Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering

SHERMAN A . JACKSON

OXFORDUNIVERSITY PRESS

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Jackson, Sherman A . Islam and the problem of Black suffering / Sherman A . Jackson. p. c m. Includes bibliographical references and index . ISBN 978-0-19-538206-8 i . Race relations-Religious aspects-Islam . 2 . Black theology . 3 . Theological anthropology-Islam. 4 . African American Muslims-United States-History. 5 . African Americans-Religion-History . I . Title . BPL9o .5 .R3J33 2009 297 .2'7-dc22 2008041155

987654321

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Contents

Introduction: William R . Jones and the Challenge of Black Theodicy, 3

Chapter One : The Formative Development of Classical Muslim Theology, 27

Chapter Two: Mu'tazilism and Black Theodicy, 47

Chapter Three : Ash'arism and Black Theodicy, 75

Chapter Four: Maturidism and Black Theodicy, 99

Chapter Five: Traditionalism and Black Theodicy, 127

Conclusion, 157

Notes, 165

Index, 217 Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering Introduction

William R. Jones and the Challenge of Black Theodicy

This book is a sequel of sorts to my Islam and the Blackamerican : Looking towards the Third Resurrection . In that book, I argued that while the rise of Islam among Blackamericans was rooted in the agenda and sensibilities of "Black Religion"-essentially, a folk- oriented, holy protest against antiblack racism'-the future was intimately tied to Blackamerican Muslims' ability to access and deploy the intellectual legacy of the classical Sunni Tradition, both as a means of domesticating Black Religion and of moving beyond it to address important spiritual and transracial issues in a manner that is both effective in an American context and likely to be recognized as Islamic in a Muslim one .' Sunni Tradition was also identified as the key to overturning the false universals invoked by many immigrant and overseas Muslims, according to which the realities of the central lands of Islam are treated as the primary object of Muslim religious contemplation, deeply informing the reigning paradigm of a properly constituted Islamic life in America. That paradigm typically excludes Blackamerican concerns or simply assumes them to be subsumed under the models settled on in the Muslim world-a presumption ultimately sustained by a deeply entrenched racial myopia or agnosticism through which immigrant and overseas Muslims tend (or tended)' to see America . By forcing the latter, however, to accept both the strictures of Tradition and its ability to sustain multiple views of equal authority, immigrant and overseas Muslims' ability to 4 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 5 privilege, if not universalize, old-world and immigrant perspectives through Beyond this practical dimension, there is another, more fundamental preconscious conflations of "East" with "Islamic" can be greatly diminished, if sense in which black theodicy parts ways with traditional theodicy . The gen- not eliminated . eral tendency in traditional (white) theodicy has been to focus on suffering in As I explained in Islam and the Blackamerican, however, in negotiating its the more abstract and neutral forms of physical illness, broken relationships, future, Blackamerican Sunni Islam will look to Sunni Tradition not as the end bereavement, natural catastrophe, or war . Such concerns were deemed in fact but as the beginning of religious deliberation . The point, in other words, is not to be "of the highest importance for all subjects ."' Similarly, suffering has been to go back in search of cut-and-dried solutions but to benefit from Tradition's thought of in highly individualistic (if impersonal) terms and as being almost authority and intellectual capital, while heightening the likelihood that one's senselessly random . John Hick, for example, whose writings have been a staple own deliberations are not derailed by the allure of undisciplined compromise of modern discussions on the subject, writes that suffering seems "random or crass, "religionized" pragmatism . This latter interest can be most effectively and meaningless" ;8 that it "must fall upon mankind with something of. . .hap- realized by placing one's views in dialogue with the accumulated wisdom of hazardness and inequity ."9 Even when suffering was understood to be directed Islam's ongoing conversation with itself . In this context, the move to position at specific groups, e.g., "the people of God," the clear implication was that it Blackamerican Muslims as active agents, as opposed to passive recipients, rec- was directed toward specific characteristics that the group members them- ognizes a fundamental difference between bona fide Islamic thought on the selves might play a role in changing .10 On such an understanding, if not they one hand and ideas and propositions whose proponents simply happen to bear themselves, then certainly the sons and daughters of, say, Christian martyrs or Muslim names on the other . Jews at Auschwitz, might be able to avoid future persecution by simply ceasing This book brings the classical Sunni theological tradition to bear on the to be Christians or Jews . modern debate over black theodicy, most specifically as instigated by the clas- Black theodicy rejects this impersonal, "voluntary," random framework as sic and controversial work of William R . Jones, Is God a White Racist? In its being oblivious to and incapable of accommodating the reality of "ethnic suf- unqualified sense, theodicy (from the Greek theos, God, the divine, and dike, fering," where a "discrete and insular" group is singled out for suffering that is justice) refers to the attempt to reconcile the presence of evil in the world with at once "enormous, mal-distributed and transgenerational ." 11 Ethnic suffering the existence of a God who is unlimited in both power and goodness .' It is a is neither random nor impersonal nor avoidable through changes in identity problem not for all religions but for those that insist that God is omnipotent or voluntary commitments . On the contrary, it is directed, highly "personal," and omnibenevolent .5 While Jones's work was explicitly directed to Blackamer- and; in its transgenerational persistence, suggestive of something on the order ican Christian theologians, and more specifically to the proponents of black of a cosmic apartheid. In this regard, black theodicy also parts with the main theology,' his critique and proposal bear the presumption of being applicable concerns of theodicy as traditionally treated by Islamicists, in whose work the to any theistic religion that holds God to be all-powerful and all-good. Islam, in focus has been almost exclusively on God in light of the more abstract question all its classical theological articulations, is such a religion . of "optimism," that is, whether this is the best world that God could have cre- As for black theodicy, as a unique and specific genre of theodicy, it ated and why God did not create a better one .12 focuses on the problem of evil in the more specific context of the historical, Black theodicy became a major topic of discussion following the appearance communal suffering of Blaclcamericans. It begins by asking how an all-good, of Jones's book in the 197os . Since then, it has remained at the heart of a per- all-powerful God could sponsor or allow moral evil that is as grand and sus- during debate over the status, modality, and efficacy of religion in general and tained as the evil of American slavery and all that has come in its train . It goes of theism in particular for Blackamericans. In a sense, theodicy has acquired on, however, to ask if and how Blackamericans can work to liberate them- a status among Blackamericans comparable to that of the problem of reconcil- selves from such evil without calling into question God's all-goodness and ing God with modern science among white Americans . Just as no religious all-powerfulness . Black theodicy, in other words, seeks not only to explain movement that fails to come to terms with the challenge of modern science can how or why God sponsors or allows black suffering but to do so in a manner hope to perpetuate itself among American whites, no religious movement that that justifies the effort to overturn this suffering in light of the theological fails to speak convincingly to the problem of black theodicy can hope to enjoy presumption that it could only exist by the power and will of an omnipotent, a durable tenure among Blaclcamericans-even if it should rise to the chal- omnibenevolent God. lenge of modern science. Despite, however, these profound and far-reaching 6 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 7

implications for Blackamerican religion overall, the debate over black theodicy difficult to justify placing (black) American reality at the center of theological has been shaped entirely by Christian sources and appropriations . Whereas contemplation, especially if those who claim or are presumed to have religious Islam, by embracing divine omnipotence and divine omnibenevolence, might authority are not Americans, or are only nominally so . be assumed to be equally susceptible to the charge of divine racism, Islamic the- This book will join precisely these competing interests-that is, of a prima ology itself has had no say in the matter, despite the conspicuous and increas- facie acceptance of received Sunni Tradition and of placing (black) American ing presence of Muslims in the Blackamerican community . This book is an reality at the center of theological contemplation . While I shall proceed on a attempt to fill this gap . basic recognition of the value and authority of Sunni theology, this should not To be fair,13 among the primary reasons Islam has not had a voice in the be mistaken for a commitment to the way those who do not share or under- black theodicy debate is that Blackamerican Muslims themselves have yet to stand my rootedness in (black) American reality have understood or deployed exercise their agency in getting the Islamic theological tradition to speak effec- that tradition . In so applying this tradition to the problem of black theodicy, tively to their concerns and realities as Blackamericans . Neither Jones nor the this book will chart new territory . It is my hope that its value and integrity will black theologians could consider Blackamerican Sunni Islam because neither be assessed not in the abstract but on the basis of how faithfully it represents enjoyed the benefit of Blackamerican Sunni voices or sources on the matter . In the Sunni theological Tradition and how effectively it addresses (black) Ameri- fact, for many Blackamerican Sunnis, the very notion of a theological perspec- can reality . tive that is grounded in American reality is viewed as suspect, if not anathema . William Chittick (among others) has recently argued that "the only uni- This predisposition is further reinforced by what has already proved to be the versally accepted dogma in the modern world is the rejection of tradition ."15 treacherous liabilities attending such an enterprise . Specifically, the infelicities Indeed, the modern mindset is deeply informed by two regimes of "public rea- of the race-based theological project of the Nation of Islam has cast a cloud of son" (science and philosophy) that have little regard for the role of authority suspicion over the very move toward any theological thinking that is race- or and tradition in conveying, discovering, or preserving truth . As we learn from people-sensitive . This has left Blackamerican Sunni Muslims hypersensitive Alexis de Tocqueville as far back as the 1830s, this is not a new development about giving race, and more specifically blackness, any consideration at all in among Americans . In fact, Tocqueville marveled at the lack among Americans their formal religious deliberations. of "a trace of what we generally consider faiths, such as customs, ancient tradi- To this must be added, of course, the false universalizing tendencies of tions, and the power of memories ."" This is all reinforced by the contemporary many immigrant and overseas Muslims ." Here, again, historically informed American commitment to autonomous individualism, which is confirmed and applications of Islamic sources and principles are equated with a universally refracted through chic and popular aversions to "organized religion ." In fact, valid and binding Islamic order. While the sociocultural, political, and other even religious people in this traditionally Protestant society nurse a certain dis- realities of the premodern and modern Muslim world invariably inform these trust of anything standing between them and scripture . This makes it difficult applications, the resulting order itself is imagined to exclude all specific endow- to appreciate an approach that values, let alone privileges, tradition . ments (ethnicity, place, time) . This insensitivity to time and space is further Beyond the point I made at the outset, however, I have opted not to invoke reinforced by the more general tendency to see theology itself as a permanently sola scriptura ("scripture only," a position taken by Protestantism against the fixed and immutable construct. To be true, in other words, it is assumed that tradition-bound interpretive authority of the Catholic church) as an interpre- theology, like God's own self, must be transcendent of all social and historical tive right or preference, for several reasons . To begin with, Blackamerican reality . Thus, questions such as "Is the Qur'an created or untreated?" or "Is Islam has reached the point where the right to dissent from the global/histori- God literally or figuratively upon the Throne?" are presumed to reflect not the cal Community (e.g., through mild obliviousness to scripture or unmediated concerns and interests of a particular time, place, or people but an ahistorical, interpretations thereof) carries little meaning in the absence of an uncontested "objective" reading of Qur'an and Sunna (i.e., supplementary teachings of the recognition by and inclusion in that global Community . This becomes easy to Prophet Muhammad). On this understanding, the questions handed down from appreciate once we recognize certain aspects of Blackamerican Islam in the the classical past come to represent the proper and fixed boundaries of theolog- context of its historical evolution . ical inquiry, and many of the answers proffered acquire a transcendence that A major force in the communal spread of Islam among Blackamericans effectively places them beyond critique . In such a context, it becomes extremely was the heretical, proto-Islamic movements of the early twentieth century . 8 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 9

In his Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race, Edward Blyden makes the insight- is a reduction of this fear, by obviating the distinction between Sunni Tradi- ful observation that heresies have been more effective than orthodoxies in tion and particular modalities of deploying or appropriating it-a distinction I "spreading religion among the Negro ."17 Among the reasons for this, I sus- hope will also underscore some of the liberating potential of Muslim Tradition . pect, beyond those mentioned by Blyden, has been the fact that heresies tend Beyond this, I hope to show how Muslim Tradition can contribute to one's abil- to present target populations with far more elastic and empty constructs into ity to address contemporary issues without sacrificing one's sense of collective which to pour the contents of their own religious imagination, en route to full self, ideational community, or transcendent belongingness . appropriation of the religion as their own . Once this process of appropriation Third, whatever the advantages of proceeding from Tradition may be, they has been completed, however, religious imagination must yield to religious can only be purchased at the price of accepting the kinds of strictures that go thought, as the community seeks to preserve and police the boundaries of what along with any serious commitment to any corporate enterprise . In the case is now its religion and guard the distinction between it and not-it. At this stage, of Sunni Islam, this has always entailed an acceptance of a basic set of ground the concept of orthodoxy acquires a premium. But orthodoxy can neither be rules for negotiating doctrine . Because Sunnism never established a formal arrived at nor policed in isolation . For at the very least, it must, on some level, ecclesiastical hierarchy, doctrinal orthodoxy was invariably negotiated through understand and present itself as the continuation of the religion's ultimate truth public debate . The only binding and unassailable authority that could ratify as understood and promoted by its original carriers and their ideological heirs . a doctrine in the name of Islam as a whole was the Unanimous Consensus The move to orthodoxy, in other words, is invariably a move to a more rather (ijm I') of the entire (and later the scholarly) Community.22 Where there was no than a less ecumenical religious identity . agreement, there was no uniformity, and a multiplicity of doctrines would have In less than a decade, an entire century will have passed on the phenom- to be recognized, ceteris paribus, as orthodox, at least inasmuch as they did not enon of communal conversion to Islam among Blackamericans, a process contradict a Unanimous Consensus . whose beginnings, true to Blyden's insight, were dominated by heretical move- To reject the authority of Unanimous Consensus, on the other hand, ments . The proto-Islamic Moorish Science Temple of Noble Drew Ali was meant to run the risk of forfeiting the means of validating one's claims to founded in 1913 ;18 the proto-Islamic Nation of Islam was formally established orthodoxy in any way that could command public recognition . One might opt, between I93o and 1931 . In other words, the point has long passed where reli- of course, to pursue a separate, competing orthodoxy (as actually happened gious imagination brings the process of religious appropriation to full tide . The with ShVism). But this would require the establishment of a separate religious presumed contradictions between being black and being Muslim have been institution, an action that would itself require massive resources and extended obliterated, and the premium is now on ensuring and preserving orthodoxy . periods of time . Moreover, while such an effort might succeed in the formative This means, inter alia, being able to back indigenous articulations with enough period (when the parameters of institutionalized understandings and general authority to ensure that they are greeted with recognition among the general- benchmarks were still being set) it would be extremely difficult thereafter and ity of Muslims, not simply within the United States but worldwide . Given the perhaps impossible today . It is thus no accident that for over a millennium, no enormous authority of Sunni Tradition, and given Blackamerican Muslims' offshoot of Sunnism or Imam! ShI`ism has been able to sustain a claim of her- lingering authority deficit" (now perhaps more as Westerners than as new- esy against or successfully deflect the charge (or insinuation) of heresy coming comers or Blackamericans), 20 it is difficult to ignore the advantages of historical from these self-proclaimed theological mainstreams . Sunnism over "free-style," unmediated interpretation . On this arrangement, Sunni doctrine (legal or theological) has always relied Second, contrary to the view of those who see in any commitment to Tradi- on a public discourse rather than the prerogative of any ecclesiastical author- tion an irrational fear of or inability to confront the present, I agree with Alis- ity or the naked assertions of any particular group . In this capacity, theology dair Maclntyre that "an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp has always had to validate itself on the basis of some objective, public author- of those future possibilities which the past has made available to the present ."21 ity (objective in the sense of everyone having equal access to it) . Sunni public Many modern Muslims (e.g., women, followed perhaps by blacks and Western- authority consisted of two interrelated sources : (i) primary, religious authority, ers generally) nurse a certain alienation from Muslim Tradition, based on their and (2) secondary, interpretive authority. Primary, religious authority, identi- fear that it can only entrap them in modes of thinking and being from which fied as al-naql (or al-manqul or al-sam') is located in the faithful transmission they desperately seek to escape . Part of what I hope to achieve through this book of scripture and its "natural" extensions . Secondary, interpretive authority,

IO ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION II

referred to as al-`aql (or al-ma`qul) resides in intellectual/rational interpreta- or efficiency of their views . Reliance on Tradition, meanwhile, overcomes much tion and debate. Beyond their univocal passages and most basic fundamentals, of this by signaling that one is willing to play by the same rules as those of the the Qur'an and Sunna are incapable of interpreting themselves or of settling great masters, implying that the view that one is advocating is little more than disputes over whose interpretation is correct . This requires the intervention of what Abu Hanifa, Thomas Aquinas, or the Founding Fathers themselves might an interpretive authority that lies outside these texts. Muslim Tradition locates advocate (or at least recognize) were they confronted with contemporary reality ." this in al-`aql. This brings me to one final point that is often overlooked and is the source The literal translation of al-`aql is "reason." As I will show in chapter I, how- of significant consternation and confusion . Simply put, there is a difference ever, al-`aql as a constituent of Muslim Tradition refers neither to the plain dictates between the contents or unmediated renderings of Qur'an and Sunna on the of the faculties nor to any particular uniform regime of systematic reasoning . It one hand and "Islam" on the other . Islam, as the phenomenon that is actually is, rather, a highly contested terrain of competing "regimes of sense" that oscillate practiced, esteemed, and identified by Muslims as their religious ideal, is the between primordial and synthetic reason, yielding overlapping composites that understanding, prioritization, and even appropriation of the Qur'an and Sunna religiously literate Muslims collectively recognize as "public reason ." Among the sustained over a long enough period of time to acquire an indeterminate but subtleties of al-'aql is that it is not purely a tool of exegesis, or extracting meaning requisite degree of normative status, among a critical mass of religiously literate from the sources ; rather, it is just as often a mechanism for monitoring eisegesis, Muslims . A verse-for example, "And We created human beings" ("wa la gad that is, validating/ invalidating meaning that is read into the sources, whatever khalagna 'l-insan")-may be pointed to as proof that there are multiple gods or the actual origins of this meaning may be . In sum, the essential function of al-aql even that the Qur'an endorses the Trinity . Such renderings, however, no mat- is to adjudicate interpretive disputes and validate interpretive arguments in the ter how "grounded" in Qur'anic passages they may appear to be, only become public realm in a manner that is recognized as fair and impartial ." a part of "Islam" when those whom critical masses of Muslims recognize While al-'aql is in one sense stable, it is also open to change and evolu- as authorities understand, defend, and endorse them as such, and this long tion, as its actual substance is not dictated by revelation but is negotiated in enough to confer upon them the status of normative understandings . This, in real space and time . Such change, however, occurs slowly, organically, within fact, is the very meaning, function, and significance of Tradition . the recognized rules of the game, and-as with the rules of any sport-for Now, where a Muslim chooses to bypass Tradition and promote unmedi- the purpose of improving rather than destroying the game itself. In its actual ated interpretations of scripture or even his or her own renderings of Tradition, operation, al-`aql has a certain dialectical relationship with al-naql . For while his or'her efforts may be convincing, linguistically justifiable, and even sub- al-nagl is in one sense fixed (the canon of revelation being closed), in another stantively correct. But unless they are immediately accepted as faithful render- sense, Unanimous Consensus (or simple vertical longevity or horizontal pre- ings or he or she commands enough authority to convert them immediately dominance) can confer upon rational/intellectual methods and arguments an into normative understandings, it may be years or even generations before authority approaching that of the transmitted canon . Through the aegis of al- these deductions acquire such a status, if they acquire it at all . In the interim, it `aql, in other words, a doctrine can move from the periphery to the center, would be misleading and perhaps disingenuous to refer to these renderings as .24 where its "Islamicity" comes to be assumed rather than argued "Islam," in the sense of representing the normative phenomenon that is lived, In this sense, while unmediated interpretation may be quicker on its feet, practiced, and esteemed by the generality or even critical masses of Muslims. Muslim Tradition can both validate and insulate doctrines and confer on them My point here is that ultimately, unless we commit to the principle that Islam a degree of longevity or even permanence, by identifying them as the legitimate is essentially the sustained conclusions of those whom critical masses of Mus- offspring of al-nagl and al-`aql with genetic links that validate their pedigree lims recognize as authorities '26 any non-Muslim or "extremist" Muslim inter- and protect them from being communally disowned . Moreover, unmediated pretation (of, e.g., jihad or female circumcision) that grounds itself in Western interpretations often fail to tell us why we should abandon the view of, say, Abu or Eastern understandings of Qur'an and Sunna must be recognized as having Hanifa, Thomas Aquinas, or the Founding Fathers in favor of a novel render- an equal claim to represent "Islam ." ing. While the implication is that the contemporary view is superior, this can be To be sure, many Muslims will take exception to this perspective, seeing difficult to prove and may even backfire, as the person, memory, or "image" of it as too deferential to the status quo and too openly inimical to reform . This is Abu Hanifa or Thomas Aquinas may be dearer to the public than the substance fair and understandable but perhaps not fully appreciative of my point . To say

12 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 13

that a particular interpretation is not esteemed by the generality of religiously of black churches were not "theologically" Christian . They adhered, rather, to literate Muslims is not at all to deny its proponent the right to embrace or even Black Religion-a folk-oriented, holy protest against antiblack racism. Wash- promote it. It is simply to say that this alone is not enough to render it "norma- ington's point was that American Christianity's historical exclusion of blacks tive Islam" with which the generality of Muslims should be identified or with had denied them access to a theological criterion by which they might proceed which we may expect them to identify, any more than it would be appropriate without compromising the doctrinal integrity of the Faith . As a result, black to shoulder (or credit) the proponent of a novel rendering with a view of a core- religious expression in general, and black protest in particular, remained largely ligionist with which he or she disagrees . outside the parameters of Christian teaching, devoid of the kind of theological My point is that the very tension between normative and novel renderings sensitivity that might obviate the distinction between crass, "religionized secu- may be a step in the process of reform but alone does not constitute reform itself . larism" and bona fide Christian doctrine . For reform, unlike schism or revolution, is typically an internal, incremental By the late 196os, these and related concerns had evolved into a movement exercise that involves, inter alia, pragmatic, albeit principled, compromise and known as Black Theology, formally inaugurated by the appearance of James consensus building . After all, it defeats the whole purpose of reform to lose Cone's powerful interventions Black Theology and Black Power (1969) and A or alienate the very constituency that one is seeking to redirect . Thus, like the Black Theology of Liberation (197o) .19 Black theology's most immediate charge tingling in one's nose before a sneeze, a novel view may be a step on the road was to establish a biblical, or at least a credibly Christian, basis for Black Power, to reform, and it may not, depending on the direction in which the various which by then had emerged as both an expression of and competitor with Black tensions involved are resolved . In any event, reform itself will always be a mat- Religion . In this capacity, Black Theology had both to confront Christianity's ter of time, circumstances, and players, not simply of an individual interpreter historical role in Blackamerican suffering and produce an understanding of the putting forth a novel view-however valid, sophisticated, or even substantively Faith that might subvert this implication and show the way to black liberation. superior that view may be . Otherwise, black Christianity was likely to suffer defections to non-Christian My aim in this book is to present theological perspectives on the problem and/or nonreligious movements . The enormity of this challenge notwithstand- J of black theodicy that the generality of religiously literate Muslims recognize ing, Black Theology burst on the scene as a bold and precocious movement. as valid representations of historical Sunnism .27 Of course, I will be the bridge Indeed, the initial excitement it generated held out the promise of a new theo- between these classical theologies and the critique and proposal of Jones, in logical beginning for Blackamericans . which capacity my own perspective will inform the use to which these classi- In 1971, however, the movement hit a snag with the publication of an cal views are put. I am cautiously confident that my depictions of the classical article, "Theodicy and Methodology in Black Theology : A Critique of Wash- schools are "Islamic," in the sense of reasonably representing their doctrine . ington, Cone and Cleage," 30 by William R . Jones, a black Baptist turned Uni- Whether or not this designation can be justifiably applied to my appropria- tarian theologian who was at the time on the faculty of Yale Divinity School . tions, only time and the responses of the Muslims will tell . This was followed in 1973 by Jones's stunning critique Is God a White Racist? Of course, the value and success of this project will depend not only on the Jones argued, first, that theodicy was the sine qua non of any successful Black- fidelity of these renderings and appropriations of classical Sunni theology but american theological expression ." For according to him, in contradistinction to on a proper understanding and a fair representation of Jones as well . In order the fundamental religious challenge confronting the white community, "The to empower my reader to judge the extent to which I have achieved this (or at essential question for Black Christians is not : Does God exist? It is rather: Does least to know my understanding of Jones) I offer the following summary . God care?" 32 Second, Jones argued, black theology embraced a theodicy that asserted but failed to prove God's benevolent predisposition toward blacks, an oversight that fundamentally undermined its effectiveness both as an antidote William R. Jones and "Divine Racism" to black suffering and a prescription for black liberation, both theologically and practically. In 1964, at the height of the civil rights movement, Joseph R. Washington, Jr., Black theology floundered, according to Jones, in its simultaneous com- published an article entitled "Are American Negro Churches Christian?" 28 Pre- mitment to classical constructions of divine omnipotence (God's all-powerful- dictably, Washington hazarded that the majority of those who packed the pews ness) and divine omnibenevolence (God's all-goodness) . Simply put, if God 1 4 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 15 is omnipotent, God must have the power to eradicate black suffering . If God as Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, Jones concludes that while God might chooses not to-as suggested by the facts on the ground-this must mean be omnipotent with regard to nature, God is emphatically not so with regard either that God intends to benefit or to harm blacks thereby . If, however, we to history . Rather, the only power God can exercise over human history is the hold this omnipotent God to be also omnibenevolent, any suffering that befalls power of persuasion . 36 As Anthony B . Pinn would later summarize Jones's posi- blacks must be understood to operate to their ultimate benefit. This, however, tion: "to extend God's activity beyond persuasion would entail a form of omnip- according to Jones, raises the problem of quietism, as it implicitly binds God- otence which allows for the divine racism charge ."37 Such an understanding, in fearing Blackamericans to accept their suffering and not oppose it . As Jones other words, would attribute to God a direct role in the suffering that humans put it, "by taking the offensive against suffering, we risk being disobedient to inflict on other humans. God,"33 since suffering must be seen as reflecting not simply God's unlimited As for the notion of God's omnibenevolence, Jones characterizes it as power but God's benevolent plan as well . On this understanding, Jones sharply oscillating between being harmful and being false . On the one hand, only on criticizes the black theologians for their agnostic approach to black suffering the most tortuous logic could one uphold such a doctrine in the face of all the and their refusal to entertain the possibility that it might be a sign of divine historical evidence to the contrary . At the same time, as we have seen, hold- malevolence . In fact, for Jones, this very possibility distinguished black suffer- ing an omnipotent God to be omnibenevolent bears the seemingly inexorable ing from suffering in more general discussions of theodicy . tendency to vest black suffering with positive value and, in so doing, raise it In its most essential elements, Jones's contention might be restated as beyond critique. Thus, rather than allow on the one hand the notion of divine follows. Blackness, however defined, is inextricably linked to a set of physical benevolence to disguise the evil of unearned suffering, and rather than rely on traits. These traits, unlike moral, ethical, or cultural tendencies or even religious the other hand on God's benevolent intervention or aid to overturn oppression, commitments, are immutable . Blackamericans, in other words, are incapable Jones insists that Blackamericans must come to see all suffering as something of changing the ontological fact of their blackness . As such, they could never to be eliminated and rely entirely on their own powers and commitments in escape the maliciousness of an antiblack God . But the very fact of sustained their effort to eradicate it . black suffering on the ground must at least be considered for its evidentiary By calling into question God's benevolence and sovereignty over history value to this effect . This underscores the urgency of the problem for Jones and and replacing them with what he calls humanocentric theism, Jones pur- informs the very title of his book : Is God a White Racist? ports to refute both the charge of divine racism and the necessity of quietism . Jones undertakes a systematic critique of five of the leading black theo- According to him, humans, not God, are the authors of moral evil . As such, logians: James Cone, Joseph R. Washington, Jr ., Albert Cleage, Major Jones, human oppression is a sign not of divine maliciousness but of human vice . and J. Deotis Roberts, all of whose theologies he judges as having failed to deal This absolves God of all responsibility for moral evil . At the same time, it com- effectively with the problem of black suffering and black liberation . On this pletely undermines any disincentive to revolt against oppression .. For on this refutation, Jones concludes that "only two models are viable for a black theod- understanding, to revolt against oppression is to revolt not against God but icy of liberation : secular humanism and what I call humanocentric theism ."34 against other human beings .38 This was Jones's alternative to the "failed" theo- Of the two, Jones expresses his personal preference for secular humanism . But dicy of the black theologians . theistic thinking is so rooted in the Black community that he sees little point in pushing a secular approach . As for "humanocentric theism," its core affirma- Whereas the theologies of the present black theologians do not suc- tion is that humans are both the authors of their own deeds and the ultimate cessfully handle the issue of divine racism, humanocentric theism agents in human history . Drawing on the work of Rabbi Richard Rubenstein provides a sturdy refutation . It accomplishes this by removing God's (of After Auschwitz fame), among others, Jones agrees that the "biblical con- overruling sovereignty from human history . The concept of divine cept of a just God who is the omnipotent judge of the world and the ultimate persuasion and the functional ultimacy of man leads to a theory author of human history must be rejected ."" For such a notion, he insists, is of human history in which the interplay of human power-centers no more reconcilable with black liberation than it was with Auschwitz . Draw- is decisive . In this context, racism is traced, causally, to human ing further on Deitrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Buber, Harvey Cox, and Howard forces. Divine responsibility for the crimes of human history is thus Burlde, among others, along with more openly antireligious authorities such eliminated.39 16 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 17

Since the publication of his thesis, responses to Jones have been both spo- humanism," he advocates a move to "strong humanism," or what he also calls radic and diffuse-a footnote here, a section in a book-chapter there . The gen- "Black humanism," that is, a humanism devoid of any theological commit- eral tendency among Blackamerican Christian thinkers appears to have been ment to the necessity of God's existence . In his words, to point out that Jones essentially undertook an "external" critique that fell approaches to Black suffering that leave intact God's goodness and outside the boundaries of Christian and/or bona fide black religious thought . existence are doomed to collapse into redemptive suffering apolo- James Cone, for example, while acknowledging the importance of Jones's work . Theistic approaches to this question are inherently trapped in its own right, protests that Jones both downplayed and misread the centrality getics within a theodical game (i.e., a compromise with evil/suffering) . of Jesus . "Anyone who reads my works can see that any theological problem Only a questioning of God's existence provides a working resolution (and especially suffering!) can and must be dealt with from the perspective of ., a full rejection of redemptive suffering) ." Jesus Christ ." According to Cone, Jones completely ignored Jesus, "because (i.e he was so involved in doing what he called an "internal" critique, when in There are numerous aspects of Pinn's thesis that one would want to cross- fact it was 1140 J. external . D. Roberts comes more directly to the point when he examine . For example, the notion (at some points more explicit than others) insists that Jones "set up requirements for black theology which no black the- that humans (read blacks) play no role at all in their own suffering begs the ist can approve without renouncing his faith ."41 Major Jones is equally blunt: question of where (if not from God) the corrective energy (or agency) is to "William R . Jones' limited God-concept is not adequate for suffering Black come from: if they are not part of the problem, how can they alone be the .1141 people of faith solution? Similarly, his apparent equation of evil with black suffering raises At the other end of the spectrum, younger scholars such as A . B . Pinn com- several questions : are adultery or theft evil, and on what basis? How about plained that rather than engage Jones, Blackamerican Christian writers viewed incest or drug abuse? And what are the consequences of these actions for his thesis as a "theological virus" to be "swiftly disposed of ."43 In reading Pinn, Blackamerican suffering? In addition, the meaning of "liberation" seems in fact, one comes to appreciate what is ultimately at stake in the whole black murky and shrouded in utilitarian mystery and innuendo. And the idea that to theodicy debate. For Pinn takes what he sees as the dismissive and inadequate recognize any redemptive quality in suffering is to compromise with it seems responses of the black theologians as proof that there is no satisfactory theo- overly utopian. logical response to the black theodicy question . In this light, even as he rejects Most important of all, Pinn's rejection of theism, like Jones's indictment the theistic approach of the black theologians as hopelessly complicit in black of it,' appears to be grounded in very particular understandings of omnipo- suffering, he goes on to criticize Jones-and his humanocentric theism-for tence and omnibenevolence that are assumed to represent the only meanings his unwillingness to abandon the theistic framework altogether in favor of an these constructs can have . Omnipotence is understood as necessarily implying overtly atheistic mode of Blackamerican religion." that everything an all-powerful God wills to occur must also be desired or pre- Pinn, whose Why Lord? was first published in 1995 and reissued in paper- ferred by God . Similarly, for humans to be possessed of an independent agency back in 1999,45 is even more emphatic than Jones in rejecting all redemptive through which to carry out actions according to their own will is deemed to be a value in black suffering. While he applauds Jones's move to denude God of categorical contradiction of divine omnipotence . Meanwhile, omnibenevolence God's all-determinative power, he sees Jones's manner of reducing God's role is taken to imply a categorical contradiction between good and evil, not simply to that of mere persuasion as effectively retaining the blind commitment to as theoretical concepts but as actual acts/events in the world, ultimately imply- omnibenevolence that he purportedly set out to refute . According to Pinn, the ing a moral objectivism that is wholly (and exclusively) indexed into Blackamer- God of "humanocentric theism" only engages in distinctly positive forms of ican interests .49 These understandings ultimately drive the contention that all persuasion.46 This absolves God of any direct role in sponsoring evil but shies theodicies "virtually silence those who suffer, because their suffering is seen away from identifying God's role in allowing evil. As Pinn puts it, "the actual as good."" As I will show, however, all four schools of classical Sunni theol- acts [of evil] are the result of human misconduct; but who made this miscon- ogy reject this particular notion of omnipotence ." And all of them, to varying duct possible? God."47 degrees, challenge the notion of strict moral objectivism . These and other dif- All of this culminates in Pinn's conclusion that Jones's "humanocen- ferences point up possibilities and alternatives that Jones, Pinn, and the black tric theism" is not a viable option for Blackamericans . In place of this "Weak theologians did not have the advantage of considering . 18 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION ig

