An Arena for Effective Opposition?

An arena for effective opposition?

A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament

Emelie Lundell 2021-01-18

Field of study: Political Science Master’s Thesis in Political Science Credits: 30 credits

Autumn 2020 Supervisor: Christer Karlsson

Department of Government Uppsala University

An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Abstract The European Union is suffering from a legitimacy crisis, which thus far has culminated with Great Britain’s decision to exit the union. According to the ‘opposition deficit thesis’, this is caused as there is no arena in which effective opposition can be voiced in the European Union, which forces EU citizens to organise their opposition outside the political system, and often against it. However, as no systemic analysis has been conducted on the opposition deficit in the EU’s democratic centre, no convincing conclusions has been made. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to systemically test the opposition deficit thesis, and to add to the current lack of research on the topic. The centre for any democratic legitimacy is the political system’s elected representatives in parliament, in which any opposition deficit would strongly indicate a democratic deficit. Therefore, I ask: is the European Parliament an arena for effective opposition? To test the opposition deficit systematically and empirically, data from 20 plenary debates between the years 2005-2007 in the European Parliament were gathered. Through simple statistical analysis, we conclude that most statements are oppositional (55 percent) and that there is no oppositional deficit. While most opposition is effective and thus has real effect in the policy-making process, the definition and operationalisation provided within the opposition deficit thesis must be refuted due to theoretical inconsistencies. Furthermore, oppositional behaviour at party- and individual level was also investigated, showing that Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional than mainstream party groups and through their opposition minimise the European Union’s democratic deficit when voiced within the system. Also, we find that there is no significant relationship between gender and political opposition, contrary to past assumptions. Therefore, it is concluded that there is no oppositional deficit in the European Parliament, and possibly no such deficit in the European Union. So, while the European Union it is suffering a legitimacy crisis which may be caused by a democracy deficit, it is not correlated to political opposition as described by the opposition deficit thesis.

Keywords: political opposition, opposition deficit, European Parliament, European Union, Peter Mair, democratic legitimacy, democratic deficit.

Word count: 15835 (excluding list of references & appendixes).

2 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University Table of contents INTRODUCTION ...... 5

PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 6

PRIOR RESEARCH ...... 7

OPPOSITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ...... 8 PETER MAIR ON POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN EU POLITICS ...... 10

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: OPERATIONALISATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ...... 12

OPERATIONALISING OPPOSITION ...... 12

OPERATIONALISING EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION ...... 14 HYPOTHESISING THE OPPOSITION DEFICIT THESIS IN MAIR’S THEORY ...... 16

RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 21

QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS ...... 21

CASE SELECTION, MATERIAL, AND DATA ...... 22 DATA COLLECTION METHOD ...... 23

FURTHER DEFINITIONS AND OPERATIONALISATIONS ...... 24 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: ON VALIDITY AND GENERALISABILITY ...... 26

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ...... 28

HYPOTHESIS 1: THERE IS LITTLE TO NO OPPOSITION IN EU POLITICS CONDUCTED IN THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT...... 29

HYPOTHESIS 2: MOST OPPOSITION THAT EXISTS IN EU POLITICS IS INEFFECTIVE ...... 31

HYPOTHESIS 3: EUROSCEPTIC PARTY GROUPS ARE MORE OPPOSITIONAL THAN THEIR NON-EUROSCEPTIC

COUNTERPARTS ...... 32 HYPOTHESIS 4: MALE MEPS ARE MORE OPPOSITIONAL THAN THEIR FEMALE COUNTERPARTS ...... 34

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 36

INTER-STUDY INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS ...... 36

IS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AN ARENA FOR EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION? ...... 37 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT GENERALISABILITY ...... 40

THE MYTH OF THE EU’S OPPOSITIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT ...... 41

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 44

BOOKS AND ARTICLES...... 44 EUROPEAN UNION PUBLICATIONS AND RECORDS ...... 47

LIST OF DEBATES ...... 48

APPENDIX I: CODE BOOK ...... 50

APPENDIX II: RELIABILITY TEST ...... 58

3 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament

List of figures

Figure 1: Relationship between classical opposition and opposition of principle (Mair, 2007)...... 11

Figure 2: Illustration of the operationalisation of effective opposition ...... 16

Figure 3: Share of oppositional statements ...... 29

Figure 4: Distribution of dimensions of conflict oppositional statements ...... 31

List of tables

Table 1: EP Party Group Euroscepticism ...... 25

Table 2: Share of modes of oppositional statements ...... 30

Table 3: Distribution of oppositional behaviour in Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic party groups ...... 33

Table 4: Distribution of modes of oppositional statements of Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic party groups ...... 34 Table 5: Distribution of oppositional by gender ...... 35

4 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University Introduction

Is the European Union democratically legitimate, or does it suffer from a democratic deficit? This is one of the principal questions in contemporary European political science, yet no definitive and scientifically exhaustive answer has been established. Philosophically and empirically, many scientists have argued both in favour and against this proposition, and some salience have been given to the arguments of authors such as Bartolini (2006), Hix (2008) and Schmidt (2007). They contended that the EU is a political system without politics, and Neunreither (1998) characterise the EU as a political system of ‘governance without opposition’. Hence indicating that EU politics has become depoliticised and turned into a system of “bureaucratic despotism” (Moravcsik, 2004: 349f). Thus, has the democratic project that is the European Union turned into a system wherein electoral citizen representation has become void and meaningless?

Any democratic development is, according to Robert Dahl in 1966, marked by three major milestones. First is the establishment of citizens’ right to vote, second is their right to be represented within the political polity, and third is the endowment of their right to organise opposition (Dahl, 1966). Political opposition is particularly important to any democratic system as it diversifies opinion, as well as challenging and influencing the government, and thus allowing for representation of non-mainstream opinions. Problematically, if the authors mentioned above are to be taken seriously, then this third milestone has never been reached for the European Union. However, is it possible that EU politics is so void of political debate that there is an opposition deficit? If so, this would mean that the very foundational idea of democracy, namely collective influence on the decision-making process, has been undermined. Furthermore, this deficit may also trigger increased and widespread scepticism of any democratic system, and thus threatening the political stability in Europe as well as the world- order (Mair, 2007: 140; Karlsson and Persson, 2018: 889).

For the European Union, the European Parliament ought to be the backbone of its democratic function and legitimacy, and any oppositional deficit would indeed support the thesis that the EU is politically vacant. To further explore this, the theoretical framework of Peter Mair (2007; 2013) will be adopted. Like the authors above, he argues that there is a serious democratic deficit in EU politics, and this is mainly due to the almost complete and deliberate depoliticization and bureaucratization of EU politics (Mair, 2007: 12). Thus, the oppositional deficit does not only internally increase the democratic deficit, but may also spur on any anti- An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament EU sentiments, which may destabilise European politics. Because of the severity of the consequences of an oppositional deficit of the EU, and the seriousness of Mair’s allegations against the EU political elites, we must further investigate this. Hence, we must ask: is there an opposition deficit in the European Union’s electorally selected body, in its democratic centre? Is the European Parliament an arena for opposition?

To successfully answer these questions, we shall test the two main hypotheses presented in Peter Mair’s article, ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’ (2007). Firstly, that there is almost no opposition, defined as any statement made which expressed critique or alternative to the suggested proposal, in EU politics. Secondly, that whatever little opposition which is expressed is, by definition, ineffective (Mair, 2007: 12). The effectiveness of opposition is primarily decided upon by the competences of the channel of influence in which the opposition is expressed. As the European Parliament belongs to the electoral channel of influence, only opposition about the allocation of resources can have any effect on the decision-making process. Thus, when asking if the European Parliament is an arena for effective opposition, one shall consequently look for the share of opposition about the allocation of resources. If we find little opposition in the European Parliament, or a large share of opposition is ineffective, we have cause to suspect that there is an opposition or democratic deficit in the European Union.

Furthermore, it is also wholly interesting to consider oppositional behaviour on party- and individual level to further investigate if Euroscepticism potentially could be a driver of the democratic deficit in terms of political opposition, or if oppositional behaviour is affected by one’s gender. Thus, some further hypotheses shall be developed based on current research on oppositional behaviour and Euroscepticism, as well as gendered legislative behaviour respectively to gain further understanding of oppositional behaviour in the European Parliament. However, before we embark to investigate if the European Parliament is an arena for effective opposition, the purpose and the questions of this study must be specified.

Purpose and research question

With the purpose to gain further knowledge about the EU’s supposed democratic deficit, we shall investigate the opposition deficit theses as presented by Peter Mair (2007). He argues that there is no arena in the European Union “in which to hold European governance accountable” (ibid: 12). The traditional arena in any democracy to do so would be the electorally elected one. The European Union’s electoral body – the European Parliament- is thus the centre of its democratic legitimacy. If no opposition is found there, then the European Union cannot be said

6 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University to be fully democratic, and potentially also have a severe democratic deficit. Furthermore, in any legislative body there ought to be discussion of proposals. Hence, if there is indeed an oppositional deficit in the European Parliament this is unnerving support for the democratic deficit thesis. Therefore, we must ask: is the European Parliament an arena for effective opposition?

The study will be structured as followed: first, an introduction into some previous studies on political opposition in general and the EU opposition deficit thesis is necessary. Second, a run- through of Mair’s theory is needed, along with, thirdly, operationalisations of some main concepts as well as the development of testable and falsifiable hypotheses. Fourth, the methods used in this study shall be presented, along with other operationalisations and methodological consideration. Fifth, the results of the data processing are presented, both through text but also in tables and figures, after which they are thoroughly discussed along with the applicability and reliability of this study. Conclusively, the results of this study shall be discussed, both in of themselves, but also in relation to the EU’s supposed democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis.

Prior research

As the European Union market itself as a purveyor of democratic values and aim to organise itself as a democracy, it ought to be judged as such. According to Robert Dahl in 1966, any democratic development is marked by three major milestones. First is the establishment of citizens’ right to vote, second is their right to be represented within the political polity, and third is the endowment of their right to organise opposition by attracting votes against the government and in elections (Dahl, 1966). Hence, political opposition is invaluable to the democratic development of any democratic state or institution, especially as this provides a political alternative and allows for valuable political discussion. Problematically, many political scientists argue that concerning the European Union, the third milestone has never been reached.

Democracy would be nothing without the possibility to dissent, to oppose the ruling power as a citizen’s right to challenge the actions and decisions of the government (Brack and Weinblum, 2011; Dahl, 1965; Dahl, 1966; Helms, 2008). Today, it has been almost 60 years since Schapiro concluded that “the process of government must be studied not only in the light of what those with power under their control try to do and actually achieve; but also with regard to those who oppose those aims, or whose interests and resistance have to be conciliated before those in

7 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament power can act” (Schapiro, 1966: 2). Although a long time has passed, few scholars have conducted theoretical research concerning the centrality of opposition in democracy since the 1970s (Brack and Weinblum, 2011; Neunreither, 1998). Furthermore, the research that has been done has embraced a strict (neo-) institutionalist standpoint, and thus not adopting a nuanced analysis perspective (Brack and Weinblum, 2011: 76). Also, as Karlsson and Persson (2018) points out, the stack of empirical research papers on political opposition in the European Union specifically is small, with only a handful of authors contributing to the field (ibid: 88). Hence, there is a significant absence of research on opposition and its importance to democracy in general, and in relation to the EU specifically, and whatever research which has been conducted on opposition in the European Union and in EU politics will be presented below, followed by a run-through of Peter Mair’s theory.

Opposition in the European Union

Numerous researchers have aimed to investigate and characterise the democratic status of EU. It has been widely accepted among many scholars that there is a democratic deficit within the European Union, and the EU is often described as a ‘polity without politics’ or a political system which “makes policy without politics” (Schmidt, 2007: 5), one of “governance without opposition” (Neunreither, 1998: 421) where the EU is more and more alike “a sleeping giant” (de Vries, 2007; Mair, 2007) and the political engagement and general debate is inactive and, thus, making the EU ‘nonpoliticized’ (Bartolini, 2006; Hix, 2013; Mair, 2007) and, hence, not fully democratic. Many of these authors, however, fail to emphasise and investigate the importance of political opposition to the European democratic political system. Neunreither (1998), Mair (2007; 2013), Helms (2009), Karlsson and Persson (2018; 2020) and Persson et al. (2019) are some of very few contributions to the field.

