 122
“faint hearted allies.”282 Editorializing aside, the administration also enjoyed broad international support for a military response.
The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand immediately committed their support. NATO invoked Article V of the charter on September
12th.”283 Even nations with whom the U.S had uncertain relationships like Russia offered pledges of support.284 Contrary to a popular narrative largely borne of opportunistic criticisms of imprecise administration language, the Bush administration did not pursue a unilateral agenda.
Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, undertook an extensive effort to build a coalition with significant success. Powell’s efforts were successful by any definition. At its height, the coalition included sixty-nine nations.285
More than twenty-five nations would support combat operations with personnel, equipment, and support services.286 Most notable was the support from Pakistan who Bush believed could exert more influence with the Taliban than any other.287
Pakistan was clearly one of the nations Bush had in mind when he admonished that
“you are either with us or you are with the terrorists.”288 The propensity for elements of Pakistan’s government to undermine U.S. policy in Afghanistan would eventually reveal itself over time, but the administration was satisfied to count them as an ally and secure a land route into Afghanistan.
282 The Editorial Board: The War Against America; The National Defense, (New York Times, 2001), accessed 7 June 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/opinion/the-war-against-america-the- national-defense.html. 283 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Invocation of Article 5, The 9/11 terrorist attacks, (NATO, 2011), accessed June 7 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm. 284 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 196. 285 Ibid, 374. 286 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 90. 287 Ibid, 187-188 288 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (The White House, 2001), accessed March 21, 2015, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 123
The role of allies and partners in the Bush policy was crucial to achieve objectives but their approach to building a coalition was a source of internal debate.
Powell and Armitage were busy building a broad coalition, but Rumsfeld was focused on partnering for the right reasons. He forcefully asserted with the president that the mission should determine coalition composition.289 All understood that all allies would enter into the coalition with differing interests and perspectives, and that they may not be willing to prosecute all missions as the U.S. intended.
It was in this sense that Rumsfeld argued to preserve the president’s decision space, advising against entering into permanently defined alliances that would restrict his flexibility later.290 One might characterize this as an instance of what
Allison called “bureaucratic politics” at play within the NSC.291 However, the NSC may debate and recommend, but ultimately the president would make his own decision. This insight does not assert bureaucratic politics was not a significant factor in the Bush administration. Rather, this insight reflects the shortcomings of the model in the presence of an engaged and decisive president in the procedure.
This final bit of context helps to frame the strategic environment in which the administration formed their response to Al Qaeda. While the NSC had attempted to characterize a global war on terror, the president was focused on responding in
Afghanistan first and the subsequent policy debate and planning was Afghanistan- centric.
289 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 354. 290 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017), NSS noted Rumsfeld’s forcefulness in convincing the president that forming a coalition with nations committed to forceful action was preferable to formal alliances. 291 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969),707. 124
Develop Objectives
Reiterating a central theme, the ADA approach to decision analysis dictates that the administration first define what was to be achieved in responding to Al
Qaeda before considering how to go about it. Doing so could have enabled the use of objectives as criteria for evaluating the utility of alternatives.
The president stated the fundamental objective of his response was to assure
U.S. domestic security and freedom. At the outset, President Bush emphasized a lengthy campaign in his address to Congress on September 20, stressing that the war on terror would “…not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."292 This lofty goal is one that most may not have fully appreciated at the time in terms of its unreasonable implications for sustained national will and resources.
The challenge with a broadly stated aspirational goal like this is a lack of specificity by which to focus actions. It is then important to narrow the focus of objectives to those that enable discernment of ways and means as well as understanding of consequences.293 Doing so is necessary to distinguish fundamentally important objectives that represent clear ends from those that are merely supporting, or ‘means’ objectives. A technique for refining objectives is to ask
‘why’ a particular objective is important. This rather simple exercise is a useful way to cull out those fundamentally essential to policy success from those that merely support achievement of a fundamental objective.294 In this sense, fundamental
292 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (The White House, 2001), accessed March 21, 2015, http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 293 Gregory S. Parnell, Value-focused Thinking, (United States Military Academy at West Point and Innovative Decisions Inc., 2018), 9. 294 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking, A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 65-57. 125 objectives represent discrete ends and become the focus of implementing strategies.
Means objectives then represent progress towards fundamental objectives.
Along this same line of thinking Stolberg offered basic questions for policy makers to consider: Where do we plan to go with the policy (the overall intent of the policy)—what is it attempting to achieve?; Why would we want to go there--what benefit will we derive from a successful implementation of the policy?; How will we get there—what ways and means might we use to attain the policy’s designated end state?; and, what follow-on actions will we take after we attain the initial end state?295
This step of decision making was not given the necessary attention for a number of reasons, pressure to produce quick results and lack of a structured procedure primary among them.296 The NSC began regular meetings on September
12 and only two days later George Tenet presented a CIA concept for joint para- military support to Afghan opposition force operations to topple the Taliban.297 The president directed the NSC meet at Camp David on September 15 where he indicated he wanted military options.298
The NSC had gotten down to the business of forming objectives but the ad hoc nature of the deliberation was now following behind operational planning that was narrowly focused on counter-terror operations and regime change. The implications of this flawed decision procedure would become evident later when objectives would prove incongruent with U.S capabilities to achieve them.
295 Alan G. Stolberg , Chapter 4: Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century, U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy And Strategy, 5th Edition, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 41. 296 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking, A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 55. 297 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, (HarperCollins, 2007), 268-271. 298 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Time in Washington, (Broadway Books, 2011), 83. 126
The president blessed the CIA’s para-military approach only four days removed from the 9/11 attacks, and CIA inserted its first covert teams on 27
September. At this point the only objectives that had been debated were in the context of a broader war on terror.
Condoleezza Rice described her anxiety during this early stage. She lamented that the meetings were not as structured as she had experienced to date and had not yet produced a plan upon which they would act.299 It is pertinent to reiterate that the structure of NSC meetings and the procedure the body follows to inform decisions are the purview of the NSA. Rice’s anxiety points to her lack of control over the procedure.
The NSC met on September 15th to continue the effort to define the threat and their strategic objectives. Rumsfeld’s staff later codified these in a 3 October DOD memorandum, "Strategic Guidance for the Campaign Against Terrorism.”300
Interestingly, these objectives were published within DOD only, and preceded the start of military operations by only four days. In fact, the operation was already being executed, as the CIA had deployed teams a week prior.
The DOD document was focused on the broader political-military strategic objectives for the so-called War on Terror. Though it was to be first applied in
Afghanistan, it lacked specific objectives for Afghanistan itself. The published objectives, though somewhat redacted, reflect intent to apply all relevant instruments of power to combat terrorism, thereby dictating roles and missions beyond the DOD across cabinet departments and the interagency:
299 Woodward, “Bush At War,” (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 85-86. 300 Strategic Guidance for the Campaign Against Terrorism, (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001). This document was largely authored by Doug Feith, 127
• (Military / Intelligence) Against terrorist organizations with global reach
that threaten the US:
- Disrupt, damage and destroy them through actions against
…(redacted).
- Deny them access to or ability to use weapons of mass destruction.
- Deny them support from state and non-state entities.
• (Diplomatic / Intelligence / Military) Against states who support those
terrorist organizations by providing safe havens, finance, diplomatic cover
or other assistance:
- Convince or compel states to sever all ties and terminate terrorist
activity within their borders.
- Isolate states from the international community and weaken regimes
that support or harbor terrorists.
- Disrupt, damage or destroy (redacted) of regimes that continue to
support terrorism.
• (Diplomatic / Intelligence / Military / Economic / Financial / Legal) Against
non-state entities (e.g., banks, corporations, criminal organizations,
foundations or entities):
- Persuade or compel them to end their support to terrorist
organizations.
• (Military / Law Enforcement) Protect the US and prevent further attacks
against the US or US interests.
• (Diplomatic) Support the creation of an international political system hostile
to terrorism to dissuade individuals, non-state actors, and states from
entering into or initiating support for terrorism.
128
• (Military / Diplomatic) Deter aggression or the use of force against the US,
allies, friends and partners, and defend their populations, forces and
critical infrastructures.
- If deterrence fails, defeat aggression or the use of force.
• (Military / Diplomatic) Prevent or control the spreading or escalation of
conflict.
• Assist other elements of national power as directed to encourage
populations dominated by terrorist organizations or their supporters to
overthrow that domination.
There was clear incongruency between these broadly stated political-military objectives, and the more focused political-military ones that were later articulated for
Afghanistan. Ideally, complementary political-military objectives where specific end states described success would drive military planning. However, OSD did not want specificity.
Doug Feith described collective OSD thinking on objectives where they viewed George H.W. Bush’s limited objectives in the first Gulf war as constraining his flexibility to pursue and destroy Iraqi forces, and thereby remove Saddam Hussein’s ability to threaten his neighbors. 301 They viewed this as a learning opportunity and resolved that they should recommend the president not declare objectives that might limit his options and constrain him later.302 When the president adopted their approach, he further entrenched the conditions for a faulty policy that would not achieve any of his objectives in Afghanistan.
301 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 10. 302 Ibid. 129
Policy Objectives
Recalling that security issues represent complex problems that are rarely solved, time and painful experience have validated that there were no simple solutions to a global terrorist threat. Simon’s notion of “satisficing” is a reminder on the importance of a sense of proportional response at this stage of analysis by tempering the desired with the achievable.303 In this sense the administration quickly narrowed their focus to a subset of their aspirations for a broader global war on terror, to address the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.
President Bush’s political and military objectives at the outset of invasion largely reflect the refined language of DOD objectives, with specific reference to Al
Qaeda and the Taliban:
Strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps…designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and; strikes against military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan... to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.304
A critically important point is that it was around these objectives that General
Franks and USCENTCOM developed their campaign strategy. Bush later re-stated these objectives after military planning was completed and the campaign had already commenced, expanding the scope of the mission to “Removing the Taliban
(from power), denying sanctuary to Al Qaeda, and helping a democratic government to emerge.”305
303 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organizations, (The Free Press, 4th Edition, 1997), 295-296. 304 George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation, (The White House, 2001), this statement by President Bush to the nation was made on October 7, 2001 to announce the invasion of Afghanistan. 305 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 194-195; U.S. Central Command Staff Officer, (Interview 2017). This staff officer recalled growing confusion among planners as the president made conflicting statements articulating U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Their main concern was the growing scope of the mission; Michael DeLong and Noah Lukeman, Inside CENTCOM: the Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, (Regnery Publishing, 2004), 36. 130
Returning to an earlier point, when forming clear objectives, the ADA methodology emphasizes distinguishing means objectives from fundamental ones.306
A distinguishing characteristic of fundamental objectives is they represent the broadest objectives directly influenced by alternatives.307 A technique to distinguish them from means objectives is to continually ask why each is important.308 Doing so with the stated Bush objectives is useful to distinguish the means objectives of disrupt and deny from the true end objective that was to destroy Al Qaeda.
Removing the Taliban from power also represents a clear end and thus a fundamental objective.
Disrupting and denying Al Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power could be achieved by military means, but destroying Al Qaeda required a much broader strategic approach. This type of analysis might well have driven focus on more holistic strategies to achieve the end objective of destroy, or, caused the president and NSC to reconsider the objective in terms of what could be reasonably achieved.
Along this same line of rationale, the ambiguous objective of “helping a democratic government to emerge” also represented a means towards the implied objective of a democratic Afghanistan. As stated, this was an incredibly ambiguous and ambitious objective that was undermined from the start by contradictory policy decisions.
Bush had initially been firm that the military not be involved in nation building operations.309 He recalled changing his mind after the Taliban fell and he felt a moral
306 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking, A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 34. 307 Ibid 308 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 39. 309 George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation, (The White House, 2001), accessed 7 June 2015, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html. 131 obligation to help the Afghan people build a free society.310 He recalled thinking after
CIA teams went into Afghanistan about who would run the country after the Taliban, and directed Colin Powell and the DOS to develop a plan to transition Afghanistan to a democracy.311 This is a stark example of a failure to consider consequences and ad hoc planning that should have been done prior to invasion as many military planning decisions were undermined by this one.
Lack of NSC clarity on objectives did not absolve senior military leaders of the responsibility to pose responsible questions in shaping policy. Advice and counsel to the president and NSC on the use of military force is the purview of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). When NSC deliberations on objectives began
General Henry “Hugh” Shelton, had a large staff and Combatant Commanders to assist him in advising them.
However, Shelton’s influence was minimal as he was already scheduled to retire at the end of September, to be replaced by Air Force General Richard “Dick”
Myers. In the interim, Shelton had directed General Franks to begin planning on 12
September and Franks first briefed concepts to the president 10 days later.312 This meant U.S. Central Command assumed the dominant advisory role to the president and NSC. Not involved in the day-to-day deliberations of the NSC, Franks input was done largely from U.S Central Command Headquarters in Florida and he was following clear planning direction from OSD.
When confronted with ambiguous objectives, Franks certainly could have articulated the limitations of the military to pursue them. He could have made all
310 Ibid, 195 311 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 197. 312 General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier, (Regan Books, 2004), 250- 252. 132 aware of specific challenges while recommending revisions and a range of options that he believed could achieve them.313 There is no evidence Franks did so.
In this sense poorly developed political-military objectives and flawed assumptions were a shared responsibility. Meanwhile, U.S Central Command staff indicated they were frustrated by ambiguous objectives and the president’s lack of specificity on the conditions that would define successful achievement of them.314
They were left to discern success on their own terms.
Rumsfeld eventually focused on objectives but only with regard to the intent to make Afghanistan a democracy. He recalled his conversation with the president in
November, recommending the U.S. limit its objectives to pursuing terrorists and avoid trying to transform Afghanistan.315 Rumsfeld’s transformational military approach was progressing under a certain set of objectives that did not include the force structure or mission planning to provide the security on which successful development of democratic institutions relied. Nevertheless, this objective remained.
Not only was the military not postured to prosecute the added missions, but the objective for a democratic Afghanistan was not yet even formally understood within the NSC. Moreover, OSD staff had specifically forbidden USCENTCOM from planning for peacekeeping and nation-building missions and their force structure reflected this guidance.316
313 The Joint Staff, About the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), accessed 15 January 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/About/. 314 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). 315 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinal, 2011), 398. 316 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), Both staff members recall specific guidance from OSD that peacekeeping and nation-building missions would not be done by U.S. forces and to focus on counter-terror operations. This enabled USCENTCOM to focus planning on a light, lethal force capable of moving rapidly around Afghanistan. USCENTCOM staff also indicated that President George W. Bush’s guidance was firm that U.S. forces would not perform nation-building missions and so the U.S. Central Command plan assumed an international coalition mission to execute these missions and these missions were not included in the USCENTCOM force sizing assessment. 133
The administration’s ambiguous objectives were further problematic as they were open to broad interpretation which made any ways and means evaluation a considerable challenge. In fact, the NSC did not even consider the costs of invasion prior to acting, and the first notable administration recognition of this did not come until three days into the invasion when Rumsfeld sent guidance to his staff indicating the need to understand them.317 Hence the implications of administration’s objectives would commit the U.S. to Afghanistan well beyond Bush’s term in office at tremendous expense.
These abrupt changes in objectives are indicative of the administration’s having acted quickly in a crisis. Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is evident in this short planning cycle where the administration perceived the need to make rapid decisions to invade, without fully understanding the implications and consequences of their intended actions.318 Ellsberg’s notion of reasonableness in decision-making and the challenges in achieving it are also pertinent here. The imperative to decide reasonably requires understanding consequences of actions.319 The Bush NSC did not evaluate consequences, and the president’s desire to respond quickly and his sentiments on establishing a democracy outweighed more practical factors.
It is pertinent here to again emphasize that disrupting and denying Al Qaeda did not constitute the fundamental goal of defeating them. 320 The Coalition would collectively damage its leadership and base of operations in Afghanistan but the raison d'être of defeating them remains unsatisfied in 2020.
317 Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Archive, First Full Tranche of Snowflakes, Subject: NSC, Briefing Book #615, Edited by Nate Jones, (George Washington University, 2018), 528. Accessed 24 January 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4357755-11-L-0559-First-Release-Bates-1- 912 318 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organizations, (The Free Press, 4th Edition, 1997), 119. 319 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001), 155-156. 320 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 34-35. 134
NSC members certainly considered what defeat of Al Qaeda meant but never really defined it. This shortcoming lends credence to Rumsfeld’s frustration with the term “war on terror” and his concern that the NSC created the perception that Al
Qaeda and terrorism could be defeated with a military campaign.321
Key Assumptions
The Bush objectives for Afghanistan were underpinned by bold assumptions that demanded pragmatic analysis. Needless to say, unanalyzed assumptions invited risk. A rather significant assumption, given Afghanistan’s history, was that the
Taliban could be removed from power without a large invasion force. This meant the president’s objectives depended on Afghan tribal forces, which jeopardized policy intent from the start. The DOD also made bold assumptions about the capacity of a small force to effectively pursue Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This entailed significant risk given the size and formidable geography of Afghanistan.
Debate over the small military footprint and CIA plan to use special operations teams and tribal fighters to effect regime change was extensive. Rumsfeld indicated he liked this approach as he was sensitive to Afghan perceptions of Americans as an occupying force. He indicated he also favored a small U.S. military footprint as deploying a large force would take much more time.322 Rumsfeld’s military transformation agenda no doubt played a central role in his approach. Afghanistan represented a forcing function by which to drive change and Rumsfeld did so with earnest. General Franks was a willing partner focused on leveraging modern technology and a force where speed, agility and lethality were emphasized.323
321 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2001), 352-353. 322 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017); Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2001), 376-377. 323 U.S Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). 135
There was apprehension when the president approved the CIA and DOD plans. Colin Powell was openly skeptical that Northern Alliance tribes could defeat the Taliban.324 Given Afghanistan’s history as the ”graveyard of empires,” pundits were quick to worry about Afghanistan becoming a quagmire only a few days into the campaign. 325 While these concerns were prescient, the dramatic initial success of the CIA-DOD plan emboldened administration members and they took this success as validation of their decision-making approach.326
Initial military success aside, the objective to pursue and deny Al Qaeda safe haven inside Afghanistan, while also establishing and maintaining security, required a much more robust force presence than was available. U.S. Central Command planners had assumed a multi-national force presence to establish and maintain security that would allow U.S. forces to focus on remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda.327
Again, this assumption was firmly underpinned by both the president’s and OSD staff’s forceful guidance that U.S. forces would not perform nation-building missions.328 This change in objectives does not however alter the fact that, as operations progressed, it became evident that U.S. force strength was inadequate to effectively prosecute the scope of the counter-terror mission.
Evidence that forces were insufficient to the geographic challenge was illustrated clearly in Tora Bora where American and British Special Forces, and
324 Ibid, 376. 325 R.W. Apple, Jr., A Military Quagmire Remembered: Afghanistan as Vietnam, (New York Times, 2001), accessed 7 June 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/31/world/nation-challenged-analysis- military-quagmire-remembered-afghanistan-vietnam.html. 326 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). This staffer characterized the sense of confidence as one bordering on hubris. 327 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), USCENTCOM planners indicate they were given clear guidance from OSD to focus on Taliban and Al Qaeda and specifically directed not to devote attention to security or stability operations and that these would be multi-national force missions. 328 Ibid, USCENTCOM planners recall that any use of the term ‘nation-building’ met with heated push- back from political appointees in OSD. Even after the president added the objective to help a democratic government emerge, the term was not to be used, 136 eastern alliance fighters had pinned down a significant portion of Al Qaeda leadership including Osama bin Laden. The senior CIA field operative on the ground, Gary Berntsen documented his frustration at resistance at the highest levels of the administration to give him more forces to cut off Al Qaeda escape routes and to kill Bin Laden.329 Berntsen’s boss Henry Crumpton appealed to General Franks with no success. He then unsuccessfully appealed to the White House.330 Insufficient forces meant Coalition forces were then reliant on the Pakistani military to close their border. Ironically, poorly formed assumptions about capabilities played a central role in allowing the number one target of the war to escape.331
The administration assumption that free Afghans would embrace a democratic form of government was also fraught with uncertainty. This required a dramatic cultural and societal shift for peoples who have historically held tightly to tribal, regional, ethnic, and sectarian affiliations. U.S. embrace of warlords in their military plan further complicated realization of a representative form of governance. Any suitable form of national government, let alone a democratic one, required a certain degree of security and stability to function that Afghanistan did not enjoy then, nor does it in 2020. Eighteen years later even the basic functions of government institutions remain a challenge under the specter of a resurgent Taliban.
These flawed assumptions indicate incomplete analysis and introduced significant risk to U.S. policy goals. These flaws yield insights into the capability and capacity of the president’s NSC to analyze complex issues, to develop viable policy options and to adjust them over time.
329 Gary Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin laden and Al Qaeda, (Three Rivers Press, 2005), 289. 330 Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed To Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 17. 331 Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way, (Yale University Press, 2011), 93. 137
As discussed earlier, the qualifications of members to provide competent analysis is a critically important function of the NSC. Presidents presumably select their members based on their expertise related to the departments over which they will preside. This experience, while valuable, did not translate to analytical acumen.
As noted, the complexity of contemporary problems is rarely so similar to past problems that historical analogy and experienced judgment are sufficient.
Failure to analyze assumptions is particularly surprising in the case of Donald
Rumsfeld, the NSC principal responsible for “exercise of policy development, planning, and resource management.”332 Rumsfeld had a reputation for demanding rigorous analysis assumptions from the DOD staff and military leaders. He frequently noted his frustration with military planners emphasizing that failure to “…examine assumptions on which a plan is based can start a planning process based on incorrect premises, and then proceed perfectly logically to incorrect conclusions.”333
Although this was stated with regard to Iraq some months after the invasion of
Afghanistan, Rumsfeld’s statements confound understanding of his acceptance of flawed U.S. policy objectives and accompanying assumptions on force sizing, particularly after the nation-building objective was added.334 Interview with NSC staff offered no compelling evidence that he argued about these assumptions.
This particular instance also provides some insight into the applicability of
Allison’s Organizational Process Model on policy performance.335 Organizational
332 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2019), accessed 11 January 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/About/Office-of-the-Secretary-of-Defense/. 333 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2001), 429-430. 334 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), USCENTCOM planners recalled the constant pressure from OSD planners for USCENTCOM to treat Afghanistan as what the military calls an economy of force mission. This means to maintain only the number necessary to the current mission set. Planners added that at this point USCENTCOM was actively planning for an invasion of Iraq that they perceived could be ordered as early as spring of 2002. In this context, they had to ensure sufficient forces for the mission they were planning in Iraq. 335 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. 138 power enabled an assertive personality in Doug Feith to negatively influence
USCENTCOM planning. Although the president insisted their mission did not include nation-building, military planners were well aware of their responsibility to plan for securing the peace after combat operations ceased, and they attempted to do so as a matter of policy.336 The ability of Feith to constrain their planning and for the OSD to dictate the force structure was key in risking failure of the president’s policy.
Define End States and Measures of Policy Success
When formulating objectives, a prescriptive approach indicates it is essential to define the conditions that constitute successful achievement of them. Doing so not only helps all understand the president’s intent, doing so enables evaluation of progress toward them. Defining end state conditions serves to sharpen objectives in terms of available strategies, capabilities, and resources to pursue them.337 As already observed, the NSC did not do this and their objectives remained ambiguous, making invasion planning a challenge to achieve.
Consideration on how the administration would define policy success could have forced a deeper discussion on their validity and attendant assumptions.
Focused refinement of objectives may well have led to more limited, achievable U.S. goals.338 Contrary to this approach the DOD deliberately chose broader objectives and the NSC adopted them.
336 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), USCENTCOM planners stated their clear understanding of post-combat security planning. They were very apprehensive at Feith’s forceful guidance not to include this mission in their planning. Their response to was to include security force troops later in their force flow and were directed to not to execute it in favor of retaining forces for other contingencies. 337 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 38-39. 338 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 19-25. 139
A prescriptive approach likewise indicates the necessity of characterizing successful policy by distinguishing measures of effectiveness (MOE) from measures of performance (MOP). MOE measure how well an objective, end state or creation of an effect is accomplished. Measures of performance are components or subsets of
MOEs and indicators of progress toward an objective, end state or effect.339
An overarching measure of effect articulated early by the administration for the invasion was prevention of another attack on the homeland.340 This represents a logical fallacy as absence of another attack is only tangentially related to the invasion of Afghanistan, and more directly related to domestic security measures. It may however be argued that disruption and degradation of Al Qaeda’s leadership and denial of Afghanistan as a base of operations represented a measure of progress in their ability to attack within the U.S.
Achievement of supporting military objectives could have been viewed as measures of performance toward political objectives, but the administration had not defined end states. Military leaders were left to determine the conditions that equated to success and establish measures of campaign effectiveness in achieving them. To this point U.S. Central Command planners understood that defeating Al
Qaeda required a much broader application of national power and effort beyond military force, and they did not attempt to define what defeat meant. They instead focused on the stated objectives to deny Al Qaeda sanctuary and emphasized destroying their leadership.341 They could claim progress under these objectives, but the MOE remained defeat of Al Qaeda.
339 JP 3-0, Joint Operations, Change 1 (Joint Staff, 2018), II-10-11. Accessed 11 December 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910. 340 Dick Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir, (Threshold Editions, 2011), 347. 341 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018) 140
Identifying the shortcomings in administration performance measures does not deny that U.S and coalition partners achieved some success though results are mixed at best. The objective to remove the Taliban (from power) was achieved very quickly though they have remained a compelling threat to the government. Al Qaeda has also largely been denied sanctuary in Afghanistan though presence of their operatives remains a real concern.
Regarding the objective to help a democratic government emerge, the coalition spent the past eighteen years developing democratic institutions that have been slow to take root in the Afghan culture where corruption and a lack of security impede progress. In 2018, civilian casualties were at their peak, opium production was at an all-time high, the Taliban threaten the government, and government forces were attacking supposed anti-Taliban allies.342
As discussed, administration characterization of policy success in terms of denying another terrorist attack within the U.S. was flawed.343 Success in this may only be claimed in terms of reduced lethality of attacks in the U.S. and this had little to do with the war in Afghanistan. In fact, the number of Islamist-inspired attacks in the U.S. has risen since 2001.344 Success in thwarting attacks or reducing their lethality was the product of sweeping changes in domestic security, improved
342 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Civilian deaths in Afghanistan hit record high, (United Nations, 2018), accessed 7 August 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/07/1014762; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Record-high opium production in Afghanistan creates multiple challenges for region and beyond, UN warns, (United nations, 2018), accessed 7 August 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1010332; Najim Rahim and Mujib Mashal, Afghan Province in Chaos After Crackdown on Militia Leader, (New York Times, 2018), accessed August 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/04/world/asia/afghanistan-militia- faryab.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fasia&action=click&contentCollection=asia®ion =stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=9&pgtype=sectionfront. 343 President Bush Has Kept America Safe: President Bush Fundamentally Reshaped Our Strategy To Protect The American People, (The White House, 2008), accessed 11 February 2015, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/factsheets/americasafe.html. 344 A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror, (CATO Institute, 2017), This study considers the number and effectiveness of Islamist- inspired attacks within the US comparing attacks preceding 9/11 with those after. This analysis reflects four successful from 1986 to 2001 with 10 deaths, and eight since with 88 deaths. 141 intelligence-sharing capabilities, proactive police work, and timely legal actions.
Frankly, operations in Afghanistan served to push Al Qaeda to increase operations across the Middle East and Northern Africa where they have evolved and remain a significant threat to U.S. interests.345
A lack of defined end state conditions represents a fundamental flaw in decision-making in the Bush NSC. A lack of clarity in defining what the invasion was to achieve has confounded the efforts of multiple administrations to declare success and withdraw. Since George Bush decided quickly to invade, identification of alternatives to invasion were briefly discussed but not considered. NSC consideration of options were focused on ways to prosecute the intended military campaign. That is to say they focused on strategy, not policy.
Develop Policy Options
Ideally the NSC would have considered a variety of options to achieve the president’s intent, and in the process, consider whether invasion would secure the ends the president sought. Rumsfeld attempted to expand policy alternatives beyond invading Afghanistan, arguing for a broader war on terror that included a third “No-
Strike” option that involved a deliberate, massive build-up of U.S. forces across the
Middle East and Mediterranean. The intent was to go after Al Qaeda in multiple locations and at least one target that was not Al Qaeda.346 It was along this line of
345 Clayton Thomas, Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa, (Congressional Research Service, 2018), accessed 23 May 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf. 346 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). NSC Staff indicate Rumsfeld tabled an alternative to exercise patience while building up overwhelming military force in the Middle East and act as intelligence and planning matured. He also allowed Wolfowitz to table the potential to include Iraq in the initial response. 142 thinking that the subject of including Iraq in the initial response was forwarded within the NSC.347
Other members did not agree. Secretary Powell agreed with the notion of a broader war on terror but also argued that, in the interest of multinational support; the international community was focused on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and would support pursuing them first.348 Vice President Cheney also initially agreed with the notion of a broader war on terror that included states that supported terrorists. He later sided with Powell in limiting the initial response to Afghanistan, adding that action against Iraq would cause a loss of momentum. Rice, Card and Tenet also supported limiting their focus to Afghanistan.
George Bush could well have selected a more deliberate timeline to enable more detailed planning as Rumsfeld had suggested.349 Development of other alternatives was certainly possible. A useful technique to assist in developing alternatives is to remove unnecessary constraints.350 Perhaps understandable in this case, time was a constraint imposed by the president.
The administration’s sense of urgency meant that the committee process was not formally engaged in the initial policy development.351 NSS members affirmed that this decision procedure was NSC Principal-centric, dictated by the president’s focus on rapid response.352 NSS members also recalled that the Deputies
347 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 346-347. 348 NSC Staff, (Interview, 2017). 349 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). NSC Staff affirm Rumsfeld posed a more deliberate “No Strike” approach in responding to Al Qaeda that included building up forces in the Middle East to give time for more planning and action on multiple fronts. 350 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 221-222. 351 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 352 Ibid. 143
Committee met but their work was reactive to NSC direction as opposed to the typical flow of analysis and recommendations upward.353
Leveraging the committee system would have expanded the analytical thinking that principals had taken on themselves. Those at a distance from the immediate debate often see the problem without the emotional or conceptual impediments those intimately involved.354 Experienced staffers’ thinking on these problems would have easily doubled, even tripled the number of experts assessing the problem and options to address it.
The president effectively ended debate over other alternatives in favor of immediate action, indicating he did so because he was aware that if another attack succeeded, the public would hold him accountable for not doing more.355 Bush summed up his decision to focus in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda, asserting that creating pressure on Saddam Hussein and others would be achieved by succeeding in Afghanistan first. He indicated he would rather deal with Iraq diplomatically.356
NSC debate moved quickly to brief consideration of variations on strategies to achieve the president’s intent.
Emphasizing again that the president had directed planning on a military response in a matter of days, doing so denied military planners time to deliberate.
CJCS Shelton had briefed initial options on September 15 that were largely confined to providing variations on the existing U.S. Central Command plans which were bombing targets with no time to generate new ones.357 The fact was that no
353 Ibid. 354 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 233.234. 355 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 180. 356 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 191. 357 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017); George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 188-189. 144 president had ever requested large-scale military operations against terrorists and so there were no plans like the president envisioned.358 Rumsfeld referred to Shelton’s presentation of options as unimaginative.359
President Bush quickly ruled out the responses of past administrations that he characterized as retreat or more ineffective cruise missile attacks.360 Three alternatives were then discussed at length, the first two included whether to focus on
Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan only, or pursue a broader war on terror with operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as preemptive action against other terrorist threats and states that harbored them. In this approach the available military means dictated the ends. The president intended to use a powerful military to attack what he could.
Analyze Options
This step of analysis ideally considers the strength and weaknesses of a range of alternatives to identify the most suitable approach that satisfies fundamental objectives and does so within the president’s tolerance for risk. As previously described, this effort focused on military strategy, not policy alternatives. The president was in a hurry and he had already resolved that the potential consequences of delaying outweighed the perceived risks of invasion.
President Bush was also aware of the implications of a compressed decision cycle. He worried initially that his NSC did not have time to adequately debate alternatives and consider plans, so he held a longer session at Camp David to focus
358 Donald P. Wright with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) October 2001–September 2005, (Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 28-29. 359 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 360 Ibid. 145 their effort.361 Emphasizing again that experienced professionals in the NSC were not focused on a disciplined step-wise decision analysis, and that Condoleezza Rice was not a capable manager of the procedure, the two days at Camp David were largely brainstorming. The NSC did not discuss other options in any great detail beyond Rumsfeld’s ideas on a massive Middle East military build-up while developing a long-term strategy.362
By the time the NSC met at Camp David on September 15, the president had already decided on his approach and wanted to hear about military plans.363 The
NSC began assessing implementing strategies before they had defined the objectives the strategy was to achieve. DOD did not have a current strategy or campaign plan for Afghanistan and had to develop one.
George Bush was determined to do something forceful and so new approaches were required. He reacted negatively when CJCS Shelton used a common military technique in presenting analysis, presenting the status quo option of cruise missile attacks. Offering the status quo in this case was only useful as a basis for comparison with other options to help frame their benefit or when other options represented unacceptable consequences.364
The president likewise rejected the CJCS's second option to employ cruise missiles and bombers as an incremental alternative that also failed to achieve his objectives. This led him by default to select Shelton's third and largely undeveloped option of "Boots on the Ground" as the only choice offered with the potential to achieve his policy objectives.
361 Bob Woodward, “Bush At War,” (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 62. 362 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 363 Ibid; George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 185. 364 William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Volume 1, Issue 1, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 8. Accessed 27 September 2015, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00055564. 146
Recalling the comparative analysis discussion, a useful technique for developing alternatives is to pose the question of ‘how’ objectives will be achieved.365 Asking ‘how’ in this session might well have driven consideration of the consequences of regime change and likely Al Qaeda reactions. Asking ‘how’ would most assuredly have caused the president to consider jus post bellum obligations ahead of invasion. Doing so would also most likely have driven deeper discussion on the implications of a small force to both pursue Al Qaeda and Taliban as well as establish security and stability. In this same way the administration might have also considered how a democratic Afghan government could be achieved, given cultural and societal hurdles, and the implications of unplanned multi-national force roles in establishing stability. It is not hard to envision that these collective considerations may well have driven a search for better alternatives to achieve their goals.
Again, revisiting the tenets of the prescriptive analytical framework, objectives and end states represent an effective way to evaluate the viability of alternatives.366
The ambiguous nature of administration objectives was not useful to do so. As described in chapter 2, the FAS technique offers another effective method for quickly analyzing options.367
This analysis can be as detailed as time allows but must be detailed enough to provide clear insights into the potential costs versus the potential benefits of an alternative before acting. It is in this exercise that the value of analysis ought to be of greatest value to a president.
365 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 50. 366 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 31-34. 367 Alan G. Stolberg, Chapter 4: Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century, U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy And Strategy, 5th Edition, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 51. 147
Though there was really only one option to develop, it was nevertheless important to exercise diligence in evaluating the feasibility of this option to achieve the president’s objectives. Though the U.S. and coalition partners certainly possessed the military capability to defeat the Taliban and pursue Al Qaeda, George
Tenet’s plan invited significant risk by relying on the Northern Alliance to attack and defeat the Taliban. This would be done with CIA paramilitary support and Special
Operations forces, supported by massive air power.
An indicator of a lack of confidence in the feasibility and suitability of this approach, this plan caused apprehension among NSC principals. Their apprehension was rooted in the fact that it shifted reliance from U.S. military capabilities to an uncertain partner in the Northern Alliance of warlords. Conflicting with their own Director, experts within the CIA asserted that allying with the Northern
Alliance could exacerbate tensions with the southern Pashtun people, and turn them against the U.S.368 Members of the CIA further argued that Northern Alliance capability to defeat the Taliban was doubtful.369
Powell likewise questioned Northern Alliance capabilities and resolve.370
Rumsfeld and the new CJCS Myers liked the strategy as it enabled their intent for a light military footprint and the president endorsed the plan, thereby accepting the risks. His doing so gives insight into his faith in CIA and military leadership to succeed as well as his level of personal tolerance for risk.371
Other key indicators of the suitability and acceptability of the administration’s response to 9/11 were evident in domestic and international support. Congress
368 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 78-80. 369 Ibid, 79. 370 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). NSS corroborate Rumsfeld’s account that Powell was openly skeptical of Northern Alliance capabilities and resolve. 371 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 376. 148 readily supported the president providing the resources required to prosecute the invasion. The administration also enjoyed broad international support. However, the coalition that formed around this effort required clear messaging to both current allies and potential partners on strategic objectives of mutual interest and roles partners could fulfill. By their own assessment, this was not as successful as it might have been.372 Clearly, a lack of communication, agreement, and planning prior to invasion on multi-national security and stability missions was a glaring shortcoming.
A responsible consideration of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability ought well to have included an assessment of the costs of invading as important decision criteria. However, changing objectives introduced significant jus post bellum responsibilities that were not seriously analyzed prior to invading. 373 These changes would have dramatically skewed any pre-invasion assessment.
Debate over who would perform post-conflict security and stability operations occurred well after the invasion was under way. While military planning progressed under clear guidance from the OSD that the UN would assume security roles, it is notable that the president cut off discussion on post-Taliban Afghanistan in a 15
October NSC meeting saying “the war is only a week old and…we've got time.”374
Less than a month later on 12 November, the Northern Alliance took control of
Kabul, and it is then the president raised the need to develop a plan for a political structure while continuing to insist that U.S. forces would not perform a peace
372 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 376; Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 125; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 360-361. Though a bit self-serving, Both Rumsfeld and Feith expressed disappointment that the administration failed to explain their policy and strategy sufficiently to key allies and this lack of communication caused friction. 373 Antonia Chayes Chapter VII½: Is Jus Post Bellum Possible? (The European Journal of International Law Vol. 24 no. 1, 2013), 292-293. Chayes asserts Article 51 may be interpreted as legal permission to act but “…the power to engage in post-conflict reconstruction is implied as a way to finish the task that was authorized in the first place.” 374 Bob Woodward, “Bush At War,” (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 241. 149 keeping role.375 He later changed his mind indicating that he was mistaken and that the U.S. had a moral obligation to help the Afghan people.376
This failure of planning had long-term economic implications for the U.S. that were not considered prior to invasion. A measure of acceptability and suitability may also be measured in terms of a policy’s sustainability over time. Prior to Afghanistan,
U.S. war efforts had historically been paid for through tax increases, sale of security bonds, even economic tools to spur inflation.377 It is significant that George Bush broke this tradition, instead relying on debit spending, and Congress was complicit in doing so.378 This practice over an extended period drove dramatic growth to the national debt during the Bush administration.
This type of FAS analysis may well have helped the NSC avoid unnecessary errors and the long-term consequences of failing to define their objectives before acting. Compounding this failure, this prescriptive assessment reflects the administration’s inability to recognize their flawed decisions and correct them. This failure resulted in an extended military presence and costs far outweighed by any security benefit realized.
Analysis of Uncertainty and Consequences
Security policy decisions inherently risk loss of life, danger, or misfortune in execution. However, it is unreasonable to expect that we can foresee all consequences and remove all risk. Acknowledging that a sound decision procedure does not remove uncertainty, a responsible decision analysis ought to at least
375 Ibid, 310. 376 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 205. 377 Ibid. 378 Bruce Bartlett, The Cost Of War, (Forbes media, 2009), accessed 2 August, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/25/shared-sacrifice-war-taxes-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html. 150 attempt to analyze key uncertainties and potential consequences to characterize risk for a president. With this perspective in mind, it was incumbent on President Bush to weigh carefully whether his intended response to the 9/11 attacks warranted the potential costs to the nation.
The responsibility to understand what might go wrong does not imply that the president should not have responded to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Rather it was prudent to understand the risks before invading by considering the perceived security benefit in terms of potential for lost lives, significant resources expended, and legitimacy both domestically and internationally.
It is fair to acknowledge that all risk assessment methods are subjective to some degree. In the end, President Bush had to make an informed decision based on the data available to him at the time and his personal tolerance for risk. It largely goes without saying that their collective failure to assess uncertainty and consequences denied the president this invaluable criteria.
The previously discussed FAS test might have helped to characterize some uncertainty and helped to focus the administration on mitigating negative consequences. Even in a time-constrained decision procedure like that following
9/11, a good qualitative assessment of consequences and risk could have been done rather quickly.
This is not to assert that doing so would have been easy or have changed the policy decision. However, in assessing the potential risks and consequences of actions under uncertain conditions, Ellsberg observed that “one must still act reasonably.” The challenge for presidents and their NSC “is to decide what this may mean.”379 Undeniably, acting reasonably in decisions like those to enter into war
379 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, Inc, 2001), 1. 151 demands a level of responsible risk analysis commensurate with the potential lives lost and national resources to be expended.
President Bush acknowledged the responsibility to evaluate risks when he pressed his NSC principals on the "...need to plan as if things won't go well." "We need to war-game this out, figure out how to keep the pressure on them and effect change, even if things don't go the way we want." He described his thinking as "I'm the kind of person who wants to make sure that all the risk is assessed...a president is constantly analyzing, making decisions based upon risk, particularly in war, risk taken relative to the--what can be achieved." He followed this reasonable statement with a contradictory one "I just think it’s instinctive. I'm not a textbook player, I'm a gut player."380
With this characterization the president obviated the notion of a disciplined procedure for assessing risk and sound reasoning along with it. He imposed a short timeline on the procedure that denied time to war-game. In doing so he violated his own guidance and ignored key elements of risk analysis.