J Among the major concerns of this book is to call into question the conten- no ethically defensible place" in a healthy, multicultural social and political tion (explicit in Pinn, more implicit in Jones) that theism, particularly one that Setting-" To be sure, it is not simply race in the abstract from which humans simultaneously embraces divine omnipotence and divine omnibenevolence, must be liberated (we are welcome to remain members of the human race) . It is incapable of sustaining respectable theological answers to the problem of is most urgently a particular concretion of race, namely blackness, and a par- black theodicy and is therefore incompatible with the cause of black libera- ticular concretion of blackness at that, namely the one that denies or impedes tion. My primary focus in this regard will be on Jones . But to the extent that autonomous, individual choice . This is clearly the implication behind Gilroy's he, Pinn, and indeed the black theologians share common understandings of notion that race-thinking strips away human dignity, and it clearly informs his omnipotence and omnibenevolence, what applies to Jones can also be assumed allusion to "authoritarianism" as a by-product of the commitment to race .57 to apply to them . Authoritarianism is even more explicitly the focus of Victor Anderson, whose concept of "ontological blackness" aims precisely at capturing the "cat- egorical, essentialist, and representational languages depicting black life and The Perduring Problem of Blackness : experience ."58 Anderson's complaint is that black identity is at once totalizing, Beyond Ontological Suffering essentialist, and stuck in unresolved tensions between "slavery and freedom, negro and citizen, insider and outsider, black and white, struggle and sur- The problem of black theodicy bears, of course, a direct and obvious relation- vival ."" This corporate identity gives short shrift to the many nuances and eco- ship to the issue of blackness itself. For without blackness, there is no black nomic, educational, occupational, and other differences among blacks . Instead, theodicy. Recent years have witnessed, however, a growing trend among black it ruthlessly binds them all to a uniform, protest-oriented racial orthodoxy that and Blackamerican intellectuals to return to and expand on a thesis articulated is vigilantly policed and backed by the threat of excommunication . All of this many years ago by James Baldwin in which he argued for the abolition of race . adds up to a debilitating denial of what Anderson calls "cultural fulfillment ." Race, according to Baldwin, not only penalized blacks but also blinded whites According to him, the racial solidarity, loyalty, and authenticity connoted by to the lie of their whiteness, which, he insists, never existed before they arrived ontological blackness "conceals, subjugates and calls into question African in America, where they became white via the (im)moral choice of subjugating Americans' interests in fulfilled individuality . 1160 and excluding nonwhites .52 Race, however, was not simply a social construct All of this, according to Anderson, has direct implications for black theol- but part of a pernicious American "social contract" that was ratified and per- ogy (and thus black theodicy) . For to the extent that black theology remains tied petuated by black and white commitments to racialized identities . Ultimately, to ontological blackness, it must remain a discourse "whose mode of existence this condemned America to a racialized game of social, political, and economic is determined by crisis, struggle, resistance, and survival-not thriving, flour- cat and mouse. As Baldwin explained to one of his white interlocutors, "if you ishing or fulfillment ."',' Indeed, according to Anderson, insist on being white, I have no alternative but to be Black ."53 In this capac- in black theology, blackness has become the totality of meaning . It ity, Baldwin saw race as a cheap and deadly opiate that poisoned the souls of cannot point to any transcendent meaning beyond itself without its addicts and robbed them of the joy and truth of what it really meant to be also fragmenting . Because black life is fundamentally determined human. by black suffering and resistance to whiteness . . . black existence is For Baldwin, however, race was more the responsibility of whites than it without the possibility of transcendence from the blackness that was of blacks. After all, whites had the power to define and thus consign others whiteness created .62 to the spaces created or simply left behind by their self-validating definitions . More recently, however, greater onus for the abolition of race has been placed In sum, black theology is grounded in a black experience that is defined by on blacks. This is apparently K. A. Appiah's point when he proclaims, in an suffering and resistance . But this is no longer the experience of most Black- essay directed against W . E . B . DuBois's "illusion of race," "The truth is that americans under what bell hooks calls "post-modern blackness," where, fol- there are no races ."54 And in his recent book Against Race, Paul Gilroy speaks lowing the gains of the civil rights movement, black prerogative has come not only of transcending race and destroying raciology but of "the pursuit of to know few, if any, formal boundaries . Under these conditions, black theol- liberation from race . "55 As he puts it, "the old, modern idea of `race' can have ogy (and thus black theodicy) would seem to lack all practical meaning and 20 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 21 utility." What black theology needs, therefore, is to move beyond ontological In America, white people are not "just humans"; nor did they come to enjoy blackness, that is, to transcend the blackness that whiteness created, and think the privilege and status they enjoy as "just humans ." Whites achieved this as outside the matrix of suffering/liberation as a chief informer of meaning in whites, their whiteness constituting a history and a consciously promoted and black life.64 zealously guarded identity that carried a presumption of authority and nor- While I am alive to many of the ultimate concerns of these thinkers, I do mativeness that blacks (and others) could neither assume nor (for much of not share-certainly not in an American context-their confidence in the their history) earn.68 In this context, white effort, like the presumed propriety of power and efficacy of "racecide ." In fact, my own perspective moves in the white reflexes, has routinely reclined on a set of positive presuppositions about opposite direction, toward the very preservation if not reinforcement of race whites as a group . This pursuit and establishment of institutionalized privilege as the most effective means-at least for the foreseeable future-of forcing need not be viewed as some kind of venereal disease peculiar to American white supremacy out of its camouflage of racelessness that has sustained it whites, as any cursory review of history from the pharaohs to Rwanda will eas- as the "invisible institution" that informs and circumscribes black and white ily demonstrate. But in America, this is and has been our reality . And the dera- American life.GS In my view, race and race-thinking are not the problem . The cialization of whites (and blacks) can only reinforce the intractableness of this problem is, rather, white supremacy and its commitment to racial hierarchy . reality and postpone, if not subvert, efforts to come to terms with it . For com- For it is not race and race-thinking that sustain white supremacy but the very ing to terms with what whiteness has done and can do requires not innocence fact that whites continue to think of and portray themselves as unraced, that is and invisibility but sustained and vigilant recognition . And in this context, my as simply human, and therefore as having the authority to speak for humanity mind moves in the opposite direction of that of Baldwin : I can only cease to be as a whole in ways that raced people cannot . As Richard Dyer observes, "white black by allowing whites to cease to be white . And that can only perpetuate, by people claim and achieve authority for what they say by not admitting, indeed placing beyond critique, the notion that whites are where they are because of not realizing, that for much of the time they speak only for whiteness ."66 And, genius, ingenuity, and hard work while blacks are where they are primarily as Dyer implies, undermining this privilege requires that whites be brought to because of a lack of these . Of course, there are today many blacks who occupy see their whiteness, not simply as a skin color but as a unique and nonreflexive positions that imply genius, ingenuity, and hard work. But even these blacks perspective on the world that is as grounded in history, fear, and the human must ultimately contend with the fact that part of the value and meaning of quest for validation and security as is anyone else's . their achievement-for them as well as for society at large-remains inextrica- I concede that race is a "social construct ." But I am not convinced- bly grounded in the fact of their blackness . scientific insinuations to the contrary notwithstanding-that this is enough In sum, to be American is and always has been to have a racialized identity . to make it "unreal," any more than "manhood," "beauty," or "kindness" are (This is why blacks and whites are the only Americans who are not routinely unreal. Similarly, if whites, of all humans-or at least of all Americans-are asked "Where are you (or your parents) from?") As Henry Adams once summa- "simply human" and unraced, then neither they nor their perspective can be rized the matter, without the clue of race, American history is "a nursery tale ."69 seen as being socially informed; rather, they reflect and assume the status of The way to make sure, however, that race does not unduly privilege or penalize a "natural," transcendent order whose validity and normativeness are obvious any of us is to recognize, monitor, and police-not deny-what race has contrib- to all, save the stupid, the primitive, or the morally depraved . This is the ulti- uted and continues to contribute to who and what we are as Americans. mate ground of a certain privilege of playing Big Brother, not in the popular As for the critique of black theology (and thus black theodicy) specifically, sense of denying private space but in the sense of exercising a certain power of I agree that to the extent that blackness becomes or seeks to become the total- validation, an inscrutable ability to "incentivize" others into seeing the world ity of meaning for Blackamericans, it forfeits access to objective, transcendent in a manner that confirms white sensibilities and interests .G7 This ultimately criteria to guide black action and judgment .70 But this is not the same as the translates into an all-encompassing false universal, where specific (read white) historical experience of blackness serving as the historical ground or context in concretions of beauty, talent, intelligence, patriotism, even danger come to con- which transcendent values-for example, fairness, courage, intelligence, dan- stitute the standard by which everyone must live, and only those who express ger, or the dictates of the Bible or Qur'an-acquire concrete, specific meaning . or recognize these values in these specific concretions are recognized as having In other words, a commitment to blackness can be totalizing in the manner any legitimate claim to them. that Anderson describes . But there is no reason why it has to be. 2 2 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 23

As for the blackness that whiteness created, I am not sure I understand why and without-that are, in a word, beyond ontological suffering. The elusive quest this is any different from the liberalism or individualism or America (or Great for autonomous authenticity, the frustrating recognition of the all-pervasive- Britain) or democracy or "success" that whiteness created . And I am not sure how ness of European thought, the absence of avenues to self-validation and public arriving at a blackness that is uninformed by whiteness would be any less essen- respect over which white Westerners do not ultimately preside as owners, the tialist than the blackness that Anderson critiques . In fact, it seems to me that one suffocating and merciless boundaries of reactionary, misguided, and mildly of the great paradoxes in all of this is that part of the whole value of an alternative hypocritical black orthodoxies-all of these contribute to what we might term to a blackness that whiteness created is the fact that whiteness itself is presumed a postmodern black suffering. Suffering, in other words, at least on this under- to be untreated-certainly by anyone other than whites-such that it might be standing, remains a reality even for postmodern blacks . And if nothing else, seen as constituting a derived as opposed to an original, autonomous identity . this suffering-alongside the plain old ontological suffering that continues to Thus, even in crafting an alternative that purportedly lies beyond ontological plague so many blacks-should go a long way in vindicating and sustaining the blackness, whiteness remains the exemplar to be emulated . And in this capacity, mandate and relevance of black theodicy . whiteness continues to inform, if not create, even "uncreated" blackness . Draconian black orthodoxies are indeed debilitating . But if the problem This book consists of five chapters . In chapter I, I trace the development of is that my individualism is compromised by the fact that whites associate me Muslim theology from its embryonic beginnings to its status as a full-blown, with blacks with whom I do not identify, this is not the doing of black ortho- metacognitive tradition. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to highlight the doxy. If, on the other hand, the problem is that in asserting my individualism extent to which history and societal situatedness informed classical Muslim blacks dissociate me from a construct of belongingness with which I wish to theological discourse . This should go a long way toward vindicating the project remain associated, then I am neither beyond racialized nor collective identities . of placing American reality at the center of Blackamerican Muslim theologi- It is precisely here, however, if I understand him correctly, that Anderson's cal contemplation, not as a transcendent, authoritative source of information notion of ontological blackness begins to shed some of its opaqueness . For the about God but as the plain on which God's self-disclosure assumes concrete problem appears ultimately to be neither racialized nor collective identity per meaning and practical relevance in validatable form. se but the fact that black collective identity has been monopolized by a part of Chapters 2 through 5 are devoted, respectively, to the four classical schools the community-namely, "da brotha on da block"-that uses an authority of of Muslim Theology: Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, Maturidism, and Traditionalism. unknown and questionable provenance to speak for and represent the whole. Here I outline each school's position on omnipotence and omnibenevolence The problem, in other words, is one of black cultural authority." This problem and how they relate to each other, as well as to a number of ancillary issues however, cannot be resolved by simply replacing one act of misrepresentation relating to theodicy and its various corollaries . As is in the nature of such an with another. Imposing a cultural orthodoxy that extols standard English or endeavor, I will not always be able to avoid a certain amount of compression, the Greeks or "flourishing" is apt to prove no less debilitating for some blacks and this may give the impression at times of a higher degree of homogeneity than one that extols hip-hop, "bling," or protest does for others . The fact of the than actually exists in these schools as a whole . What I present, however, is matter is that the uneven gains of the civil rights movement have resulted in what I believe can be safely referred to as the "going opinion" in these schools . disparate modern and postmodern Blackamerican constituencies, all of whom Where I deem it appropriate, I make reference to important details and dissent- jockey for position and ownership within and over the single designation ing views in the notes . "blackness ." In the end, whatever the solution to this dilemma may be, merely Related to this point, a word must be said about my use of the term "Sun- crafting and seeking to impose an alternative (universal) collective identity that nism." Particularly in my references to Mu'tazilism, I will use this term in its goes "beyond ontological blackness" would not seem to be it . 72 very broadest sense, that is, in contradistinction to Shi`ism . Within Sunnism, It is true, and this brings me to my final point, that many blacks are simply however, the Ash'arites, Maturidites, and Traditionalists routinely excluded the beyond and cannot identify with an experience that is grounded in suffering, Mu'tazilites from the designation Ahl al-Sunnah as a formal, concrete theologi- protest, and resistance . But as Anderson's (and others') critique seems to indi- cal marker, while neither categorically excommunicating them as unbelievers cate, even these blacks, who may have moved beyond ontological blackness, nor associating them with Shi`ism-a trend that lasted all the way up to the time continue to battle nagging affronts, limitations, and liminalities-from within that Mu'tazilism faded as a formal movement within Sunnism . Nevertheless, 24 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING INTRODUCTION 25

as I will show, Mu'tazilism figured centrally in the early development of Sunni various ways Muslim theology might offer alternatives to Jones' conclusions theology, and that is why I include Mu'tazilism under the general designation and improve on his proposal . This is all couched in the context of my own cri- "Sunnism." This, however, should be understood as being separate from and tique of Jones . The book ends with a brief conclusion in which I summarize my unrelated to the question of whether the Sunni majority should or should not findings and try to place them in their proper context by offering a few words have excluded the Mu'tazilites from the Ahl al-Sunna . on the limitations of theology as a means of knowing and relating to God . There was, however, one fundamental fault line separating Mu'tazilism While my focus in this book is on the issue of black suffering, it is my hope from the remaining Sunni schools that should be noted, as failure to do so that the broader relevance of the theological questions it raises and treats will could play into certain modern biases and unduly prejudice modern readings . not be lost on my reader . Questions regarding God's omnipotence, and thus Whereas Mu'tazilism inclined toward human autonomy (both in the sense of God's prerogative (moral and ontological), as well as God's omnibenevolence, being able to determine divinely sanctioned value independent of God's dis- and thus the extent to which God's will may or may not conform to humans' closure and of having the independent ability to translate value into action) wishes and expectations, are critically relevant to any number of issues pres- Ash'arism, Maturidism, and Traditionalism all evinced, to varying degrees, ently being debated among Muslim-Americans-from the "gender-jihad" to a deep, if sophisticated, commitment to heteronomy (i .e ., a basic dependence ethics, liberalism, democracy and human rights to Islam and interreligious on God both for value and the ability to translate it into action) . Given the dialogue . In this context, one of the ancillary benefits of this book may be its tendency to privilege the familiar, modern readers might be tempted to place contribution to setting Muslim public religious discourse in America on firmer J Mu'tazilism on this side of the Enlightenment, while viewing the other schools theological footing . as essentially pre-Enlightenment modes of religion (i .e. "fundamentalism") . Finally, no amount of obfuscation could conceal the unavoidably polemi- However inviting, this impulse might be tempered by the thought-particu- cal dimensions of this book . Equally apparent-at least I hope-will be the fact larly relevant for those outside the dominant group-that if humans in general that my perspective on numerous issues has been greatly enriched, as has the can negotiate their relationships with God to the end of conflating their wishes perspective of so many scholars over the years, by the challenge of Professor with what they understand and present as the will of God, this will be all the Jones's work Is God a White Racist? As is in the nature of any work such as this, more possible for the powerful . And this synergy between power and preroga- I have found it necessary to characterize positions, impute motives, and out- tive can result in a religiously sanctioned regime of domination that ultimately right go on the offensive at times . This has all been done in what I hope will be lies beyond criticism and appeal ." recognized as a spirit of scholarly debate in the pursuit of truth and communal Each of the classical schools of Muslim theology must be seen as repre- well-being. Throughout this endeavor, I have tried to be fair and respectful . senting its own vision of the Islamic theological ideal. While there is significant I can only hope-and this is my solemn prayer-that my pen did not get the overlap between them, there is also sizeable disagreement-often expressed in better of me. a polemical tone . These differences, moreover, are often a matter of emphasis, priority, and degree rather than categorical contradiction . This obliges one to recognize that while one might legitimately point to the views of any of these schools as an Islamic position, no single one of them should be taken inde- pendently to represent the Islamic position . At the same time, this sustained disagreement highlights not only the pluralistic nature of premodern Islam but also the extent to which a common commitment to monotheism (tawhid) can sustain palpably divergent perspectives on God and God's relationship to Creation . Following each overview, I place each school in conversation with the cri- tique and proposal of Jones, offering my analysis of how applicable the charge of divine racism and quietism is to their respective theologies, the extent to which they would or could accommodate humanocentric theism, and the I

The Formative Development of Classical Muslim Theology

The Arabians and Atheological "Peripheral Vision"

The rise and development of systematic theology in Islam is inextricably linked to the spread of the religion itself . While Muhammad's original followers undoubtedly contemplated the theological suggestions of the Qur'an alongside his supplemental addenda, the absence of any preexisting systematic thought in Arabia spared them from having to reconcile this with any overarching, formal criterion . Arabian interpretive proclivities tended, rather, to be far more axiomatic than analytical. The meaning and utility of revelation was both accessed and measured by the criterion of Arabian "common sense," a far more relaxed and porous prism than the rigid philosophical schemas that later dominated . Arabian interpretive tendencies might be likened to what the Zen Buddhist scholar Alan Watts calls "peripheral vision," as the alternative to the approach to apprehending meaning that he calls "central vision ." According to Watts,

central vision is used for accurate work like reading, in which our eyes are focused on one small area after another like spotlights . Peripheral vision is less conscious, less bright than the intense ray of the spotlight. We use it for seeing at night, and for taking "subconscious" notice of objects and movements not in the direct line of central vision .' 28 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 29

Peripheral vision contrasts with central vision precisely in its limited utility for immediate heirs . It is also reflected in the substance of the occasional theologi- such "accurate work like reading ." By "reading," however, we must understand cal exchanges that did take place . For example, it is reported that the Successor something more than simple exegesis, or the mechanical decoding of words, (Tabii) Masruq was once at the home of the Prophet's widow, A'ishah, when grammar, and syntax . Reading-and certainly "accurate" reading-is invari- she said to him, "0 Abu A'ishah, there are three things that a person may ably an effort to make sense of what is being read . The criterion for what consti- utter that constitute abominable lies against God ." Masruq asked, "What are tutes "sense" itself, however, is rarely provided by the words themselves and is these?" A'ishah replied, "Whoever claims that Muhammad [actually] saw his almost invariably brought to a text or statement from without.' This goes beyond Lord invents an abominable lie against God ." At this, Masruq sat up from his the simple issue of context ; for all who are present at the time of a speech-act reclining position and petitioned, "0 Mother of the believers, be patient with have access to context, and even those who are not present habitually construct me and do not rush me, but did not God The Exalted say, `And he saw Him at or imagine one of their own . Yet, Americans who are contemporaries of Toni the clear horizon [81 :231,' and `And he saw Him at another station' L53 :13]? To Morrison or trained in American history are not automatically rendered capa- this A'ishah replied: ble of effecting "proper" readings of The Bluest Eye or the U .S . Constitution . "Proper" readings of these texts require, rather, an adequate grasp of law or I am the first of this Community to ask the Messenger of God about literature as proper disciplines. this, God's blessings and salutations be upon him. And he said, `This All of this is another way of saying that what is usually considered to be was Gabriel; I never saw him in the form in which he was created "accurate reading" relies on a set of interpretive presuppositions that are closed except on these two occasions . . . . Did you not hear God's statement, to all save the formally initiated . In this capacity, "proper reading" always "Vision apprehends Him not while He apprehends [all] vision, and He is The Subtle, the All-Informed" [6 :1031? And did you not hear entails an element of eisegesis, or reading a certain amount of meaning into a God's statement, "It is not fitting that God should address a human, text. Central vision is critical to this enterprise precisely because it begins with [wahy] a much more attentive and purposeful eye to the particular "regime of sense" except through undetectable communication or from behind with which a text is to be reconciled . This is not to say that peripheral vision a veil or by way of sending a messenger who transmits, by His is inherently less effective-or even less interested-in this reconciliation pro- permission, what He wills of undetectable communication . Verily He is Most High, All-Wise" 142 ?4 cess . Peripheral vision is simply more at home with regimes of sense that are :51] less rigid, precise, and systematic . It negotiates, in other words, not with strict Clearly, Masruq's approach to the verses he cited was grounded in a straightfor- logical premises and propositions but with the intuitive meanings and putative ward reading that rested on the dictates of Arabian common sense, including consensus that is the basis of common sense . What peripheral vision sacri- a palpable obliviousness to the kinds of theological implications (e.g., anthro- fices in terms of precision, detail, and counterintuitive possibilities it makes up pomorphism) that would later exercise the theologians. Meanwhile, A'ishah's through an unencumbered apprehension of plain meanings and operative gist. response also implies a common-sense understanding of Qur'anic and Pro- Indeed, according to Watts, one of peripheral vision's most important uses is phetic sources that had apparently escaped Masruq . For her, the possibility of for attaining "that `knowledge of reality' which we try to attain by the cumber- the Prophet's seeing God was limited not by any preexisting regime of sense some calculations of theology, metaphysics and logical inference ." 3 or set of philosophical principles but by a straightforward reading of the teach- Central and peripheral vision operate side by side in modern Western soci- ings of the Prophet himself, teachings whose primary authority lay not in their eties . Given our high rates of literacy and formal education, however, central substance but in their provenance . vision tends almost invariably to dwarf peripheral vision, certainly in the public On a more popular level, one could cite an exchange between the Prophet sphere, where competing interpretations must negotiate with each other . The and a bedouin convert. In response to the Prophet's statement "God laughs at Arabians, meanwhile, were an unlettered people whose basic interpretive sche- the way you come upon hardship, fall into despair and then so quickly respond mas neither required nor included any systematic central vision to prepare the to the slightest relief," the bedouin is reported to have asked, "And does our way for sophisticated feats of semantic reconciliation . Lord actually laugh?" When the Prophet responded "Yes," the bedouin replied : This depiction of the Arabians is confirmed by the seeming paucity of theo- We will never despair of good from a Lord who laughs ."5 Again, the possibil- logically relevant exchanges among the Prophet's contemporaries and them I J. t)' of God's laughing here is not controlled by any tightly regulated system of

30 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 31 reason or regime of philosophical sense . The interpretive backdrop is a much clear indictment of the kind of linguistic formalism and "morphomania" that more porous edifice that admits a wide range of possibilities whose actualiza- would later characterize theology (and law) . He points out that the Arabians tion is established or disestablished by a straightforward, common-sense con- recognized that operative meaning often transcended individual words and struction of Prophetic teaching . was thus more effectively apprehended through (what I have termed) periph- The idea that the Arabians were unencumbered by any formal philosophical eral vision . This was a corollary, incidentally, to the Arabians' lack of the kind or logical regime of sense is reinforced by several medieval Muslims thinkers . of uncompromising commitment to verbatim recall that later dominated . Among the most emphatic in this regard is perhaps the eighth/fourteenth- According to al-Shatibi, the Arabians were quite unperturbed by dialectical and century Spanish reformer Ibrahim b . Musa al-Shatibi (d . 790/1388), who went other minor substitutions in the Qur'an, hadith or poetry, as long as these did so far as to make the normative claim that shan`ah (Islamic law and theology) is not significantly cloud or detract from operative meanings ." In fact, he notes, an "unlettered" (ummi) discourse.' Writing well after the establishment of the precision, neatness, and too much care could actually detract from the overall classical schools of thought, al-Shatibi was fully aware of the towering edifice value of a speech-act . Thus, he cites the literary critic al-Asma`i (d . 212/828), of Muslim intellectual output . His point, however, was that much of this tradi- who criticized the early poet al-Hutay'ah (d . 54/ 674) for his verbal punctilious- tion lay beyond the reach of the average worshipper and constituted, as such, a ness: "I found his poetry to be all polished, which indicated that he had [care- betrayal of the shart`ah's normative character . His characterization of sharti`ah fully] crafted it. Natural poets do not do this . They simply let their words fly as "unlettered," in other words, was less a descriptive than a prescriptive asser- with abandon, the good with the bad ." 11 tion, which he grounded in his understanding of the primordial orientation of For al-Shatibi, all of this translated into the propriety of interpreting scrip- the Arabian recipients-cum-custodians of revelation . ture in a manner that yielded meanings that were equally accessible to the By "unlettered," al-Shatibi was referring precisely to the absence of any lettered and unlettered alike . 12 With specific reference to theology, he notes intellectual traditions or scholarly disciplines that might endow the Arabians that "gratuitously exploring the depths of meaning [ta `ammuq] and delving into with formal, systematic interpretive presuppositions with which they would matters that the masses are not equally prepared to understand is a violation seek to reconcile scripture . Commenting on the hadith of the Prophet, "I was of the aims of the unlettered shan`ah."13 Indeed, in his opinion, this tendency sent to an unlettered [ummi] community," al-Shatibi points out that the toward gratuitous delving, which often resulted in affected and counterintui- Arabians tive interpretations, was the root of most, if not all, schism in Islam ." Whether or not one takes al-Shatibi at face value, there can be little doubt ill had no knowledge of the sciences of the ancients [`ulum al-agdamin] . i that the Arabians were far more attuned to a habitual reliance on peripheral Indeed, the term ummi takes its meaning from the word umm vision and common-sense constructions than to any tightly focused analytical [mother], inasmuch as it refers to one who remains in the state in gaze. By the middle of the second/eighth century, however, the Muslim con- which his or her mother bore him or her, not having learned to quests had engendered a process of ethnic and civilizational heterodyning that write or anything else. Thus, the ummi is one who remains in the generated a fundamental shift in the interpretive orientation of critical masses primordial state in which he or she was born.? of Arab (to be distinguished from Arabian) Muslims . In relying on peripheral Al-Shatibi confirms the axiomatic, "unlettered" approach of the Arabians by vision, the original Arabians had simply been doing what comes naturally . So, reference to several tendencies he detects among them . He cites, for example, too, however, would growing numbers of newly converted Arabicized peoples an incident involving the Companion and second caliph, 'Umar I, who on recit- who were the heirs of far more systematic and analytical regimes of sense . ing the verse "wafakihatan wa abban" ("and fruits and ? pastures") is reported The resulting dissonance in their respective reconciliation strategies divided to have asked, "What is abban?" Before anyone could answer, 'Umar preemp - Muslim theologians into two main camps : Traditionalism and Rationalism . tively interjected, "We have not been charged with [delving into the likes of] Ultimately, this division would determine the course and substance of Muslim

I II this."8 In another example, 'Umar is said to have harshly rebuked a man for theological history and remain operative right down to the present day . asking questions about isolated, difficult vocabulary in the Qur'an .9 Contrary to common depictions," the fault line separating these two In the same context, al-Shatibi notes that it was not the Arabians' habit to theological approaches did not lie in each giving a different priority to reason obsess over individual words as the key to apprehending meaning . This was a (al-`aql) versus revelation . Rationalists were no less committed to revelation, 32 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 33 or even tradition, than were Traditionalists ; and Traditionalists were no more To get an idea of the diversity and complexity of the arteries that flowed averse to using reason than were Rationalists .l6 It is more accurate to say that into the new, hybrid Arabness, consider the Arab conquest of Samarqand in these two approaches represented not two different attitudes toward reason Transoxiana, which began in the first/seventh century . This city lay at the inter- but two different traditions of reason. The conflict, in other words, was not section of the trade routes that led from India and Afghanistan, via Balkh and over how much authority to accord reason or revelation per se but over which Tirmidh, and from Persia, via Marw, northward and eastward into the Turkish regime of sense should govern the act of reading revelation . In sum, tradition- steppes and along the Silk Road to eastern Turkistan and China . This gen- alism and Rationalism parted over which universe of meanings should be eral area had known Hellenism for some time (Alexander the Great occupied recognized as the proper backdrop against which scripture should be made Samargand more than once) and boasted Buddhist, Nestorian Christian, Zoro- to make sense . astrian, Chinese, and Manichaean inhabitants." After the Arab conquest, the All of this would be further obscured by a barely perceptible parallel devel- area produced a number of important Muslim "Arab" scholars, including Abu opment : the distention of the designation "Arab ." This had the effect of con- Mansur al-Maturidi (d . 333/944), founder of the Maturidite school of theol- cealing the palpably different interpretive legacies bequeathed to those who ogy, and Muhammad b. Ismd'il al-Bukhari (d. 256/870), collector of the most began versus those who ended their genealogy as "Arabs ." As this term made authoritative body of Prophetic traditions .' This kind of progression ofArabiza- no distinction between those for whom peripheral and central vision came nat- tion recurred in virtually all the lands where Islam burgeoned . urally and those for whom they were contrived, its use obscured the fact that But the new Muslims' adoption of the Arabic language would not be scripture was being approached by peoples who were now all considered Arabs enough to sublate all the cultural, intellectual and other legacies their respec- but who proceeded on the basis of different and, ultimately, competing regimes tive histories had bequeathed them. These influences, however, rather than of sense . To this would be added the masterfully executed "rhetoric of transcen- persisting as the result of a conscious effort to bring in contributions from dence" (discussed in the final section of this chapter), which both Rational- Hellenism, Buddhism, or Zoroastrianism, would simply continue to enjoy a ist and Traditionalist theology employed with the deliberate aim-unlike the prima facie presumption of legitimacy, much like "democracy," "capitalism," unintentional effect of distending the term "Arab"-of concealing the histori- or "racial equality" among American converts . In other words, people did cally informed specificities of the various regimes of sense that governed their not generally think of these influences as conscious "borrowings" but simply respective modalities of interpretation . assumed that they were as valid under Islam as they had been under the old order.20 This presumption rendered these influences invisible for many and effectively raised them beyond critique . Muhammad b. Idris Al-Shafi`I and the Arabian versus In sum, many nouveaux Arabes naturally sought to reconcile scripture the Arab Regime of Sense with a regime of sense that included elements that were both unknown and unbecoming to the original Arabians, as well as those who followed their cue. In his book Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period, Richard Bulliett points Nowhere, perhaps, would the resulting conflict play out with more force and out that the central Arab lands of Islam did not become majority Muslim until urgency than in the campaign of Muhammad b . Idris al-Shafi`I (d . 204/820), centuries after the initial Muslim conquests ." The glacial pace of religious con- eponymous leader of one of the four Sunni schools of law . version was paralleled, however, by a much faster and more widespread phe- Early in its history, Sunni Islam consciously decided not to mediate inter- nomenon of Arabization . Massive numbers of people in Egypt, North Africa, pretive disputes through a centralized ecclesiastical authority ." The only the Fertile Crescent, Greater Iraq, Iran, and Transoxania adopted Arabic as binding interpretive authority would be the ijma` (Unanimous Consensus) of their primary language and became Arabs . This had obvious implications for the community of recognized interpreters . Disputed doctrines on which the the enterprise of reading and negotiating the meanings of scripture . But much community did not reach ijma` had to be left, ceteris paribus, to the market of of this diversity would be camouflaged by the use of the all-inclusive designa- debate. This provision, via the possibility-indeed inevitability-of multiple, tion "Arab," which promoted the image, tacitly confirmed by modern scholar- even mutually exclusive, claims to doctrinal correctness, laid the foundation ship, of the Arabs as a historically and ideationally undifferentiated group or for a broadly recognized intellectual freedom . On the other hand, it virtually even a "race ." guaranteed the existence of substantively repugnant and facile views .22

ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 34 THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 35

It was in this context, as the gates of religious and ethnolinguistic conver- to be trusted and deferred to, by virtue of an inscrutable insight they have into sion were flung off the hinges, that al-Shafi'i wrote his al-Risalah (The Epistle) . their language, regardless of whatever other linguistic possibilities might seem This work is widely accepted as the first conscious commitment to a systematic to inhere in the words themselves . For, according to al-Shafi`I, theory of interpretation that could serve as the "public reason" through which scriptural deductions could be validated . It was not an exercise in ecumenical God addressed revelation to the Arabs in their language, according relativism in which al-Shafi`I sought recognition for any and every interpretive to what they understood of the meanings imparted by that language . approach. On the contrary, he was deeply troubled by what he deemed to be And among those things they knew of their language was the interpretive viruses whose influence was going undetected because they had multiplicity of ways in which meaning could be conveyed . Indeed, been sublated into the realm of "plain speech" or "common sense" by peoples it was part of their primordial nature [fitra] that . . . they might speak whose language was now that of the Arabians but whose historically and cul- of a thing and identify it only in terms of the meaning that attaches turally determined interpretive presuppositions were emphatically not . To be to it, without resorting to a specific word for it, just as people do sure, al-Shafii was not the first to recognize this distinction . It had already with physical gestures . And this could be the highest form of speech been captured in (among other statements) a remark by Abu 'Amr b . al-`Ala' among them, inasmuch as only those who are versed in this [i.e., (d. 154/770), the famed philologist and focal figure of one of the seven canoni- their language] could engage in it, to the exclusion of those who are cal recitations of the Qur'an . Addressing the proto-Mu'tazilite 'Amr b . 'Ubayd ignorant of it." (d. 144/761), Abu 'Amr protested, "You are a non-Arab [a jami], not in your In sum, from al-Shafii's perspective, words alone-language in the restricted language but in your understanding."23 Al-Shafi`I, however, was apparently the sense-could not tell the whole story . On the contrary, interpretive presup- first to factor this insight into a systematic theory of scriptural interpretation . positions invariably informed the process of decoding meaning . For al-Shafi`I, Al-Shafii points out that scripture routinely conveys meanings that are this did not translate into a desire to purge all presuppositions from the pro- clear and relatively univocal "among those in whose language the Qur'an was cess of interpretation . Rather, he wanted to ensure that the primordial presup- revealed" (even if some of these meanings may be clearer than others) . The positions of the Arabs-or more precisely the Arabians!-would hold sway same verses, he says, may generate disputes among peoples who are "ignorant over the composite Persian, Indian, Central Asian, and Hellenistic regimes of of the language of the Arabs ."24 He reminds his readers that revelation was sent sense that the now Arabic-speaking heirs of Late Antiquity were carrying over in the Arabic tongue and insists that only those who are versed in its linguistic and that the new intellectual atmosphere of the conquered territories was conventions can hope to navigate their way through it . He unabashedly asserts spawning. For al-Shafii, the greatest threat was that the primordial orienta- the linguistic superiority of the Arabs, as well as his belief that non-Arabs tion of the Arabians would lose pride of place in a veritable interpretive free- must follow, not lead, the Arabs . (al-'ajam) for-all among those who now spoke Arabic but had not necessarily internalized The most prominent people in terms of language are those whose primordial Arabian presuppositions . language is that of the Prophet . And it is not permissible-and God This understanding of al-Shafi`I is confirmed by another work of his on knows best-for the people of his language to be followers of the Positive law, his famous al- Umm (The Mother-Text), in which in several places people of another language in a single letter. On the contrary, all other he takes up controversial questions and sets out to resolve them . As a prolegom- languages are to take their place of subservience to his language ." enon to his resolutions proper, however, he makes the conspicuously odd but Profoundly telling assertion "This is the language of the Arabs" ("wa huwa lisan It is important to note-and this is the crux of the matter here-that by "lan- `arabi"), or "This is Arabic speech ("wa hadha kalam `arabi").27 For example: guage" al-Shafii means something significantly broader than vocabulary, grammar, and syntax. He is referring to a certain psychological at-homeness Someone said to me, "What do you say regarding a man whose life, with non-reflexive ways of knowing and communicating that accrue to the property, or family is physically threatened?" I [al-Shafii] responded, Arabs by virtue of their participation in a common social, cultural, material, "He may defend himself." He then asked, "And if he is unable to and psychological history. Even when the Arabs are unable to identify why or do so except through fighting?" I said, "Then, he may fight ." He liil,l~lf.,, l; how they understaiid an expression in a particular way, their understanding is asked, "Even if such fighting should result in his or the aggressor's 36 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 37

death?" I said, "Yes, if there is no other way to defend himself ." Weiss has called "exotericism" : the principle that the only valid interpretive [The questioner goes on to ask what al-Shafii means by "no other proofs are ones that are grounded in sources and arguments that exist in the way," and al-Shaft i gives him several examples . Then the questioner public domain and are thus equally accessible to all ." On this criterion, subjec- says:] "Has not Hammad related on the authority of Yahya b . Said tive hunches, epiphanies, and the like are all banned from consideration . In on the authority of Abu Umamah b . Sahl b. Hunayf that `Uthman such a context, whatever inscrutable insights the Arabians might have into the b. 'Affan said, `The Prophet, God's blessing and salutations be upon meaning of revelation would have to be extracted from the realm of subjective him, said, "It is not permissible to kill a Muslim except for three consciousness, packaged in the guise of objective language, and presented as reasons: apostasy, adultery or in retaliation for murder (of a family the plain dictates of revelatory speech . This was the beginning (and the whole member)"?"' I said, "The hadith of `Uthman is as he related, and his point, as I will show) of the reign of linguistic formalism whose most egregious attribution to the Prophet that the latter said, `It is not permissible to effects al-Shatibi (who insisted that shan`ah was an "unlettered" discourse) kill a Muslim except for three reasons,' is as he related it . But now, would later seek to reverse . this is Arabic speech [wa hadha kalamun `arabiyun] ." (al-Umm 4:223) Demographically, Arabicized, non-Arab Muslims were rapidly becoming the majority, including the majority of the custodians of the religious sciences . Of From here, al-Shafii goes on to reconcile this hadith with his previously cited the focal transmitters of the seven canonical recitations (gira'at/s . gira'ah) of the responses . Qur'an, only two, Abu `Amr b . al-`Ala' and `Abd Allah b . `Amir (d. 118/736), were To be sure, the entire text of al- Umm is written in Arabic . It is inconceivable, of original Arabian stock ." All of the compilers of the six canonical collections therefore, that al-Shafii could have been directing these statements-"This is of hadith were born and raised in Turko-Persian Greater Khurasan, and of these the language of the Arabs," "This is Arabic speech"-to Greek, Aramaic, or apparently only one, Muslim b . al-Hajjaj, was of Arabian origins ." To this were Persian speakers whom he might have assumed were ignorant of this fact . In added Arabicized non-Arab contributions to the critical apparatus undergirding point of fact, al-Shafii's statement was directed at Arabic-speaking non-Arabs the religious sciences, a fact that was widely recognized and was neatly summa- (al-`ajam). Its purpose was to alert them to the fact that as Arabic speakers they rized by the celebrated historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun (d . 8o8/I4o6) : might think that they had fully grasped the meaning of these words, but as The carriers of the Islamic religious sciences were [Arabicized] non- peoples who descended from non-Arabian backgrounds, there remained a Arabs [al-`ajam], or at least most of them were . As for the rational universe of semantic possibility that lay beyond their casual gaze . It was thus sciences [al-`ulum al-`agliyah], they did not appear in this Community proper, in negotiating the meaning of Qur'anic or Prophetic speech, for such until after the carriers and authors of knowledge distinguished people to defer to the interpretive insights of the Arabians . themselves and these sciences became established as serious Al- Shafii descended from the royal tribe of Quraysh, hailing on his father's vocations, at which time [Arabicized] non-Arabs also became the side, in fact, from the Prophet's sister clan of Banu al-Muttalib .28 The purity main representatives thereof." and power of his Arabic was legendary, and his recognition of the role of Ara- bian nativism in preserving the integrity of Islam was unrelenting . His subtle The writings on interpretive theory that followed the death of al-Shafii clearly deconstruction of the conflation between Arab and Arabian was nothing short show that these Arabicized non-Arab theoreticians consciously infused the of brilliant . Yet (and one should not overindulge one's modern, particularly Islamic religious sciences with a palpable strain of linguistic formalism . In American, sensibilities here) his thesis suffered a fundamental weakness . In both jurisprudence and theology, meaning was reduced, ceteris paribus, to the underscoring the interpretive perspicacity of the Arabians, he not only privi- observable features of language : morphology, grammar, syntax ." In fact, in leged their primordial presuppositions but effectively placed them beyond cri- its speculative mode, theology itself came to be known as ilm al-kalam: liter- tique, as a subjective universe of insights to which outsiders had no access . ally, "the science of words," in abbreviated form simply al-kalam. The aim of This went against the grain of both the ideological and the demographic trends this approach was almost certainly to limit if not eliminate the influence of of the times. subjective biases, historically informed endowments, and ideologically driven Ideologically, and perhaps in conscious opposition to the kind of nativism presuppositions. In other words, by denying, at least in theory, a role to sub- al-Shafii articulated, Sunnism was moving in the direction of what Bernard jective judgments, all interpreters would be effectively reduced to the role of 11