Neunreither (1998) denies the EU status as a political system as “there is nothing comparable to a government” (ibid: 434), but instead classifies it as a negotiation system. Furthermore, as opposition is formed against policy or politics, a system without government cannot have opposition directed against it, and thus the EU is a system of “governance without opposition” (ibid: 421). However, according to Almond (1960) the European Union ought to be considered a political system, but not a state, as it “makes and implements binding decisions, and has the capacity to (a) extract resources; (b) regulate behaviour; (c) distribute benefits; (d) respond to demands; and (e) symbolize values and identities” (cited in Mair, 2013: 123). And, as Mair points out, the EU is inherently symptomatic in its creation and development. It was not made

8 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University to be democratic in the conventional sense, because it was created to exist as an alternative to conventional democracy. Unlike conventional democracy, the EU was made not to be restrained by the electoral process and to further respond to the policymakers needs (ibid: 131-133). However, by allowing an understanding of the European Union as a political system with some democratic characteristics, one allows for deeper analytics and hence understanding of the EU.

Whatever the EU may be defined as, it is still usual for the EU to be characterised and criticised in relation to its democratic status, and one can nevertheless question if there is effective opposition within the EU. There is far-spread Euroscepticism that in certain cases run deep into government or politics, for example in Hungary with now President Viktor Órban for the Fidesz party and Poland’s PiS party, as well as in movements such as the Yellow Vests in France and the Brexit-movement in the United Kingdom. This shows an obvious paradox of the current understanding of opposition in the EU: how can we question whether there is opposition within the EU when we can see much of it? However, by dividing opposition against policy and opposition against polity the paradox evaporates according to Karlsson and Persson (2018). With this distinction, they summarise previous research as concluding that the EU has a deficit of policy opposition, but a surplus of polity opposition (ibid: 888). Although this does not make the supposed ‘policy opposition deficit’ less detrimental for the democratic system. Opposition and political dissent are key components of the democratic political system as it (1) rationalises political action though diversifying and challenging mainstream thinking, and (2) allows for citizen influence and control over government (Dahl, 1965: 11ff; Dahl, 1966). Hence, any form of democratic deficit, policy oppositional in this case, is alarming as it threatens the validity of the democratic system. In the EU, a ‘policy opposition deficit’ or ‘consensus surplus’ could lead to or further motivate instances of Euroscepticism (Mair, 2013: 140).

Helms (2009) theoretically investigates parliamentary opposition in the EU, both how it is portrayed nationally and in Brussels. He concludes that there are certain manifestations which can be “meaningfully described in terms of parliamentary opposition”, although not entirely so (ibid: 210). Although these manifestations exist, the system often fails to hold policymakers accountable because the European Parliament have limited possibilities to exercise control over the commission (ibid: 198f; 210). Karlsson and Persson (2018) takes upon themselves to empirically explore this alleged ‘opposition deficit’ in Europe. By analysing statements made in the Swedish European Affairs Committee in the Swedish parliament they test four hypotheses: (1) that there is little opposition in the EU, (2) that opposition has increased in the

9 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament EU, (3) that opposition has decreased in the EU, and (4) that opposition in EU politics is mainly expressed by populist or Eurosceptic parties (ibid: 893f). They conclude that “there seems to be considerably more opposition in EU politics than has previously been assumed” (ibid: 900).

Persson et al. also research how Eurosceptic parties influence politics through their dissent in the article ‘Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?’. From their analysis, they derive that there is significantly more EU opposition in both the Swedish and Danish parliaments than previously theorised, and that “policy opposition is by far the most common mode of opposition in EU affairs” (2019: 264). In their yet to be published article, Karlsson and Persson (2020) further examine the role of national parliaments in EU affairs. They directly disprove Mair’s (2007) thesis that there is an opposition deficit in EU affairs by showing that nearly 40 percent of statements made in European Affairs Council meetings are oppositional. They conclude that the arena of opposition, which Mair (2007; 2013) persistently denied existence of in the European Union, do exist and that “the concerns of raised by Mair are no longer valid” (Karlsson and Persson, 2020: 27).

Hence, we see large discrepancies in how to view the potential democracy and opposition deficit in EU politics, and only by conducting further research in the specific field of research on opposition in EU affairs can we uncover part of the truth. Hence, even though there is research indicating that Mair’s (2007; 2013) theorised view of opposition in the European Union may be wrong, there is room for further tests of falsifiability – especially in other EU institutions, such as the European Parliament.

Peter Mair on Political Opposition in EU Politics

Peter Mair mainly presents his theoretical framework about the EU’s opposition deficit in his article ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’ (2007). In it, he begins by highlighting three modes of opposition as presented by Kirchheimer in 1957. Firstly, ‘classical opposition’ reflects a system in which those not in government rule oppose and offer alternatives to government policies, albeit recognising their right to hold office and pursue their policies. Second, is ‘opposition of principle’ where the non-governing entity rejects not only the politics of the governing, but also the polity, i.e. the political system, itself. Finally, ‘the elimination of opposition’, which Mair and Kirchheimer describes as occurring whenever the government is run as by a cartel, and no real difference exists between the supposedly competing candidates (ibid: 5). These modes are in no way discrete but overlap and relate to one another.

10 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University Furthermore, Mair argues that opposition of principle becomes more likely whenever classical opposition is undermined or given less scope: “In other words, if political actors lack the opportunity to develop classical opposition, then they either submit entirely, leading to the elimination of opposition, or they revolt” (ibid: 6). This relationship is presented in the schema below. Hence Mair conclude that “once we cannot organize opposition in the EU, we are almost forced to organize opposition to the EU” (ibid: 7, author’s cursive). This means that by elimination of classical opposition in the EU, the EU itself systemically creates opposition of principle, or Euroscepticism.

Figure 1: Relationship between classical opposition and opposition of principle (Mair, 2007).

Political debate is needed for opposition, and the EU has been depoliticised to the extent that the debate is limited. Usually, citizen can seek to control EU policy and the EU polity through two overlapping channels of political influence: through their national parliaments and governments who represent them in the Council of Ministers and the European Council, and though electoral representation in the European Parliament. Furthermore, these channels overlap in two important ways (ibid: 7ff). First, by increasing use of co-decision processes, and second, because it tends to be the same actors who take upon themselves to negotiate between the two channels; or, as Mair writes “the same political parties, subject to control by the same political leadership and by the same organized membership, compete in both channels” (ibid: 9).

There are also two main dimensions of conflict and competition of the European Union: the ‘Europeanisation dimension’ and the ‘functional dimension’. The first mentioned dimension revolves around the expansion and deepening of the institutionalisation of the EU-project and the EU’s distinct political system, and thus conflicts about how deep EU influences should reach into the domestic sphere. The second dimension is less involved with EU as a polity, but rather the actual policies of the Union such as allocation of resources and other priorities (ibid: 10). With these channels and dimensions, then, Mair creates a cluster of in which channel the 11 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament competences to phrase opposition exist for each dimension of conflict. This cluster has been illustrated below.

According to Mair, opposition in the Europeanisation dimension, especially those of deepened and widened institutionalisation, is most effectively handled by institutions in the channel adhering to the national route of representation. Conversely, the competences to manage opposition in the functional dimension lie in the electoral channel of opposition but may also be processed through the national route, i.e. the territorial channel of representation. The electoral channel is expected to be of main competence here mainly because it is within this realm that the European Parliament’s competences mainly lie. Hence, for opposition to be effective, is must be channelled through the right route, i.e. where the main competence of that specific dimension lies (ibid: 11). Problematically, as Mair brings attention to, reality is quite different and thus contestation to the EU is very ineffective. When looking at debates and other programmes, Mair finds that “opposition regarding the institutionalization of Europe being voiced within the European channel (electoral channel of representation), where no relevant competence lies; whereas opposition along the functional dimension is usually invoked in the national channel (territorial channel of representation), even though on this dimension authority is shared with the European channel” (ibid). Here we find the main issue of effective opposition within the EU which forces many dissidents to opposition of principle, namely that their opposition is voiced through an ineffective channel, and thus has little to no effect.

Analytical framework: operationalisations and hypotheses

In this section the vital concepts of opposition and effective opposition shall be defined and discussed. Furthermore, these definitions shall be operationalised into measurable and identifiable variables with distinct values which can be used to investigate the opposition deficit thesis and Mair’s theory on political opposition in the EU. While the definition of opposition is derived from previous work by Dahl (1966), the definition of effective opposition is obtained from Mair’s work itself. From Mair’s theory, then, we can extract some testable hypotheses which shall guide the analytical endeavour.

Operationalising opposition

In the literature, there are different definitions of opposition, albeit none is drastically different from the other (Brack and Weinblum, 2011). This study assumes the more minimalistic definition proposed by Dahl in 1966: “expression of disagreement with the government” (cited

12 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University in Karlsson and Persson, 2018: 891). From this definition of opposition, we must discuss what is meant by disagreement, what this disagreement is about, and if it must be directed towards a government to indeed be classified as political opposition.

Disagreement is in general a very broad term, but in the context of political opposition there are some manifestations through which disagreement can be knows. First, Norton (2008) and Karlsson and Persson (2018) presents the type ‘critique’. As the most common type of opposition in the Westminster system, criticism is employed by the party not in government to both control and restrain the government, and to distance themselves from it – both to make their chances of winning higher in the next election (Norton, 2008: 238). Critique is identifiable as disapproval toward the proposal at hand, without offering an alternative proposal, amendment, or solution. However, as Karlsson and Persson (2018) note, “there is a second type of disagreement that is equally or even more important, namely that of presenting alternatives” (ibid: 892, authors’ cursive). By presenting alternatives, choice is introduced into the debate which deepens its democratic importance. They argue that by presenting an alternative to the suggested policy one is implicitly criticising it (ibid). Finally, the last type of opposition is the lack thereof, namely non-opposition which would be expressed as support or by statements not expressing opinion, categorised as ‘other’. While the type of opposition is interesting to distinguish, what is important for this paper is whither opposition or non-opposition is expressed, and to what degree. Hence, any statement is categorised as oppositional when the speaker expresses critique or alternative, and any statement is categorised as non-opposition whenever support or other is expressed. This variable hence gets the name type of statement which can take on the values opposition or non-opposition.

Second, just as Kirchheimer (1957) presented, one needs to distinguish between three modes of opposition. The first, ‘classical opposition’ reflects the government-opposition relationship in the Westminster system. Those not in government both oppose and offer alternatives to suggested policy, but, importantly, recognise the legitimacy of the government and their right to govern (Kirchheimer, 1957: 127; Mair, 2007: 5). As classical opposition is exclusively about the contents of policy, it shall be referred to as policy opposition. ‘Opposition of principle’ on the other hand entails not only policy opposition, but also opposition to the government and the system of governance (Kirchheimer, 1957: 127). This denouncement of legitimacy is called polity opposition by Karlsson and Persson (2018). However, there is also a form of opposition where opposition is held against parts of the system of governance or the “conducting of

13 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament politics”, but it is not denied legitimacy, namely procedural opposition (ibid: 892). Both policy and procedural opposition is expected and encouraged to an extent in any democratic system (Dahl, 1965), while polity opposition is more often taken as a sign of citizen unrest – or as a reaction to the impossibility to express policy or procedural opposition (Mair, 2007; 2013). Thence, we have developed the variable mode of opposition, in which the statements are either about policy, procedure or polity. To make the variable exhaustible, a category of other will gather all non-categorizable observations.

Operationalising effective opposition

Mair himself operationalises the concept of effective opposition relatively well in his article ‘Political opposition and the European Union’ (2007). The effectiveness is primarily decided by the dimension of conflict, the channel of political influence, and the channels’ competences.