This lack of analytical rigor does not reflect well on NSC principals whose roles and responsibilities were created for just this purpose. The president had the benefit of experienced national security experts with which to perform this assessment. However, the first real assessment of potential consequences occurred at Rumsfeld’s direction more than a month into the war where he offered “We ought to think through the bad things that could happen, and what are the good things that could happen that we need to be ready for in both respects.”381
380 Bob Woodward, “Bush At War,” (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 136-137. 381 Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Archive, First Full Tranche of Snowflakes, Subject: NSC, Briefing Book #615, Edited by Nate Jones, (George Washington University, 2018), 634. Accessed 24 January 2018, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4357755-11-L-0559-First-Release-Bates-1- 912 152
General Franks’ had accepted the administration’s objectives as they were and the attendant risks along with them. He apparently did not foresee the negative consequences of his intended force structure or the difficulty he would face in characterizing success. Franks expected the war on terror could last for decades, but he didn’t expect to be in Afghanistan for an extended period.382 His interpretation of Bush’s objectives were rather simplistically defined as destroying Al Qaeda’s network in Afghanistan and removing the Taliban from power.383 Since he did not expect to perform peacekeeping and security missions, he anticipated a short duration campaign and then work quickly to “establish (the) capability of coalition partners to prevent the re-emergence of terrorism and provide support for humanitarian efforts.”384 While he acknowledged a three to five-year effort, he did not foresee a large U.S. force presence there.385 Franks clearly did not realize the implications of the term “defeat” as it applied to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
In order to meet the president’s short timeline for action, USCENTCOM planners fashioned a quick reaction concept. This approach served a number of purposes in addition to a quick response. The concept achieved Rumsfeld’s desire to avoid appearance of an occupying force, and it demonstrated his transformation efforts in DOD. A related consideration imposed by OSD was that deploying a large force would deprive them of forces to use elsewhere.386 Based on this approach,
U.S. combat troops would average only 5,200 throughout 2002.387
382 General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier, (ReganBooks, 2004), 244. 383 Ibid, 271-272. 384 Ibid. 385 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). Staff reaffirmed that OSD guidance to them was that they would not act in peacekeeping or security/stability missions, that these would be coalition missions. 386 Ibid. This was a deliberate consideration as the USCENTCOM staff anticipated the need for follow- on missions in the GWOT. 387 Amy Belasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential 153
The consequence of a light military footprint made denying Al Qaeda sanctuary a significant challenge, if not impossible in Afghanistan. The desire to avoid appearing an occupying force while also denying Al Qaeda sanctuary then required some creative interpretation.388 General Franks interpreted this objective as the requirement to deny Al Qaeda uncontested ability to operate in Afghanistan.389
This was a conventional military interpretation of success that was achievable but hardly effective in ‘destroying Al Qaeda.” Even removing the Taliban from power was jeopardized by the lack of sufficient forces to deny the flight of Taliban leadership and to secure the nation after. This ensured the coalition would have to battle a Taliban insurgency that became the central focus of the war and has continued for the past eighteen years.
The administration’s rapid action precipitated a great deal of uncertainty in other areas. A key uncertainty was the relationship with Pakistan. Had Pakistan denied or constrained access to Afghanistan, the administration would have been forced to rely on access through Central Asian countries with which the U.S. had no formal ties. Access through Pakistan was further complicated in that the U.S. had aligned itself with the Northern Alliance who were aligned with India—Pakistan’s mortal enemy.390 The Northern Alliance’s relationship with India introduced great uncertainty and the likelihood that Pakistan would undermine any actions that went
Issues: Table 5. Average Monthly Troop Levels in the Afghan War, FY2002-FY2008: Five DOD Sources, (Congressional Research Service, 2009), 29. 388 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), USCENTCOM staff affirmed that the administration’s objectives required some interpretation to identify what end states would define success and military planners could only restate them in terms of what was militarily achievable. USCENTCOM planners certainly recognized that defeating Al Qaeda was a much broader objective beyond Afghanistan and that they could only pursue Al Qaeda to the extent available capabilities allowed. 389 390 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, (HarperCollins, 2007), 214-216. 154 against its interests. This uncertainty included whether they would secure areas of their border to prevent Al Qaeda and Taliban moves east into Pakistani tribal areas.
Understanding this risk, a reasonable planning response might have been to place more U.S. forces in the eastern mountains. USCENTCOM did not do this, despite repeated U.S. unit requests for more forces in Tora Bora and along the mountainous border, and the consequences have plagued the campaign since.
Revisiting the lack of planning for post-Taliban governance, Bush gave the mission to Colin Powell to develop a plan for a “transition to democracy” well after the invasion was under way.391 Powell’s staff developed an approach but the late attention to the issue and the rapid defeat of the Taliban denied them time to plan and coordinate sufficiently. The combined impact of a small U.S. military footprint and the lack of post-combat planning meant Afghanistan was too dangerous to hold governance talks in the country, so the administration convened a conference in
Germany to select an interim leader for Afghanistan.392
The administration’s lack of attention resulted in hastily formed roles for coalition partners to lead an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission on six-month rotations until NATO formally assumed command authority in 2003.393
The administration’s objective to develop a democratic Afghanistan was also fraught with uncertainty. The president’s basic assumption of a universal longing for freedom would translate to an embrace of democratic values. This perspective implies Afghans would embrace American interpretations of fundamental liberal values that include competing for and sharing power through nonviolent processes,
391 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 197. 392 Alexandra Poolos, Afghanistan: Bonn Talks See Some Progress On Interim Government, (Radio Free Europe, 2001). Accessed 12 November 2016, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1098143.html. 393 NATO Update, NATO takes on Afghanistan mission, (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2003), accessed 20 February 2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/08-august/e0811a.htm 155 and a commitment to human rights. These notions represent a foreign concept to a nation fundamentally rooted in sectarian Islamic and tribal culture. The sectarian, ethnic, and tribal differences that persist in Afghanistan eighteen years later reflect the challenges to the administration’s beliefs.
Failure to fully analyze the potential consequences associated with each of these uncertainties served to increase risk to policy success. This failure of analysis compounded the preceding errors of deciding on a strategy before defining the objectives for the strategy. In a remarkable illustration of the state of pre-war analysis and planning, a frustrated Rumsfeld directed Doug Feith to produce a new
Afghanistan strategy on 31 October, 24 days after the war began. Rumsfeld’s frustration was the result of an unsatisfactory update from Franks on his campaign strategy, the pace of the Northern Alliance, and Franks’ willingness to wait on the
CIA plan to progress.394
Feith and the DOD staff drafted a "Military Strategy in Afghanistan" that same day.395 It is particularly noteworthy that this military strategy was done over only a few hours in consultation with Joint Staff members, while specifically omitting
USCENTCOM and CIA who were actually implementing the current strategy that had been blessed by the president. 396 Consistent with their jealous protection of DOD authorities, they also did not involve NSC Staff.397 This again illustrates the power of large government organizations where neither the president nor Rumsfeld could
“substantially control” the implementation of their intent.398
394 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 119-120. 395 Ibid, 120-122. 396 Ibid, 121. 397 National Security Staff, (Interview, 2017). NSC Staff indicate that NSC members saw the draft military strategy memo later but it was provided for their information not for comment. 398 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. 156
The President’s Decision
The preceding analysis considered development of essential criteria to inform
President Bush’s policy response to the 9/11 attacks. At this stage of a prescriptive procedure, the president would typically consider how well competing alternatives might achieve policy objectives and consider them in terms of their associated consequences. The preceding analysis elaborated on the various challenges to achieving the president’s policy intent. Ideally NSC analysis would reflect these challenges leading to refinement of objectives, precipitating tradeoffs among them that might provide the president a blended option that both maintained his fundamental objectives and satisfied his tolerance for risk. This was not the case.
Bush NSC decisions were not guided by any formal procedure nor did they leverage the existing committee process to assist their effort. This type of analysis is the core responsibility of the NSC, and their deliberation reflects significant gaps.
George Bush initially announced a Global War on Terror and then quickly narrowed the scope to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Deliberating in a largely unstructured and ad hoc manner over a period of only five days, the president and his NSC determined they would invade. Bush then dictated an ultimatum to the Taliban, that if they did not acquiesce to his demands, the U.S. would invade.
Over the course of the next weeks, the NSC quickly pivoted to planning the military strategy before they ever identified the objectives the military strategy was to achieve. The president’s clear intent was to use a strong military to strike back at Al
Qaeda, and his initial policy objectives reflected what he desired rather than a deliberate assessment of what was feasible.
157
Assess Policy Effectiveness
As the war played out and negative consequences of poor planning were revealed, the administration was forced to adjust their strategy to the conditions on the ground. However, the president did not adjust his policy objectives. A clear indicator of the ambiguous nature of his objectives for the war and his misunderstanding of how to measure policy performance, the president referred to a
‘scorecard’ of Al Qaeda leaders upon whose death or capture he would measure progress.399 This recalls the misguided body count measures used in Vietnam that provided little insight into progress. Killing Al Qaeda leadership did not mean defeat of the organization or their motivations, and certainly did not reduce the organization’s reach. The group expanded into Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and the
Maghreb. It has shown resiliency, slowly rebuilding and again represents a significant global threat.400
Further evidence the president did not understand measures of effect, revealed itself when he recalled that he measured policy performance in terms of how effective they were at preventing another attack on the homeland.401 As previously discussed, this logical fallacy wrongly attempted to link the absence of attacks in the U.S. to disruption of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.402
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith argued in his memoir some years later that useful measures of effect were the liberation of Afghans from the
Taliban while avoiding being viewed as an occupying force there, and successfully putting a representative government into place before the end of 2001. These were
399 Bob Woodward, “Bush At War,” (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 110-111, 116-117. 400 Daniel R. Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018), 9-10. 401 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 180-181. 402 Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, Bert Meuffels, Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness: Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules, (Springer , 2009), 8. 158 outcomes the administration could well have defined as performance indicators, but these were certainly not defined prior to invasion. In fact, Feith had argued prior to invasion that “creating a stable, post-Taliban Afghanistan was desirable but not necessarily within U.S. control,” and “nation-building is not our strategic goal.” More specifically, these objectives were largely after-thoughts and have little or nothing to do with the fundamental objective of the war to pursue and defeat Al Qaeda.
General Franks and USCENTCOM planners clearly understood the military end state of regime change. However, success in defeating, even denying Al Qaeda sanctuary, was a challenge and military planners pointed to a lack of clear end states from the NSC.403 Left to define success themselves, they considered the destruction of Al Qaeda elements and their installations as measures of military success, understanding that this would be an extended counter-terror campaign without clear end.404
The ambiguous nature of their objectives represented an opportunity for the administration to describe success in expedient terms of their choosing. The president could well have declared the Taliban and Al Qaeda defeated in terms of having routed them. Denying Al Qaeda safe haven was also sufficiently vague that he could have claimed success by any number of definitions. The president also could well have declared success in establishing a new government when the first national election was complete, and the basic government institutions were established.
403 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). USCENTCOM staff were candid in recalling frustration at vague policy guidance. 404 U.S. Central Command staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). Staff indicated that in the absence of administration definitions of success and constraints on missions they were to consider, planners were obligated to define measures of effectiveness in terms of what could be achieved with military capabilities. 159
Rather than leverage this ambiguity to declare success and withdraw, the president held stubbornly to the objective of a democratic government. He likewise held to the unrealistic notion that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan could be defeated in some conventional but undefined sense.
Steinbruner described this dynamic observing that decision makers operating in conditions of significant uncertainty, often establish strong beliefs and act on these beliefs despite the risks involved. Bush’s decisions reflect what he desired, and he did not alter them even when subsequent evidence contradicted them.405
Findings and Conclusions
Findings
The attacks of September 11, 2001 certainly justified U.S. action against Al
Qaeda, but a rushed, emotional approach led to a decision to invade that preceded consideration on what was to be achieved by it. Evaluation of the Bush response In terms of the ADA framework reflects both omissions of analysis and violations of an orderly, stepwise approach to understand the security issue. George Bush’s approach was alternative-focused rather than value-focused. That is, the president decided to invade before first identifying U.S. goals and articulating what was to be achieved. The NSC, principally DOD, then developed objectives in terms of what they desired the invasion to achieve with no clear articulation of what success would be—strategy led policy.
In applying the prescriptive ADA framework to Bush NSC policy formulation, the overarching finding of this case is that an unstructured decision procedure within
405 Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 88- 106, 112-139. 160 the NSC had direct causal implications to unsatisfactory policy outcomes.
Specifically, evaluation through the lens of the ADA framework revealed fundamental flaws in objectives, assumptions, and a lack of diligence in analyzing potential consequences. In short, Bush policy decisions in this case assumed excessive risk.
It is not melodramatic to assert that security policy decisions of this magnitude demanded a level of professional scrutiny and diligence commensurate with the value of the lives and national resources to be placed at risk. This fundamental requirement demanded the Bush NSC not only explain why their decision to invade was appropriate but also demanded a reasonable characterization of what constituted success. Reasonable focus on the conditions that represented success was likely to have driven further refinement of flawed objectives the military would struggle to achieve. On this point Clausewitz remains ever pertinent: “first, the supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its true nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”406
The Bush NSC did not meet this fundamental requirement and the resulting eighteen years of struggle in Afghanistan reflects the challenges of a compressed decision environment where the administration rushed to act ahead of prudent analysis. As a result, their formulation procedure did not result in a reasonable and acceptable decision tempered by consideration of what was feasible.
These flaws in Bush policy formulation provide insight into potential systemic challenges within the national security system to be considered in later cases. The
406 Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton University Press, 1976), 88. 161 compressed decision cycle under crisis conditions denied extensive use of the committee system which left critically important analysis of assumptions, consequences, and risk up to principals who did not exercise a great deal of intellectual effort on them. This failure points to another key element of the system which is the role of Congress in providing legal authority and approval of resources to implement the policy.
The Bush NSC’s analytical failures amplify the negative implications of both broad Executive branch latitude and weak Legislative branch actions to drive a more reasonable set of objectives. This lack of effective checks and balances between
Executive and Legislative branches is perhaps a reflection on the incompleteness of statutory requirements dictating Executive responsibilities to justify employment of military force. More specifically, this case reflects a lack of necessary legislative requirements on NSC responsibilities to develop specific decision criteria on which to base Congressional support. Absent legislative demands for key decision criteria clarifying objectives and the conditions that would indicate achievement of them, the
Executive branch was free to enter into conflict without critical important legal tethers on the ways and means by which it would be prosecuted.
The preceding findings indicate that the prescriptive ADA methodology was effective in this case to articulate the causal implications of the flaws and gaps in decision criteria in terms of their impact on the ways and means to achieve policy intent. However, where the ADA framework was useful in identifying the causal relationship of decision criteria to policy performance, it was not adequate to explain fully explain why these occurred.
162
Conclusions
The following conclusions are framed in terms of the preceding findings and their implications to the central question of this study. The ADA perspective enhanced understanding of the presidential decision-making procedure in this case and provided key insights into how this prescriptive perspective might add value to mainstream FPA approaches.
When viewed through the lens of the ADA methodology, the implications of a rushed, ad hoc decision procedure revealed significant and negative implications to policy performance resulting from an illogical order to, and omission of, key elements of analysis. Primary among these, the decision to invade before first identifying what invasion was to achieve demonstrated the pitfalls of “Alternative-focused thinking” rather than “Value-focused thinking.”407 Policy followed strategy and objectives were framed by what the president believed could be achieved militarily.
The prescriptive framework was useful to emphasize arguably the most significant factor contributing to policy failure which was ambiguous objectives and the assumptions underpinning them. Bush objectives were characterized by vague verbs like “disrupt, deny, defeat, and help” with no explanation of the conditions that would define successful achievement of each. These objectives did not fundamentally change during the administration’s tenure and eighteen years later the
U.S. persists in trying to achieve them.
Perhaps the most difficult objective to achieve among these was to defeat Al
Qaeda, particularly with such a small military force. The military pursued a focused campaign to kill or capture Al Qaeda operatives, but this was insufficient by itself. An
407 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking, A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), vii-viii. 163 effective campaign demanded a much broader and concerted effort requiring the focused application of other instruments of national power. Hart’s reminder on subordinating the military objective to the political one is particularly pertinent here:
“…the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily—that is practically— impossible."408 In this sense, the objectives to disrupt and deny Al Qaeda, though vague, were militarily achievable by a number of measures but defeating them was, to use Hart’s words “practically impossible.”409 Defeating Al Qaeda and “…every terrorist group of global reach” then demanded a broader political, legal, and financial strategy on a global scale to deny them material support and reduce the appeal of their ideology. The perpetual nature of this effort absent a clearly defined grand strategy and achievable end state conditions made identification of sustainable resourcing a veritable Gordian knot.
The preceding reference on the need for a broader strategy necessitates a brief discussion of the George W. Bush administration’s forwarding the GWOT as a grand strategy. Defining confrontation of terrorism as a global war implied that the conflict in Afghanistan, and later for Iraq, were subordinate elements of a ‘grand design’ where none was ever satisfactorily articulated.410 To emphasize the challenges in accurately defining grand strategy, the Bush administration articulated a policy not a strategy.411 Actions under a grand strategy imply the employment of all instruments of national power toward a unified goal where in this case predominantly military capabilities were employed. Further, the ambiguity of GWOT objectives were
408 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351. 409 Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, (Department of State Publications, 2016), 312, accessed 7 June 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016-State-Department- Country-Report-on-Terrorism.pdf. 410 Ibid, 2. 411 Hew Strachan, Annual Defence Lecture: War and strategy, (Chatham House, 2007), 2. 164 problematic in defining proportional means where a war of indeterminate scope and duration could not be effectively resourced. A more fundamental problem was the stated objective of the GWOT to ‘defeat’ terror. This unrealistic objective was “…to eliminate a means of fighting, not to achieve a political goal.”412
This study did not endeavor to evaluate decisions or actions taken in the case studies in terms of their implications to an incoherent notion of grand strategy.
Rather this research was distinctly focused on understanding how the policy formulation procedure was executed, employing a prescriptive framework to ascertain how it might be useful to focus further FPA on key decision elements with causal implications to policy performance.
With this in mind, application of the ADA methodology demonstrated its utility to answer the ‘what’ questions terms errors in analysis or omission of key decision criteria and characterization of their causal relationships to policy performance.
However, the methodology was not adequate to answer the ’why’ questions and explain the NSC’s failure to scrutinize the ambiguous nature of their objectives and the bold assumptions underpinning the Bush strategy. At the same time, the methodology was useful to focus attention on these key criteria where other analytical approaches are better suited to explain the collective thinking. An example of this is a need to understand why Rumsfeld ignored the implications of a small military force and failure to demand a significant increase in forces despite compelling requirements to do so.
The ADA framework also demonstrated its utility in illustrating the implications of the Bush NSC failure to consider jus post bellum obligations prior to invasion. The debate over who would perform security and stability operations well after the
412 Ibid, 2. 165 invasion was under way is revealing. Bush had repeatedly asserted that U.S. troops would not act as nation-builders or peacekeepers. This position reflected his firm stance during his presidential campaign and permeated his thinking in the planning for the invasion.413 The administration specifically constrained USCENTCOM from planning for these missions and Bush was firm that he wanted the UN to assume these roles.414 Unfortunately that dialogue was not undertaken with the UN until after the Taliban regime had fallen.
Bush’s change in intent after the military plan was implemented, compounded the challenges of a small military force and further impaired their ability to secure
Afghanistan post-combat operations.415 Bush later lamented such a small number of forces offering that it took “…several years” to recognize the initial force was too small.416 Further analysis by other methods is necessary to fully understand his change in intent on U.S. force roles as his doing so indicates he had given the consequences little forethought. Further analysis is also necessary to explain the lack of pressure from experienced NSC professionals like Powell to address it when the implications of a small force were known.
Changing objectives are indicative of the administration having acted quickly in a crisis where the NSC did not take the time to evaluate the likely consequences of their intended actions and the cost of this failure was significant. This incident highlights both the utility and the limitations of the prescriptive methodology. The
413 George W. Bush, Debate Transcript: The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000), accessed 23 June 2014, http://www.debates.org/?page=october-11- 2000-debate-transcriphttps://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-11-2000- debate-transcript/; Bush responded comments on the Somalia mission “…I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.” 414 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). 415 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), Staff planners observed the combined impact of this decision and the fact that OSD wanted USCENTCOM to retain forces for Iraq denied Afghanistan much needed forces. 416 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 207. 166
ADA methodology was useful to inform the ‘what’ questions in terms of identifying analytical flaws and their implications. But the methodology was not useful to address the ‘why’ questions and suggests a complementary relationship where descriptive frameworks might explain why the president and his NSC decided as they did. For example, Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is evident in this short planning cycle where the administration perceived the need to make rapid decisions to invade, without fully understanding the implications and consequences of their intended actions.417 Ellsberg’s notion of reasonableness in decision-making and the challenges in achieving it are also pertinent here. The imperative to decide reasonably, required understanding assumptions and their potential consequences but the president did not emphasize doing so.418
Failure to analyze assumptions is particularly surprising in the case of Donald
Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld’s reputation for demanding rigorous analysis of assumptions was well known. He frequently admonished that failure to “…examine assumptions on which a plan is based can start a planning process based on incorrect premises, and then proceed perfectly logically to incorrect conclusions.”419 Understanding that these were a point of analytical emphasis in general, for Rumsfeld, indicates there were other compelling factors influencing his acceptance of flawed U.S. policy objectives and accompanying assumptions on force sizing, particularly after the nation-building objective was added. The ADA methodology was not well suited to explain these factors. However, the ADA framework’s focus on these specific discontinuities and their implications again demonstrated its potential to focus mainstream FPA approaches on key factors influencing policy performance.
417 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organizations, (The Free Press, 4th Edition, 1997), 119. 418 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001), 155-156. 419 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2001), 429-430. 167
This particular instance also provides some insight into the applicability of
Allison’s Organizational Process Model on policy performance.420 Organizational power enabled an assertive personality in Doug Feith to negatively influence
USCENTCOM planning. Although the president insisted their mission did not include nation-building, military planners were well aware of their responsibility to plan for securing the peace after combat operations ceased, and they attempted to do so as a matter of policy.421 The ability of Feith to constrain their planning and for the OSD to dictate the force structure was key in risking failure of the president’s policy.
Failure of NSC principals to scrutinize the consequences of their objectives and assumptions did not relieve senior military leadership of the responsibility to do so. Interviews revealed senior military leaders understood their professional obligations to plan for post-combat security and stability operations. They instead deviated from their own doctrine that dictated they plan for contingencies, accepting
NSC and DOD guidance that others would execute these missions. Military leaders also understood the stated objective to defeat Al Qaeda was a broader mission beyond Afghanistan that required an international focus and truly integrated use of all elements of national power.422 In Afghanistan, this geographically focused and largely conventional military approach was only sufficient to damage Al Qaeda and the Taliban’s military formations such as they were. This forced USCENTCOM to pursue a strategy to achieve political objectives under a limited definition of ‘defeat.’
420 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. 421 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), USCENTCOM planners stated their clear understanding of post-combat security planning. They were very apprehensive at Feith’s forceful guidance not to include this mission in their planning. Their response to was to include security force troops later in their force flow and were directed to not to execute it in favor of retaining forces for other contingencies. 422 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018) Staff affirmed that they understood the military limitations in defeating a violent Jihadist ideology and so focused on planning regional campaigns around militarily achievable objectives. 168
Any attempt to measure policy effectiveness in Afghanistan is challenged by the poor security return on U.S. investment there when considered in terms of the vast number of resources expended. Perhaps the most glaring weakness in Bush administration decision making was their failure to recognize or acknowledge that their objectives required revision. Failure to do so led to nineteen years of extended conflict where in 2020 the Taliban continues to threaten the Afghan government, where Al Qaeda remains a threat, and where democratic institutions are undermined by corruption and lack of security. The outcome of the Bush decision to invade
Afghanistan may be reasonably characterized as strategic failure
From a broader security perspective, the decision to invade Afghanistan did not make the U.S. safer, nor has the global threat of terror been significantly reduced over nearly two decades of effort.423 The remarkable success of homeland security measures that have denied another attack on the scale of the 9/11 attacks obscures these facts. In fact, there are more extremist jihadist groups than ever launching attacks across the globe.424.
It we were to compare Bush NSC deliberations with that of other regulated government organizations, it is startling that the NSC did not exercise a degree of analytical rigor or attention to risk that nearly all other government decisions would have to in accordance with regulation or statute. In fact, it is reasonable to expect that the NSC would apply a level of analytical rigor commensurate with what any
423 Thomas Joscelyn, Fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda fights on, (The Long War Journal, 2016), accessed 11 September, 2016; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/fifteen-years- after-the-911-attacks-al-qaeda-fights- on.php?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2009-12- 16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief 424 Paul Miller, How Does Jihadism End? Choosing Between Forever War And Nation Building, (War on the Rocks , 2016), accessed 11 September 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/how-does- jihadism-end-choosing-between-forever-war-and-nation- building/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2009-12- 16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief. 169 medium size company would utilize to justify their expenditures. This lack of analytical rigor reinforces earlier observations on systemic issues within the national security system.
In evaluating this case, application of the prescriptive approach revealed both the merits of the ADA methodology and its limitations. The evidence suggests the
ADA methodology’s capacity to emphasize the causal implications of procedural challenges to policy performance serves to focus descriptive analysis on these key failures to understand why they occurred. For example, descriptive FPA perspectives are necessary to explain the various factors that allowed political, ideological, and emotional judgments to drive the president’s insistence on a democratic Afghanistan.
Further analysis is also necessary to understand how and why the NSC quickly simplified a complex challenge that was Al Qaeda’s global threat into a predominantly regional military response they could implement under a short timeline.
Along this descriptive line of thinking, prominent national security experts expressed strong sentiments on the administration’s response to the 9/11 attacks.
David Rothkopf characterized George W. Bush’s policy approach as inclined toward
“moral absolutes” that served as a “simplifying force, dividing the choices into right and wrong, black and white.”425 Rothkopf asserted this moral idealism obscured clear thinking and as a result the administration failed to fully consider the consequences in rushing to war.426 Former National Security Advisor, Brent
Scowcroft, also commented on Bush’s reliance on “absolutist beliefs,” asserting that they blurred rational thinking to a point that the desired policy ends justified the
425 David J. Rothkopf, Running the World, (PublicAffairs, 205), 397. 426 David J. Rothkopf, National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear, (PublicAffairs, 2014), 23. 170 means. He further observed that good policy decision making does not work in this fashion and every policy decision should be considered with “informed skepticism” and the potential ways a policy might fail.427
As observed earlier in this case study, these characterizations of Bush’s world view are readily described by Steinbruner’s Cognitive Processes model where, although Bush operated in conditions of significant uncertainty, his strong beliefs in the broad appeal of democratic freedoms led him to pursue a democratic
Afghanistan despite the risks involved. He made decisions about what he desired and did not alter them even when subsequent evidence contradicted them.
The preceding findings and conclusions point to the utility of an ADA methodology to focus attention on deviations from our conceptions of rational choices and their implications to both implementation and outcomes. This represents a valuable capability by which to focus descriptive methods on critical elements of the policy decision to explain why they occurred. In this way this case study suggests the utility of a prescriptive approach to bridge the gap between normative and descriptive theories and its potential to enhance the FPA body of knowledge.
Although the intent of this research is to compare multiple decision procedures from a common analytical framework, this model will first be applied to a second decision case from the same administration to further identify patterns in their analytical approach and reinforce findings. Doing so will provide insights into the validity of the ADA approach in terms of its utility to FPA.
427 Ibid, 398. Scowcroft made these comments in a 2004 interview with Rothkopf where he expressed concern over what he considers Bush’s absolutist view that it is a moral obligation to export democracy while at the same time pointing out the paradox of espousing a policy of absolutes while also practicing pragmatic relations with autocrats. 171
Chapter VI
2003 Invasion of Iraq
The 9/11 attacks served to amplify the Bush administration’s focus on potential threats beyond Al Qaeda. Although the war in Afghanistan was only weeks old, the president directed military planning for a potential invasion of Iraq. The administration’s stated concern in Iraq was the prospect of terrorists gaining access to Iraqi WMD.428 Intelligence indicated that known terrorists were operating inside
Northern Iraq, and uncertainty with regard to Saddam Hussein’s relationship with them was forwarded as a contributing factor in the administration’s urgency to act.429
Direction from the president in November 2001 created pressure for
USCENTCOM staff to develop plans quickly.430 Military planners were focused on the early stages of the Afghanistan war when they suddenly had to consider the prospect they could be directed to execute an invasion of Iraq as early as spring
2002.431
The manner in which George Bush and his NSC considered the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is evaluated here to understand the degree to which their decision analysis procedure represented a causal factor in the unsatisfying policy outcomes. Analysis of a second case from the Bush administration enabled comparison and contrast between their decision-making procedure for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This comparison was useful to establish patterns and trends
428 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 224-225. 429 Ibid. 430 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinal, 2011), 427. 431 U.S. Central Command Staff Officers, (Telephone Interview, 2018) Staffers affirmed USCENTCOM planning began in late November 2001 at SECDEF direction and both operated under the understanding that they could be tasked to execute an invasion in spring 2002. The plan evolved over the following year but the initial planning was done under the pressure of time while the staff was also managing an ongoing campaign in Afghanistan whose outcome was not yet assured. 172 in their procedure and to further validate the utility of the prescriptive ADA methodology to FPA.
Decision Criteria Specific to Key Considerations: Security Policy Analysis: Define the Policy Issue - Did the President clerly articulate what was at stake to the nation? (Interests at Stake) - Did procedure consider the priority of the threat in context of competing interests?
- What were the key disagreements? How were they adjudicated? (Understand the Decision Environment) - What were laws, organizations and institutions, policies, strategies, and treaties that influenced policy development? - What were key motivations influencing actions and reactions (such as strategic culture, cultural identity, political or ideological culture, resilience)? (Key Stakeholders Foreign and Domestic) - To what extent did staffs consider foreign and domestic stakeholders, audiences, and policy communities who have influence in the scope and nature of the policy decision?
Develop Objectives - What was the President's guidance, intent?
(Policy Objectives) - How were policy objectives developed and were desired end state conditions defined?
(Key Assumptions) - Did the NSC analyze key assumptions, stated and unstated, and factors shaping policy objectives?
(Define End State Conditions & - Did the NSC define how policy success/failure would be evaluated? Measures of Policy Success)
Develop Policy Options - Did NSC consider a range of options that may satisfy the policy objectives?
Analyze Options - How were policy options analyzed and validated?
(Identify Both Expected and Potential - How were consequences assessed and risk articulated? Consequences)
(Identify Key Uncertainties) - What uncertainties exist adding risk to the decision? - How were policy options compared and contrasted by the President?
The President's Decision - What were the trade-offs and deciding factors in the President's decision? Criteria - How effectively was the policy decision communicated to key audiences/stakeholders? - How did the President assess policy effectiveness and whether adjustment was required?
Figure 1.
As is typical with any policy decision, there are competing narratives on the reasons the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq and the necessity of doing so.432 Some offered arguments of manipulated intelligence and public opinion.433
Some critics asserted that diplomatic avenues and inspections were not
432 David Ray Griffin, Neocon Imperialism, 9/11, and the Attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, (Information Clearing House, 2007), 1. Griffin offers a popular argument that events of 9/11 merely enabled the neo-conservative agenda of global hegemony. 433 Admiral Mike McConnell, Interview of Mr. Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence With Mr. Tim Russert, NBC’s Meet the Press, (National Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). Accessed 28 June 2015, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20070722_interview .pd. 173 exhausted.434 Even some inside the administration asserted that there was no formal
NSC debate on the decision to invade, and that no viable alternatives to war were ever considered.435 Regardless of the veracity of these narratives, the administration confidently drove forward planning for Iraq with the same ad hoc decision procedure used in Afghanistan, where the major implications of their flawed decisions had not yet fully manifested themselves.
Unlike the immediate post-9/11 crisis environment, the administration enjoyed a luxury of time to deliberate on what to do about Saddam Hussein. Where the compressed decision procedure for Afghanistan was NSC principal-centric, Iraq represented an opportunity where the committee process could potentially play a more structured and productive analytical role. The NSC likewise had ample time to deliberate and develop multiple policy options for the president. This would not prove to be the case.
The president had directed military planning begin in 2001, and the administration began to informally make their public case for confronting Saddam
Hussein in 2002 in various news conferences and speeches.436 They intensified their case to the public through the autumn with the president addressing both the U.N and the nation.437
434 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon and Schuster, 2009), 227-228. 435 Ibid; George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007), 459-461; Richard Armitage, Prism Volume 1, number 1: An Interview with Richard L. Armitage, (Journal of the National Defense University, 2009 ), 104. 436 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Volume 38, Issue 34, Administration of George W. Bush, (U.S. Presidential Library, 2002), 1393-4; Elizabeth Bumiller and James Dao, Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack, (New York Times, 27 August 2002), A1. 437 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Volume 38, Issue 34, Administration of George W. Bush, (U.S. Presidential Library, 2002), 1532. 174
Members of the administration pointed to intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs at the time as validation of their intent.438 They argued that this intelligence, and
Saddam’s history of evading the requirements of U.N resolutions left the president with no acceptable alternatives to invasion unless Saddam agreed to leave Iraq.439
They also argued that their decisions were consistent with U.S. policy as regime change was the existing policy of the United States when George W. Bush entered office.440
The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate reinforced administration perceptions on Iraq’s WMD programs.441 More specifically, a lack of evidence that they were satisfactorily dismantled further fueled concern.442 Saddam’s public response applauding the 9/11 attacks and his belligerence in denying international inspections reinforced perceptions he was hiding his programs.
These were key factors in fanning the administration’s worst fears about the potential that terrorists could gain access to WMD, and their patience in dealing with
Saddam through international institutions evaporated. Jervis’s observations on the manner in which decision-makers’ perceptions of the world and other actors influence their decisions before they have considered the problem fully are evident here. Bush’s perceptions of the Iraqi threat were reinforced by the NIE, and
Saddam’s statements further hardened his resolve to address the threat by force ahead of formal NSC deliberation.443
438 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002). 439 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 214-218. 440 Ibid, 196-197; House Resolution 4655, Iraq Liberation Act, (Government Printing Office, 1998), 2. 441 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002). 442 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 227-228. 443 Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976), 28-29. 175
The confluence of post-9/11 emotion; frustration with Saddam Hussein’s unwillingness to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR); the prospect of hidden Iraqi WMD capabilities; and the continued urgency to respond to terrorist threats, drove the administration to develop a plan to coerce Iraqi compliance. In the event compliance could not be coerced, the administration resolved to compel compliance through invasion.
Incentive to act on Iraq may also be attributed in some measure to George
Bush’s belief that the spread of democratic ideals was both a desirable and a necessary alternative to repressive ideologies in the Middle East, and that US security would be bolstered by such a spread. The perceived threat from Iraq presented a second opportunity to test his belief.444 Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” expanded over the course of his presidency, but he clearly held this belief upon entering office. Prominent members of his cabinet, including Condoleezza Rice, echoed both this perspective, and that Iraq represented an opportunity to advance this agenda.445
Bush’s Freedom Agenda represents a situation Steiner described where a decision maker maintains strong beliefs and acts on them despite the risks involved.
As a result, they make decisions about what they desire or what might be attainable and do not alter them even when subsequent evidence contradicts them.446 The president’s decision making on Iraq was biased in this way and this belief influenced
NSC deliberations from the start.
444 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 397-398. 445 Condoleezza Rice, Transforming the Middle East, (Washington Post, 2003), accessed 6 June 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/08/07/transforming-the-middle- east/2a267aac-4136-45ad-972f-106ac91e5acd/?utm_term=.cb88429e6cbe 446 Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 88- 106, 112-139. 176
George Bush intended to deal with Iraq very differently than his immediate predecessor. The Clinton administration approach to Saddam Hussein had been to pursue options governed by the rule of international law and inspections.447 9/11 altered administration perspectives and potential threats were viewed in a new light.
Bush had indicated he would not allow what he viewed as unacceptably dangerous threats by regimes with WMD to go unaddressed.448 This policy approach meant acting before threats manifested themselves.
What the Bush administration framed as a pre-emptive policy may be viewed as a preventive approach characterized in terms of wars of choice versus those of necessity. It is necessary to define pre-emption versus prevention as there is a clear and significant difference between them. Colin Gray described Preemptive war where: “Preemption is not controversial; legally, morally, or strategically. To preempt means to strike first (or attempt to do so) in the face of an attack that is either already underway or is very credibly imminent. The decision for war has been taken by the enemy.”449 Preemptive war is justified by international law under circumstances codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter.450
The administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy in essence expanded
Gray’s definition of preemption to include actions better defined as preventive war.451
447 Martin Indyk, The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East, (The Washington Institute, 1993), accessed August 2016, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-clinton- administrations-approach-to-the-middle-east. Indyk served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs during the Clinton Administration where he authored the U.S. policy of dual containment with regard to Iraq and Iran. 448 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), 131-133. 449 Colin Gray, The Implications of Preemptive And Preventive War Doctrines: a Reconsideration, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), V. 450 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII: Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51. Access 21 June 2016, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un- charter/chapter-vii/index.html. 451 George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (The White House, 2002), 14. 177
Gray’s definition of preventive war is also useful here to describe a significant distinction that is: “a war of discretion. It differs from preemptive war both in its timing and in its motivation. The preemptor has no choice other than to strike back rapidly;
The preventor, however, chooses to wage war, at least to launch military action, because of its fears for the future should it fail to act now.”452 This definition accurately describes elements of what came to be known as the “Bush Doctrine” first articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy, and was further refined in the
2006 document. The Bush approach set off a heated debate among foreign policy experts on its controversial and aggressive shift away from a tradition of employing force as a last resort.453
Returning to an earlier point, although the administration asserted that the
Iraqi threat was compelling and the president would not delay action, they operated on a timetable of their choosing. They deliberated over a period of sixteen months before acting.
When the national security system works as intended, the president and NSC principals first define their policy intent in terms of threats to interests, and then empower a deliberate committee process to develop objectives, options and provide well analyzed policy recommendations. In this process the Principal’s Committee would typically empower the Deputies Committee to explore all options, to drive a detailed analysis and to pose recommendations in due time. This fit with the president’s stated intent for his committee process where the Deputies Committee
452 Colin Gray, The Implications of Preemptive And Preventive War Doctrines: a Reconsideration, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), V. 453 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon and Schuster, 2009), 213. 178 was to “prescribe and review” the work of the interagency and to ensure that issues brought to the Principals had been properly analyzed and prepared for decision.”454
Define the Policy Issue
Analysis of the Bush decision to invade Iraq begins with how they defined the problem of Saddam Hussein, their belief that he was hiding WMD, and their uncertainty about his relationship with terrorist organizations. Definition of the problem is a key point of focus in a prescriptive decision methodology, as accurate characterization of the threat in terms of interests and the immediacy of addressing it, is the crux of forming sound policy. It is this careful, focused statement of the issue that will drive development of policy objectives, the implementing strategies, and the allocation of resources to achieve them.455
Some critics have argued that members of the Bush administration entered office with designs on dealing forcefully with the Saddam Hussein regime, and so were predisposed to invade Iraq.456 This may well be true for some members, however, when considered in terms of the available facts, an unbiased analysis in terms of decision criteria reflects a more nuanced set of circumstances driving
Bush’s decision-making.
Iraqi WMD had been an ongoing international security challenge. Credible intelligence sources underpinned the administration’s understanding that Saddam
454 George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 1: Organization of the National Security Council System, (The White House, 2001), 4. 455 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 3-4. Keeney, a notable Decision Scientist and Operations Research Analyst authored a Systems Analysis approach to complex decision-making that is widely used in business, finance, industry and the military. Keeney has a long successful history of practical experience in helping companies in addressing complex problems. 456 John Prados, Reframing the Iraq War, (The Huffington Post, 2004), accessed 9 October 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-prados/post_997_b_749773.html. 179
Hussein had retained some WMD capability and was developing more.457 His behavior over a ten-year period had demonstrated he would not willingly comply with
UNSCRs to disclose and destroy any WMD capabilities. This perception and fear that terrorists could obtain Iraqi WMD material, led the president and his staff to shape U.S. government policy toward direct military intervention.458
When Saddam ejected inspectors in 1998, the Clinton administration adopted a policy of regime change with the Iraq Liberation Act, but did not find a compelling rationale to commit to major military action over Iraqi non-compliance.459 The Clinton administration approach largely limited executive actions to support of opposition organization efforts to achieve regime change. Uncertainty in the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks clearly hardened Bush’s resolve to approach Iraq more forcefully.
Though the veracity of some analysis underpinning the findings of the 2002
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) have been criticized, it is a matter of record that multiple intelligence estimates composing the document asserted Saddam Hussein was reconstituting WMD capabilities, and he did nothing credible to deny their assertions.460 UN inspections had verified that Iraqi intellectual capabilities and dual use facilities remained intact that could be readily converted to WMD production.