38 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 39

mechanical decoders. This was meant to have the effect of leveling the playing the very next page, al-Bazdawi acknowledges that the Prophet's Companions field between Arabians, Arabs, and even non-Arabs, by rendering scriptural never engaged in speculative theology and that the only justification for learn- intent accessible to all who had mastered the formalistic methods enshrined ing this science was the current changed environment in which people cast in the newly established interpretive disciplines of systematic jurisprudence aspersions on the religion and posed new challenges to it ." Meanwhile, the (usul al figh) and theology (`ilm al-kalam) . This development set the stage for an Traditionalist Ibn Taymiya (d . 728/1328) authored an entire five volumes, Dar' interpretive egalitarianism in which everyone had equal access to the sources ta`arud al-`aql wa al-nagl (Averting Contradiction Between Reason and Revela- and 6 and methods from which religious knowledge was derived, on the basis of tion), dedicated explicitly to highlighting Traditionalism's consistency with rea- which the historically informed interpretive presuppositions of everyone would son and rationality ."' be equally proscribed . Nowhere is Rationalism's rhetoric of transcendence executed with more force than in its most fundamental and enduring charge against Tradition- alism : anthropomorphism . In Muslim theological discourse, anthropomor- Traditionalism and Rationalism : The Rhetoric of Transcendence phism was not the mere attribution of human characteristics to God ; it was and the False Detente the affirmation that accidents (a'rad/s . `arad)-for example size, motion, shape, color-inhered in the divine essence ." Far from being grounded, however, in This was, at least, the theory . In reality, preexisting presuppositions might be what may be considered "plain" or "natural" reason, Rationalist constructions artfully camouflaged, or even altered ; but it would be difficult, if not impos- of anthropomorphism were indebted to specific appropriations of Aristotle ." sible, to, eliminate them . In this light, both Traditionalism and Rationalism Ultimately, the power and seamlessness of the identification of reason with attempted to conceal the contributions of secular history to their interpretive what was essentially an Islamicized Aristotelianism obscured the fact that out- perspectives by resorting to what I call a rhetoric of transcendence .34 Ratio- side this very specific regime of sense, it would be perfectly possible to recon- nalism, whose operative regime of sense was grounded in the Aristotelian cile ostensibly anthropomorphic doctrines with the dictates of "plain" or even and other Middle Eastern and Central Asian categories, pursued this aim by formal reasoning . masterfully conflating "reason" (`aql) with the composite system of logic per- Perhaps the simplest way to demonstrate this point is by means of an colating in the lands of Late Antiquity . On this filiation, only those who paid insight provided by the American philosopher-theologian Charles Hartshorne, homage to a particular "Islamicized" construction of primarily Aristotelian one of the leaders of a movement known as Process Theology (or process the- logic were justified in making any claims to reason-reason being, of course, ism) . Recognizing the relationship between Christian theology and Aristotle, or so it was implied, transcendent of all particular histories . Traditionalists, Hartshorne began with a critique of the Aristotelian obsession with "being" meanwhile, pursued the concealment of historically informed presuppostions or "existence" as the ultimate concern of theology ." In place of being, Hart- by explicitly claiming that Traditionalist understandings reflected "the way of shorne substituted (following Alfred North Whitehead and others) "becoming" the Pious Ancestors," thus imputing a certain sempiternal fidelity to their point or "process" as a more realistic representation of reality . This brought him of view. The implication, in other words, was that Traditionalist doctrine, how- to a rereading of Aristotle, with the most important (for my purposes) result ever removed chronologically from that of the first generation of Muslims, was being a whole new range of possibilities in the relationship between reason and ideationally uninformed by all intervening history ." anthropomorphism . To be sure, these were not mutually exclusive claims . Over time, Ratio- Beginning with the Aristotelian categories "necessary," "contingent," nalists and Traditionalists alike eventually sought to confer upon themselves and "impossible," (i.e., wajib, mumkin, muhal)-with which students of the benefits of both . Thus, for example, the Maturidite Rationalist Abu al-Yusr Muslim Rationalist theology are all too familiar-Hartshorne pointed out al-Bazdawi (d . 493/1099) assured the readers of his Usul al-din (Foundations of that in reality, "necessary" is indistinguishable from "always" and that it is Religion) that whoever stuck to its contents would be on the path of "the Party only because B always follows A or that B never follows A that we can speak of of Sunna and Communal Cohesion" (Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jama`ah) and that the causal relationship between them as "necessary" or "impossible ." Time, "this is the way of the Prophet, God's blessings and salutations be upon him, in other words, not space (or "being," as some sort of third dimension), was his Companions and the righteous after them ."36 This is despite the fact that on JI riIi ,IJ'I a the true ground from which such statements derived their meaning . On this 40 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 41 understanding, a "necessary" event or being would be one whose existence- presuppositions informed their interpretations . Their claim was simply that the as a necessary event or being-could only be established after the passing of right presuppositions informed this process-that their regime of sense was an infinity of time. As such, a necessary event or being must be in a con- identical to that of the Prophet and the generation whose reality had formed stant state of becoming, since it cannot outlast an infinity of time and its very the context in which revelation assumed normative meanings . In other words, necessary-ness preempts the possibility of its nonexistence . Put differently, a Traditionalism saw (and sees) itself as the custodian of "transcendent" mean- necessary event or being must always exist and always be in a state of becom- ing, that is, meaning uninformed by any history, save the normative history of ing, as time itself progresses toward infinity . On this analysis, Hartshorne the period of revelation and the first three or so generations of sacred history insisted, "becoming," not "being," was the true basis of Aristotle's logical cat- following that .45 egories .42 From here he went on to construct a theology based on the process At bottom, the Traditionalist charge against Rationalism was that it consti- of becoming, whence the term "Process Theology ." tuted an unsanctioned innovation (bid'ah) that introduced meanings and meth- But if "becoming," which Muslim Rationalists unanimously held to be ods of derivation that were alien to the tradition of the Prophet and his original an accident, is admitted as the basis of both the "necessary" and the "eter- followers . This implied, of course-and this is the crux of the matter-that nal," then the meaning of "anthropomorphism" would have to be radically Traditionalists were themselves mere transmitters of normative doctrine whose altered, if indeed it retained any meaning at all . For on such an understand- substance was uninformed by any new, historically grounded ideas, experi- ing, there would be no contradiction between God being necessary and ences, or insights . eternal and God being characterized by such accidents as mounting (the Perhaps the simplest way to draw back the curtain on Traditionalist rheto- Throne), descending (to the lower heavens), or actually having a hand-all ric is through an insight from the Ghanaian scholar Kwame Gyekye . In his Traditionalist doctrines that Rationalists categorically condemned as bla- book Tradition and Modernity : Philosophical Reflections on the African Experi- tantly anthropomorphic." ence," Gyekye grapples with the problem of how to reconcile the concept of None of this should distract us from my main point here, which is not to modernity with the concept of tradition in such a way that the assumed incom- vindicate Traditionalist doctrine or favor Hartshorne over traditional under- patibility between the two might be reduced and traditional African societies standings of Aristotle .44 My point is simply to highlight the distinction between might be able to adopt certain aspects of modernity in good conscience . To this reason and particular constructions of reason . For this distinction clarifies the end, in a chapter entitled "Tradition and Modernity," Gyekye sets out to expose difference between Traditionalist doctrines being "unreasonable" and their how greatly a fundamental misunderstanding of tradition itself has exagger- simply being inconsistent with a Rationalist regime of sense . Indeed, on ated the polarity between tradition and modernity . Hartshorne's regime of sense-clearly just as grounded in reason as that of Beginning with several scholarly definitions of "tradition" (from the Latin the Muslim Rationalists-it might be as reasonable to affirm the doctrine of tradere, "hand over"), Gyekye notes that all of them revolve around the con- God mounting the Throne, descending to the lower heavens or creating the first cept of transmission or a simple handing down-for example, Harry B . Acton: human with God's hand, as it would be to negate them or explain them away "a belief or practice transmitted from one generation to another and accepted through figurative or allegorical interpretation. as authoritative or deferred to, without argument" ; Edward Shils : "anything In sum, Muslim Rationalism was heir to a concrete and very specific tradi- which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present" ; Samuel tion of formal reasoning . To those who inherited or later subscribed to this tra- Fleischacker : "a set of customs passed down over the generations, and a set of dition, its method may have come so naturally and the results of its application beliefs and values endorsing those customs ."47 Gyekye points out that these def- may have appeared so incontrovertible that nonreason or irrationality appeared initions are all problematic, inasmuch as they fail to recognize the fundamental to be the only imaginable alternative. This, at least, was the ideological position difference between transmitting beliefs and practices to future generations and of the Muslim Rationalists . And this would ultimately sustain the stigma and merely placing them at the present generation's disposal. This is critical, in that stereotype of fideism and opposition to reason as the hallmarks of Traditional- the operative element in both establishing and sustaining a tradition is not the ist thought . handing down but the preservation of beliefs and practices . For a tradition is As for the Traditionalists, who emphatically rejected the primacy of the formed or perpetuated only if what is handed down is actually preserved (and Islamicized AristotcIian regime of sense, they did not deny that extrascriptural according to Gyekye, for several generations) ." 42 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 43

Even more important-and here Gyekye parts most fundamentally with counterattempt to impute Prophetic origins to its Islamicized Aristotelianism . his predecessors-the enterprise of preservation cannot be carried out by the In light of this weakness, Traditionalism takes on the appearance of being the transmitting generation but can only be executed by the receiving or custo- ,,natural" interpretive approach that is both present and operative prior to any dial one . For any number of reasons, the custodial generation may choose to intentional act of acquisition. This "virtual primordialness," as it were, goes a abandon, modify, or supplement what it receives . This process of preserving, long way in explaining Traditionalism's success in standing up to the more abandoning, or modifying entails in turn an act of evaluation, which, Gyekye rigorous and sophisticated arsenal of Muslim Rationalism . It also contributes reiterates, would be irrelevant were tradition merely what is handed down to Blackamerican Sunni Muslims' palpable attraction to Traditionalist theology from the past ." On this understanding, he redefines tradition as "any cultural (now in the form of Salafism) . As J. Deotis Roberts points out, "the Platonic- product that was created or pursued by past generations and that, having been Aristotelian logical and metaphysical tradition is alien to th[e] Black religious accepted and preserved, in whole or in part, by successive generations, has tradition."52 Thus, Traditionalism comes to constitute the theological default been maintained to the present."" mode for perhaps the majority of Blackamerican Muslims . In sum, tradition is not the result of the simple act of transmission or None of this should direct attention away from the fact that Traditionalism handing down but of a process of evaluation, amplification, suppression, refine- and Rationalism are identical in their tendency to conceal or overlook the role ment, and assessing the polarity between would-be tradition and contempo- of historically informed presuppositions in their respective interpretive tradi- rary, indigenous innovations or nonindigenous ideas and practices . Moreover, tions. Nowhere does this emerge with more force and clarity, perhaps, than in as long as no essential elements are deemed to have been sacrificed in this the debate over divine speech, kalam Allah, one of the most controversial and process of reception, the result will be a tradition that while only a simulacrum seminal issues in the entire history of Muslim theology . of the original is vested with all the authority of having resulted from a direct As is known, the Rationalist Mu'tazilites argued that the Qur'an was cre- act of handing down . In other words, regardless of their actual origin, as long ated. Their opponents, the Rationalist Ash'arites and MaturIdites, along with as a set of ideas or practices receives endorsement from the custodial genera- the Traditionalists, insisted that it was the uncreated word of God . Back of all of tion, it will enjoy the full status and authority of authentic tradition, despite its this was the question of whether speech itself was an essential aspect of God's inclusion of elements unknown to the founding generation . nature (sifat dhat), which would make it sempiternal, or a nonessential, per- Here is where Gyekye's notion of critical evaluation and selective endorse- formative trait (sifat frl) that would place it among God's actions, that occurred ment sheds meaningful light on the claims of Muslim Traditionalism . For Tra- in time and space, for example the creation of the universe . The Mu'tazilites ditionalism seems to affirm that from the time of the Prophet's death all the insisted on the latter, their opponents on the former. way down to the founding of the Traditionalist movement, the regime of sense When we examine, however, the substance and application of the criteria handed down from generation to generation has remained unmodified and has for determining which traits are essential and which performative, we find pre- absorbed nothing from the repertoire of indigenous innovations or nonindige- scriptural and extrascriptural history playing a determinative role. In his impor- nous ideas and practices . This may be the ideological position implied or asserted tant work Tabsirat al-adillah, the MaturIdite theologian Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafi by some. But even the arch-Traditionalist Hanbalites showed clear signs of selec- (d. 508/1114) describes these criteria in the following terms : tive endorsement . For example, in his account of the (in)famous Inquisition (Mih- na), the famed historian al-Tabari (d. 310/923) notes that when Ahmad b. Hanbal They [the Mu`tazilites] say that the difference between the two is that (d. 241/855), the patron saint of Traditionalism, was first asked to respond to the that which can be asserted and cannot be denied [ma yuthbat wa la caliph al-Ma`mun's letter asserting the createdness of the Qur'an, he replied : "It is yajuz nafyuh] is an essential trait . Thus, it is said, "God knows such the word of God. I have nothing to add beyond this" ("huwa kalam Allah la azidu and such." But it is not said, "God does not know such and such ." `alayha") . 51 In time, however, the standard position of the Hanbalite school came And it is said, "God has the capacity to do such and such." But it is to be that the Qur'an is emphatically the untreated word of God, a position with not said, "God does not have the capacity to do such and such ." It is which Ibn Hanbal himself would be identified . said, "God sees so and so ." But it is not said, "God does not see so The real strength of Traditionalism lay not in the credibility of its claim to and so ." And it is said, "God hears the voice of so and so ." But it is be the custodian of transcendent meaning but in the weakness of the Rationalist not said, "God does not hear the voice of so and so ." ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 44 THE FORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL MUSLIM THEOLOGY 45

Meanwhile, it can be said that God creates a son for Zayd but not From medieval times down to the present, these two competing hegemo- for `Amr or that He bestows provisions upon [razaga] 'Abd Allah nies, Traditionalism and Rationalism, have continued in a perennial struggle but not upon Khalid. This is indicative of the difference . And in for preeminence . Neither has succeeded in dislodging or completely silenc- this context, it is proper to say that God spoke to Moses, upon him ing its counterpart ; nor has either formally acknowledged the legitimacy of the be peace, while He did not speak to Pharaoh . This confirms that it other's regime of sense . Thus, Muslim theology has entailed a running "false [i.e., speech] is a among the performative traits and that God did not detente" of sorts, where Rationalism and Traditionalism theoretically condemn possess speech as a sempiternal trait." each other as heresies even as they practically, albeit begrudgingly, recognize Meanwhile, according to al-Nasafi, the "mutakallimu ahl al-hadith," among the other's existence as an immoveable fact. whom he includes the Ash'arites and seemingly, if somewhat oddly, the Tradi- Since the failed Inquisition (Mihna) of the third/ninth century and Islam's tionalists, settle on the following principle : conscious decision not to turn to the state or any other centralized ecclesias- tical body as a permanent instrument for determining orthodoxy, no formal That the denial of which implies a defect is an essential attribute . mechanism has existed for ushering theological movements into or out of exis- Thus, were you to deny [the attribute of] life, this would bind you to tence . Rather, these eventualities have been left, ceteris paribus, to the market the defective attribute of death. And were you to deny the attribute of debate, even as they have often been influenced by the preferences and poli- of capacity [qudrah], this would bind you to the defective attribute of cies of powerful political forces." Over time, this situation has produced and incapacity ['ajz] . Likewise in the case of knowledge versus ignorance, sustained the four main theological schools that have survived into modern seeing versus blindness, and hearing versus deafness . times-three Rationalist (Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, and Matundism) and one Traditionalist, all of which have spoken to the issue of theodicy . That, on the other hand, the denial of which does not imply a defect is a performative attribute . Thus, were you to deny God the attribute of giving life [ihya'] or causing death or motion or rest, none of this would imply a defect.

By this we know the difference between the two [i.e., essential and performative attributes] . Now, were you to deny God the attribute of speech, this would bind you to the defects of handicap, incapacity, and dumbness . Thus, it [i.e., speech] is among the essential attributes ."

Clearly, neither revelation nor pure reason is the sole ground of these crite- ria. They recline, rather, on a historically informed set of intuitive sensibilities about the role, nature, and "character" of God . In fact, al-Nasafi's depictions ultimately suggest that history-normalized, internalized, and then forgotten as history-is perhaps an inextricable constituent of all "traditions of reason ." These historically informed sensibilities ultimately function as part of the fil- ter through which the theologically (and otherwise) relevant data of revelation is interpreted and deployed. Those who agree or disagree with the results of this process as upheld by those who claim or are assumed to possess religious authority are respectively lauded or rebuked as partisans or opponents of rea- son, tradition, and ultimately, orthodoxy . 2

Mu`tazilism and Black Theodicy

The Early Development and Basic Contours of Mu'tazilite Theology

In the history of Muslim theology, the Mu'tazilites have been J identified as the rationalists par excellence, the putative founders, or d perhaps the instigators, of systematic theology in Islam .' In a sense, the entire history of Muslim theology can be viewed as a running response to Mu'tazilism. For even where the interpretive methods n and doctrinal positions they founded were rejected or upstaged, i indeed, even after the Mu'tazilites themselves faded as a formal movement within Sunni Islam, the fundamental principles and problematics they introduced-not to mention any number of concrete doctrines-continued to exercise and, indeed, inform the Muslim theological agenda and imagination . Historically, Mu'tazilism has been cast as a separatist movement of sorts that emerged at the beginning of the second/eighth century . The traditional story is that the famed protoorthodox master al-Hasan al-Basra (d. 110/728) was once presiding over a study circle in the mosque at Basra when a man approached and asked him to settle the controversy over the fate of miscreant believers . According to the man, some-for example, certain groups of Kharijitesz-held that those who committed grave sins were doomed to Hell eternally ; others, such as the Murji'ites,3 held that as long as one was a believer in one's heart, one's misdeeds would bring no harm in the afterlife, just as the good 48 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU`TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 49

deeds of unbelievers would bring no benefit that the early movement would draw truculent scorn from . Before al-Hasan could gather his of the mawali, thoughts, a student of his, Wasil b. `Ata' (d . 131/748) arose and interjected : "I al-Shaft' do not say that those who commit grave sins are believers or unbelievers in the My judgment regarding the speculative theologians [ashab al-kalam] absolute ; rather, they occupy a status between these two statuses, being neither is that they be beaten with palm leaf stalks, saddled backward on believers nor unbelievers ."4 camels and paraded through the settled and Bedouin districts under Wail then got up, withdrew from al-Hasan's circle, and proceeded to the declaration "This is the recompense of those who abandon the another part of the mosque, where he continued to expound on this doctrine . At Book [of God] and the Sunna and engage in speculative theology ."11 this, al-Hasan remarked, "Wasil has separated from us" (i`tazala Wasil `anna)."5 The active participle of the verb i `tazala, which al-Hasan used to describe Wasil's From early on, Mu'tazilism embraced a belief in systematic, formal reason's action, is mu`tazil. The Mu'tazilites are said thus to have acquired their name indispensability to the religious enterprise . A typical (albeit later) vindication from Wasil's act of separation. of this position is supplied by al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar (d . 415/1024) : "Because Of course, modern scholarship has rightly challenged the historicity of this God can be known through neither a priori nor sentient apprehension, sys- story. In fact, medieval Muslim scholars themselves cast aspersions on it,' some tematic, formal reason [al-tafakkur wa al-nazar] is the means by which we Wasil ."" Reason, moreover, was the true ground of all illill even replacing with his brother-in-law `Amr b . 'Ubayd (d. 144/761) and must seek to know Him al-Hasan with another contemporary, Qutada .$ On more substantive grounds, religious knowledge, because it was the only basis on which the authority of there is little reason to believe that such an event could crystalize into a for- revelation itself could be established and its content understood or made to mal movement the discombobulated mass of rationalist trends and tendencies make sense . Thus, al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar explicitly ranks reason first among floating around in the early second/eighth century . And even if what might be the sources of Islam . Anticipating, however, objections to this prioritization, called early "Mu'tazilite tendencies" had coalesced into a formal movement, he adds : there is no apparent connection between this event and the most salient fea- Some might find this ranking strange and think that the sources tures of the Mu'tazilite approach . Nor is there any explanation why a move- should be limited to the Qur'an, Sunna and Unanimous Consensus ment that is supposed to have been founded on a particular thesis-Wasil's [ijma`] . Or they might think that reason, as a source of knowledge, (or 'Amr's) "status between the two statuses"-would include thinkers such should come after [these sources] . But this is not true . For God The Ih as Ibrahim b . Sayyar al-Nazzam (d . 231/845), who unequivocally rejected Exalted only addressed the people of reason [ahl al-`aql] . And it is that thesis . on the basis of reason that we know the Qur'an to be authoritative ; These and other considerations point up the difficulty of determining the likewise with the Sunna and Unanimous Consensus. Thus, reason precise origins of Mu'tazilism . While the debt to Aristotle and Late Antiquity is the primary source [al-asl] . And we only speak of the Qur'an being I seems obvious, there is also evidence of Zoroastrian, Christian, Manichaean, primary inasmuch as it alerts us to the dictates of reason .13 and Indian influence .' In fact, A. Kevin Reinhart has argued that Mu`tazilism emerged as a minoritarian movement in the conquered territories, where To be sure, "reason" did not refer to the plain dictates of the human facul- non-Muslims predominated, as part of an effort to appeal to and convince the ties. It included a battery of assumptions, premises and circumscriptions fash- majority of the truth of Islam on the only basis that could be invoked as com- ioned out of the legacy of late antiquity, especially Aristotle, alongside various monly owned and neutral : "reason ."" "Middle Eastern" and Central Asian complements and competitors . Out of this It comes as no surprise in this light that a high proportion of Arabicized composite, the Mu'tazilites constructed their rational proof for the existence of non-Arabs (mawali/s. mawla) numbered among the founding figures of early God: Everything in the world is possessed of accidents (a`radls. 'arad)-size, Mu'tazilism. These include Wasil b . `At a,' `Amr b . 'Ubayd, Abu Bakr al-Asamm shape, existence in space and time, and so on . Accidents, however, are neither (d. 200 or 201/815 or 816), Bishr b . Mu'tamar (d. 210/825), Mu'ammar b . self-producing nor self-sustaining. Therefore, all accidents must have a pro- 'Abbad al-Sulami (d . 215/830), Abu al-Hudhayl b . al-'Allaf (d . 226/840-41), ducer (muhdith). An infinite regression of temporal producers must ultimately Ibrahim b . Sayyar al-Nazzam, and `Uthman b . Bahr al-Jahiz (d . 250 or 255/864 begin with an unproduced producer. This unproduced producer, that is, the or 869) . It is little wonder, given his misgivings about the interpretive schemas Creator (al-sani`), is God ." 50 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU`TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 5I

This argument was the common link between Mu'tazilism and the remain . 2 . Divine omnibenevolence ('adl) was the basis on which the Mu'tazilites ing Rationalist schools and was the basis of one of its most seminal doctrinal affirmed human efficiency, since a just God could neither sponsor proscriptions : the ban on the idea of accidents, including affective traits, inher . human evil nor reward and punish people for actions over which they ing in the divine . All scriptural data had to be reconciled with this basic crite- exercised no effective control . (ta'wil) promise and threat (al-wa'd wa al-wa'td) was the basis on which rion, and allegorical interpretation played a major role in this regard . 15 3 . Divine Thus, for example, against the apparently anthropomorphic connotations of repentent believers were said to be bound to be rewarded and Qur'anic references to God's "hand" or "eye(s)," Mu'tazilites insisted that these unrepentent believers were bound to be punished in the afterlife . status between the two statuses (al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn) referred to God's "bounty" and "knowledge," respectively ." Similarly, scrip. 4. The tural references to God's wrath (ghadab) were explained as a simple matter of applied to miscreant believers . will (iradah) duty to command right and forbid wrong (al-amr bi'l-ma`raf wa'n- God's to condemn or debase the disobedient, as any affective activ- 5 . The ity on God's part would imply change (taghayyur)-a proscribed accident.'? nahy 'ani'l-munkar), translated into a certain commitment to socio- Regarding Prophetic hadith, in addition to allegorical interpretation, political activism . Mu'tazilites invoked reason in more general terms as a justification for set- Among these principles, monotheism and omnibenevolence assumed pride of ting them aside,'$ especially those of palpably limited diffusion (ahadT).'9 For . In fact, the Mu'tazilites would place their entire movement under the des- example, in response to a series of isolated reports on the fate of children place ignation The People of Omnibenevolence and Monotheism (Ahl al- Adl wa al- of unbelievers, al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar insists : "It is not permissible to aban- TawhTd). At bottom, omnibenevolence was the real first principle of Mu'tazilism don the rational faculties that God the Exalted has ingrained in us in favor of and, more than anything, it marked the boundary between the movement and such reports."" In a similar fashion, with no attention at all to its isnad (chain its theological rivals . The Mu'tazilite construction of monotheism produced of narrators) '21 al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar dismisses the hadith wherein Adam only one major controversy : that of the divine attributes, including (most impor- deflects Moses' criticism by arguing that his act of original disobedience was tantly) the attribute of speech . But this controversy-as even such staunch oppo- both foreknown and brought into actual existence by God . According to 'Abd nents of Mu'tazilism as the celebrated al-Ghazali (d . 505/1111) indicated-has al-Jabbar, been exaggerated beyond its true significance, via a combination of medieval this would necessitate that no unbeliever, polytheist, or miscreant partisanship and modern misunderstanding . In an attempt to clarify this confu- be subject to any blame, since every act they commit would be prede- sion, al-Ghazali asks rhetorically about a critic of Mu'tazilism, termined, in accordance with what God mentioned in His Book, that why does he have such strong words for the Mu'tazilite regarding the is, "and every small and large deed has been entered ." And any group latter's negation of the divine attributes [qua attributes] while fully whose ignorance reaches this level deserves to have every criticism acknowledging that God is knowing and has knowledge of all things, and blameworthy nickname attached to it ." and that He is powerful and has power over all possibilities, his [the From around the middle of the third/ninth century to the latter part of the Mu'tazilite's] disagreement with the Ash'arites being simply over fifth/eleventh, Mu'tazilism passed through its gold and silver periods, and then whether God is knowing and powerful by His essence or by an attri- 24 faded as a formally constituted movement in the central lands of Sunnism .23 bute [namely, knowledge, power] that is distinct from His essence? By the middle of the third/ninth century, two distinct schools, the Basrian and In other words, leaving aside the question of anthropomorphism, little sepa- the Baghdad', had emerged, as well as a general Mu'tazilite consensus around rated the Mu'tazilites from their opponents on the question of monotheism the so-called Five Principles (al-usal al-khams), with which the movement as a and the actual substance of God's essential (dhati) and performative (fi`li) traits . whole came to be identified . These were: Indeed, in many ways, the difference was as subtle (and inconsequential) as I. Monotheism (tawhid) emphasized the impossibility of coeternals . On both sides' agreeing that water is wet, while disagreeing over whether wetness iro the basis of this doctrine, Mu'tazilites denied that God had attributes, inheres in the actual essence of water or is ultimately distinct and brought to since these would have to be coeternal with God . that essence from without . 52 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU'TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 53

By contrast, omnibenevolence-and most particularly its relationship to Shiite Mu`tazilite Ahmad b . Yahya b. al-Murtada's (d . 840/1437), Tabagat al- omnipotence-was the basis of much more substantive and seminal disagree. ymu`tazilah (Classes of Mu`tazilites) '21 "one might be a Mu'tazilite and also be ment. Whereas Ash'arism, Maturidism, and Traditionalism-all in their own affiliated with ShI`ism or Murji'ism . But to be a Mu'tazilite and be opposed to way-privileged omnipotence as the master principle, Mu'tazilism invoked the doctrine of free will or a proponent of the doctrine of crass determinism the omnibenevolence as characteristic with which all else about God had to be (jabr) was simply unthinkable ."28 reconciled. For them, God either was omnibenevolent or was not God . More. It is exceedingly important to note, however, that the Mu'tazilite construc- over-and this is the source of much of the renewed interest in Mu`tazilism tion of free will was the antithesis of the aforementioned jabr, which in its among modern Sunni Muslims-the Mu'tazilite conception of divine omnibe. most fundamental expression denied both human choice (ikhtiyctr) and human nevolence was, to borrow the expression of Jones, unabashedly "humanocen. power or agency (qudrah) . All human action, according to this doctrine, was tric." Based on the principle that one could gain knowledge of God, the Unseen fully determined and unilaterally instantiated by God, in which capacity the role (al-gha'ib), by applying to God what was known of the world of human expe . of humans was merely apparent." In opposing this doctrine, the Mu'tazilite rience (al-shahid), Mu'tazilites insisted that the same basic regime of propri- construction of free will fully anticipated the modern understanding of the con- ety that applied to humans applied to God . Thus, any act that was proper or cept. According to The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, "we believe we have free improper for humans was, mutatis mutandis, proper or improper for God . will when (a) it is `up to us' what we choose from an array of alternative pos- The Mu'tazilites held that omnibenevolence, like reason, was critical to the sibilities and (b) the origin or source of our choices and actions is in us and not very integrity of revealed religion. In their view, the truthfulness and efficacy in anyone or anything else over which we have no control ."" of the prophets and scripture were both contingent upon the fact that only a In short, in addition to freedom of choice, the Mu'tazilite construction of wise, compassionate, and benevolent God would send messengers and support free will entailed human efficiency and secondary causation. In fact, their insis- them with the miracles they wrought . Otherwise, one would have to consider tence that humans had both the ability to choose and the autonomous power to the possibility that the prophets were sent not to guide but to confuse and mis- translate their choices into reality resulted in an outright affirmation that humans lead people and that the least efficacious interpretation of scripture was as valid actually created their own actions (khalq ofal al-`ibad) .31 This compound nature and proper as the most . This, the Mu'tazilites insisted, would both betray and of the Mu'tazilite doctrine has resulted in considerable confusion and overstate- undermine the value and authority of scripture ." ment, particularly when assessing some of their opponents' responses . As I will

d As far as its actual substance is concerned, Mu'tazilite omnibenevolence show, in attacking Mu`tazilite free will, Ash'arites, Maturidites, and Traditional- required that God be exonerated from all moral evil 26 and injustice . This ists focused almost entirely on human efficiency and secondary causation, not on entailed absolving God of both the actual creation of the evil acts of humans freedom of choice (ikhtiyar) . What they rejected, in other words, was basically the .32 and the charge that God held humans responsible for actions that were beyond former, that is, as it related to action, not the latter, as it related to choice their control . This demanded, in turn, that humans be endowed not simply For their part, the Mu'tazilites invested heavily in their constructions of 0 with freedom of choice but with the actual ability to translate their choices omnibenevolence and free will . Indeed, they took this as the basis for tracing into actual physical reality . In this way, no evil committed by humans could be Mu'tazilism itself all the way back to the time of the Prophet ." This is clearly attributed to God, and God could not be deemed unjust for holding humans reflected in the work of Ibn al-Murtada, cited earlier, where the first caliph, accountable for their evil actions . Abu Bakr, and the Companion 'Abd Allah b . Mas`ud are counted Mu'tazilites This laid the foundation for the most distinctive and enduring disagree- because, after they responded to a question on inheritance, they affirmed, ment between the Mu'tazilites and their theological adversaries : the conflict "I speak my opinion on this matter . If it is correct, it is from God. But if it is over free will . While anthropomorphism remained a consistent bone of con- wrong, it is from me and Satan ."34 The third caliph, 'Uthman, is counted a tention, this issue also divided Ash'arites, Maturidites, and Traditionalists . All Mu'tazilite because in response to his attackers' statement "God pelts you," of the latter, however, lined up against the Mu'tazilites on the matter of free he protested, "You lie ; if God were pelting me, He would not miss ."35 In these will. Though they initially exercised no monopoly over this doctrine, free will and all the other examples adduced by Ibn al-Murtada, the implication is clear : would ultimately emerge as the sine qua non of Mu'tazilism . As S. Diwald- absolving God of evil and affirming human free will and autonomous efficiency 36 Wilzer notes in her introduction to the biographical dictionary by the Zaydi are original and go all the way back to the first generation of Muslims . I~I~h666 u . 54 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU`TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 55