First, Mair presents the dimensions of conflict and competition in the European Union; The ‘Europeanisation dimension’ and the ‘functional dimension’. The forementioned dimension includes any influence on the institutionalisation and penetration of the EU-project and the EU’s distinct political system, and thus includes conflicts about how deep and how wide the EU influences should reach into the national sphere. He debates this dimension quite intensely in the review section of the Journal of European Public Policy in 2004 (Mair, 2004). In it, he argues that you can discern two forms of Europeanisation: that of the “construction of institutions at the supra- or intergovernmental level” and its impact on domestic structures, and that of “penetration of the European dimension in national arenas of politics and policy” (ibid: 339f). Conflicts regarding the Europeanisation dimension then will concern “creation, consolidation and territorial reach of authoritative political institutions at the supranational European level” as well as “the extent to which local policies and practices become subject to standardizing European influences and constraints” (Mair, 2007: 9). Hence, any conflict regarding the extent of the influence of the EU, i.e., what the EU and its institutions should and should not affect, as well as how much, belongs to the Europeanisation dimension.

For the functional dimension, Mair draws upon previous research and theoretical models made by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). They presented an axis which “grouped various interest-specific conflicts over the allocation of resources” with conflicts concerning “ideological oppositions” (Mair, 2007: 10). Concerning the EU then, the functional dimension is less involved with EU as a polity, but rather the actual policies of the Union such as allocation of resources and other priorities. These may be interest-specific or ideological but does not question “whatever version

14 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University of Europe happens to exist at the time” (ibid: 10). Specifically, conflicts in the functional dimension are never about the legitimacy, influence, or organisational structure of EU institutions, but rather about approach, priorities, and allocation of resources (ibid).

European citizens have two main channels through which they can affect EU politics: the national channel of indirect influence, and the electoral channel of direct influence. Through the national channel, EU citizens appoint their government representatives which has decision- making power in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. (ibid: 7ff). Furthermore, national parliaments also offer opposition to EU policy suggestions through national European Affairs Committees (Karlsson and Persson, 2018; Persson et al., 2019). Through European Parliament elections, however, the EU citizens can exercise more direct control over policy and procedure (ibid: 7). This channel is often viewed as a direct necessity for democracy as it allows control and accountability of the elected body and is the main link between the governing and the governed, and is often called the electoral channel.

1. Conflicts adhering to the Europeanisation dimension are handled in the national channel of influence. 2. Conflicts adhering to the functional dimension are, primarily, handled in the electoral channel of influence.

Any debate can adhere to either the Europeanisation or functional dimension or, if unclear, an ‘other’ category in case the debate cannot be connected to either. Hence, opposition in the European Parliament is only effective if it adheres to the functional dimension of conflict. This idea is stylised and illustrated in figure 2 below, and effective opposition in the European Parliament is marked.

15 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Figure 2: Illustration of the operationalisation of effective opposition

Operationalisation of Europeanisation dimension Functional dimension effective opposition: the Any statement made about Any statement about the dimensions of conflict and the organisation or influence allocation or distribution of the channels of influence. of the EU or any EU resources, as well as institution, as well as about prioritisation of attention, EU procedures and EU money, time, and effort. Do membership. Anything not question the current EU questioning the current polity or procedure. established EU polity or procedure. Electoral channel The channel through which citizens gain influence in Ineffective. Effective. direct elections and are represented in the European Parliament. Territorial channel The channel through which citizens gain influence Effective. Rarely effective. indirectly though nationally elected officials and representatives in EU institutions.

It is worthy to note that while Mair presents the thought of effective opposition, and it being central to his causal claim, there is no obvious extensive explanation of his definition of ‘effective opposition’ in Political Opposition in the European Union (2007). However, as we are doing a theory-testing study, keeping within the realms of the given theory is paramount even if we find gross problems with one or several parts of the theory at hand. This because, if we diverge from the theory in the testing of relatively in-theory operationalised variables, we effectively test something not intended by us or the original author. The definition and operationalisation will, nonetheless, be considered further below in the discussion.

Hypothesising the opposition deficit thesis in Mair’s theory

With the definitions and operationalisations above, we can start developing testable hypotheses from Peter Mair’s theory about political opposition in EU politics and apply these on opposition in the European Parliament specifically. On an aggregate level, we can derive hypotheses of

16 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University the share of opposition and its effectiveness, but it would also be highly interesting to see if these relationships could be affected by any variable at party and individual level. We shall begin with the prior mentioned and work our way down the funnel of analytical levels.

As we now know, Mair’s main point of argument is that there is no opposition, or at least very little opposition in EU politics. This is especially detrimental for the EU’s democratic legitimacy, at it means that there is no exchange of opinion nor challenge of the political power – there is no arena for opposition. Furthermore, the little opposition that does exist “is almost by definition ineffective” (ibid: 12). In these conditions, then, citizens can only organise opposition outside and against the system or submit and have opposition effectively eliminated. From this, we can derive a stylised version of Mair’s general thesis:

Mair’s general thesis: Because there is little to no opposition in EU politics, and because whatever opposition that does exist is ineffective, EU citizens are forced to either submit or organise opposition outside the political system.

From this thesis, we can derive hypotheses which allow us to test Mair’s assumptions purposefully and systematically. Primarily, we are interested in the existence of opposition in relation to non-opposition, and whither this opposition can be considered effective. We shall start with the prior.

Mair strongly point out that there is very little opposition in EU politics in general but also direct some specific critique towards the European Parliament. He points out that while the EU has achieved the first two out of Dahl’s (1966) three milestones of the democratic development of political institutions, it has not reached the third one. Hence, while EU citizens thus have the right to vote, and the right to right to be represented, they do not have the right to organise opposition in the case of EU institutions (Mair, 2007: 6f). Furthermore, Mair argues that while the European Parliament is a representative body, EU citizens “emphatically lack the right to organize opposition within the [EU] system” (Mair, 2007: 7). Hence, he assumes that there is no, or at least very little, opposition in EU politics. Hence, the first hypothesis is derived:

H1: There is little to no opposition in EU politics conducted in the European Parliament.

Furthermore, Mair also hypothesises that due to a lack of classical opposition, citizens which want to express opposition against policy will be forced to do so outside the political system. Also, these people will be more inclined to direct dissent towards the political body – the polity.

17 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Hence, although there could be a large amount of opposition in the plenary debates, it is questionable if larger shares of this mode of opposition (see operationalisation of opposition above) is desirable in any democratic institution. The democratic ideal relies upon the exchange of ideas on policy and procedure to challenge the views and power of the ruling party, and to represent all citizens’ opinion. However, outspread opposition against the political system could only lead to citizen unrest, and potentially the elimination of democratic institutions and ideals instead - or, as Shapiro put it in 1965: “revolutions become necessary because the polity has failed to integrate opposition within government, and to provide it with an outlet” (cited in Mair, 2007:6). Hence, for opposition not to be eliminated or excluded from the EU’s political system, it must not be about polity. Therefore, we must also ask: what mode does opposition in the European Parliament take on?

But is this the only thing that matters? Is it possible that even though there is a large share of polity and policy opposition, it will have no or little effect on the policy making process? One might argue that whichever degree to which opposition does exist or which mode it takes on does not matter if none of the opposition can be deemed effective. This is so, and hence it is very important to question the effectiveness of any opposition. In Mair’s mind, only opposition which adheres to the functional dimension of conflict can be effective in the European Parliament. This because the European Parliament only has the competences to allocate attention and resources. Hence, when Mair assumes that there is no effective opposition in the European Parliament, he assumes that very little opposition belonging to the functional dimension of conflict is brought up there, and that whatever opposition that is voiced in EP plenary debates adheres to the Europeanisation dimension of conflict. This is stylised as:

H2: Most opposition that exist is ineffective in the European Parliament.

As interesting as Mair’s initial thesis is, one wonder what might affect the level of opposition in the European Parliament. Primarily, Mair argues that the main reason as to why citizens cannot organise opposition within the political system, is because the political system itself has been depoliticized. Correctly he argues that “opposition demands political debate” (Mair, 2007: 7). Logically, however, there ought to be some debate in the European Parliament, and thus there ought to be some opposition. A bringer of a debate in any context is often those strongly opposed the context itself – here citizens and parties with Eurosceptic agendas. Hence, at a party level, it is highly interesting to investigate how the prevalence of Eurosceptic MEPs affect the political debate and opposition in EU politics.

18 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University In their paper from 2019, Persson et al. show that Eurosceptic actors have a significant impact on oppositional behaviour at the national parliament arena. Hence, does Eurosceptic parties also has an impact on the conduction of politics in the European Parliament? In the national parliaments, Eurosceptic parties can be divided into ‘hard’ Eurosceptic and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic, whereas the hard Eurosceptic parties account for more opposition than soft Eurosceptic parties or mainstream parties according to the authors (Persson et al., 2019: 263). In the European Parliament, there have and still are several Eurosceptic actors and party groups. During the time of interests for this thesis, however, there are two party groups which are characterised as Eurosceptical: Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN) and the Independence/Democracy group (IND/DEM).

While it also would have been interesting to investigate the level of opposition by party/ideology, there is no previous literature on the topic to build upon, and there is no reason to believe that political ideology would affect the level of opposition – other than the prevalence of Euroscepticism. Furthermore, this would also need to include a discussion about the prevalence of ideology and ‘classical’ party politics. In short, some authors argue that voting in the EP is “driven by national party preferences and memberships” (Hix, 2002: 694). This supports McElroy and Benoit’s (2011) worry that its is, in general, difficult to talk about one cohesive party ideology on the EU level. As one cannot confidently derive one cohesive party ideology for one EU party, we cannot safely derive at any conclusions about how the level of opposition is affected by ideology at an EU level. Euroscepticism is, however, more consistent in the EU parties (ibid). Hence, we meaningfully hypothesise about Euroscepticism in this paper, and derive a third hypothesis:

H3: MEPs from hard Eurosceptic party groups express more opposition than MEPs from other political party groups in European Parliament plenary debates.

Additionally, one might also speculate that Eurosceptic parties would oppose the polity – the political system – of the EU than the policy being made. It is in the nature of Euroscepticism itself to be negatively inclined towards increased influence of the EU and its institutions, the question, however, is if this is expressed in EP plenary debates. Persson et al. also find that hard Eurosceptic parties also present more opposition against polity than soft Eurosceptic parties and mainstream parties, as well as expressing an almost equal proportion of policy opposition (ibid: 263). Is this also so for Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament? And what does this mean for Mair’s thesis, and the European Union’s oppositional legitimacy? Also, if the MEPs 19 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament belonging to Eurosceptic party groups mainly criticise the influence of the EU and its institutions, this makes their opposition primarily ineffective as it belongs to the European dimension of conflict. Hence, does the opposition expressed by the MEPs in Eurosceptic party groups affect the policy outcome in EU politics?

Furthermore, on the individual level there are countless variables which may affect the behaviour and attitude of the MEPs. However, one which has gotten more and more salience throughout the last decades is the effect of the social construction of behaviour based on a person’s sex – their social gender. In The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, Michelle Taylor-Robinson dedicates the chapter ‘Gender and Legislatures’ to the topic. In it, she notes that as many national legislative institutions were established before women gained the right to vote, which “is plausible that the institutions advantage the career needs and legislative styles of male politicians” (Taylor-Robinson, 2014: 254). If this is true, then legislative institutions are gendered and shaped to primarily devote attention to ‘men’s issues’.

Additionally, feminist institutionalists (FI), and Chappell (2006) in particular, have proposed that stereotypical gender roles may influence women’s political behaviour, making their substantive representation different from men’s. Chapell argues that “institutional norms prescribe (…) “acceptable” masculine and feminine forms of behavior, rules, and values for men and women within institutions” (Chapell, 2006: 226). These ideas of gendered appropriate behaviour can also change between different same-state institutions and across countries (ibid: 229). If Chapell and Taylor-Robinson are correct in their inquiries, then there is a high possibility that women do not follow the same behavioural patterns as men concerning opposition in plenary debates. So, what oppositional behaviour do women portray? If the European Parliament is a gendered legislative institution which elevates men, it is very likely that its structural and social rules dictate that women are less oppositional than men. Furthermore, other social constructions could have formed women’s oppositional behavioural patterns. Bäck and Debus (2019) show that female MPs are less vocal in legislative debates, especially when the debate is on a traditionally masculine topic (ibid: 576). As women are less represented in national legislative debates, one could assume that the same pattern is repeated at the supra-national level. Hence, a fourth and final hypothesis can be derived:

H4: Male MEPs will express more opposition than female MEPs.