Lead Inspector Hans Blix, also disputed Iraq’s December 2002 declaration to the UN
Security Council as inaccurate with regard to unaccounted for chemical and biological weapons materials.461
457 National Intelligence Estimate 2002: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, (National Intelligence Council, 2002), 6. 458 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 229-233. 459 Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, (Congressional Research Service, 2002), 6. 460 National Intelligence Estimate 2002: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, (National Intelligence Council, 2002), 6. 461 Hans Blix, The Security Council, 27 January 2003: An Update on Inspection, (UNMOVIC, 2003), accessed 11 July 2016, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_council_briefings.asp#5. 180
These concerns and the accompanying sense of national fear over further attacks, engendered a political environment where even Congressional skeptics of direct action felt compelled to empower the administration to do so. When voting on a House Joint Resolution authorizing the use of military force, a majority of
Democrats who might typically oppose a Republican president voted for the resolution.462
We now know that the Iraq Survey Group spent considerable time investigating after the invasion and, while chemical munitions were found, the investigation determined Iraq had no new WMD facilities or capabilities.463 However, it is important to consider George Bush’s decisions from his perspective, based on what the intelligence experts and members of his NSC were telling him at the time. It is also important to consider the post 9/11 environment and consider the uncertain conditions that influenced the president.
Interests at Stake
A key element of defining a threat to the nation was to articulate why it matters, and the potential consequences of failing to address it. Morgenthau described interests as “the perennial standard by which political action must be judged.”464 While Morgenthau explored interests from a number of perspectives from
462 U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress - 2nd Session, House Joint Resolution 114 (107th): Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, (Washington, 2002), accessed 13 November,2016, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2 &vote=00237#top. 29 of 50 Democrats voted for the resolution. 463 Report of the Activities of the Committee on Armed Services for the One Hundred Ninth Congress, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), Then Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, United States Army, testified chemical munitions had been found in Iraq containing mustard and Sarin nerve agent. He characterized these chemical weapons capable of causing mass casualties. David Kay, Chief Weapons Inspector and the first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Iraq Survey Group, noted that these munitions were produced pre-1991. 464 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, (Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 10. 181 individuals to states, the national interest is a commonly stated basis politicians use to justify their actions. As discussed in chapter IV, not all interests merit the same emphasis, and it was incumbent on the NSC to consider Saddam Hussein in context with other security interests. Doing so would provide perspective to the immediacy and priority of the threat.
President Bush argued that the combined threats of Saddam Hussein’s known support for terrorists, and his possession of and capacity to produce WMD, as well as his past use of them, represented a compelling danger to both the U.S. and international security to be confronted.465 The president was clear that he would "... not wait on events, while dangers gather," and his administration would ensure that neither Iraq, nor any other potential threat, could pose a WMD threat to U.S. national security.466 Bush’s characterization implies that the administration considered the
Iraqi threat in context with other interests and applied “…prudent judgments as to the acceptable costs and risks pursuing them.”467
This firm characterization of the threat appeared to make invasion the default course of action, as Saddam’s pattern of behavior was unlikely to change. Honest consideration of any viable alternatives to invasion depended upon the assertive influence of NSC principals, most of who held similar perspectives to the president’s.
Critics have asserted the Bush Freedom Agenda was again a key motivator for direct military action in Iraq. David Rothkopf asserted bias and out-sized influence on the part of “transformationalists” in the administration in justifying the Iraqi threat.
465 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 251-252. 466 George W. Bush, The President's State of the Union Address, (The White House, 2002). Accessed June 21 2015, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129- 11.html. 467 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press 1993), xxiv. 182
468 He asserted that Cheney and Rumsfeld held transformative agendas and possessed disproportionate weight that largely drove NSC recommendations. This perspective asserted the administration was pre-disposed to see invasion of Iraq as a transformational moment, and their preventive policy was a contrived over- statement of Saddam’s WMD threat to suit their agenda. Rothkopf’s characterization is not quite accurate.
Donald Rumsfeld was focused on military transformation and could hardly be characterized in the same category as Bush, Cheney, Rice, Wolfowitz and Feith, whose idealistic notions of spreading democratic values, clearly influenced their thinking. Rumsfeld expressed clear reservations on what could be achieved in Iraq and argued against an occupation.469 It is also not quite accurate to characterize the
Bush perspective on the Iraqi threat in purely transformational terms.
If one objectively considers the intelligence and UN inspection assessments at the time, Saddam Hussein retained a WMD capability, and even if all had been successfully destroyed, Iraq maintained the intellectual and physical capabilities to resume production.470 Saddam’s WMD capabilities were only part of the administration’s concern. Intelligence linking Saddam Hussein to terrorist elements and the potential that he could provide them with WMD material was a major concern Bush could hardly ignore.471 This coupled with administration belief that the terrorist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi was operating a chemical and biological weapons lab in northeastern Iraq amplified their concern.
468 David Rothkopf, Running the World, (PublicAffairs, 2005), 408. 469 NSC Staff (Interview, 2017), Staff recall Rumsfeld’s vocal reservations with regard to occupying Iraq and he argued for a rapid transition back to Iraqi control; Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinal, 2011), 483. Rumsfeld recalled expressing his reservations to the president. 470 National Intelligence Estimate 2002: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, (National Intelligence Council, 2002), 6. 471 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 224-225. 183
President Bush referred to intelligence indicating that Al-Zarqawi was attempting to smuggle WMD material into the U.S. or Europe. This made the lack of certainty over Saddam’s capabilities all the more compelling to him.472 While Al-
Zarqawi was based in Northern Iraq and would later become the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, intelligence linking Al-Qaeda to Saddam was later found to be suspect.
Nevertheless, the president was obligated to consider it in his assessment of the issue and risk at the time.
In light of these apparent threats, George Bush perceived Saddam Hussein’s lack of cooperation and unwillingness to disclose capabilities as him having something to hide, and this reinforced his fears.473 The intelligence on Al-Zarqawi would seem to lend some credibility to the president’s position. However, it was incumbent upon the administration to prudently discern the immediacy of the threat.
Neuchterlein's hierarchy of interests is again helpful here to characterize Saddam’s threat in context with competing interests.474
Recall that a vital interest represents a clear danger “where probable serious harm to the security and well-being of the nation will result if strong measures, including military ones, are not taken by the government within a short period of time.” A major interest represents a somewhat less immediate threat where “the political, economic, and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment which thus require corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats.475
472 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 236. 473 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 253. 474 The Concept of `National Interest': A Time for New Approaches (Donald E. Nuechterlein), 1979, Orbis, 23, 76. 475 Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: U.S. National Interests in the 1980s, (University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 9. 184
Emphasizing the difference between administration perspectives, the Clinton administration had focused on resumed inspections and continued sanctions, even though the existing U.S. policy was regime change. These actions were reflective of their view of Saddam Hussein as a threat to a major interest. While nothing significant had changed in terms of the threat, the 9/11 attacks and new intelligence on Al-Zarqawi compelled George Bush to resolve that Saddam now represented a threat to vital U.S. interests.
Despite his characterization of the threat as a compelling one, it is noteworthy that Bush resisted attacking the site where intelligence sources placed Al-Zarqawi prior to the invasion for a number of reasons. His NSC advised him that any potential coalition supporting an invasion could be adversely impacted if he did so unilaterally.476 Stopping terrorists who might possess a chemical or biological capability was Bush’s stated security imperative. George Bush’s willingness to wait undermines his own argument on the urgency of the threat and his assertions he would not wait for threats to develop.
Understand the Decision Environment
A prescriptive approach to good decision making emphasizes understanding the problem fully before identifying objectives and desired outcomes. This seems a rather simplistic notion but understanding linked decisions and how other actors will be impacted and react, is integral to a risk-informed decision. More specifically, understanding actors who possess the ability to influence success or failure, and discerning their relative importance to success represents a policy imperative.
476 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 237. 185
Understanding how the administration evaluated the competing interests and factors that would directly influence policy implementation, provides essential context that is key to understanding the decisions that resulted. The number of actors and factors that could potentially influence policy outcomes make addressing all of them unreasonable. So the decision maker must identify those key to success or failure and will invariably have to make some difficult choices to maintain their core objectives. This understanding is the product of a deliberate effort to frame the circumstances accurately, and reexamination of problem definition as analysis proceeds. Doing so is critically important to evolve perceptions and judgments, and to either validate or invalidate assumptions.477
It is pertinent to again consider that the war in Afghanistan was only weeks old when planning for Iraq began. The timing of this is relevant in that the adverse implications of policy decisions in Afghanistan were not yet realized.478 In fact, the implications of policy errors in Afghanistan were not yet fully realized when the invasion of Iraq began sixteen months later. Members of the NSC perceived the apparent success of the military plan for Afghanistan was a product of their good policy planning, engendering a false sense of confidence in their policy procedure.479
While there was ample time for deliberate committee analysis of policy objectives and options, members of the administration have asserted there was no formal debate on the actual decision to invade Iraq. George Tenet recalled the existing U.S. policy was regime change when the new administration took charge,
477 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, (Science, Vol. 211, 1981), 453. 478 U.S. Central Command Staff Officers, (Telephone Interview, 2018) Staffers affirmed Donald Rumsfeld’s time line and that USCENTCOM planning for invasion began in late November 2001. 479 Ibid, USCENTCOM staff described OSD staff confidence in what appeared to be a wildly successful policy approach in Afghanistan and were adamant that USCENTCOM planners leverage the same light but lethal military concept for Iraq. 186 and they immediately began considering ways to achieve that end early in 2001.480
He also asserted “There never was a serious debate that I know of within the administration about the imminence of the Iraqi threat.”481 This is an interesting assertion in that Tenet was responsible for characterizing the threat and had ample opportunity to do so. In fact, his agency played a central role informing the 2002 NIE that provided the intelligence underpinnings of the threat.
Nevertheless, invasion was the first option the president considered and was the default option within the administration, yet they had not identified what an invasion was to achieve.482 Once again, policy was following strategy. From a prescriptive perspective, this single decision represents a significant departure from a logical, orderly procedure that had far reaching implications for subsequent policy formulation. The balance of the sixteen months from November 2001 to March 2003 was spent building the case to domestic and international audiences.
Somewhat of an outlier among a group of largely like-minded members, Colin
Powell had argued for exhausting diplomatic efforts through the UN. In doing so he at least ensured an alternative to invasion was in play. He further argued that if
Saddam did not acquiesce, a new resolution would give legal footing to U.S. policy.483
The president eventually signed on to Powell’s approach, but skeptical NSC perspectives played out in public. Cheney argued in a speech to the Veterans of
Foreign Wars that another inspection agreement would not assure Iraqi compliance,
480 George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007), 459-461. 481 George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007), 305, 308. 482 Ibid, 469. 483 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2009), 211-212. 187 and regime change was the only viable option remaining to deal effectively with
Iraq.484 Cheney and Rumsfeld were openly skeptical that even if Saddam agreed to resume inspections, doing so would only delay action while a threat grew.485,486 This skeptical approach also permeated the committee process where OSD representatives championed invasion as the only option.487
This dynamic reinforces observations that an engaged decision maker undermines aspects of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model. Houghton observed that in cases like this, Allison’s model is more appropriate to describe policy implementation, where bureaucrats exercise significant influence in how policy is carried out, and where presidents have limited ability to control them.488 Despite persistent arguments from Cheney and Rumsfeld, Bush eventually called for a new resolution in a September 2002 speech to the UN, having acquiesced to forceful arguments from both Powell and British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
Meanwhile, military planners welcomed the extended diplomatic effort as it bought them planning time and the potential for a solution that would avoid having to send troops into simultaneous conflicts.489 The existing campaign plans for Iraq required significant revisions and this forced the USCENTCOM staff into a situation
484 Dick Cheney, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention: Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, (The White House, 2002), accessed 13 November 2016, https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html.. 485 Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir, (Threshold Editions, 2011), 390-391. 486 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinal, 2011), 440-442. 487 National Council Security Staff, (Interview, 2017). 488 Houghton, David P., The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 32-34. 489 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018) Staff members recalled the hope they maintained that diplomatic efforts would obviate the necessity for an invasion as the scope of the revisions to Operations Plan 1003 developed in 1998 were extensive to consider modern capabilities and intent for fewer but more capable forces. Theses revisions became Operations Plan 1003V. 188 of planning a second campaign, while also managing the ongoing execution of
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
As the diplomatic push for resumed inspections progressed, the administration continued to build their case for invasion primarily based on a variety of intelligence data. Senator Bob Graham, then the Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, questioned the administration's case on the threat.
Graham asserted that the administration failed to show a compelling link between
Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 terrorists. Absent a clear link, he did not perceive a compelling threat to the homeland.490 Graham expressed concern about the administration's evolving definition of the war on terror to include those states that
"...might have the ability to provide weapons of mass destruction, even if they themselves are not engaged in terrorist activities or providing sanctuary."491 Graham then demanded a National Intelligence Estimate when the administration did not do so.
An NIE is a composite assessment from all U.S. intelligence sources. Graham indicated that the resulting NIE drove him to vote against authorizing the president to go to war. He argued the administration’s case reflected faulty or unverified intelligence, and his position was reinforced by strong dissent from the Departments of State and Energy on specific areas critical to verify the threat.492 Graham’s concern was that the administration had contrived the threat of Iraq as a clear and compelling threat to meet their needs.493 In this sense he was clearly concerned
490Bob Graham, What I Knew Before the Invasion, (Washington Post, 2005), accessed May 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802397.html. 491 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), 194. 492 Bob Graham, What I Knew Before the Invasion, (Washington Post, 2005), accessed May 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802397.html. 493 Ibid. 189 about administration confirmation-bias regarding Saddam Hussein and that their analysis of the Iraqi threat conformed to preexisting beliefs.494
It is the nature in which pre-war intelligence was developed and presented to the president, the NSC, and the world that provides revealing insights into Graham’s concerns. It likewise reflects the implications of a large bureaucracy where span of control is a challenge, and where organizational processes can exercise significant influence on policy formulation.495
The OSD played a central role in intelligence assessments and judgments in this case, which is decidedly not their function. The mission of the OSD is specifically focused on civilian oversight of the U.S. military.496 However, the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) invested significant effort in reviewing and summarizing intelligence data to support policy recommendations.
The specific mission of the OUSDP is “to provide responsive, forward- thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Defense, in alignment with national security objectives.”497 While use of intelligence data is integral to this function and underpins policy, OSD is not a part of the Intelligence Community nor does their expertise include intelligence analysis.
Doug Feith was the force behind this effort and characterized the work of the
Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), as reviewing existing data and summarizing it in order to inform and shape policy.498 This characterization sounds
494 Ibid. 495 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 699. 496 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mission Statement, (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), accessed June 23 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/About/Office-of-the-Secretary-of-Defense/. 497 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mission Statement, (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), accessed June 23 2018, https://policy.defense.gov/. 498 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 116-118. 190 reasonable enough except the product of OUSDP analysis was to draw more certain findings and judgments than had Intelligence Community (IC) analysts.499 These findings and judgments inflated the links between Saddam and Al Qaeda, falsely reinforcing both the president’s and NSC member’s perception of the threat.500
One might reasonably assert that intelligence judgments coming from the
DOD to the president and NSC should have required corroboration from the IC.
NSS members indicate that there was no reason at the time to question these analytical judgments, as they referenced appropriate intelligence sources and data.
501 It is also noteworthy that the CIA did not contradict them or offer any caveats at the time.502 In fact, these findings were largely complimented by the CIA in their
January 2003 report on “Iraqi Support to Terrorism.”503 In this way Doug Feith acted beyond organizational authorities and constraints to directly impact policy. This illustrates elements of DOD’s bureaucratic power and the limitations of presidential control over organizational processes.504
OSD findings and judgments on intelligence did not go uncontested.
Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski was a staff officer in the OUSDP’s Office of
Special Plans (OSP) and was a vocal critic of the work. She authored anonymous articles while serving in OSP that were sharply critical of their questionable use of intelligence. She asserted that leadership selectively ignored intelligence that did not support their narrative and chose data that supported their case for invasion.505 If
499 Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S Senate, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Pre- War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, (U.S. Senate, 2004), 287-288. 500 Ibid, 304-314. 501 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017), 502 Ibid. NSS staff recollection is that the CIA did not contradict them or offer any caveats and so the NSS reasonably assumed they were IC products. 503 Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S Senate, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Pre- War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, (U.S. Senate, 2004), 286. 504 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 699-709. 505 Marc Cooper, Soldier for the Truth, (LA Weekly, 2004), Accessed June 2016, Cooper interviewed 191 there was not sufficient reason to question OSD analysis prior to these articles, there certainly was reason to investigate them after. NSC staff did not offer a reasonable rationale for why the NSC did not.506
The implications of contrived intelligence judgments are that these formed the basis of Colin Powell’s February 2003 briefing to the United Nations Security
Council.507 This is not a minor oversight of procedure nor an inconsequential flaw of analysis. Rather this reinforces emphasis on both the NSA’s lack of control over the decision procedure, and Rumsfeld’s apparent lack of control over his organization’s staff work that had significant implications. This instance again illustrates the ability of strong personalities to leverage organizational authority to the detriment of policy legitimacy.508
Beyond Senator Graham’s dissent over intelligence links, a number of other experts also disagreed with the president’s view of an Iraqi threat as imminent and vital.509 The president’s policy intent met with vocal criticism outside the administration and apprehension from within.
Former NSA Brent Scowcroft published a blunt Op-Ed article in August 2002, arguing that attacking Iraq was unnecessary and a distraction from focus on terror.510
Inside the administration Richard Haass, then Director of Policy Planning at the
Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski on her experience in OSP and her anonymous articles “Insider Notes From the Pentagon.” https://www.laweekly.com/news/soldier-for-the-truth-2137791. 506 NSC Staff, (Interview, 2017). One staffer again asserted that since CIA did not question them, the NSC staff did not. This same staffer acknowledged they were not in position to know if NSC Principals sought clarification from OSD. 507 Colin L. Powell, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, (U.S. Department of State, 2003), accessed June 2016, https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm. 508 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. Allison does not necessarily account for strong personalities within government organizations whose actions and influences can have significant impact on policy despite the authority of the leader of the organization, in this case Donald Rumsfeld. 509 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2009), 233-246. 510 Brent Scowcroft, Don’t Attack Saddam, (Wall Street Journal, 2002), accessed June 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1029371773228069195. 192
Department of State, asserted that this policy was appropriate for Afghanistan where attacks on the U.S. originated, but not for Iraq which he referred to as a “war of choice.”511 He asserted that he argued this with both Condoleezza Rice and through
Colin Powell, that pushing for renewed inspections and containing Saddam was an appropriate alternative to war in Iraq.512 Haass noted that these arguments were largely too late as Rice told him in July 2002 that the president had already decided to invade.513 It is noteworthy that Rice’s revelation to Haass occurred ahead of the
September 2002 Iraqi agreement to resumed inspections. This insight also reflects that the continued debate on Iraq was not about whether to invade, but in how it would be done.
Senior military officers also voiced skepticism, although most did so anonymously. Tom Ricks, a Washington Post reporter at the time, ran a story in July
2002 citing unnamed sources in the Pentagon who asserted senior military leadership were largely against an invasion.514 Military leaders enjoyed a great deal of credibility among Americans at the time, and their dissension created a degree of pressure on the administration to defend the legitimacy of their policy intent. This debate was another factor persuading the president to pursue a new UNSCR, and with it a measure of legitimacy by demonstrating the U.S. was responsibly pursuing an alternative to war.515
511 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2009), 11. 512 Ibid, 211-212. 513 Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2009), 213. 514 Thomas Ricks, Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed: Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals' Conventional Views, (Washington Post, 2002), accessed 12 July 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/10/AR2006071000574_pf.html. 515 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 238-239. 193
Meanwhile, members of the administration asserted there were no alternatives to invasion argued within the NSC.516 Richard Armitage, Deputy
Secretary of State, observed that the president never held a formal debate on whether to invade or not.517 George Tenet and Richard Hass echoed Armitage’s assertion on the lack of debate.518
These assertions appear a bit hollow, particularly in Tenet’s case. Had Tenet raised the issue to the president in his daily intelligence briefing and was not convincing, he could also have ensured it was brought up for debate within the NSC.
He later acknowledged the obligation to have done so.519 Similarly Colin Powell could have forced the debate. NSC staff acknowledge Powell’s consistent push for a diplomatic track and pursuit of UN agreement, but they did not recall any instance where the Secretary forcefully argued against invasion. They rather assert that his role in the debate centered on the need for legitimacy, and an overwhelming use of force if invasion was warranted.520
These collective insights reinforce assertions of groupthink and confirmation bias within the NSC.521 This dynamic appears very similar to Janis’ description of the
Kennedy NSC during the Bay of Pigs. Janis viewed Kennedy’s NSC as full of intelligent advisors who failed to follow a disciplined decision procedure, accepting a flawed plan from the CIA without criticism. This description also fits the Bush NSC
516 John Prados and Christopher Ames, The National Security Archive: The Iraq War -- Part II: Was There Even a Decision? (George Washington University, 2010), accessed 9 October 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/index.htm.. 517 Richard Armitage, Prism Volume 1, number 1: An Interview with Richard L. Armitage, (Journal of the National Defense University, 2009 ), 104. 518 George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007), 305, 308; Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon and Schuster, 2009), 227-228. 519 George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007), 469. 520 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 521 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Wadsworth, 1982), 262-271. 194 who similarly failed to debate fundamental questions, failed to question assumptions, and who set aside critical information in accepting flawed intelligence judgments.522
There was another dynamic at play here where the president’s beliefs, leadership style and personality constrained the behavior of individuals involved in a group decision procedure. This served to privilege some members over others.523
Both NSS members and Richard Haass observed that Cheney and Rumsfeld were able to readily assert that their views complemented the president’s, while Powell had to overcome dissent from the Vice President, NSA, and SECDEF.524
Reemphasizing an earlier point, debate among experienced professionals was undoubtedly important, however debate does not equate to deliberate analysis and development of fundamental decision criteria. There was ample time for extended analysis to underpin debate, but this relied on an honest broker to impose discipline on the procedure. This is the intended role of the NSA, but Rice did not exercise the power of the president to do so.
In contrast, former Counter-Terrorism adviser to the NSC, Richard Clarke characterized his experience in the Kissinger NSC and the fundamental difference between debate and fact-based decision analysis.525 He noted that the Kissinger procedure was rigorous where detailed analysis of goals, assumptions, options, and potential outcomes informed by intelligence were the basis for all debate. Clarke offered that he did not witness this same disciplined approach in the Bush NSC.526
522 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 14-47. 523 Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, Groupthink: High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations, (Columbia University Press, 1983), 54-55. 524 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017); Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2009), 222. Haass’ characterization matches that of NSS staff who observed the NSC first-hand. 525 David Rothkopf, Running the World, (PublicAffairs, 2005), 118. Clarke referenced National Security Study Memoranda providing analysis that preceded National Security Decision Memorandum that were policy decision documents for formal NSC debate. 526 David Rothkopf, Running the World, (PublicAffairs, 2005), 118. 195
Against this backdrop, limited Bush administration debate proceeded over the course of more than a year. At the same time, the intensity of their narrative for confronting Saddam increased.
Key Stakeholders: Foreign and Domestic
Understanding key factors that would influence policy legitimacy and performance required consideration of various stakeholders. A prescriptive approach specifies considering how intended actions will impact each, their likely responses, and the implications to policy objectives.527
Key domestic audiences included the public, Congress, and the media who would surely influence public support. The effectiveness of the administration’s messaging was evident in multiple polls reflecting these audiences were largely supportive.528 However some respected national security experts urged the administration to make a stronger case for invasion. Former NSA, Brent Scowcroft,
Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, and Retired CJCS Hugh Shelton all cautioned the administration that invading Iraq required more justification.529
527 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992),230-232. 528 Gallup, Historical Trends, accessed 17 June 2016, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx. Monthly polls from September 2002 through March 2003 reflect public support for invasion consistently between 50-60%; Pew Research, Decision to Use Military Force in Iraq. Accessed 17 June 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-the-war-in-iraq- 20032008/. Pew’s survey in March 2003 reflects 72% support. 529 Brent Scowcroft, Don’t Attack Saddam, (Wall Street Journal, 2002), accessed June 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1029371773228069195; Thomas E. Ricks, Ex-Commander Opposes Iraq Invasion, (Washington Post, 2002), Accessed 16 June 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/07/10/AR2006071000568.html. General Anthony Zinni made his comments at the Annual Conference of the Middle Eat Institute stating "I'm not convinced we need to do this now," and, "I believe he is . . . containable at this moment."; General Joseph P. Hoar, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (U.S. Senate, 2004), Accessed June 16 2016, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HoarTestimony040519.pdf. General Hoar told the committee he believed in the policy of regime change but not under the conditions the Bush administration was forwarding. He also voiced concern the lack of a plan for ending the war. 196
While these respected professionals would be difficult for any president to ignore, George Bush possessed a great deal of political capital at the time in that his popularity was high for his leadership on 9/11 and the apparent success in
Afghanistan.530 The president began to forcefully make his case to the American people in January 2002 at the State of the Union address, and consistently reinforced it throughout the year.531 A key factor in solidifying NSC support was
George Tenet’s increasingly confident assessments on Iraqi WMD that succeeded in winning the support of Powell.
An additional and significant factor enabling the president’s policy was a continued shift in power from the Legislative to Executive branch. Presidents have accumulated disproportionate power over time in taking the nation to war without formal approval from Congress. This has been particularly true since Truman’s deployment of forces into Korea in 1950.532 Despite Constitutional intent for co-equal but separate powers, Congress has not protected their authority as aggressively as presidents have pushed the limits of theirs. The Bush administration readily leveraged intelligence data and the media to build their case for using military force, effectively putting Congress in the position of executing due diligence while also trying not to appear weak on defense.
As noted earlier, the U.S. Constitution defines the roles and responsibilities between the Executive and Legislative branches where, the president is the
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, but Congress retains the power to make
530 Gallup, Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush. Accessed July 2017, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx. Bush’s approval ratings immediately after 9/11 were near 90% approval and remained generally around 60-70% approval though the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 531 Ibid, 92,93. 532 Joseph V. Gallagher III, Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication, Parameters, Vol. XLI, 2011, 23-24 197 declarations of war and to raise and support the armed forces.533 In order to limit the president’s authority to take the nation to war without a declaration of war from
Congress, the Congress passed the 1973 War Powers Resolution. 534 This Act was intended to serve as a Legislative branch check on Executive power to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities."535
At odds here are Legislative branch arguments on their Constitutional authority to declare war, and Executive branch arguments that modern threats make it an imperative to act quickly to protect national security.536 There is certainly merit to both perspectives. Constitutional language was deliberate to assure that unilateral action did not have catastrophic consequences and so the framers of the
Constitution attempted to assure the nation only went to war after meaningful debate and the consent of both the Congress and president. 537 However modern warfare has altered the circumstances and the Congress has legislated to compensate for it.
The contemporary national security system we now have, was legislated to mitigate against strategic surprise. This system is based on a premise that a global presence is essential and relies upon quick response to be effective.538
In this system, presidents have demonstrated reluctance to ask
Congressional approval that might constrain their latitude to exercise military force as they deem appropriate. When the Congress declares war, much of the war-
533 Constitution of the United States of America, under Article I, Section 8, and Article II, Section 2. Access 10 June 2018, available at: https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript 534 War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, passed on November 7, 1973. The War Powers Resolution is sometimes referred to as the War Powers Act, its title in the version passed by the Senate. This Joint Resolution is codified in the United States Code ("USC") in Title 50, Chapter 33, Sections 1541-48; Library of Congress, accessed 3 June, 2013; http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war- powers.php 535 Ibid, Section 1541. Purpose and policy. 536 Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution, (Harvard University Press, 2013), 2. 537 Ibid, 3-5. 538 Ibid, 5-7 198 related power transfers to the Congress, thereby constraining the president's decision space. Instead, presidents have requested an Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF) that largely gains Congressional agreement to the president’s policy without excessive strings attached.
George Bush pursued an AMUF from Congress. The Congressional
Research Service (CRS) characterized the various perspectives to Congress against the AMUF. These included forceful arguments from experts who asserted that any real threat Saddam Hussein’s regime posed could be managed through current measures.539 Critics also argued that invading Iraq could destabilize the Middle East and hinder the broader war on terrorism.540 Still others were concerned about the potential for significant U.S. casualties and were wary of the potential for a long-term presence in Iraq.541
Some members of Congress were specifically concerned about what they viewed as a shift away from the objective to deal with Al Qaeda to one of counter-
WMD proliferation, and their concern with what they viewed as a preventive policy.542
Rumsfeld’s response was couched in terms of the nexus of terrorists and WMD, and the often-used administration position that it was necessary because waiting and risking another attack was not acceptable.543
Senators also questioned Rumsfeld on post-regime planning to stabilize Iraq and establish a government. Rumsfeld’s responses indicated the immature level of planning, indicating that the mission was largely the responsibility of the State
539 Alfred B. Prados, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action, (Congressional Research Service, 2002), 4-6. 540 Richard P. Cronin, Iraq: Debate over U.S. Policy, (Congressional Research Service, 2003), 10. 541 Richard P. Cronin, Iraq: Debate over U.S. Policy, (Congressional Research Service, 2003), 21. 542 U.S. Policy on Iraq: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, September 19, 23, 25, 2002, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 60-63. 543 Ibid, 83-96. 199
Department, while acknowledging some largely undefined military role.544 Rumsfeld’s testimony should have evoked critical questions on administration planning and demanded satisfactory responses as a condition for authority and funding. Congress did not do so and the AUMF quickly passed both houses. 545 This resolution gave the president the authority to invade and approved the resources to do so absent satisfactory understanding on critical elements of plans or the costs of invading.
With regard to the general structure of legislative checks and balances,
Congress’s acceptance further undermined vitally important legislative constraints on executive authority. The reality is that once a force is committed, any Congressional desire to dictate limits or impose resource constraints are often met with forceful accusations that they jeopardize the safety of service men and women deployed.
Since elected officials are constantly running for re-election, they are not inclined to impair their own popularity by giving a potential campaign opponent a readily exploitable issue where their patriotism will almost certainly be questioned.
This dynamic clearly illustrates what Mintz described as the
'Noncompensatory Principle,' where decision makers are unlikely to make decisions that will harm them politically.546 By failing to force the issue and fully debate a declaration of war, Congress effectively ceded their authority to the president giving him in essence a blank cheque with which to implement his policy.
Congressional abdication of responsibility did not absolve the NSC of the need for responsible deliberation on the post-regime governance plan for Iraq. This represented such a critically important aspect of the administration’s decision
544 Ibid, 72-73. 545 107th Congress, 2d Session: House Joint Resolution 114: To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). 546 Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making," (Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993), 598. 200 procedure, that it cannot be overstated. The way in which the administration approached this key phase is illustrative of an ad hoc decision procedure, where key issues like reconstruction and governance issues were considered very late and were not prioritized. Recalling the administration’s stated objective of an Iraq that
“Adheres to the rule of law and respects fundamental human rights, including freedom of speech and worship; and encourages the building of democratic institutions," a secure and stable environment, so central policy success, received comparatively little emphasis compared to the invasion itself.547
George Bush’s intent for confrontation with Iraq required significant effort to garner international support. French and German opposition negated NATO alliance support causing a significant rift between allies.548 As negotiations took place to secure the support of UN Security Council members, the president acquiesced to
French insistence that the Security Council should reconvene to consider options should Iraq fail to comply with a new UNSCR. Bush’s agreement resulted in France,
China, and Russia joining the other UN members in unanimously supporting
Resolution 1441 that gave Iraq one week to agree to comply.
Despite success in gaining support for the resolution, some nations remained staunchly against invasion, viewing Bush’s intent to employ a preventive policy to invade Iraq as illegal. These included France, Russia and the Parliament of the
European Union.549 Actors in this case were clearly looking for U.S. deference to the
UN Charter as was the case when the U.S. sought and received Security Council
547 Condoleezza Rice, Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Policy paper, TAB A: Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy, (The White House, 2002), 2. 548 British Broadcasting Corporation, EU allies unite against Iraq War, (BBC News, 2003), accessed 12 July, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2683409.stm. 549 European Parliament, Resolution on the Situation in Iraq, (Brussels, 2003), accessed May 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003- 0032+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 201 support in November 1990 in response to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.550 More fundamentally, the U.S. assertion of its right to attack undermined the principle of collective security and the authority of the United Nations Charter to which the U.S. is a signatory.
A key ally in this effort was British Prime Minister Tony Blair who also advocated for military action against Saddam Hussein. Blair understood the need to seek international consensus in order to achieve domestic support. His insistence to
George Bush on the need for a new UN resolution was a key factor in Bush agreeing to do so.551 Blair was also instrumental in convincing George Bush to seek a second resolution from the UN Security council following Iraq’s failure to fully comply with
Resolution 1441. He convinced the president that doing so provided political legitimacy.552
Legitimacy of the administration’s intent also required support from a key actor in chief UN inspector, Hans Blix. Blix provided his formal report in January
2003, and his revelation that his teams had discovered undeclared warheads, indications of VX nerve gas, and precursor chemicals for mustard gas, bolstered the administration’s case. He also indicated that Iraq had likely retained some anthrax after the date it was declared destroyed.553 In addition to these findings, his report of
Iraqi harassment during inspections reinforced the Bush case. Blix further updated the Security Council in February, reporting that Iraq had failed to account for 1000
550 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678 (United Nations, 1990), Accessed August 2016, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/102245?ln=en. 551 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 244. 552 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 244-247. 553 Hans Blix, The Security Council, 27 January 2003: An Update on Inspection, (UNMOVIC, 2003), accessed 11 July 2016, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_council_briefings.asp#5. 202 tons of chemical agent.554 The president leveraged these findings to demonstrate
Iraq’s failure to comply.555
Other important perspectives on the U.S. position were those of regional actors who were circumspect about U.S. resolve, and deeply concerned about instability following a regime change. With the exception of Kuwait, Middle Eastern nations were opposed to invasion. Arab League leaders widely condemned the intent to invade.556 Saudi Arabia publicly warned against unilateral U.S. action and voiced their fear of the instability that might follow.557 The royal family was clearly concerned over the prospect of sectarian conflict and more importantly, a pro-
Iranian Shia government emerging on its border.558 To this point the CIA warned the
NSC on the potential for instability and sectarian violence that could spill over borders threatening key Arab states.559 These warnings amplified what Rumsfeld had defined as a “Parade of Horribles.” These were the product of analysis of potential consequences by Rumsfeld’s staff that will be detailed later in discussion of consequences and uncertainty. The key point here is that the NSC overlooked these potential hazards.
The administration required the cooperation of regional partners in Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan, among others for basing and overflight access.
These nations had ample reason to be reluctant given the lack of U.S. support to
554 Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council on 25 November 2002: Executive Chairman's visit to Baghdad, (UNMOVIC, 2003), accessed 11 July, 2006; http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_council_briefings.asp#6. 555 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 238-239. 556 Cable News Network, Arab leaders declare opposition to war in Iraq: Arab League calls on Saddam to cooperate with inspections, (CNN.com, 2003), accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/01/sprj.irq.arab.ministers/index.html. 557 British Broadcasting Corporation, Saudis Warn US Over Iraq War, (BBC News, 2003),accessed 12 July 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2773759.stm. 558 Congressional Research Service Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 2009), 18. 559 George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, (HarperCollins, 2007), 483-484. 203 uprisings inside Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. The U.S. had encouraged action and then failed to act as Saddam took retribution. The way the administration resolved this provides further insight into a constrained decision procedure and demonstrates a lack of commitment to alternatives to war.
Doug Feith detailed the administration’s pursuit of a diplomatic track with the
UN while also planning for military action. This effort required the president to assure the Security Council he desired a peaceful resolution, while at the same time he maintained focus on the military build-up. There were pragmatic reasons to do both in the event diplomacy failed, but Feith’s characterization reinforces perceptions that the administration was manipulating the situation in their attempts to disguise the build-up.
Rumsfeld asserted his decision to limit force flows was intended to ensure military actions didn’t undermine Bush’s credibility in his diplomatic push with the
UN.560 However, the success of a coercive diplomatic effort required Saddam
Hussein to recognize a credible U.S. force in Kuwait ready to invade. Whether or not he recognized the threat, attempts to hide the build-up reflect the actions of an administration that was not serious about coercing a diplomatic solution. This is reinforced by Feith’s citing operational security as the reason deployments were tightly managed.561
These characterizations of poorly managed NSC deliberations and unilateral
DOD efforts reflect poorly on Condoleezza Rice’s approach to her role. Rice’s own interpretation of her role was “to get the secretaries to do what the President wants
560 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinal, 2011), 439. Rumsfeld offered this rationale in his memoir in recalling his decision to limit force flows into theater in November 2002. 561 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (HarperCollins, 2008), 237. 204 them to do.”562 This differs from the widely-held notion that the NSA’s job is to ensure that issues for executive decision have been fully analyzed and debated, providing the president a balanced, fact-based basis to inform decisions.563
Cheney and Rumsfeld’s strong personalities made Condoleezza Rice’s job a challenge and undermined her ability to authoritatively manage the NSC decision procedure.564 Rice commented on her sometimes-adversarial relationship with
Rumsfeld, and the challenges she experienced in trying to find consensus while mitigating friction between Rumsfeld and Powell. She confirmed the dysfunction resulting from Rumsfeld’s open criticisms of the State Department as well as the
State Department’s inclination to disagree with the president’s policies through leaks to the press.565 She attributed these leaks to Powell’s staff while pointing out that
Powell was unable to prevent them.
Rice acknowledged that both Powell and Rumsfeld voiced frustration over her approach. Rumsfeld didn’t like that she sought consensus and preferred she act as an honest broker of competing opinions and factors.566 Powell was frustrated that
Rice didn’t ensure the president received a balanced argument between State,
Defense and Vice President positions, allowing Rumsfeld and Cheney positions to dominate the debate.567 Perceptions matter, particularly in a small group like the
NSC where Rice did not appear to be an honest broker and the procedure suffered for it.
562 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway paperbacks, 2011), 14. 563 Hadley, Stephen J., The Role and Importance of the National Security Advisor, (The Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 2017), accessed January 2019, available at: https://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/handle/1969.1/158834. Hadley references the “Scowcroft Model” as the widely accepted definition of the NSA’s roles and responsibilities. 564 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway, 2011), 16- 20. 565 Ibid, 16-17. 566 Ibid, 19. 567 Ibid, 21-22. 205
Rice also commented on Rumsfeld’s criticisms of her NSC management and the number of principal’s meetings. Rumsfeld viewed Rice’s management style of consensus building as ineffective and a cause of disharmony among the principals.
Rather than seek consensus, he argued that her role as NSA was to provide the president with the various perspectives or options and let him decide.568 Rice countered that the president often asked her to seek consensus.
Rice noted that the frequency of NSC principals meetings was driven by
Rumsfeld’s need for control at the DOD and the resulting inability of his deputies to speak for him.569 Since his deputies could not speak for him, productive Deputies
Committee meetings were not possible and DOD policy recommendations had to come from Rumsfeld. This impeded Rice’s ability to fully leverage the functional expertise of the broader interagency and exercise the normal committee process.
This precipitated more Principals meetings to do the work that committees should have done. The result was to further narrow the perspectives informing the president.570 This meant that important analysis was only considered if a principal brought it to the president.571
Operating under these dynamics the NSC characterized the threat as they perceived it and established their respective positions. They then moved on to developing policy objectives and options. Under the normal operation of the committee system, the president and NSC principals might typically define broadly stated objectives at this point, but they would ideally push the security issue to the
568 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 325. 569 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway, 2011), 20- 22. 570 Ibid, 20. 571 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). Staff referred to the DOD practice of avoiding commitment to positions in DC meetings and later forming a DOD position forwarded through Rumsfeld; 206 committee process for development and analysis. This did not go as intended.
Members of the NSS indicated a key breakdown in the process was that OSD members of the Deputies Committee marginalized their involvement.572
Develop Objectives
A fundamental element of a prescriptive ADA methodology is the deliberate order of the analytical procedure. This order dictates that development of objectives must precede consideration of alternatives, as objectives define what alternatives are to achieve. This makes intuitive sense, but decision makers very often go directly to what might be done about a problem, immediately thinking about alternatives.573
In this case the president had decided on invasion prior to considering what was to be achieved by it. Unlike Afghanistan, the objectives for Iraq were developed over a reasonably lengthy timeframe, and when the NSC finally considered them in October
2002, they reflected a decidedly transformational intent.
Policy Objectives
The objectives included an Iraq that: "Renounces support for, and sponsorship of, international terrorism; continues to be a single, unitary state; is free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery, and associated programs; no longer oppresses or tyrannizes its people; respects the basic rights of all Iraqis- -including women and minorities; adheres to the rule of law and respects
572 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017), This NSS member recalled that OSD was particularly parochial about DoD purview over campaign related issues and resisted NSS involvement. He indicates that, although the NSC’s Executive Steering Committee (ESG) was to coordinate an interagency approach to post-regime change governance and reconstruction, OSD members routinely missed meetings and resisted ceding what they viewed as DoD authorities. 573 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 3-4. 207 fundamental human rights, including freedom of speech and worship; and encourages the building of democratic institutions"574
The end state conditions for regime change and removal of WMD were abundantly clear but the others were ambiguous. Objectives to encourage the building of democratic institutions in an Iraq that adheres to the rule of law, respects human rights, etc., are vague and open-ended propositions that made clear resourcing decisions almost impossible.575 This again represented a critically important shortcoming in the administration’s decision procedure.