It was, again, however, not free will per se but the Mu'tazilite commit . this basis, for example, the Ash'arites insisted that God was free to do anything ment to secondary causation that most exercised their opponents . This ulti. God pleased, and the Ash'arites, Maturidites, and Traditionalists affirmed that (al-Qadariyah) God willed necessarily came into existence, and that nothing came mately earned them the pejorative nickname Qadarites . As everything W. Montgomery Watt points out, this term was originally ambiguous, refer . into existence independent of God's will . ring to both those who restricted the determination (qadar) of human acts_ From a Mu'tazilite perspective, God was singularly Al-la hu, which is why including evil ones-to God and those who affirmed that not God but humans knowledge about God could be gained by observing God's effects in Creation . determined human actions ." In time, however, the Mu'tazilites' opponents But this did not translate into an understanding of omnipotence as an exclusive succeeded in removing this ambiguity by conflating the refusal to attribute evil monopoly over all power. It especially did not negate humans' ability to create to God (and the parallel insistence that humans determined their own acts) or choose their own actions independently ; nor did it imply that nothing could with the plain and primary meaning of the term qadar. They were aided in come into existence independent of the direct will of God ; nor did it confer this regard by a ubiquitously cited statement attributed to the Prophet : "The upon God the right to do as God pleased, with no regard for the interests of Qadarites are the Zoroastrians of this community" (al-gadartiyah majus hadhihi God's creatures . al-ummah) .38 Given the Zoroastrian belief in the existence of two gods, a creator While Mu'tazilites understood God's power to be complete, superior, and of good (Ahura Mazda) and a creator of evil (Ahriman), this hadith was made efficient, they insisted all the same that it was not God but, again, humans who to imply that the Qadariyah among the Muslims were those who denied that created (yakhluq) their own actions . The slightly later al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar God was the creator of all acts, good and evil, even if this denial was ultimately and his disciples are explicit in reiterating that "human actions are not cre- a good faith effort to dissociate God from human misdeeds and suffering. ated in humans [by God] . Rather, humans themselves bring their own actions While the Mu'tazilites privileged omnibenevolence over omnipotence, into actual existence" ("afal al-`ibad ghayru makhlagatin fihim wa annahum they remained firmly committed to both . How they reconciled this prioritiza- al-muhdithuna laha") .42 Similarly, according to al-Shahrastani, it was a point of tion was, of course, a major point of contention between them and their rivals . unanimous consensus among all Mu'tazilites that "humans have [complete, There are several possible approaches to adumbrating the relationship they autonomous] agency and create their own actions, good and evil, as a result proposed. In the interest of brevity and effect, I shall hazard the following . of which they deserve reward or punishment in the Hereafter. God, as such, In his famous monograph Kitab al-asma' wa al&fat (The Book of Divine is absolved of all responsibility for evil, injustice and acts such as unbelief or Names and Attributes), the Ash'arite theologian Abu Bakr al-Bayhagi disobedience. 1143 (3 84/994-45 8 / 1065) cites an interesting opinion regarding the etymology of In this capacity, God's omnipotence neither preempted the occurrence of the name Allah . According to this view, the conceptual core of the divine name human actions that God had not willed directly nor required that God directly was the Arabic phrase la hu, "it is his/it's," "it belongs to him/it," "it is for will an action, that is, in the first instance, in order for it to come into actual him/it." To this the Arabians added the definite article al, producing Al-la hu. existence . As I will show, Mu'tazilites did not see in God's granting humans Then, in accordance with linguistic convention, they added a medial alif (a) for the autonomous volition and power to create their own actions any challenge emphatic effect, yielding the proper name Allah . God, in other words, was per- to or violation of God's omnipotence . ceived by the Arabians to be emphatically "the one to whom the universe and Nor did the Mu'tazilite understanding of omnipotence confer upon God all that is in it belongs ."39 the unqualified right to do as God pleased, such that all God's actions were On linguistic grounds, al-Bayhagi expresses reservations about this deri- rendered good and just, regardless of their effect on God's creatures . On the vation, holding Allah to be a proper ('alam) rather than a derived (mushtaqq) contrary, Mu`tazilites insisted that God "must, from the standpoint of wisdom name, as attested to by the fact that the definite article remains in the presence [hikmah], act in the interest of humanity ."' This appears in large part to have of the vocative ya.40 But al-Bayhagi's whole point in citing this la hu opinion emerged out of early discussions with Zoroastrian dualists . The latter report- was that it confirmed the point to which this section of his book was devoted : edly insisted that wise actions were those that benefited those who performed that "everything other than God is a product of God's having innovated and cre- them. Since, however, from a Mu'tazilite perspective (indeed from the perspec- ated it."41 This premise deeply informed the Ash'arite and (albeit in modified tive of the generality of Muslims), God is above benefit, God's actions could fashion) Maturidite and Traditionalist understandings of omnipotence . On only be wise if they benefited other than God. Otherwise, God's actions would 56 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU`TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 57

all be pointless, as they would benefit neither God nor other than God . Thus, its every theological impulse and sensibility . Contrary, however, to the impres- the Mu'tazilites insisted that any act of God, if it is to avoid pointlessness, must sion a hasty reading of them might yield, morality for the Mu'tazilites was not serve the interest of humans . 45 sirnply what individuals or groups might decide by subjective fiat . It was only In effect, the Mu'tazilite conception of omnipotence rejected the reduc . what humans could prove to be good or evil on the basis of "sound reason" and tion of omnibenevolence to a simple matter of provenance, or judging actions rational argument . solely on the basis of their source . Rather, acts were to be judged on the basis of either their inherent properties or their effect, regardless of whether they issued from humans or from God . 46 "An evil act [al-gabih] is evil because it occurs with Relevant Details of Mu'tazilite Theology certain properties in a certain context [`ala wajh] . And whenever an act occurs with these properties in these contexts, it must be deemed evil, regardless of The foregoing is about as far as one can safely go with describing general char- whether it issues from God The Exalted or from one of us." 47 acteristics of Mu'tazilism that are shared across the movement . Beyond these Embedded in this position was another Mu'tazilite commitment : the so- basic commitments, Mu'tazilites differed widely over details . The famed her- called doctrine of al-husn wa al-qubh al-`agliyan .48 This doctrine affirmed that esiologist al-Shahrastani (d. 548/1153), for example, enumerates no less than good and evil inhere either in acts themselves (the Baghdadi school) or in the twelve formally constituted Mu'tazilite groups, with substantive differences primordial categories of the mind through which reality is naturally perceived within some ofthese . 53 In light of this, as I proceed to some of the details of their (the Basrian school) .49 In either case, good and evil are detectable by sound rea- basic doctrines, I shall privilege the writings of the great Mu'tazilite al-Qadi son unaided by scripture . Thus, one can actually know both that God imposes 'Abd al-Jabbar (d . 415/1024). Doing so will entail certain obvious drawbacks but moral obligations and what these obligations are, independent of God's self will also afford a number of advantages . Prior to the discovery (Yemen, 1951) disclosure to this effect . In its essential features, the Baghdadi position paral- and subsequent publication (Cairo, 1960-69) of his voluminous al-Mughni ft leled the pre-Enlightenment doctrine of "intelligible essences," according to abwab al-tawhid wa al-`adl (All You Need to Know About Monotheism and which a stone, for example, is distinguishable from a plant because it is the Omnibenevolence), our knowledge of the actual substance of Mu'tazilite doc- repository of an objectively intelligible "stone-ness . "50 The Basrian position, trine had been based on a narrow sliver of surviving Mu'tazilite tracts alongside meanwhile, anticipated Kant's "a priori concepts of understanding" or "catego- general descriptions by non-Mu'tazilite detractors and heresiologists. In this ries of the mind," according to which the mind apprehends reality according context, 'Abd al-Jabbar emerges as a major (if not main) source for the study of to preset schemas . 51 In both cases, good and evil are identifiable on the basis of Mu'tazilism . He provides the additional benefit of representing Mu'tazilism in certain inherent or naturally apprehended qualities, which exist independent its most mature form, having absorbed the accumulated wisdom of more than of subjective judgments, human or divine . On this understanding, outside the two and a half centuries of Mu'tazilites' responses to their critics . Finally, he is area of specifically religious observances, for example, the number of units in likely to figure prominently in any modern (including Blackamerican) appro- a prayer, the role of revelation is merely to confirm or uncover the natural-cum- priation or derivation of Mu'tazilite thought. normative order of things, not to posit this. Ultimately, this connects with the Abu al-Hasan 'Abd al-Jabbar b . Ahmad b. al-Khalil b . 'Abd Allah al- Mu'tazilite construction of omnibenevolence, in that it justifies God's holding Hamadhani al-Asadabadi was born in the Persian city of Hamadhan some- humans accountable for violating the moral dictates of what they can know by time between 320/932 and 325/936. A Shafi i in law, he began as an Ash'arite sound reason, even in the absence of revelation or any knowledge of Prophetic in theology but later abandoned this school to become a proponent of Basrian teaching.12 Mu`tazilism, as a member of the Bahshamiyah wing of that division .S 4 This In sum, the Mu'tazilite understanding of omnipotence refused to privilege may explain why the Shiite Buyid vizier al-Sahib b . `Abbad appointed him gads qudat this divine characteristic over divine omnibenevolence in such a way that the (chief justice) in 367/978 even though he was a Sunni, the Buyids, latter would be emptied of substantive meaning or made contingent on divine or and Shiism more generally, being committed proponents of Mu'tazilite the- human subjectivity. Indeed, preserving divine omnibenevolence as a concrete ology, This is where he derived his sobriquet al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar . Several property with concrete implications for God's actions and God's relationship of his works on Mu'tazilite theology have survived, the most important for to Creation was part of the central nervous system of Mu'tazilism, informing Present purposes being al-Mughni fi abwab al-tawhid wa al-`adl, Sharh al-usul 5 8 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU'TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 59

al-khamsah (Explanation of the Five Principles) and Fadl al-i`tizal (The virtue not will except that God wills [that you will]" ("wa ma tasha'ana illa an yasha' 58 of Mu`tazilism). 55 At the time of his death, he was the greatest representative of Allah")" (76 :30 ; 81 :29), 'Abd al-Jabbar's position might be viewed as a more Mu'tazilism during its silver period . reasonable, if not more faithful, rendering thereof . At the very least, its ability A number of features of `Abd al-Jabbar's thought call for attention . First, to explain such Qur'anic refrains as "Had your Lord willed, everyone on Earth his response to the opponents of the concept of free will and human efficiency would have believed altogether" ("wa law sha'a rabbuka la-amana man fi `l-ardi sheds additional light on the Mu'tazilite understanding of the relationship kulluhum jami`an") would appear to be well-nigh redeeming (zo :99) . 59 Indeed, between omnipotence and omnibenevolence . Recall that the whole point of on 'Abd al-Jabbar's approach, such verses would simply imply that if God had affirming free will and autonomous human efficiency had been to avert the willed everyone to believe, God would not have granted human beings the inde- attribution of evil and injustice to God (i .e., the belief that God actually created pendent choice and capacity to disbelieve . evil and that God therefore punished people for actions that were beyond their Second, in keeping with Mu'tazilite consensus, 'Abd al-Jabbar affirms that control) . To the opponents of secondary causation, imputing such efficiency to all of God's actions are good and just . This is not because these actions issue humans undermined God's monopoly on ultimate power and imposed limita- from the Owner of the universe but because God is simply above committing tions on the power God possessed . For as they saw it, a truly efficient human evil (gaba'ih/s. gabih) . According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, "when we say that God The could both cause to come into existence actions that God had not willed and Exalted is just and wise [`adl hakim], we mean that He neither commits nor J prevent from coming into existence actions that God had willed ." From 'Abd chooses detestable acts, nor fails to do what is incumbent [wajib)], and that all al-Jabbar's perspective, however, this argument simply missed the point : of His actions are [therefore] good ."" To say that God neither commits nor chooses evil is not the same as saying What God The Exalted wills either pertains to His own actions or that God is incapable of doing so, that is, by God's essence or on the argument to those of someone else . If He wills something pertaining to His that because God is the Owner of the universe God's actions are disquali- own actions and it does not occur, this would indicate impotence fied from being considered evil . 'Abd al-Jabbar is explicit (even, incidentally, and incapacity on His part . For, by definition, the action of one who against other Mu'tazilites such as al-Nazzam and al-Jahiz) in stating that God is is capable must occur in accordance with his unimpeded incentive theoretically capable of committing evil (mawsuf bi al-qudrah `ala al-gabih) but to act, such that if it does not occur, this would indicate that he is simply chooses not to do so ." According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, it is neither God's incapable. But if what He wills pertains to the action of someone else, inability nor God's ineligibility but rather God's omnibenevolence ('adl) that He either wills that it occur through force and coercion or that it occur prevents evil from issuing from God ." through that other's choice . If He wills (that it occur) through force This is further reinforced, according to 'Abd al-Jabbar, by the fact that God and coercion and it does not occur, this would indicate incapacity on is (I) knowledgeable of the evil nature of evil acts ; (2) free of any need to com- His part . . . But if He wills that it occur through that other's choice, in mit evil acts ; and (3) aware of being free of any need to commit evil acts ." In the a context where no harm or benefit accrues to Him, then the nonoc- world of human experience (al-shahid), anyone who enjoys such an advantage currence of this action would not indicate any incapacity on His part ." will always choose good and never evil . By analogy, 'Abd al-Jabbar insists, the same applies to God (al-gha'ib) . From 'Abd al-Jabbar's perspective, the doctrine of free will and human effi- ciency neither placed unacceptable restrictions on God's power nor placed the Were a person given a choice between telling the truth and lying, occurrence of any human action outside of God's effective control . On the con- where the benefit of both was equal, it being said to them, "If you lie, trary, this doctrine simply recognized the ability of others to act via a power we will give you a dirham [gold coin], and if you tell the truth, we will that God had summarily transferred to them . In other words, while humans give you a dirham," while this person knows the evil nature of lying, may have volition and power (qudrah, istita`ah) through which they can effec- is free of any need to lie and knows that he or she is free of any need tively initiate and instantiate their actions, they are not-and Mu'tazilites do to lie, such a person will never choose lying over telling the truth . . . . not argue that they are-the actual creators of this volition and power . Rather, The same logic applies to God, on the basis of which He can never this is entirely the result of a grant from God . On this understanding, rather choose evil . . . . For there is no difference in the way that proofs apply than being viewed as a violation of such often-cited verses as "And you do to the world of the Seen and the Unseen .G4 6o ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU'TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 61

In all of this, what could be called the "humanocentric" core of `Abd al-Jabbar's innocent child commits a good and evil act, respectively . This however, earns construction of omnibenevolence is, again, both clear and operative . In fact, by hire or her neither praise nor condemnation, because the acts themselves were comparison, whereas Jones merely implies that God is bound by what humans not wild ones. Will, or intention, in other words, is relevant to praise and con- (of sound mind and disposition) deem to be good or evil, 'Abd al-Jabbar is demnation but not to the actual moral status of acts ." For, again, moral status unabashed and unequivocal in this assertion . is determined on the basis of an act's effect. As for the substantive properties of good and evil, 'Abd al-Jabbar focuses All of this is ultimately related to another aspect of 'Abd al-Jabbar's under- more on the latter than the former (due almost certainly to the fact that his pri- standing of omnibenevolence: God's transcendence of "pointlessness" ('abath) . mary concern was with absolving God of evil) . "Good" (al-husn) is simply "that According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, not only must God's actions steer clear of evil, they which is knowingly done in such a manner that its agent deserves no blame" must actually promote concrete, palpable interests (aghrad/s . gharad) .73 Other- ("ma yaga`u `ala wajhin la yastahigqu fa`iluhu bi fi`lihi idha 'alimahu 'alayhi `dh- wise, there would be no point in a wise, just God undertaking such actions . On dhamm") .G5 "Evil" (al-qubh) refers to acts whose agents deserve blame, because this understanding, God can only inflict suffering if doing so entails a benefit they proceed with neither knowledge nor the reasonable presumption that their or constitutes an earned recompense . And in this context, it would actually be acts (i) procure a benefit (naf ); (2) avert a greater harm (daf darar a`zam) ; or pointless, according to 'Abd al-Jabbar, for God to inflict suffering simply in (3) constitute a justifiable recompense (mustahagq) .66 In the case of both good order to avert some other suffering.74 and evil, there is a clear utilitarian element in 'Abd al-Jabbar's conceptions: the This requirement that God avert pointlessness extends to the very act of value of an act is directly tied to the benefit or harm its agent knowingly delivers creating human beings to begin with and of imposing on them religious obli- to others . Not harming others, in other words, is the minimum required for an gations (taklif). According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, God creates humans in order to act to be good. Accordingly, 'Abd al-Jabbar insists that an agent whose action benefit them (li yanfa`ahum) .75 While God could simply grant this benefit gra- only benefits himself does not deserve praise ." On this understanding, all of tis, such generosity would render God's having endowed humans with reason God's acts are good, because they are always performed in the interest and to and other faculties pointless, since humans do not need these things if God is the benefit of others .G8 simply going to guarantee their happiness . To be sure, by way of their facul- Having said this much, it must be noted that `Abd al-Jabbar was not a strict ties, humans can arrive at numerous forms and levels of happiness . But the ontologist; he did not hold any particular act, divine or human, to be inherently greatest happiness is the eternal bliss of the afterlife, and this happiness is good or evil in any and all circumstances .68 While he recognized, ceteris pari- so great that it could only be justified as recompense for an extremely special bus, physical and psychological pleasures (maladhdh/s. maladhdhah) and pain activity, to the extent that it would be unjust for God to grant it otherwise . Just (alam and ghamm) to be theoretically good and bad, respectively, he held that as it would undermine a child's interest to lavish him or her undeservedly with whether they turned out to be actually good or bad depended on the "circum- large amounts of money, and just as it would be injurious to a parent for his stances and modality" (wajh) via which they occurred. No act, in other words, or her child to accord to a stranger the honor and deference properly reserved could be deemed good or evil in the absence of an assessment of its warrant for parents, so, too, would it be wrong for God to grant the happiness of the and or effect . Thus, the same injurious action (darar) that occurs as an act of afterlife in the absence of commensurate desert . This is why God imposes reli- injustice (zulm) could constitute an act of justice ('adl) if accompanied by an gious obligations : to provide human beings with a means of earning a benefit exculpatory benefit or a justifiable cause ." that they could not otherwise justifiably earn, let alone be granted gratis ." And In keeping with the general Mu'tazilite insistence that provenance was despite the possibility that humans might actually fail in this regard, this is irrelevant to the moral status of an act, 'Abd al-Jabbar excludes will (iradah) outweighed by the enormity of the consequences of possible success . from the moral constitution of acts . This is for the purpose of isolating the onto- While 'Abd al-Jabbar's construction of omnipotence (like that of the logical effects as the exclusive locus of an act's goodness or evil . Otherwise, 'Abd Mu'tazilites in general) exonerated God of direct responsibility for the moral al-Jabbar points out, were will or intention relevant to the moral status of an act, evil that humans visited on other humans, he remained alive to the presence of an otherwise evil act could be rendered good by simply stripping it of its evil metaphysical evil, in the form of earthquakes, hurricanes, debilitating diseases, intention ." Here, however, he distinguishes between the moral status of the act and the like, for which only God could be assumed to be responsible . Moreover, itself and that of tb P actor. A heedless or sleeping person who rescues or kills an the sheer scope of moral evil, in its cumulative effect, so devastated humanity 62 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU'TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 63

that its sustained pervasiveness almost had to challenge, at least prima facie, human wants or needs . As an alternative, moreover, to the popular notion that the Mu'tazilite commitment to divine omnibenevolence and even more so "one gets what one deserves," lutf is called upon to explain the existence of some of `Abd al-Jabbar's idealized expansions thereof, for example, the notion seemingly gratuitous bounty and or evil in the world . that God creates humans for the purpose of benefiting them and that God must Not all suffering and evil can be explained away, of course, by reference act in humans' interest ." In the face of all of this, 'Abd al-Jabbar called on two to lutf. Beyond its immediate effect on its victims and the fact that evil often final concepts, lutfand `iwad, to aid him in effecting a reconciliation between appears neither to promote obedience nor discourage disobedience, there are

I divine omnibenevolence and inevitable human suffering . instances where ostensibly evil acts are actually incapable of promoting enough According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, while the direct effect of an action might be positive effect to render them good. A primary example of this would be the evil, in that it promotes no apparent good, repels no apparent evil, and is not a suffering of children. Since children are not bound by the religious obligations justifiable recompense for any prior infraction, the indirect effect may actually of taklif, even if their suffering could promote obedience or discourage disobe- translate into a benefit for the victim and or others . This is because injurious dience in others, this could not benefit them, especially if they die before reach- occurrences often serve as admonitions and incentives that promote humil- ing the age of majority or as unbelievers . Thus, where God afflicts a child with ity, gratitude, and obedience to God, discouraging disobedience, apathy, and a debilitating disease, with the result that the child dies or grows up to be an heedlessness . A random car accident, for example, in which one survives but unbeliever, this would appear to be at the very least pointless ." Pointlessness, one's friend perishes can have the effect of arousing religious sensibilities . however (`abath), as I have shown, is a species of evil (qubh), according to 'Abd Inasmuch as such a result promotes the greater happiness of the Hereafter, the al-Jabbar (and Mu'tazilites generally) . net benefit of this apparently evil occurrence can end up outweighing its evil Here `Abd al-Jabbar introduces the concept of 'iwad or "indemnification ."" and render it good. This indirect effect of promoting God-consciousness and In the simplest terms, 'iwad is not a reward-a return on good-but a restitu- discouraging religious apathy is at the heart of the concept of lutf which 'Abd tion for harm suffered. Its purpose is to insulate acts of God from being judged al-Jabbar defines as "that which is experienced in such a way that it encourages as evil by attaching to them benefits that outweigh their harm . These benefits one to choose obedience [to God's commands] or at least renders one's choice take the form of added pleasures or diminished pain, occasionally here but of obedience more likely to occur" ("ma yad`u ila fi`li't ta`ati 'ala wajhin yaqa'u most especially in the Hereafter ." They extend to all humans, Muslims and ikhtiyaruha 'indahu aw yakanu awla an yaqa'a `indah") .78 non-Muslims alike ." And they attach to God's direct acts-for example, natural An act or occurrence does not have to be evil or bad in order for it to con- disasters, God's commands and prohibitions-as well as God's indirect acts, stitute a lutf. Nor does it have to exert its effect on its immediate object . Simply for example, God's having granted human beings free will . Thus, for example, hearing about the good or bad experience of another can function as a lutf. In because the religious law permits the slaughtering of animals, animals must sum, lutfmight be viewed as either acts or occurrences that inspire people to be indemnified via `iwad." do good or as the answer to the question of why bad things happen to good According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, when humans carry out evil acts against people. When an act or occurrence, good or bad, results in obedience or good, it other humans, they become responsible for indemnifying the latter and mak- constitutes a species of lutfcalled tawfiq (divine facilitation) .79 When an action ing them whole-for example, by returning what was stolen . If they do not, or occurrence inspires the avoidance of disobedience or evil, it constitutes a God will assume the task of indemnification by taking away from the evildo- species of lutfcalled 'ismah (divine protection) ." ers some of the 'iwad due them (for pains they themselves have suffered) and Note that while lutfclearly plays this exculpatory role, it must be under- transferring this to their victims in the afterlife ." Here, however, in keeping stood as part of 'Abd al-Jabbar's campaign to reinforce and vindicate God's with his commitment to omnihenevolence, 'Abd al-Jabbar notes that God may omnibenevolence. It is grounded, in other words, in the broader principle that bring psychological or emotional pain to the hearts of the evildoers at the time God must act in the interest of God's creatures . It is on this basis that 'Abd they commit their evil acts, so that they themselves might be eligible for indem- al-Jabbar insists that whenever God knows that the occurrence of a particular nification (at least in the form of reduced punishment) in the afterlife ."" event would result in a person choosing to obey or choosing not to disobey, it As for instances where God is the source of suffering-for example, in becomes incumbent on God to bring this event about.81 Lutf, in other words, is cases of debilitating illnesses or natural disasters-God may deliver persons' primarily about promoting proper human choices, not about directly granting !wad to them in this life or in the afterlife . In this life, `iwad may come in the 64 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU'TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 65

form of psychological, emotional, or other advantages that are so subtle that the human beings. Like that of Jones, the Mu'tazilite view of God as essentially beneficiary may not recognize them as indemnifications .89 In the Hereafter, the God of nature but not of history96 enables them to affirm God's omnibe- `iwad comes in the form of intensified pleasures or diminished punishments . nevolence despite the existence of sociopolitical evil in the world . God, in other Note, however, that God's `iwad is never equal to the suffering God sponsors words, might be directly responsible for metaphysical evil, in the form of natu- or allows but always goes far beyond it . This is why it is not evil for God to ral disasters and the like, but God is not directly responsible for moral evil, in impose such suffering unilaterally, without the consent or permission of God's the form of injustices humans visit on each other. Similarly, Jones's notion of creatures and in the absence of what would appear to be a justifiable cause . For the "functional ultimacy of man," 97 which he strove so mightily to establish and so great is God's indemnification relative to the suffering imposed or allowed defend, flows almost effortlessly from Mu'tazilism. In fact, for Mu'tazilites, that any reasonable person would gladly accept such suffering in exchange." if a person does not have to act "as if he were the ultimate valuator or agent in a man knows that he can turn $ioo into $ioo,ooo, it would not be unjust for human history" ;98 he or she is emphatically and unequivocally both . This is the him to take another's $ioo and invest it for him without the latter's permis- dear implication of Mu'tazilism's insistence on holding God (al-gha'ib) to a r. sion. The same applies to God and God's acts in the form of `iwad.91 regime of morality grounded in the experiences and perspective of the human In the end, according to 'Abd al-Jabbar, it is God's ability to guide, direct, being (al-shahid) and in their uncompromising affirmation that the human and offset through lutfand indemnify through 'iwad that separates God's acts being, not God, is the creator of human acts (khaliq of al al-`ibad) . from those of humans . This is ultimately what ensures that all of God's actions In sum, if the "special merits" of Jones's humanocentric theism reside li end up being just and good, in contradistinction to all human actions.92 in "its capacity to eliminate the charge of divine racism and its unambigu- ous impulse against quietism," 99 Mu'tazilism must be held in at least equal esteem . Mu'tazilism and Jones Beyond these points of functional convergence, however, Mu'tazilism actually appears to offer a number of advantages over Jones, most particularly Even the most casual perusal of the foregoing reveals a striking compat- regarding the substance and status of religion (or perhaps more specifically ibility between Mu'tazilism and Jones's critique and proposal . The idea that theism). In fact, in light of what I have described of the Mu'tazilite approach, humans, not God, are the source of sociopolitical evil finds clear resonance some of Jones's assumptions about religion appear to be premature if not in the Mu'tazilite insistence on free will and human efficiency . Similarly, the unfounded. For example, in Mu'tazilism omnibenevolence and omnipotence Mu'tazilite (or perhaps 'Abd al-Jabbar's) definition of evil unequivocally identi- reveal themselves to be reconcilable both with each other and with the aim of fies undeserved pain and suffering, physical or psychological, as "something to black liberation in a manner that avoids what Jones presents as the necessity be eliminated," or at the very least indemnified ." On this filiation, God must be of negating or greatly attenuating their substance . Similarly, the secularizing seen as being neither pleased with nor responsible for ethnic suffering . More- tendency-reflected, inter alia, in the appeal to humanism and "nontheistic" over, quietism, the notion that Blackamericans, or any other suffering people, models-shows itself to be superfluous to the goal of repudiating both divine must embrace and acquiesce to their suffering, is repudiated . For, again, on racism and quietism . Indeed, in his enthusiasm to impute panacean potential the Mu'tazilite approach, to rebel against the evil of suffering is to rebel not to his alternative model, Jones appears to overlook the potential cost of aban- against God but against humans .94 This is further fortified by the fifth of the doning traditional, theistic approaches. Mu'tazilism, meanwhile, shows the Mu'tazilites' Five Principles, the duty to command right and forbid wrong ("al- Way to both liberation and maintaining a religious/theistic worldview . amr bi al-ma `ruf wa al-nahy `an al-munkar") .95 On this principle, not only would In assessing the inadequacies of the theodicy of black theology, Jones Blackamerican (or any other) Muslims be justified in rebelling against oppres - determined theism to be part of the problem . He saw "black humanism" as a sion, they might actually be religiously duty bound to do so . much more effective basis for a black theology of liberation, which prompted In addition to satisfying every major aspect of Jones's critique of blacll hire, in his words, to try "to make th[e] humanistic wing of black religion the theodicy, Mu'tazilism also anticipates his proposal . Jones's "humanocentric norm for contemporary black theology."100 Humanocentric theism, in other theism," whose ultimate aim is to reconcile divine omnipotence with effective Words, was actually Jones's compromise offered in recognition of the tenacious human agency, is of a piece with the Mu'tazilite conceptions of both God and hold of theism over black theologians (and Blackamericans in general) . For 66 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU`TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 67 him, the real key to the Blackamerican Aufklaurung lies in the secular insights accept . . . [the] conclusion that it was God's will that Hitler committed six of such antireligious, existentialist critics as Camus and Sartre, alongside those million Jews to slaughter ."104 of such religious dissidents as Rubenstein and, to a lesser extent, Butler, Cox, By first attributing to God and then absolving God of traditional construc- and Burkle . tions of omnipotence, Jones is able to justify both the move toward secularism The secularizing tendencies implied by Jones's approach are both stark and his ostensible repositioning himself within a theistic mold . He confirms and unrelenting . In fact, his depictions might lead one to believe that if the the latter commitment by noting that while his humanocentric theism grants interest is black liberation, such a move is unavoidable. But this is difficult to humans the freedom to act, this freedom is ultimately "the consequence of square with the fact that the Mu'tazilites were thoroughgoing, hard-core the- God's will ." 105 But he says this only after having equivocated a certain opposi- ists! And few (if any) of the insights and criticisms of Camus, Sarte, and the tion to the very notion of theism itself, as part of an effort to fortify the move others would apply to Mu'tazilism . All of this makes it difficult to ignore the to secularism and preempt any backsliding into "theological obscenity ." This bourgeois character of the existentialist thought Jones draws on, where faith is time writing against Rubenstein, who feared that secular humanism would a private matter and the religious people whose interests are contemplated are ultimately destroy Judaism, Jones writes : neither poor nor oppressed ."' In this context, the greatest threat to the indi- He [Rubenstein] castigates the determinism implicit in the tradi- vidual becomes neither suffering nor oppression but the threat to individual tional biblical concept of God as the ultimate author of human his- autonomy represented by the heteronomous character and authority of reli- tory, and the optimism it entails . Yet I find it difficult to differentiate gion. In other words, Jones's secular, Enlightenment thinkers do not oppose between the determinism of the God of nature he accepts and that of religion because it is inherently ineffective in repelling oppression (as this is the God of history he rejects .101 neither their main problem nor their primary concern) ; they oppose it because it inherently challenges subjectivism (read humanism) and threatens the hedo- In other words, even a theism that limits God's omnipotence to mastery over nism implied by (bourgeois) autonomy-the very autonomy, incidentally, that nature constitutes too great a liability for Jones . Thus, the only sure way to guar- is denied to oppressed blacks not by religion but by the unchecked exercise of antee that God does not obstruct the road to black liberation, either through autonomy on the part of whites . It is interesting in this regard that while Jones God's own actions or through the malappropriations of an ideologically mis- is sensitive to "the fatal residue of the oppressor's world view "102 and its impact guided black theology, is to neutralize God . This confirms his earlier admis- on the theism of black theology, he evinces no parallel concern about the anti- sion that his decision to proceed in a theistic framework was merely tactical . religious and secular biases of his Enlightenment sources who also happen to For my purposes, it is enough to point out that the Mu'tazilite approach hail from the ranks of the oppressor . renders all of this unnecessary . Evil and ethnic suffering can be accounted for Jones's construction of theism appears at times to be both leading and unsta- by a free will and human efficiency granted by an omnipotent God (this omnipo- ble. On the one hand, traditional notions of theism are seemingly clung to for tence residing, inter alia, in the fact that humans and their efficiency emerge the purpose of promoting the case against God, or at least against black theology from God's creative act) . At the same time, the Mu'tazilite commitment to At the same time, this traditional notion of God is attacked, presumably for the independent human agency is so stark, so emphatic, and so uncompromis- purpose of raising God above untenable descriptions . In the end, however, it is ing that there is no justification for any fear that God's mastery over nature not at all clear whether it is untenable conceptions of God or the very belief in God might spill over into human history and negate human choice. In short, on a that must be jettisoned. Ultimately, and particularly during his defense of his MU'tazilite weltanschauung, there is simply no need for any retreat from the- humanocentric theism, Jones evinces clear sympathies with the latter option . ism as a means of preserving or enhancing human autonomy, responsibility, For example, at one point, following the lead of Rubenstein, Jones refers or effectiveness . Nor would there be any particular advantage in doing so . In to the idea of God being active in and sovereign over human history as a "theo - fact, the Mu`tazilites would insist that the very pervasiveness of human suffer- logical obscenity ."103 This, in turn, justifies the effective denial or obfuscation ing, despite human's possessing moral understanding and agency, suggests of omnipotence as the only means of subverting the charge of divine rac- the need for correctives that lie beyond human control . Here, moreover, their ism. Quoting Rubenstein, Jones writes, "if I believed in God as the omnipo - commitment would be not simply to theism per se but to the very strictest tent author of the historical drama and Israel as His Chosen People, I had to construction of monotheism . Indeed, despite their firm commitment to human 68 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU`TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 69