However, social construction may not only dictate the descriptive representation of women – how vocal and oppositional they are – but also the real effect they have on policy (referred to 20 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University as substantive representation by Taylor-Robinson (2014)). Hence, it might not only be the numerical representation that is affected by gendered norms, but also the content of the opposition and if it has any effect on policy. Is women’s opposition effective? And how does the rate of effectiveness compare to that of men?

Summarised, this study reserch the degree of expressed opposition in the European Parliament (H1) and if this opposition can be deemed effective in accordance with Mair’s (2007; 2013) definitions (H2) to establish if the European Parliament can be classified as an effective arena of opposition. Furthermore, we will look down the levels of analysis, and investigate whither Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional than their non-Eurosceptic counterparts (H3) and if, at an individual level, men are more oppositional than women (H4). These four established hypotheses will further guide and narrow down the research of this study and shall hence be the focus of its analytical endeavour. To start off, the research design is presented.

Research design

The following sections will give an account of the quantitative content analysis method as described by Esaiasson et al., as well as determining the and arguing for the case selection, choice of material and determination of the main units of analysis and other important data points. Furthermore, some methodological considerations about validity, reliability and generalisability are discussed.

Quantitative content analysis

The method of quantitative content analysis is best suited for our purposes. Presented in the Swedish methods bible, Metodpraktikan (2017), by Esaiasson et al. as a “very useful tool when one seeks answers to questions about the occurrence of different categories of content in a piece of material” (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 198, my translation). As vague as that may be, the following sections prove it to be a very useful method. Quantitative content analysis employs a method of measuring either the frequency or the space given to a specific category, based on the ideas of centrality and importance (‘centralitet’ and ‘viktighet’ in Swedish); that something which is brought up often or takes a lot of space is deemed central or important. By developing relatively clear categories – operationalisation - one can quite painlessly process a larger quantity of materials through what at first glance might seem to be ‘mechanical counting’. This counting, however, is everything but mechanical and must be preceded by through interpretation and operationalisation of concepts into clear and discreet categories (ibid: 198f). 21 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Turning an idea into somethings measurable through operationalisation demands both theoretical and practical considerations of reliability. One must define the units of analysis, their properties or variables to be registered with them, and which values they may have (ibid: 201). For this study, all variables, their values and how to interpret them can be found in the Codebook (see Appendix). The theory or the purpose of the study often guides the choice of analytical units, as well as the variables and their values. To make this process clear, rules of interpretation must be set and followed – each variable value must be simple and uniquely defined to be easily separated and so each unit can only be assigned one value. To make sure that each unit can be attributed a value, an ‘other’ category is often used (ibid: 200-208).

Case selection, material, and data

For any democratic entity, the existence of an electoral body is paramount. Many, if not most, definitions of democracy include the existence of some sort of electoral representation. For Joseph Schumpeter, democracy is only a method through which citizens appoint and resign political leaders in general and free elections: “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1950: 269, cited in Anteweg, 2013: 100). For citizens to fulfil their duty, they need information and an alternative; they need political opposition (Anteweg, 2013: 100). In Democracy and its critics, Robert Dahl presented a much more extensive definition with a list of criteria for a democratic process, which primarily involved the election of political representatives, (Dahl, 1991; Näsström, 2017: 6). Furthermore, in his 1966 book Political Opposition in Western Democracies, he highlights the importance of opposition to the democratic function of any political system. Hence, opposition behaviour in parliament must be viewed as being of outmost importance to any democratic system.

The main output of the European Union is the different legislative acts it adopts though the EP and the Council, and it is within this process of creating output in which political opposition plays its role to the democratic legitimacy of any political system (see Dahl, 1996; 1966). The plenary debates within the codecision procedure are made for MEPs to express their support or discontent with a proposed legislative act and will thus be source of the data of this study. However, by choosing debates in the codecision procedure there is a risk that there will predominantly be opposition adhering to the functional dimension of conflict. However, Mair agues clearly that there is very little opposition within the EU, and no arena to express it. As

22 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University such, if we do find opposition within the debates of the codecision procedure – the dominant EU legislative procedure – then we do find substantial proof that his opposition hypothesis is incorrect. Furthermore, he also argues that any opposition within EU politics is “almost by definition ineffective” (Mair, 2007: 12). However, the codecision procedure only ought to deal with functional matters, and be effective in his terms. As we have this discrepancy between Mair’s hypothesis, and the logical ideas of legislative procedures, we ought to categorize and see if opposition in the dominant legislative procedure is as ineffective as Mair suggests empirically and systemically. Hence, even if this proves to be a least likely case for Mair’s hypothesis, it is still a worthy endeavour to take on.

Thusly, the analytical unit of interest is statements made by members of the European Parliament (MEPs). A statement usually consists of a few sentences, relaying one meaningful message. It touches upon one point of the agenda, and usually have a clear focus on either policy, process or polity. The plenary debates adhering to the codecision procedure are transcribed by the European Parliament themselves, and translated into the EUs official languages. All plenary debates can we found on the European Parliament’s website under the category plenary (debates and videos) or through the European Parliament’s Public Register of Documents.

Data collection method

Because of the intent to test Mair’s theory specifically, one ought to adhere to the same time period which he might have had access to while making his claims of the oppositional deficit in the European Union. The main article in which he denies the EP oppositional prowess is in his article ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’ from 2007, which he then repeats in the book Ruling the Void from 2013. Hence, the timespan of interest ought to be early 2000nds. Keeping to the years in which Mair could have collected the data for the original article published in 2007, I will focus on data in 2005-2007. From the European Parliament’s ‘Search Verbatim reports’-function1, a search was made for translated debates in the EPs register of documents between the dates 2005-01-01 and 2007-12-31 (adhering to the 6th parliamentary term) and adding the search word ‘COD’, we get 235 results. The search word ‘COD’ is added as all processes adhering to the codecision procedure/Ordinary Legislative Procedure gets that

1 Search function used: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/debates-video.html 23 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament reference code. Some of the results, however, will be ‘annexes’ or ‘explanation of votes’ which will be ignored.

The selection process will be completely random, but if an ‘annex’ or ‘explanation of vote’ is randomly selected, then the selection process will restart. The aim is to collect data from around 20 debates and 800-900 units of analysis, which is sufficient to ensure reliable results of oppositional behaviour in the MEPs. Each debate is begun with a presentation of the amendments proposed by the rapporteur, as well as formal statements from the President of the European Parliament. Speaking time in the plenary is divided equally among the political groups, and further into the total number of members of that political group which intends to speak. The people of interest here are only the individual MEPs and their statements towards the Council’s proposed legislative text, and the amendments agreed upon by the relevant committee.

The main variables of interest are Type of opposition, Mode of opposition and Dimension of conflict. The first two are operationalized to measure opposition, while the third is a way to measure effectiveness in accordance with Mair’s theory (2007; 3013). Other variables are merely categorical and organizational, such as register reference number, event date, debate name, and party group of speakers. Each of the main variables are operationalized above and accounted for in the code book (see Appendix I). All data will be summarized in tables and graphs.

Further definitions and operationalisations

Here, other central definitions and operationalisations will be presented. Specifically, that of Euroscepticism and gender. We shall begin with the prior. In their 2011 paper, McElroy and Benoit characterise the ideological positions and policy cohesion of the party groups. The authors track the EP political groups in three separate original surveys conducted in 2004, 2007 and 2010, and conclude that “EP party groups not only occupy the entire range of the left-right spectrum, but also are clearly distinguishable from one another in policy terms” (ibid: 1). Among relativising the party groups’ ideology on the traditional left-right axis, they also quantify a Euroscepticism score. To capture the level of Euroscepticism of 2005-2007, a mean is conducted between the party group Euroscepticism score reported for 2004 and 2007 by McElroy and Benoit (2011). This is done to more accurately depict the level of Euroscepticism throughout the period. Furthermore, any score above 10 (of 20) is considered positive towards

24 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University the EU, and any score below is considered sceptic. A party group is considered hard Eurosceptic whenever this score is under 5.

Table 1: EP Party Group Euroscepticism Party group Euroscepticism Euroscepticism Euroscepticism score Attitude score (2004) score (2007) (mean) towards the (0-20, 0 = Most (0-20, 0 = Most (0-20, 0 = Most EU Eurosceptic). Eurosceptic). Eurosceptic). (Pro >10, 5>Soft>10, Hard<5) GUE/NGL 11,5 9,5 10,5 Pro Greens/EFA 13,5 14 13,75 Pro (Verts/ALE) PES (PSE, 14,5 15 14,75 Pro S&D) ALDE 13,5 14,5 14 Pro EPP-ED 13,5 14 13,75 Pro (PPE-DE) IND/DEM 2 2 2 Hard UEN 3 5,5 4,25 Hard NI N/A N/A N/A Sceptic (Derived from figure in McElroy and Benoit, 2011: 23)

As no party group exhibits soft Euroscepticism according to McElroy and Benoit’s calculations, Euroscepticism will henceforth mean hard Euroscepticism. MEPs which do not belong to any political group (called non-inscrincts or NI), is not provided by McElroy and Benoit, and thus they do not have a Eurosceptic score. However, by looking at the individual members making statements and their national party’s attitude towards the EU, we can assess if the non-inscrincts group in this data set should be assumed to be Eurosceptic or Europositive. By looking at the twelve MEPs national party belongings, only two belong to parties which are pro-EU (16,7%), and 17% of statements made by this group were made by MEPs belonging to an EU-positive national party. Hence, we can assume that the NI-group, or non-attached members, are predominantly Eurosceptic and should be characterised as such.

25 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament There is a theoretical difference between sex and gender, where the first one is determined by the purely physical aspect of one’s reproductive organs, the latter describes the social aspects and expectations placed upon oneself as a consequence of those reproductive organs or one’s self-prescribed gender identity. This difference was established by Robert Stroller in 1964, and is widely used by governments, institutes, and organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO). Furthermore, more and more people identify on a gender spectrum instead of on the traditional binary scale of male and female, and some identify as non-gender. Furthermore, the WHO “recognise that there are variations in how people experience gender based upon self-perception and expression, and how they behave” (Tolland and Evans, 2019: 2). This distinction is highly important, especially as we in this study is interested in gendered behaviour, it is important to use the right term for clarification. In the material, it is not given which gender role each MEP identify as. However, one can guess from appearance and name. While this might be troublesome, it is the only way through which this variable can be measured in the present. Although highly problematic, acknowledging this makes any classification of gender more premeditated and sounder.

Methodological considerations: on validity and generalisability

Most quantitative methods are often criticised for being too blunt, for not taking advantage of and sometimes ignoring the intricacies and nuances the material at hand. However, while this might be true in some cases, most researchers who employ quantitative designs do take nuances into considerations – while operationalising their units of interest. The ‘mechanical counting’ of some quantitative methods is almost always preceded by major works of interpretation where all nuances and intricacies had to be considered for the reliability of the study. Furthermore, there are one major advantage of ‘mechanical counting’: a lot more material can be processed with a larger number of variables and variable values (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 199).

For a study to have high reliability (consistency) and validity (accuracy), all operationalisations must be done carefully and take the above-mentioned nuances into account. High reliability is achieved when there is an absence of random and unsystematic faults, such as careless and neglectful mistakes during the collection or processing of data. Therefore, we have high reliability when the measuring instrument is employed correctly (ibid: 64). Tests of reliability can be made after a study has been finished, by investigating the accuracy of the coding variable by variable. Esaiasson et al., however, point out that the degree of correspondence always depends on the level of difficulty of the variable. Often, variables which needs more

26 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University interpretation to set a value often have a higher risk of being less reliable during a test. Hence, the level of accuracy needed for a variable coding to be deemed reliable is dependent upon the variable itself (ibid: 209).

The validity of the study, then, is decided both by 1) the measurement accuracy of the operationalised indicator for the theoretical definition, 2) the lack of systemic faults, and 3) that the intended thing is measured. The operationalisation of a theoretical definition can almost always be questioned, and each time there is a discrepancy between the empirical indicator and the theoretical definition the researcher commits a systemic fault. Furthermore, the larger the discrepancy the more serious the systemic fault usually is (ibid: 58ff).