In a further illustration of policy following strategy, war planning had been progressing for eleven months before Condoleezza Rice circulated these proposed objectives. She issued a draft document of objectives in October 2002 with comments due only two days later.576 NSS members affirmed the astounding fact that the NSC approved them as did the president without a formal debate.577 NSS members also recalled debate wasn’t deemed necessary as the objectives reflected the collective thinking of the president and principals who had opportunity to comment on them and raise any concerns.578
Repeating his rationale for a democratic Afghanistan, the president approved the objective for a democratic Iraq under the belief that all people desire to be free, and he equated freedom with democratic governance in the form that he understood
574 Condoleezza Rice, Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Policy paper, TAB A: Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy, (The White House, 2002), 2. 575 Gregory S. Parnell, Value-focused Thinking, (United States Military Academy at West Point and Innovative Decisions Inc., 2018), 9. Parnell emphasized the need for specificity in fundamental objectives that enable credible resource allocation decisions. 576 Condoleezza Rice, Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Policy paper, TAB A: Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy, (The White House, 2002), 2. 577 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 578 Ibid. 208 it.579 This intent was much more expansive than the objectives he articulated to the
American people and the world when he announced the invasion which was to
“disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”580
The procedure by which these were developed provides insights into committee dysfunction and how transformational objectives were included. Members of the Deputy’s Committee asserted that DOD effectively impeded debate and recommendations on objectives that were contrary to their positions.581 They asserted that OSD members routinely maintained that they could not agree to any recommendations without Secretary of Defense approval.
Wolfowitz and Feith were the OSD representatives to the committee. Where
Feith recalled frequent committee and interagency debate on objectives and options, he did not offer details on committee consensus. Instead he frequently offered insights into DOD disagreement with various positions, and the OSD practice of seeking agreement within the department that Rumsfeld would then take forward.
Feith’s version validates assertions that this OSD practice enabled them to shape objectives to their liking.
Wolfowitz and Feith held strong transformationalist sentiments that matched the president’s, and their inclusion of “building of democratic institutions” was certain to gain Bush’s approval. Although the committee process does not assure comprehensive decision analysis, in impeding committee input, the DOD potentially denied the president and other NSC principals critically important perspectives and
579 George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, (The White House, 2002), accessed June 20, 2015, https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html. 580 George W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation, (Office of the Press Secretary, 2003), accessed 23 April 2016, https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html. 581 Ibid. 209 dissenting positions. Circumventing the committee process certainly enabled DOD to shape decisions to support their perspective.582
This environment clearly reflects the push-pull of bureaucratic and organizational forces in shaping policy that would have decidedly negative implications to performance.583 A pertinent reminder here again is that the management and discipline over the committee process is the purview of the NSA.
In formulating policy objectives, Simon’s notion of “satisficing” is a reminder on the importance of tempering the desirable with the achievable. It is useful here again to consider the administration’s objectives in terms of Hart’s observation that military objectives must be achievable."584 The objective to establish a democracy in
Iraq first required a secure environment in which to do so. This meant a force sufficient to control the expanse of Iraq following regime change.
This requirement was clear to experts like Colin Powell and General Eric
Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, leading them to recommend a much larger force than General Franks planned for the invasion. While Rumsfeld supported the objective in principal, he did not view implementing it as practical and maintained that occupation would be a mistake and wanted a speedy transition to Iraqi control.
Based on this intent, planning for post-combat security and stability missions were largely resisted within OSD.585
582 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 583 Houghton, David P., The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 32-34. This dynamic illustrated Houghton’s observation that Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics model applies more readily to policy implementation; Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 699-711. This dynamic also reflects Allison’s observations on the limited span of control presidents have over the government bureaucracy. 584 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351. 585 NSC Staff, (Interview, 2017). Staff maintained that Feith was adamant that post regime security was a DOD matter and declined to take it up in DC meetings. USCENTCOM staff indicated that OSD staff guidance to them was that OSD would oversee planning for post-combat operations. 210
Rumsfeld indicated he had approved a troop level of 450,000 to be available as needed, but this is a rather disingenuous recollection of the facts. Franks had originally briefed a plan calling for a large number of forces and Rumsfeld rejected it.
Franks’ follow-up plan called for an invasion force of 150,000, with the balance of forces available as he deemed necessary.586 Again leveraging speed and surprise, he employed a relatively small, lethal force.587 “Shock and Awe” was very impressive and effective in removing the regime but an inability to secure the nation immediately after was the source of many problems to come.
Though Franks and his staff planned the invasion, inadequate force levels were directly attributable to Rumsfeld’s influence. His influence led to a plan intended to deploy only enough force Franks thought capable of stabilizing the country until
Iraqis could assume control, and he intended to transition control quickly.588 The consequences of this inadequate planning are well documented where insufficient forces were unable to reestablish security immediately after the regime collapsed.
Key Assumptions
Effective decision procedures deliberately consider key assumptions to understand their implications to achievement of objectives. Unanalyzed assumptions risk loss and failure. Stating the obvious, this is particularly true in the case of military invasion. Similar to Afghanistan, an ad hoc decision procedure again allowed important assumptions to go unanalyzed, not the least of which were the implications
586 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinal, 2011), 438-440. 587 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). This staffer asserted there was a sense of confidence bordering on hubris within the administration in the immediate aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion. He contended this confidence supplanted clear thinking and analysis with regard to Iraq that allowed bold assumptions to permeate decision-making that discounted Iraqi cultural and societal factors that would influence how they viewed democracy. 588 Ibid. 211 of the light military footprint. We now know that inadequate forces to secure
Afghanistan was a key failure, and this same failure would prove to be the Achilles heel of administration intent in Iraq.
This may well have turned out differently had the DOD planned in accordance with both existing doctrine and the moral imperative to do so. OSD impeded
USCENTCOM planning for stability and security operations, emphasizing a rapid transition to Iraqi control.589 After Rumsfeld rejected their initial plan, USCENTCOM staff formed a plan to leverage elements of the Iraqi Army to assume the security mission.590 Though the Iraqi Army had dissolved during the invasion, USCENTCOM planners remained convinced on the viability of their plan as Iraqi Generals had approached senior U.S. commanders, offering to bring their units back together to secure the country.591 Paul Bremer’s decision to formally disband the Army and ban all Ba’athists ultimately undermined this plan.
Developing contingency plans that enable rapid adjustment to changing conditions are based in long standing military doctrine.592 Responsible analysis of assumptions required that USCENTCOM planners consider that their plan to leverage elements of the Iraqi Army might not work. In this case they were very likely to have planned a large build-up of forces in Kuwait ready to rapidly deploy into
Iraq.593 They could not do so as rapidly as was necessary, as Rumsfeld had constrained force flows ahead of diplomatic initiatives.594 The chaos that followed reflects the implications of political decisions undermining military plans. These are
589 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). 590 Ibid. 591 Ibid. 592 Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Planning, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), IV-38. 593 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). 594 Ibid. 212 further discussed in this chapter under Identification of Expected and Potential
Consequences.
The flawed intelligence estimates underpinning administration decisions on the Iraqi threat are well documented. These assessments placed the terrorist Al-
Zarqawi in Northern Iraq at the time and Colin Powell presented intelligence-based evidence at the United Nations that Al Zarqawi was known to have experimented with biological weapons.595 Since Zarqawi’s base of operations was in the semi- autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq, tying Saddam Hussein to him was not a straightforward exercise. However, the Bush administration assumed the worst, viewing a potential connection between terrorists and Saddam’s WMD as a compelling rationale for action.596
The implications of these collective assumptions cannot be overstated. The contrived intelligence judgments that enabled invasion, and political decisions undermining military planning, represented significant challenges to policy intent.
Further, the Bush administration assumption that Iraqis would embrace democratic institutions was likewise a bold assumption in a nation with clear sectarian divisions and a population that had only known autocratic rule for decades. These represent unnecessary errors that could well have been avoided.
Define End State Conditions & Measures of Policy Success
Successful policy is logically characterized by achievement of desired outcomes. Defining the conditions that characterize success serve to ensure common understanding and unity of effort, particularly with regard to those who must
595 Colin Powell, Presentation to United Nations: Ties to al Qaeda, (United Nations, 2003). 596 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 236-237. 213 resource and implement the policy. This understanding is likewise important to those who judge policy legitimacy.
Some desired end state conditions were clearly stated including an Iraq with no WMD, no means of delivering them, and removal of any associated programs.
Less clear, was the goal for an Iraq that “encourages the building of democratic institutions."597 The president had opportunity to clarify his intent, and while he attempted to do so in his February 2003 “Future of Iraq” speech, he did not articulate how he would judge success.598
This ambiguity may be useful to politicians as it provides great latitude in defining success. However, this lack of clarity presented problems among the implementing departments and agencies. There was no clear direction from the NSC on who was responsible for planning, and this enabled strong personalities and bureaucratic politics to undermine responsible planning and coordination. For example, the Department of State would typically be responsible for post-regime governance and reconstruction. They assumed they would be and planned accordingly. This would not be the case. Responsibility was uncharacteristically placed on DOD who had done the least amount of planning.
Rumsfeld and his staff had presented the case to the NSC that Rumsfeld should be the administration official in charge of post-regime governance.599 The
DOD rationale was that no other official, save the president, had the legal authority to command the armed forces who must provide security. The president and NSC agreed.600 However, Rumsfeld directed that OSD delay standing up a post-war
597 Ibid, 154-155 598 George W. Bush, President Discusses the Future of Iraq, (The White House, 2003). Accessed 23 April 2015, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html. 599 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (HarperCollins, 2008), 315-316. 600 Ibid, 315-316. Feith presented this argument to the NSC on 15 October 2002. 214 planning office as members of the NSC believed doing so might undermine diplomatic efforts.601
This decision languished until after Iraq’s weapons declaration in December
2002, when the president was convinced invasion was inevitable. On 20 January,
President Bush finally formally chartered the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), as the DOD organization to manage the transition from military to civilian control.602 Responsibility for post-regime governance then rested within the DOD with only two months for the interagency and
USCENTCOM to plan prior to the invasion. The implications of this delay and lack of emphasis on planning for immediate post-regime security are discussed later in the chapter in the assessment of potential consequences.
The period immediately following regime change was a chaotic one. Civilian control was a challenge to a small military force made more difficult by guerilla attacks from armed paramilitary forces calling themselves Fedayeen Saddam. The
ORHA struggled in this environment. Their effectiveness relied on security the military could not achieve with a small force.
Ironically, Rumsfeld had provided guidance to NSC members very early in
2001 emphasizing the proper use of military force.603 His guidance emphasized the need for clearly achievable objectives pursued at acceptable risk and understanding of military limitations.604 With this guidance in mind in 2003 he and his staff concluded an occupation of Iraq would be a mistake and he forwarded his assessment to members of the NSC.605 This key policy issue was not debated within
601 Ibid, 317. 602 George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-24: Iraq Post War Planning Office, (The White House, 2003). 603 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinal, 2011), 481. 604 Ibid, 483. 605 Ibid, 484-485. 215 the NSC. Rumsfeld did not force the issue and it enabled him to drive a plan to transition governance back to the Iraqis as quickly as possible.606
Failure to debate this issue in detail, and understand the implications of
Rumsfeld’s plan, was in part due to the fact that the president agreed with
Rumsfeld’s intent.607 In fact, the tenets of their internal policy and strategy document specified a quick transition to Iraqi control.608 This once again points to a continued failure of the NSA to impose discipline on the decision procedure where elements of the policy and strategy were left to the judgment of DOD.
Develop Policy Options
As regime change in Iraq was U.S. policy when the Bush administration entered office, they immediately began deliberating available options short of war to achieve this goal. Doug Feith detailed Deputies Committee deliberations on potential options in the summer of 2001 that were never elevated to the Principals due to disagreement among members.609 Feith described this as a dysfunctional committee process but in reality, this dynamic reflects an NSC committee process working as intended, with members considering what was recognized as a persistent threat, but not a compelling one that demanded immediate NSC Principal attention.
The OSD response was to develop options further within DOD. Potential alternatives short of war developed under Rumsfeld included: ending no-fly zone
606 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). Staff indicate that the memorandum was circulated for reading but it was not formally tabled for discussion within a principals meeting. 607 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway Books, 2011), 209. 608 Condoleezza Rice, Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Policy paper, TAB A: Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy, (The White House, 2002), 2. 609 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (HarperCollins, 2008), 206-209. 216 enforcement and accepting monitoring of Iraq from a distance, with the caveat that this likely meant confrontation with Iraq later over WMD; pursuing regime change through guarantees to regional partners with promises of stalwart support; or pursuing direct dialogue with Saddam Hussein betting that he would prefer to achieve some resolution of hostility with western powers.610 In addition to these options, the Rumsfeld team considered regime change through focused support to
Iraqi opposition groups in accordance with the existing U.S. policy.611 This was not deemed a viable path as unreliable U.S. support to opposition groups following the first Gulf War resulted in Saddam Hussein effectively neutralizing any credible opposition.612
After the 9/11 attacks any options short of war were dismissed within the
NSC, save the potential for a diplomatic solution whereby Saddam Hussein would disclose all facilities and capabilities through inspections. No one in the NSC except
Colin Powell gave this option much credibility.613 By the end of 2002 the president’s expectations that Saddam would resist were affirmed. He resolved that diplomacy had failed and invasion was the only viable option left to him. The president explained his position as the least bad option in terms of perceived risk.614 One can readily interpret the president’s response in terms of confirmation bias as well as
Jervis’s observations on judgments, perceptions, and misperceptions. 615
610 Ibid, 210-211. 611 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011), 414. 612 Ibid. 613 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). Staff observed that no one except Colin Powell believed Saddam would willingly disclose his WMD and assumed the threat of war was the only credible way to achieve this. This meant planning for war. 614 Dr. Ralph L. Keeney, (Interview, 2018), Keeney observed that even in choosing a least bad option the president was making a value-based choice that can be viewed as one that best protected the interest at stake. 615 Peter Wason, On The Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, (Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12 (3), 1960), 129–140; Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976), 28-29. 217
Bush’s reasoning reflects the weight and urgency that uncertainty and perception of risk can have on a decision maker. Neuchterlein’s hierarchy of interests again provides a useful framework to characterize Bush’s perception of the risk and intensity of the security interest. 616 Although we now know the intelligence underpinning this perception was inaccurate, many agreed with the president’s assessment at the time. A dysfunctional committee process played a key role in denying the president opposing perspectives and other alternatives.
Any potential for debate over alternatives was impaired by the secrecy and very limited participation in Deputies Committee meetings.617 OSD representatives ensured that regime change was the necessary starting premise of this group.618 The
DC also did not involve the interagency PCCs and so they would play little or no role in development of the policy. An indication that the administration had already decided on invasion is further evidenced here as these meetings occurred more than a full year before the president’s public announcement of the decision to invade.
Ironically, given that he was one of the chief obstacles to interagency input,
Feith lamented in his memoir on the lack of clarity and that the president did not benefit from a thorough interagency debate.619 He largely placed blame for this on
DOS and CIA officials, as well as Condoleezza Rice’s management style. Feith’s description of these challenges does not square with either his and Paul Wolfowitz’s practice of declining to adopt DC recommendations, instead developing and forwarding DOD agreed positions.620
616 Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: U.S. National Interests in the 1980s, (University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 9. 617 Ibid, 237. 618 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (HarperCollins, 2008), 272-273.. 619 Ibid, 272-273. 620 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 218
Coercive diplomacy remained the only serious alternative to invasion because
Powell and key allies pressured Bush for it. While Powell’s effort progressed throughout 2002, NSC debate focused on various implementing strategies for invasion. It is important to again point out that objectives for the invasion were not codified into memoranda until November 2002, long after the war planning for invasion was largely completed in August.621 Strategy once again led policy where what was to be achieved was dictated by the way in which it was to be achieved.
Analyze Options
A prescriptive ADA framework dictates that options be compared in terms of how well each achieved administration objectives. This approach often leads to consideration of potential trade-offs among objectives that might make one option clearly better than the others.622 This was not done and aspirational objectives for a democratic Iraq remained.
Coercive Diplomacy
Although the coercive diplomatic effort represented a viable alternative that might verify Iraq no longer possessed WMD, most members of the NSC believed it was very unlikely and gave it minimal attention. Their effort was instead largely focused on invasion, fully expecting that Saddam Hussein would resist inspections, or that violations of them would help their case.
621 Condoleezza Rice, Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Policy paper, TAB A: Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy, (The White House, 2002), 2; General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier, (ReganBooks, 2004). 362-377, 384. Franks briefed the concept to the President in December 2001 and evolving war plans to OSD and the president over the course of 2002. The war plan OPLAN 1003V was briefed in full to the President in August 2002. 622 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 50-53. 219
Revisiting the underlying rationale for coercive diplomacy, it only works if an enemy believes in the certainty of the threat of force that accompanies it. George
Bush described his intent for the coercive diplomatic track, to build up a credible invasion force as incentive for Saddam to accept inspections and demonstrate full disclosure. 623 At the same time OSD undermined the coercive intent by directing
USCENTCOM to disguise their build-up in Kuwait. 624
Absent a compelling threat, Saddam Hussein’s long experience with the U.S. left him unconvinced on U.S. resolve, and he indicated that he feared appearing weak to Iran more than he feared U.S. actions.625 He added that by the time he understood invasion was imminent, it was too late.626 His perceptions of U.S. resolve were perhaps reinforced by US failure to support the Shia uprisings in 1991, and the fact that when he ejected inspectors in 1998, the US response was to support a series of UN resolutions condemning his actions.
The passage of UNSCR 1441 reflected broad international consensus and
Saddam finally recognized this as a last opportunity to prevent military confrontation, and he agreed to immediate inspections.627 One could argue that coercive diplomacy in fact worked in this case. However, the fact that inspectors operated in Iraq for nearly two months finding violations and experienced harassment reflects a lack of seriousness on Saddam’s behalf. Although he later admitted that he agreed to inspections when he determined war was inevitable, he also indicated, as noted
623 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 229-230. 624 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), This staffer validates the intent to disguise the U.S. build-up in Kuwait in order to leverage surprise when they attacked. This plan is at odds with the administration’s stated intent to pursue credible coercive diplomacy. 625 Saddam Hussein, Federal Bureau of Investigation Interrogation, (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), 2. 626 Ibid, 3. 627 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, (United Nations, 2002). 220 above, that he feared exposing weakness to Iran more than U.S. threats. 628 He explained that while he understood war might be inevitable, he expected any real invasion would be preceded by a long air campaign, and believed he had ample time to seek a deal with the U.S.629
Lack of Iraqi compliance after two months also convinced Powell that inspections would not succeed, and he too effectively concluded that “The question isn’t how much longer do you need for inspections to work. Inspections will not work.” 630 The administration now turned their full attention to justifying their intent to invade.
Their stance that invasion was the only alternative left to the president did not absolve the NSC of the requirement to evaluate the viability of their policy, to understand it strengths and weaknesses and to plan accordingly. This could have been done in a number of ways. Again, a rather quick FAS assessment could have helped to address obvious gaps in analysis and planning.
Invasion
The overwhelming U.S. military capability in Iraq during the first Gulf War had grown significantly more capable in the interim, indicating that regime change through invasion was clearly feasible. The acceptability of invading Iraq may be measured to some degree in terms of the widely held intelligence findings, domestic perceptions that force represented a reasonable course of action, and international perceptions that invasion represented a legal last option.
628 Saddam Hussein, Federal Bureau of Investigation Interrogation, (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), 1-3. 629 Ibid, 3. 630 Glenn Kessler, Moderate Powell Turns Hawkish On War With Iraq, (Washington Post, 2003), Section A20, 1. 221
The Bush administration certainly demonstrated that they understood these requirements to justify their policy and spent considerable effort in developing intelligence to support their case and in securing broad support. Though the intelligence was flawed, most accepted it as legitimate at the time with a few notable exceptions. This effort was less an internal administration analysis of acceptability than it was a method of selling their position to domestic and international stakeholders.
Promoting the acceptability of their policy to domestic audiences was fairly easy as support was very high. Pew Research Center surveys in 2003 indicated that
72% of Americans thought that the decision to use military force was the right one, while only 22% disagreed.631 Though it took significant effort, the administration achieved broad international support through UN resolution. However, it was not without detractors and controversy with some key allies including France, Germany, and New Zealand who were publicly against invasion. Despite this disagreement, the administration resolved that they had sufficient legal and political support to enable their policy.
The feasibility and acceptability of an option does not mean that it is suitable.
Any viable alternative must also be judged in terms of both sustainability of the implementation strategy, the physical costs, and expenditure of resources over time.
In this regard a lack of comprehensive planning and analysis, beyond the physical overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, was a key driver of policy challenges. This may again in large measure be attributed to what has been characterized as hubris
631 Pew Research Center, Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008 (Pew Research Center, 2008), accessed 10 October 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward- the-war-in-iraq-20032008/. 222 resulting from their perceived success in Afghanistan.632 Flawed planning and uncoordinated decisions were quickly evident in the chaotic post-regime environment, where coalition forces were inadequate to establish security, and where the Iraqi military could not be engaged to do so.
Recalling the earlier discussion on groupthink, NSC members acknowledged diplomacy as an alternative, but used it as a mechanism to support their position that invasion was necessary. Notably, Powell and Tenet have claimed that they were circumspect about invasion, but they agreed with the decision, nonetheless. This dynamic is often referred to as the “Abilene Paradox,” where group consensus can mask individual disagreement leading to adverse consequences.633 Janis characterized this dynamic, associating a number of observable symptoms of defective decision-making that are reflected in this case including: a failure to genuinely consider alternative perspectives; processing information in a biased manner; failure to examine potential costs and risks of the preferred choice, and failure to work out detailed implementation and contingencies.634
Analysis of Uncertainty and Consequences
As previously observed, the inherent risks to lives and livelihoods, and the implications of failure resident in security policy decisions are such that they demand a deliberate assessment of key uncertainties and consequences of action.635 Donald
632 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). This NSS member recalled the rapid victory and relative calm in Afghanistan engendered confidence this staffer characterized as ‘hubris” among some members of the NSC and OSD staff that permeated their planning for Iraq. 633 Jerry B. Harvey, The Abilene Paradox: The Management of Agreement, (Organizational Dynamics, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1974). Harvey’s description of a group deciding to take a bus trip to Abilene, Texas is case study on individuals who may not have agreed, or who had reservations, but did not speak their minds only to go along with something they didn’t want to do. 634 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, Groupthink Theory: A Model, (Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 47. 635 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 65-66. 223
Rumsfeld understood this need and he enumerated some for the president’s consideration that his staff titled a “Parade of Horribles”.636 This list included ten bad strategic outcomes, nine of which were in fact realized. Rumsfeld had developed this list of potential hazards to generate more detailed analysis and reduce their likelihood.
Among the hazards on this list, Rumsfeld’s staff recognized that: a war might cause more harm both inside Iraq and regionally, and entail much greater costs than expected; that reconstruction efforts might take many more years and much greater
U.S. resources than they anticipated, and that invasion might precipitate ethnic strife.
These potential outcomes were prescient and one would reasonably expect that their serious implications would have driven NSC debate. But they did not, and policy intent was in jeopardy as soon as the invasion began. An NSC staffer asserted that Rumsfeld’s concerns were perceived within the NSC as a DOD responsibility to plan accordingly.637 This same staffer indicated that the need for further deliberation was also muted by the general belief among the administration that the Iraqi people would welcome the U.S. as liberators.638 Feith also asserted that Rumsfeld considered that these negative consequences were more likely in an extended war, which reinforced his desire for speed, surprise and prosecuting the invasion with a smaller force.639
In other words the DOD’s estimation was that speed and a rapid military victory could minimize the potential for bad consequences. This was a tremendous leap of logic. USCENTCOM planners similarly referred to optimistic thinking among
636 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 332-335. 637 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 638 Ibid. 639 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 333. 224
OSD staff and a fundamental misunderstanding of Iraqi history, not the least of which were the deep ethnic and sectarian issues there.640
Some NSS members defended the procedure by asserting that NSC consideration of Rumsfeld’s list was adequate.641 However, consideration does not equate to deliberate analysis, and the absence of contingency planning is further evidence of a deeply flawed NSC procedure. Further, NSC failure to consider potential hazards and plan for contingencies does not absolve military leaders of their responsibility to do so.
Beyond the requirement for developing contingency plans, U.S military doctrine states that military leaders are responsible for securing and stabilizing an area after combat operations cease.642 USCENTCOM planners indicate that they clearly understood the military roles and responsibilities for post-regime security. In explaining their planning approach, they cited specific guidance from OSD to plan a quick transition to Iraqi responsibility under a Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA).643
USCENTCOM planners had relied on two key assumptions for achieving a stable post-combat environment. These included the intent to retain the bulk of the
Iraqi Army who could maintain security, and retention of government administrators necessary for restoration of basic services.644 USCENTCOM planners also understood that nearly all government workers were Ba’athists out of necessity.
They were concerned by OSD staff comments that Ba’athists could not be part of the transitional government. UNCENTCOM staff viewed their comments as uninformed
640 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018) 641 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 642 Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, (Joint Staff, 2017), VIII-24, 643 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). 644 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 225 and assumed military leaders would control the situation in country, not OSD staff.
This proved to be a significant mistake.645
This lack of administration attention to post-regime stability and governance is perhaps their most glaring failure. There was in fact a great deal of planning done for this phase but, due to bureaucratic in-fighting, planning was largely uncoordinated between the NSC, OSD and USCENTCOM.646 In a vacuum of clear presidential direction and NSC management of the situation, the Coalition Provisional Authority,
L. Paul Bremer, made a rapid set of significant decisions denying Baathist participation in government, and disbanding the Iraqi Army.
DOS had done extensive work planning for a transition to Iraqi authority that
DOD did not acknowledge or leverage. Astoundingly, Jay Garner, Director of ORHA indicated that he was never made aware of DOS planning. 647 Criticisms that the administration failed to leverage the committee process on post-war planning are accurate, but it wasn’t for a lack of effort from the DOS or the NSS. In addition to the extensive DOS planning effort, an NSS Executive Steering Group (ESG) also directed non-military planning through the Deputies Committee. The committee process was exercised and the interagency considered many aspects of post-regime planning requirements. However, consideration does not equate to a formally coordinated plan, particularly one that DOD would adopt. OSD viewed coordination
645 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018) Staffers indicated that USCENTCOM assumptions were to retain elements of the Iraqi Army, police and government personnel to run Iraq during a transition to Iraqi self-governance and that NSC principals and OSD staff were well aware of this. They recalled during presentation of their plan to OSD that Doug Feith was adamant on the need for de-Ba’athification. They discounted his rationale as unrealistic and characterized it as a gross misunderstanding of Iraq. The also assumed General Franks retained command authority to impose these decisions until he formally passed control to the Coalition Provisional Authority. 646 Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, Andrew Rathmell, After Saddam Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, (RAND Arroyo Center, 2008), xvii-xx. 647 Jay Garner, No Plan, No Peace: How the British and US governments invaded Iraq with no plan for bringing peace and democracy to a country with no history of either, (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). Accessed 10 March 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axbEVGi_M30. 226 and planning between the NSS, the Deputies Committee, and DOS, as unwanted meddling in what they viewed as their responsibility.648
The confluence of conflicting decisions had dramatic implications to policy intent. USCENTCOM planners understood that Iraq represented a very different type of fight than Afghanistan, requiring many more forces and a much more robust post- regime security plan.649 In further evidence of OSD’s central role in impeding security and stability requirements and their confusion of transition requirements with an occupation, military planners pointed to a lack of receptiveness in OSD to military advice, particularly with regard to Doug Feith.650 The ORHA was formed under OSD to lead this transition, and during execution, it became evident that ORHA was under-staffed and poorly financed for the scope of the mission intended.651
The combination of OSD meddling and Paul Bremer’s poor decisions made
Rumsfeld’s “Parade of Horribles” a reality. It is the nature of uncertainty that one may know what might happen, but one cannot know with certainty what will happen.
Rumsfeld’s list of potential hazards reflected awareness of the key uncertainties that might eventually undermine success, yet he clearly failed to impose his authority to mitigate against them and plan for contingencies.
648 Colonel Larry Wilkerson, No Plan, No Peace: How the British and US governments invaded Iraq with no plan for bringing peace and democracy to a country with no history of either, (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). Accessed 10 March 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axbEVGi_M30. Wilkerson, who served as Colin Powell’s Chief of Staff, reflected on the dysfunctional relationship with DOD and affirmed Powell’s characterization of OSD as “the crazies”; National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017); U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018); National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). NSS staff were adamant that they had affected a great deal of post-regime planning in concert with USCENTCOM but OSD staff would not vote on recommendations. 649 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). 650 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), Both staffers recalled the OSD staff response to their input similarly and both commented on their lack of understanding about Iraq. Both had similar recollections of differences with OSD staff, particularly Doug Feith, on post-regime requirements and their emphasis on not appearing to be an occupying force. 651 General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, ReganBooks, 2004), 524. 227
These considerations of uncertainty and consequences pertain directly to the relative utility and acceptability of the president’s policy intent. Given a complex environment and the subjectivity of risk assessment methods, presidents frequently are forced to make momentous decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Rumsfeld brought the potential for significant consequences to NSC attention and the NSC enjoyed ample time to perform a detailed assessment to reduce uncertainty and provide the president with risk informed decision criteria. They failed to do so. More specifically, Rumsfeld and his staff neglected to examine them in detail and plan accordingly
The President’s Decision
Hans Blix’ January 2003 report to the UN detailing incidents of Iraqi failure to disclose capabilities and harassment of inspectors, further affirmed George Bush’s expectation that diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful.652 The president resolved that regime change was now justified and the window for military operations articulated by General Franks now appeared to drive the time table for action. After a failed final push to gain a second resolution from the UN Security Council, he ordered the invasion in March 2003.653
Coalition forces quickly gained control of the country by mid-April and the
Saddam regime was effectively removed. The mission shifted to reestablishing security, reconstruction, and searching for WMD.654 OSD’s contrived intelligence judgments on WMD that underpinned the administration’s rationale for invasion
652 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 244. 653 George W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation March 19, 2003 (Office of the Press Secretary, 2003). Accessed 29 March 2013: http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html 654, Raymond W. Copson, Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview (Congressional Research Service, 2003), 4-6. 228 proved largely untrue. David Kay, Special Advisor to the Iraq Survey Group, later testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2004 that his team had determined there were no undocumented stockpiles of WMD or production facilities in Iraq.655
The implications of poor post-war planning were also quickly realized as the
Iraqi army dissolved, and coalition forces were too small to effectively establish security. Collective misunderstanding of deep sectarian forces in Iraq and the implications of failure to develop contingency plans were made clear by a series of fateful policy decisions regarding disbandment of the Iraqi Army and "de-
Baathification.”
Assess Policy Effectiveness
Policy performance must be viewed in context of all objectives and the cost- benefit of the decision to invade. No doubt the rapid military victory achieved a key administration objective of regime change and the subsequent search for WMD confirmed Iraq’s capability was no longer a threat. These represented but two of the president’s objectives. Realizing the harder policy objective for a democratic Iraq proved a much greater challenge.
Regarding the objective for a democratic Iraq, the implications of inadequate planning and forces to secure and stabilize the country following regime change cannot be overstated. This objective was a significant challenge in a deeply sectarian nation with a long history of authoritarian rule. Any success absolutely relied on a secure, stable environment that was not achieved. This did as much to
655 David Kay, Transcript of David Kay testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee (, 2004), Accessed on 3 June 2013: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/ pdf/Iraq/kaytestimony.pdf. 229 undermine policy success as any other factor. The result was a steady drain of resources and lives over the course of nearly a decade toward an unachievable goal.
The president and NSC were acutely aware of apprehension among senior military professionals over the size of the force and lack of post-regime planning.656
Then Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki testified before Congress that he believed a much larger force was required to occupy and secure the country.657
Administration officials, principally Paul Wolfowitz, assertively attempted to discredit this assessment.658 Professional military advice borne of experience and historical precedent was undermined by bureaucratic force. However, this approach could not have succeeded without the full support of General Franks and focused implementation by his command. He had embraced an approach that emphasized leverage of highly advanced technology and rapid global reach. In embracing
Rumsfeld’s transformation, Franks considered Colin Powell’s concerns over force size as antiquated thinking.659
Fast forward three years to the summer of 2006 where security remained the key issue undermining policy success in Iraq. Al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency had successfully ignited a civil war. The president finally acknowledged his objectives were in jeopardy but allowed his emotional ties to the sunk cost in lives and wounded to influence his thinking. He went against the counsel of many senior military, the Department of State and NSC members, and decided to surge forces
656 Thomas E. Ricks, Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq, (Washington Post, 2002), A01. Accessed 12 July 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10749- 2002Jul27.html. 657 General Eric Shinseki, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, (Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network, 2003), Accessed 21 March 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjpCfzY4SKo. 658 Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts General On Iraq Occupation Force's Size, (New York Times, 2003), accessed 13 November, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-responses-military-spending-pentagon-contradicts- general-iraq-occupation.html. 659 General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, ReganBooks, 2004), 393-397. 230 under a new strategy. This decision was not popular with the public either. A Pew
Research poll indicated that 67% of Americans said the war in Iraq was not going well in February 2007. 660 This figure represented the largest percentage expressing a negative view since the war began.
The implications of the surge are relevant in this case to characterize the power of personal ideals and unwillingness to concede failure. Bush’s sense of responsibility for lives lost was an irrational commitment to a flawed policy. His new counterinsurgency strategy continued to pursue the same flawed policy objectives.
Effectiveness continued to rely on an Iraqi government pursuing a decidedly sectarian agenda. More importantly, the Petraeus strategy succeeded only in diffusing the civil war to a point that the president could declare success and slowly withdraw U.S. troops.661 This was hardly a victory, but the administration could make a case their objectives were achieved.
Whether or not one agrees that the invasion of Iraq was warranted, from an ends, ways, and means perspective, the vast capacity of the U.S. to prosecute
George Bush’s policy intent was insufficient. The poor outcome points to the need for presidents to consider the suitability of a policy over time. Seventeen years on, Iraq remains unstable. The invasion gave rise to ISIS and greater instability across the broader Middle East. Any attempt to characterize the invasion of Iraq as a component of the GWOT must acknowledge that the purpose of the GWOT was to reduce threats to the U.S. The war in Iraq increased them.
The viability of policy is a function of its affordability over time. There were multiple, conflicting administration assessments of potential war costs, none of which
660 Pew Research Center, Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008: How Well Is the War Going? (Pew Research Center, 2008), accessed 13 November 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-the-war-in-iraq-20032008/ 661 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 390-391. 231 were realistic. It is unclear what specific costs were factored into pre-war estimates but even the highest was exceeded by more than 400%.662 Though cost is only one measure of performance, it is one that quickly illustrates the uncertainty of war and emphasizes that the enemy often decides when it is over.
The economic implications of the war extend well beyond those to prosecute it.
Like Afghanistan, the war in Iraq was funded almost entirely by borrowing. The results were increased U.S. budget deficits, increased national debt, and other negative macroeconomic effects. As previously observed, U.S. war efforts have historically been funded through borrowing while largely off-set by tax increases.
However, the Bush administration, in concert with Congress, borrowed massively using debit spending to fund the war while at the same time reducing taxes.663 This practice led to a $1.6 Trillion increase to the national debt that is now in excess of
$21 trillion.664 Attempting to put this figure in perspective, the national debt is now more than six times the annual revenue the U.S. government brings in, and exceeds the total 2018 Gross Domestic Product of $20.8 Trillion.665
The Bush administration was clearly not as concerned about the cost of the war as they were with the perceived security benefits they envisioned by prosecuting it.
662 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, (Congressional Research Service, 2014), 15. 663 Robert D. Hormats, The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars from the Revolution to the War on Terror, (Times Book, 2007). 664 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, (Congressional Research Service, 2014), 6; US National Debt Clock, Real Time U.S. National Debt Clock, accessed 31 August, 2016, http://www.usdebtclock.org/. 665 The World Bank, United States GDP (Current US $), accessed 31 August 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states. 232
Findings and Conclusions
Findings
This case provided an opportunity to compare and contrast the extended decision procedure for Iraq with the compressed Afghanistan decision cycle. It was perhaps understandable that decisions in crisis under compressed time constraints like that for Afghanistan lacked complete analysis of key decision criteria. However, the Bush NSC enjoyed a luxury of time to exercise the committee process and perform detailed analysis of their objectives for Iraq. They had ample opportunity to develop alternative policy options, to cull out and question assumptions and to understand potential consequences. Unfortunately, they did not.
This prescriptive evaluation of Bush NSC decision making on Iraq revealed that they repeated many of the same fundamental errors of analysis evident in the
Afghanistan case. Poorly formed objectives, fundamentally flawed assumptions, and negligence in analyzing potential consequences were compounded by poor planning by DOD that collectively led to an unsatisfactory policy outcome.
A repeat of Afghanistan planning, a fundamental flaw in administration analysis was that policy objectives did not precede strategy. Rather the president resolved to invade Iraq and policy objectives were stated in terms of what the administration believed they could achieve militarily. Again much like Afghanistan, policy intent was further complicated by inclusion of the aspirational objective for a democratic Iraq and failure to fully plan for successful implementation. Bush policy objectives were also collectively undermined by an absence of clear end state conditions that would describe successful achievement of them.
Decision making in the Bush NSC was characterized by selective use of expert judgment and driven by the strongest personalities within the NSC. Members
233 of the administration ignored the advice and counsel of experienced military practitioners who questioned the size of the force that would implement the president’s plan. George Bush enabled Cheney and Rumsfeld to press their agendas at the expense of other perspectives. This failing was exacerbated by the
DOD’s circumvention of the committee process. As a result, Bush’s counsel was constrained to that of his NSC Principals, the NSS, and his political staff. This assured that most agreed with his intent and effectively denied him a broader set of expertise and perspectives. This environment resulted in planning for invasion at the exclusion of other alternatives except an impatient coercive diplomatic effort that was presumed to fail.
This coercive diplomatic track was undermined by both Saddam’s misperception of Bush’s resolve and a lack of patience within the administration.
Saddam was skeptical the U.S. would actually invade and didn’t interpret the steady build-up of forces in Kuwait as an imminent threat to his regime.666 Despite Bush’s agreement to the diplomatic push for a new UN resolution and inspections, there was not extensive NSC debate or emphasis on it as a genuine alternative to war.
Bush policy objectives were further undermined by flawed, unanalyzed assumptions. Anxiety in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and fear of
WMD finding their way into the hands of terrorists led to a biased decision process.
The administration interpreted Saddam’s treatment of inspectors and apparent failure to disclose residual capabilities as proof that he was hiding WMD programs.
This was compounded by administration members selectively using intelligence
666 Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Peace, Mark e. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, The Iraq Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership, (Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2007), viii 234 products to inflate findings and judgments to fit their narrative that Saddam continued to pursue WMD and he had ties to Al Qaeda.
Once the firm decision to invade was made, the administration was responsible for planning to secure the peace after combat operations ceased.
Planning for a strong military role in post-combat stabilization was mutually de- emphasized by both OSD staff and General Franks.667 Exacerbating a lack of coordinated planning, the NSC issued NSPD-24 in January 2003, directly placing responsibility for postwar stability on USCENTCOM and DOD very late in the planning process.668 While he acknowledged that security and civic actions go hand- in-hand, Franks expected a rapid transition to Iraqi authority and neglected to plan for US-led security operations. He insisted on a division of effort where
USCENTCOM focused on operations to affect regime change and OSD was to focus on post-regime planning.669
The administration was focused on a rapid transition to civil authority. They did not envision a significant security and stability mission for the Coalition as they expected to be welcomed as liberators. The NSS, DOD, DOS, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had all assessed postwar scenarios and planned their approaches to them. Clearly these disparate efforts were poorly integrated into a civil-military plan and poorly coordinated in implementation.670
667 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 668 George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 24, (The White House, 2003), 1. 669 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, (Regan Books, 2004), 441. Franks wrote: “While we at CENTCOM were executing the war plan, Washington should focus on policy-level issues . . . I knew the President and Don Rumsfeld would back me up, so I felt free to pass the message along to the bureaucracy beneath them: You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of”; Franks also wrote: “As I had said throughout our planning sessions, civic action and security were linked—inextricably linked. There was a commonly held belief that civil action would not be possible in Iraq without security. I would continue to argue that there could be no security without civic action.” 670 Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, Andrew Rathmell, After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, (RAND Corporation, 2008), xix-xx. 235
Despite General Franks and OSD positions on security roles, USCENTCOM planners acknowledged the need to plan for security and stability operations. But they also understood the limitations of a small military force and they opted to develop a plan to leverage the Iraqi Army to assume security roles.