autonomy, they would recoil in horror at any theology that jeopardized God' s that one at least consider the possibility that God is malevolent, at least toward transcendence . And they would take strong exception to such theistic compro . blacks . Black theologians' insistence on asserting rather than proving God's mises as Bonhoeffer's and Major Jones's idea of God as "cosufferer," 107 Harvey goodness only revealed, in Jones's view, their agnostic approach to black suf- Cox's notion of God as "codetermines," 108 and even William R . Jones's notion fering. This had the effect of forestalling the judgment that suffering is an of God as "cocreator ."109 evil that must be destroyed . Since, the argument runs, God the Omnipotent is Again, Mu'tazilism completely sidesteps Jones's contention that belief in responsible for every occurrence and since every occurrence effected by God u divine omnipotence renders God responsible for and pleased with evil. In fact, the Benevolent must have positive value, suffering, to the extent that it is identi- their particular construction of free will aimed precisely at avoiding such con- fied with divine sponsorship, must be deemed positive and cannot be opposed, except as an act of defiance ."' h clusions . As 'Abd al-Jabbar insisted, "had God willed [disobedience and evil in general], this would mean that He loved these things and was pleased with By calling God's benevolence into question, Jones is able to strip ethnic suf- them, because will [iradah], love [mahabbah], and pleasure [rida] are of a single fering of any pretension to legitimacy it might acquire on theological grounds. constitution .""' This is why he (and Mu'tazilites generally) insists that it is not But in order to implicate God in the crimes of black oppression, it is necessary God but humans-and only humans-who both will and instantiate human to affirm God's control over human history (by associating God with traditional actions, despite their belief in the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent notions of omnipotence) . This, however, leads, ironically, to the justification Creator . for rejecting that very divine control . And this denial of divine control over Jones goes on to insist that traditional, theistic understandings of divine human history is what endows men and women with the unilateral capacity omnipotence necessarily lead to quietism . Mu'tazilism, of course, would side- to rise against oppression . On this understanding, even on the assumption step any charge of quietism by rejecting aspects of the traditional understand- (which Jones invites us to entertain) that God is malevolent, human beings are ing of omnipotence . This, however, should not lull one into accepting the logic put in a position to effect their own way out. Ultimately, given all these adjust- underlying the charge itself. As I will show more explicitly in my treatments ments, the God of humanocentric theism turns out to be a mildly protean deity : of Ash'arism, Maturidism, and Traditionalism, even if God were the source now omnipotent, now not; now omnibenevolent, now neither . Indeed, in sum- 11114 of human suffering, it would not follow that humans must acquiesce thereto marizing the merits of this "new variety of theism, Jones indirectly concedes or that the traditional, theistic concept of omnipotence is incapable of sustain- that, "there is no significant difference between his variety of theism, on the , 115 ing an ethic of resistance ."' On the contrary, resistance could be just as effec- one hand, and atheism or humanism, on the other . tively promoted through a theistic approach as through a secular one . All that is Again, this sophisticated denudation-cum-deicide is executed and justified required is a scriptural mandate or directive to resist : "Fight them until there is in the name of subverting divine racism and quietism . As I have shown, how- no [attempt to normalize] domination [fitna]" (2:193; 8:39) ; "Fight the patrons ever, Mu'tazilism, which would brook no compromise on God's benevolence, of Satan" (4:76) ; "Permission has been granted to those who fight because let alone existence, shows the way to a clear alternative . they have been wronged" (22 :39) ; "[Normalized] domination [fitna] is worse But perhaps the real advantage of Mu'tazilism emerges when we move than murder" (2 :I9I) .112 The Mu'tazilite imperative to command right and beyond these theoretical (read theological) concerns to more practical consider- forbid wrong is little more than a shorthand translation of these and similar ations . The whole point of negating or minimizing God's role as valuator and injunctions . And all of this stands independent of any theological conclusions sovereign was to empower Blackamericans to act in their own behalf . Denud- about whether God or human beings are responsible for moral evil . Indeed, ing God of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, in other words, was meant to Mu'tazilites have never contended that a man who is drowning, for example, in liberate Blackamericans from the psychological shackles that might otherwise a flood that has been caused by God must be left to drown because to do other - thwart their decision to act . Having laid this theoretical groundwork, Jones wise would be to oppose God's will. appears to leave the question of practical effectiveness to mere chance . Having Turning to the matter of omnibenevolence, similar observations apply to succeeded, in other words, in bringing Blackamericans to see themselves as Jones's critique and proposal . Jones insists that sustained black suffering can- functionally ultimate and endowed with the independent ability to direct their not be reconciled with belief in the inherent benevolence of God . In his view, efforts toward crushing oppression, Jones leaves a singularly glaring question any honest assessment of the ontological fact of black suffering would require L, unanswered: What if Blackamericans' oppressors are more numerous, more 70 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU`TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 71 powerful, more resolved, better organized, and possessed of bigger, better, and action, the interests of poor blacks were forced onto the national agenda and more guns? into the psyche of the dominant group with an urgency not seen in decades . To be sure, Jones recognizes that paralysis may result "when it is thought Now, Jones theoretically recognizes the persuasive (i.e., indirect) power of God that it is impossible to terminate one's suffering ."116 He also concedes that his to change human behavior and conditions ."' But his fear that any reliance all-is-in-human-beings'-hands philosophy has "a certain potential for defeat . on God will result in quietism pushes him back into the arms of the "all-is- ism."117 In other words, Jones clearly understands that taking God out of the in-man's-hands" approach . Taken seriously, this denies the most vulnerable equation may actually render Blackamericans more rather then less vulnerable . members of society the psychological advantage of being able to appeal to a But rather than address this liability head on, he simply tosses the ball back God of great power and influence, despite the paucity of their resources relative into the court of those who would appeal to God's intervention : to those of the people identified as their oppressors . Beyond this, even where the God of Mu'tazilism fails to intervene in behalf the claim of God's support for black liberation lacks substance until of the oppressed in God's capacity as God of nature, God's omnibenevolence the black theologians refute the charge of divine racism. . . . Until they dictates that God indemnify them in the life to come . This was at the heart provide a more effective theodicy, the choice is between (a) a black of 'Abd al-Jabbar's doctrine of `iwad . Jones, of course, would only smile-or hope based on God as a white racist and (b) one based on God as perhaps scoff-at such notions . For from his perspective, doctrines such as functionally neutral relative to human affairs .118 `iwad are of a piece with the "pie-in-the-sky" theodicies that locate in suffering Harold Cruse once noted (in another context) that "two cultural negatives can- some redeeming quality that ends up promoting quietism .'22 In truth, however, not possibly add up to a cultural positive in society at large .""' Similarly, it 'iwad does not at all carry a message of "Grin and bear it," let alone "May I would seem, two theological negatives cannot add up to a theological positive. have seconds, please?" It merely assures the oppressed that if their struggle to If the theodicy of the black theologians fails to subvert divine racism and quiet- fulfill their duty to "command right and forbid wrong" should result in earthly ism, it is not at all clear why this should render a theodicy that fails to subvert failure, this is not the limit of what they can expect . defeatism any more effective (and any more acceptable) as a basis for black In sum, in the name of subverting quietism, Jones not only marginalizes liberation . God but attempts to secularize (from the Latin saeculum, "the present world") In all fairness, it must be admitted that the Mu'tazilite restriction of God's religion. His stern rejection of what he calls "theodicies of last resort" and power to the domain of nature raises similar liabilities . But the Mu'tazilites "beyond human comprehension theodicies" 123 leaves no room for any incen- part with Jones in their positive assessment of the nexus between nature and tives or valorizations beyond this life . But if the numbers and resources of history (what Jones found problematic in Rubenstein) 120 and in their blanket the oppressor far exceed those of the oppressed, how are the oppressed better rejection of secularism, which would render God powerless and irrelevant to served by an ideology that frees and urges them to fight but offers neither aid in human welfare beyond the occasion of death . These departures restore reli- this life nor compensation in the next? And how is the disincentive to act, given gious efficacy to Mu'tazilism, while working to stave off the threat and tragedy the odds, to be overcome if there is nothing greater to look forward to than vic- of defeatism . tories so precarious and so improbable that they must always be miraculously In contradistinction to Jones, the Mu'tazilite removal of God's direct snatched from the jaws of defeat? control over human history does not render God "neutral relative to human It is here, perhaps, that we come to ore of the most serious and paradoxi- affairs ." On the contrary, God's omnibenevolence (`adl) dictates that God act cal weakness of Jones's entire system . As the celebrated Christian theologian in the interest of justice and human welfare, even in God's "limited" capac - Reinhold Niebuhr (d. 1971) once noted, "contending factions in a social strug- ity as God of nature . This was the whole point of 'Abd al-Jabbar's concept of gle require morale ; and morale is created by the right dogmas, symbols and lutf Even if God does not intervene in a manner that negates or undermines emotionally potent oversimplifications .""' Given the odds with which they are autonomous human agency, human perspectives and decision-making can be invariably confronted, Blackamericans would seem to have a far greater need for affected by forces that are controlled by God but reside outside the human incentives and motivators that are potent and death-defying than they have for psyche. The recent hurricanes in the Gulf region of the United States (Katrina handsome doctrines that are rationally defensible but, precisely for that reason, and Rita) are perhaps ample demonstrations of this . Independent of black vulnerable to rationalized compromise . In the ostensible interest, however, of 72 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MU'TAZILISM AND BLACK THEODICY 73 strengthening Blackamericans' resolve, Jones actually ends up denying them in identity-in-difference-all of these continue to stoke feelings of oppression functionally powerful incentives on the basis of a logic that is largely alien to that are simply beyond ontological suffering . In such a context, to embrace a the theistic sensibilities that have traditionally defined them as a people . worldview in which there is no appeal to any power or universe of meanings, To be sure, Jones's concern about quietism is both understandable and values, or incentives, no rational procedures, methods of thinking, or regimes well placed . But quietism is not necessarily the only or most pernicious threat of sense higher than or outside the control of one's oppressors, would hardly confronting Blackamericans, especially not in the post-civil rights era . Equally seem to be in the interest of an oppressed people . This, however, would appear if not more problematic is "assimilative escapism," neither honestly embracing to be the denouement of Jones's approach. At one point, Jones acknowledges nor actively opposing oppression but simply trying to stay out of the oppres- that "a movement away from theism should come only if it is convincingly sors' way-by using the oppressors' definitions of success, beauty, intelligence, demonstrated that it is a hindrance to black liberation .""' Given this review of and reason to disguise the provenance of the parameters that define and cir- Mu'tazilism, one would have to question whether this prerequisite has actually cumscribe one's life, all the while feverishly toiling to neutralize the oppressive been met. weight of the oppressors' expectations by dressing these up in failed appro- priations that render one a more fervent and exaggerated proponent of the oppressors' values than the oppressors themselves . The result is that oppres- sion is neither confronted and overcome by resistance nor embraced through quietism but merely sidestepped and placed beyond critique through a mildly deliberate agnosia that impedes one's ability to recognize or acknowledge the normalized domination that circumscribes one's life . In his provocative book The Intimate Enemy, the Indian scholar Ashis Nandy reminds us that one of the most corrosive and surreptitious effects of defeat is the imperceptible adoption of the perspective and standards of the victor :

Defeat . . . is a disaster and so are the imposed ways of the victor . But worse is the loss of one's "soul" and the internalization of one's victor, because it forces one to fight the victor according to the victor's values, within his model of dissent. Better to be a comical dissenter than to be a powerful, serious but acceptable opponent . 121

Indeed, Nandy adds, "the dominant idea of rationality is the first strand of consciousness to be co-opted by any successful structure of institutionalized oppression.""' These articulations go to the very heart of the reality confronting post- civil rights (or what some have called "postmodern") blackness . While much of the legal, institutional, and sociocultural ontological suffering has been overcome (e.g., lynchings and other terrorisms, Jim Crow, legalized segrega- tion, economic apartheid), the elusive quest for autonomous authenticity, the oppressive weight and mustiness of ideological orphanhood, the failure of oth- ers to recognize one as a producer rather than a mere consumer of the values and parameters that inform one's life choices, the disquieting alienation and frustration born of the vagueness of one's historical roots, the gnawing vexa- tions laced with the inscrutable sweetness of a black cultural orthodoxy steeped 3 Ash'arism and Black Theodicy

Early Development and Basic Contours of Ash'arite Theology

I begin my discussion of Ash'arism with a famous exchange that reportedly took place between the movement's founder, Abu al- Hasan al-Ash`ari, and his one-time teacher, Abu `Ali al-Jubba'i, the leader of Basrian Mu'tazilism .

AL-ASH`ART : 0 shaykh, what do you say regarding the fate of three people [in the Hereafter] : a believer, an unbeliever, and a child? AL-JUBBA'T : The believer is among the [honored] classes ; the unbeliever is among the doomed ; and the child is among those who escape [perdition] .

AL-ASH`ARI : If the child should desire to ascend to the ranks of the honored, would this be possible?

AL-JUBBA'T : No. It would be said to him, "The believer simply earned this rank through his obedience, the likes of which you do not have to your credit ." AL-ASH'ART : If the child should respond, "This is not my fault . Had You allowed me to live longer, I would have put forth the same obedience as the [adult] believer"?

AL-JuBBA'i : God would respond, "I knew that had I given you [additional] life, you would have disobeyed Me, for which you ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 76 ASH ' ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 77

would have been punished. So I observed your best interest and caused may refer to God as "nature" (al-tab'), as long as one understands al-tab' to you to die before reaching the age of majority [at which time you would be "active" (fa`il), "living" (hayy), "powerful," (qadir) and "knowing" have become responsible for obeying Me according to the religious law] ." While the Ash'arite concept of God would thus part ways with the scientific

AL-ASH`ARI : What if the [adult] unbeliever should then protest : "0 Lord, depiction of the cosmos as a "machine with no mind,'71 the Ash'arites would You knew my fate just as You knew his . Why did You not observe my emphatically agree that God is free to operate independent of any humano- best interest as You observed his?" centric purposes or goals . Indeed, even where God appears to act in the inter- est of human beings, the Ash'arites insist that God is not bound to do so . In At this, al-Jubba'i is said to have fallen silent.' this context, destruction, suffering, ruthless competition, and the like are all This story, repeated in several versions,2 underscores the depth and tenacity chalked up as simply part of God's autonomous modus operandi . And, pace of the Ash'arite commitment to a construction of omnipotence that emphati- the Mu'tazilites, there is nothing intrinsically "evil," let alone "unjust," about cally rejected the Mu'tazilite contention that God is bound by values, principles, any of this ; nor does it in any way impugn the idea of the existence of God or norms that lie outside God's self-determined dictates . On this understand- itself. For, as I will show, for Ash'arites, the whole notion of what is generally ing, God is both free and empowered to do as God pleases, and nothing that taken as evil is not a reflection of ontological reality but merely of human per- J God does can be adjudged evil or unjust, regardless of its substance and regard- spective. And while they would reject the modern scientific notion of humans less of its effect on Creation. As al-Ash`arI himself later explained, "The Lord as "accidental products," they would nod in basic agreement with Keith Ward of all being, exalted and holy be He, is not under any law [shan `ah]; nor is there when he rhetorically soliloquizes, "It seems odd to say that there are absolute anyone above Him who could impose limits on or define boundaries for Him ; and objective moral obligations, when morality is so obviously an invention nor is there above Him anyone who could permit, forbid, command, or dis- of a bunch of primates crawling around the surface . . . . Is it rational to follow courage Him."3 those beliefs as though they were absolute moral obligations, when I know This was the upshot of al-Ash`arl's cross-examination of al-Jubba'i . As a that they are not?"' Mu'tazilite, al-Jubba'I would brook no compromise on God's omnibenevolence Again, the Ash'arites would part with modern science in their emphatic and its effective priority over God's omnipotence . By showing, however, that insistence that God possesses, among other attributes,' knowledge (or "intelli- God's actions do not always conform to human interests, al-Ash`arI aimed gence"), will (iradah), and absolute, autonomous power (qudrah). It was through to show that the Mu'tazilite construction of omnibenevolence was an invalid qudrah, in fact, that God, according to them, would come to exercise absolute, basis on which to found or judge God's actions . The whole point of his adult autonomous control over the universe . Indeed, this is the theological grund- unbeliever's protest was to show that God's omnibenevolence could only be norm of Ash'arism : God, al-la-hu, is omnipotent in the fullest sense of the tra- upheld by conceding that it was independent of the effects of God's actions on ditional understanding of the term,' being both all-powerful and autonomous humans, since the unbeliever was clearly not served by God's allowing him to (from the Greek autonomos, "having its own laws") . Similarly, God, according reach majority. Such a concession would only confirm, of course, the validity to the Ash'arites, is not merely the first efficient cause ; God is the only efficient of the Ash'arite prioritization of omnipotence over omnibenevolence, as well cause.lo as the dictum that nothing could undermine God's unbound prerogative or sit This construction of omnipotence was the ultimate ground of the Ash'arite c in judgment over anything God did. ommitment to the principle of occasionalism . According to this concept, when As a Rationalist movement, Ash'arism embraced the aforemention ed. - Paper is put to fire, the fire burns not through any natural power inhering in its proof of God's existence, 4 as a result of which it denied the propriety of acc essence but by the continuous creative activity of God. What gives the appear- - dents, including affective traits, inhering in the divine . On this understand ance " of fire possessing this power is the fact that God habitually-to be distin- ing, if one places divine agency behind such concepts as "genetic mutation guished from necessarily-causes burning to occur on the coming together of or "natural selection," the Ash'arite perspective on the Creator's relationsh'P re and paper. In the absence of such divine activity, no such burning would c to Creation might be likened, in some ways at least, to the modern scientifi or could occur; for fire has no intrinsic, effective power of its own . Nor does notion of the universe as an impersonal, autonomous machine . Indeed, the anything else besides God . In short, everything in the universe is wholly con- one Ash'arite 'Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdad' (d . 429/1037) states explicitly that hngent on God, the absolutely and only noncontingent. 78 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH'ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 79

This commitment to occasionalism and the rejection of secondary cause s theologians." Unlike the case with Mu'tazilism, however, the historical origins . The movement's founder was Abu al-Hasan `All was a sustained and explicit signature of Ash'arism, a position they have stead . of Ash`arism are well known . Bishr al-Ash`ari, a descendant of the Prophet's Companion fastly upheld down to modern times . Thus, we read in the work of Ahmad b. Isma`ll b . `All b al-Dardir (d. 1201/1786), Sharh al-kharidah al-bahiyah, which is still read by Abu Musa al-Ash'arl . Al-Ash`ari was born in Basra sometime between students at al-Azhar university today : 260/873-74 and 27o/883 ;16 he died around 324/936 .17 Basra, as is well known, was the birthplace and a major center of Mu'tazilism, and al-Ash`arl began his Ordinary entities have no inherent effect on the things with which theological career as a devotee of this school . As the top pupil of the aforemen- they come in contact. Fire does not have the effect of burning, food tioned Mu'tazilite chief Abu `All al-Jubba'I, he would probably have succeeded does not have the effect of offsetting hunger, and water does not have his master as leader of Basrian Mu'tazilism had he remained a Mu'tazilite . the effect of quenching thirst or producing vegetation . . . . Nor does But al-Ash`ari lived in the aftermath of the (in)famous Inquisition (Mihna), a knife have the effect of cutting ; nor does anything have the effect of from which the nearly martyred Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d . 241/855) emerged as a repelling or attracting heat or cold, not by nature, not as an efficient hero." The bold and unpretentious Traditionalism championed by Ibn Hanbal, ['illah] cause nor by any inherent power that God implants in these with its newly acquired bona fides for speaking truth to power, appealed to the things. Rather, the efficient cause in all these matters is God alone, primordial religious sensibilities of the masses and elite alike ." Meanwhile, by His sheer choice [of producing these effects] on the occasion Rationalist heavy handedness had cast a cloud of opprobrium over Mu'tazilism, 11 of these encounters . and it was in this context that al-Ash`arl declared his break with his alma mater This commitment to occasionalism (at least according to the dominant trend (as it were), aligning himself, at least apparently, with the theology of Ahmad among Ash`arites) 12 was not limited to what are usually understood to be "natu- Ibn Hanba1.20 At the mosque at Basra, it is reported, al-Ash`arI mounted a chair ral occurrences" but extended to human acts as well . As one contemporary and proclaimed at the top of his lungs : Ash'arite theologian summed it up, "When a man strikes a glass with a rock Whoever knows me, knows me . And whoever does not know me, and breaks it, the striking, the breaking, and the breaking up all occur by the let me introduce myself. I am so and so, the son of so and so . I used creative act of God, man's role being limited to that of Acquisition [kasb] .13 On to believe in the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an and that this understanding, humans, like everything else, have no intrinsic power of humans would not have an ocular vision of God [in the Hereafter] their own but are absolutely and wholly contingent upon God. God, meanwhile, and that humans are the authors of their own evil . I now repent is absolutely unique, autonomous, and unrestricted in God's power. From this of all of this and abandon it, embracing that which repudiates the conception flows an unrestricted, divine prerogative that effectively collapses Mu'tazilites and exposes their scandalous and defective doctrines ." divine omnibenevolence into divine omnipotence, reducing God's goodness (al-husn) and justice (al-'adl) to a simple matter of provenance : nothing God By the time of this conversion, however, al-Ash`ari had thoroughly imbibed the does can be evil, and everything God does must be just, because it issues from regime of sense that undergirded the Mu'tazilite approach. If he now identified God and falls squarely within God's unbound prerogative. with the main theological conclusions of Ibn Hanbal, he did so on the basis of Omnipotence, on this understanding, was for Ash'arism what omnibenevo - vindications grounded, in substantial part at least, in the basic postulates of lence was for Mu'tazilism . Everything that was said about God had to be recon- Mu'tazilite systematic reasoning . This regime of sense, essentially an Islami- ciled with, if not subordinated to, God's exclusive, nonnegotiable all-powerfulness cized Hellenistic one, would drive Ash'arism's reconciliation project no less (al-qudrah) . In fact, according to al-Ash`arl, God's power to create-that is, from than it drove that of the Mu'tazilites . Thus, allegorical or figurative interpreta- tion nothing (al-qudrah `ala al-ikhtira `)-was the single most distinctive attribute that (ta'wil) figured almost as centrally in Ash'arism as it did in Mu'tazilism . set God apart from all other beings (akhassu sifah) .14 From this basic commit- In fact, the Ash'arite commitment to "reason" led any number of them to ment flowed a number of subsidiary doctrines that became staples of Ash'arite question the faith of those who followed blindly or could not rationally vindi- theology and bear direct relevance to the issue of (black) theodicy. cate their beliefs .22 Ultimately, the simultaneous embracing of Traditionalist Like Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism was not a monolith ; it developed into its doctrine alongside the sustained commitment to Rationalist methodology (i .e., classical form over several generations and at the hands of several seminal Mu`tazilite-inspired kalam) has prompted a number of modern scholars to cast 80 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH'ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 81

Ash'arism as a middle-road theology ." Whatever the merits of this judgment, less so in sub-Saharan Africa . In fact, in sub-Saharan Africa, Ash'arism appears it would not be enough to move premodern (or modern) Rationalism and Tra- to predominate unchallenged. Thus, for example, the writings of'Uthman Dan ditionalism beyond the aforementioned false detente . 24 Fodio (Ibn Fad-1) (d. 1233/1817), founder of the Sokoto Caliphate and one of In the field of theology, al-Ash'ari authored three important works that have black Africa's most illustrious Muslims (and almost certainly the most well come down to us : Kitab al-Luma fi al-i'tigad (Luminousness in Belief), al-Ibanah known among Blackamerican Muslims) demonstrate a clear and unreserved , an usal al-diyanah (Clarifying the Bases of Religion), and Maqalat al-islamiyin commitment to Ash'arism .29 Indeed, a Traditionalist element would not begin wailkhtilaf al-musallin (Doctrines of Those Who Associate Themselves with to challenge Ash'arite hegemony in black African Islam until the latter half of Islam and Controversies of Those Who Offer the Canonical Prayers)-a work the twentieth century and the rise in influence of the Wahhabi and then the on heresiography and not theology per se, though it reflects al-Ash'ari's under- Salafi movements-that is, over the past fifty years or so .30 standing of numerous theological terms and concepts ." These works reveal the extent to which al-Ash'ari parted with his Mu'tazilite coreligionists beyond what he mentioned at the mosque at Basra . Later Ash'arism would confirm Relevant Details of Ash'arite Theology these departures and expand, modify, validate and override them in ways that reflect both a natural evolution and the perspectives of individual Ash'arite As mentioned, divine omnipotence was the theological grundnorm of theologians engaging subtly divergent audiences .26 After al-Ash'ari himself, Ash'arism . The most fundamental consequence of the Ash'arites' construction the major contributors to classical Ash'arism included Abu Bakr al-Bagillani of omnipotence was their emphatic and uncompromising refusal to admit sec- (d. 403/1013), Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwayni (d . 478/1085), Abu Hamid al-Ghazali ondary causes ." For Ash'arites, everything that existed came as a consequence (d. 505/1111), and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209) . 27 of God's will, and nothing that God did not will could come into existence . This All of these thinkers wrote during an era when Mu'tazilism was in steady position, assiduously maintained by Ash'arites down to the present, goes all decline within Sunnism and the real theological challenge to Ash'arism was com- the way back to al-Ash'ar himself: ing from Traditionalism . To a man, however, these scholars display a perduring God the Exalted is the creator of all temporal things . And it is not hostility toward Mu'tazilism and an almost benign neglect of Traditionalism . possible for Him to create what He does not will to exist [ma la This was probably part of Ash'arism's attempt to camouflage its Mu'tazilite yuriduh] . As He says, "He [is] the Executor of all that He wills [fa'al li roots in the aftermath of the Inquisition . At the same time, Ash'arism sought ma yund] ." Similarly, it is not possible for anything to exist in God's to reinforce the hopelessly shaky detente with Traditionalism, by echoing a dominion without His having willed its existence . For were anything shared contempt for a common enemy and reiterating the fact and propriety to exist in His dominion without His having willed so, this would of al-Ash'ari's theological matricide . Ultimately, this approach would go a long imply one of two things: (a) that God is oblivious and heedless, or way in sustaining the image of Mu'tazilism as a theological pariah . As a result, (b) that He is weak, impotent, feeble, and incapable of realizing what to this day, Mu'tazilism can be invoked in Sunni circles only as an iconoclastic He wills . Since none of this can apply to God, it is impossible for any- protest against a putatively stale theological status quo. thing to exist in His dominion without His having willed so ." For its part, Ash'arism is today the most popular and widespread of the Rationalist schools among Sunnis, certainly in the central lands of Islam . In Earlier (in chapter 2), I showed that the Mu'tazilite 'Abd al-Jabbar drew a dis- addition, it enjoys significant diffusion in outlying areas, including the West, tinction between God's not willing a thing and God's actual willing against it. On though in America this applies much more to Muslims from overseas than it this distinction, it was possible for God to preserve God's monopoly on ultimate does to Blackamericans . Historically, Ash'arism was espoused by a seemingly Power while transferring to human beings a created power via which they could disproportionately high number of Shafi i and Maliki scholars . Hanafis rarely bring into existence acts that God had not directly willed ." From an Ash'arite identified with it, and Hanbalis virtually never. Within the Shafi'i and Maliki Perspective, this kind of human agency threatened God's omnipotence and schools, however, Ash'arism was always contested and challenged by an ever- Implied impotence and or a lack of control on God's part . For in their view, God present Traditionalist element, certainly in the central lands .28 This seems to had to instantiate and control the actions (i.e., physical occurrences in the world) have been less the case in the Islamic West (excluding Spain, perhaps) and even 6"' of all actors, God as well as others . As al-Ash'an summarizes the matter, 82 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH'ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 83

L If someone other than God [e.g., a human] commits an act that God Said `Abd al-Jabbar : "Glorified be He Who is above committing does not will to exist, the occurrence of this act must be detested by evil." Said al-Isfara'ini: "Glorified be He in whose dominion nothing God. And if God detests [yakrahu] this occurrence, He must reject occurs without His permission." Said 'Abd al-Jabbar : "Does it. The very occurrence of this act, however, would mean that it took our Lord will that He be disobeyed?" Said al-Isfara'ini : "Could our place whether God willed so or not . And this describes weakness and Lord be disobeyed against His will?" Said `Abd al-Jabbar : "If He feebleness .34 denies me guidance and decrees my perdition, does He commit a good or an evil act?" Said al-Isfara'ini : "If He denies you something Again, for al-Ash`ari, and the Ash'arites, God's omnipotence implied God's that belongs to you, then He commits an evil act . But if He denies complete control over the affairs of the universe . Moreover, in contradistinction you something that belongs to Him, He simply singles out for His to the Mu'tazilites (as well as Jones, Rubenstein, et al .) God's power and control mercy whomsoever He pleases."38 extended over both nature and history. This was all captured in an often-cited dictum for which al-Ash`ari claims unanimous consensus (ijma`) : "Whatever Again, from an Ash'arite perspective, the propriety of God's actions resided God wills happens, and whatever He does not will does not" ("ma sha' Allahu exclusively in their provenance . By rejecting the notion that there were any kana wa ma lam yasha' lam yakun") . 35 standards external to God's self-determined prerogative and that anyone other To be sure, both al-Ash`ari and the Ash'arites after him recognized the than God shared in God's ownership of the universe, the Ash'arites were able existence of such infelicities as unbelief and disobedience . In fact, al-Ash`ari to deny anyone the right to second-guess God's actions . On this understand- states explicitly that unbelief has more currency in the world than does belief ." ing, God could create unbelief, corruption, disobedience, and all other man- Given the Ash'arite understanding of divine omnipotence, such an admission ners of vice without in any way violating the dictates of divini . would obviously require explanation. Here, however, rather than retreat from To this "provenance argument" (as it might be called) the Ash'arites- their commitment to God's omnipotence as complete and all-encompassing and especially later Ash'arites-added a more substantive vindication that was power and control, the Ash'arites unflinchingly resign themselves to unre- grounded in their subscription to what George Hourani calls "theistic subjec- stricted divine prerogative, openly affirming that unbelief, disobedience, and tivism."39 This doctrine basically states that value, that is, good or evil, does not the like all occur as a consequence of God's will, reiterating all the while that inhere in things themselves but comes to them from without, in the case of the had God not willed that these things exist, they would not-indeed, could not- Ash'arites, from scripture . This is essentially the same position embraced by come into being ." modern proponents of what is called "weak ontology," with the exception that This raises a number of obvious questions . If God is the actual creator of instead of scripture, nontheistic weak ontologists negotiate value through an unbelief, disobedience, and the like, how can God be exonerated from evil? If open-ended process of excavation, inquiry, and contestation .40 Good and evil, belief, obedience, unbelief, and disobedience are all ultimately God's creation, in other words, have no independent existence or identity of their own but are how is it just to reward and punish human beings for these things? Conversely, essentially whatever one can argue them to be . Interestingly, weal-, ontologists if God has complete control over the universe, how is it possible for God to be tend to suspect religious people, particularly those who believe in an omnipo- disobeyed in the first place? Indeed, is it even proper, in this context, to speak tent God, of being unable to resist the tendency to superimpose scripture-based of human agency in any meaningful sense? values on to the world, as if these, coming from God, necessarily reflect onto- logical reality Recall that it was precisely the question of justice (`adl) that informed the . As Stephen White, a major proponent of weak ontology, notes : Mu'tazilite prioritization of omnibenevolence and fueled their attack against It is perhaps the case that religions with an omnipotent creator-god their adversaries. The Mu'tazilism responded by reiterating the postulate that have the most difficulty avoiding strong ontological formulations . none of God's actions, qua God's actions, performed by God as proprietor of Creation by a subject entails intentionality, and the created are the universe, could be considered evil or unjust . Their logic in this regard, presumed bound in some way to conform to those intentions . What as well as the counter-perspective of Mu'tazilism is captured in an often-cited then could provide a more powerful sense of affirmation and self- exchange that allegedly took place between the Mu'tazilite chief al-Qadi 'Abd righteousness than to know and feel that your words and will have al-Jabbar and the Ash'arite theologian Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini : tapped directly into divine intentionality .41 II 84 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH`ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 85

From an Ash'arite perspective, such an understanding merely echoes what and "evil" were technically inapplicable to God's acts . As al-Juwayni summed IJ they consider to be the Mu'tazilite fallacy . The Mu'tazilites had insisted that up the matter, "from the perspective of one who is subject to neither harm nor ."45 On this understanding, revelation merely confirmed or uncovered the moral qualities (positive or neg a. benefit, there is no [moral] distinction between acts tive) of the actions it addressed . For the Baghdadis, this was a confirmation of God's act of creating unbelief, disobedience, and the like could not be deemed the inherent characteristics of acts themselves ; for the Basrians, it was a confir- "evil" in any objective or absolute sense. Indeed, later Ash'arites, for example, mation of the mental schemas that God had pressed on the human psyche as al-Ghazali, would push the dictum that God's actions were beyond moral judg- the normative prism through which uncorrupted humans naturally viewed the ment to the absolute limit and indulge it with Stoic resolve : world." Scripture, in either case (with the exception of purely "religious obser . It is permissible [ja'iz] for God not to place any obligations upon vances," (`ibadat, such as ritual prayer or fasting) brought virtually nothing to human beings ; and it is permissible for Him to impose upon them these actions that was not already there . For this reason, humans could discern obligations beyond their capacity; He may subject them to pain with good and evil independent of revelation and were justified in even holding God no offsetting recompense and with no infractions having been com- to a standard of morality so deduced. For, again, this standard was assumed to mitted on their part . And He does not have to do what is in their best be grounded either in the objectively observable features of a God-created reality interest; nor does He have to reward their obedience or punish their (the Baghdadis) or in a primordial psychological schema of norms and values disobedience ." that was a direct result and reflection of God's will (the Basrians) . By contrast, the Ash'arites insisted that revelation neither disclosed nor Indeed, confirmed the moral qualities of the acts it addressed. Rather, scripture actu- If God imposes duties upon humans and they fulfill them all, this established ally these qualities as an essentially arbitrary act of divine fiat . In the does not obligate Him to reward them . Rather, if He wills ]in sha'], absence of divine address, human acts had no moral qualities of their own, He rewards them ; and if He wills, He punishes them ; and if He wills positive or negative . Thus, the Ash'arites insisted that (I) prior to revelation, He simply annihilates them with no resurrection . Indeed, it would humans were morally bound by nothing ; (2) outside the dictates of revela- be all the same were God to forgive all the unbelievers and punish all tion, there was no reliable, objective index of morality; and (3) even within the the believers .47 scope of revelation, it was the divine address and not any inherent qualities, either in acts themselves or in the human psyche, that established the moral Because the Ash'arites recognized no objectively reliable human experience status of human deeds .43 (al-shahid) on the basis of which God (al-gha'ib) could be held to any standard `iwad, For the Ash'arites, the only objective grounds for determining the "good" of conduct, they also parted with the Mu'tazilites on the necessity of or "evil" of human acts was the reward and punishment of the Hereafter . This, or indemnification. Recall that indemnification was necessary in order to moreover, could be known only on the basis of scripture .44 On this understand- offset the evil effects of certain acts of God that resulted in human suffer- ing, all socially constructed schemes of morality fell short of providing any ing. Since "evil," however (like "good"), according to the Ash'arites, was a authentic standard of conduct for humans or God. At the same time, inasmuch hopelessly subjective category and since God was above it in any case, there as God was above the rewards and punishments of the Hereafter, scripture was essentially nothing for God to "make up" to humans who suffered from could only indicate the propriety of God's actions. It could not dictate any of God actions.48 this to God. As for lutf the Ash'arites actually acknowledged that it was possible for In sum, the Ash'arites insisted that temporal reality, or the world of human God to engage in it,49 but they used this very possibility against the Mu'tazilites . experience, provided no basis for true moral judgments, neither for humans Al-Ash`ari, for example, argued that if God could use acts that God caused to nor for God, neither prescriptively nor descriptively . Prescriptively, the only occur outside the human psyche to promote or facilitate belief and obedience, true basis of morality was scripture . Descriptively, the true basis of what gener - God could similarly use other acts outside the human psyche to bring about ally passed for morality was simply the degree of harm or benefit (real or poten - unbelief and disobedience .50 Ultimately, al-Ash`ari's argument came down tial) that an act or occurrence was deemed by humans to bring to humans . As to the charge that the Mu'tazilite defense of lutf merely posited what it was for God, God was above both harm and benefit and, thus, the categories "good" Supposed to prove : that God necessarily acts in the interest of human beings . 86 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH`ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 87