In this study, the operationalisation of opposition is found in Karlsson and Persson (2018; 2020) and Persson et al. (2019). They start off from Dahl’s (1966) basic understanding of opposition as an “expression of disagreement with the government” (Karlsson and Persson, 2018: 891), and further building their operationalisation on the works of Norton (2008) and Kirchheimer (1957). The cumulative trait of their operationalisation is thus established, and by bringing together long-standing ideas they create a solid and wide operationalisation. Of course, like always, their operationalisation can be criticised, but with the field of EU opposition being so under-researched there is little to compare it to nor an alternative operationalisation to use. Furthermore, their operationalisation is proving both to be exhaustive and exclusive – all statements of opinion can be put into one, and only one, category. Hence, their operationalisation both have a cumulative and logical advantages.

The second operationalisation of effective opposition is given by in part by Mair (2004; 2007; 2013) and thus has the advantage of being within-theory derived and a logically necessary consequence of the theory. Mair himself theorises that one dimension of conflict must be opposed in one channel of influence to be effective. Each channel is clearly defined, and as we are only interested in opposition in the European Parliament only opposition in the functional dimension is effective in accordance with the theory. Hence, a definition of both the functional and Europeanisation dimension of conflict is needed. While they are somewhat vague concepts, one can derive the former as only having to do with allocation of within-polity existing means while the second is more concerned with polity or procedure changing measures. The operationalisation of these dimensions has been made after through considerations and with help from other literature to avoid validity issues. To make the operationalisation exhaustive, an ‘other’ category is added for statements not belonging to either dimension. 27 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament To further increase the validity of the study, randomisation of the units of analysis is conducted to avoid systemic problems. The most optimal solution would of course be to include all units of analysis possible, which is practically impossible. By correctly using randomised selection of the analytical units of interests, one creates a smaller copy of the population at large. By doing this, we can be relatively certain that the results based on the smaller sample is generalisable to the larger population (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 171). In this study, the units of analysis will be statements made in specific debates. While not fully being able to randomise statements made, we can randomise the debates chosen for scrutiny and then include all statements made in that specific debate. By doing this, however, the topic of the debate nor the speakers of debate can have a systemic effect on the results. By having access to all debates made during the time period in question, we can be sure that there will be no systemic difference between the sample and the population (ibid: 175). With the method of randomisation, then, we should be able to generalise the results of this study somewhat confidently to all opposition in EU politics.

With the methods of analysis and data collection, as well as definitions and operationalisations, the hypotheses presented in the section above shall be tested. In the end, we ought to have a valid and reliable answer to this study’s overarching question: is the European Parliament an arena for effective opposition? The results are presented below.

Results and analysis

In this section the results of the study are presented to test the hypotheses and seek answers to the questions presented in the section on the analytical framework of this study. To summarise, we hypothesis that there are few instances of oppositional behaviour in European Parliament plenary debates, and that none of this opposition can be deemed effective (H1 and H2). For opposition to be effective, it must adhere to the functional channel of conflict, and hence only be about the allocation of EU resources. Additionally, hypotheses were construction at what might affect the oppositional behaviour of MEPs at both party and individual level. At party level, it is though that Eurosceptic parties will be more oppositional than other parties (H3), and at an individual level it is assumed that women are less oppositional than men (H4). Consequently, we also ask if these possible differences matter to the policy outcome – if they are deemed effective. For this intent, the variables type of opposition, mode of opposition and effectiveness are observed in the data and will form the bases of the results and conclusions.

28 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University A reliability test was conducted to evaluate the inter-coder reliability. With the aims to measure the accuracy of the analytical framework, the test is conducted by recoding a share of the original data set. A high correlation between the original coding and the test coding is preferrable, as it shows clarity of the analytical tool and that the coder is consequent in her interpretations. The full methodology and results from the reliability test can be found in Appendix II. Summarised, the test show that there is roughly a 70-80% correlation between the original and test coding, depending on the variable. Due to the nature of the variables of interest, the levels of correlations are satisfactory for each variable. Hence, the results below are methodologically reliable.

With 902 statements were collected and analysed from 20 different debates in the European Parliament adhering to the codecision procedure. These debates were held in 2005 to 2007, with a somewhat equal distribution between the years. Out of the statements, 76% were held during the 1st reading in plenary, and over five policy areas with the internal market, community policies and economic, social and territorial cohesion being the most popular. This is the material basis of the research of this study, and the results are presented and analysed below, beginning with the first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: There is little to no opposition in EU politics conducted in the European Parliament.

Mair is quite straightforward in his theories and exclaims that there is little to no opposition to be found in the European Union or in European Union politics. Opposition, as being defined as criticism or giving an alternative, is however quite Figure 3: Share of oppositional statements prevalent in debates during 2005-2007 in the 55%

European Parliament. Out of the 902 statements 50

collected for this study, 55,11% of them expressed 45% 40 opposition. Conclusively, with 55% of all

statements being oppositional, one cannot with 30 Percent confidence conclude that ‘there is little or no 20

opposition in the European Union’ (H1a) as 55% 10

cannot, within any reason, be assumed to be small 0 share – it is a majority – and the first hypothesis 0 1 extracted from Mair’s theory must be denounced. Type of statement Note: 0 = non-opposition, 1 = opposition. n = 902.

29 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Hence, there is no proof of there being an oppositional deficit in EU politics during the period of interest.

However, when Mair speaks of the detrimental oppositional deficit in EU politics, he directs specific worry towards the lack of classical opposition – also known as policy opposition. Arguing that it is a deficit of this specific type of deficit which meaningfully limits citizens oppositional representation and leads to opposition either being supressed or organised against the political system. Hence, if there is a significant lack of policy opposition, there is a significant risk for the democratic legitimacy and survival of the EU system. Hence, looking into the mode of opposition is vital for our understanding of the democratic deficit.

Table 2: Share of modes of oppositional statements

Mode of opposition Policy 253 (51,01%) Procedure 157 (31,65%) Polity 84 (16,94%) Other 2 (0,40%) Total 496 (100%)

Looking at table 2 above, we can see that 51% of all oppositional statements are about policy, while 31% and 17% is about procedure and polity, respectively. Hence, with some simple mathematics, we can conclude that around 28,11 percent of all statements made in this data set are oppositional and about at policy. 28% is a substantial share of statements, and hence one cannot reasonably argue that there is little classical opposition expressed in the European Parliament. But can one reasonably and meaningfully argue that this is a deficit? Yes and no, depending on the yardstick used and Mair does not give one. Hence, we cannot meaningfully assume a deficit of policy opposition, but nor can we fully refute it. Therefore, we can conclude that a substantial amount of policy opposition is expressed in the European Parliament, but not if it is too little.

However, is a substantial share of oppositional statements the prime decider of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union? Even if a majority of statements are oppositional and there is no oppositional deficit, does this numerical representation of opinion eliminate the worry of the European Union having a democratic deficit? Not really, as a numerical representation does not require substantial representation. Substantial representation is also dependent upon to

30 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University which the degree the opposition is listened to and its potential effect on policy outcomes, i.e. the effectiveness of that opposition. Hence, that will be investigated next.

Hypothesis 2: Most opposition that exists in EU politics is ineffective

The effectiveness of any opposition is determined by an oppositional statement’s dimension of conflict, and through which channel of influence that opposition is expressed. The two main channels of influence, the electoral and the national channel, have separate decision-making competences which allows different forms of opposition to be effective in each one respectively. To be concise, any statements about allocation of resources belong to the functional dimension of conflict, and these types of opposition is most effective if expressed through the electoral channel of influence, i.e., in the European Parliament. Conversely, conflicts about the influence and reach of the European Union and its institutions can only be effective if voiced through the national channel. Hence, for opposition to be effective in the European Parliament, it must belong to the functional dimension of conflict. Then, and only then, does the European Parliament not have a deficit of substantive opposition. Mair hypothesises that most opposition made in EU politics is ineffective, and this shall be investigated below.

From figure 4, we can see that 61% of all Figure 4: Distribution of dimensions of conflict oppositional oppositional statements made in this data set statements adheres to the functional dimension of 60 61%

conflict. Hence, if the European Parliament 50 only has decision-making competences in matters adhering to the functional dimension, 40

then only those are effective. Hence, 61% of 33% 30

all oppositional statements made in the 20 European Parliament is effective, while 33%

is inherently ineffective and cannot have any 10 Oppositional statements, share of total of share Oppositionalstatements,

substantial influence on the decisions made. 6% 0

1 2 3 Thus, we must denounce the second Dimension of conflict hypothesis as we cannot conclude that most Note: 1 = Europeanisation dimension, 2 = functional dimension, & opposition is ineffective. As 61% is a 3 = other. n = 496 qualified majority of all oppositional

31 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament statements, we instead must conclude that most opposition in EU politics is effective. This in contrary to Mair’s thesis. Furthermore, we can not only confirm that there is a substantial share of opposition in general but policy opposition specifically in EU politics, but also that a large amount of the opposition is also effective. Hence, we must also conclude that the European Parliament has substantive democratic legitimacy.

However, these conclusions are all made at an aggregate level, and to gain further knowledge of the opposition al deficit in EU politics it also ought to be researched on party and individual levels. Hence, we shall begin with investigating if the oppositional behaviour of Eurosceptic party groups at the party level, and at an individual level we shall compare the difference between the oppositional behaviour of men and women respectively.

Hypothesis 3: Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional than their non- Eurosceptic counterparts

Alike Persson et al. (2019), we hypothesise that Eurosceptic MEPs are more oppositional than other party group MEPs. In our data set the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN) and Independence/Democracy Group (IND/DEM) are hard Eurosceptic. Furthermore, 83% of all non-attached members (NI group) belong to national parties which also profile themselves as being Eurosceptic. Hence, this group will be treated as Eurosceptic. However, the degree of which they are Eurosceptic cannot be assumed. Hence, we can only treat this variable as a dichotomy between Eurosceptic parties and Non-Eurosceptic parties.

In table 3 below, we can conclude that Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional than non-Eurosceptic party groups with 15,7 percentage points, which strongly supports hypothesis H3. Additionally, the interpretation of the results is further promoted by the results of the significance test Chi2. From this test we get a p-value of ⁓0,0008 which shows that, at 99,9% significance level, that this distribution is not random. Hence, we can confidently conclude that Eurosceptic party groups will express more opposition than other party groups in EU politics.

32 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University Table 3: Distribution of oppositional behaviour in Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic party groups

Non-opposition Opposition Total Non-Eurosceptic 47,3% 52,7% 100% (364) (405) (769) Eurosceptic 31,6% 68,4% 100% (42) (91) (133) Difference 15,7 -15,7 (percentage points) Chi2 X-squared = 11,372 Df = 1 p-value = 0.0007457 Note: Counts in parenthesis. n = 902

Also, one might think that Eurosceptic party groups would focus their opposition on polity as it may seem in their nature to do so. After all, parties are characterised as Eurosceptic just because they oppose and challenge the EU’s and its institutions’ influence for ideological reasons. Hence, they ought to mainly express polity opposition. If so, however, they contribute to minimising the role of policy opposition. As Mair describes it in his general theory (see the section Hypothesising the opposition deficit thesis in Mair’s theory), a minimisation of classical/policy opposition will force opposers to either submit or organise opposition against the polity. However, if Eurosceptic parties voice polity opposition in the EP, and this share of polity opposition is overbearing of other modes, Eurosceptic party groups may further cause a policy opposition deficit, and thus force other opposition out of the system. Hence, we question if Eurosceptic are constructive contributors to oppositional discussion and democracy in EU politics, or if they are contributors to the policy opposition deficit.

We can see in table 4 below that Eurosceptic parties do express more polity opposition than non-Eurosceptic parties, with 24,2% and 15,3% of oppositional statements being about polity, respectively. Hence, Eurosceptic parties are 8,9 percentage points more oppositional about polity than non-Eurosceptic parties. However, we also see that Eurosceptic parties express 8,8 percentage points more opposition about policy than non-Eurosceptic parties. Hence, the data is inconclusive as we cannot assume that Eurosceptic party groups will only increase the degree of polity opposition, and aiming to criticise the EU’s political system. Instead, by providing policy opposition, they also increase the level of classical opposition and thus decreases the risk of opposition being forced to be organised outside the EU system. As long as Eurosceptic party groups may voice their opposition within the system, then, they instead increase the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament as they represent and voice non-mainstream opinions and values. Which, although sometimes a threat to the political system itself (polity opposition), An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Eurosceptic party groups still represent EU citizens, and thus strengthens the EU’s collective decision-making.