The DOD named Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner to lead ORHA but formed this organization only two months prior to invasion. This denied Garner and his small staff sufficient time to plan, coordinate across government agencies, and implement effectively. Even this short planning was undermined by uncoordinated political decisions. ORHA struggled with a small staff and poor funding and their efforts were short-lived. Only days after he arrived in Baghdad,
Garner was informed that President Bush had appointed Paul Bremer as his permanent envoy to Iraq in charge of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Bremer acted quickly and his unilateral decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and deny any
Baath party members a role in the government quickly obviated USCENTCOM plans to leverage the Iraqi military.671
These collective findings again illustrate direct causal implications of procedural error and omissions to the undesirable outcome in Iraq. Reinforcing the findings from the Afghanistan case, this case revealed both the strengths and limitations of the prescriptive framework. The ADA methodology was useful to cull out various omissions and incidents of flawed analysis and their relationship to challenges realized in policy implementation. The case likewise reinforced that the prescriptive methodology was not as useful to explain why these errors occurred.
Further descriptive analysis and historical documentation are necessary to fully
671L. Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities, (CPA Order Number 2, 2003). CPA 2 formally dissolved Iraq’s armed forces and its defense ministry. 236 characterize why the Bush NSC repeated many of the same errors, and worse yet, failed to correct them.
Members of the NSS were useful to explain why the NSC felt comfortable with their decision procedure based on perceived success in Afghanistan. However, there remains much to understand on why, after more than sixteen months of watching the military challenges play out there, that they did not revisit the planning assumptions for Iraq. Further, planning for invasion before identifying the objectives to be achieved by it again meant policy was dictated by strategy. Failure, even refusal within OSD to plan for post-war contingencies reflects a gross error of judgment that dramatically impacted policy intent. Some rather simple ‘what if’ analysis on
Rumsfeld’s Parade of Horribles could well have driven further contingency planning to avoid them.
Some findings in this case reinforce those from the Afghanistan case pointing to systemic failures within the national security system that had significant implications to policy performance. The Bush administration had ample time to exercise the committee process but failed to effectively manage it. Failure to do so enabled DOD’s manipulation of the process to drive their agenda. As a result, Bush’s counsel was again largely constrained to that of his NSC Principals and staff, effectively denying him a broader set of perspectives. Also similar to the Afghanistan case, Congress authorized action without asserting its authority and tying resources to clear understanding of objectives and the conditions that indicated success.
Conclusions
While responsibility ultimately lies with the president, this flawed policy procedure and its outcome is to some extent attributable to Condoleezza Rice’s
237 failure in her role as NSA. While the Department Secretaries wield significant statutory authority and influence, Rice was responsible to the president to manage their input through a structured decision procedure. Her failure to leverage the president’s authority and impose discipline on both the way the NSC deliberated issues and the committee process, enabled DOD to shape policy implementation to their own intent. The implications of Rice’s ineffectiveness are reflected in inadequate and uncoordinated interagency post-war planning, and flawed decisions by both OSD staff and General Franks’ that undermined their ability to establish security.
These shortcomings also reflect the president’s reliance on his own judgment and that of his cabinet members, rather than underpinning his decisions with robust analysis. This case reinforces that reliance on experienced judgment is insufficient by itself to address complex, unique problems. Over-reliance on judgment and experience enabled cognitive shortcuts that served to overly simplify decisions, enabled misperceptions, bias and unrealistic ideals to influence reasoning.672
An ad hoc decision procedure enabled flawed assumptions to go unaddressed resulting in avoidable errors in implementation. A recurring theme, one might reasonably expect a level of analytical rigor on these types of decisions commensurate with the lives and interests at stake. Like the Afghanistan case, it is reasonable to expect the NSC to apply a level of analytical rigor at least equal to that which any company would in analyzing financial decisions that involve their hard- earned assets. They did not.
672 Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Science, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974), 1124.Tversky and Kahneman observe that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.” 238
In a further illustration of a lack of critical thinking, members of the administration asserted that there were no alternatives to invasion argued within the
NSC.673 In fact, George Tenet and Richard Hass echoed Richard Armitage’s assertion that the president never held a formal debate on whether to invade or not.674 NSC staff acknowledge Powell’s consistent push for a diplomatic track and pursuit of UN agreement, but they did not recall any instance where the Secretary forcefully argued against invasion. They rather assert that his role in the debate centered on the need for legitimacy, and an overwhelming use of force if invasion was warranted.675
Reinforcing the findings of the Afghanistan case, the ADA framework was useful in characterizing the implications of these analytical failures, and the specific areas of decision-making process discontinuity, but it was not well suited to explain
‘why’ these omissions and flaws occurred. This again suggests the complementary nature of ADA methods to mainstream FPA. The ADA framework’s focus on the specific discontinuities that held implications to policy performance served to focus mainstream FPA analysis to answer the ‘why’ questions. For example, the NSC’s quick agreement with the president on the CIA plan without detailed analysis of the many assumptions and potential consequences of it may be well explained by
Janis’s description of groupthink and confirmation bias. Janis characterized these dynamics at play in the Kennedy NSC during the Bay of Pigs.676 He viewed
673 John Prados and Christopher Ames, The National Security Archive: The Iraq War -- Part II: Was There Even a Decision? (George Washington University, 2010), accessed 9 October 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/index.htm.. 674 Richard L. Armitage, (Journal of the National Defense University, 2009 ), 104; George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007), 305, 308; Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon and Schuster, 2009), 227-228. 675 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 676 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 14-47. 239
Kennedy’s NSC as full of intelligent advisors who failed to follow a disciplined decision procedure, accepting a flawed plan from the CIA without criticism.677
There was another Groupthink dynamic at play here, where the president’s beliefs, leadership style and personality constrained the behavior of individuals involved in a group decision procedure. This served to privilege some members over others.678 Both NSS members and Richard Haass observed that Cheney and
Rumsfeld were able to readily assert that their views complemented the president’s, while Powell had to overcome dissent from the Vice President, NSA, and
SECDEF.679
A similar and critically important factor in the Bush administration push to invade was the way in which OSD manipulated intelligence findings to support their narrative. Doug Feith was the force behind the work of the PCTEG to draw more certain findings and judgments than had Intelligence Community (IC) analysts.680
These findings and judgments inflated the links between Saddam and Al Qaeda, falsely reinforcing both the president’s and NSC member’s perception of the threat.681 In this way Doug Feith acted beyond organizational authorities and constraints to directly impact policy. This illustrates DOD’s bureaucratic power and the limitations of presidential control over organizational processes both ably explained by Allison’s models.682
677 Ibid. 678 Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, Groupthink: High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations, (Columbia University Press, 1983), 54-55. 679 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017); Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2009), 222. Haass’ characterization matches that of NSS staff who observed the NSC first-hand. 680 Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S Senate, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Pre- War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, (U.S. Senate, 2004), 287-288. 681 Ibid, 304-314. 682 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 699-709. 240
These are not minor oversights of procedure, nor inconsequential flaws of analysis. Rather this reinforces emphasis on both the NSA’s lack of control over the decision procedure, and Rumsfeld’s apparent lack of control over his organization’s staff work that had significant implications. This instance again illustrates the ability of strong personalities to leverage organizational authority to the detriment of policy legitimacy.683
The ADA methodology reflected similar findings as those from the
Afghanistan case, demonstrating its utility to focus on flawed analysis and the neglect of key decision criteria. It again demonstrated its ability to inform the ‘what’ questions while also affirming its limitations to explain why these errors occurred.
The ADA methodology was useful to focus on the implications of the Bush desire to establish a democratic Iraq, and Bush’s transformational ideology was clearly a key factor driving unrealistic policy. However, it did not require a great deal of effort to foresee the rather obvious consequences of inaccurate assumptions. Among these were assumptions that Coalition forces would be viewed as liberators, that this would translate to a rapid transition to Iraqi authority, and that these would collectively result in a level of security sufficient to enable post-regime stability and effective governance. These could have been rather easily considered and mitigating plans developed should they prove inaccurate.
The ADA framework was not capable of sufficiently explaining why the NSC again failed to question their assumptions, particularly those underpinning Bush’s
Freedom Agenda. This represents a situation Steiner described where a decision maker maintains strong beliefs and acts on them despite the risks involved. As a
683 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. Allison does not necessarily account for strong personalities within government organizations whose actions and influences can have significant impact on policy despite the authority of the leader of the organization, in this case Donald Rumsfeld. 241 result, they make decisions about what they desire or what might be attainable and do not alter them even when subsequent evidence contradicts them.684 The president’s decision making on Iraq was biased in this way and this belief influenced
NSC deliberations from the start.
Revisiting an important point, it was the president’s intent for a democratic
Iraq that enabled Wolfowitz and Feith to include transformational objectives that were at odds with Rumsfeld’s thinking. Rumsfeld thought that attempting to build a democratic Iraq was impractical.685 Both he and his deputies focused on regime change but from very different perspectives and certainly not in a unified manner.
Both approaches had detrimental effects on implementation. OSD resistance to coordinating an interagency plan for post-war stability and governance undermined any potential for a smooth democratic transition. Houghton’s description of Homo
Bureaucraticus fits here where parts of the government were pulling in different directions undermining intent.686 This dysfunction once again illustrates the challenge of control over large organizations where assertive personalities can act with a great deal of latitude.
It does not require a great deal of critical thinking to discern that introduction of democratic principles and institutions to a society that had only ever known autocratic rule, would require a prolonged period of transition. Some rather straightforward analysis on the implications of resourcing a long transition should have driven deeper thinking and planning for the post-war stability and
684 Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 88- 106, 112-139. 685 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 333. Feith indicated that Rumsfeld believed strongly that the longer U.S. forces occupied the country the more likely his “Parade of Horribles” would be realized. This underpinned hi rationale for a smaller, lethal force and rapid transition to Iraqi governance. 686 David Patrick Houghton, The Decision Point, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 30-31. 242 reconstruction plan. It is illustrative that Donald Rumsfeld’s “Parade of Horribles” was not given appropriate debate or analysis. In this single document Rumsfeld had enumerated numerous hazards, the majority of which were realized. It is then remarkable that these did not provoke further detailed analysis of potential consequences.
The Bush administration justified their policy in terms of a compelling WMD proliferation threat posed by a rogue regime who also sponsored or gave safe haven to terrorists.687 The president could have limited his policy to removing the WMD threat and kept his objectives manageable. However, he encumbered his policy with regime change and with it, a risky aspirational objective for a democratic Iraq, asserting that it would create an example and set the conditions to spread democracy across the Middle East.688
Removing Saddam Hussein may be considered an operational success in this context, however much like Afghanistan, operational success did not translate to the desired strategic objective of a stable democracy in the Middle East. Instead the invasion inflamed age-old fissures between Shia and Sunni as well as between Arab and Kurd. By late 2006 the Sunni insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq successfully ignited a sectarian civil war. Rumsfeld’s “Parade of Horribles” were realized.
Failure to plan for the hazards Rumsfeld enumerated was costly. The U.S. public’s patience and willingness to continue to support the administration’s goals eroded. A series of Pew Research surveys reflects this erosion of support from an
687 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (White House, 2001), Access May, 2013: http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; George W. Bush, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution (White House, 2002). Accessed August, 2013: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-7.html. 688 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 232. 243 initial 72% approval in 2003, to 38% by 2008. The surveys likewise reflected a steady erosion of public support for keeping U.S. troops in Iraq.689
If the Bush administration were to measure success in Iraq in terms of having established a democracy there, success or failure may not be entirely clear for decades to come. Iraq now possesses a weak, corrupt central government where powerful Shia militias undermine any efforts to unify Sunni and Kurdish factions.690
Even if Iraq were to become a model of democracy in the future, the invasion remains a strategic failure from an ends, ways, and means perspective, where the security benefit was not proportional to the costs incurred. Any prospects for improved regional stability were undermined by U.S. support to the Shia majority in
Iraq. This alienated regional Sunni governments who feared a Shia government would invite greater Iranian influence.691 They in turn supported Sunni insurgents in
Iraq.692 The effect was to push the Shia controlled government closer to Iran.693
Ultimately, U.S. actions in Iraq resulted in greater instability that increasingly jeopardize U.S. interests in the region.694
689 Pew Research Center, Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008, (Pew Research Center, 2008), access 12 April 2006: http://www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward- the-war-in-iraq-20032008/. 690 Ibid, 2 691 Geneive Abdo, Deborah Amos, Reza Aslan Associate, F. Gregory Gause III, Ed Husain, Vali R. Nasr, The Sunni-Shia Divide, (The Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), accessed 26 December, 2014 at: http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/?cid=otr- marketing_url-sunni_shia_infoguide. 692 Stephen M. Walt, Lessons of Two Wars: We Will Lose in Iraq and Afghanistan, (Foreign Policy, 2011), accessed 7 July, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/16/lessons_of_two_wars_we_will_lose_in_iraq_and_afgh anistan#sthash.l0ejjOVc.8V85bi7w.dpuf. 693 Daniel L. Byman, The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraq: Testimony Before the House Committee On Foreign Affairs, (The Brookings Institution, 2013), accessed 31 December 2013 at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/12/12-resurgence-al-qaeda-iraq-byman#. 694 Jim Garamone, Obama Describes Core US Interests in the Middle East, (American Forces Press Service, 2013), President Obama reiterated U.S. interests in the Middle East including assuring the free flow of energy resources, countering terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and "... a peaceful, prosperous, stable and democratic Middle East...", Accessed March 17, 2014: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120847. 244
This study also affirmed a systemic challenge from the previous case, that executive authority to form foreign policy unchecked by assertive legislative checks and balances represents an unreasonably risky approach to national security.
Congress failed to sufficiently challenge and shape the administration’s objectives or the assumptions that underpinned them. They failed to impose clear conditions under which they would permit the president to use military force. The result was administration pursuit of open-ended objectives with no constraints on the means to do so. Since presidents will predictably push the limits of Executive authority, only legislative action establishing a legal requirement for specific criteria to be met as a condition for Congressional support is likely to resolve this problem in the future.
This dynamic clearly illustrates what Mintz described as the
'Noncompensatory Principle,' where members of Congress, particularly Democrats in this case, were unlikely to make decisions that could harm them politically.695
Perpetually focused on the next election, they chose not to force the issue and fully debate a declaration of war, effectively ceding their authority to the president.
These findings and conclusions reinforce those of the Afghanistan case demonstrating the utility of an ADA methodology to illustrate deviations from a rational procedure and their implications to both policy implementation and outcomes. This case also reinforced the limitations of a prescriptive methodology to explain why these errors and omissions of analysis occurred. Yet, in emphasizing the implications of deviations from a rational decision procedure, the methodology provides a useful lens to focus descriptive explanation on the crucial elements of the decision with clear causal links to performance. In this way this case study again
695 Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making," (Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993), 598. 245 suggests the utility of an ADA approach in bridging the gap between normative and descriptive theories. Where a normative procedure represents an ideal, the prescriptive methodology traces how decisions were actually formed, emphasizing deviations from a rational procedure, and explaining why these deviations matter.
From a broader perspective, these repeated errors within the Bush NSC reflect trends and patterns that point to systemic challenges within the national security system. These will be further evaluated through comparison with the analytical procedure of the succeeding Obama administration in forming their policy approach to Afghanistan. Doing so enables focused comparison between the decision procedures of two administrations considering a common problem, and either validation or rejection of previous findings on systemic challenges within the national security system.
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Chapter VII
Afghanistan – The 2009 Surge
Barack Obama inherited the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his administration would have to confront the same problems as his predecessor in forming their policy. Since Obama’s stated intent upon entering office was to withdraw U.S. combat forces from Iraq and focus on Afghanistan, the manner in which the Obama NSC informed their policy on Afghanistan is evaluated here.
This case represented an opportunity to evaluate the Obama decision procedure both in terms of the prescriptive framework outlined in Figure 1, and that of the previous administration. This evaluation again attempts to validate the utility of the ADA methodology and to understand the degree to which their decision analysis procedure represented a causal factor in the outcome of the Obama policy.
Comparison with the Bush decision procedure also enabled consideration of the degree to which the Obama procedure affirms or refutes earlier findings on systemic issues within the U.S. national Security system.
Barack Obama entered office in January 2009, having run his campaign building on his long-standing criticism of Iraq as a disastrous war of choice, and
Afghanistan as the right but neglected war against Al Qaeda and terrorism.696
Obama had promised that if elected, he would end the war in Iraq and emphasize winning in Afghanistan. He had disparaged the foreign policy establishment for
“Washington Groupthink” in
696 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 86-87. 247
Decision Criteria Specific to Key Considerations: Security Policy Analysis: Define the Policy Issue - Did the President clerly articulate what was at stake to the nation? (Interests at Stake) - Did procedure consider the priority of the threat in context of competing interests?
- What were the key disagreements? How were they adjudicated? (Understand the Decision Environment) - What were laws, organizations and institutions, policies, strategies, and treaties that influenced policy development? - What were key motivations influencing actions and reactions (such as strategic culture, cultural identity, political or ideological culture, resilience)? (Key Stakeholders Foreign and Domestic) - To what extent did staffs consider foreign and domestic stakeholders, audiences, and policy communities who have influence in the scope and nature of the policy decision?
Develop Objectives - What was the President's guidance, intent?
(Policy Objectives) - How were policy objectives developed and were desired end state conditions defined?
(Key Assumptions) - Did the NSC analyze key assumptions, stated and unstated, and factors shaping policy objectives?
(Define End State Conditions & - Did the NSC define how policy success/failure would be evaluated? Measures of Policy Success)
Develop Policy Options - Did NSC consider a range of options that may satisfy the policy objectives?
Analyze Options - How were policy options analyzed and validated?
(Identify Both Expected and Potential - How were consequences assessed and risk articulated? Consequences)
(Identify Key Uncertainties) - What uncertainties exist adding risk to the decision? - How were policy options compared and contrasted by the President?
The President's Decision - What were the trade-offs and deciding factors in the President's decision? Criteria - How effectively was the policy decision communicated to key audiences/stakeholders? - How did the President assess policy effectiveness and whether adjustment was required?
Figure 1. enabling the Bush administration to prosecute a war in Iraq that he considered unnecessary.697 Having harshly criticized George W. Bush’s foreign policy, he also had campaigned on the promise to break with what he phrased as Bush’s unilateralist approach to foreign policy and to rebuild strained relationships.698 In the broadest sense his foreign policy intent was to repair and protect the liberal international order that the United States helped create after World War II.699
697 Barack Obama: "Press Release - On Fifth Anniversary of Speech Opposing Iraq War, Obama Again Challenges Conventional Washington Thinking," (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 2007), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=93308. 698 David J. Rothkopf, National Insecurity: American Leadership in the Age of Fear, (PublicAffairs, 2014), 157-158. 699 Barack Obama, Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan, (New York Times, 2008), accessed 16 December 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text- obama.html?pagewanted=all. 248
During his campaign Obama offered a more assertive approach in
Afghanistan, stating his willingness to send American forces into Pakistan to pursue
Al Qaeda should Pakistan fail to act against them.700 This intent represented a dramatic expansion in the scope of the war. Many attributed his statements, particularly regarding Pakistan, to inexperience or campaign rhetoric designed to appear strong on defense. Michael Hayden, then CIA Director, expected that when confronted with the facts about ongoing operations and the nature of the threat environment, the new president would adjust his perspective on many Bush administration policies.701
Obama’s national security decision-making procedure was much different than George W. Bush’s. While Bush’s was characterized by dominant principals like
Cheney and Rumsfeld, Obama’s procedure was characterized by a close relationship with political staff and certain members of his NSS.702 It became increasingly apparent over the course of his presidency that Barack Obama relied on his own intellect and analysis to form decisions. He was an independent thinker who challenged assumptions and was open to taking political risks. He demonstrated an understanding of foreign policy resource implications and he sought out many perspectives. This president’s embrace of analysis presented a ready environment
700 Barack Obama, Townhall meeting at the National Council of La Raza conference in Miami Beach, (Reuters, 2007), accessed 11 March 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics- obama/tough-talk-on-pakistan-from-obama-idUSN0132206420070801. 701 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 103. 702 Robert M. Gates, The Quiet Fury of Robert Gates, (Wall Street Journal, 2014), accessed 15 January 2017. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304617404579306851526222552, Gates describes the Obama White House as: “I never confronted Obama directly over what I (as well as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta and others) saw as his determination that the White House tightly control every aspect of national security policy and even operations. His White House was by far the most centralized and controlling in national security of any I had seen since Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger ruled the roost.” 249 where the NSC could have leveraged rigorous decision analysis to inform Obama’s decision-making, perhaps avoiding the errors of the previous administration.
Define The Policy Issue
The security issues framed by the Obama administration for Afghanistan were essentially the same as those of the Bush administration. Al Qaeda remained a significant threat to the homeland and U.S. interests around the world. Al Qaeda was able to operate from remote areas of tribal regions in Pakistan where they remained relatively safe. The Taliban represented a clear threat to the democratically elected government and Afghan Security Forces were incapable of securing the nation without military assistance.
Prior to making any declarative policy decisions, Obama directed a sixty-day assessment of Afghanistan strategy in order to gain some clarity and begin to formulate his policy. In terms of this study’s prescriptive methodology, this was a good first step enabling the president to first validate or adjust policy objectives before determining how to go about achieving them. Bruce Riedel, a former Bush
NSC member and Middle East intelligence specialist informing Obama’s campaign, headed up the assessment teaming with Michele Flournoy who was then Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Richard Holbrooke who was Obama’s Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Based on the Riedel, Flournoy, Holbrooke assessment, the administration discerned that disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was not sufficient to ensure security. They asserted that doing so also required effective operations against Al Qaeda in Pakistan. They likewise discerned that reversing a
250
Taliban insurgency required denying them support and freedom of movement across the Pakistani border.
It should not be surprising that the product of the assessment mirrored
Riedel’s previously published book on the topic emphasizing that Pakistan, not
Afghanistan was the core U.S. interest in Central Asia.703 Riedel immediately recommended a fully resourced counterinsurgency approach that included going after insurgents in Pakistan. A fully resourced counterinsurgency ‘strategy’ he concluded would require an additional 100,000 troops, a number that no one in the military or the administration had advocated.704
Interests at Stake
In this case the Obama administration inherited a strategy that was pursuing the previous administration’s objectives. In accordance with the prescriptive methodology, the new administration’s desire for a new strategy should logically have been preceded by a focused NSC evaluation and validation of interests, and then formulation of objectives to secure them. This was not the case and represents the first significant deviation from a prescribed analytical procedure. Defining the interests at stake was an essential first step in framing what the administration intended to do about securing them.705 Framing the interests in Afghanistan in the context of others and characterizing their intensity was also important to define an appropriate policy.706
703 Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda, (Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 704 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). 705 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), Preface. 706 Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: U.S. National Interests in the 1980s, (University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 9-10. 251
The administration’s early position reflected Riedel’s assessment and a fundamental change in defining Pakistan as the vital interest in the region. This presented Barack Obama with a challenge to articulate a continued U.S. interest in
Afghanistan that would meet with domestic approval, while attempting to go after Al
Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan. While the Taliban and Al Qaeda remained the operational focus in Afghanistan, the policy objectives and strategy would become much more complicated by committing significant resources to operations in
Pakistan.707
It was months later that a frustrated president pressed his NSC that they had to begin again with interests and form their objectives from there.708 Many administration policy decisions had been made before this effort was undertaken.
Based on the Riedel assessment, the president’s March 2009 agreement to increase troops in support of a counterinsurgency ‘strategy’ was essentially a continuation of the Bush approach. The significant difference was increased counter- terror operations in Pakistan. This strategy was to be revisited in a year’s time.
In announcing his strategy, the president had summed up his characterization of U.S. interests as “…Al Qaida is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the
707 Barack Obama, A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, 2009), accessed June 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/03/27/a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and- pakistan. 708 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). Staff affirm the Bob Woodward and Robert Gates accounts of the 13 September meeting where the president heard competing positions and became frustrated that they were revising the Riedel strategy in September when they had said they would give a year. The McCrystal assessment drove this reconsideration. Before accepting any position the president wanted to start with interests to gain a better perspective on what was necessarily at stake. 252
Taliban or allows Al Qaida to go unchallenged, that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”709
With this rationale the president made the case that a stable Afghanistan free of the Taliban and Al Qaeda remained vital to U.S. security interests. Obama also emphasized Al Qaeda represented an international threat indicating that recent attacks around the globe and in Kabul were tied to Al Qaida and its allies in
Pakistan.710 He likewise warned that the Pakistani government was at risk for their failure to address terrorist elements within their borders and that if they did not act, the U.S. would.
Obama’s concerns about Pakistan were expressed in terms of implications to both the mission in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda’s threat to the homeland. However, it is fair to assert that the most important U.S. security interest in Pakistan was the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons and the potential for lost control and proliferation of nuclear materials.711
It is not clear how Riedel and others believed U.S. actions inside Pakistan would have served to improve Pakistani government stability or the security of their nuclear weapons or materials. Rather, success with the Riedel strategy largely depended on a dramatic increase in U.S. resources, and motivating the Pakistanis to address terrorist threats inside their borders, thereby improving security to their nuclear arsenal.
709 Barack Obama, Transcript: Obama Announces New Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategies, (Washington Post, 2009), accessed 16 December 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/03/27/AR2009032700891.html. 710 Ibid. 711 William J. Perry, Report on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy, (International Security Advisory Board, 2012), 2. Accessed 12 March 2016, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/199627.pdf. 253
President Obama initially supported the strategy but did not fully resource it as he desired time to further evaluate the conflict and develop his own policy and strategy based on a fresh look at U.S. interests. Soon after the March strategy decision, General Stanley McCrystal replaced General David McKiernan and completed his own sixty-day assessment. By late summer, McCrystal’s proposed campaign strategy was an even bigger population-centric counterinsurgency.712
With Gates’s advocacy, McCrystal’s overview drove debate in a second strategic assessment.
McCrystal’s assessment affirmed that Al Qaeda remained in the region and represented a continued threat, but their safe haven was now in Pakistan’s largely ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).713 As the NSC debated a new strategy in September 2009, the president was forceful that he did not want to see a troop request from McCrystal until the interests and objectives were defined.714
Understand the Decision Environment
The Obama NSC effort to understand the decision environment consumes a considerable portion of this case study. This is due in part because the administration inherited the conflict in Afghanistan, and the implications of the previous administration’s actions with it.
Barack Obama’s approach to a new Afghanistan strategy would be shaped by inherited objectives and undesirable trends in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
712 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 353-356. 713 National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007), 6. Accessed 12 July 2016, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//nukevault/ebb270/18.pdf. 714 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Telephone Interview, 2018), This advisor recalled the forceful language Secretary Gates used with GEN McCrystal that at the president’s direction he would not submit a troop any request prior to completion of the strategic review. 254
Development of a new strategy was complicated by strong advocates for opposing approaches within his NSC. Competing for the president’s attention was a dire financial crisis that threatened to push the nation into economic depression.715 This financial crisis dominated domestic political attention and denied the president time to focus on Afghanistan. In this case one would expect the president to rely on his
NSC.
Sorting through the mélange of factors to discern those that might truly influence success or failure of a new strategy was the analytical challenge for the president’s NSC and his NSS. As with any complex issue, varying experiences, competing opinions, agendas and values complicated the effort. Robert Gates succinctly characterized the national security system in dealing with these types of complex problems, that “ultimately they had to be addressed by just eight people.”
Gates was referring to the president, vice president, the NSA, and NSC principals.716
This description focused attention on the small group of professionals upon whose experience, judgment and analytical acumen represent the fulcrum of policy decision making.
As previously discussed, the administration believed progress in Afghanistan had been impaired by insufficient resources and attention. This was largely the result of the rapid Bush administration transition in priority from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003.
This shift had the effect of denying successive commanders in Afghanistan the resources they required to simultaneously pursue counter-terror operations and maintain security in the presence of a growing Taliban insurgency. A disproportionate amount of funding and effort spent on military operations versus
715 Economic Report of the President, (Council of Economic Advisers, 2017), 21. Accessed 9 January 2018. Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/erp/2017 716 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 151. 255 reconstruction over the period of 2001-2008 reflects their challenge in providing security.717
During this period Hamid Karzai’s government demonstrated pervasive corruption enabled by a U.S. influenced constitution that failed to impose power- sharing, or a system of checks and balances on presidential power.718 This resulted in a corrupt legislature and power centralized in the president. Compounding these factors was that Karzai won a second term through election rigging.719 An increasingly illegitimate government, graft and lack of security enabled a burgeoning
Taliban insurgency.
The U.S. military focus in Afghanistan had to this point been counterterrorism operations leaving the reconstruction and nation-building efforts to the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). National Security Advisor, General
James Jones characterized this period as a disrespectful failure to embrace the full
NATO contribution. He expressed Obama’s desire for a more international effort describing the past as “we didn’t consult, we didn’t ask, we didn’t listen” to allies willing to contribute, characterizing the mission as focused on U.S. and United
Kingdom missions at the expense of others.720
When Barack Obama took office in 2009, senior military leaders had been expressing concern about the combination of Taliban territorial gains and Al Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan for some time.721 General David McKiernan had been
717 Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way, (Yale University Press, 2011), 134. 718 Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the Propaganda of Silence (Seven Stories Press, 2006), 142. 719 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, New evidence of widespread fraud in Afghanistan election uncovered, (The Guardian, 2009), accessed 2 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/18/afghanistan-election-fraud-evidence. 720 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 134-135. Jones made these statements to a British Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. 721 General David McKiernan, Situation in Afghanistan, (Pentagon, 2008), accessed 17 September 2016, https://www.c-span.org/video/?281532-1/situation-afghanistan. McKiernan re-emphasized the 256 requesting additional forces to counter the Taliban insurgency since summer 2008.
Of the 30,000 troops McKiernan requested, President Bush committed 9,000 before he left office. President Obama entered office with decisions on these issues awaiting his response.
The 60-day Riedel assessment had resulted in the president’s agreement to a troop increase. 722 Before General McKiernan could put the additional forces to use he was relieved of command, and Obama nominated General Stanley McCrystal to replace him. Secretary Gates gave McCrystal sixty days to conduct his own assessment of the conditions in Afghanistan. This review would inform the extended strategy review that lasted well into the autumn.723
A key factor influencing the quality of policy decisions during these reviews was Obama’s use of his national security team. Obama’s personal staff and NSS enjoyed unusual empowerment to act outside of normal lines of communication to the departments.724 This was not the original intent for the NSS. The NSS had traditionally been a coordinating body for interagency and departmental development, and policy implementation. 725 This is an important point as government agencies and departments have statutory authorities to act, the NSS do not. Secretary Gates grew concerned about the increased size and increasingly hands-on role of the Obama NSS.726
need for additional resources including funds, economic support, and more civilians to support governance and reconstruction and more combat forces to battle the growing Taliban insurgency. 722 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 723 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 348-343, 367. 724 Robert M. Gates, The Quiet Fury of Robert Gates, (Wall Street Journal, 2014), accessed 15 January 2017. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304617404579306851526222552. 725 David J. Rothkopf, National Insecurity: American Leadership in the Age of Fear, (PublicAffairs, 2014), 164-168. 726 Robert M. Gates, The Quiet Fury of Robert Gates, (Wall Street Journal, 2014), accessed 15 January 2017. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304617404579306851526222552. 257
Perhaps a more important factor influencing policy was Gates’ observation that the NSS would normally act as an honest broker, ensuring the president had all the facts for decision. In this case the NSS actively advocated for their preferred position, alienating the DOS and DOD in the process.727 NSS were firmly in favor of a counter-terror focus and their access to the president effectively put a finger on the scale tilting debate within the NSC.
Gates became particularly upset that NSS members were talking directly to
Commanders in the field. Direct NSS communication with the Afghanistan country team and military staff were in Gates’s estimation, mini Departments of State and
Defense inside the White House. He asserted they were exceeding their roles and responsibilities by implementing a policy agenda rather than coordinating its implementation through the departments who had statutory responsibility to do so.728
Members of the NSS asserted that their communicating directly with Commanders and military staff was not unusual. They further argued that many times they could not get the Pentagon to respond quickly enough or that responses were not candid.729
Barack Obama’s reliance on a few staff and his own analysis effectively minimized the impact of more experienced cabinet principals and ideas from the departments that might have helped the administration avoid unnecessary errors.730
727 Ibid, 384-385. 728 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 482. 729 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), Staff asserted that direct communication with commands was done due to administration angst over the slowness of Pentagon response and that OSD versions of Commander’s responses were often restated inaccurately. Staff also asserted that NSS members have done this historically, but that Gates was particularly sensitive to it. 730 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 290-292. 258
Complicating the president’s decision-making, competing voices managed to reduce policy and strategy debates to one over operational and tactical approaches relating to the appropriateness of counterterrorism versus counterinsurgency.
This debate pitted Vice President Biden and NSS members who advocated a counter-terror focus, against others who advocated for an expanded counterinsurgency focus, including Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, Admiral
Mullen, Generals McCrystal and Petraeus, and Bruce Riedel.731 Ambassador Karl
Eikenberry’s assessment complemented Biden’s. Eikenberry had previously served as Commander, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, and witnessed the resurgence of the Taliban. While he offered no policy solutions, Eikenberry offered an experienced perspective on the proposed strategy that did not support the counterinsurgency position of the military. These opposing positions frustrated the president at the lack of strategic thinking and complicated his decision-making. 732
Adding complexity to the debate were key elements of the initial Riedel assessment. Riedel contended that Afghanistan could not be secured so long as Al
Qaeda and the Taliban enjoyed a safe base of operations in Pakistan from which they moved freely. Increased focus on Pakistan had in fact begun in the Bush administration. Pakistan had grown increasingly unstable fueled by their ever- present paranoia over India, and by multiple terrorist groups in the ungoverned portions of the country.733 The Pakistani military had demonstrated a reluctance or unwillingness to confront the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), alternatively referred to
731 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). 732 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 232-233. Bob Woodward relays a conversation between the president and Press Secretary Robert Gibbs where the president opined that he was tired of “boilerplate statements” and that “People have to stop telling me what I already know…and we have to get to the point where we hear some information about what people want to do.” 733 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, (RAND, 2008), 54-56. Accessed 15 September 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf. 259 as the Pakistani Taliban. They also demonstrated an unwillingness to confront the
Haqqani network operating largely in its tribal areas.734 An unstable nuclear power that harbored and even enabled terrorist organizations was unacceptable to
President Bush. He had authorized limited cross-border operations and drone strikes in his last year in office.735
Obama became increasingly convinced that any policy for Afghanistan must consider the strategic center of gravity for the fight against Al Qaeda was in
Pakistan.736 The resulting U.S. escalation in attacks inside a sovereign Pakistan served to increase instability there and jeopardized the U.S.-Pakistan military alliance.737
Though a lack of resources was viewed as a key impediment to U.S. and
NATO effort, any viable policy intent also depended on a capable partner in the
Afghan government. Biden and others asserted that Karzai was not a viable partner and Ambassador Eikenberry’s assessment affirmed it.738 Members of the president’s staff emphasized that corruption and graft in the Karzai government was a key factor determining the president’s eventual policy shift from an objective for a democratic Afghanistan to “…a more capable and accountable Afghan government.”739
734 Ibid, 54-61. 735 Pir Zubair Shah, Eric Schmitt And Jane Perlezsept, American Forces Attack Militants on Pakistani Soil, (New York Times, 2008). Accessed 16 September 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/04/world/asia/04attack.html. 736 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), Staff observed that Obama’s conviction was informed by Riedel’s assessment as well as intelligence and military analysis. 737 Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria, U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), accessed March 12, 2016, 738 Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns, (Department of State, 2009), 3. Accessed 17 September 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/documents/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in- afghanistan#p=1. 739 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 260
Policy success in Afghanistan likewise required a level of sustained security that had not yet been achieved over a period of eight years. Inability to generate and sustain capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in sufficient numbers was also an impediment to transitioning security responsibility to the Afghans. Constant attrition continued to deny an adequate capability. This challenge would not be overcome before Obama left office. In fact, a January 2017 assessment by the U.S.
Special Investigator General for Afghan Reconstruction affirmed that the ANSF were still not yet capable of securing the country.740 This assessment came as U.S. and
NATO forces were dramatically reduced and the Taliban regained control of large portions of the country.741
The Obama administration certainly recognized the persistence and resilience of the Taliban. Richard Holbrooke advocated for dealing with them, understanding that some acceptable accommodation between the Taliban and the Afghan government was necessary to end the conflict.742 General McCrystal’s intent, supported by Petraeus and Gates, was also to attempt reconciliation with the
Taliban.743 Any intent to reconcile elements of the Taliban were opposed by the
Karzai government. This impasse left McCrystal in the position of continuing to fight an insurgency while attempting to improve ANSF capabilities sufficiently to combat them on their own.
This scenario echoes the Nixon administration’s policy of “Vietnamization” where they embraced a flawed political solution, rationalizing that an improved South
Vietnamese military could succeed where a large U.S. force along with the South
740 Special Investigator General for Afghan Reconstruction, High Risk List January 2017, 11. Accessed 11 January 2017, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2017_High-Risk_List.pdf#page=17. 741 Ibid, 13. 742 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 240-243. 743 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 261
Vietnamese forces could not.744 The comparisons here are uncanny as then
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird described the program to the House Armed
Services Committee. He asserted that Vietnamization was "the effective assumption by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces of a larger share of combat operations from American forces," so that "U.S. forces can be in fact withdrawn in substantial numbers."745
This approach was certainly rooted in political calculus where the Nixon administration did not want to be seen as losing the war, and this approach provided the political space to declare mission success. In this case the administration articulated an approach that shifted responsibility for potential outcomes on the
South Vietnamese government. Certainly, Barack Obama’s staff were concerned about similar issues and pursued a similar approach that shifted responsibility for security to the Afghan government. This scenario reflects elements of Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory that characterized decision-maker’s choices among alternatives based on their aversion to loss.746
Beyond the conditions in Afghanistan, other factors negatively influenced
Obama’s decisions. Key among these was an unhealthy erosion of trust between the administration and senior military leadership. The president and his political staff were suspicious of military maneuvering and viewed public statements from senior military leaders on strategy as campaigning for their position. 747 They viewed these statements as undermining the president and constraining his options.748
744 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, Part I, 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970, 7023-7024. 745 Ibid. 746 Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, (Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1979), 263 747 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 748 Ibid, Staff indicated that the administration became increasingly suspicious that DOD and senior military leaders were constraining the president’s decision space and their response was to constrain their access. 262
Tension grew when the Washington Post leaked a secret McChrystal report on his review of the conflict. The president believed the military had leaked the report.749 Members of McCrystal’s advisory staff deny this and assert the leak likely originated among Congressional Republicans who supported an expanded counter- insurgency.750 McCrystal further exacerbated the situation by offering comments in media interviews during the second strategy review, asserting that the Biden counterterrorism-plus option could not succeed. This presented the president with a dilemma. If he were to adopt Biden’s option, McCrystal’s publicly offered opinion on it would make it appear as though he were ignoring military expertise.751
General Petraeus also crossed the president who saw him as promoting
McCrystal’s approach, when he contacted the Washington Post and offered a rebuttal to another Post reporter’s story in early September.752 CJCS Mullen was likewise seen as undermining the president by supporting a fully resourced counterinsurgency in his confirmation hearings in September 2009.753 These instances represent a vitally important element of civil-military relations. A key tenet of trust in this relationship is one where senior military leaders provide their best advice and counsel to the Commander-in-Chief in an unbiased and private manner.