In the absence of such proof especially given the inexplicability of so much the sole or primary point of having power is to place it in the service of desire . human suffering, Ash'arism insisted that there was no basis for denying that While the Ash'arites affirmed that God could use God's power for this purpose, God might act intentionally in a manner that humans find harmful or morally they denied that God was bound to do so and that God's choice not to implied objectionable . weakness or incapacity on God's part. As al-Ash`ari points out, God clearly All of this underscores, again, the depth of the Ash'arite commitment to decrees the death of the prophets and the continued existence of Satan, while divine omnipotence and its entailment of complete power, prerogative, and none of this can be said to represent God's normative preference. S G At the same control. Precisely this commitment, however, forces the question of how it is time, the mere occurrence of these realities cannot be taken as proof that God possible for humans to disobey God . In his critique of traditional omnipotence, was compelled to act in the manner God did, that God could not have avoided Charles Hartshorne raised this question and went on to insist that those who creating Satan or that God was incapable of permanently forestalling the death supported "tyrannical" and "despotic" (read traditional) notions of omnipo . of the prophets . Indeed, the latter is precisely what God will do in the case of tence could only respond by engaging in various forms of doublespeak .51 Some everyone in the Hereafter . theologians (he mentions Aquinas by name) argued that God does not actually What all this comes down to is that for an infinity of reasons-as a test, a create sin or disobedience but merely permits them to come into being." Others, punishment, an incentive for humans to strive to do better-God may actively he contended, argued that "God decides that the creature shall perform act A, and intentionally cause to come into existence (or not to come into existence) any but . . . that the act shall be performed `freely.' Hartshorne's response to all of number of things that violate God's normative preferences' Thus, in response this is to throw up his hands in frustration and protest that none of this can be to the question of how it is possible for an omnipotent God to be disobeyed, reconciled with the notion-upheld by all traditional (Western) constructions the Ash'arites would affirm that it is only God's normative preference that can of omnipotence-that God decides and determines everything. be and often is defied, not His ontological decree, which is not and cannot be For their part, the Ash'arites (especially later Ash'arites) would introduce defied, the latter not the former being the true ground of God's omnipotence . a modification that would both avert the need for doublespeak and allow for Indeed, everything that God ontologically wills necessarily occurs ; and nothing a possibility that seems to have escaped both Hartshorne and the (Western) that God ontologically wills against can occur . theologians he so harshly critiques . This was the view, emphatically rejected by But if God's ontological decree cannot be resisted and His omnipotence Mu'tazilites such as 'Abd al-Jabbar, that there is a distinction between God's extends over both nature and history, what room can there be for human "will" as God's ontological decree and God's "will" as God's deontological decree, agency and responsibility? This was at the heart of the Mu'tazilite insistence or normative preference, that is, what God loves, is pleased with, and desires on free will and human efficiency and the parallel charge they made against to occur .54 According to this distinction, not everything that corresponds to their adversaries of jabr, or crass determinism ." From a Mu'tazilite perspec- God's normative preference necessarily came into existence . On the contrary, tive, either humans have free will and the power to create their own actions, only what God wills via God's ontological decree necessarily occurs . On this or they do not. If they do not, they cannot-or at least not justifiably-be held understanding, God could will, that is, ontologically decree, the existence of accountable for actions that are at best only virtually theirs . unbelief-in which case it would have to come into being and could not do so The Ash'arite response to this contention was the famous doctrine of kasb or without God having willed it-even though this did not correspond to what Acquisition, whose whole point was to reconcile human agency with God's all- God wanted or was pleased with in the normative sense . Conversely, God encompassing power and control . Traditionally, the reaction to kasb has been to might will-that is, prefer, desire, or be pleased with-the occurrence of belief regard it as an attempt to reconcile irreconcilables . 'Abd al-Jabbar, for example, or obedience without ontologically decreeing it, in which case neither belief nor repeatedly dismisses it as "non-sense" (ghayr ma`qul) .59 And the Traditionalist obedience would, or could, come into existence ." Ibn Taymiya counts it among the three untenable doctrines that scholars made From an Ash'arite perspective (and I will present other versions of this fun of and dismissed as fantastic .'( 'The modern scholar Muhammad M . Sharif with Maturidism and Traditionalism), while God exercised complete con- concludes that "the Ash'arite view on this problem [of free will] is not free from trol over the universe, this did not mean that God only caused to come into logical and ethical difficulties ."61 And Merlin Schwartz writes glibly, "one has existence that which corresponded to God's normative preference. What this to come to the conclusion that the human action is in the power of both God comes down to is a conception of power that is devoid of the assumption that and man at once ." Even later Muslim theologians who supported the doctrine 88 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH'ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 89 recognized how intellectually taxing it could be .G3 Thus as late as the twelfth/ Note, however, that this created power is not provided as a general "block- eighteenth century, Ibn Abi 'Udhbah (d grant" (as it were), like a power-cell of a specified strength and duration that can .1172/1758) pointed to the popularity of the saying "More subtle than al-Ash`ari's kasb."64 be used at its owner's complete discretion . Rather, this power is dispensed in an kasb from the Outside Islamic studies, however, scholarship in modern philosophy sug . emphatically occasionalist fashion, which is what distinguishes kasb, gests that such an attitude may be premature . In fact, modern philosophy more general transfer of power embraced by Mu'tazilism . With in other has produced an entire movement, compatibilism, that rejects the presum ed words, God grants only a specific power for a specific action at a specific instant, amely the instant at which a human being wills an act. Prior to this, according incompatibility between free will and various forms of determinism ." While n . it would be a distortion to count Ash'arism as a medieval version of compati . to the Ash'arites, humans do not have the efficient power to perform the act bilism,66 much of the discussion among compatibilists, semicompatibilists, Moreover, the power that humans receive in consequence of willing a particu- and incompatibilists seems to turn on competing definitions of freedom, will, lar act is only effective in bringing about that specific act. It is a power, in other power, and ability . The cumulative effect of these discussions is to point up the words, that has no effectiveness outside this particular willed or intended act distinction between will, that is, choice, desire, or freely made decision, and and no capacity to bring about any other act .73 In sum, according to the Ash'arite power, that is, the ability to translate choices, desires, and freely made decisions version of kasb, 74 God continuously and instantaneously grants human beings into ontological reality ." a temporally created power (qudrah hadithah, qudrah muhdathah) with which to This distinction, routinely overlooked by critics and students of Ash'arism perform specific, individual acts, in response to an infinite number of petitions alike, turns out to be key to a fair and proper assessment of kasb. For clar- communicated to God through the human will (iradah) . ity's sake, I must reiterate that in developing this doctrine, the Ash'arites were In this way, the actual occurrence of all human acts remains contingent responding to the Mu'tazilite claim that human beings create (khalaqu) their upon God, and God remains the final determiner of whether or not an act own actions, which the Ash'arites understood as implying that someone other occurs, since the created power God grants by way of kasb ultimately remains than God has the power to create . The Ash'arites were not responding, at least outside of human control." On this understanding, the Ash'arites are able to not primarily, to any claim about whether humans freely will or choose their remain true to their interpretation of the dictum "Whatever God wills hap- actions. In other words, the Ash'arites were concerned primarily not with psy- pens, and whatever He does not will does not" ("ma sha' Allahu kana wa ma chology, or the noetic instantiations and psychological impulses leading up lam yasha' lam yakun") without in any way compromising, let alone denying, to human actions, but with ontology, that is, the actual production of human human agency .", At the same time, God is ultimately exonerated of responsi- actions as events in the physical world . bility for moral evil, inasmuch as the human will functions as the chronological In light of this concern, the general Ash'arite approach, certainly from the first cause of human action, since, without its petitioning God for the power to time of al-Bagillani on, was to divide human actions into (I) will (iradah) and (2) act, there could be no (intentional) human action, good or evil . power (qudrah)-or in some locutions "capacity" (istita`ah)-and then insist that Notice in all of this that the issue of free will (i .e., in the sense of freedom for an (intentional) human act to take place, both are required.68 Given their occa- of choice) effectively recedes into the background . This is because on the sionalist cosmology and their construction of divine omnipotence, Ash'arites Ash'arite construction, whether or not humans are possessed of free choice is would not credit human beings with any self-subsisting, efficient power of their ultimately tangential to the issue at hand . For, again, the Ash'arites' ultimate own.G9 Accordingly, in order to be able to produce an individual act, humans concern was with refuting the claim that humans created their own actions must receive or "acquire" the requisite power from God (that is, as a created (i.e., brought them into actual existence), not with whether or not they freely power) ." Kasb, then, referred to this created power that is granted by God and chose them. In this context, it becomes clear that the surfeited emphasis on through which humans are rendered able to translate will into action . Thus, as free will, in the sense of freedom of choice, that has dominated Western stud- al-Ash`ari states, humans "acquire" actions (i.e., become muktasib) in that actions ies of Muslim theology invariably privileges, even as it distorts, the Mu'tazilite occur through a temporally created power (qudrah muhdathah) that is granted by frame of reference, while ever-so-subtly misrepresenting Ash'arism (and the God.7' Al-Bagillani, meanwhile, defines kasb as "the undertaking of an action via Other schools) . For such an approach essentially takes freedom of choice an [acquired] power that occurs at the [same time and] strata [of the action] and as the ultimate litmus test for "good" theology and then goes on to judge distinguishes this action from involuntary movements such as palsy ."72 Ash'arites (and the others) on the basis of how directly or not they appear 90 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH`ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 91 to affirm "free will ." The negative implications of this approach can be see n indemnify them for any unearned suffering God inflicts, they are not denying in the tendency among Western scholars to accuse the Ash'arites of flatly that God may or even does do these things ." They are simply denying that God denying "free will ."" must do these things, especially on the basis of historically informed or socially For their part, however, by insisting that the actual occurrence of a human constructed notions of justice or goodness that are independent of God's self- act was contingent not on free choice but on the acquisition of a specific, created disclosure . power, the Ash'arites were able to minimize the role and importance of human choice by signaling that human will alone, however free or restricted, is not an efficient cause of human action. Moreover, on this argument, they were able Ash'arism and Jones to proceed without-at least not explicitly-taking a firm or consistent posi . tion on the matter of free choice at all . Thus, Ash'arites demonstrate a range It is clear from the foregoing that Ash'arism is poorly reconciled with the cri- of attitudes toward independent human choice, from explicit denial-as, for tique and proposal of Jones . To begin with, the Ash'arite insistence that God example, in some of the articulations of al-Ash`arI 78-to coquettish ambiguity, is sovereign over nature and history plays, at least prima facie, directly into as in al-Bagillani,79 to simple admission, as in al-Razi,SO to explicit affirmation, Jones's critical construction of omnipotence, according to which God is directly as in al-Juwayni . Indeed, al-Juwayni, while undoubtedly aware of the state- implicated in the suffering inflicted by humans on other humans . Similarly, ments of al-Ash`arI and other predecessors, goes so far as to insist that anyone on his critical indictment of "traditional omnipotence," which the Ash'arites so who doubts, let alone denies, that human actions occur through human choice boldly promote, Jones would deny Ash'arism any claim to the argument that (ikhtiyar) is either "afflicted with mental illness or stubbornly obsequious and rebelling against the evil of unearned suffering entails dissatisfaction with the unyieldingly ignorant ."" acts of humans but not of God . In short, on prima facie grounds, at least, both In sum, kasb enabled the Ash'arites to avert the charge of crass determin- the charge of divine racism (i.e., that God is responsible for black suffering) ism (jabr), affirm (or least not have to deny) human freedom of choice, and and the inevitability of quietism (i.e ., that humans can only oppose oppres- maintain their commitment to a traditional construction of omnipotence . By sion by opposing what God decrees) would appear at first blush to have little insisting that human will contributes to the instantiation of intentional acts, difficulty sticking to Ash'arism. they were able to maintain that only those acts that are the object of human will Meanwhile, Jones's concept of humanocentric theism finds no support come into being . This undermined the Mu'tazilite charge ofjabr, which would whatever in Ash'arism; nor does his ultimate refusal to credit God with omnibe- only occur where a human wills one thing and is compelled to perform another nevolence; nor does his "all-is-in-man's hands" approach, his notion of man as or where he or she has not willed at all and is compelled all the same to act ." the ultimate valuator, or his particular notion of man and God as codetermin- At the same time, by insisting that human will is not efficient, the Ash'arites ers.84 In sum, while Ash'arism appears, on the one hand, to be vulnerable to were able to maintain that only what God (ontologically) wills, as reflected in Jones's every critique, on the other hand, it either contradicts or raises serious God's grant of a specific, created power, can come into being . This confirmed problems for every major aspect of Jones's proposal . the dictates of traditional omnipotence that placed God in complete control Yet it is precisely (though by no means exclusively) with Ash'arism that over everything that actually comes into being . one begins to see how the absence of a Muslim voice may have impoverished As I move into my analysis of Ash'arism and Jones, one last, critical point the discourse on black theodicy . For with Ash'arism (and, as I will show, must be borne in mind. In both its doctrines and its locutions, Ash'arism must Maturidism and Traditionalism) we are introduced to a universe of alternative be understood as a conscious response to Mu'tazilism (among other competi - definitions, presumptions, and ways of viewing things that were neither pro- tors) . Most particularly, the Ash'arites were responding to Mu'tazilite claims vided by Mu'tazilism nor considered by the religious and existentialist thinkers about what is incumbent on God, based on values and principles that God had Jones relies on . Most notable in this regard is the alternative to the presumed not identified as God's own . From beginning to end, it was this obligation that contradiction between divine omnipotence and human agency, the distinc- the Ash'arites rejected, not the possibility (or even the reality) of the various acts tion between ontological decree and normative preference, and the religious or tendencies the Mu`tazilites attributed to God . Thus, when the Ash`arites commitment to a weak rather than a strong moral ontology . Together, these deny, for example, that God must act in the interest of humans or that God must adjustments combine to (I) complicate-if not frustrate-the charge of divine 92 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH`ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 93

racism; (2) refute the claimed necessity of quietism; (3) question the deni This disavowal of divine approval of human evil is further reinforced by al (or indictment) of divine omnibenevolence by questioning the categorical evil of the Ash`arite doctrine of Acquisition (kasb) . Kasb establishes-or at least allows black suffering ;SS and (q.) reveal, as did Mu'tazilism, the superfluousness of a for-human choice and agency ; at the same time, it rejects the notion that nontheistic or secular approach . human choice is an efficient cause of human action, effectively highlighting . On this understanding, Recall that the charge of divine racism rested on the contention that if G od the distinction between psychology and ontology is omnipotent, God must have the power to eradicate black suffering . If God human beings remain responsible for their actions as psychological events, does not, this can only mean that God does not want to .86 As Jones put it, ,if even if they do not ultimately control whether, how, or to what extent these God abhors human [read black] suffering, then how are we to account for its psychological choices translate into reality. While humans remain thus con- powerto perform their actions, that power is granted actual presence? The fact of human suffering calls into question the sovereignt y tingent upon God for the of God, or else it suggests that He is not exercising His transcendence for the on the basis of a plainly acknowledged human choice (ikhtiyar), however free good of black liberation. "87 Black suffering, in other words, is either consistent or restricted various Ash'arite thinkers may hold that choice to be ." Human or inconsistent with God's sovereignty and preference . If it is consistent, God choice, in other words, is a sine qua non of human beings' inhumanity to must be a "white racist." If it is not, God cannot be omnipotent . human beings. I have shown, however, how, on an Ash'arite approach, there is no neces- Together, these adjustments pose a serious challenge to Jones's two main sary connection between divine disinterest in black liberation and God's will . contentions : that God is or must be a white racist and that human beings can . As for divine ing-or, more properly, ontologically decreeing-black suffering . Indeed, on an only accommodate divine omnipotence via a piety of quietism Ash'arite approach, the occurrence of black suffering would no more indicate racism, even if God can be said to decree black suffering ontologically, this is divine malevolence toward blacks than the existence-indeed pervasiveness- not the same as God decreeing the psychological impulses (in the oppressors) of unbelief and disobedience in the world or than the death of the Prophet that set this reality in motion. On the contrary, were humans to exercise their Muhammad indicates divine malevolence towards the Prophet and the teach- choice (ikhtiyar) in a manner that promoted sociopolitical good, God would be . In such light, it is dif- ings of Islam .88 It is true that the wisdom (hikmah) behind these occurrences equally active in translating these choices into reality may be difficult, if not impossible, to discern." But it is certainly a stretch to ficult to see how God can be declared a white racist, when God stands equally . turn this into proof positive of divine maliciousness or deceit . prepared to confer existence on the choices of blacks as on those of whites Again, the Ash'arite distinction between divine decree and divine prefer- The fact'that whites' choices happen to result in harm to blacks could only be ence implies a conception of power that flows against the grain of most of an indictment of God on the assumption that (i) God was directly responsible Western (and some Eastern, e.g., Mu'tazilite) thought . For the Ash`arites, for white oppressors' choices ; (2) God granted whites the ability to choose (and one does not possess power for the sole purpose of realizing one's wants . As therefore qualify to have their choices translated into reality) while denying this such, the occurrence of events that do not reflect one's ideals is not necessar- to blacks; or (3) God translated the choices of whites into reality while refusing ily a contradiction of one's possession of power . This is what the Mu'tazilites the same to blacks . None of this corresponds, however, to anything found in were unable or unwilling to accept; and it was also too counterintuitive (and Ash'arite theology, certainly not in terms of Ash'arism's going opinion. perhaps too dyspeptic) for Jones and those on whom he relied . But when As for the issue of quietism, the Ash'arite insistence on God's omnipo- al-Ash`ari (and the Ash'arites after him) insist that unbelief and disobedi - tence notwithstanding, there is nothing in Ash'arite theology that would imply ence cannot exist independent of God's will, they are saying precisely that that God is or must be pleased with sociopolitical oppression ; nor, therefore, an omnipotent God who exercises a complete and absolute monopoly over is there any parallel obligation for oppressed humans to be pleased with such . ultimate power can intentionally call into being things that do not meet with On the contrary, as al-Ash`ari himself explicitly insists, God's approval. And for the Ash'arites, this in no way connotes impotence , confusion, or anything approaching divine schizophrenia . In short, both There are afflictions, such as natural catastrophes, illness, disease, . the idea that God might be incapable of preventing black suffering and the loss of money, children and the like, that we must bear with patience of idea that God is or must be pleased with its occurrence would be summarily And there are afflictions, such as unbelief and all the various rejected by Ash`arisrn . forms of disobedience, that we are not to bear with patience ."91 94 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH`ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 95

In his condemnation of black suffering, Jones appears to proceed on the At bottom, in addition to signaling the distinction between God's ontologi . cal decree and normative preference, this depiction highlights Ash`aris m,s basis of a moral objectivism reminiscent of the strong ontology of the Baghdadi recognition of scripture as an independent and self-validating deontological Mu'tazilites or the psychological naturalism of 'Abd al-Jabbar (i.e., that the authority. On this recognition, despite their tracing every occurrence to God's human psyche is naturally programmed to impose a proper moral order on the . On this approach, rather than prove his claim-that is, on the basis of ontological decree, the Ash'arites turned to scripture as the true and only repo s, world) itory of God's normative preference . On this understanding, they insisted that an objective, validateable definition of evil-Jones simply assumes and asserts a Muslim might not only be justified but obligated to oppose any number of the evil of black suffering and in so doing effectively places this beyond cri- . For their part, the Ash'arites summarily reject any type of moral objectiv- occurrences that could only be assumed to exist as a result of God's ontologi . tique cal decree. Certainly no less than Mu'tazilism-if not more, given their eleva- ism and insist that all claims to objective morality mistake personal or group tion of scripture over reason as the basis of morality-the Ash'arites would interest or socially constructed morality for a transcendent, universal, moral uphold the scriptural injunction "Command right and forbid wrong" to both order that is ontologically inscribed on Creation. the letter and spirit of revelation . This clearly flies in the face of any piety of Of all the classical Ash'arites, none argues this point more emphatically quietism . Indeed, one might consider as an instance of concrete evidence the than the celebrated Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d . 505/1111) . He insists that all fact that the great champion of the Muslim victory over the Crusaders, Salah moral judgments that are not based on scripture are unavoidably relativistic al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin in the West), was-like so many other defenders of and bound to the perspective of the agents or objects of the acts in question . the Faith-a dedicated proponent of Ash'arite theology ." Ultimately, what people habitually identify as "good" (hasan) or "evil" (gabih) is Beyond this, the doctrine ofkasb, or Acquisition, reinforces (again) the dis- simply what they deem to serve or contradict their interests (gharadl pl . aghrad) . tinction between God's wishes and those of humans, inasmuch as it recognizes Thus, a single act will often turn out to be "good" to one group or individual human choice as an entity separate and distinct from God's . On this distinc- and "evil" to another." tion, it becomes possible, if not obligatory, to oppose sociopolitical oppression One who has no religion will deem his affair with another man's without implying opposition to the will or wishes of God . In sum, pace Jones, wife to be a good thing, counting his conquest of her a bounty . And Ash'arism establishes that there is no necessary connection between belief in he will consider the act of one who exposes his breach to be evil and divine omnipotence and quietism . Indeed, quietism-that is, as an absolute, as term the latter an evil-doing snitch . A religious person, meanwhile, opposed to a pragmatic principle-has nothing to do with Ash'arite theology . will term the latter a good-doing guardian of community standards . These adjustments clearly pose a challenge to Jones's concept of omnip- And each of these persons will simply describe these actions accord- otence and its relationship to divine racism . Having said as much, they do ing to their interests .` not necessarily lead us all the way out of the woods on the matter of omnibe- nevolence . For it is one thing to prove that God is neither responsible for nor Al-Ghazali acknowledges that intelligent people, be they religious or not, com- pleased with human suffering, quite another to confer innocence on God's monly prefer telling the truth to lying or saving a drowning man to abandon- choice not to stop it, either by preempting the occurrence of evil impulses in ing him, even where they are under no religious obligation to do so and where human beings themselves or by refusing to translate them into action. God's doing so serves no apparent interest and may even entail liabilities . He points failure, in other words, to prevent black suffering might be reasonably argued out, however, that personal interest is often an ulterior rather than an apparent to contradict any claim of divine omnibenevolence . or material motive, in which capacity it can be as obscured from the doer of an From an Ash'arite perspective, however, God's failure (or refusal) to inter- act as it is from outside observers . In other words, while acts of apparent altru- vene on behalf of blacks would only contradict God's omnibenevolence on the ism may appearto serve no palpable interests, they invariably promote a certain assumption that black afflictions are objectively and categorically evil . But this visceral satisfaction whose status as an interest is no less solid and motivating the Ash'arites would refuse to concede . Indeed, their weak moral ontology ends for all the ease with which it may be obscured ." up threatening the very core of Jones's campaign, providing them, at least in In a similar vein, al-Ghazali acknowledges the seemingly universal tena- theory, with another means of preserving God's omnibenevolence even in the ciousness of certain moral convictions, for example, the evil of lying, that face of (black) human suffering . are grounded in communal consensus . He warns, however, that while large 96 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING ASH`ARISM AND BLACK THEODICY 97

numbers of intelligent people may agree on the moral status of an act, it cannot society, a prerequisite that ultimately only God can fulfill and, thus, only God's be assumed that their agreement was based on any shared a priori insight or revelation can impart . on any quality that inhered in the act itself. Rather, some of the parties to this Take the statement "Justice is good, lying is evil" and present agreement may base their conviction on revelation, while others may simpl y it before the court of primordial reason, which affords a priori defer to the majority, in order to curry favor, promote some other interest or knowledge . Then imagine that you have not lived with anyone nor AIL simply avoid criticism ; still others may come to such convictions on the basis mingled in the midst of any religious community. And imagine of faulty reasoning or false evidence ." Accordingly, consensus can neither be that you have not been ingratiated with any tradition, that you have taken to establish the inherent moral quality of an act nor even to represent, not been refined by any upbringing or primed with the teachings of necessarily, the true beliefs of all of the parties to it .91 . Then see if you are able to doubt the truth of In sum, in al-Ghazali's view, all categorical moral judgments that are not any teacher or guide . You will find that you are able to do so and that grounded in scripture entail the fallacy of universalizing the particular such a statement . More- . And the only reason that you find difficulty over, even the judgments that are grounded in scripture are only universally doubt readily comes conducting this test is that the state in which you exist contradicts valid in the sense that God will, ceteris paribus, always reward or punish them, these instructions .102 not in the sense of conforming to any ontological index of right and wrong, Scripture, in other words, does not disclose or uncover right and wrong, it sim- In all of this, al-Ghazali is simply reiterating what Ash'arites as a whole held ply posits these, as an extension of God's absolute and unrestricted prerogative . in general agreement.103 On this approach, black suffering could neither be This "theistic subjectivism" and its corresponding repudiation of moral objec- considered a categorical evil nor pointed to as a contradiction of God's omnibe- tivism is both true and representative of what al-Ghazali would consider to be nevolence. To be sure, it may be counted an evil from the perspective of blacks . "Islamic morality."98 To him, the veracity of this brand of moral reasoning is But Ash'arites would retort that no moral claim that reclines on the perspec- clear to all fair-minded, reasonable people who have not been misled by any of tive of its claimant can make any pretensions to objective, ontological morality . three common tendencies . Otherwise, on such a criterion, blacks-including Jones-would be no more First, there is the tendency to abstract personal biases and preferences into justified in declaring God to be a white racist for allowing black suffering than false universals, whereby an individual deems an act to be universally good or the Ku Klux Klan would be in declaring God a black racist for preventing them evil because it is good or evil to him or her . Here, al-Ghazali notes, the interests from carrying out their ambition to dominate blacks . Meanwhile, on the basic of an individual or group appear to their minds "as if they represent the inter- Ash'arite construction and valuation of omnipotence, all of God's acts, includ- ests of the entire world."" ing God's refusal to intervene to stop evil, remain good in that they fall within Second, the seductive power of tradition, socialization, and upbringing God's unrestricted prerogative, in which capacity they cannot be deemed cat- leads to the tendency to ignore exceptions and equate what is usually or rou- egorically (or objectively) evil . On this understanding, God remains omnibe- tinely good or evil with what is always so. Thus, lying is deemed a categorical nevolent, despite the unobstructed presence of black suffering in the world . evil only because instances where it might be good (e.g., where one's spouse As with Mu'tazilism, it is clear that Ash'arism's responses to Jones's charges prepares that inedible meatloaf) are routinely overlooked ."' of divine racism and quietism render the move to a secularized "humanocen- Third, the Pavlovian interface between experience and cognition promotes tric theism" superfluous. Like the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites were hardcore the mental habit of transferring the good or bad associations of things to one's theists. Unlike the Mu'tazilites, however, they would not support the notion of understanding of the essence of things themselves . Thus, a man may refuse the functional ultimacy of human beings, neither in terms of the definition of to eat honey because he cannot disassociate it from the stool of infants ; or he objective good and evil nor in terms of humans creating their own acts . This, may fail to recognize a woman's beauty because she has a pagan name ; or he however, does not condemn the Ash'arites to acquiescence in the face of suf- may reject a theological doctrine simply because it is associated with a rival or fering . Indeed, among the broader implications of their weak ontology is that discredited school.'°' While it justifies the denial of the categorical evil of black suffering, it is equally In sum, al-Ghazali's whole point is that true moral judgments are ahistori- emphatic in denying the opposite. In other words, white domination of blacks cal and are attainable only by those who transcend the predilections of self and can no more be counted a categorical good than it could be counted a categorical 98 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING evil. At the same time, by reducing all quotidian moral judgments to a matter of perspective, the interests of blacks would be just as valid-assuming that they did not collide with scripture-and could be just as fervently pursued as those of any other group . Black perspective, in other words, has no less, even if it has no more, a prima facie claim to validity than that of any other group . 4 That said, the incentive to rebel against oppression may be slightly weaker in Ash'arism-and certainly less immediate-than it is in either Jones's humano . centric theism or Mu'tazilism . This is because in Ash'arism, the legitimacy of Maturidism and Black black interests and the propriety of revolution, rather than being assumed-that is, as a universal given-would have to be negotiated through scripture . This Theodicy process, in turn, both assumes and demands a level of interpretive acumen and a degree of religious commitment that is required neither by humanocentric theism nor by Mu'tazilism . Yet it is precisely in this increased centrality of religiosity and what could be called "scripturalism" that Ash'arism may go beyond Mu'tazilism in coun- tering the debilitations of the secular status quo, by preserving access to a uni- verse of meanings that is beyond the control and manipulation of the dominant Early Development and Basic Contours group. This is clearly the implication of Ash'arism's recognition of scripture as of Maturidite Theology a transcendent, nonnegotiable,"' self-authenticating deontological authority. As long as scripture identifies oppression and injustice as evils (which it does), Maturidism is the rationalist school that grew out of the theological it will be difficult, if not impossible, for oppressors to place their self-serving articulations of Abu Mansur al-Maturldl (d. 333/944) .' Like interests beyond critique and rationalize their way to normalized regimes of Ash'arism, it developed into maturity in conscious opposition to domination, which enable them to enlist and sustain their victims' psychologi- Mu'tazilism (and to a far lesser extent Traditionalism) . Also as with 05 cal complicity .' Ash`arism, the various regimes of sense percolating in Maturidism's Finally, the Ash'arite doctrine of kasb, or Acquisition, provides additional place of birth and early development informed its overall approach . tactical support. For even where the guns or numbers or resolve of the oppres- Unlike, however, the dramatic debut of al-Ash`ari, charismatic sor are greater than those of the oppressed, God can always be appealed to to dissident and founder of a consciously corrective movement, both deny, modify, or muffle the grant of power needed to translate the oppressors' Maturidism's eponym and the movement as a whole emerged quietly will into reality . In this way, Ash'arism can provide a steady antidote not only out of relative obscurity . Indeed, more than a century would pass on to quietism but to the kind of hopelessness, despair, and paralysis that are al-Maturidi's critical reflections before they attracted any significant the relentless and loyal companions of overwhelming odds . At the same time, attention from Mu'tazilite, Ash'arite, or Traditionalist competitors .2 based on its weak ontology, Ash'arism can accommodate, support and perhaps Abu Mansur Muhammad b . Muhammad b . Mahmud point the way to alternative universes of meaning and normativeness, thereby al-Maturidi was born in the central Asian village of Maturid (or frustrating, or at least complicating, the process of ideological/psychological Maturit), northwest of the city of Samarqand, sometime probably cooptation via the medium of false universals. In this capacity, Ash'arism can between 235/850 and 247/861 .1 Little is known about his genealogy, not only support the cause of liberating blacks from the vexations of ontological and the occasional claim that he descended from the Companion suffering, it can also aid in insulating them from some of the tragedies of what Abu Ayyub al-Ansari seems suspect . What is known is that he was might be called their postontological condition . raised in the Hanafi legal tradition, with a direct line of teachers going back to Abu Hanifa himself.4 Abu Hanifa, however, while providing doctrinal direction, was not the actual source of 100 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 10I al-Maturidi's theology. Claims that al-Maturidl was merely a theological At bottom, the Maturidites subscribed to the same basic composite of permutation of Abu Hanifa probably reflect more of an attempt to traditionaliz e reason invoked by the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites, which included the ban on Maturidism than they do actual history. accidents inhering in the divine . At the same time, however, the Maturidites Al-Maturidi reportedly authored several theological works, most of which remained leery of being identified with Mu'tazilite hermeneutics, appearing are lost.' The most important one, however, Kitab al-tawhid, has come down at times to align themselves with Traditionalism . Thus, for example, when to us. As Mustafa Ceric notes in his study of this work, this was al -Maturidi's interpreting the meaning of God's "hand," they ostensibly straddled a position Summa Theologia.' Yet for all its sophistication, detail, and comprehensivenes s, between repudiating the figurative interpretations (ta'wil) of the Mu'tazilites it did not assume the place in Muslim theological history one would expect. The and denying that such verses could be taken in their full literalness to the point primary reason for this was, oddly, the infelicitous state of its Arabic . Indeed, of implying tashbih -anthropomorphism, that is, that God has a hand resem- its language was so impregnable that the fifth/eleventh-century Maturidite Abu bling the human hand." While rejecting, however, the specific interpretations al-Yusr al-Bazdawi, whose line of teachers went directly back to al-Maturidi, of the Mu'tazilites, that is, that "hand" refers to God's power and capacity, justified his decision not to adduce it in support of any of his arguments by the Maturidites insist that there are multiple modes in which such references occur fact that it was "mildly impenetrable, prolix, and difficult in its arrangement ." 7 in the Qur'an . These include figurative modes, where, "hand" is intended to All of this supports the notion that classical Maturidism was not simply mean "dominion," "bounty," or even "disobedience ." And then there is a mode a gloss on al-Maturidi's Kitab al-tawhid but was the product of subsequent in which the plain sense of "hand" is to be left intact, bi la kayf-that is, without Hanafi doctors in greater Khurasan and, especially, Transoxiana .8 While attempting to explain or speculate about its modality-and, bi la tashbihthat removed from the intellectual center in Iraq, these two regions constituted an is, without assuming created likenesses to God ." This applies to "physical" enormously rich and vibrant market of ideas . Something of their grandeur is attributes, such as God's "hand," as well as "affective" attributes, such as God's reflected in the statement of the renowned philosopher and medical genius Ibn "disgust" (sakhat), "pleasure" (rida), and the like." Sina (d. 428/1037), recalling his experience in Bukhara : "I saw books whose In the end, however, this dual commitment is largely settled in favor of a very names are yet unknown to many-works I had never seen before and have reiteration of the ban on likening God to created entities . Thus, for example, in not seen since ."9 This intellectual richness was not limited to the strictly ratio- treating the hadith on God's "foot," Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi reverts to a formal- nal sciences . All of the compilers of the canonical collections of hadith-al- istic argument that alters the vowel on the word gadam (foot) such that it reads Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Da'ud, al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasa'i, and Ibn Majah-hailed gidam (sempiternity) and the report can be explained as a simple reference to from this general area . God's sempiternal knowledge that the unbelievers would not believe ." This is Like its rationalist counterparts, Maturidism held "reason" to be indispens- followed by allegorical interpretations of those verses and hadiths that typically able to the religious enterprise . Al-Maturidi himself opens Kitab al-tawhid with exercised Mu`tazilites, for example, those declaring God's "coming," "descend- a section entitled "The Invalidation of Blind Following and the Obligation to ing," "mounting the Throne," and "sending down" the Qur'an .11 Against the Know Religion by Way of Proofs" ("ibtal al-taglid wa wujub ma`rifat al-din bi Mu`tazilites, however, al-Nasafi explicitly (and conspicuously) defends the non- al-daltl") .10 This is immediately followed by a section identifying reason (al- createdness of the Qur'an and the beatific vision of God in the Hereafter ."' `aql) and prophetic transmission (al-sam') as the only bases of religious knowl - As with Mu'tazilism, early Maturidism subdivided into two distinct edge." The relationship between these two is neatly summarized by the later schools, the Samarqandi and Bukharan . Later Maturidites, however, harmo- Maturidite Kamal al-Din al-Magdisi : If a univocal report (nass) that is of limited nized the most important differences between the two, with the Samargandi diffusion (ahadi) appears to contradict reason, we conclude that the narrator expression emerging as the more authoritative . Indeed, in his groundbreak- lied, spoke inadvertently, misheard, or misquoted his or her source . If this ing study of the movement, Wilfred Madelung implies that any major distinc- report turns out to be widely diffused and congruent (mutawatir)-for example, tions between these two schools had virtually disappeared by the late fourth/ a verse from the Qur'an-we conclude that it could not conceivably be univocal tenth century, 19 which presumably explains his identifying Maturidism itself but must be zahir : that is, it bears both an apparent and one or more less appar- as "the school of Samargand . "20 Besides al-Maturidi himself, I shall rely on the ent meanings, in which case it must be interpreted according to one of its less following major contributors to classical Maturidism : Abu al-Yusr al-Bazdawi apparent meanings that comports with reason ." (d. 493/1099), Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafi (d. 508/1115), Abu al-Thana' Mahmud 102 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 103 b. Zayd al-Lamishi (d . c. beginning 6th/12th century), Najm al-Din 'Umar al-Razi-none produced anything even approaching the depth and compre- al-Nasafi (d . 537/1142), Kamal al-Din Ibn al-Humam (d . 861 /1455), Kamal hensiveness of Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasal's Tabsirat al-adillah. al-Din Muhammad b. Muhammad b . AbI Sharif al-Magdisl (d. 905/1499- Maturidism has sustained its place within Sunnism down to the present, 1500), and 'Abd al-Rahim b . 'Ali b. al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh Zadeh (d . 944/ 1537). with active adherents in Turkey, Central Asia, the Balkans, parts of the Middle With the exception of al-Lamishi (believed to be a student of Abu al-Mu'in al . East, and the subcontinent. Unlike Ash'arism and Traditionalism, however, Nasafl), 21 al-Magdisi, and Shaykh Zadeh, all of these scholars appear on Ceric's Maturidism has remained exclusive to one juristic school : Hanafism. This list of the most important Maturidites . Similarly, all of the earlier scholars are partially explains its limited diffusion among Muslim Americans, especially Central Asian Hanafis, as the focal point shifted toward the Middle East only Blackamericans: patterns of immigration, the state of religious education in later-Ibn al-Humam being an Egyptian, al-Magdisi apparently a Palestinian, the Muslim world, and the study-abroad choices and opportunities of Muslim and Shaykh Zadeh an Ottoman Turk ." Americans have simply not resulted in much formal contact with Maturidism . As an expression of Muslim rationalism, Maturidism has tradition . In the end, however, this could translate into a certain advantage for Maturldism, ally taken a back seat to Ash'arism, though it has long been recognized as given the present climate and the nature and priority of calls for reform . Being equally orthodox .23 At first blush, one is inclined to implicate Ash'arism itself the least known of the theological schools (in the West), Maturidism could ben- in this relegation . Ash'arites dominated the field of heresiography, and all efit, in other words, from its lack of association with the status quo, alongside of the major works on this subject ignore al-Maturidi and the Maturidites . the parallel, if unspoken, prospect that it may constitute the untried theological Al-Shahrastani does not cite either in al-Milal wa al-nihal; nor does al-Ash'ari panacea that is firmly grounded in and identified with Sunni Tradition . in Magalat al-islamiyin ; nor does al-Baghdadl in al-Farq bayna al firaq; nor does Ibn Hajar in Lisan al-mizan ; nor does al-Suyuti in Tabagat al-mufassirin (Classes of Exegetes), despite al-Maturidi's authorship of a well-known exege- Relevant Details of Maturidite Theology sis, Ta'wilat al-qur'an (a.k.a. Ta'wilat ahl al-sunnah) .24 This lack of reference, however, is also found among non-Ash'arites . Al-Nadim (d. 380/990) exhib- While al-Maturldl (d . 333/944) and al-Ash`ari (d . ca. 324/936) were immedi- its it in al-Fihrist, as does Ibn Hazm (d . 456/1064) in Kitab al-Fist." In his ate contemporaries, they apparently never engaged each other . Facing a com- vast polemical output, the Traditionalist Ibn Taymiya (d . 728/1328) makes mon enemy, however, in Mu'tazilism, and drawing on ideational backgrounds only oblique and passing references to Maturidites .26 Indeed, even 'Umar that yielded identical constructs of reason, their theologies converged on many al-Nasafl (the Maturldite!) makes no mention of al-Maturidi in al-Aga'id points. This convergence continued into classical Ash'arism and Maturidism al-nasafiyah, despite that work's eventual status as a major source for and led to attempts in later centuries to smooth over differences . The most Maturidite instruction .27 influential of these efforts was the famous poem al-Nuniyahfi al-khilaf bayna None of this should seduce one into thinking that Maturidism was a mar- al-ash`ariyah wa al-maturtdiyah, by the Ash'arite propagandist Taj al-Din ginal or insignificant movement . It was popular among the Arabicized Per- al-Subki (d. 771/1370) . This work reduced the differences between the two sians of eastern Khurasan and was the preferred school of the Central Asian schools to thirteen points, seven of which were identified as "terminological," and Ottoman Turks, not to mention its eventual identification with Hanafism (lafzi) leaving purportedly only six that were "substantive" (ma`nawi) .29 in general . From its central Asian origins, it spread all over the lands of Islam, Ceric has alluded to how overindulging such efforts can distort Maturidism from Egypt in the west to China and India in the east . In this capacity, at least by forcing it into a posture of being viewed as a more or less failed or success- during the high Middle Ages, it almost certainly attracted as many formal fol- ful version of Ash`arism .30 This is no less true in the present case, the organi- lowers as Ash'arism or Traditionalism, and certainly more than Mu`tazilism- zational utility of taking Ash'arism as a point of reference notwithstanding. As for why it lagged behind Ash'arism in prestige and reputation, there are I might begin, however, by pointing out that from the early Maturidite per- simply no convincing explanations, though several scholars have proffered spective, it was actually Ash'arism that lapsed into theological irregularity, a suggestions.28 One thing, however, is certain: Maturidism's relative obscurity judgment that denied them immediate inclusion under the designation Ahl was unrelated to its having any less sophistication than Ash'arism . Indeed , al-Sunnah wa al Jama`ah (the Party of Sunna and Communal Cohesion) . This of the great classical Ash`arites-al-Bagillani, al-Juwayni, al-Ghazah, even and similar terms (e.g., Ahl al-Hagq, the Party of Truth) were used by early 1 0 4 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 105