Table 4: Distribution of modes of oppositional statements of Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic party groups

Mode of opposition

Attitude towards Policy Procedure Polity Other Total the EU (Count) Non-Eurosceptic 49,4% 34,8% 15,3% 0,5% 100% (200) (141) (62) (2) (405) Eurosceptic 58,2% 17,6% 24,2% 0,0% 100% (53) (16) (22) (0) (91) Difference 8,8 17,2 8,9 0,5 - (percentage points) Chi2 X-squared = 12,013 Df = 3 p-value = 0,007338 Note: Counts in parenthesis. n = 496

Therefore, must conclude that Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional than mainstream party groups in the European Parliament, and we hence gain support for hypothesis H3. Furthermore, there’s also reliable evidence that Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional towards polity and policy than mainstream party groups. As this relationship is statistically significant, we can also derive that the prevalence of Eurosceptic party groups increases the share of both polity and policy opposition, and hence both contribute to the EU’s democratic legitimacy and depress it – and to about the same amount at that.

Hypothesis 4: Male MEPs are more oppositional than their female counterparts

Lastly, we ought to investigate oppositional behaviour at an individual level. As a variable which has gained more salience throughout the years, the gendered social construction of oppositional behaviour is greatly under-researched. However, there are some previous works on socially constructed definitions of appropriate gendered behaviour (Chapell, 2006) and oppositional behaviour (Bäck and Debus, 2019), as well as theorising that legislature may be gendered institutions (Taylor-Robinson, 2014). All of the above show or theorise, individually, that it is socially dictated that men are allowed to be more vocal than women. Hence, we might assume that this is also the case in EU politics. However, no research has been done on the differences between the sexes in oppositional behaviour in EU politics, gaining insight would be highly informative for developing an idea of gender-based patterns in legislatures generallt

34 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University and the European Parliament specifically. Hence, our fourth hypothesis was derived, claiming that male MEPs express more opposition than female MEPs.

In table 5 below, we can see women are 0,3 percentage points more oppositional than their male counterparts. This is a seemingly insignificant difference, and we hence gain no support for hypothesis 4. Hence, from this material we do not gain any support for the hypothesis claiming that male MEPs express more opposition than female MEPs. Also, the chi2 test shows a significance level under 10%. Hence, there is most likely no causal relationship between gender and oppositional behaviour, or the difference it makes is so small in this data set that it cannot be generalised to the population. Thus, we find no support for hypothesis 4.

Table 5: Distribution of oppositional by gender

Oppositional behaviour Gender of speaker Non-opposition Opposition Total Female 45,2% 54,8% 100% (175) (212) (387) Male 44,9% 55,1% 100% (231) (284) (515) Difference 0,3 -0,3 (percentage points) Chi2 X-squared= 0,0119 Df = 1 p-value = 0,9131 Note: Counts in parentheses n = 902

Thusly, this material provides concrete answers concerning all the hypotheses, showing that there is no deficit of policy opposition (H1), and that while Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional than mainstream party groups and thus effectively increase the level of opposition in EU politics, they are also more oppositional about polity and policy than their mainstream equivalents (H3). Also, the data gathered showed that the supposed relationship between gender and oppositional behaviour is practically insignificant, and hence, most likely, random. Furthermore, there is also evidence contradictory to Mair’s belief that most, if not all, opposition in EU politics is ineffective. Therefore, can we fully refute Mair’s theory and the opposition deficit thesis? What does this mean for the EU’s democratic legitimacy? And are these results valid and reliable enough? These questions will be discussed below.

35 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Discussion and conclusions

In this section, we shall further discuss the results of this study. First, the results of the hypothesis-testing must be discussed thoroughly in relation to their interpretation and credibility. Secondly, these results shall be considered in relation to Mair’s theory, as well as, thirdly, the meaning of these results at large. Lastly, we must also discuss the generalisability of this study. All this to answer the overarching question of this thesis: is the European Parliament an arena for effective opposition?

Inter-study interpretation of the results

Through systemic and meticulous data collection, as well as through analysis we can conclude that there is indeed no oppositional deficit in the European Parliament during the sixth plenary term (2004-2009). With around 55% of all statements being oppositional, and 51% of opposition being directed toward policy, we can conclude that almost 30% of all statements made are opposition against policy. This is indeed a substantial amount, and we can hence gather that there is no oppositional deficit or a deficit of classical opposition in the European Parliament and we must denounce one of Mair’s main building-blocks. Furthermore, with 61% of opposition adhering to the functional dimension of conflict, we also find substantial evidence that majority of all opposition is effective, contradictory of Mair’s assumption and hypothesis H2. Hence, we must conclude that there is no deficit of effective opposition in the European Parliament during its sixth term, and nor is there a deficit of policy opposition.

Additionally, we find proof that MEPs belonging Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional than their mainstream equivalents, and thusly the third hypothesis is effectively supported. Alike Karlsson and Persson’s (2018) and Persson et al.’s (2019) results, we find that Eurosceptic party groups are more oppositional about polity than mainstream party groups, but also that they are more oppositional about policy. While Eurosceptic party groups express more polity and policy opposition in relative terms, they do not express more of any such opposition in absolute terms. This meaning that while Eurosceptic parties are roughly 15% more oppositional than mainstream parties, they only make around 18% of all oppositional statements. Thus, we cannot say that Eurosceptic party groups have monopolized opposition in the European Parliament, but that they are more oppositional than non-Eurosceptic MEPs. This is an important distinction to note, and nor should it be taken lightly, as it does tell us about oppositional behaviour and what may affect oppositional behaviour. Especially, this analysis

36 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University would indicate that an increase in Eurosceptic MEPs would also increase the share of opposition in the European Parliament.

On an individual level, then, we have no statistically significant data to neither support nor denounce the fourth hypothesis. Even if we do find that male MEPs are slightly more oppositional than women, the significance level of that distribution is much less than any normally accepted level (usually around 90-95%). Hence, we do not find any support for there being a relationship between gender and oppositional behaviour. This indicates that whatever difference is measures is, most probably, random or caused by a third variable.

Hence, we must conclude that there is no oppositional deficit, and that most opposition is indeed effective. Furthermore, we also find that Eurosceptic party groups might positively contribute to diminish that deficit. However, some questions ought to be asked: Is this enough opposition for our worries of an opposition deficit to fully dwindle? And is this opposition effective enough? And how should these results be interpretated within Mair’s theory? And what do these conclusions mean for it – must we dismiss it? All these questions will be discussed below.

Is the European Parliament an arena for effective opposition?

Initially, we must discuss and challenge the conclusion on the first hypothesis in two ways. First, one may wonder if this is enough opposition in relation to the share of expressed support (45%) in the data. As political opposition acts to diversify and challenge mainstream thinking, the mainstream thinking is needed for opposition to exist. But for there to be a discussion, there must also be an opposition to the opposition, which is normally expressed as support for the proposal at hand. Hence, expressed support is essential for any political discussion. In comparison to Karlsson and Persson (2018), the results of this study show that there is slightly more opposition in the European Parliament (55%) than in European Affairs Committees (EAC) (48,5%). Interestingly, however, only 11,1% of statements in the EACs expressed support and around 40% of statements are characterised as ‘other’, a category representing questions, clarifications and alike.

Does this mean that there is too much expressed support in the European Parliament? Theoretically, this can be thought to depend on the systemic predispositions and characteristics of the MEPs, but also the rules and regulations which formally regulate behaviour. In the European Parliament, MEPs often express support for the political process and the work of other MEPs, other than support for the current legislative proposal. It is possible that this is 37 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament social convention, and thus a higher degree of expressed support is expected. Furthermore, unlike in the EACs, the European Parliament’s plenary debates are a prelude to a legislative vote. Hence, MEPs could be expected to publicly voice their support for the full or parts of a proposal, and sometimes for their party group. Hence if these assumptions are true, we must conclude that the share of expressed support is expected to be higher than in EACs. Thus, we must also suppose that this level of expressed support is within a ‘normal’ interval and is not negative to the degree of opposition.

Second, it is possible that there are enough opposition in the debates held, but that the debates themselves either in time, number of statements, topics included, or attention given to them, is insufficient for opposition to be meaningful. During the codecision procedure, most EP votes are preceded by a plenary debate, but not all (European Parliament, 2019). Certainly, this does give some room for an oppositional deficit irrespective of the level of opposition expressed during the plenary debates, as some questioned fall into the category of ‘not important’ and hence are not debated properly and openly before a vote. However, with ‘most’ questions falling within the scope of the codecision procedure, the degree of possible increased opposition deficit is small. And, furthermore, with the codecision procedure being the main legislative channel, most issues go through the codecision procedure process. Hence, we can confidently conclude that we can dismiss hypothesis H1. However, is there a risk that more areas or topics become pushed under the political carpet and successfully depoliticise them? So, while we must dismiss the opposition deficit thesis in this study, one must also point out that there is a possibility of increased bureaucratization and depoliticization, but this worry ought not to be overplayed when directed towards the legislative procedure.

Furthermore, as most opposition in the European Parliament belongs to the functional dimension of conflict, then, most of the opposition expressed is effective. While this result is statistically significant (p≤0,001), there are two major questions: first, is it effective enough? And second, is the definition of effective theoretically sound? Mair assumes that “opposition, even when it exists, is almost by definition ineffective” (Mair, 2007: 12) as “we tend to find opposition regarding the institutionalization of Europe being voiced within the European channel, where no relevant competence lies” (ibid: 11). Mair speaks both of absolute terms – all opposition is ineffective – and in relative terms – most opposition is ineffective. Most prevalent, however, is the idea of opposition “tends to be” or is “usually” ineffective (ibid). Thus, the hypothesis H2 is set up in Mair’s terms, but it also seems that he is aiming to describe a larger share of opposition which is ineffective than a qualified majority. However, he does 38 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University not set up a level of effectiveness which is deemed appropriate, and neither can we estimate one from the texts. Assessing the sufficient amount or share of anything is a complex matter, and a to set hard limits is almost impossible. Foremost because a hard divide removes many if not all nuance of the situation and one might lose some important information and distinction, but also because the location of a limit often is not given. Hence, we cannot say if it is enough for EP debates to be 60,9% effective, or if that is too little. However, effectiveness is usually sought to be maximised, and any degree of ineffectiveness is treated that something which ought to be remedied. Hence, while 60,9% effectiveness is satisfactory, it is still lacking, and the amount of which opposition is ineffective is potentially detrimental to the democratic legitimacy of the EP.

We can only judge the effectiveness of opposition in EU politics and the EP if we have a sound instrument for measuring such effectiveness. Mair presents that the two main channels of influence (the national and the European) has different competences to effectively make decisions about different topics, and that certain opposition on one topic must be voiced through the channel which has the relevant competence. The European Parliament belongs to the European channel of influence and only has competence to make decisions in questions adhering to the functional dimensions, i.e. about allocation and distribution of means. However, most legislation pass through the EP and the codecision process. During the sixth legislative term, the codecision procedure was further extended into the area of freedom, security and justice (Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Vidal-Quadras and Rothe, n/d: 6). With 18 committees on subjects ranging from agricultural affairs, the internal market, and fisheries to constitutional affairs, foreign affairs as well as economic and monetary affairs, the EP legislate on all types of decisions (ibid: 41). Furthermore, since the Single European Act (SEA), the EP must approve of all new treaties about the accession of a new member state into the EU, among other institutional matters. Also, the EP has budgetary and control powers. Hence, the European Parliament do have the competences to make decisions about the influence and the reach of the European Union, and hence the Europeanisation dimension. Furthermore, the influence of the EP has increased in all areas since the accession if the Lisbon treaty in 2009, where the European Parliament’s width of influence increased, along with its power relative to the European Council. The EP’s competences, then, have been further extended. Therefore, the European Parliament no longer only has competences in areas adhering to the functional dimension of conflict, and thus, theoretically, making more of the expressed opposition effective. Hence, we conclude that hypothesis H2 must be denounced, and increasingly so as 39 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament the European Parliament gains more competences and legislative power. This also makes Mair’s operationalisation (2004; 2007; 2013) non-representative of reality and invalid. Even though we can conclude that opposition in EU politics is primarily effective, this definition of effectiveness is invalid. Hence, we both disprove Mair’s within-theory assumptions, and detrimentally criticise his operationalisation of effective opposition.