This professional imperative had been violated multiple times at the very highest levels, and White House officials were angry.754
Obama’s frustration with the military was amplified by a lack of critical thinking skills in his own NSC to inform his decision-making. The roots of the president’s lack of confidence in his NSC is perhaps best described by Gates. Gates expressed his
749 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Interview, 2018). 750 Ibid. 751 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 752 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 157-159. 753 Ibid, 172-173. 754 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 263 relief early in the administration that General Jim Jones was appointed National
Security Advisor, “because no one else in the White House at the senior level had been in the military,”…“nor, apart from Jones’s deputy at the NSC, Tom Donilon, did the senior people at the White House have any executive branch experience in national security affairs.”755 Gates also pointed out the young and inexperienced composition of the NSS as a contributing factor.756
Exacerbating this challenge, the president empowered and relied on his political staff and NSS to the consternation of Gates and Clinton.757 Gates was particularly disturbed by this relationship. He observed that the president relied on a small number of trusted personal staff and confidantes to form and tightly control the most important decisions, and did so outside the formal NSC process.758 In fact,
Gates referred to the Obama White House as “by far the most centralized and controlling in national security of any I had seen since Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger.”759
Given these observations on the president’s frustration with the lack of strategic thinking within his cabinet, it should also not be surprising that the new president sought outside counsel. Obama sought advice from experienced and respected actors like Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sandy
Berger, and Colin Powell.760 Powell counseled him to avoid getting pushed to a decision by strong voices and personalities, and to think it through on his own.761
One might have anticipated some quick changes to the cabinet to improve this
755 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 290. 756 Ibid, 287-288. 757 Ibid, 482. 758 758 Robert M. Gates, The Quiet Fury of Robert Gates, (Wall Street Journal, 2014), accessed 15 January 2017. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304617404579306851526222552. 759 Ibid. 760 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 137. 761 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 174-175. 264 weakness in decision support but there were not. In fact, the first substantive change to the Obama cabinet was not until Robert Gates left in 2011.762
As mentioned earlier, the most significant factor distracting the new president from focus on security policy was a deepening financial crisis that threatened to sink the nation into economic depression. The dominating nature of this issue cannot be overstated. The tenuous condition of U.S. and global financial markets represented a true existential threat to the economy. The economy was shrinking at a rate unseen since the 1950s.763 While the Bush administration had bailed out large investment banks, the major markets continued to shrink losing more than 40% of their volume over a five month period as businesses bled jobs at an alarming rate along the way.764 A major employer, the U.S. automobile industry was also failing and required a Congressionally supported bailout package.765
If Obama was not already sensitive to the cost of the war in Afghanistan, the degree to which he intended to focus America’s effort and resources on “the good war,” were certainly influenced by the realities of the economic crisis.766 The prospect of a long, expensive counterinsurgency and nation-building commitment was not acceptable to the president. Obama’s Budget Director Peter Orszag, assessed that McCrystal’s strategy would cost nearly a trillion dollars over a ten-year
762 Barack H. Obama Cabinet Nominations, (United States Senate, 2019), accessed 2 February 2019, https://www.senate.gov/reference/Obama_cabinet.htm. 763 Louis Uchitelle, Edmund L. Andrews, Economy Slides at Fastest Rate Since Late 1950s, (New York Times, 2009), A-1. 764 Victor Kalitowski, Volume Based Technical Analysis: Stock Market Crashes, (Marketvolume.com, 2017), accessed 12 January 2017, http://www.marketvolume.com/analysis/stockmarketcrashes.asp. 765 Wharton Public Policy Initiative, A Reflection on the 2009 American Auto Bailout, (University of Pennsylvania, 2017). Accessed June 23 2018, https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1779- a-reflection-on-the-2009-american-auto-bailout#_edn2. 766 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), Staff asserts Obama came into office with no sense of the costs to win in Afghanistan. As the financial bailouts of banks and auto industry progressed and strategic reviews played out, the president realized the open-ended nature of a fully- resourced counter-insurgency strategy, was not an affordable choice for the U.S. 265 period. Obama responded with “I’m not doing 10 years...that is not in the national interest.”767
These factors shaped Barack Obama’s thinking that evolved quickly over a period of a few months. There was a strong tether keeping him committed to the conflict that was fear of another 9/11-like attack originating from Pakistan.768 The president understood the potential for another attack was high and worried it could be a nuclear one.769 His decision making on Afghanistan was made more complicated by the NSS who actively opposed NSC principal positions.
The examples of both bureaucratic politics and organizational process at play in this administration are many, where bargaining, infighting, and organizations imposed dysfunctional dynamics on the president’s deliberations.770 This dysfunction would have implications for development and analysis of alternatives as well as for implementation.
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The president had determined early on that he did not have a viable partner in the Afghan government, leading him to rephrase his policy intent to seek a more accountable government. From the U.S. perspective Karzai had proven to be unreliable and had come to be viewed as erratic and unstable.771 President Hamid
Karzai had become comfortable with the long-term commitment George W. Bush repeatedly expressed, and Bush had not incentivized Karzai to improve government capacity or forcefully address corruption.
767 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 251. 768 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 769 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 362-363. 770 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 699-709. 771 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 266
Vice President Biden and Senator Lindsey Graham traveled to Afghanistan prior to Obama officially taking office to talk directly to Karzai, impressing on him that the new president had a different perspective than the last. Biden told Karzai that
Obama would not deal with him directly as Bush had done, thus reinforcing that circumstances had changed.772 A major concern was that Karzai was fueling public anger over civilian casualties resulting from U.S. operations, thereby validating the
Taliban narrative of the U.S as a foreign occupier.773 Biden was firm with Karzai that the U.S. would only continue to support him if he could be a productive partner, and if not, the U.S would “…cut our losses.”774
Biden’s comments reinforced the fact that Karzai no longer viewed the U.S. as a reliable partner either. In fact, he was certain the Obama administration was intent on getting rid of him.775 His perception would be validated later by Richard
Holbrooke’s concerted efforts to get other candidates to run against him in the 2009 election.776 U.S. confidence in him as a partner was further eroded following his reelection through apparent voter fraud.777
Pakistan had also just elected a new president, Asif Ali Zardari when Barack
Obama took office. In early 2009 it was not yet understood how much authority
Zardari could assert over the military or Pakistani intelligence services. His actions since taking office had not engendered confidence as his government had recently
772 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 67. The U.S. knew that Karzai was a manic depressive who might be of questionable reliance but overlooked this issue in returning him from exile to Afghanistan in 2001. 773 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 774 Ibid, 69. 775 Ahmed Rashid, How Obama Lost Karzai: The road out of Afghanistan runs through two presidents who just don't get along, (Foreign Policy, 2011). Accessed September 17 September 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/21/how-obama-lost-karzai-2/ 776 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 358-359. 777 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 231. 267 signed a cease-fire with extremists in northwest Pakistan associated with the TTP.778
In doing so the government had effectively ceded control of a significant section of the country to the group and allowed a parallel Sharia legal system.779
The Pakistani military began to forcefully respond to the TTP only when the group violated the cease-fire and continued to gain territory to the point of threatening the capital of Islamabad. This slow response fueled international security concerns as the TTP advance also came uncomfortably close to a nuclear weapons depot.780 During this period Zardari did not demonstrate he was capable of asserting control over the military, nor was he successful in breaking Pakistani ISI relationships with extremist groups.781
While the Obama administration expressed positive public statements on
Pakistani operations against extremists, they were frustrated that these efforts didn’t go nearly far enough.782 Pakistani reluctance was consistent with their view that the
U.S. alliances in Afghanistan were also India’s, and thus at odds with their security interests.783 The administration’s concerns about Taliban and instability in Pakistan are ironic in that the CIA had worked with the Pakistani ISI to fund opposition groups
778 Zarar Khan, Pakistan agrees to Islamic law in Taliban area (Associated Press, 2009). Accessed 17 September 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30194622/ns/world_news- south_and_central_asia/t/pakistan-agrees-islamic-law-taliban-area/ 779 Ibid. 780 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 781 Muhammad Khalil Khan and Lu Wei, When Friends Turned into Enemies: The Role of the National State vs. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in the War against Terrorism in Pakistan, (The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 28, No. 4, 2016), 616-617. 782 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). 783 Syed Farooq, Pakistan's Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the Fluctuating U.S. Strategy, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1, (Columbia University, 2009), 144. Accessed 7 January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24384177.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad08e71a3e75a10b4c317a66df7 b018c0. 268 of Taliban to form a resistance to Mullah Omar. These groups eventually joined forces and attacked both Pakistani and U.S.-led Coalition forces.784
Any successful outcome in Afghanistan also depended upon significant NATO support, in both monetary and force contributions. Afghanistan tested both the political will and capabilities of NATO partners where the stabilization and reconstruction mission was made exceedingly difficult in the middle of a counterinsurgency fight. While the U.S, Canada and the UK performed the bulk of combat operations, the majority of NATO partners performed stability and reconstruction roles.
While a majority of Europeans supported providing security, reconstruction and training, a September 2008 German Marshall Fund poll reflected that only 43% supported combat operations against the Taliban, a core objective of the Obama counter-insurgency approach. 785 Recalling Jones’s characterization of the relationship as a lack of U.S. respect for NATO partners, European allies also did not view U.S. leadership favorably with only 36% approval.786 Against this backdrop
Obama had to solicit greater NATO contributions in order to meet the force levels the military indicated were required to blunt Taliban momentum, and accelerate ASNF readiness. Public opinion among NATO nations at the time was firmly in favor of reducing their commitment.787
784 Ashok K. Behuria The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State, (Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2007) 706-707. DOI: 10.1080/09700160701662252. The CIA joined ISI to form a Taliban group called Jaishul Muslim-led by Akbar Agha to oppose Mullah Omar. The group openly criticized Mullah Omar’s policies and protection of Al Qaeda. The CIA pursued a similar effort with Mullah Abdul Razzaq, the Taliban’s former defense minister, to reach a political settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The CIA paid a huge amount of money to these groups and also provided military training with the help of ISI, but all these groups later merged into the Taliban movement against the U.S.-led coalition forces. 785 Transatlantic Trends 2008, (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2008), 4. Accessed 12 January 2017, http://trends.gmfus.org/files/archived/doc/2008_english_key.pdf. 786 Ibid, 6. 787 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 25-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, (The Pew Research Center, 2009), 22. Accessed 12 March 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/264.pdf. 269
A key constituency in any security policy decision were senior DOD and military leadership, whose organizations would have to achieve most policy goals.
The U.S. military’s rapid victories in Afghanistan and Iraq bolstered the profession’s already strong status among Americans. The Service Chiefs and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs routinely testified before Congress and carried a great deal of influence on Capitol Hill. The apparent success of the 2007 Iraq surge further burnished the reputations of Generals Stanley McCrystal and David Petraeus. McCrystal and
Petraeus would help to shape Barack Obama’s Afghanistan policy through their assertions that a counterinsurgency was necessary to blunt Taliban momentum. 788
The president also valued the experienced perspective of Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates who supported the McCrystal and Petraeus recommendations.789
Their collective professional assessments would have been difficult for any president to ignore, but Barack Obama’s own campaign rhetoric on Afghanistan coupled with their forceful position drove the president to accept elements of their approach.
Arguably the most important stakeholder in the president’s Afghanistan policy was Congressional support for resourcing it. The 2008 election increased the
Democratic majority in the Congress, and expectations that Barack Obama could successfully pursue his agenda were reasonably high. However, Democrats had spent significant effort to tie Bush spending to demonstrated progress and were dubious of supporting troop increases without imposing the same conditions on
Obama.790
During the strategy reviews the president reminded his NSC that the
Congress would impose a timetable on any strategy, and so an extensive
788 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 789 Ibid. 790 Carl Hulse, Democrats Have Qualms Over War in Afghanistan, The New York Times, 2009), accessed 13 March 2016, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/us/politics/24spend.html 270 counterinsurgency was not sustainable.791 The president’s subsequent decisions to increase forces were then met with predictable skepticism, even disagreement from
Democratic party leaders.792
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and
Senator John Kerry were all dubious of deeper involvement and increased funding and made public statements to that affect. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Carl Levin voiced clear opposition to any potential troop surge.793 Their collective position was that they had railed against George W. Bush’s policies for years, and resisted supporting a policy that would require them to argue Obama’s approach was not more of the same.794
Develop Objectives
Obama administration objectives may be viewed in two stages. The new administration began their first policy assessment against the backdrop of Bush’s previous eight years of decisions. Obama initially accepted the Bush objectives with the exception of the requirement for a democratic government. He articulated his position to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael Mullin as “I want to get
791 Ibid. 792 Deirdre Walsh, Pelosi Keeps Door Open on War Tax, (Cable News Network, 2009), accessed 12 March 2016, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/11/25/pelosi-keeps-door-open-on-war-tax-2/, Nancy Pelosi voiced deep skepticism among Congressional Democrats stating “…there is serious unrest in our Caucus about can we afford this war?" 793 Martin Sief, With Friends Like These: As Obama decides his next move in Afghanistan, he’s getting the greatest pushback from some of the leading foreign-affairs lights in the Democratic Party, (The Daily Beast, 2009), accessed 12 January 2017, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/10/07/with-friends-like-these.html. 794 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Legislator Sees Echoes of Vietnam in Afghan War, (The New York Times, 2009), accessed 13 March 2016, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/politics/13obey.html, Congressman David Obey, (Democrat- Wisconsin) voiced a common sentiment among Democrats indicating that he would not support a surge without knowing how Congress would pay for it. A long-time fixture in Congress, he indicated that he gave Nixon a year in 1969 to see what the new president would do since “…he had inherited the (Vietnam) war, so I bit my tongue for a year.” Mr. Obey added ““I said the same thing with Obama.” 271
Afghanistan and Pakistan right, but I don’t want to build a Jeffersonian democracy.”795 This was a very positive first step as doing so represented a much lower expectation and potentially reduced the resource implications. However, he also complicated the policy by agreeing to expand counterterrorism operations into
Pakistan and increasing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. This position would change rapidly over the summer of 2009 and policy objectives were revisited in a second strategic review.
Policy Objectives
Barack Obama articulated his initial policy objectives in March 2009 to
“disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” and to
“reverse the Taliban's gains and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government.” As previously observed, in expanding the objective to defeat Al Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the president not only retained a flawed objective but dramatically expanded upon the ways and means to pursue it.
Obama further complicated his policy with an intent to stabilize the Pakistani government and improve their struggling economy. The president indicated he would offer economic assistance with an expectation that Pakistan would increase its efforts to combat Al-Qaeda and violent extremists.796 Members of the president’s cabinet were skeptical.797 The complicated nature of the relationship between
795 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 34. 796 Ibid. 797 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 288-289. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair saw the policy as deeply flawed and thought the president and his team had unrealistic ideas on changing Pakistani behavior; Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 343. 272
Afghanistan and Pakistan was challenge enough, but adding the intent for operations in Pakistan made this an unrealistic goal.798
Rory Stewart, an expert at Harvard University at the time, articulated the conflicting nature of the policy before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “In reality, the attempt to create an Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy seems to me a little bit as though we’ve gone into a room with an angry cat and a tiger—the angry cat being
Afghanistan and the tiger being Pakistan—and we’re beating the cat. And when you say, ‘‘Why are you beating the cat?’’ the answer is, ‘‘Oh, it’s a cat/tiger strategy. It’s an Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy.’’ But, in fact, you’re beating the cat because you don’t know what to do about the tiger.”
Unsurprisingly, the president’s initial policy statement reflected very nearly the same language as the Riedel, Flournoy, Holbrooke assessment.799 The president had accepted their recommendations as a near-term approach intending to watch how it progressed. This assessment did not offer the president better objectives upon which to formulate a significantly different or achievable strategy. Obama’s initial objectives reflect the same critical deviation from the prescriptive framework as did Bush’s. Ambiguous verbs like ““disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” made defining progress a challenge that would frustrate the president.
Success of this policy depended not only on a significant increase in resources, but on a risky notion that the Pakistani government would genuinely pursue terrorists to deny them safe havens and end their support to the Taliban. This required Pakistani government control of, or at least cooperation from the military
798 Rory Stewart, Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 24-28. 799 Bruce Riedel, Michelle Flournoy, Richard Holbrooke, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, 2009), accessed 28 March 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan- Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf. 273 and the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who enabled both the Taliban and terrorist elements, including Al Qaeda.800 This was unlikely and Obama’s policy intent was in jeopardy from the start.
Before the Riedel strategy could be realistically implemented the new commander, General McCrystal, asserted immediate and significant changes were required and the resulting troop request shocked the administration.801 The president was not receptive to changes to the strategy, but the McCrystal assessment drove him to undertake a second more extensive review lasting from September to
December 2009.
A reconsideration of policy objectives would normally be a product of the committee process. This was not the case and the president did not empower his
NSA, James Jones to do so. Instead, the president led a strategy review himself and largely maintained the decision process at the principal’s level, while consulting often with his personal staff and NSS.802 Recalling Gates’s observations on the composition of the Obama political staff and lack of experience in the NSS, this effort did not go well.
The NSC went into a detailed analysis of their objectives while the president asked focused questions on their viability and costs associated with them.803 Robert
Gates detailed the extended debate that led to narrowing the focus to Al Qaeda.804
Similar to Gates’s concerns about the NSS and president’s staff, James Jones
800 Bruce Riedel, The Taliban affirm their alliance with al-Qaida: Afghan peace talks in doubt, (Brookings Institute, 2015). Accessed 21 January 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/08/20/the-taliban-affirm-their-alliance-with-al-qaida- afghan-peace-talks-in-doubt/. Riedel observed that the Haqqani network, which operates very closely with the ISI, made little secret of its support for al-Qaida. This implied the ISI de facto enabled Al Qaeda. 801 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 195. 802 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 803 Ibid. 804 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 372-377. 274 voiced similar concerns over a lack of critical thinking within the NSC. He expressed that there was a lack of strategic clarity and demonstrated frustration that there was no clear understanding of what outcome would be good enough. He was concerned that the political staff and military had differing definitions of what good enough might be.805 An insightful observation was Woodward’s recognition that “Eight years into the war, they were struggling to refine what the core objectives were.”806
It is critically important to point out here that, similar to the Bush NSC, while the NSC debated their objectives, they failed to identify the conditions that would define success. Maintaining terms like “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” of Al Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan continued to hold the military to open-ended objectives as had been the case in the preceding seven years.807
As the second review progressed the president grew frustrated at a lack of proposed options that could achieve his objectives on a timeline he could accept. He had specified objectives to defeat Al Qaeda and reverse Taliban momentum, but in an October NSC meeting, he indicated that he did not see a clear end state. He voiced frustration that “There is neither victory nor defeat in 10 years,” and reinforced his bottom-line objective that he wanted an exit strategy.808 The president now wanted strategic options to reverse Taliban momentum on a timeline, and was not supportive of an extended counterinsurgency campaign as McCrystal and Petraeus envisioned.809 These aspects reflect a president asking the appropriate questions on
‘how’ his objectives would be achieved.810
805 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 806 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 185. 807 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351. 808 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 253. 809 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 810 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 50. 275
Gates elaborated on long sessions in the White House Situation Room where the NSC exhaustively looked at every “angle or substantive issue.”811 A long time
CIA analyst having served eight presidents, Gates observed that he viewed Obama as the most intelligent and deliberate of them possessing an exceptional analytical mind.812 However, dissonance between open-ended objectives and the president’s desire for an acceptable end state on a limited timeframe, somewhat undermines
Robert Gates’ observations of Obama’s analytical ability.
Once again Gates’s observations emphasize that the complex nature of security problems exceed the cognitive abilities of even the most capable minds.
Acknowledgment of this complexity was in fact the impetus for creating the NSC and
NSS in the first place. Their stated responsibility is to analyze complex security issues. They were not doing so effectively, and James Jones was not empowered to impose analytical discipline or shape the debate.813
Gates faulted the procedure as being purely focused on military strategy anchored in political calculus, and too little thought on the need for civilian advisors and experts to perform the governance building mission. He recalled the predominant areas of focus were the nature of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the military strategy for dealing with each.814
The president eventually discerned during the second review that his objectives could not be achieved by the debated strategies at an acceptable cost.
Interestingly, the president made this determination without ever having satisfactorily defined the conditions that he viewed as success. The result was a further
811 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 370-371. 812 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 299-300. 813 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 814 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 370-377. 276 compromise between objectives and a timetable for reduction in combat troops, that many labeled as a withdrawal.815
In a December 2009 speech at West Point, the president told the nation that his basic objective remained to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” He further offered the U.S objectives to “deny al Qaeda a safe haven,” to “reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government,” and “…strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.”816 He reaffirmed these objectives under a timeline to demonstrate success and begin withdrawal of forces.
Repeating a theme, these objectives continued a flawed policy with vague end states. The policy failed to include the need for reconciliation of the Taliban, a critically important objective that must be part of any lasting peace in Afghanistan.
Military leadership focused on reconciliation and reintegration of the Taliban as a key objective in their campaign strategy, but planners point to the timeline as a key policy statement undermining their effort. Under a timeline, the Taliban had no meaningful incentive to negotiate.817
In retaining these objectives, the NSC failed to address important questions on ‘how’ their objectives could be achieved by the current strategy. This is primarily the result of their having failed to adequately interrogate the important questions on
‘why’ their objectives were the right ones in the first place.818 Detailed consideration
815 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), Staff pushed back on the label of a withdrawal and emphasized the president’s characterization of this as a reduction of combat troops while maintaining trainers for the ANSF. 816 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, 2009), accessed 15 October 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward- afghanistan-and-pakistan. 817 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 818 Ibid, 39. 277 of alternatives in terms of ‘how’ each might achieve their objectives, would likely have led to a more detailed reconsideration of the appropriateness of those objectives.819 This is the type of analysis that led to revision of the objective to help a democratic Afghan government to emerge. It is then perplexing that this same analysis did not lead to revised language of “disrupt, dismantle and defeat.”
Key Assumptions
While the initial policy statement in March 2009 effectively removed the U.S. policy objective to help a democratic government emerge, the hasty strategic assessment maintained the flawed assumption that defeating Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan was practical with no clear definition of what ‘defeat’ meant.
The president began the second policy and strategy assessment asking appropriate questions on how defeat of Al Qaeda could be achieved. Prodding his
NSC that he did not yet believe he had good options, he emphasized that deriving them would require them to challenge their collective assumptions.820 This review of assumptions also included requiring the military to question their rationale for a robust, extended counterinsurgency. The military position at the time held that the
Taliban remained largely irreconcilable unless they viewed the U.S. commitment as enduring.821
The Petraeus-led surge in Iraq had demonstrated to many that a population- centric counterinsurgency could effectively tamp down the violence to an acceptable
819 Ibid, 38-41. 820 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 160. 821 Stephen Biddle, (Telephone Interview, 2018). Biddle served on General Stanley McChrystal's Initial Strategic Assessment Team in Kabul in 2009 and as a Senior Advisor to General Petraeus' Central Command Assessment Team in Washington in 2008-2009. 278 degree, providing political space for withdrawal of U.S. forces. Though the circumstances and actors in Afghanistan were acknowledged to be very different, the perceived success in Iraq drove a wave of enthusiasm for counterinsurgency and assumed it as a solution. A key distinction here that warrants reemphasis is that in the midst of what was supposed to be a broad policy debate, military and political leaders alike had somehow elevated operational and tactical approaches to a strategic level that obscured true strategic thinking. The president’s military experts were advising him that areas cleared of Taliban could be transitioned to ANSF control within two years.822 Based on this the President assumed Iraq-like success could be achieved on a timeline.823
A related assumption lurking behind the military’s counterinsurgency argument was an assumption the Afghan government could be persuaded to pursue reconciliation with the Taliban. This was a bold assumption in that the Karzai government had thus far not agreed to even negotiate let alone agree to reconciliation.824
Success likewise assumed a reliable partner in Pakistan, and in Obama’s words, a relationship “built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust.”825 Pakistan had proven duplicitous over the course of the war and were actively undermining U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. They had likewise undermined counterterrorism operations within Pakistan. Basing any operational or strategic success on this partnership was a bold assumption to say the least.
822 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018). Staff indicate that both GEN Petraeus and GEM McCrystal believed progress could be achieved in two years 823 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). 824 Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way, (Yale University Press, 2011), 238-240. 825 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, 2009), accessed 15 October 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward- afghanistan-and-pakistan. 279
Counterinsurgency advocates further complicated the policy by asserting that success in Afghanistan was also tied to success in Pakistan. Stephen Biddle asserted that, although the lack of a dependable partner in Karzai was a real issue, a robust counterinsurgency was crucial to prevent instability in Pakistan. He testified before the House Armed Services Committee that “if the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state, their ability to use a state’s resources as a base to destabilize secular government in Pakistan would enable a major increase in the risk of state collapse there.”826 Biddle was a recognized expert who had advised ISAF and worked on both General McCrystal’s and General Petraeus’s strategies.827 The president’s consideration of these assumptions certainly played a key role in his hedging policy pursued on a timeline.
Define End State Conditions & Measures of Policy Success
Similar to Bush policy formulation errors, a lack of clear end states was also an issue in the Obama policy. A lack of clearly defined end states presented a genuine challenge in declaring their successful achievement. This was a particularly significant challenge for those military leaders implementing the policy. On the other hand, ambiguously stated objectives allowed great latitude where nearly any subjective measure could describe progress. For example, intent to disrupt and dismantle Al Qaeda were sufficiently ambiguous, enabling the administration to claim nearly any progress as good enough. However, defeating Al Qaeda and reconciling the Taliban represented somewhat greater challenges as defeat and reconcile both were specific definitions of intent.
826 Stephen Biddle, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) accessed 4 January 2017, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-strategy-afghanistan-iraq/p18545. 827 Ibid. 280
Defeating Al Qaeda had always been a problematic objective as victory in a conventional sense not only required neutralizing their leaders and reintegrating fighters, truly defeating them required successfully diminishing the allure of their message and extremist ideology. There was no realistic strategy to do so and denying them safe haven effectively became the measure of “defeat.” This again points to the hollowness of the so-called GWOT strategy. Regarding the Taliban, the most basic definition of reconciliation was an end to conflict. There was no real way to articulate success on this objective so long as Taliban attacks continued.
Defining success in Afghanistan was further complicated by the fact that the
U.S. had pursued these open-ended objectives with predominantly military capabilities for eight years without success. Hart’s observation remains ever relevant to this case: “The military objective is only the means to a political end.
Hence the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily—that is practically—impossible."828
In attempting to define satisfactory conditions that would characterize success the NSC struggled. The president and his NSC debated how to effectively deny the
Taliban and the president settled on a strategy to disrupt their progress. The president defined ‘disrupt’ in terms similar to attrition where persistent attack on them was intended “to degrade capacity to such an extent that security could be manageable by the ANSF.”829
The intent to deny Al Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan implied a long-term presence in Afghanistan when the president had imposed a timeline for
828 Basil Liddell-Hart, Strategy, (Praeger Publishers, 1975), 351. 829 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 270-271. 281 withdrawal. The implications of the timeline were that Obama’s intent to withdraw combat capability undermined any meaningful strategy to deny safe haven and meant that operations would be largely confined to aerial and missile attacks which was the failed approach prior to invading in 2001.
In redefining the objectives to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and accepting defeat of Al Qaeda in terms of denying them safe havens, the administration’s overarching measure of policy success were conditions in Afghanistan that were good enough to permit a withdrawal. These redefined goals did not represent victory in a conventional sense, however they demonstrated Barack Obama’s pragmatism and recognition that his objectives were not achievable with available ways and means.
Develop Policy Options
It is again important to describe this step in terms of the prescriptive framework that dictates policy objectives specifying what is to be achieved, must precede strategy which describes how policy objectives are to be achieved. In this case policy was being formed based on proposed strategies, what Keeney referred to as “alternative-focused thinking.”830 This approach limited what could be achieved to the competing approaches as defined by the military and members of his NSC.
These significantly constrained the president’s choices. The fact that the president held the debate himself at the NSC Principal level, denied him any benefit to be realized from broader perspectives in the Committee process.
830 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992), 3. 282
As the second strategy review progressed, this backward procedure left
Barack Obama frustrated by a lack of options, and he felt his decision space was boxed in by his Secretary of Defense and the military.831 His response to this was to become more forceful in constraining notions of an extended counterinsurgency campaign.832 As his perspective evolved, he not only sought to redefine and limit
U.S. objectives on terms he could accept, he imposed a timeline for transferring security responsibility to the ANSF and reducing U.S. troop strength.
Complicating the second review was that the NSC was divided into assertive camps advocating opposing strategies. Biden was forceful in recommending a
Counter-Terror focused campaign, arguing that Karzai was not a viable partner and nation-building objectives could not be achieved. Other key advisors in Bruce Riedel,
Michelle Flournoy, Robert Gates, Hillary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen were advocates of what they referred to as both a counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency
(COIN) strategy, an approach that would require an extended and expensive commitment to Afghanistan for many years.833
Repeating an earlier point, reference to CT or COIN as strategy is a bit of a misnomer as both are tactical or operational approaches that may be employed only as part of a strategy. NSC staff affirm that Biden advocated forcefully for a predominantly CT focus. His position eventually evolved to add some minimal COIN effort, what he referred to as CT-Plus.834 In framing these choices for the president,
Gates characterized the Biden CT-Plus alternative as “COIN-minus,” and essentially the same failed approach that the U.S. had pursued since 2004.835 He likewise
831 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 368-369. 832 Ibid, 372. 833 Ibid, 342-343. 834 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 835 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 374. 283 characterized McCrystal’s fully resourced COIN alternative as ambitious and more costly than the U.S was prepared to give.836
NSC debate evolved over these two disparate positions, pitting NSC principals against each other with the NSS playing an uncommonly assertive advocacy role. Biden’s compromise “CT-plus” strategy was intended to enable the president to focus on what he viewed as the compelling terrorist threat in Pakistan, while at the same time narrowing the focus of effort in Afghanistan on transferring responsibility to the ANSF.837 NSC staff validate that Jones, Donilon and Lute agreed with Biden.838 The president directed the option be included in military analysis.839
Senior military assessment was that Biden’s counter-terror option was not a viable one to deny Al Qaeda sanctuary or to ultimately defeat them.840 Biden’s line of thinking was a direct challenge to senior military counsel that would cause friction and served to add to the mistrust that already existed between the president and the military establishment.841 This was further complicated by the NSA Jones and NSS member Doug Lute who were also experienced General Officers who did not agree with the McCrystal assessment.842
While the president wrestled with the senior military position on Afghanistan, strong voices among a group of academic counterinsurgency advocates added their opinions. Max Boot and Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign
Relations, published opinion pieces early and often in 2009 advocating a COIN
‘strategy’ in Afghanistan.843 Biddle testified before the House Armed Services
836 Ibid. 837 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 838 Ibid. 839 Ibid. 840 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 841 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 842 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 385. 843Max Boot, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) accessed 4 January 2017, http://www.cfr.org/experts/national-security-warfare-terrorism/max-boot/b5641?page=12, Boot writes 284
Committee multiple times arguing that McCrystal’s COIN approach was the right one.844 These were experienced experts whose perspectives carried weight in the
U.S government.
Ambassador Eikenberry forcefully countered the DOD’s COIN position during the extended policy debate in September 2009. He advised the president in a cable that it required too many resources for too long and would creep into a nation- building effort. He also emphasized that the Afghan government was not a viable partner and the ANSF could not assume responsibility on the president’s desired timeline.845 Eikenberry’s cable angered military leadership, not the least of which was
General McCrystal with whom Eikenberry did not share the cable before sending it, despite meeting with him multiple times each week.846
Eikenberry’s assessment reinforced the president’s thinking on the affordability of a COIN strategy on the scale that McCrystal proposed, and he was looking for less ambitious options. Eikenberry’s perspective at the same time complemented what Biden had been advocating in terms of less COIN and more focus on CT.
This competition between groups, while perhaps healthy in forcing extended debate, fits with Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics model. Allison observed that actors in politics make predictable arguments based on their current position, and statements
on Afghanistan no less than ten times in 2009, several of these opinion pieces are advocacy pieces of McCrystal’s strategy and counterinsurgency in general. 844 Stephen Biddle, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) accessed 4 January 2017, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-strategy-afghanistan-iraq/p18545, Biddle was a strong COIN advocate having testified before Congress on the merits of a COIN strategy in Afghanistan. 845 Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns, (Department of State, 2009), 2-3. Accessed 17 September 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/documents/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in- afghanistan#p=1. 846 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Telephone interview, 2018), This advisor to the staff confirmed McCrystal’s anger, not so much at the fact Eikenberry disagreed with his recommendations but in the way Eikenberry did it. 285 of policy are the result of negotiations among them.847 This competition illustrates the influence of both assertive personalities and agendas, amplifying again the value of an analytical procedure to guide the decision maker deliberately through the competing arguments.
The president asked appropriate questions in terms of using objectives as evaluation criteria for policy options. Obama sought clarity on basic questions including whether Al Qaeda could be defeated and reintegrated, and whether defeating the Taliban was necessary to defeat al Qaeda.848 These questions spoke directly to the viability of the policy and any strategic options to achieve it. The extended NSC assessments failed to add sufficient clarity to these questions.
Debate centered on the priority and balance between CT and COIN operations and the forces required to implement them. Because the president’s critically important questions were not answered, his ability to adjust the existing policy was limited and frustrating.849 So, Obama NSC debate was reduced to variations on the existing
Bush strategy.
Status Quo Plus
The result of the administration’s initial assessment was a policy that largely retained the Bush objectives with increased focus toward Pakistan. Note that the
Bush administration had also attempted to pursue Al Qaeda in Pakistan, but their efforts had been largely coordinated with the Pakistani government who undermined success by forewarning targets of U.S. operations in many cases.850 The initial
847 Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 707-708. 848 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 370-371. 849 Ibid, 368-369. 850 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 286
Obama policy was slightly different in that it would pursue largely the same strategy but with increased resources and operations inside Pakistan would be done without forewarning to Pakistani authorities. The new president responded to David
McKiernan’s troop requests enabling his pursuit of the ongoing COIN and capacity building missions. The president also narrowed the Bush objective of helping a democratic government emerge to one of establishing “a capable and accountable government” to whom governance and security responsibilities could be transferred and thereby enable a U.S. withdrawal.
NSC debate on the president’s policy intent centered on an expanded civilian role in the mission to improve Afghan governance capacity, along with military operations and training to achieve conditions the president envisioned would enable a U.S. withdrawal during his presidency.
Afghanistan Good Enough
McCrystal’s summer 2009 assessment accompanied by his request for
40,000 additional forces, and intent to pursue a robust population-centric COIN met with resistance in the NSC.851 The collective recommendations of McCrystal,
Petraeus, Mullin, Clinton and Gates ran contrary to the president’s intent to get out of
Afghanistan sooner rather than later. An extended debate was undertaken to understand how the proposed military strategy supported the president’s policy intent.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates characterized this extended assessment as one that “…led to a helpful, steady narrowing of our objectives and ambitions.” 852
851 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 353. 852 Robert M. Gates, The Quiet Fury of Robert Gates, (Wall Street Journal, 2014), accessed 15 January 2017. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304617404579306851526222552. 287
Gates’s description again confirmed that strategy led policy in this case. Rather than focus on objectives and use them as criteria to assess the utility of alternatives, the administration focused on the alternatives. In this way, perceptions on the plausibility of the competing strategies became the evaluation criteria for policy objectives. In this sense the president’s objectives did not reflect what he wanted to achieve. They rather reflected a pessimistic consideration of what could be achieved under limited time and forces.
This policy option reflected elements of Ellsberg’s experiments on what he referred to as the challenge to define reasonable solutions to problems under uncertain conditions. His testing of decision making under uncertain, ambiguous conditions where the consequences of actions are not known, reveals that reasonable decision makers will often consciously make seemingly irrational choices influenced by other values that weighted their decisions.853
Analyze Options
The president came into office espousing that a surge of resources in terms of forces and funds was needed to achieve success in Afghanistan. Deliberation within his NSC was done largely in terms of the prior administration’s goals.
Extended debate allowed the president to pose fundamental questions about assumptions underpinning the current objectives and whether they could be achieved at an acceptable cost. Successive commanders in McKiernan, McCrystal, and Petraeus had advocated assertively for a robust and extended counterinsurgency approach.854 Their common assessment was that a majority of
853 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001), 155-156. 854 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), Staff confirmed that all three Commanders had reached common conclusions on strategy and believed the U.S. had to publicly voice a long-term commitment in order to convince the Taliban that negotiation was their best path forward. 288 the Taliban would not agree to reconciliation without a coercive motivation to do so.855 Under this plan the Taliban insurgency had to be blunted allowing time for
Afghan government and security force capacity to grow to a point where they could stand on their own.
This option represented a level of commitment Barack Obama was unwilling to accept. Over the course of several months Obama had come to an understanding that achievement of his existing objectives was not realistic. He was adamant that the primary purpose for being in Afghanistan was to defeat Al Qaeda. His pragmatic response was to restate the objective to pursue a more capable government and demanded a strategy that emphasized defeat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Since the president had already determined that more resources expended on the current strategy was unacceptable, the administration revised their approach. In this assessment, Biden’s CT-plus approach acknowledged the president’s thinking.
He asserted that even if the Taliban returned to power, they would not necessarily welcome Al Qaeda back, nor was Al Qaeda likely to leave their safe haven in
Pakistan as doing so increased their vulnerability to U.S. attacks.856 Under this strategy, the U.S. would focus only as much COIN attention on the Taliban necessary to enable continued capacity building in Afghanistan, while emphasizing
CT operations. When the president announced his policy, his words seemingly reflected an agreement to the McCrystal COIN approach, however in constraining force levels and time, his policy decision was more in line with Biden’s proposal.857
855 Stephen Biddle, (Interview, 2018), Biddle observed that both General McCrystal’s and General Petraeus’ staff had come to common conclusions on a counter-insurgency campaign and the U.S. commitment was key to convincing them to negotiate. 856 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). 857 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 384. 289
The president’s compromise was to surge 30,000 troops rather than the
40,000 McCrystal had requested. Indicating he had little faith in the COIN strategy, he also placed a time constraint on the military to demonstrate progress in both reversing Taliban momentum and improving ANSF capability. This meant that
McCrystal had to demonstrate progress quickly and do so with fewer forces than he thought were needed.
The president came to this approach after having pushed and cajoled his
NSC and military chain of command over a three-month period. In the end this extended debate resulted in a policy that sought security and readiness conditions in
Afghanistan sufficient to justify a reduction of combat forces. In other words, this was a satisficing option to achieve ‘good enough.’
Analysis of Uncertainty and Consequences
While this decision was informed by a long debate and consideration on the uncertainties, potential consequences, and strategic risk associated with the strategies presented, the president’s imposition of a timeline was widely interpreted as a strategic mistake. Members of the NSC and military asserted the Taliban would merely wait until the U.S. withdrew combat forces to fully assert themselves.858
While the president’s objectives continued to reflect ambiguous outcomes, his decision-making reflected that he had listened to the experts advising him and he found that they did not offer him clear choices that he believed could achieve his goals at acceptable cost.859 In pursuing this time constrained policy, the president
858 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). 859 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Interview, 2018), The advisor recalled the NSS feedback to General McCrystal that he had to show progress with the resources the president agreed to. This same advisor also recalled that General Petraeus was also very cognizant of the need to demonstrate progress and he ensured that any statements going back to the White House include the wording that any progress “was fragile and reversible.”; National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 290 had in essence accepted the consequences of failing to compel reconciliation with the Taliban. The implications of this were that the root cause of conflict in
Afghanistan would remain and with it, the potential that the Afghan government could fail. Obama’s position also accepted the risk that, were Biden’s assertions wrong, a potential consequence of accepting an Afghanistan where the Taliban remained a powerful force, might also mean a continued Al Qaeda presence. This certainly risked undermining the objective to deny Al Qaeda safe haven.
The NSC had considered the potential consequences associated with both the COIN and CT-Plus approaches. In terms of the COIN approach, they had considered the key uncertainty related to an unreliable and corrupt Afghan government. They had also considered the uncertainty associated with an unreliable, duplicitous partner in the Pakistani government and its potential to undermine any strategy.
A number of other uncertainties shaped the risk averse position the president was considering. These included the vulnerabilities of the Pakistani government to extremist elements, with particular attention on Pakistani nuclear weapons and material. The president’s policy decision reflected a fairly pragmatic and realistic view of the environment and the limits of both power and resources to achieve his objectives. His unwillingness to bear the cost of an extended COIN campaign and long-term commitment of military forces left him few options but to see what
McCrystal and Petraeus could achieve over 18 months.
2018), Staff observed the president’s frustration with the options presented and lack of believe that either one was a viable path to achieve objectives, so he adopted a “show me” position as a pre- condition to reinforcing any success. Staff recalled that the command constantly reminded them that any progress was “fragile and reversible” and interpreted this as the military’s way to maintain administration commitment. 291
It is important to acknowledge again at this point that one cannot possibly predict or control all of the consequences, and so the quality of the decision-making procedure must be the focus as opposed to the potential consequences.860 The quality of the decision procedure and the analytical rigor that goes into it remains the element of the problem over which the decision maker exerts the most control.
The President’s Decision
The preceding prescriptive analysis considered the various factors and actors influencing President Obama’s policy response to the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan. Obama insisted on an extended analysis of objectives, assumptions and consequences that revealed to him the challenges of destroying Al Qaeda and establishing a democratic government. Though he retained flawed policy objectives and his NSC debated only one policy alternative to the status quo, the president considered both in terms of how well each might achieve his objectives.
This analysis led to pragmatic refinement of objectives precipitating tradeoffs among them. This resulted in both a lowering of expectations for the Afghan government and constraints on implementation towards objectives he did not view as achievable. Given this rational approach, the president’s expansion of objectives for
Pakistan is perplexing and signifies a lack of critical thinking.
The president’s path to this result was characterized by extended analysis and debate. Obama navigated the push-pull of bureaucratic politics, pre-judgments, and bias, and determined that none of the debated options would achieve his goals.
860 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 110-111. 292
He settled on a hybrid policy that reflected elements of both the Biden and McCrystal approaches.
The Obama policy set about increasing U.S. support to the region while also setting a timetable on which to steadily withdraw combat forces. These incongruent notions sent mixed signals and made articulation of policy all the more challenging.
Rothkopf succinctly summarized this controversial approach as “hello, I must be going.”861 In compromise, the president had embraced a satisficing policy of
Afghanistan ‘good enough’ that would provide the political space to withdraw as had been the case in Iraq.