Maturidites in abundance but were reserved exclusively for them, only extend- Yet Maturidites routinely cast themselves as the theological enemies ofMu'tazilism, ing to include Ash'arism over time." Indeed, from a Maturidite vantage point, while looking on the Ash'arites as perhaps political adversaries but, increasingly the differences with Ash'arism were far more numerous and substantive . One as time wears on, more or less theological fraternal competitors ." need only consult Shaykh Zadeh's Nazm al fara'id wa jam' al fawa'id, where There are at least two probable reasons behind this Maturidite attitude no less than forty differences are identified." And according to Madelung, the towards Mu'tazilism . First, in Iraq, early Hanafism had long been associated Ottoman Maturidite Kamal al-DIn al-Bayadl (d . after 1083/1672) cites some with Mu'tazilism and even produced a number of important Mu'tazilite theo- fifty differences ." Meanwhile, in addition to glossing over intra-Maturidite con- logians. As what eventually became "Maturidism," however, spread among troversies, comparisons with Ash'arism tend to minimize the extent to which Central Asian Hanafis and from there to the central lands of Islam, Hanafism Maturidites agreed with Mu'tazilites (or Traditionalists) against the Ash`arites .34 developed a strident impulse to rid itself of all traces of and associations with In fact, the relative frequency of this alignment led some to conclude that it was the increasingly discredited Mu'tazilite "heresy. 1140 actually Maturldism that constituted the middle road, i.e., between Ash'arisrn Second, and probably most important, Maturidism broke with Mu'tazilism and Mu`tazilism! 3 S and united with Ash'arism in a mutual rejection of secondary causation. In fact, Whether one endorses or negates this alleged middle-road status, it is clear Maturidism appears at times to go beyond Ash'arism in this regard, in word that there was substantial ground shared between Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, and if not in substance. For example, the Ash'arite-leaning al-Taftazani States that Maturldism, particularly around the cluster of issues connected with the mat- the "shaykhs from Transoxiana," i .e., Maturidites, exaggerated to the point ter of theodicy . The following chart lays out the basic positions of all three of condemning the Mu'tazilites as polytheists (mushrikin) for affirming that schools. humans created their own actions-a charge confirmed by the writings of al-Bazdawi, Abu al-Mu'in al-Nasafi, 'Umar al-Nasafi, and al-Lamishi .41 Simi- Mu'tazilism Ash`arism Maturidism larly, in defense of occasionalist cosmology (in which God enjoys an exclusive

Husn/qubh Yes No (Buhkaran) No/ monopoly on all self-subsisting power) Abu al-Mu`In al-Nasafi condemns as (Samargandi) Yes unbelief (kufr) the notion that medicine, doctors, or clothing have an inherent Can impose impossible No Yes (Buhkaran) Yes/ as opposed to occasionalist ability to heal, cool, or warm the body . In all of these duty (Samargandi) No" instances, al-Nasafi insists, these things must be regarded as simple media Kasb No Yes Yes (aabab/s .42 Must observe human Yes No No . sabab), God being the only efficient cause interest This emphatic commitment to traditional omnipotence brought the 'Iwad (must) Yes No No Maturidites to see Mu'tazilism as a corrosive force whose theological sensibili- Lutf (must) (Basrian) Yes/ No No ties, if left unchecked, would invariably undermine religion (Bagdadi) No . Like the Ash'arites, Can reward unbelievers No Yes No but with perhaps a sharper point, they feared that if God's unrestricted preroga- God can do as God No Yes No tive, which God's absolute monopoly over power implied, could be denied or pleases even challenged, God could be forced into a negotiated relationship with human Free will (choice) Yes Yes Yes Humans create own Yes No No beings, resulting in a normative religiosity whose terms were partially dictated actions by humans . This was anathema to the Maturidites'43 and it was their anxiety in God can do evil No 37 No 38 Yes this regard that informed such strident depictions of Mu'tazilism as the follow- Moral ontology Strong Weak "Soft" ing by Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafi :

Of the twelve issues considered, the Maturidites agree with the Mu'tazilites As for the Mu'tazilites, they begin and end by rivaling God . They say on between three to five and with the Ash'arites on six . (The Ash'arites agree to Him: You are obliged to act in accordance with what is best (al-as with the Mu'tazilites on only one, free will-differences in detail notwithstand - lab) for us. And it is incumbent upon You to observe our interests . ing.) On the face of it, then, there appears to be little more agreement between This is our right and Your obligation, by whose lack of fulfillment Maturidism and A sh'arism than there is between Maturidism and Mu`tazilisrn . You become unjust, tyrannical, incompetent, and derelict in Your io6 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 107

duty. And You will only maintain your Lordship and sovereignty In this way, the Maturidites, like the Ash'arites, were able to avoid both jabr (over us) by fulfilling Your obligation to us . Moreover, if we obey (crass determinism) and the challenge to God's ultimate power and control any of Your commands and show gratitude for Your having fulfilled implied by the Mu'tazilite claim that humans created their own acts . As with some of Your obligations to us, You must reward and compensate Ash'arite kasb, human choices are instantiated-that is, translated into acts/ us for fulfilling our duty toward You . You may not contradict these events in the world-via a grant of power from God received on petitions com- parameters .44 And You may not cause us to suffer in the absence municated through the human will . Abu al-Mu`In al-Nasafi explains : "God has of some prior infraction [on our part] unless You indemnify us established as the normal order [`adah] that whenever a person who enjoys for this .45 sound means and members intends [gasada] an act, God grants him the capac- ity [qudrah] with which to perform that act."49 Al-Nasafl was a major figure in classical Maturidism-regarded, in fact, as the Having said this much, there were numerous differences in detail between greatest of the Central Asian theologians ." Even after allowing for the plain the Ash'arite and Maturidite versions of kasb. To begin with, Maturidites divide ideological bias in his depiction '41 it is clear that for him nothing less than human power or agency (qudrah, istita`ah) into two distinct modes or dimen- the basic thrust and integrity of religion itself rested on the preservation of sions . The first of these is what they call salamat al-asbab wa al-alat, literally, a traditional construction of divine omnipotence . For God, according to the "operational soundness of the means and members ." Basically, this translates Maturidites, enjoyed an absolute monopoly on power, which translated into an into the capacity of the members and senses to function in their normally absolute prerogative of action and placed God above any claims that humans designed fashion-that is, for eyes to see, ears to hear, and legs to support activ- might make on God from their perspective as humans . Like that of Ash'arism, ities such as walking . The second dimension of power they call the "effective Maturidite theodicy was hardwired to this commitment . This implied, however cause" ('illah) of a specifically intended act . Abu al-Mu`In al-Nasafi, for example, (as I have shown) neither complete agreement with Ash'arism nor complete describes this power as "an accident [or phenomenon] that God creates in a living disagreement with Mu'tazilism. Rather, the Maturidite understanding of the being via which the latter is able to carry out its chosen acts" (" `arad yakhluquhu relationship between omnipotence and other divine (and human) characteris- Allah ta`ala fi al-hayawan yaf alu bihi of alahu al-ikhtiyartiyah") .50 The first of tics was identifiably its own. these two modes appears to be granted in a manner similar, if not identical to, Maturidite omnipotence, like that of the Ash'arites, placed God in com- the block-grant method I described in Mu`tazilism .51 The second mode, that plete and absolute control over nature and history . Rather than negate human is, what Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafl refers to as the actual cause (as opposed to a free will or admit secondary causation, however, Maturidites put forth their simple precondition) translates intentional acts into actual being and is granted own version of the doctrine of kasb, or Acquisition . As with the Ash'arites, this in occasionalist fashion as the object of kasb. was the key to maintaining human free choice and responsibility in the face The functional difference between these two modes of agency . resides in of divine omnipotence and the complete contingence of all ontological occur- their respective contributions to the theoretical versus the actual possibility of rences on God's creative power, over which God alone exercised an absolute acts, especially-though apparently not exclusively-moral acts . The salamat monopoly. Humans, in other words, retained, on this construction, a vaguely al-asbab wa al-alat determines theoretical possibility, both in the sense of defined freedom of choice, but the actual instantiation of their choices as acts/ whether one can theoretically perform an act and in the sense of how fully events in the world remained contingent on God. As al-Lamishl summarizes one can perform it. A person with sound limbs is theoretically able to walk the matter, and play basketball. A paraplegic, however, is not able to walk, theoretically scholars differed regarding the voluntary acts [afal ikhtiyartyah] or practically ; nor is everyone who has fully functional limbs able to play bas- of human beings . The Party of Sunna and Communal Cohesion ketball like Michael Jordan. Meanwhile, what might be called "casual" acts- affirmed that they are created by God the Exalted, while they are for example, hearing or understanding spoken words even when one is not acquired by humans. By creating, instantiating and producing these directly focusing on a speaker-require only the functional capacity of the acts, God comes to be called [their] creator . By acquiring [kasb] and senses. In other words, even without intention (moral or other), any num- performing these acts, humans come to be called their "doers" [fa`il], ber of acts remains possible. But whenever a person is denied the salamat by which they are counted either obedient or disobedient .48 al-asbab wa al-alat-that is, the senses and members themselves are rendered io8 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 109

functionally inoperative-all acts become impossible (mumtani `), theoretically used to skip rope or bake cookies ."' Speaking in this regard, al-Nasafi makes J and actually. the point that if the power granted could only be used for the thing petitioned, By contrast, the absence of the second mode of agency-that is, the effec- this would ultimately result in a form of determinism approaching jabr.59 In a tive cause or `illah-detracts not from an act's theoretical possibility but only similar vein, Shaykh Zadeh explains that the power granted on a petition to act from its actual possibility. This is because were an individual of sound senses is overinclusive and thus capable of instantiating more than just the petitioned and members to petition God for this mode of agency, he or she would receive act itself.G° All in all, one might say that whereas the Ash'arite grant works it, at which time he or she would be able to carry out the intended act . The like a commercial invoice that limits its recipient to the specifically petitioned only reason this person is not able to perform this act is that he or she does act, the Maturidite grant works more like a gift card that can be redeemed not petition for the requisite agency or effective cause . In other words, even in for a specified gift or its categorical equivalent. Still, the restrictions placed on the absence of an act's effective 'illah, the act itself remains theoretically pos- both the modality of the grant and the use of the effective power (qudrah) set sible, even if it is not actually possible . This is why, according to the apparently Maturidite kasb apart from the more general block-grant of autonomous moral dominant view among Maturidites, humans remain responsible for all actions agency endorsed by Mu'tazilism . Thus, while Maturidite kasb turns out to be for which they are endowed with the salamat al-asbab wa al-alat to perform .52 less occasionalistically efficient than the Ash'arite version, it remains all the For whether they acquire the effective cause via which these acts are actually same occasionalistic. brought into being is ultimately up to them . Beyond these details regarding the doctrine of kasb, Maturidite and What all of this comes down to is that while it is possible for humans to Ash'arite constructions of divine omnipotence evince more palpable differ- perform any number of "casual" acts on the basis of the operational sound- ences regarding the relationship between omnipotence and other divine traits . ness of the members, moral action-namely, faith (Tman) and obedience to In the Ash'arite system, omnipotence ranks above and beyond all other divine God, as a sustained, conscious activity-requires a complementary agency that attributes . Thus, God's power can operate independent of all God's other quali- God dispatches in occasionalist fashion on petitions from the human will ." ties, including justice ('adl), wisdom (hikmah), mercy (rahmah), and the like . Here, in fact, Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi is explicit in depicting faith as the result Indeed, for Ash'arites, the transcendent, omnipotent Owner of the universe of a dialectical relationship between humans and God. According to him, faith can do anything He pleases . And all God's actions are good (hasan) and just is "an act [fi`l] of humans that occurs through the guidance of God . . . actual ('adl) simply because they flow from the unassailable prerogative implied by guidance coming from God, while seeking and accepting guidance [al-istihda' this transcendent omnipotence . wa al-ihtida'] comes from humans."54 Of course, there is a difference between The Maturidites, meanwhile, isolate one attribute, wisdom (hikmah), and "wanting" to act morally and actually "willing" to do so . A person may "want" invoke it as an effective check on God's power . Whether God's wisdom is sub- to do good, as an abstract moral ideal, without actually "willing" to do good, as ordinate to or consubstantial with God's power is not totally clear . What is clear a concrete psychological act, which would include petitioning God for the effec- is that God's power cannot operate independent of God's wisdom. Thus, while tive cause via which to execute or sustain this action ." At any rate, al-Nasafi Maturidites recognize God as owner of the universe,G1 they temper this with flatly rejects both the notion that faith is an uncreated entity that is solely the the insistence that wisdom inextricably informs all of God's actions . Otherwise, doing of God (the fallacy, according to him, of the crass determinist, jabrtyah) for God's acts to be devoid of wisdom would amount to pointlessness ('abath) . and the notion that faith is a wholly uncreated entity that is solely the product And God, according to the Maturidites, in agreement with the Mu'tazilites, is of humans (the fallacy of the gadariyah, i.e., Mu'tazilites) . Rather, in order for emphatically above pointlessness . humans to acquire and sustain faith, they must both petition God and receive Al-Maturdi himself had defined wisdom (hikmah) as "placing everything strength (quwah) and assistance (`awn) from God." in its proper place" ("wad'u kulli shay'in mawdi`ah") .G2 By the time we get to Abu Maturidite kasb turns out to be slightly less occasionalistically efficient al-Mu'In al-Nasafi, however, wisdom takes on a more emphatically teleologi- than the Ash'arite version . For the Maturidites, the power granted by God on cal thrust. Al-Nasafi defines wisdom as "that which promotes a praiseworthy a petition from the human will carries both the capacity to perform the peti- result" ("kullu ma lahu 'aqibah hamidah") .63 Ultimately, as I will show, it is not tioned act and its categorical opposite s' In other words, the power granted on always possible to determine, certainly not in practical terms, what renders a petition to belie-^ might also be used to disbelieve, though it could not be the result of a particular act/event praiseworthy, other than the fact that it is IIO ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY III

wise, ultimately attributable to God . Nevertheless, this remains the basic understand . may be enough to render all of God's actions this is not the same as ing of wisdom and its inextricable relationship to divine acts that one finds in rendering them categorically good. In other words, in contradistinction to the Maturidism as late as Shaykh Zadeh (and presumably after) .G4 Ash'arites, were God to reward unbelievers eternally, damn believers eternally, At first blush, it is easy to get the impression that wisdom (hikmah) plays or impose on humans obligations they cannot fulfill, this would all have to be in Maturidism the same role that justice plays in Mu'tazilism . In both systems, deemed evil; and the mere fact that these actions issued from God would not be these qualities effectively place limits on God's power . Closer examination, enough to preempt this judgment and make these actions substantively good ." however, reveals that while there is obvious overlap between these respective he reason, however,-in contradistinction to the Mu'tazilites-that God can- deployments, the two are not identical, and their respective roles in the two not/does not do these things is not that doing so would amount to evil (and the systems are deceptively more complex. Maturidites generally concede that it would) but that doing so would amount to First, while Mu'tazilites insist that justice, good, and evil can be known by pointlessness (`abath), since it would be devoid of wisdom ." reason," Maturidites unanimously insist that the wisdom behind God's actions Here is where Maturidism distinguishes itself most markedly from both may lie beyond human apprehension." Even where one is unable, in other Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism : God in Maturidism can sponsor evil, both on the words, to identify any specific wisdom behind an act, one must surrender to the popular understanding and on the more formal Mu'tazilite definition of "that teleological necessity that all of God's acts must serve a wise purpose. This is which procures no benefit, averts no greater harm, nor serves as a justifiable further underscored by the fact that the Maturidites, in contradistinction to the recompense ."72 As concrete examples, Maturidites point to the suffering of Mu'tazilites, neither adduce nor recognize any compensatory doctrines, such children, the slaughtering of animals, and allowing minors to reach majority as lutf or 'iwad, to offset possible lapses in divine wisdom . This is because, while it is known that they will not believe ." While all of these occurrences according to the Maturidites, it is impossible for God to act independent of wis- qualify as evil, all are ultimately attributable to God and within the scope of dom and thus for any of God's actions to be ultimately devoid of a praiseworthy what God can do . What God cannot do, and does not do, at least according to function . the Maturidites, is sponsor evil that does not serve a wise end . Thus, all of the Second, whereas in the Mu'tazilite system goodness (husn) and justice aforementioned occurrences, while qualifying as evil in the most immediate ('adl) are pegged to human indices, wisdom for Maturidites is not necessarily sense, must ultimately serve a wise and praiseworthy end . In sum, whereas in pegged to any human index at all. Al-Maturidi insists repeatedly that God's both Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism God's goodness and justice are or would be actions cannot violate the dictates of wisdom, even if the actual substance of contradicted by God's sponsorship of evil, no such contradiction exists between what that wisdom is remains beyond human apprehension ." Indeed, Abu evil and Maturidite wisdom or hikmah. al-Mu'In al-Nasafi sharply criticizes the Mu'tazilites for taking human expe- Finally, related to the last point, evil in the Maturidite system, in addition rience as the basis for assessing divine acts ." Wisdom, in other words, in to being functionally consistent with divine wisdom, is actually credited with Maturidism contrasts with goodness and justice in Mu'tazilism, both in the the ability to play an affirmatively positive role . In fact, al-Maturidi singularly sense that it is theocentric-as opposed to humanocentric-and in the sense distinguishes himself among classical thinkers by holding the existence of evil that it functions more like goodness and justice in the Ash'arite system, where to be among the proofs of God's existence! As the editor of his I

since it shows that God's creative capacity is limited neither to good nor to any is everything that serves a praiseworthy end . And here, he adds "that which other single genus. It also shows that God is above benefit and harm, since does not serve a praiseworthy end is foolish [safah] and evil [gabih] ."80 In other one who seeks benefit or fears harm will only create that which serves these words, God's acts do not have to be of immediate or practical human benefit P interests ." Al-Lamishi confirms this and adds that evil's existence proves that in order for them to be wise and transcend pointlessness ; nor can they be wise absolutely nothing is beyond God's creative capacity .' Speaking from a more and devoid of pointlessness if there is no ultimate end that they serve, even if it practical angle, al-Maturidl finds in venomous snakes and harmful minerals remains within God's putative "right" to commit such acts . In sum, by avoiding a template on which humans can contemplate the harm and benefit of the acts that are ultimately vain, God is exonerated from evil, pace the Mu'tazilites, afterlife, just as they seek to maximize benefit and avoid harm in this life .77 who invoked such concepts as iwad to offset the immediate evil of divine acts ." Meanwhile, al-Magdisi observes that evil-for example, suffering-can serve And only by promoting acts that are ultimately praiseworthy and purposeful do as expiation for disobedience, a rectifier of morals, and a protection from self God's acts remain good and wise, pace the Ash'arites, who hold God's acts to indulgence and hubris ." be good and wise by the mere fact that they issue from God, with no attention All of this raises, of course, a number of questions . What, according to the at all to their effect, immediate or otherwise . Maturidites, is the actual substance of evil and can it be known by human rea- On this understanding, God in Maturidite theology is omnibenevolent but son? Given their admission that God can sponsor evil, what can be the mean- in a clearly counterintuitive manner that differs from what is found in both ing of omnibenevolence in Maturidite thought? Indeed, do Maturidites hold Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism . Both of the latter judge divine acts according to God to be omnnibenevolent? their immediate effect, and those that are (or could be in the case of Ash'arism) This question of God's omnibenevolence, or 'adl, goes back to the very deemed immediately evil contradict divine omnibenevolence . In Maturidism, beginning of Maturidism . In Kitab al-tawhid, al-Maturidl intimates that while by contrast, divine acts are judged according to their ultimate effect, and only the Mu'tazilites correctly identified God as omnibenevolent, they incorrectly those acts that are deemed to be teleologically evil-that is, ultimately devoid of equated benevolence with serving concrete, identifiable human interests . In good, just, or wise effects-violate God's omnibenevolence. Since, however, it place of this, al-Maturidl insists that omnibenevolence must be understood is ultimately impossible, according to Maturidism, for God's acts to be devoid not practically or in terms of immediate effect but teleologically in terms of of ultimate purpose, none of God's acts can be deemed evil, which means, by ultimate effect . On this understanding, as long as an act or occurrence can be default, that all of God's acts must be good, at least in the final analysis . identified with a positive ultimate effect, it is, according to al-Maturidl, good As for the actual substance of evil in Maturidite thought, one should note (hasan) and just ('adl). This, however-and this is the crux of the matter-was that when they speak of the possibility of God sponsoring evil, they are only also al-Maturldl's definition of wisdom (al-hikmah) . In effect, al-Maturidl col- speaking of what I have termed "immediate evil," that is, acts whose effects lapsed justice and goodness into wisdom and argued that all acts that can be people measure in immediate time and space . In fact, given the Maturidites' identified as ultimately wise must also be counted (ultimately) good and just . In commitment to traditional omnipotence and divine wisdom (hikmah), all dis- fact, his argument was essentially that this is the meaning that the Mu'tazilites cussions of evil in Maturidism are essentially discussions of immediate evil . should have imputed to justice ('adl) . Thus he writes, "The meaning of wisdom For while nothing can exist independent of God's ontological decree, everything is `hitting the mark,' which is `putting everything in its proper place .' And this God ontologically decrees must ultimately result in wisdom/goodness . Thus, is the very meaning of justice" ("ta'wilu al-hikmati al-isabatu wa huwa wad`u there can be no ultimate evil in Maturidism, and all evil that exists must be kulli shay'in mawdi`ahu wa dhalika ma`na al-`adl") .'9 limited to an "immediate" effect. Later Maturidites confirm, refine, and expand on this approach . Abu This is the light in which one must understand such statements as that of al-Mu'In al-Nasafi, for example, rejects the Mu'tazilite claim that a wise act al-Magdisi: "The Hanafites [read Maturidites] unanimously affirm the good and , 1182 must benefit (yanfa'u) its subject or object . At the same time, he challenges evil of acts in the same manner that the Mu'tazilites do . Here, the reference a bit more indulgently, the Ash'arite claim that God cannot commit evil acts, is simply to the fact that reason can, ceteris paribus, apprehend the immedi- which they base on their insistence that evil acts are simply those that are for- ate effects of acts/events in the world . As Shaykh Zadeh observes, reason can bidden, and no one can forbid God . Against both of these views, al-Nasafi puts both establish and penetrate such socially informed judgments as the good- forth the position of "our shaykhs" (mashayikhuna) to the effect that wisdom ness of knowledge and the evil of ignorance, and it can know what appeals to 114 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 115

and repulses individuals ." This does not mean-despite the apparent sense the weak ontology of the Ash'arites . The Maturidites recognize the validity of al-Maqdisi's statement-that reason can always apprehend the teleological of fundamental a priori moral judgments, such as the evil of God's sending effects of acts. Indeed, al-Magdisi himself states explicitly that the ultimate sta- liars as prophets, though they apparently limit the scope of these to categorical tus of acts/events "may be apprehended through reason [qad tudrak], as, for grundnorms. They also admit a number of socially informed, practical judg- example, with expiations for disobedience and promotions for obedience, and ments, such as the goodness of knowledge and the evil of ignorance, and they they may be merely supposed [qad tuzann] ."84 In no case, however, can our recognize reason's ability to excavate the practical good and evil of acts/events assessments of the immediate status or effects of an act be taken as proof of its in real space and time . This makes it easy at times to get lost in their locu- V 1J long-term purpose or effect . This is the context in which Abu al-Mu`In al-Nasaf3, tions, as there is obviously a distinction between these two modes of reason- for example, dismisses as presumptuous the Mu'tazilite procedure of making ing. The Maturidites use al-'aql, however, to refer to both, and this obscures analogical judgments about the Unseen based on observations of the Seen (qiyas the fact that universal, a priori judgments (e.g., the evil of sending liars as al-gha'ib 'ala al-shahid) . As he put it, "God has created things beyond measure, prophets) differ fundamentally from practical and socially informed judg- in the hidden depths of the Earth, the inner recesses of the mountains, and the ments (e.g., the propriety of lying to one's spouse about a disastrous meatloaf floors of the oceans, things that are of no [apparent] benefit to any of His crea- or of not picking one's nose in public) . Since, however, "reason" is credited tures and of which those who encounter them have no understanding ."85 with the capacity, albeit limited, to judge acts/events as practically good or In sum, the Maturidites recognize both the possibilities and limitations evil, and since the commitment to hikmah requires that all acts/events be of moral and practical reasoning . While some things relating to morality and ultimately good and wise, all moral judgments-or at least those that identify practicality clearly fall within reason's scope, other things flatly defy it . Under acts/events as evil-must in effect be provisional . In other words, all acts/ no circumstances, however, are we justified in equating the limits of reason events must be capable of acquiring a teleological status that differs funda- with the limits of reality . For the mere fact that we cannot know the moral or mentally from their immediate, practical status. This provisional character practical harm or benefit of an act/event is not proof of its nonexistence . As the of Maturidite moral judgments is what I aim to capture with the designation Arabic saying goes, "Nonexistence of knowledge is not the same as knowledge "soft moral ontology ." of nonexistence" ("adamu'l-ilm laysa 'ilman bi'l-`adam") . This brings me to the final point of this section and the juncture at which And yet the Maturidites flatly reject the Ash'arite position that reason is Maturidism reunites with Ash'arism, in categorical opposition to Mu'tazilism. incapable of making any independent moral judgments . Such a position, they I have shown that the Ash'arites, in contradistinction to the Mu'tazilites, rec- argue, in agreement with the Mu'tazilites, actually threatens the foundations ognized a distinction between God's ontological decree and God's normative of revealed religion . For if humans could not know by way of reason the evil of preference . On this distinction, it was possible for God to instantiate acts/events lying, for example, they would have no basis for accepting the truthfulness of that violated God's normative preference and to love or desire certain acts/ the prophets and thus the value and provenance of revelation . As Shaykh Zadeh events yet not translate these into ontological reality . On this understanding, explains, were revelation itself the source of people's initial obligation to believe, while all manner of unbelief and disobedience could be ultimately attributed to this would result in the circular argument that people must believe in revelation God, their existence did not necessarily reflect God's normative preference or because they must believe in revelation . But revelation, Shaykh Zadeh insists, approval . Conversely, the fact that God did not convert God's every preference derives its initial authority not from itself but from the fact that people instinc - into reality did not reflect any lapse or defect in God's power . On the contrary, tively know that God would not dispatch prophets (and back them with miracles) this was simply a manifestation of a profoundly different understanding of the in order to lie to and mislead people . This people know, however, because they relationship between divine power and divine preference, according to which know that such lying and deception is inherently evil (not to mention devoid of divine power is not bound to act solely in the interest of divine preference ."' wisdom) . And this is a wholly rational, a priori judgment, which people must be Indeed, one might say that it is precisely God's ability to transcend desire and in possession ofprior to and independent of any revelation, since it must serve as preference that actually confirms God's power and wisdom . the very basis upon which revelation acquires its status and value .86 The Maturidites fervently embrace this distinction . Indeed, this is part of All of this leads the Maturidites to what I have termed a "soft" moral ontol- their commitment to the absolute and completely autonomous, deontological ogy, in contradistinction to both the strong ontology of the Mu`tazilites and authority of revelation, independent of whatever conclusions might be reached H6 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 1 17 about God's role in the ontological sponsoring of evil . As with the Ash'arites, while human society in its present condition may not reflect God's normative though clearly tempered by the dictates of hikmah, the Maturidite understand . preference, this does not mean that God is in any way incapable of instantiating ing of divine omnipotence implies an absolute, unilateral prerogative to impose God's every pleasure . Nor does reality on the ground replace scripture as obligations and restrictions as God sees fit . This is why the Maturidites were so the basis and absolutely reliable indicator of what humans are duty bound or opposed to what they perceived as the Mu'tazilite attempt to forge a negotiated not to do . relationship with God. From their perspective, this constituted both a challenge and an affront to God's unilateral prerogative to legislate as God pleased. As did the Ash'arites, the Maturidites clearly asserted that will (iradah) is Maturidism and Jones not the same as desire (shahwah, ishtiha') . In fact, according to Abu al-Mu'in al-Nasafi, desire is merely a species of will, that is, a subset of the mother-set, Given their mutual subscription to a traditional construction of omnipotence, most specifically corresponding to the will to bring about that which benefits coupled with their emphatic rejection of secondary causation, it comes as no one by engendering pleasure or some other positive effect . Since God, how- surprise that Maturidism would relate to the critique and proposal of Jones ever, is above benefit, God's will cannot be the equivalent of God's desire .88 in much the same way that Ash'arism did . Indeed, most of what was said in Thus, God can both will without desiring (or preferring), and desire (or prefer) my analysis of Ash'arism and Jones would apply to my analysis of Jones and without willing. In fact, al-Nasafi points out, to will an act is often to seek its Maturidism . instantiation despite the existence of aversion (kurh), not simply in the absence of Beginning with the matter of omnipotence, God in Maturidism is sovereign such. Will, in other words, rather than obliterating, negating, or assuming the over nature and history. This does not mean, however, pace Jones and his sup- absence of aversion, actually overrides or overcomes it." Thus, for God to (onto- porters, that omnipotence renders God directly and fully responsible for black logically) will a particular act does not necessarily reflect God's preference or suffering. Nor, and precisely for this reason, would black opposition to such the absence of aversion to it . Rather, God's very act of (ontologically) willing a suffering necessarily amount to opposition to God . On the contrary, Maturidite thing may actually entail the presence of an aversion that God has decided to kasb, like the kasb of the Ash'arites, affords human beings free choice regard- override . ing their actions, even as it simultaneously preserves God's omnipotence . This All of this is further accentuated by the Maturidite construction of divine makes it possible both to assign responsibility to humans for human action wisdom (hikmah). As I have shown, according to this commitment, God can and to revolt against the misdeeds of humans without revolting against God or sponsor (immediate) evil, despite the fact that that evil is not consistent with God's sovereignty over the universe . God's ultimate preference, love, or pleasure . This is categorically confirmed by Beyond this, certain subtleties in Matundite kasb actually render the Abu al-Mu`In al-Nasafi when he writes : charge of divine racism and quietism less applicable to Maturidism than it was to Ash'arism . As mentioned, the Maturidites held the created power granted We hold that every temporal occurrence, whatever its traits, comes by way of kasb to be merely a grant of the capacity to execute . This power, in into being via the will of God . If an occurrence constitutes an act of other words, was an enabling power, not a compelling one. Pointing precisely to [mashi'ah], obedience, it occurs in accordance with God's volition this distinction, Abu al-Mu'in al-Nasafi insists that if this power actually had [rida], [mahabbah], command [amr], will [iradah], pleasure love the effect of compelling humans to act, there would be no difference between [gada'], and apportionment [qadar] . If, on the other hand, execution kasb andjabr (crass determinism) . For in such cases, the granted power would it constitutes an act of disobedience, it occurs via God's volition, effectively obliterate human choice ." This is a particularly interesting detail of will, execution, and apportionment but not in accordance with His Maturidite kasb, given their position, pace the Mu'tazilites, that the power to ." command or His pleasure or His love execute an intentionally willed (moral) act is granted at the instant of execu- In sum, while all manner of evil might exist, there is no necessary relationship tion and not before .92 What this comes down to is that, according to Maturidite between such evil and God's normative preference . (And one should be mind- kasb, humans ultimately retain a certain ability to withdraw or suspend their ful in this regard that for Maturidites, by the time an immediate evil reaches its initial decision to act, even after God has granted the power of execution . Thus, , ultimate purpose, if, must cease to be evil and become good and wise .) Similarly in terms of its actual effect, the morally effective dimension of human agency 118 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 119