But what does these conclusions mean for the EU’s oppositional deficit at large? And does this mean that the European Union has reached the third milestone of democratic institutional development, as described by Dahl (1965)? Can the assumed democratic deficit fully be dismissed?

Methodological considerations about generalisability

Some considerations must be had about the generalisation of this study. First, the results are only directly applicable to the codecision procedure. As concluded earlier, the codecision procedure might be the most important legislative procedure in the EU political context since it is with this procedure most laws, and hence decisions which inevitably will affect EU citizens, are made. For opposition to be expressed in this procedure is paramount for the political validity of the EU. The legislative procedure is one of the main channels of influence in any democracy. Also, because of its prevalence, the results of this study can, with some confidence, be generalised to the whole European Parliament and EU politics.

Second, we have the time period. The data is taken from 2005-2007, with those years being a major part of the sixth parliamentary term (2004-2009) (European Parliament, n/d c). Hence, the data can be generalised to the full term. However, with each election the electoral construction of the parliament will change, and so can the relationship between political groups, the members of parliament, and hence oppositional behaviour. However, while comparing the number of MEPs belonging to the largest political groups during the sixth and the seventh parliamentary term, there are few key differences in the five major parties. However, the two smaller parties – UEN and IND/DEM in the sixth term – are replaced by other, somewhat equally Eurosceptic parties (European Parliament, n/d c; European Parliament, n/d d). Hence, because of the electoral similarities, the results in this study are, to some degree, also applicable to the seventh parliamentary term.

40 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University The myth of the EU’s oppositional and democratic deficit

Dahl (1966) described political opposition as an invaluable part of any democratic institution, as it provides political alternative and challenge the mainstream political agenda, as well as allowing those not in government to influence the decision-making process (Dahl, 1965: 11ff; Dahl, 1966). And in this study, we find no evidence for an oppositional deficit – we find quite the opposite. Through the comprehensive hypothesis testing conducted in this study, Mair’s fundamental assumptions are disproven. With 55% of all statements in the European Parliament plenary debates being oppositional, there is no opposition deficit to speak of – in general or about policy.

Furthermore, most of this opposition is also effective as it, in Mair’s terms, falls within the European Parliament’s competences. However, this definition has proven to be an unfair as well as inconsistent with the European Parliaments real competences, especially after the Lisbon treaty came into effect in 2009, which greatly increased the Parliament’s legislative powers. Therefore, we must conclude that the European Parliament cannot be proven to be ineffective, both within the realms of Mair’s theory, and outside of it. However, the increased competences of the European Parliament could potentially mean that more opposition is effective than assumed in this thesis. Also, we find that there is a substantial degree of opposition, and it also seems that Eurosceptic prevalence might increase the fulfilments of the EU’s democratic ideals. Furthermore, we can also conclude that there is no direct statistical relationship between a MEP’s gender and their oppositional behaviour.

Hence, we can confidently assume that in the European Parliament, during its sixth term, is fully democratic in relation to Dahl’s milestones (1965). However, does this mean that the whole European Union project is fully democratic? Not necessarily, and for two reasons: first, the degree of opposition is not the sole decider of democratic legitimacy. For instance, the effectiveness of that opposition may is also a key decider, among the rules of the electoral system, division of power between the legislative, executive and judicial bodies, and much more. The first mentioned, the effectiveness of opposition, cannot be confidently measured in accordance with Mair’ (2007) operationalisation. However, it does indicate that most opposition in the European Parliament is actually effective, in the sense that the EP does have competences in most questions and oppositional statements made there. Thus, we can, with some confidence, conclude that there is no democratic deficit in the European Parliament, in

41 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament terms of opposition. This indicates that the European Union itself has a lesser deficit than what some authors make it out to be.

Second, this study only research opposition in the European Parliament, not the full European Union. Hence, we cannot fully conclude that the Union is without a democratic deficit even if it is concluded that the Parliament is. However, no country which normally would be characterised as fully democratic only has democratic institutions. Nor does all countries which are normally thought of as fully democratic only have institutions in which a substantial amount of opposition is expressed. Nor is any of this expected. To then judge the European Union more strictly than one would any country is not rational. Hence, is it not possible that the EU is democratic enough in its overall level of opposition?

Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that a higher prevalence of Eurosceptic party groups would increase the level of opposition, and hence diminish the EU’s democratic deficit. Eurosceptic party groups being more oppositional than mainstream party groups and do not only oppress polity, but they are also more oppositional towards policy than mainstream parties. Is it possible that an increase in Eurosceptic MEPs would increase the level of opposition in general but also the degree of policy opposition specifically, and thus also solidifies the EUs democratic legitimacy? The data analysis suggests that as Euroscepticism grow, so would opposition in the European Parliament. Additionally, it would also mean an increase in specifically polity and policy opposition. Hence, while many would assume that an increased level of Euroscepticism would be detrimental for the legitimacy of European democracy, it would de facto decrease the oppositional deficit in the European Parliament further, and increase the level of classical opposition. While one might think that increased Euroscepticism could lead to the downfall of the European democratic project, as long as this opposition is expressed within the system, it might instead enhance it.

If an opposition deficit had been found in the European Parliament, this would have been strong evidence for Mair’s theory. Then, we could have concluded that a lack of classical opposition would have led to organisation of opposition outside the system – the legitimacy crisis we have witnessed during the last decade. However, we find that the European Parliament must be thought of as oppositional, political, and fully democratic, and indicating that the same can be said about the whole European Union. Through this study, then, we must renounce Peter Mair’s thesis (2007; 2013) that a deficit of classical opposition leads to organised opposition outside

42 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University yet against the system. Also, there is no proof that opposition and political debate has been deliberately minimised, which therefore clears the political elites of such suspicion.

As the democratic deficit thesis does not gain any support in this study, and nor is any concern about the EU’s democratic legitimacy is founded within this research. But how then should we understand the growing dissent against the EU system, thus far culminating with Brexit? And what is the true relationship between political opposition and democratic legitimacy, or the prevalence of the systemic questioning of it? This cannot be answered within the realms of this thesis, but we can confidently exclude that the legitimacy crisis was caused by an opposition deficit. Furthermore, we can also conclude that a systemic crisis, such as the one in the EU right now, does not cause an opposition deficit. Hence, more research is needed to gain a fuller understanding of what is causing this legitimacy crisis, and to possibly discover a cure before more member states leave the democratic project the European Union falls apart.

43 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University List of References

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45 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’, in Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (eds) (1967), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York: Free Press, pp. 6–26. Mair, P. (2004) ‘The Europeanisation dimension’. In Christiansen, T. (ed.), ‘Review section’. Journal of European Public Policy, 11:2, 337-348, doi: 10.1080/1350176042000194476. Mair, P. (2007) ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’, Government and Opposition, 42(1), pp. 1–17. doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00209.x. Mair, P. (2013) Ruling the Void. London: Verso Books. McElroy, G. and Benoit, K. (2012) ‘Policy positioning in the European Parliament’, European Union Politics, 13(1), pp. 150–167. doi: 10.1177/1465116511416680. Miller, C. M. (2018). Beneath the Spectacle: Gendering the ‘Everyday’ in the British House of Commons. University of Birmingham, Ph.D. Mårtensson, M. (2007) ‘Mixed Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union’, Journal of European Integration, 29(3), pp. 285–302. doi: 10.1080/07036330701442281. Neunreither, K. (1998). “Governance without opposition: the case of the European Union” Government and Opposition, 33(4), pp.419-441. Norton, P. (2008). ‘Making Sense of Opposition’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 14(1/2), 236–50. Näsström, S. (2017-09-28). ‘Demokrati: vad och varför?’ Lecture notes. Course: Problems of Democracy. Uppsala University, Department of Government. Persson, T., Mårtensson, M. and Karlsson, C. (2019) ‘Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 42(3–4), pp. 245–269. doi: 10.1111/1467-9477.12152. Schapiro, L. (1966). ‘Foreword’ Government and Opposition, 1(1), pp.1-6. Schmidt, V.A. (2007) The EU and National Polities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schumpeter, J.A. (1976). Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 5th edn. London: Allen & Unwin. Stoller, R. J. (1964). ‘A contribution to the study of gender identity’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, volume 45 issues 2 to 3, pages 220 to 226. 46 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University Taylor-Robinson M. M. (2014) ‘Gender and Legislatures’. In: Martin S, Saalfeld T and Strøm K (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 250–266. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199653010.013.0009. Tolland, L., and Evans, J. (2019) ‘What is the difference between sex and gender? Exploring the difference between sex and gender, looking at concepts that are important to the Sustainable Development Goals’. Office for National Statistics, United Kingdom. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/environmentalaccounts/articles/whatisthedifference betweensexandgender/2019-02-21. Van der Eijk, C. and Franklin, M. N. (2004) ‘Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe’, in Marks, G. and Steenbergen, M. R. (eds) European Integration and Political Conflict, pp. 33–50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

European Union publications and records European Parliament (2007-11-16). ‘End of the Identity , Tradition and Sovereignty political group as Romanian MEPs leave’. Post-briefing item. Available at: [Accessed 2020-10-30].

European Parliament (2019). ‘Handbook on the ordinary legislative procedure: a guide to how the European Parliament co-legislates’. English version. Available at: http://www.epgenpro.europarl.europa.eu/static/ordinary-legislative-procedure/en/ordinary- legislative-procedure/handbook-on-the-ordinary-legislative-procedure.html [Accessed 2020- 10-06].

European Parliament (2020). ‘1.2.3.3. Report of proceedings, final version (translated)’ Public Register of Documents. [Accessed 2020-09-29].

47 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament European Parliament (no date a). How Plenary Works. Available at: [Accessed 2020-10-06].

European Parliament (no date b). Search Verbatim reports. Available at: [accessed 2020- 10-07].

European Parliament (no date c). European Parliament: 2004-2009. Constitutive session. Available at: < https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/european- results/2004-2009/constitutive-session/> [accessed 2020-11-30].

European Parliament (no date d). European Parliament: 2009-2014. Constitutive session. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/european-results/2009- 2014/constitutive-session/ [accessed 2020-11-30].

Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, R., Vidal-Quadras, A. and Rothe, M. (no date). Activity report: 1 May to 13 July 2009 (6th parliamentary term) of the delegations to the Conciliation Committee. European Parliament. CM\787539EN.doc. Available at < https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/198145/activity_report_2004_2009_en.pdf> [accessed 2020-11-30].

List of debates 12-01-2005, Sulphur content of marine fuels, ref. nr. 2002/0259(COD).

20-05-2005, Port security, ref. nr. 2004/0031(COD).

06-06-2005, Reinsurance, ref. nr. 2004/0097(COD).

08-06-2005, Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, ref. nr. 2004/0036(COD).

22-06-2005, Community Border Code, ref.nr. 2004/0127(COD).

24-10-2005, Fluorinated greenhouse gases – Emissions from motor vehicle air-conditioning systems, ref. nr. 2003/0189A(COD).

12-12-2005, Markets in financial instruments, ref. nr. 2005/0111(COD).

13-02-2006, Services, ref.nr. 2004/0001(COD).

48 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University 31-05-2006, Medicinal products for paediatric use, ref. nr. 2004/0217(COD).

03-07-2006, Payer information with transfers of funds, ref. nr. 2005/0138(COD).

04-09-2006, Funding to deal with pollution caused by ships, ref. nr. 2005/0098(COD).

29-11-2006, The placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles, ref. nr. 2005/0194(COD).

13-12-2006, Double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil tankers, ref. nr. 2006/0046(COD).

23-04-2007, Advanced therapy medicinal products, ref. nr. 2005/0227(COD).

21-05-2007, Combating violence (Daphne III programme), ref. nr. 2005/0037A(COD).

18-06-2007, Cat and dog fur, ref.nr. 2006/0236(COD).

09-07-2007, Community action programme in the field of health – Action to tackle cardiovascular disease, ref. nr. 2005/0042A(COD).