Obama’s policy statement in December 2009 was implemented based on a pessimistic expectation of what might be accomplished with limited resources and time. This marriage of idealistic objectives and pessimistic expectations provides insight into the complexity of wicked problems and the prospect that there are often no good solutions. Keeney observed that even in choosing what he viewed as an unsatisfactory option, Obama had made an informed, values-based decision.862
This decision was not popular with his Democratic party. Surging forces and resources towards a war the president apparently viewed as unsustainable appeared wasteful.863 His decision could also well have harmed the Democratic party as 2010 midterm Congressional elections fell within this timeline. Nevertheless, the president considered the debate on the options presented him and made a values-based
861 David J. Rothkopf, National Insecurity: American Leadership in the Age of Fear, (PublicAffairs, 2014), 180. 862 Ralph L. Keeney, (Interview, 2018). Keeney observed that Obama’s decision reflected a values- based judgement that considered valuable lives and resources. His decision to minimize further resources toward objectives he viewed skeptically was a pragmatic response and indicative of value- focused thinking. 863 Gregory S. Parnell, Value-Focused Thinking, Methods for Conducting Military Operational Analysis, (Military Operations Research Society, 2007), 621. Parnell observed that a decision represents an irrevocable allocation of resources and that analysis must demonstrate the value of any alternative to achieve the benefit in order to warrant the allocation. 293 decision.864 Though a cynical case may be made that the president’s timeline was politically motivated, his decision appears to contradict Mintz’s precautionary principle to some extent. Mintz asserted that a decision maker is unlikely to make a decision that could harm them politically.865 Obama made this decision knowing that doing so could well have harmed his party as well as his own chances at re-election.
Barack Obama’s announcement of his policy intent caused apprehension among some members of his NSC and allies. NSC members who had advocated a robust COIN strategy felt that the content of the president’s speeches did not match their understanding of what had been agreed.866 They attributed this disconnect to the fact that the political staff closest to the president influenced the president.867
The president’s communication of his policy and strategy also sent conflicting messages and sowed doubt among stakeholders foreign and domestic.
NATO allies listening to the president’s policy announcement might have begun to have doubts about U.S. commitment and their perceived value with his statement that “more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security over six decades” and “we have not always been thanked for these efforts.”868 Afghans listening to his announcement and his inclusion of a timeline were sent a message that U.S. commitment had limits. In
864 Ibid. 865 Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making," (Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993), 598. 866 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018), Staff recalled phone calls to NSS members, principally from DOD and the ISAF staff, complaining that the president’s public comments did not match their understanding of NSC agreements and undermined the strategy. 867 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). 868 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009). 294 sowing doubt, the president undermined Allied commitment he needed to achieve his objectives.869 The inclusion of a timeline also likely emboldened the Taliban.870
Obama certainly approached his analysis of Afghanistan in a pragmatic, reasonable way. However a flawed decision analysis procedure and conflicting advice from experts caused him to weight his decisions in a way that might be characterized as irrational, particularly with regard to his intent for Pakistan.871
Steinbruner observed that in cases like this, although decision makers often operate in conditions of significant uncertainty, they also often act on strong beliefs despite the risks involved. As a result, they make decisions about what they desire and do not alter them even when subsequent evidence contradicts them.872 The president understood the importance of addressing the Al Qaeda threat residing in
Pakistan and agreed to act on it despite the risks. In deciding on a policy to unilaterally violate their sovereignty with CT operations he risked damaging the relationship with an ally as well as increased the likelihood that the Pakistanis would undermine operations.
Assess Policy Effectiveness
The ambiguous nature of the president’s objectives with regard to defeating or denying Al Qaeda, reversing Taliban momentum, or improving the Afghan government, enabled the administration to declare progress by any number of measures they judged to be adequate. These same ambiguous objectives likewise
869 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Interview, 2018), ISAF staff recalled a high level of concern among allies on the U.S. commitment. 870 Michael Rubin, The Afghanistan Withdrawal: Why Obama Was Wrong to Insist on a Deadline, (American Enterprise Institute, 2010), accessed 12 July, 2016, http://www.aei.org/publication/the- afghanistan-withdrawal-why-obama-was-wrong-to-insist-on-a-deadline/ 871 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001), 155-156 872 Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 88- 106, 112-139. 295 allowed critics to assert failure. Regardless, this approach allowed the administration to characterize progress on their terms and Barack Obama held to his word and began to withdraw combat troops at the end of 2011 and continued to reduce troop levels throughout most of his presidency.
Findings and Conclusions
Findings
Barack Obama’s decision-making on Afghanistan is perhaps the best example among the examined cases of the challenges to quality decision making in the contemporary NSC. His decisions are illustrative that poor decisions are not typically the result of a lack of effort or intelligence, rather they are the result of the fact that most decision makers don’t know how to properly analyze complex problems and develop criteria to inform a good decision.873 Barack Obama demonstrated a keen interest and was deliberate in both demanding and considering a wealth of analysis.874 He demonstrated an awareness of resource limitations in stating that the U.S. was not committed to a long-term presence in Afghanistan.875
However, the president’s analytical nature and pragmatism did not significantly improve policy decision-making.
This case reinforces that the complexity, pace, and volume of problems and issues a president faces daily exceed cognitive limits of even the brightest. Though he asked many of the right questions, this prescriptive evaluation of the Obama
873 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 3-6. 874 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 298-300. Robert Gates compares and contrasts the decision-making styles of George W. Bush and Barack Obama calling Obama “…the most deliberative president I worked for.” He compared his analytical style to that of Abraham Lincoln, high praise from a former intelligence analyst. 875 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 128. 296 decision procedure reflects that the president’s lack of experience, coupled with an ineffective NSA and a lack of disciplined analysis from his NSC impeded good policy decisions.
Similar in many ways to the pitfalls of the Bush NSC, an unstructured decision procedure in this administration again enabled cognitive, bureaucratic, and political factors to adversely influence quality decision making. A key driver of dysfunction,
Obama’s first NSA, General James Jones, was responsible for imposing a disciplined procedure but was ineffective in this role. While highly experienced,
Jones did not have any history or relationship with the president and Obama did not empower him to impose executive authority over the NSC or committee process.
However Jones’s Deputy, Thomas Donilon, had a strong relationship with the president having served on his campaign staff. This close relationship predictably led to direct consultation between Obama and Donilon, often going around or excluding Jones.876 Interviews with NSS indicate that Jones was quickly marginalized by others near the president.877
Obama went around his NSA and empowered his relatively inexperienced
NSS, who often communicated directly to the ISAF staff to develop plans.878 Robert
Gates observed that the president’s decision making was further impaired by the fact that senior members of his NSS had no executive branch experience beyond Jones,
Donilon and General Doug Lute.879 The implications of the president’s relationship with his political staff and members of his NSS was that less experienced voices appeared to carry more influence than those of cabinet principals who were
876 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 290-291. 877 Ibid, 291. 878 Ibid, 482. 879 Ibid, 290. 297 undoubtedly selected for their experience in foreign policy.880 USCENTCOM staff members likewise indicated a lack of input to planning.881 In this environment key policy decisions were often made outside of formal channels by the president and a small circle of trusted agents.882
Despite the deep analysis of objectives and end states in the second review, the NSC decision procedure was no more effective in underpinning decisions with credible analysis than the previous administration. In the absence of structured analysis this wealth of experience within the NSC took on even greater importance and Obama failed to leverage it. The fulcrum of security policy decision-making was effectively shifted away from NSC Principals to the president’s staff.
The prescriptive framework revealed a flaw in the Obama policy decision procedure similar to the Bush administration where a chosen strategy drove definition of policy objectives. This is decidedly backward as objectives define what strategy is to achieve. Unlike the Bush administration, Barack Obama sought to define objectives to represent achievable goals. However, even after a second strategic review the Obama NSC attempted to revise the existing objectives rather than develop new ones based on what they believed was achievable.
Over time the Obama objectives regarding Al Qaeda morphed from a goal to
“degrade, dismantle and defeat” to a less ambitious definition of defeat that was to
“deny Al Qaeda a safe haven.” The objective to “reverse the Taliban’s gains and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government” was adjusted to one
880 Ibid, 384-385. 881 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018). USCENTCOM staff expressed frustration at not knowing what positions the ISAF staff was forwarding to the NSC and the guidance the NSS were giving to the ISAF staff without USCENTCOM in the loop. 882 National Security Council Staff, (Telephone Interview, 2018), Staff elaborated on the dynamics inside the White House and the fact that the NSS clearly had a close relationship with the president and articulated his intent rather than the NSC Principals; James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 211-213. 298 with less emphasis on an accountable government and a restated intent to “reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.”883
Similar to the Bush administration objectives, these were characterized by ambiguous verbs that did not describe clear definitions of success. However this enabled the administration to define success in whatever terms they chose.
While the president was skeptical of both defeating Al Qaeda and the viability of a capable and accountable government, he strangely did not reconsider the unrealistic objective to pursue Al Qaeda in Pakistan. A rather straight forward “what if” analysis on the viability and potential consequences of pursuing Al Qaeda in
Pakistan could have readily revealed the folly of doing so. This approach was certainly not going to further the stated interest of a stable Pakistan. In fact, a pragmatic analysis would likely have revealed the likelihood for increased instability.
A rather cynical approach, the administration also held to the notion that they could reduce the Taliban threat to a point where a sufficiently improved ANSF could manage the threat on an 18-month timeline. This met with broad criticism where the
Taliban were likely to lie low and wait for U.S. withdrawal.884
A key point in this assessment is the fact that the president’s decision-making was also undermined by a palpable mistrust of the military, resulting in disproportional reliance on the staff closest to him who also were not experienced in executive decision-making or security policy formulation. In this environment unstructured analysis, mistrust, and constrained expert input, collectively served to
883 Barack Obama, Transcript: Obama Announces New Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategies, (Washington Post, 2009), accessed 16 December 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/03/27/AR2009032700891.html; Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, 2009), accessed 15 October 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address- nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 884 Stephen Biddle, (Interview, 2018), Biddle indicated that both General McCrystal and General Petraeus believed the Taliban would just wait to see what the U.S. did at the 18-month threshold. They had the luxury of time to wait the U.S. and allies out. 299 allow tactical and operational military approaches to drive strategy and policy development.
Reinforcing the findings from the previous cases, this case validated the ADA methodology’s utility in characterizing the implications of errors of analytical order and omissions to challenges in policy performance. Also consistent with the previous cases, the prescriptive analysis was limited in explaining elements of Obama’s thinking. For example, the prescriptive methodology does not provide clear insight into why exactly Obama favored the perspectives of his inexperienced staff over that of his experienced NSC principals. There were certainly well-documented factors at play here including his lack of trust in military leaders, but NSS interviews emphasized his great trust in Robert Gates and Hillary Clinton. The prescriptive analysis was also limited in explaining why, in the face of great economic uncertainty and the president’s forcefully stated intent to constrain resources, that NSC principals continued to push for an extended and costly COIN strategy when they were well aware the president would not support the resources necessary to implement it.
Key elements in this case echo those in the Bush administration. Barack
Obama presided over the great majority of the policy formulation procedure, retaining most of the deliberations at the Principal level. In doing so, he denied the broader perspectives of the interagency through the committee process. Ultimately he and his NSC committed many of the same errors of analysis as the Bush NSC.
Conclusions
Barack Obama was inclined toward detailed analysis and his approach demonstrated that he was aware of the need to base his policy in national interests,
300 to identify objectives that reflected those interests, and to consider the assumptions and consequences associated with competing alternatives. Yet there was no discernable structure to the analytical procedure to guide critical thinking. Rather the president and NSC relied on their own experience and judgment to form decision criteria and policy positions.
In this environment an ad hoc procedure and parochial factions within the
NSC failed the president. A group of experienced NSC professionals failed to first reconsider what was to be achieved before deliberating on a new implementing strategy. This illustrates that even the extensive experience and judgment of seasoned national security professionals are not sufficient by themselves to address complex problems.
Much like the Bush NSC, the Obama NSC approach to policy was alternative- focused, developing their strategic alternatives and then trying to conform their objectives to the chosen strategy. In this way, perceptions on the plausibility of the competing strategies became the evaluation criteria for policy objectives. The result was the president’s objectives did not reflect what he wanted to achieve. They rather reflected a pessimistic consideration of what could be achieved under limited time and forces.
Obama’s adoption of a ‘Good Enough’ approach reflected elements of
Ellsberg’s observations on the challenge to define reasonable solutions to problems under uncertain conditions. Ellsberg’s testing of decision making under uncertain, ambiguous conditions where the consequences of actions are not known, indicated that reasonable decision makers often consciously make seemingly irrational choices influenced by other values that weighted their decisions.885
885 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001), 155-156. 301
The president’s decision-making and the competing influences on it in this case merit consideration of the institutions, structures and processes in which policies are formed. This case illustrates how powerful stakeholder perspectives and agendas served to shape the president’s policy positions.886 These differences were reflected in divided camps within the NSC where principals, senior military and other experts advocated COIN while his Vice President and some staff advocated a CT strategy. This case likewise illustrates the dysfunction within the NSS where the NSA had less influence than his staff did with Obama. This was compounded by strong
NSS advocacy for a CT strategy that was at odds with principals.
No matter which strategy Obama chose, members of his administration certainly recognized that reaching some acceptable accommodation between the
Taliban and the Afghan government was necessary to end the conflict.887 General
McCrystal’s intent, supported by Petraeus and Gates, was also to attempt reconciliation with the Taliban.888 Any intent to reconcile elements of the Taliban were opposed by the Karzai government. This impasse left McCrystal in the position of continuing to fight an insurgency while attempting to improve ANSF capabilities sufficiently to combat them on their own.
This scenario echoed the Nixon administration’s policy of “Vietnamization” where they embraced a flawed political solution, rationalizing that an improved South
Vietnamese military could succeed where a large U.S. force along with the South
Vietnamese forces could not.889 This approach was based on a political calculus
886 Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 707-708; James G. March and Herbert A Simon, Organizations (Wiley, 1958), 171. 887 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 240-243. 888 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 889 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, Part I, 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970, 7023-7024. 302 whereby the Nixon administration did not want to be seen as losing the war, and thus required an approach that provided the political space to declare mission ‘success.’
In this case the administration articulated an approach that shifted responsibility for potential outcomes onto the South Vietnamese government. Certainly, Barack
Obama’s staff were concerned about similar issues and pursued a similar approach that shifted responsibility for security to the Afghan government. This scenario might well be explained by other FPA frameworks. For example Kahneman and Tversky’s
Prospect Theory asserted decision-maker’s choices among alternatives involving uncertainty are biased towards their aversion to loss.890
Despite his own misgivings on both approaches the president’s policy decision reflects their influence and included both. Barack Obama asserted his will and reduced combat forces over the course of his presidency. However the Taliban steadily expanded their control over areas of the country and Al Qaeda remained in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as many predicted. Though ANSF capacity grew, they remained largely unable to maintain security without NATO help. Most notably, shortly after the Taliban seized the northern city of Kunduz in 2015, Obama reversed his plans to withdraw all U.S. troops by the end of his term. He indicated a stay- behind force of 5,500 troops was necessary to prevent further Taliban advances.
Before leaving office in 2016 he again acknowledged Taliban gains and committed to leave 8,400 combat forces in an attempt to reverse Taliban progress again. These results may be characterized in a number of ways but when the outcomes are compared with the objectives, U.S. policy may reasonably be characterized in terms of strategic failure.
890 Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, (Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1979), 263 303
The ADA methodology again demonstrated its utility in this case characterizing the analytical procedure and the implications of deviations from a prescribed procedure. This case likewise reaffirmed there were factors influencing
Barack Obama’s decision-making that the ADA framework is not structured to explain but where mainstream FPA frameworks might well do so. For example, it is interesting to consider Obama’s decision-making in this case in terms of Mintz’s
'Noncompensatory Principle. Mintz asserted that politicians constantly weigh the political calculus of decisions and are unlikely to select an option that will harm them.891 Obama certainly weighed the political implications of his decisions and yet chose an approach that risked hurting him politically. While he constrained resources and time, Obama also surged forces in Afghanistan against the wishes of his own party and the large majority of voters who elected him. This decision adds some necessary context to Mintz’s principle where politicians are certainly cognizant of political implications and consider them, but they also often make decisions beyond their own self-interests.
This case again illustrates the utility of a prescriptive approach to focus further analysis on explanation of deviations from a rational procedure. It likewise reinforces previous findings on the limitations of an ADA methodology to explain why many of the observed errors and omissions of analysis occurred. Additionally the ADA framework’s utility in illustrating causal relationships between the rigor of the analytical procedure and outcomes reinforces its predictive potential for use in FPA.
From a broader perspective, failure of the Obama policy echoes those of the
Bush administration and reflects a collective failure of the Executive and Legislative
891 Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision-making," (Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993), 598. 304 branches to assure sound security policy. These shared failures reflect systemic challenges in the national security system that span administrations and persist today. Executive branch failures in policy analysis resulted in ambiguous objectives and flawed assumptions that invited unnecessary and avoidable risk to policy intent.
Congress’s failure was to again resource a president’s intent without tethering their support to clear articulation of the conditions that would define success.
305
Chapter VIII
Findings and Conclusions
This research hypothesized that the decision analysis procedure within the
NSC represents a causal factor of independent significance in U.S. national security policy performance. With this in mind, this research was undertaken posing the central question: How might an ADA perspective enhance understanding of presidential decision-making procedures on vital national security issues and can this prescriptive perspective add value to mainstream FPA approaches?
This research examined U.S. policy decisions on the employment of military force in Afghanistan and Iraq under the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. The impetus of the study was to better understand why, despite a robust national security apparatus, unparalleled military capabilities and vast economic capacity, multiple administrations failed to achieve U.S. security policy goals.
An obvious consideration when considering decisions to use force, is to weigh the perceived security benefit with the costs to the nation in terms of the lives lost, and resources expended. In these terms, the undesirable outcomes of presidential decisions in these cases demand inquiry into how they were informed.
Analysis of foreign policy decisions have traditionally been the product of two distinct perspectives, those being normative and descriptive approaches. However, specific focus on the efficacy of NSC analysis to underpin and inform policy decisions required a somewhat different aperture than generalized FPA frameworks offer.
306
The intent to interrogate NSC decision procedures in each case required an approach designed to do so in specific detail. This requirement led to consideration of decision science methodologies and adoption of a prescriptive ADA procedure.
This methodology was designed to enable detailed evaluation of what was considered by each administration, in terms of what decision science experts indicate would comprise a quality, risk-informed decision.
Where descriptive FPA models would typically explain decisions in terms of how a decision maker responded in the presence of cognitive, structural, or political influences, this prescriptive ADA perspective explained decisions in terms of procedural requirements for ordered analysis and development of specific criteria.
This approach did not assume or prescribe a rational choice, rather it reflected a rational procedure to guide development of choices in the presence of cognitive, structural and political influences.
This detailed consideration and comparison of NSC analytical procedures warranted acknowledgement of a limitation present in all subjective decisions, that is the impracticality of establishing an ‘ideal’ decision procedure by which to analyze and address all strategic problems. This is an unrealistic goal as the aforementioned human factors are ever present in decision-making. To this point, the great volume of staff work associated with any major policy decision funneling upward through the
NSC committee process does not obviate a president's nor NSC Principal’s personality, motivations, risk tolerance nor the competing influences of intermestic politics.
In considering the wealth of presidential decisions to employ military force, a broad number of cases were considered. An approach to maximize cases from across multiple administrations was desirable in order to expand the basis of
307 comparison and potentially reinforce trends, patterns, and key findings. Since the purpose of this research was to understand both unique and systemic challenges to good security policy decision making, it made good analytical sense to select the particular cases studied here, as they represented successive administrations considering a common problem set.
This approach enabled me to hold the problem set constant, while comparing and contrasting the specific analytical considerations of each administration in terms of a common methodology. This enabled identification of analytical errors and gaps in each case in terms of the prescriptive framework, while also identifying key factors, recurring patterns, and systemic issues to security policy decision making across administrations.
The findings and conclusions of this research approach are framed with specific focus on the purpose of the NSC itself as this body represents the fulcrum about which U.S. security policy is formed and implemented. The NSC was created in response to the lessons learned from World War II when Congress instituted the national security system as a measure to prevent future strategic surprise.892 In addition to the NSC, the National Security Act of 1947 put into place other supporting institutions, acknowledging that such a system was necessary to manage and inform decision-making on complex security problems. This same act formalized a National
892 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed America, (Princeton University Press, 2008), 2-3.; Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, The Whittaker, Alan G., Brown, Shannon A., Smith, Frederick C., & McKune, Elizabeth, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System. (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2011), 6; Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, History of the National Security Council 1947-1997, (United States Department of State, 1997), accessed March 2016, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm. 308
Military Establishment to advise the president in developing informed decisions involving potential military conflict.893
Given this level of government emphasis and specific intent, it is reasonable to expect that NSC deliberations on decisions to go to war are appropriate, proportional, and underpinned by a prudent level of analytical rigor commensurate with the national security interests and lives at stake. Yet the NSC follows no formal decision analysis procedure, nor is there a statutory requirement to do so. In light of this fact, the unsatisfactory outcomes of George W. Bush’s decisions to invade
Afghanistan and Iraq, and Barack Obama’s decision to surge forces in Afghanistan, called attention to the efficacy and rigor of the NSC deliberations informing their policy decisions.
Analysis of these cases was undertaken with an understanding that decision makers often make poor decisions because most have not been trained on how to make good ones.894 Efforts to understand how decision makers think and behave have often overlooked this rather obvious driver of quality policy decision-making.
This is a critically important consideration in evaluating the performance of the NSC whose members bear statutory responsibility to inform security policy decisions. The startling reality is that the NSCs of these administrations failed to provide a level of risk-based analysis equal to that which any medium-sized company would perform as a matter of course in assessing risk to their financial decisions.
893 The National Security Act of 1947 – July 26, 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758. 894 Ibid, 3. 309
The Value of an Applied Decision Science Approach to Policy Analysis
This study’s prescriptive analytical methodology was based in methods developed in the field of decision science to inform risk-based decision-making. In very basic terms decision theory is a formal procedure of logic to distinguish between what is feasible and what is desirable.895 In discerning the feasible from the desirable, decision scientists forwarded ADA methods grounded in a disciplined approach to develop criteria and evaluate choices, and do so in a specific order of analysis that is fundamental to good decision-making.896
This approach emphasized that identifying and analyzing the right problem and satisfactory objectives to address it, are essential prior to consideration of alternatives. The central premise of this analytical approach is that objectives define what is to be achieved, while alternatives merely represent various ways to achieve them. In keeping with this approach, policy objectives must precede alternative strategies to achieve them.
In this methodology, objectives and end states that define successful achievement of them form the essential evaluation criteria for judging the quality of any alternatives. A further benefit to evaluation of alternatives in terms of objectives is that doing so provides insights into potential trade-offs among them that seek to protect fundamental objectives, that is objectives that are ends unto themselves and maximize the potential for an acceptable outcome.897
When applied to NSC decision-making procedures in the study cases, this methodology revealed significant deviations from analytical order and gaps in
895 Itzhak Gilboa, Maria Rouziou, and Olivier Sibony, Decision theory made relevant: Between the software and the shrink, (Research in Economics, 72, 2018) 241. 896 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 4-6. 897 Ibid, 31. 310 development of critically important criteria. The implications of these shortcomings represented clear causal links between the efficacy of analytical procedures and unsatisfactory policy outcomes. Most importantly, interrogation of the decision procedures in these cases demonstrated the predictive benefit of a prescriptive methodology where policy outcomes are closely tied to the quality of the decision- making that underpinned them.
Key Findings
An overarching finding of this research, spanning all cases, is that successive administrations considered the same security problems, possessing different world views, values, and political ideologies, and yet their policies failed due to similar procedural flaws in their analysis. Inability of both administrations to discern feasible policy objectives from those they desired, represents a fundamental violation of rationality that existed in all three decision cases.
Procedural shortcomings of NSC analysis in these cases enabled poorly formed policy objectives, unclear end state conditions, flawed assumptions, and inadequate examination of consequences. These collectively undermined development of viable strategies and consumed national resources far out of proportion with any tangible security gains. This relationship between policy ends and strategy was framed in terms of Park’s observation that “…policy outlines the bounds of what strategy should attain while strategy identifies the costs of policy’s goals.”898
898 Francis J.H. Park, Where Are Policy and Risk?; A Dialogue on Strategy: On Strategy as Ends, Ways, and Means ((Parameters Volume 47 , No.1, Spring 2017), 126. 311
Incongruency between objectives and strategies represents the central failure of U.S. policy intent. Both George W. Bush and Barrack Obama adopted objectives that could not be achieved at an acceptable cost, no matter how capable the military. This focus on the ends-ways-means balance acknowledged the constraining reality that even the vast resource capacity of the U.S. has limits, making identification of achievable objectives the security policy-making imperative.
The broader implications of flawed policy decision-making in these cases were realization of a less stable global security environment than was the case prior to U.S. actions, and where terrorist threats to the U.S. are greater than was the case before either president took office. In sum, these policy failures represent a failure of the NSC to responsibly evaluate security problems and recommend appropriate, proportional policy responses.
These failures of analysis emphasize that the policy outcome is directly related to the quality of the decision analysis underpinning them. Ironically, the quality of the analytical procedure is the component of the issue over which the decision maker retains the greatest degree of control and represents the key weakness in both administrations.899 A key finding of this research, is that there was no formal analytical procedure to which either administration adhered. This finding represents a compelling factor in the national security system that is of independent significance to policy outcomes.
A key factor challenging quality decision-making is the great latitude presidents exercise in creating and defining the operation of their own national security systems. While fundamental to the notion of executive authority, a key
899 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 111. 312 implication of this broad latitude is that presidents are not required to define or adhere to any formal decision analysis procedure. Presidents may choose any approach or methods they desire. An implication of this prerogative in these cases is that this system operated largely on experienced-based judgment rather than evidence-based analysis.900
With this in mind, it is also noteworthy that members of the NSC and NSS often conflated the committee process with analytical procedure. The NSC committee process represents a formal hierarchal structure by which members were to consider and elevate recommendations to the NSC Principals and president.
Formal analysis may be implied in this system but there was no formal guidance to consider specific decision criteria in any case. Unless a president specifically requested analysis, members of each administration were largely left to discern what they believed the president needed to inform a decision. With this understanding, the prescriptive ADA approach employed here was instrumental in evaluating how administrations approached decision analysis, teasing out the gaps, trends and patterns associated with a system that followed an ad hoc procedure in each case.
These flaws then direct necessary scrutiny on the NSC, the unelected body responsible for developing policy recommendations for presidents. Like all presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama formed their National Security
Councils from among their staff and Cabinet Principals. In an ideal world these political appointees would be capable of providing evidenced-based recommendations. However, the political nature of appointments does not assure appointees possess any analytical skills, rather they are typically selected based on
900 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2018). A common characterization among staff interviewed was to describe to the committee process as an analytical one. Further discussion revealed that they equated committee debate based in experience and judgment as analysis. 313 experience or relationships. Compounding this shortcoming, although NSS members are largely detailed to the White House from across the government or academia for their functional or topical expertise, this also does not assure analytical acumen necessary to assure quality decision support.
Presidents retain and rely on the National Security Advisor to manage the security policy development procedure and assure issues are analyzed and vetted for decision. The NSA in turn relies on presidential empowerment to be effective.
However, empowerment is often not enough. In the Bush administration,
Condoleezza Rice certainly enjoyed the president’s trust and empowerment, but she did not display an intimate understanding of good decision-making procedure and she failed to forcefully confront the dysfunction between assertive principals. She likewise failed to impose discipline on the committee process enabling DOD to push their agenda. In the Obama administration, General Jim Jones lacked both a close relationship and access to the president while members of the NSS maintained personal relationships and enjoyed frequent access to Obama. This meant Jones’ influence was minimal and he was not empowered to impose discipline on the procedure. The result was that less experienced staff perspectives often circumvented the NSA and perhaps exerted greater influence on the president’s decision-making than the more experienced NSA or NSC principals. To this point,
Secretary Robert Gates expressed frustration at the level to which an empowered
NSS exercised influence with President Obama and, in his opinion, acted beyond the bounds of their statutory roles.
The absence of quality analysis meant both presidents relied on their own experience, judgment, and instincts. This allowed personal ideals, political factors, preconceptions, bias, and cognitive limitations to undermine sound decision-making.
314
This finding does not in any way propose to diminish the importance of experience and sound judgment in any problem-solving endeavor. These attributes are certainly invaluable to effective policy formulation, particularly in maintaining perspective in a stressful environment and in understanding the appropriateness of recommendations and alternatives. As previously discussed however, reliance on the judgment of experienced professionals is insufficient by itself to address complex problems.
Reliance on experienced judgment in these cases necessitated an assumption that the problems they considered were sufficiently similar to past ones such that historical analogy and the experiences of members were sufficient to address them. This assumption also required that all actors involved behaved similarly as in past instances, and their collective interests were similar to past problems, such that judgments about them were reasonable. This is a deeply flawed premise, yet it was under this construct that the NSC and committee system largely functioned in these cases. This finding represents a compelling factor in policy success or failure across administrations that is likely to impact future administrations.
It is also important to reemphasize at this point that this research does not conclude nor advocate that the NSC system adopt this specific prescriptive methodology or any for that matter. This was decidedly not the point of the research.
Rather, the prescriptive methodology employed here was to apply a suitable approach by which to compare and contrast the specific decision support procedures of each administration.
A related implication of the absence of formal procedures is that the transition between administrations represents an early and serious challenge to a president’s decision-making capacity. The impact of changing NSC and NSS
315 members from administration to administration represents an unsatisfactory gap in continuity and learned counsel. This means that no matter the experience-level or qualifications of incoming administration members, their learning curve is steep, and they are vulnerable to misstep. This transition gap represents a key structural challenge that impacts every administration.
A lack of committee input into key decisions of both administrations represents a third key finding that challenged quality decision-making in these cases.
The Committee process was designed with the intent to assure security issues were analyzed and shaped for decision by interagency and policy experts prior to NSC
Principal and presidential consideration. There were a number of reasons that neither president leveraged this process effectively. In each case the president was deeply engaged in the decision process which meant that most deliberations were done with NSC Principals. This effectively denied committee input and with it broader and perhaps opposing perspectives that might have positively influenced their decisions. Bureaucratic politics and powerful organizational processes were also evident in all three cases where the parochial nature of the NSC Principals, NSS, political staff and certain departments each played a role impeding the committee process and a quality decision procedure.
In the Bush administration, bureaucratic politics were evident where
Rumsfeld and his Deputies effectively impeded committee input that did not support their positions. This resulted in increased reliance on NSC principals meetings where members of the administration perceived an assertive Rumsfeld and Vice President
Cheney held significant influence, and where Powell’s ability to influence was muted.
In these cases personalities and agendas impeded disciplined thinking and analysis.
There was also strong evidence of groupthink in the Bush NSC where Principals
316 conformed to the president’s rationale for his decisions even when some held strong reservations.
Barack Obama’s perception that a parochial DOD was deliberately limiting his options led to disproportionate reliance on his political staff and NSS members, to the detriment of NSC Principals, senior military advisors, and the broader committee process. Compounding dysfunction, an adversarial relationship with the military and direct access of NSS members to the president allowed strong opinions from less experienced advisors to circumvent the NSA and NSC Principals. This enabled NSS members to openly advocate for specific positions at odds with Principals and senior military positions.
A fourth key finding affirmed a prevalent criticism of Congress where weak legislative oversight also played a role in enabling poor policy decisions.901
Presidents Bush and Obama were empowered by Congress to employ military force in Afghanistan and Iraq through Authorizations for the Use of Military Force.902 The two AMUF contained common language authorizing both presidents to use
“necessary and appropriate force” at their discretion. There were few legislative requirements for either administration to provide specific decision criteria that would have enabled Congress to adequately scope the appropriateness and resource requirements of these policies. Presidents had only to meet the requirements of the
War Powers Resolution, which required them to report every 60 days on actions taken pursuant to the exercise of the authority granted. This unconstrained authority
901 James M. Goldgeier and Elizabeth N. Saunders, The Unconstrained Presidency: Checks and Balances Eroded Long Before Trump, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Accessed December 2018, available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/unconstrained-presidency-checks-and-balances-eroded- long-trump 902 Senate Joint Resolution 23, 107th Congress, (Public Law No: 107-40, 2001) Accessed 12 June 2016, https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf; House Joint Resolution, (Public Law 107–243, 107th Congress, 2002), Access 12 June 2016, https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ243/PLAW-107publ243.pdf 317 may have made sense in a crisis situation like that immediately following the 9/11 attacks, but Iraq did not represent a time-sensitive situation and neither of these
AMUF were amended significantly over time. In fact, Barack Obama justified his use of force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant under it in 2014.903
Among these key findings, flawed policy objectives in these cases represent the Achille’s Heel of both administration’s intent. George Bush stubbornly held to flawed objectives in both theaters despite strong criticism and arguments for withdrawal. Obama largely retained these flawed objectives and, though he modified them over time, they remained ambiguous such that they denied clear articulation of the conditions that would describe successful achievement of them. The direct implications were that unparalleled operational success and vast expenditure of resources in Afghanistan and Iraq could not achieve Bush or Obama objectives.
Jervis might have characterized these responses in terms of cognitive dissonance, where decision makers rationalize a decision based on the value he or she places on the objective, ignoring or minimizing other alternatives.904 Jervis observed that cognitive dissonance in these stressful policy situations “…will also increase the value placed on specific objectives and possessions gained by war.”905
These observations are particularly relevant in George Bush’s commitment to reversing the unsatisfactory situation in Iraq where, though the cost of his policy was high, he believed he must accomplish something worthy of all the sacrifices made to
903 Savage, Charlie, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a Legal Basis for Airstrikes, (The New York Times, 2014), Accessed 28 March 2019, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/americas/obama-sees-iraq-resolution-as-a-legal-basis-for- airstrikes-official-says.html 904 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976), 393. Jervis observes that “A major deduction from dissonance theory is that expending resources increase dissonance and thus increases the pressures to believe that the policy is succeeding. The argument here is the reverse of the obvious one that people will pay a high price for things that they value highly: sacrifices increase the value placed on the goals that are sought and achieved.” 905 Ibid, 396. 318 achieve it.906 This might also explain Barack Obama’s reluctance to completely abandon Afghanistan, deciding to increase forces before leaving office. In such cases, reasoned perspective on expenditure of means in proportion to actual achievements is lost. Rather the decision maker focuses on what they perceive might be lost.
The consequences of these collective failures are that U.S. interventions in
Iraq and Afghanistan did not defeat Al Qaeda nor did they achieve the democratic models envisioned in either case. Bush’s preventive policies certainly did not reduce the threat of terrorism, they increased it. Obama’s surge also did not resolve the challenges of defeating Al Qaeda nor remove the threat posed by the Taliban to the elected government.907
Conclusions - Advancing the Body of Knowledge
This research was undertaken to understand how a prescriptive ADA perspective might enhance understanding of presidential decision-making procedures on vital national security issues, and the extent to which a prescriptive perspective might add value to mainstream FPA approaches.
The evidence suggests that the prescriptive ADA methodology represents a useful way to map the decision-making terrain to reveal specific analytical discontinuities and characterizing their causal implications. The evidence likewise revealed the limitations of prescriptive approaches to explain why intelligent and experienced professionals failed to impose a level of analytical rigor commensurate
906 Ibid, 394. 907 Stephen M. Walt, Lessons of Two Wars: We Will Lose in Iraq and Afghanistan, (Foreign Policy, 2011), accessed 7 July, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/16/lessons_of_two_wars_we_will_lose_in_iraq_and_afgh anistan#sthash.l0ejjOVc.8V85bi7w.dpuf 319 with the gravity of their decisions. In other words the framework is useful to answer the ‘what’ questions but is limited in answering the ‘why’ questions. This outcome then suggests a complementary capability to mainstream FPA approaches whereby the ADA methodology focuses the ‘why’ analysis on the key determinants of policy performance.
Analysis of the policy decisions of successive administrations addressing the same problems revealed the utility of the ADA framework to improved understanding of president’s decision-making procedures. This methodology was useful in revealing both discontinuities in the analytical procedure as well as systemic challenges within the national security system that adversely impacted policy performance.
Application of the prescriptive framework to the decision cases was also useful to focus further analysis through other FPA approaches on the specific determinants of policy performance.
2001 Decision to Invade Afghanistan
The ADA methodology demonstrated its effectiveness in characterizing the relationship between both omissions in analysis and failure to develop key decision criteria, in the unsatisfactory outcome of George W. Bush’s policy decision-making in this case. While the ADA methodology demonstrated utility in characterizing the relationship between procedure and policy performance, it also revealed its limitations to fully characterize why these occurred.
Ambiguously stated political-military objectives represented a key challenge to
George Bush’s policy intent for Afghanistan. In this case, a lack of clearly understood conditions that would describe success led to an open-ended campaign of indeterminate duration. The policy challenges in Afghanistan were also undermined
320 by choosing a military strategy before determining what was to be achieved by it.
This was further complicated by the fact that the president’s objectives changed after the military plan was in action. This posed significant challenges to military leaders who had invaded under a relatively small force structure based on assumptions that were no longer accurate.
General Franks and USCENTCOM planned their campaign strategy around the president’s initial objectives for “Strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps…designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and; strikes against military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan... to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.”908 Bush later re-stated and at the same time complicated these objectives after military planning was completed and the campaign had commenced as, “Removing the Taliban (from power), denying sanctuary to Al Qaeda, and helping a democratic government to emerge.”909 This represented a dramatic expansion of policy intent under ambiguous objectives and neither the president nor NSC ever characterized the conditions that defined successful achievement of them.
This placed military leaders in an unenviable position of defining end state conditions that met the president’s intent for disrupting, denying, and defeating Al
Qaeda. The president’s addition of an objective for a democratic Afghan government also added a significant security mission for which USCENTCOM had not planned.
As a result, they did not have adequate forces in place to establish security or perform nation-building missions while also pursuing Al Qaeda and Taliban.
908 George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation, (The White House, 2001), this statement by President Bush to the nation was made on October 7, 2001 to announce the invasion of Afghanistan. 909 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010), 194-195. 321
Changing objectives are indicative of the president’s desire to act quickly in a crisis where the NSC did not take the time to evaluate the likely consequences of their intended actions. Interrogation of this case highlights both the utility and the limitations of the prescriptive methodology. The ADA methodology was useful to inform the ‘what’ questions in terms of identifying analytical flaws and their implications. But the methodology was not useful to address the ‘why’ questions and suggests a complementary relationship where descriptive frameworks might explain why the president and his NSC decided as they did. For example, Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is evident in this short planning cycle where the administration perceived the need to make rapid decisions to invade, without fully understanding the implications and consequences of their intended actions.910 Ellsberg’s notion of reasonableness in decision-making and the challenges in achieving it are also pertinent here. The imperative to decide reasonably required understanding assumptions and their potential consequences but the president did not emphasize doing so.911
Failure to analyze assumptions is particularly surprising in the case of Donald
Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld’s reputation for demanding rigorous analysis of assumptions was well known. He frequently admonished that failure to “…examine assumptions on which a plan is based can start a planning process based on incorrect premises, and then proceed perfectly logically to incorrect conclusions.”912 Understanding that these were a point of general analytical emphasis for Rumsfeld indicates there were other compelling factors influencing his acceptance of flawed U.S. policy objectives and accompanying assumptions on force sizing, particularly after the nation-building
910 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organizations, (The Free Press, 4th Edition, 1997), 119. 911 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001), 155-156. 912 Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2001), 429-430. 322 objective was added. The ADA methodology was not well suited to explain these factors. However, the ADA framework’s focus on these decision criteria and their implications again demonstrated its potential to focus mainstream FPA approaches on key factors influencing policy performance.
This particular instance also provides some insight into the applicability of
Allison’s Organizational Process Model on policy performance.913 Organizational power enabled an assertive personality in Doug Feith to negatively influence
USCENTCOM planning. Although the president insisted their mission did not include nation-building, military planners were well aware of their responsibility to plan for securing the peace after combat operations ceased, and they attempted to do so as a matter of policy.914 The ability of Feith to constrain their planning and for the OSD to dictate the force structure was key in risking failure of the president’s policy.
This initial application of the ADA framework demonstrated its potential to reveal the implications of analytical flaws on policy performance. At the same time this first case demonstrated the limitations of the ADA framework to answer the ‘why’ questions that would provide insights into how and why they occurred. Expanding on this observation, some errors of analysis were readily attributed to flawed procedure like that of identifying the strategic alternative of invasion before identifying what invasion was to achieve. However, faulty procedure does not explain why experienced policy practitioners did not fully consider their objectives in terms of what the military could practically achieve. It is likewise unclear why the NSC failed
913 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. 914 U.S. Central Command Staff, (Interview, 2018), USCENTCOM planners stated their clear understanding of post-combat security planning. They were very apprehensive at Feith’s forceful guidance not to include this mission in their planning. Their response to was to include security force troops later in their force flow and were directed to not to execute it in favor of retaining forces for other contingencies. 323 to question their assumptions or likely consequences before acting. More fundamentally, it confounds understanding why after the challenges of the military strategy were evident, that George Bush and his NSC failed to recognize that their objectives required revision. Failure to do so led to eighteen years of extended conflict where in 2020 the Taliban continues to threaten the Afghan government, where Al Qaeda remains a threat, and where democratic institutions are undermined by corruption and lack of security. While the ADA framework was useful to relate specific analytical failures to these undesirable outcomes, mainstream FPA frameworks are necessary to explain how and why these occurred.
These policy challenges also focus attention to some key systemic issues within the Bush NSC, namely a lack of institutional mechanisms to assure sound policy deliberations. The ad hoc approach within the NSC that resulted in avoidable mistakes invites scrutiny on the broad latitude of the Executive branch and perhaps the incompleteness of the legislation dictating NSC responsibilities. The attacks of
September 11, 2001 certainly justified U.S. action against Al Qaeda, but an undisciplined and rushed decision procedure resulted in poorly formed policy wasting many lives and significant national resources for little or no security benefit.