04-09-2007, Inland transport of dangerous goods, ref. nr. 2006/0278(COD).

25-09-2007, European Institute of Technology, ref. nr. 2006/0197(COD).

49 An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament APPENDIX I: CODE BOOK

Code book

Opposition in the European Parliament

Emelie Lundell

1. Independent variables 2. Dependent variables 3. Analytical unit 4. How to interpret and categorise the dependent variables

2020-11-17

50 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University 1. Independent Variables a. Register reference The COD-reference number given by the European Parliament's Public Register office. b. Event date The date of the plenary session, in the order of DD-MM-YYYY. c. Debate name Given name of the debate in the European Parliament plenary session agenda. d. Reading in plenary Pointer for where in the legislative process the debate is occurring. Variable value Reading in plenary 1 1st reading in plenary 2 2nd reading in plenary 3 3rd reading in plenary e. Debate policy area The main subject of the debate given in the EP procedure file. Often, a procedure adheres to two or more subject areas, of which the most prevalent will be selected in this study. Furthermore, the subject is often divided further into each subject area, which shall be ignored. Hence, only the main subject area of each EP policy debate will be presented. Possible subject areas are: Variable Subject area 4 Economic, social and territorial cohesion value 5 Economic and monetary system 1 European Citizenship 6 External relations of the Union 2 Internal market, single market 7 Area of freedom, security and justice 3 Community policies 8 State and evolution of the Union

Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University f. Nationality of Speaker The country from which the speaker is elected to the European Parliament as reported by the European Parliament, sixth term. Variable value / Country Variable value / Country Variable value / Country Country code Country code Country code AT Austria DE Germany PL Poland BE Belgium EL Greece PT Portugal BG Bulgaria HU Hungary SK Slovakia CY Cyprus IE Ireland SI Slovenia CZ Czechia IT Italy ES Spain DK Denmark LV Latvia SE Sweden EE Estonia LT Lithuania UK United Kingdom FI Finland LU Luxembourg g. Sex of speaker Whichever physical sex the speaker seems to adhere to. Variable value Sex 1 Female 2 Male

Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University h. Party group of speakers The political group which the speaker belongs to in the European Parliament (sixth term).

Variable Group Group name Sub-parties Attitude towards Eurosceptic Number of seats, Value abbreviation EU, 0-20 0 = Pro-EU total 785 (0-20, 0 = Most 1 = Eurosceptic Eurosceptic). 1 EPP-ED Group of the European People's Party European People’s Party 13,75 0 288 (36,69%) (Christian Democrats) and European European Democrats Democrats 2 PSE Socialist Group in the European Party of European Socialists 14,75 0 218 (27,77% Parliament 3 ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party 14 0 100 (12,74%) Democrats for Europe European Democratic Party + 2 unaffiliated national parties + 2 independent politicians

4 Verts/ALE Group of the Greens/European Free European Green Party 13,75 0 43 (5,48%) Alliance European Free Alliance + 2 unaffiliated national parties 5 UEN Union for Europe of the Nations Group Alliance for Europe of the Nations 4,25 1 44 (5,61%) + 6 unaffiliated national parties 6 GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European Party of the European Left 10,5 0 40 (5,10%) United Left – Nordic Green Left Nordic Green Left Alliance + 5 unaffiliated national parties 7 IND/DEM Independence/Democracy Group Alliance of Independent Democrats in Europe 2 1 22 (2,80%) EUDemocrats + 2 unaffiliated national parties 8 NI Non-inscrincts/Non-attached members Euronat N/A 1 30 (3,82%) + 11 unaffiliated national parties + 3 independent politicians

An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament During the period 15-01-2007 to 13-11-2007, the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group (ITS) was an official party group in the European Parliament. A party group must have minimum 20 members, and with some members leaving the group was ended in November 2007. Due to its short history, the MEPs belonging to this group at the time of debate will be sorted into the group they belonged to before the creation of ITS – most were non-attached members. ITS was far-right and Eurosceptic, having members such as the French National Front’s Jean-Marie Le Pen, Italy’s Social Alternative Alessandra Mussolini (granddaughter of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini), and the Austrian Freedom Party’s Andreas Moelzer (European Parliament, 2007; BBC, 2007a; BBC, 2007b)

i. Object of opposition The institution/object which is the object of opposition. Most often the Commission or the European Council as the legislative ‘opponents’ of the EP.

Variable value Object of opposition Operationalisation 1 European Parliament Any statement against/in support of the line of the European Parliament. 2 European Council Any statement against/in support of the line of the European Council. 3 European Commission Any statement against/in support of the line of the European Commission. 4 The EU Any statement against/in support of the line of the EU. 5 The European Parliament Any statement against/in support of the coinciding line of the European Parliament and the and the European Council European Council. 6 The member states / a Any statement against/in support of the line of the member state(s). member state 7 A political group Any statement against/in support of the line of the speaker’s own political group. 8 The European Court of Any statement against/in support of the line of the The European Court of Justice. Justice 9 A European Parliament Any statement against/in support of the line of the EP committee committee 10 Other Any statement against/in support of the line of another actor not mentioned above.

54 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University 2. Dependent variables a. Type of opposition Variable value Type of opposition Operationalisation 1 Critique Any negative comment toward the proposal at the table without offering an alternative Whenever there is unclarities as of if a statement is a critique, the statement should be categories as other (4). A type of opposition. 2 Alternative Presentation of an alternative to the suggested proposal. Whenever there is unclarities as of if a statement presents an alternative, the statements should be categorised as a critique (1). A type of opposition. 3 Support Comment or idea of agreement with the proposal. A type of non-opposition. 4 Other Any statement which cannot be classified with the above-mentioned categories. A type of non- opposition.

b. Mode of opposition Variable value Mode of opposition Operationalisation 1 Policy opposition Any opposition directed at policy, or the content of politics. 2 Procedural opposition Any opposition directed at the system by which the state is governed, or the way in which politics is conducted. 3 Polity opposition Any opposition directed at the system of governance, the political entity, changes in decision- making processes and institutions, as well as the EU:s competences. 4 Other Any statement which cannot be said to contain a mode of opposition, or whenever the mode of opposition is unclear. If any statement cannot be classified in 1-3, they must be classified as other (4).

An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament

c. Dimension of conflict Variable value Dimension of conflict Operationalisation 1 Europeanisation dimension Any statement made about the organisation or influence of the EU or any EU institution, as well as about EU procedures and EU membership, the competences of the EU and its institutions and their right to act. 2 Functional dimensions Any statement about the allocation or distribution of resources, as well as prioritisation of attention, money, time, and effort. 3 Other Any statement which does not adhere to any dimension of conflict, or if it is unclear to which category a statement adheres. Examples: the conduct of a specific person, i.e. not an institution. If any statement cannot be classified in 1 or 2, they must be classified as other (3).

3. Analytical units The analytical units of the study are the statements made by members of the European Parliament in plenary debates during the Ordinary Legislative Procedure in the European Parliament, with the exceptions of the president of the European Parliament whom only hold formal presentations and other highly formalised procedural duties. Representatives of the Commission and European Council often visit the plenary sessions, but as they represent another channel of influence, their statements are not included as a unit of analysis. Furthermore, written statements included in the debate transcription after the debate has been closed shall be excluded from this scope. Any statement is connected to the full speech and into singular remark – however, it is the statement which is the analytical unit. I shall understand these terms as:

Speech – The full oral communication of one speaker in the allotted time given for it in the EP plenary debate.

Remark – The smallest units of which a comment can be done meaningfully. Normally a one or a few sentences.

56 Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University Statement – A communication made up by several remarks in order to portray a meaningful message. They touch only upon one point of the agenda, and have a clear focus on either policy, polity, or procedure.

4. How to interpret and categorise the dependent variables For the dependent variables, the type and mode of opposition and dimension of conflict shall be decided by the overall tendency of the statement, meaning how much space is given and how concrete the statement is towards one category. Furthermore, it should always be the goal to capture the overall picture of a statement, and rarely in relation to any other statement. The one statement should, in best, be categorised individually.

In cases where a speaker expresses their support to the opinion of another speaker, the referred to speaker’s opinion will act as a clarification and will henceforth be coded as normal.

If there is a statement adhering to several variable values of the same variable that cannot be separated into different statements, the speech as a whole can be divided up into several analytical units that together express different variable values. Thus, representing the general picture of the speaker’s speech.

Statements which are borderline cases between two or more variable values should be categorised in accordance with the general tendency and picture of the statement.

If there is any question, or a confident answer cannot be come to about the variable value of a statement, a question mark should be added to that variable value and the researcher should come back to it another day. If no clear answer can be concluded, the researcher should always take upon herself to categorise the variable to the most careful variable value.

Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University APPENDIX II: RELIABILITY TEST

Method & design

A reliability test aims to assess the quality and accuracy of a quantitative content analysis. A reliability test is conducted by using a share of the original data and, variable by variable, comparing the coding of the original study and the reliability test coding. High correlation between answers show a high reliability of the test, usually 75% or above is assumed to be a good level of reliability of a test. This, however, is very dependent upon the variable itself in the difficulty of its measurement whereas a relatively easy variable to measure is expected to have close to 100% similarity between the original coding and the test coding. With an interpretation-dependent variable, however, one cannot expect such a high conformity (Esaiasson et al., 2017: 209). Methodological experts have and will continue to discuss where to draw the line, but there can be no clear-cut answer and the judgement will have to be highly context depdent.

From the set of 902 observations of statements, 90 observations (ca 10%) were randomly drawn to be a part of the inter-coder reliability test. For generalisation purposes, it is important that the statements were randomly selected as to limit any biased effect or skewness of the results. The test was further made blind, i.e. all statements were collected without their previous allotted variable values before testing started. Thus, making it impossible to see or remember the values of the relevant variables.

The relevant variables are all the variables below:

1. Type of opposition, which may have discreet values of integers between and including 1-4. The type of opposition depends greatly of interpretation, specifically if the speaker is presenting criticism or an alternative. Furthermore, the speaker may express all three types – criticism, alternative and support – in one statement towards different parts or ideas. Hence, the most prevalent type of opposition is chosen, which gives room for more interpretation. Thus, one cannot expect a higher degree of correlation and a lower standard should be set. Around 70% should be a good benchmark. 2. Mode of opposition, which may have discreet values of integers between and including 1-4. Master’s Thesis Department of Government Uppsala University The mode of opposition is more straightforward, and it is usually easy to read in the text what the speaker is talking about – policy, procedure or polity. There are cases where some interpretation is needed to unravel the mode, however. Thus, one can expect a higher degree of correspondence between the original coding and the test coding and a higher standard should be set. We ought, then, to expect a conformity at around 80-85%. 3. Dimension of conflict, which may have discreet values of integers between and including 1-3. The dimension of conflict is, in its definition, correlated to the mode of opposition. Although there are more interpretation concerning the topical content of the discussion, and this variable is thus more inclusive. Because of this dependency on but also higher degree of interpretation than the mode of opposition, the standard should be set at a higher basis, but lower than the mode of opposition. We ought, then, to expect a conformity at around 75%.

Result

Variable Expected level of Real level of conformity, conformity, percentage percentage points point Type of opposition ⁓70% 72,2% Mode of opposition ⁓80-85% 82,2% Dimension of conflict ⁓80% 76,7%

The type of opposition and mode of opposition are both at an acceptable level and shows that there is internal validity to the measurement of these variables. While the interreliability of the measurement of opposition is probably to increase as the variable Type of opposition is recoded into an dichotomy between opposition and non-opposition. The dimension of conflict is slightly below the expected level, but not at an unacceptable level as this variable demands quite a bit of interpretation by the researcher. Hence, above 75% conformity is deemed to be enough for the measurement of this variable to be reliable.

This test was made as independent as possible, but one ought to be vary of researcher bias. The tool of measurement may be internalised into the researcher but may not be applicable or as reliable when used by other researchers. Because of this, one ought to take the results from this 59

An Arena for Effective Opposition? A systematic investigation into political opposition in the European Parliament reliability test with some caution. It would have been preferrable to have another researcher do the reliability test, and thus testing whither the instrument is indeed consistent when applied by another researcher. However, this has not been possible and with the precautions taken – randomisation and blindness of the test – we can still have some belief in the developed instrument’s reliability and consistency.