If one were to characterize the outcome of the invasion in terms of the largely discredited notion of the GWOT as a grand strategy, it may be judged by the fact that the global threat has not been reduced over nearly two decades of effort.915 Despite all of the expense and effort, extremist jihadist groups remain capable of launching
915 Thomas Joscelyn, Fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda fights on, (The Long War Journal, 2016), accessed 11 September, 2016; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/fifteen-years- after-the-911-attacks-al-qaeda-fights- on.php?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2009-12- 16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief 324 attacks across the globe.916 Eighteen years of sustained counter-terror operations and growing American debt are troubling indicators of a faulty national security system where policymakers appear unable to balance the desirable with feasible and reasonable policy.917
2003 Decision to Invade Iraq
This case affirmed the findings of the Afghanistan case with regard to the
ADA framework’s utility in culling out the key analytical flaws and their implications to policy performance. This case likewise affirmed the limitations of the ADA methodology to explain why these occurred.
In considering the Bush NSC’s deliberations over what to do about Saddam
Hussein and the prospect of Iraqi WMD, one might reasonably expect that they learned from their Afghanistan experience and their analytical approach would be improved given more time to deliberate and plan. The administration operated on a timeline of their choosing, with ample opportunity to cull out and question assumptions, to understand consequences and associated risks, and to consider policy alternatives. They likewise enjoyed ample time to develop a focused implementation plan that considered and could accommodate potential consequences.
However, George W. Bush did not afford his administration time to learn from
Afghanistan. He directed planning for an invasion of Iraq within a month of the
916 Paul Miller, How Does Jihadism End? Choosing Between Forever War And Nation Building, (War on the Rocks , 2016), accessed 11 September 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/how-does- jihadism-end-choosing-between-forever-war-and-nation- building/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%2009-12- 16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief. 917 Al Jazeera, Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech, (Al Jazeera, 2004), accessed 20 June 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html. Osama Bin Laden’s stated strategy was “bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.” 325
Afghanistan invasion. This quick shift toward Iraq while the invasion in Afghanistan was under way was buoyed by a false perception that their planning for Afghanistan was going very well. This reinforced their approach to planning for Iraq.
Scrutiny of the NSC procedure reflects they learned little from Afghanistan and their deliberations again deviated from orderly analysis and omitted key criteria.
The implications of ambiguous or unachievable objectives again resulted in an open- ended commitment and an intent to build a democratic Iraq. This case also confirmed the methodology’s limitations to fully characterize why these occurred while again demonstrating its utility to focus further descriptive analysis on the determinants of policy performance.
Repeating many of the same procedural errors in the rushed Afghanistan policy formulation, the Bush policy for Iraq reflected the same reliance on experienced judgment within the NSC, and his own personal ideals and convictions to form decisions. This approach reflected cognitive shortcuts that served to overly simplify what was a complex security problem, enabling biases and organizational agendas to negatively influence policy. 918 The result was that policy again followed strategy where objectives were poorly defined and framed in terms of what the president believed invasion could achieve. This approach was again hampered by failure to articulate the conditions that would characterize successful achievement of objectives.
Reemphasizing an earlier point, this observation does not argue with the imperative for professionals to make judgments at times based on experience. For
918 Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Science, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974), 1124.Tversky and Kahneman observe that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.” 326 example, presidents must rely on the experience and judgment of senior military practitioners who represent the best resource available to inform on decisions to use military force. However, George Bush as well as members of his administration not only failed to develop key criteria, they also displayed poor judgement by ignoring the experienced advice of senior military practitioners.
Further illustrating a lack of critical thinking, members of the administration asserted there were no alternatives to invasion argued within the NSC.919 In fact,
George Tenet and Richard Haass echoed Richard Armitage’s assertion that the president never held a formal debate on whether to invade or not.920 NSC staff acknowledge Powell’s consistent push for a diplomatic track and pursuit of UN agreement, but they did not recall any instance where the Secretary forcefully argued against invasion. They rather assert that his role in the debate centered on the need for legitimacy, and an overwhelming use of force if invasion was warranted.921
While the ADA framework was instrumental in characterizing the implications of these failures, it was not again capable of explaining why they occurred. This again illustrates the potentially complementary nature of ADA methods to mainstream FPA. These insights, for example, may be explained by Janis’ description of groupthink and confirmation bias. Janis characterized these dynamics at play in the Kennedy NSC during the Bay of Pigs.922 He viewed Kennedy’s NSC as
919 John Prados and Christopher Ames, The National Security Archive: The Iraq War -- Part II: Was There Even a Decision? (George Washington University, 2010), accessed 9 October 2016, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/index.htm.. 920 Richard L. Armitage, (Journal of the National Defense University, 2009 ), 104; George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007), 305, 308; Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon and Schuster, 2009), 227-228. 921 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017). 922 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 14-47. 327 full of intelligent advisors who failed to follow a disciplined decision procedure, accepting a flawed plan from the CIA without criticism.923
There was another dynamic at play here where the president’s beliefs, leadership style and personality constrained the behavior of individuals involved in a group decision procedure. This served to privilege some members over others.924
Both NSS members and Richard Haass observed that Cheney and Rumsfeld were able to readily assert that their views complemented the president’s, while Powell had to overcome dissent from the Vice President, NSA, and SECDEF.925
A similar and critically important factor in the Bush administration push to invade was the way in which OSD manipulated intelligence findings to support their narrative. Doug Feith was the force behind the work of the PCTEG to draw more certain findings and judgments than had Intelligence Community (IC) analysts.926
These findings and judgments inflated the links between Saddam and Al Qaeda, falsely reinforcing both the president’s and NSC member’s perception of the threat.927 In this way Doug Feith acted beyond organizational authorities and constraints to directly impact policy. This illustrates elements of DOD’s bureaucratic power and the limitations of presidential control over organizational processes.928
This is not a minor oversight of procedure, nor an inconsequential flaw of analysis. Rather this reinforces emphasis on both the NSA’s lack of control over the decision procedure, and Rumsfeld’s apparent lack of control over his organization’s
923 Ibid. 924 Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, Groupthink: High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations, (Columbia University Press, 1983), 54-55. 925 National Security Council Staff, (Interview, 2017); Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon & Schuster, 2009), 222. Haass’ characterization matches that of NSS staff who observed the NSC first-hand. 926 Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S Senate, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Pre- War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, (U.S. Senate, 2004), 287-288. 927 Ibid, 304-314. 928 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 699-709. 328 staff work that had significant implications. This instance again illustrates the ability of strong personalities to leverage organizational authority to the detriment of policy legitimacy.929
The ADA methodology reflected similar findings as those from the
Afghanistan case, demonstrating its utility to focus on flawed analysis and the neglect of key decision criteria. Although it again demonstrated its ability to inform the ‘what’ questions, the methodology also affirmed the limitations observed in the
Afghanistan case in explaining why these errors occurred. Bush’s transformational ideology was clearly a key factor driving unrealistic policy where, similar to
Afghanistan, the administration assumed that Iraqis would embrace their conception of democracy. George Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” was driven by a belief that the spread of democratic ideals was both a desirable and a necessary alternative to repressive ideologies in the Middle East, and that US security would be bolstered by such a spread.
It did not require a great deal of effort to foresee the rather obvious consequences of inaccurate assumptions. Among these were assumptions that
Coalition forces would be viewed as liberators, that this would translate to a rapid transition to Iraqi authority, and that these would collectively result in a level of security sufficient to enable post-regime stability and effective governance. These could have been rather easily considered and mitigating plans developed should they prove inaccurate.
A clear influencing factor in the Bush policy was his Freedom Agenda. The
ADA framework was useful in characterizing the flawed assumptions and potential
929 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 698. Allison does not necessarily account for strong personalities within government organizations whose actions and influences can have significant impact on policy despite the authority of the leader of the organization, in this case Donald Rumsfeld. 329 consequences accompanying this notion, but it was not useful in explaining why neither the president or the NSC deliberated over its assumptions and potential that they might be wrong. Bush’s Freedom Agenda represents a situation Steiner described where a decision maker maintains strong beliefs and acts on them despite the risks involved. As a result, they make decisions about what they desire or what might be attainable and do not alter them even when subsequent evidence contradicts them.930 The president’s decision making on Iraq was biased in this way and this belief influenced NSC deliberations from the start.
The initial elation Iraqis displayed could well have been productively channeled toward a peaceful democratic transition, but unilateral decisions of the
CPA undermined this potential, inflaming an insurgency and enabling the rise of Al
Qaeda in Iraq that eventually ignited a civil war.
Revisiting an important point, it was the president’s intent for a democratic
Iraq that enabled Wolfowitz and Feith to include transformational objectives that were at odds with Rumsfeld’s thinking. Rumsfeld thought that attempting to build a democratic Iraq was impractical.931 Both he and his deputies focused on regime change but from very different perspectives and certainly not in a unified manner.
Both approaches had detrimental effects on implementation. OSD resistance to coordinating an interagency plan for post-war stability and governance undermined any potential for a smooth democratic transition. Houghton’s description of Homo
Bureaucraticus fits here where parts of the government were pulling in different
930 Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, (Princeton University Press, 1974), 88- 106, 112-139. 931 Douglas J. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008), 333. Feith indicated that Rumsfeld believed strongly that the longer U.S. forces occupied the country the more likely his “Parade of Horribles” would be realized. This underpinned hi rationale for a smaller, lethal force and rapid transition to Iraqi governance. 330 directions undermining intent.932 This dysfunction once again illustrates the challenge of control over large organizations where assertive personalities can act with a great deal of latitude.
It does not require a great deal of critical thinking to discern that introduction of democratic principles and institutions to a society that had only ever known autocratic rule, would require a prolonged period of transition. Some rather straightforward analysis on the implications of resourcing a long transition should have driven deeper thinking and planning for the post-war stability and reconstruction plan. It is illustrative that Donald Rumsfeld’s “Parade of Horribles” was not given appropriate debate or analysis. In this single document Rumsfeld had enumerated numerous hazards, the majority of which were realized. It is then remarkable that these did not provoke further detailed analysis of potential consequences.
Like Afghanistan, the collective failure of the president and NSC to consider the conditions that would characterize success of their objectives, to question their assumptions and have planned contingencies with regard to foreseeable consequences, had direct implications to policy performance. The ADA framework was again useful in characterizing these procedural issues. However faulty procedure does not explain why the president did not demand further debate over force size when the implications of a small force became evident in Afghanistan long before the invasion of Iraq began. An act of hubris, members of the OSD staff forcefully rejected arguments that a much larger force was necessary to establish security and restore stability and the president accepted it.
932 David Patrick Houghton, The Decision Point, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 30-31. 331
Rumsfeld’s military transformation agenda remained a point of emphasis and
DOD was adamant about keeping the force as light as possible to enable speed and agility. The USCENTCOM approach to this constraint was to conform with
Rumsfeld’s intent by planning for unidentified elements of the Iraqi army to reestablish security following invasion. This risky, uncoordinated approach was promptly undermined by the unilateral decisions of Paul Bremer, the Coalition
Provisional Authority. The results were an explosion of sectarian conflict and a long insurgency that undermined policy intent. Each of these mistakes was avoidable but the dysfunctional dynamics at play within the administration and their idealistic approach undermined reasonable policy.
The systemic issues identified in the Bush NSC formulation of Afghanistan policy were affirmed in their Iraq policy formulation. Executive prerogative over policy decision-making enabled the same errors. Congress again failed to legislatively tie authority to invade to satisfactory understanding of the conditions that would define success and help to scope the level of commitment required. Congress had opportunity to learn from the experience in Afghanistan, yet they failed to impose lessons learned on the president. Congress’s response might well be explained by
Mintz’s 'Noncompensatory Principle,' where decision makers are unlikely to make decisions that will harm them politically.933 Perpetually focused on the next election,
Congress chose not to force the issue and be accused of being unpatriotic. They failed to fully debate a declaration of war, effectively ceding their authority to the president.
933 Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making," (Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993), 598. 332
The net result of the Bush decision to invade Iraq was greater regional instability than was the case prior to invasion.934 More specifically, increased regional instability resulted from U.S. support to the Shia majority in Iraq that alienated regional Allies.935 With these outcomes as a measure, Bush’s preventive policy in
Iraq may be characterized as a strategic failure.936
Important to the purposes of this research, the findings of this case affirmed the potential utility of the ADA methodology to complement mainstream FPA approaches. The prescriptive framework’s ability to focus further descriptive analysis on the determinants of policy performance represents a potentially useful enhancement to the body of FPA knowledge.
2009 Decision to Surge Forces in Afghanistan
This case reaffirmed the findings of the two Bush decision cases. The ADA framework was again useful to map the decision procedure in a way that identified key analytical flaws and their causal relationship to policy performance. This case reinforced the potential value of prescriptive methods to focus further mainstream
FPA analysis to answer the critically important questions on ‘why’ presidents chose as they did. This case also reaffirmed some critically important systemic challenges to sound security policy making.
934 Jim Garamone, Obama Describes Core US Interests in the Middle East, (American Forces Press Service, 2013), President Obama reiterated U.S. interests in the Middle East including assuring the free flow of energy resources, countering terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and "... a peaceful, prosperous, stable and democratic Middle East...", Accessed March 17, 2014: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120847. 935 Daniel L. Byman, The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraq: Testimony Before the House Committee On Foreign Affairs, (The Brookings Institution, 2013), accessed 31 December 2013 at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2013/12/12-resurgence-al-qaeda-iraq-byman#. 936 Stephen M. Walt, Lessons of Two Wars: We Will Lose in Iraq and Afghanistan, (Foreign Policy, 2011), accessed 7 July, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/16/lessons_of_two_wars_we_will_lose_in_iraq_and_afgh anistan#sthash.l0ejjOVc.8V85bi7w.dpuf. 333
President Barack Obama’s decision-making on Afghanistan is illustrative that poor decisions are not typically the result of a lack of effort or intelligence. Rather they are the result of the fact that many decision makers don’t know how to properly analyze and develop criteria to inform a good decision.937 The ADA framework prescribes that the Obama NSC would ideally have begun their deliberations by reconsidering the problem in terms of U.S. interests and a restatement of objectives.
Though they eventually did so, this was not initially the case.
The challenges to good policy decision-making by a new administration were amplified in this case by the president’s requirement to immediately address wars in
Iraq, and Afghanistan, while also responding to a compelling economic crisis. This environment led the president to rely on a strategic assessment from experts outside his NSC. The result was the new president accepted the recommendations of a rapid strategic review that largely retained the flawed objectives of the previous seven years. Obama then further complicated the policy intent by the addition of objectives for Pakistan that greatly expanded the scope of effort and increased risk. A repeat of the flawed Bush procedure, the initial Obama policy decision focused on strategy formulation rather than what was to be achieved by the strategy. However, Obama was unsatisfied and an assessment from General McCrystal drove the president to undertake a second review within months of his initial decision.
Over the course of the second extended policy and strategy review, the president demonstrated a keen analytical interest and pragmatic focus on resource constrained objectives. He was forceful in stating that a long-term presence in
Afghanistan was not in U.S. interests.938 However, the Obama NSC policy
937 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 3-6. 938 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 128. 334 formulation procedure was an ad hoc approach that made the president vulnerable to analytical errors and omissions. This procedure was further undermined by bureaucratic and organizational influences that undermined good decision-making.
Despite the president’s analytical nature, this effort was no more effective than that of the Bush administration.
Dysfunction within the staff also impaired decision-making in this case. The
Obama NSS and personal staff’s desire to control decision-making undermined the
NSC process, and alienated departments of the Executive branch from the president. Robert Gates observed that the president’s NSS was impaired by a lack of executive branch experience and that James Jones was quickly marginalized by others near the president.939 In this environment one might normally expect the president to rely heavily on his more experienced NSC principals. President Obama did not, and key policy decisions were often made outside of formal channels by the president and a small circle of trusted agents on his staff.940,941
While it has been repeatedly observed that experienced judgment is insufficient by itself to address complex problems, a wealth of experience within the
NSC takes on greater importance in the absence of a structured analytical procedure. Yet Obama marginalized his most experienced principals in favor of advice from inexperienced staff. As a result, his decisions were undermined by unstructured analysis and significant influence from the most inexperienced perspectives in his administration.
939 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 290. 940 Advisor to the ISAF Commander, (Telephone Interview, 2018), This advisor to both General McCrystal and General Petraeus elaborated on the dynamics inside the White House and the fact that OSD staff were of little value in discerning administration thinking on Afghanistan. He also commented on the dysfunctional environment where the NSS clearly had a close relationship with the president and articulated his intent rather than the NSC Principals. 941 James Mann, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012), 211-213. 335
The president’s search for a viable policy over a number of months was undermined by both strong proponents of specific strategies, and retention of flawed objectives from the previous administration. This meant that policy objectives remained incongruent with available ways and means. The president chafed that defeating Al Qaeda and reversing Taliban gains remained open-ended objectives about which he eventually decided to constrain resources. The outcome was a policy based on pursuit of flawed objectives on a timeline to demonstrate an undefined level of progress before beginning to withdraw. This policy undermined Taliban incentive to negotiate and Obama left office with largely the same conditions with which he entered.
No matter which strategy Obama chose, members of his administration certainly recognized the need to reach some acceptable accommodation between the Taliban and the Afghan government was necessary to end the conflict.942
General McCrystal’s intent, supported by Petraeus and Gates, was also to attempt reconciliation with the Taliban.943 Any intent to reconcile elements of the Taliban were opposed by the Karzai government. This impasse left McCrystal in the position of continuing to fight an insurgency while attempting to improve ANSF capabilities sufficiently to combat them on their own.
This scenario echoed the Nixon administration’s policy of “Vietnamization” where they embraced a flawed political solution, rationalizing that an improved South
Vietnamese military could succeed where a large U.S. force along with the South
Vietnamese forces could not.944 This was based on a political calculus whereby the
Nixon administration did not want to be seen as losing the war, and thus required an
942 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 240-243. 943 International Security Assistance Force Staff Advisor, (Telephone Interview, 2018). 944 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, Part I, 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970, 7023-7024. 336 approach that provided the political space to declare mission ‘success.’ In this case the administration articulated an approach that shifted responsibility for potential outcomes onto the South Vietnamese government. Certainly, Barack Obama’s staff were concerned about similar issues and pursued a similar approach that shifted responsibility for security to the Afghan government. This scenario reflects elements of Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory that characterized decision-maker’s choices among alternatives based on their aversion to loss.945
This case reaffirmed the findings of the preceding Bush decision cases where the ADA framework demonstrated utility in identifying the procedural determinants of policy performance. It likewise affirmed the limitations of the ADA framework to fully explain why these occurred. The methodology however focused further analysis on the key factors undermining policy performance necessary to explain how forceful stakeholder perspectives, as well as bureaucratic and institutional factors shaped the president’s policy positions.946
The president’s choices were framed by NSC principals, senior military leaders and think tank scholars who advocated COIN, while his Vice President and some NSS members advocated CT. As the debate progressed, each of these influences competed for the president’s consideration, and despite his own misgivings on both approaches, his policy decision hedged by retaining objectives for both missions. Yet his decisions failed to achieve his objectives and he left office having agreed to troop increases to battle Taliban advances.
945 Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, (Econometrica, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1979), 263 946 Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 707-708; James G. March and Herbert A Simon, Organizations (Wiley, 1958), 171. 337
The ADA methodology was useful in characterizing the implications of the
Obama decision procedure but there were factors influencing Barack Obama’s decision-making that the ADA framework is not structured to explain. This again points to a weakness of the methodology while at the same time emphasizing the utility of mainstream FPA frameworks to understand decisions. For example, it is interesting to consider Obama’s decision-making in this case where, while he constrained resources and time, he chose to surge forces in Afghanistan against the wishes of his own party and the large majority of voters who elected him. Obama’s decision runs counter to Mintz’s 'Noncompensatory Principle. Mintz asserted that politicians constantly weigh the political calculus of decisions and are unlikely to select an option that will harm them.947 Obama certainly weighed the political implications of his decisions and yet chose an approach that risked hurting him politically. This decision adds some necessary context to Mintz’s principle where politicians are certainly cognizant of political implications and consider them, but they also often make decisions beyond their own self-interests.
Systemic Challenges in the National Security System
This research illustrated clear instances of flawed analytical procedures within successive NSCs, representing causal factors in security policy performance. Each of the study cases reflected similar flaws in formulation of objectives, analysis of assumptions and consequences associated with alternatives, and characterization of risk.948 Failure to consider key decision criteria meant presidential decisions omitted
947 Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision-making," (Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993), 598. 948 Alex Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision-making," (Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, 1993), 595 338 critical thinking necessary to form appropriate and proportional policy responses to complex security problems.
These systemic issues reflect the broad authority of the Executive branch where presidents are empowered to form their own staffs and national security decision-making procedures with minimal legislative oversight. There are significant assumptions that underpin this approach, the capacity of presidents and their staffs to apply an appropriate level of critical thinking skills and competent decision analysis principal among them. This requirement for critical thinking and analytical competency is hardly guaranteed in a system largely composed of political appointees.
These systemic issues likewise reflect a lack of diligence on the part of
Congress to exercise appropriate checks and balances on Executive authority.
Congress failed to exercise conditional support based on articulation of key policy criteria by which to judge the appropriateness of intended actions in terms of benefit to national interests and the cost in lives and resources. This represents a systemic national security issue that is likely to persist in the absence of statutory requirements for discrete policy decision criteria as a condition for Congressional support.
The outcomes of these cases reinforce that vast American economic capacity, and unparalleled military capabilities were insufficient to overcome poor policy decision-making. The cited challenges to national security policy formulation in these cases are indicative of those that future administrations are certain to face and where presidents and their NSCs are prone to the same procedural errors. The culmination of factors influencing president’s choices on complex security problems
339 are compounded by a lack of responsible analysis and critical thinking. The result is that U.S. security policy is too often “too far wrong.” 949
This research reinforces the notion that our ability to predict policy outcomes is directly related to the manner in which the policy was formed. The ADA methodology’s capacity to enable identification of the key causal factors influencing policy performance is the core strength of a prescriptive approach. These findings suggest the ADA methodology has utility to FPA in its ability to focus descriptive analysis on the procedural determinants of policy performance and explain why they occurred.
Understanding the origins of the ADA methodology and its designed intent to guide decision making under uncertain conditions, it is reasonable to consider the extent to which such a framework might be capable of disciplining decision making in a political environment. The findings of this research suggest the answer is entirely contextual. The rationality of the procedure might well help to assure a comprehensive analysis of a particular problem, but strong political factors and influences can often overwhelm any well-intentioned procedure. Even had the Bush
NSC policy formulation procedure been a formal and rigidly analytical one, it is hard to envision how such a procedure would have tempered the influence of strong personalities like those of Rumsfeld and Cheney. It is equally unlikely a similar policy formulation procedure in the Obama Administration would have tempered the strong influence of Biden or the influence of powerful COIN advocates on the president’s choices. The reality is that strong ideals, political factors and personalities will always shape decisions in a political sphere.
949 Sir Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace”, (RUSI, A Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Vol. 119, 1974), 3-9. 340
This points again to a rather important finding of the research on the complementary nature of prescriptive and descriptive FPA approaches. The prescriptive procedure was useful to cull out ‘what’ occurred, where descriptive FPA approaches are postured to explain ‘why’ they occurred. The prescriptive approach enables a separation of the decision-making procedure from extraneous political factors, again pointing to the complementary nature of the two approaches.
Moreover, there appears to be genuine value in the complementary nature of the prescriptive and descriptive approaches to focus collective analysis on the determinant factors driving policy performance.
The research findings also suggest that a better understanding of these errors and omissions of rational procedure and their relationship to performance represents an improved ability to predict outcomes. As Allison observed, “as the logic of prediction underscores, the analyst must summarize the various determinants as they bear on the event in question.”950 The prescriptive ADA methodology warrants further testing as it represents a capability to link descriptive theories to the actual choices individuals made in a more focused way, and in doing so, improve their predictive potential.
950 Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969), 690.
341
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Special Investigator General for Afghan Reconstruction, High Risk List January 2017, 11. Available at: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2017_High- Risk_List.pdf#page=17Special Operations Command, Pacific website, http://www.socpac.socom.mil/default.aspx
The National Security Act of 1947 – July 26, 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1947-07-26.pdf
The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 25-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, (The Pew Research Center, 2009). Available at: https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and- analysis/reports/2009/07/23/25nation-2009-pew-global-attitudes-survey
The World Bank, United States GDP (Current US $). Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?
Transatlantic Trends 2008, (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2008). Available at: http://www.gmfus.org/file/3473/download U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, Part I, 91st Congress, 2nd session, (United States Congress, 1970)
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2019). Available at: https://dod.defense.gov/About/Office-of-the-Secretary-of-Defense/
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress - 2nd Session, House Joint Resolution 114 (107th): Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, (United States Congress, 2002). Available at: http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress= 107&session=2&vote=00237#top
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Civilian deaths in Afghanistan hit record high, (United Nations, 2018). Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/07/1014762
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United Nations Charter, Chapter VII: Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441, (United Nations, 2002). Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf
US National Debt Clock, Real Time U.S. National Debt Clock, 2016, http://www.usdebtclock.org/
War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, passed on November 7, 1973. The War Powers Resolution is sometimes referred to as the War Powers Act, its title in the version passed by the Senate. This Joint Resolution is codified in the United States Code ("USC") in Title 50, Chapter 33, Sections 1541-48; Library of Congress. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php
White House Background Paper on Iraq, Saddam Hussein's Defiance of United Nations Resolutions, (The White House, 2002). Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=234558
White Paper: Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” (The White House, 1997). Available at: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm
(ii) Speeches:
Al Jazeera, Full transcript of bin Laden’s speech, (Al Jazeera, 2004). Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849163336457223.html
Bush, George W., President Bush Speaks at VMI, Addresses Middle East Conflict (CNN Transcript, 2002) Available at: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0204/17/se.02.html
Bush, George W., A Period Of Consequences, (The Citadel, 1999). Available at: http://www.citadel.edu/root/pres_bush
Bush, George W., Address to the United Nations General Assembly, (The White House, 2002). Available at: https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html
Bush, George W., Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (The White House, 2001). Available at: http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
Bush, George W., President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution (White House, 2002). Available at: http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-7.html
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Bush, George W., President Bush Addresses the Nation March 19, 2003 (Office of the Press Secretary, 2003). Available at: http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html
Bush, George W., The President's State of the Union Address, (The White House, 2002). Available at: https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html
Bush, George W., President Discusses the Future of Iraq, (The White House, 2003). Available at: https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html
Bush, George W., Statement by the President October 7, 2001(Office of the Press Secretary, 2001). Available at: https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html
Bush, George W., Debate Transcript: The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, (Commission on Presidential Debates, 2000). Available at: http://www.debates.org/?page=october-11-2000-debate- transcriphttps://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-11- 2000-debate-transcript/
Cheney, Dick, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention: Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, (The White House, 2002). Available at: https://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html
Obama, Barack, "Remarks in Kansas City, Missouri: "A Sacred Trust"," August 21, 2007 (The American Presidency Project, 2014). Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77039
Obama, Barack, Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan, (New York Times, 2008). Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text- obama.html?pagewanted=all
Obama, Barack, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, (The White House, 2009). Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president- acceptance-nobel-peace-prize
Obama, Barack, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (The White House, 2009). Available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address- nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan
Obama, Barack, Townhall meeting at the National Council of La Raza conference in Miami Beach, (Reuters, 2007). Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa- politics-obama/tough-talk-on-pakistan-from-obama-idUSN0132206420070801
349
Obama, Barack, Transcript: Obama Announces New Afghanistan, Pakistan Strategies, (Washington Post, 2009). Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/03/27/AR2009032700891.html
Obama, Barack, "Press Release - On Fifth Anniversary of Speech Opposing Iraq War, Obama Again Challenges Conventional Washington Thinking," (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 2007). Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=93308
Powell, Colin L., Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, (U.S. Department of State, 2003)Available at: https://2001- 2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm
Stewart, Rory, Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009). Available at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091609_Transcript_Exploring%20Thr ee%20Strategies%20for%20Afghanistan.pdf
(iii) Memoirs:
Bush, George W., Decision Points, (Broadway Books, 2010)
Cheney, Dick with Liz Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir, (Threshold Editions, 2011)
Churchill, Sir Winston, My Early Life: 1874-1904, (Touchstone, 1930)
Feith, Douglas J., War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, (Harper, 2008)
Franks, General Tommy R., American Soldier (William Morrow Paperbacks, 2005)
Gates, Robert M., Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014)
Powell, Colin; with Tony Koltz, It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership, (Harper, 2012)
Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, (Broadway, 2011)
Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir, (Sentinel, 2011)
Tenet, George J. with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (Harper Collins, 2007)
(iv) Interviews:
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Advisor to the ISAF Staff (Telephone Interview, 2018), Senior Advisor to both General Stanley McCrystal and General David Petraeus.
Joint Staff, J-5 (Telephone Interview, 2017), This former staff officer worked on Central Asia plans during the Barack Obama administration, 2008-2010.
National Security Council Staff 1, (Interview, 2017). This staffer served in the Bush NSS.
National Security Council Staff 2, (Interview, 2017). This staffer served in the Bush NSS.
National Security Council Staff 3, (Interview, 2017). This staffer served in the Bush NSS.
National Security Council Staff 4, (Interview, 2017). This staffer served in the Obama NSS.
National Security Council Staff 5, (Interview, 2017). This staffer served in the Obama NSS. U.S. Central Command Staff 1, (Interview, 2018). Staff Officer with firsthand experience in developing plans for Afghanistan and Iraq.
U.S. Central Command Staff 2, (Interview, 2018). Staff Officer with firsthand experience in developing plans for Afghanistan and Iraq.
U.S. Central Command Staff 3, (Interview, 2018). Staff Officer with firsthand experience in developing plans for Afghanistan and Iraq.
Secondary Material (i) Official Documents:
Army Doctrine Publication No. 5-0 (Field Manual 5-0): The Operations Process, (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2012)
Army Doctrine Publication No. 3-0 (Field Manual 3-0): Unified Land Operations, (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2011)
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design, Version 1.0, (Joint Staff, J-7, 2011)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006). Available at: https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2006-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf
The Joint Staff, About the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), accessed 15 January 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/About/
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, (Department of the Army, 2008). Available at: https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-5-500.pdf
(v) Books:
Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Little, Brown and Company, 1971)
Banks, Christopher P., Cohen, David B., Green, John C., The Final Arbiter: The Consequences of Bush v. Gore for Law and Politics, (State University of New York Press, 2005)
Bartholomees, J. Boone, Jr., The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory Of War And Strategy, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2012)
Bartholomees, J. Boone, Jr., The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2012)
Baylis, John; Wirtz, James J.; Cohen, Eliot; Gray, Colin S., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, (Oxford University Press, 2002)
Berntsen, Gary, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin laden and Al Qaeda, (Three Rivers Press, 2005)
Birkland, Thomas A., An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and Models of Public Policy Making, (Routledge, 2015)
Bird, Tim and Marshall, Alex, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way (Orient BlackSwan, 2012)
Chambers, John Whiteclay II, The Oxford Companion to American Military History, (Oxford University Press, 1999)
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2012)
Churchill, Winston, My Early Life: 1874-1904, (Touchstone, 1930) Clarke, Richard A., Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, (Simon & Schuster, 2004)
Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, 1976)
Cooper, H.M., Organizing Knowledge Synthesis: A Taxonomy of Literature Review, (Knowledge in Society, Volume 1, 1998). Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF03177550
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Creswell, John W., Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, (SAGE Publications, 2d Edition, 2003)
Destler, I.M., Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, (Princeton University Press, 1972)
Dye, Thomas R. Understanding Public Policy (Prentice-Hall, 1972)
Ellsberg, Daniel, Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, (Garland Publishing, 2001)
Foreign Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, College of Arts & Science, and the University of Missouri. http://foreignpolicyanalysis.org/
George, Alexander L., Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press 1993)
George, Alexander L., The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Foreign Policy, (American Political Science Review, 1972)
George, Roger Z; and Harvey Rishkof (ed), The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, (Georgetown University Press, 2011)
Geva, Nehemia and Alex Mintz, Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive - Rational Debate, (Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1997)
Gray, Colin S., Modern Strategy, (Oxford University Press, 1999)
Gray, Colin, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (Routledge, 2007)
Haass, Richard N., War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars, (Simon and Schuster, 2009)
Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Brookings, 1974)
Hammond, John, Ralph Keeney, and Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions, (Harvard Business School Press, 1999)
Hart, Paul’t, Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink, (Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1991). Available at: http://www.ftms.edu.my/images/Document/MOD003554%20- %20Effective%20Team%20and%20Performance%20Management/Seminar%209- Janis%20-%20group%20think.pdf
Holcomb, James F., The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I, 4th Edition: Theory Of War And Strategy: Chapter 9: Managing Strategic Risk, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2010). Available at: https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2182.pdf
Hormats, Robert D., The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars from the Revolution to the War on Terror, (Times Book, 2007)
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Hormats, Robert D., The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars from the Revolution to the War on Terror, (Times Book, 2007)
Houghton, David, “The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making,” (Oxford University Press, 2013)
Howard, Michael, The Causes of Wars and Other Essays, (Harvard University Press, 1983)
Hudson, Valerie M., Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014)
Inderfurth, Karl F. and Loch K. Johnson, “Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council: McGeorge Bundy, “Letter to the Jackson Subcommittee,” (Oxford University Press, 2004)
Janis, Irving L., Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, (The Free Press, 1989)
Janis, Irving L., Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Wadsworth, 1982)
Janis, Irving L., Victims of Groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascoes, (Houghton Mifflin, 1972)
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976).
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976)
Keeney, Ralph L., Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking, (Harvard University Press, 1992)
Keeney, Ralph L., Decision Analysis: An Overview, (Operations Research, Vol. 30, No. 5., 1982). Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/170347?seq=1
Khong, Yuen Foong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, (Princeton University Press, 1992), available at: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/5008.html
Kissinger, Henry, White House Years (Little, Brown and Company, 1979) Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921)
Klein, Gary, The Power of Intuition: How to Use Your Gut Feelings to Make Better Decisions at Work, (Doubleday, 2003)
Kolhatkar, Sonali and James Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the Propaganda of Silence (Seven Stories Press, 2006)
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Liddell-Hart, Basil, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (Faber and Faber, 1954)
Liddell-Hart, Basil. H., Strategy: The Indirect Approach (Faber & Faber, 1967), as cited in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, ‘Introduction’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
Lippmann, Walter, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Little, Brown and Company, 1943)
Luttwak, Edward, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987)
Main, Bruce W., Risk Assessment: Basics and Benchmarks, (Design Safety Engineering Inc., 2004)
Mann, James, The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, (Viking, 2012)
March, James G. and Herbert A Simon, Organizations (Wiley, 1958)
Mintz, Alex A.; Geva, Nehemia (Editors), The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking, Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, (Lynne Rienner, 1997)
Mintz, Alex and DeRouen, Karl Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Cambridge University Press)
Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, (Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)
Neack, Laura, Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019)
Nuechterlein, Donald E., America Overcommitted: U.S. National Interests in the 1980s, (University Press of Kentucky, 1985)
Parnell, Gregory S., Chapter 19: Value-focused Thinking, (Military Operations Research Society, Editors Andrew Loerch and Larry Rainey, 2007)
Prados, John Keeper Of The Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush, (William Morrow & Co, 1991)
Riedel, Bruce, The Search for Al Qaeda, (Brookings Institution Press, 2008)
Robinson, James A.; and Snyder, Richard C., Decision-making in International Politics, Herbert C. Kelman (editor), International Behavior: A Social-psychological Analysis. (Holt, Rinehart and Winston,1965)
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Rodman, Peter W., Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2009)
Rothkopf, David J., National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear, (PublicAffairs, 2014)
Rothkopf, David J., Running the World, (PublicAffairs, 2005)
Schafer, Mark; and Scott Crichlow, Groupthink vs. High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations, (Columbia University Press, 2010)
Senge, Peter M., The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (Currency, 1990)
Shoemaker, Christopher C., The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council, (Westview Press, 1991)
Simon, Herbert, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organizations, (The Free Press, 4th Edition, 1997)
Snyder, Richard Carlton and Henry W. Bruck, Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, (Free Press of Glencoe, 1962)
Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Political Decision Analysis , (Princeton University Press, 1974)
Stolberg, Alan G., Chapter 4: Making National Security Policy in the 21st Century, U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy And Strategy, 5th Edition, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2012)
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Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Science, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974)
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Woodward, Bob, Obama’s Wars, (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010)
Woodward, Bob, Plan of Attack, (Simon & Schuster, 2004)
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(vi) Articles and Periodicals:
A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror, (CATO Institute, 2017), available at: https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/step-back-lessons-us-foreign- policy-failed-war-terror
Abdo, Geneive; Amos, Deborah; Aslan, Reza; Gause III, F. Gregory; Husain, Ed; Nasr, Vali R., The Sunni-Shia Divide, (The Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). Available at: http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia- divide/p33176#!/?cid=otr-marketing_url-sunni_shia_infoguide
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, New evidence of widespread fraud in Afghanistan election uncovered, (The Guardian, 2009). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/18/afghanistan-election-fraud-evidence
Admiral Mike McConnell, Interview of Mr. Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence With Mr. Tim Russert, NBC’s Meet the Press, (National Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). Available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Speeches%20and%20Interviews/20 070722_interview.pdf
Ahmed Rashid, How Obama Lost Karzai: The Road Out of Afghanistan Runs Through Two Presidents Who Just Don't Get Along, (Foreign Policy, 2011). Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/21/how-obama-lost-karzai-2/
Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System, Annual Update (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 2011). Available at: https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/17619/205945/icaf-nsc-policy-process-report-08- 2011.pdfThe%20National%20Security%20Policy%20Process:%20The%20National %20Security%20Council%20and%20Interagency%20System
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Allison, Graham T., Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (The American Political Science Review, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1969). Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1954423?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Apple, R.W., Jr., A Military Quagmire Remembered: Afghanistan as Vietnam, (New York Times, 2001). Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/31/world/nation- challenged-analysis-military-quagmire-remembered-afghanistan- vietnam.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=7F69208CAE4F45B7046EDDCFC6E0 C068&gwt=pay
Armitage, Richard, Prism Volume 1, number 1: An Interview with Richard L. Armitage, (Journal of the National Defense University, 2009). Available at: https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_1-1/Prism_1- 1_finalPDF.pdf?ver=2018-06-11-132210-517
Art, Robert J., “A Defensible Defense,” International Security 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991)
Baker, Peter, How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan, (New York Times, 2009). Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html
Baldor, Lolita C., Officials: US to keep more troops in Afghanistan into 2016, (The Associated Press, 2015), available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/16/officials-us-to-keep-more- troops-in-afghanistan-in/
Banks, Christopher P.; Cohen, David B.; Green, John C., The Final Arbiter: The Consequences of Bush v. Gore for Law and Politics, (State University of New York Press, 2005), 174-175.
Bartlett, Bruce, The Cost Of War, (Forbes media, 2009). Available at: http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/25/shared-sacrifice-war-taxes-opinions-columnists- bruce-bartlett.html.
Behuria, Ashok K., The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State, (Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2007) 706-707. Available at: DOI: 10.1080/09700160701662252
Bensahel, Nora, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, Andrew Rathmell, After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, (RAND Corporation, 2008). Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG642.pdf
Biddle, Stephen, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Available at: http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-strategy-afghanistan-iraq/p18545
Biddle, Stephen, Assessing the Case for War in Afghanistan, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Available at: https://www.cfr.org/report/assessing-case-war- afghanistan
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Biddle, Stephen, Assessing U.S. Options for Afghanistan, (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Available at: https://www.cfr.org/report/assessing-us-options- afghanistan
Biddle, Stephen, Defense One: Afghanistan Needs a Settlement, Not Another Troop- Withdrawal Deadline, (National Journal Group, Inc., 2016). Available at: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/afghanistan-needs-settlement-not- another-troop-withdrawal-deadline/128879/
Bilmes, Linda J., The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets, (Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School, 2013), available at: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=923
Bock, Joseph G., J.G., & Duncan L. Clarke, “The National Security Assistant and the White House Staff: National Security Policy Decisionmaking and Domestic Political Considerations, 1947-1984,” (Presidential Studies Quarterly, XVI, 2, 1986)
Bonhomme, Brian, & Cathleen Boivin, Milestone Documents in World History: Exploring the Primary Sources that Shaped the World: Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad against Americans, (Salem Press, 1996), available at: http://salempress.com/store/pdfs/bin_laden.pdf
Bonhomme, Brian, Boivin, Cathleen, Milestone Documents in World History: Osama bin Laden’s Declaration of Jihad against Americans, 1996, (Salem Press, 2010)
Boot, Max, A New Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) accessed 4 January 2017, http://www.cfr.org/experts/national-security- warfare-terrorism/max-boot/b5641?page=12
Boot, Max, What the Heck Is a 'Neocon'? (Wall Street Journal, 2002). Available at: http://www.cfr.org/world/heck-neocon/p5343
Bordeleau, Chris, Afghanistan Security Forces Beyond 2014: Will They Be Ready? (Centre for Security Governance, 2014)
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