(i.e ., the 'illah) in Maturidite kasb would appear to be less determinative than white subjugation of blacks . As would the Ash'arites, Maturidites would insist the more compelling agency advocated by the majority of Ash`arites .93 that not everything God allows or even causes to happen is necessarily a reflec- On this understanding, while God, according to Maturidism, remains tion of God's "wants"; yet none of this can be taken as an indication of any involved in human actions, God is actually less implicated-and humans are divine incapacity, weakness, or confusion . actually more implicated-than God is according to Ash'arite kasb . Thus, the All of this leads to a set of conclusions almost identical to those reached charge of divine racism, at least on this score, would be even less applicable to in my comparison between Ash'arism and Jones: (I) the charge of divine rac- Maturidism than to Ash'arism (though it might be technically more applicable ism is suspect at best; for God's failure/refusal to eradicate black suffering is I to Maturidism than to Mu`tazilism) .94 The same would apply to the charge neither indicative of God's approval nor suggestive of any incapacity on God's of quietism. part; (2) the claim that quietism is the only or most honest form of piety that Speaking of quietism, we should note that scripture in MaturIdism is no less can attend a commitment to divine omnipotence is severely called into ques- a deontological authority than it is in Ash'arism (or Mu'tazilism for that matter) . tion, as rebellion against the misdeeds of human beings does not necessarily Thus, even in the absence of a doctrine of kasb, it would not follow that black entail rebellion against God ; (3) the existence of black suffering is not in and of acquiescence in the face of black suffering is the only response that is consistent itself a solid basis for impugning God's omnibenevolence ; for the occurrence with recognizing God's omnipotence or seeking God's pleasure . For according to of immediate evil is not the same as the absence of ultimate good ; and (4) as the Maturidites, the basis of humans' knowledge of God's pleasure is scripture, with Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism, there is, in light of all of this, no necessity to not the ontological reality that God sustains . Thus, all that is needed to promote a opt for a nontheistic or secular approach to the problem of black suffering . piety of resistance is a scriptural mandate to resist, regardless of one's conclusion Having said all of this, there is one aspect of Jones's critique and proposal about whether human beings or God are responsible for the evil to be resisted . that would seem to pose a major challenge to Maturidism: Jones's rejection of Such a mandate-based, for example, on such Qur'anic verses as "Fight them what he terms "theologies of last resort" and "beyond human comprehension" until there is no oppression"-is as real and authoritative for Maturidites as it strategies for explaining black suffering . For Jones, one of the fatal flaws of the is for Ash'arites or Mu`tazilites.9S Indeed, it was no less than the preservation of black theologians was their tendency to assert the divine omnibenevolence they God's nonnegotiable authority to dictate the terms of the God-human relation- were supposed to be proving. This, in his view, enabled them to sidestep the ship-including what is forbidden, what is obligatory, what is punishable, and possibility that black suffering might actually be a sign of divine disdain and what is rewarded-that so exercised Abu al-Mu'In al-NasafI in the face ofwhat he malevolence toward blacks . By privileging, in other words, the doctrine of divine perceived to be the subversive encroachments of the Mu`tazilites .9G omnibenevolence over the fact of black suffering, the latter could be confronted In the matter of divine omnibenevolence, here too, the Maturidites refused agnostically and further obfuscated via a tacit directive not to pay any attention to compromise. According to them, all of God's actions, as well as those of to that Master behind the curtain .97 humans, which God necessarily sponsors, must result in ultimate good and In discussing Ash'arism, I made the point that while the doctrine of kasb entail ultimate wisdom. This was the gist of the Maturidites' (rather unique) might absolve God of direct responsibility for the (mis)deeds of humans, construction of omnibenevolence . Moreover, humans, according to them, pace God's decision not to intervene to stop them-either through preempting the Jones, are not and cannot be the ultimate valuators of acts/events, even if many impulses that prompt such misdeeds or by withholding or modifying the grant of humans' moral judgments may be practically valid. For, according to the of power necessary to execute them-was a separate matter . The Ash'arites cir- Maturidites, both the teleological aim and effect of an act/event may lie beyond cumvented this problem by invoking a weak ontology, on the basis of which the - human apprehension . On this understanding, Jones's concept of humanocen categorical evil of black suffering could be called into question . I have shown, tric theism, which vests humans with the ultimate authority to pass ultimate however, that the Maturidites reject the weak ontology of the Ash'arites and judgment, would find little support among the Maturidites and would actually insist that reason can pass at least provisional judgments of good and evil . violate their understanding of divine omnipotence . On this understanding, the Maturidites could not deny that the evil that God Finally, on the basis of the distinction between God's ontological decree did not intervene to stop was substantively evil, at least in immediate terms . and normative preference, the existence of black suffering cannot serve as This raises the question of how God's omnibenevolence can be reconciled with proof of any divine malevolence, suggesting in any way that God approves of God's refusal/failure to intervene . 12 0 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 121

Here, the Maturidites would fall back on the doctrine of hikmah . Pace the To what extent, in light of all of this, does the Maturidite commitment to 11 Ash'arites, blacks could judge any particular instance of unearned suffering hikmah amount to what Jones would characterize as just another "pie-in-the- as practically or immediately evil. On the other hand, they could not pass a sky theodicy"? Ultimately, the answer to this question depends on the teleo- judgment to the effect that this or all unearned suffering was categorically logical presuppositions that drive it. Here, however, it may not be going too far 1'II, 'IIIII'I'I or ultimately evil . This was because, according to Maturidite hikmah, all evil, to say that Jones is as teleologically driven as are the Maturidites . For Jones, including black suffering, not only can but ultimately must serve a positive tele. God's goodness and sovereignty can only be sustained to the extent that they ological end . In other words, while God may not intervene to preempt an evil result in black liberation. This liberation, moreover, is measured in concrete, act/event, God's omnibenevolence is preserved by the fact that God invariably immediate terms, in the here and now . Beneath the surface of this criterion ensures that such an act/event serves a wise/good end . appears to lurk a more subtle and substantive commitment . This emerges Here, however, Maturidism comes into direct conflict with one of the most when we ask the question "How do we know when blacks have achieved libera- seminal and consistent grundnorms of Jones : the categorical evil of all unearned tion?" Here, given Jones's rejection of "theologies of last resort" and "beyond suffering. Jones is adamantly opposed to considering the possibility that suf- human comprehension strategies," black liberation takes on the appearance of fering-enormous, unearned, transgenerational, maldistributed suffering- being indexed into a set of ideals and possibilities that emerge out of the social, might serve any positive function for blacks. For him, all suffering must be economic, and political status and prerogatives of whites . We know, in other regarded as something to be eliminated ;98 it must be "desanctified" and treated words, that blacks have achieved liberation when they arrive at the point where as neither the will of God nor the way of nature . Otherwise, he fears, "the they enjoy the same social, economic and political status, prerogatives, and oppressed will not regard their suffering as oppressive and will not be moti- presumptions as whites, not potentially but actually, here, now, today . 103 Any vated to attack it ."99 Like the theories that surrender to the proposition that delayed delivery, such as that implied by Maturidite hikmah, must be rejected the wisdom behind black suffering simply lies beyond people's ability to grasp as a theodicy of pie in the sky. it, Jones dismisses, as essentially collaborationist, theories that merely mollify Such an understanding makes clean work of the charge of pie-in-the-sky- oppression by searching for elusive silver linings . He is particularly vexed by ism against Maturidite hikmah . But while Jones's depictions clearly imply the concepts of redemptive or vicarious suffering, such as that put forth by Joseph aforementioned criterion, nowhere does he explicitly express this . In fact, the R. Washington Jr u . Such theories, he protests, assume but never clarify the clearest (and presumably most considered) expression of his definition of black basis on which "bad" and "good"-that is, redemptive-suffering are to be dis- liberation appears on the last page of his 1991 afterword, where, quoting Lerone tinguished, such that we might embrace the good and revolt against the bad . Bennet, he speaks of the need to "think with our eyes . . . to abandon the partial Moreover, Jones insists, particularly in the case of Washington, redemptive frame of reference of our oppressor and to create . . . concepts that release our suffering implies both the inevitability and the perpetuity of white domina- reality.""' Here, Jones makes a clean break with the outward achievements of tion.'00 And, at the end of the day, any redemptive effect it might have will whites and points to the necessity of throwing off the psychological prisms and ultimately operate to the benefit of oppressive whites . "The vicarious suffering schemas that inform the way blacks see and feel about themselves, the world, of blacks is intended more for white salvation than for black liberation, for does and others in it . Black liberation, in other words, is a liberation from the uni- not black liberation hinge upon the success of liberating whites from bondage verse of values and meanings that sustain not only the social, economic, and to preconscious racism?" °' political status quo but, more important, the psychological/emotional status For Jones, in order for any suffering to be good, it must be proved to oper- quo as well . In sum, the real target of Jones's liberation appears to lie beyond ate in the interest of those who suffer."' Such proof, however, can never be ontological suffering . made to rest on an act/event that is supposed to take place in the future . For Ironically, here is where the case against Maturidite hikmah is most until such a redemptive act/event actually comes to pass, the initial judgment severely weakened, if not undermined. For if the aim of black liberation is to of evil must be recognized as valid . Moreover, Jones insists, the possibility free blacks from the ideological prisms and "partial frame[s] of reference" of that such evil represents malevolence on God's part must be granted at least their oppressors, then anything that impedes the process of drawing blacks as much weight as the possibility that some future act/event will ultimately into this mindset must be recognized as ultimately good. In other words, vindicate it. black suffering-that is, white domination, subjugation, and mistreatment 12 2 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 123 of blacks-may be immediately evil . But if blacks' ultimate good lies in their course, against the fact that there is nothing in Maturidite doctrine that would being insulated from sensibilities and ways of thinking that normalize and raise bind blacks to a quietistic acceptance of unearned suffering . At the same time, their domination beyond critique, then surely one must recognize the wisdom on a commitment to Maturidite hikmah, black inability to eradicate suffering behind any suffering that impedes the process of their being inducted into need not be a harbinger of doom and despair, not to mention desperate, side- the very worldview of those who dominate them . If, as Joseph R. Washington, door attempts at assimilation . For every act/event that is sponsored by God Jr. claimed, blacks were/are not theologically Christian because white Christian must ultimately serve a wise end . racism has denied them access to Christian theology,105 and if, as Jones now Even beyond this, however, there is another investment to be made in claims, traditional Christian theology is the core of the problem, might not white Maturidite hikmah . As the noted Indian scholar Ashis Nandy once observed, racism be recognized as actually serving the ultimate interests of blacks? 10 G Put a consciousness that emerges out of the existential experience of slavery, differently, if-as is commonly recognized today-certain sociopsychological deprivation, and persecution can have the effect of reinforcing one's human- norms and categories form inescapable frameworks for life and thought that ity and fortifying it against decay . Similarly, such a consciousness, because it deny those living within them external vantage points from which they can is removed from the narcotizing effects of the reigning paradigm, like that of question or critique, might not the very forces that have denied Blackamericans the little boy in the tale of the emperor's new clothes, can provide more imme- full access to these frameworks ultimately operate in their favor? diate access not to trivial but to profound, cosmic realities, sensibilities, and In this light-and perhaps only in this light-while the blackness that insights to which power, privilege, and unchallenged routine can ultimately condemns Blackamericans to suffering and oppression may be considered a blind or desensitize one . As the Qur'an states, speaking of the benefits of a curse, it may ultimately constitute a "blessed curse ." Perhaps the significance healthy regimen of discomfort and deprivation, "0 you who believe, fasting and profundity of this "blessed curse of blackness" emerges most clearly when has been prescribed for you as it was for those before you that you might we consider the case of poor and working-class whites and or those who are attain God-consciousness" (2 :183) . And as the Qur'an also states, warning of legally but not socially white, for example, many Muslim immigrants . While the intoxicating effects of surfeited privilege, "Were it not that all humanity these groups are often victimized by the status quo, itself underwritten by the would become thereby a single community, We would adorn the homes of judgments and prejudices of the dominant group, they are also routinely anes- those who reject the All-Merciful with roofs of silver and stairways on which thetized by the dominant group's success at co-opting them into a common they could ascend ." (4.3 :23). 108 Fasting, in other words, can serve as a means of identity (actual or desired) that impedes their ability to recognize their subjuga- getting "outside the box" of unchallenged, unpondered automation in which tion and identify avenues of escape . Thus, despite the horrendous exploitation one's vulnerabilities and bounties are both patched over and taken for granted. to which corporate America often subjects poor and working-class whites, they Wealth, on the other hand, certainly an exaggerated surfeit of wealth, can are often found supporting the interests of the upper classes and big business blind one to the entire universe of human reality, intermediate contingency, via the medium of a common racial identity .107 As for Muslim immigrants, and unearned advantage, such that the entire reality of connectedness with only their status (or identification) as Muslims and their post-9/II mistreat - others is obscured and the entire truth of one's contingency on one's Maker is ment as such has begun to alert them to the fact that what they thought was the completely obliterated . currency of their (legal) whiteness is counterfeit and that the criteria via which This may explain why Nandy condenses these considerations into a pref- society often calls on them to seek social, cultural, or political redemption are erence for a consciousness produced by oppression over a consciousness pro- subversive of a healthy, sufficiently self-validating sense of self. duced by power: On this understanding, Maturidite hikmah would appear not only not to constitute an anesthetic but actually to serve a positive role in bringing blacks Between the modern master and the non-modern slave, one must to terms with their unearned, enormous, maldistributed, transgenerational suf- choose the slave, not because one should choose voluntarily poverty fering. At the very least, blackness, the very trait that marks them as a discrete or admit the superiority of suffering, not only because the slave and insular target, can also inoculate them against the disaster of normaliza - is oppressed, not even because he works (which Marx said made him tion that raises their condition beyond critique, the avoidance of normalizatio n less alienated than the master) . One must choose the slave because being the sine qua non of all resistance . All of this must be understood, of he represents a higher-order cognition which perforce includes the MATURIDISM AND BLACK THEODICY 125 124 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING

master as a human, whereas the master's cognition has to exclude precisely this kind of knowledge that the powerful are least prepared to enter- the slave except as a "thing ."109 tain and the oppressed most disdainful of owning ." I have shown that neither the charge of divine racism nor the necessity of George Washington certainly meant well when he stated that the United states a piety of quietism can be sustained against Maturidism . In consequence, the would "give to bigotry no sanction and to persecution no assistance," but he move to a secular approach to black liberation can be seen to be not only super- was apparently oblivious to the massive bigotry and persecution going on on fluous but, as I have shown in the cases of Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism, actu- his estate .11° Thomas Jefferson was, no doubt, equally oblivious to the contradic . ally counterproductive . Maturidism, no less than Mu'tazilism or Ash'arism, toriness of his declaration "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men provides a powerful theistic incentive to revolt against domination and equally are created equal ." Those huddled in the slave quarters, however, could only powerful assurances that sustain the oppressed in case of defeat . Beyond this, marvel at and perhaps pity such hubristic self-delusion . Many of the United Ilu however, Maturidism ultimately affirms the uniqueness and the wisdom States' present-day political leaders may be honestly convinced of the selfless behind the ontological fact of blackness. For blackness, like all ontological altruism of sending billions of dollars abroad to build democracies, schools, realities, according to Maturidism, must ultimately serve the cause of good- . But every homeboy in every inner city knows that such altruism and hospitals ness and wisdom . As I have shown, one way it does this is to impede the pre- is ultimately false ; so does every Palestinian living in the squalor of a refugee cipitous induction of blacks into the proverbial burning building of normalized ; and so does every American Indian who is trapped in the gloom and camp domination. despair of the primitive American pueblo . Members of the dominant group Of course, the same must hold true of whiteness. Indeed, whiteness, too, may honestly believe that all science is neutral and "objective ." But the vic- must serve some positive teleological end. And it is perhaps here that the power tims of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, as well as those who toil under the and significance of Maturidite hikmah may become most manifest . For the bot- judgments of every "scientific" test of "intelligence," know that perspective and tom line of all of this ultimately turns out to be that human knowledge-most interest are never far from the surface . particularly human knowledge of self-in order to advance, sustain, and pro- In sum, the consciousness of oppression, the mindset spawned by the tect itself from itself, requires a level of crossfertilization and dialectical interac- "blessed curse of blackness," entails a unique epistemology, a particular way tion between the perspectives of both the oppressor and the oppressed."' of knowing, and a range of what can be known whose benefits may actually By themselves, human groups-not to mention individuals-are largely ."' This unique epistemol- offset the evil that produces this consciousness itself limited in their self-knowledge to the distorted returns on their own projec- ogy can both liberate blacks/oppressed, even in the midst of unearned suffer- tions, prone and mildly oblivious to the treachery of their own self-deceptions . ing, and empower them to respond to oppression without dehumanizing the This is perhaps the ultimate wisdom or hikmah behind the existence of evil and enemy. Even more important, especially in these times of post-modern (that is, suffering in the world : to provide humanity with that multiplicity of perspec- post-civil rights) blackness-when increasing numbers of Blackamericans no tives that Hans-Georg Gadamer refers to as "horizons,""' via which men and longer experience or are even able to fathom the possibility, let alone the real- women can pursue greater self-truth and greater self-understanding . As Gad- ity, of systematic, race-based, physical oppression-this epistemology can bore amer observes, "to exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can never its way through many of the maladies and vexations that lie beyond ontological be complete .11115 In this context, only God, whose self-knowledge is essential suffering, from the inability to connect with the self to the failure to "see" with (dhati) and neither contingent nor experiential, can have true and complete . Finally, in line with Jones's criterion, this is an epistemology one's own eyes knowledge of self, totally independent of others . We humans, on the other hand, that benefits blacks first and foremost, its benefit to others coming only subse- in the absence of interaction between multiple consciousnesses, including quently, if it comes at all . those of oppressors as well as the oppressed, are likely to remain blinded by And it may not . For the unfortunate fact is that nobody-certainly nobody what is nearest to us, with little appreciation for the multiple layers of contin- . Indeed, one of the great in the modern West-really wants this epistemology gency, deflection and projection that define us as the individuals and groups paradoxes of oppression and marginalization is that while the epistemology we think we are." , they spawn can both buoy the powerless and protect the powerful-that is, from the blind spots and self-delusions generated by power and privilege-it is 5 Traditionalism and Black Theodicy

Early Development and Basic Contours of Traditionalist Theology

The theological movement known as Traditionalism developed in opposition to the universe of interpretive presuppositions via which Rationalism insisted that scripture be understood and vindicated . This is not to say that Traditionalist tendencies came into being only after Rationalism appeared on the scene . For clearly, there were theological ruminations before the second/eighth century, and these, if only by default, invariably included a "Traditionalist" element, at least in the sense of being uninformed by the kinds of preoccupations that Rationalism would ultimately introduce and raise to an ostensibly universal standard . But while the "proto- Traditionalists," as it were, were simply doing what comes naturally, full-blown Traditionalism entailed an acute sense of mission : to preserve the primordial character of the Faith and defend it against the perceived encroachments and distortions of Rationalism . Prior to the third/ninth century, there was no single figure with whom the Traditionalist orientation could be identified . That century produced, however, the (in)famous Inquisition (Mihna) revolving around the question of the createdness of the Qur'an .' Out of the ashes of this ill-fated campaign emerged the person of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d .241 / 855), whose dogged resistance earned him a torturous stint in prison and transformed him into both a hero and the patron 128 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 129 saint of Traditionalism. From this time on, Traditionalism would be identi . who collected, scrutinized, and developed the science of hadith, became major fied with the name and teachings of Ibn Hanbal . In fact, "Hanbali" came to contributors to, if not the very backbone of, primitive Traditionalism .' double as a designation for Traditionalist . This did not mean that only those Hadith, including the attitude toward and understanding of it, was at the who were Hanbalis in law were Traditionalists in theology . On the contrary, center of much of the conflict between early Traditionalism and Rationalism, Traditionalism had representation in all of the juridical schools . The Hanbali especially that category of hadith that was recognized as being of limited diffu- school simply distinguished itself by being the only juridical school that was sion (ahadi) .6 Confronted with such reports as "Our Lord descends to the lower exclusively Traditionalist. Whereas one's juristic identity as a Hanafi, Shafi`i, or heavens every night" or "God is made happier by the repentance of His servant Maliki carried no consistently reliable theological implication, to be a Hanbali than one of you is by [finding his lost] camel," Rationalists would dismiss these in law meant, ipso facto, to be a Traditionalist in theology .' attributions to the Prophet as inauthentic, marginalize them as nonnormative, Traditionalism saw itself as the "natural" or primordial approach to appre- or process them through various modes of allegorical interpretation (ta'wil), in hending meaning, which it deemed to be already present and operative in order to avoid the dreaded fallacy of anthropomorphism.' Traditionalists on the human beings prior to the acquisition of any particular system of formal rea- other hand looked on the avoidance of this particular construction of anthropo- soning.' The latter, in fact, in the form of 'ilm al-kalam, is what Traditional. morphism as an alien criterion and thus saw no need to play down such reports ism saw Rationalism as having introduced as an "unsanctioned innovation" or explain away their plain sense . (bid'ah) . According to Traditionalist historical memory, this innovation did As for the Qur'an, since everyone deemed its entire transmission to be not reach full tide until after the first three centuries or so of Islam-that is, beyond falsification (mutawatir), Rationalists were left with only an interpre- after the period during which the primordial approach of the so-called Salaf, tive option in the face of "problematic" declarations . Thus, a verse such as or Pious Ancestors, had exercised de facto dominance . This particular reading "the All-Merciful mounted the Throne" or verses that referred to God's "face" of history transforms both the period and the approach of the Pious Ances- or "hand" were interpreted allegorically, "mounted," for example, coming to tors into normative criteria . Among the defining principles of this approach mean "seized," "face" coming to mean "grandeur" and "hand" coming to mean is that provenance is the sine qua non of normative authenticity and the only "bounty." Traditionalists, meanwhile, again, rejected both the need for and the determinant of a doctrine's binding religious authority . This entails, in turn, propriety of such allegorical interpretations and insisted on the plain sense two corollary considerations : (i) whether a statement or doctrine can be reli- or hagiqah (reality) of these verses, denying all the while being bound to what ably traced back to the Prophet, and (2) whether a particular understanding of others (namely, Rationalists) might deem to be their logical (that is, anthropo- the Prophet's teachings can be reliably traced to his disciples and their direct morphic) implications . In fact, early Traditionalism enshrined the principles ideological heirs . of balkafa and imrar as bulwarks against unwarranted speculation-balkafa (an All of this is underscored by a dogged commitment to the principle that as abbreviation of bi la kayf) being the practice of abstaining from asking "how" the All-Knowing, God is unquestionably most knowledgeable of God . On this and imrar being the cognate principle of "passing scriptural data on to posterity belief, Traditionalism sets out, first and foremost, to establish what God's emis- just as it had been received" (imraruha kama ja'at), that is, without resorting sary, the Prophet, taught-that is, to confirm the identity of the nagl/manqul. 4 to speculative vindications .8 These principles are best understood, as reflecting Once this is achieved, Traditionalism sees little need or justification for going not a fideistic commitment to unthinking per se but a recognition that aspects beyond this to ray-subjective, even if principled, speculation . Nor is there any of God's knowledge of God, as imparted in God's revelation, may lie beyond acceptable basis, other than "primordial reason"-that is, Traditionalist 'aql / the frontiers of human reason . ma`qul, or the established linguistic conventions of the Arabians-for second- From a Traditionalist perspective (and certainly later Traditionalism), the guessing the Prophet's words or altering their plain sense . While the Qur'an commitment to plain sense or hagiqah neither implied nor amounted to anthro- and Sunna are equally part of the Prophet's teachings, no one-not even the Pomorphism. In fact, according to the redoubtable Ibn Taymiya (d . 728/1328), MU'tazilites-questioned the authority or authenticity of the Qur'an. Thus, it was actually the Rationalists who were guilty of anthropomorphism, which the bulk of Traditionalist attention fell on the Sunna, as both an independent is what drove them to allegorical interpretation . According to Ibn Taymiya, the source of religious doctrine and an authoritative commentary on the Qur'an- Rationalists' inability to transcend created reality as their frame of reference In this context, those known as the early Partisans of Hadith (Alit al-Hadith) , forced them to associate God's "hand" or "face" with the human or created hand 130 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 131 or face. Then, on this association, seeking to deny all likenesses to God, they set Such sophisticated vindications notwithstanding, the premium placed on out to divest God of all "problematic" attributes, explaining away scriptural ref ,,plain sense" or hagigah has earned Traditionalism a rather uncharitable image erences to these via allegorical interpretation . Thus, Ibn Taymiya writes, in modern times . Of all the classical schools of Muslim theology, it has suf- fered most from the zeitgeist informing modern Western (and by extension they understand God's names and attributes only as these would some modern Eastern) scholarship . More recently, the post-9/II association befit created entities . Then, on this understanding, they set out to of Wahhabism and Salafism with all that is backward, violent, and ugly has deny these attributes thus understood, thereby joining the practice added to this disfigurement-Wahhabism and Salafism both being identified of assuming likenesses to God with that of divestiture : they begin by as ideological heirs and modern expressions of Traditionalism . Such negative assuming likenesses to Him and they end by divesting Him of His predispositions complicate the quest for understanding, even as they confuse attributes . And this entails anthropomorphism on their part .' theology with various other forms of religious expression . More important, For Traditionalists, God has a "hand" and a "face," even a "'foot." We know they point up the need for maximum vigilance in bracketing those influences this because God informs us of it in God's revelation and God's Messenger that tend to blind one to one's most generally accepted and least interrogated confirms it in his teachings . As for the precise modality-for example, the size, modern prejudices . shape, substance-of these entities, this remains beyond our comprehension . As the "scientific" study of Islam approached maturity in the West in the We know, however, that these entities are unlike any human or created organ, late nineteenth century, the parallel rise of the natural and social sciences because God tells us so, when God says in the Qur'an "Nothing is anything birthed the development of "higher criticism" in biblical studies . This opened like Him" ("laysa ka mithlihi shay"') . Traditionalists, therefore, accept both the a new chapter in the age-old divide between "reason" and "revelation," and obligation to believe and the inability to completely know-belief in a sense one of the important by-products of this development was the emergence of constituting for them its own, independent epistemology . This is clearly the Christian Fundamentalism, according to which Protestant scholars and theolo- implication behind such statements as the following by the Hanbali Tradition- gians sought to erect a dyke of literalism around the Bible, in order to stave off alist Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudamah (d . 620/1223): what they saw as doctrinal compromise and erosion ." In this context, literalism came to represent the antithesis of modernity, progress, and especially reason. We are in no need of knowing the meaning of what God intended These associations were ultimately carried into Islamic studies and its analyses by His attributes . For they require no action ; and there is no duty of the Traditionalist-Rationalist divide . In fact, so entrenched and uncontested connected with them other than belief in them . And belief is possible was the idea that Traditionalism was opposed to "reason" that no less a figure without knowing the meaning intended by them . For, indeed, belief than the great Hungarian Islamicist Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) depicted it as without knowledge is sound .1° a movement favored by the "lower classes ."This attitude has continued right For other Traditionalists-for example, Ibn Taymiya-the idea that all of God's down to the present. Thus, in his Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rational- attributes are simply empty categories into which humans are to pour unal- ism, Benyamin Abrahamov refers to "pure traditionalists" as those "who have loyed belief was not satisfactory." Still, they, too, insisted that God's essence, not used reason in deriving the principles of religion ."" More recently, Khaled names, and attributes are (and should remain) shrouded in an element of mys - Abou El-Fadl, explaining the evolution of modern Muslim "extremism," depicts , tery.'2 Again, this should not be equated with any commitment to irrationality the AN al-Hadath of old as "literalist movements . . . that claimed to adhere to the though it may be safely seen as entailing an element of arationality . For from traditions of the Prophet faithfully, and without the `corrupting' influence of a Traditionalist perspective, while created reality invariably informs the mental human interpretation or reason .""' associations inspired by the language of revelation, it must never be forgotten Part of what has justified and reinforced this attitude toward Traditional- that God is above creation and thus above the associations that derive from ism is the substance, contours, and centrality of the premodern controversy humans' created experience ." This gap, as it were, between humans' created over the divine names and attributes (al-asma' wa al-sifat) .19 As I have shown, mental associations and the uncreated, transcendent reality of God can never Rationalism readily invoked allegorical interpretation as a means of recon- - be bridged by reason alone (the fallacy, according to Traditionalists, of Rational ciling scriptural references to the divine attributes with its regime of sense. 14 ism). This is, rather, the role of religion and religious devotion. Given its indebtedness to "Islamicized Hellenism," this regime was familiar 132 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 133 to Western scholars and unquestionably accepted as the equivalent of "rea- religion-certainly Islam-in modern times . The problem of being held to scrip- son." Meanwhile, Traditionalism (as I have shown) rejected this regime and tural renderings that are deemed unsuitable has in many instances little at all to saw little need or justification for ta'wil. The resulting insistence on plain sense do with literal interpretation. There is nothing particularly literalistic, for exam- evoked clear parallels with the tendency in modern Fundamentalism to seek ple, in holding the verse "Marry them, two and three and four" to be a permission security in literalism . At the same time, Muslims as a whole were still viewed for a man to marry up to four wives, or in holding the verse "And you do not will primarily as non-Westerners 20 caught in the clutches of a pre-Enlightenment except that God wills" to be proof that humans do not have free will . In fact, these mindset. In this context, the tendency to privilege plain over synthetic mean- verses could just as easily yield meanings other than the generally accepted ones ing was assumed to be all the more potent in Islam . Thus, Traditionalists, and on an even more literal interpretation: one could deduce, for example, a permis- especially Hanbalites, came to be identified as "strict literalists," with all that sion to marry nine wives, or even, perhaps, a permission for lesbian polygyny, 25 this implied in the context of the modern, Western discourse on religion . or that God can and therefore does grant human beings free will . In reality, however, Traditionalism was neither a flight from "reason" nor It is not literalism per se that confers on received renderings the authority a blind, fideistic commitment to literalism . The Traditionalists invoked "rea- to bind and perhaps paralyze subsequent generations . It is more the implica- son" almost as readily as did the Rationalists ; they simply rejected the notion tion that received meanings are located solely in the words on the page with no that "reason" was limited to the composite Islamicized Hellenistic-Late Antiq- contribution from interpretive perspectives generated by secular history . This, uity version of it that the Rationalists embraced . At the same time, even the and not their groundedness in "literal" interpretation, is what places received arch-Traditionalist Ahmad Ibn Hanbal reportedly insisted that any number of renderings beyond critique . For this is what binds subsequent generations to hadiths-for example, "The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the a specific history (or historical perspective) in the name of commitment to spe- All-Merciful"-were not to be taken literally, since on checking one's breast one cific texts . The failure or inability, in other words, to separate the historical chaff finds no "two fingers ."21 Figurative interpretation, in other words, was not cat- from the transcendent wheat leaves subsequent generations laboring under egorically taboo . In fact, given their identification with the primordial linguistic the notion that all meaning is dictated by texts and that the only way to oppose instincts of the Arabians, Traditionalists were acutely aware of the semantic or attack a particular normative meaning is to oppose or attack the purport- elasticity of the language of revelation . They understood, as I have shown in my edly plain sense of the text on which it is based . This, however-and this is description of al-Shafi`i, that this was a language in which one might "speak my point here-remains a problem whether one is dealing with the legacy of of a thing and identify it only in terms of the meaning that attaches to it, with- Traditionalism or Rationalism . For while Traditionalism downplays the influ- out resorting to a specific word for it," this being among "the highest form ence of postrevelation history, Rationalism conceals its debt to history by way of speech."22 For Traditionalists, however, only these kinds of primordial con- of linguistic formalism. The challenge, thus, for contemporary Muslims is not siderations, not the logical implications recognized by Rationalists, provided simply to come up with alternatives to literalist interpretations (which in this justification for invoking allegorical interpretation . context might result in no more than the obligation to stick to a nonliteral yet Still, as is clear from the example of Ibn Hanbal and the "two-fingers still historically informed and perhaps ill-suited Rationalism) . The challenge, move hadith," such primordial reason could justify-indeed, even require-the rather, has been and remains to produce approaches to Muslim intellectual his- from a literal to a nonliteral sense . Similarly, the insistence on plain sense was tory that can locate and monitor through time and space the semantic contribu- not blind and unqualified but the result of a reasoned conclusion that there was tions of both the secular and the transcendent ." neither need nor justification for any other rendering .23 As Laoust points out Ironically, this is precisely the commitment Traditionalism, at least in its in his treatment of classical Traditionalism, "it is hardly possible to acquire an ideal posture, seeks to uphold s, . As Laoust points out, one of its general prin- understanding of hadiths and to resolve their contradictions and divergence with' ciples is that "nothing is to be regarded as imposing social obligations but the or to deduce from them the consequences which may derive from them, religious practices which God has explicitly prescribed ; inversely, nothing can 24 out using a minimum of personal judgment." be lawfully forbidden but the practices which have been prohibited by God in All in all, the fixation on literalism and the tendency to stigmatize Tradi- the Kur'an and the Sunna ."27 In other words, Traditionalism's relentless oppo- tionalism as literalistic fideism reflects not only a distortion of this movemen t sition to both ray and bid `ah is aimed precisely at denying all ultimate (read per- but a profound misapprehension of the fundamental problem confronting rnanent) authority to all historically informed accretions, including the various 134 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 135

forms of novelty introduced by theologians, jurists, ascetics, and mystics, as Traditionalism and contributed heavily to the defense and propagation of the 31 well as the decisions handed down by caliphs, sultans, and administrativ e movement. In a similar vein, perhaps based on their "protestant" proclivities officials. On the one hand, this translates into a rigorous, restrictive vigilance (e.g., sola scriptura) carried over from their pre-Islamic background, coupled regarding strictly religious doctrine and practice . At the same time, it implies a with their suspicion of the dominant regime(s) of sense in the West, Tradition- P general openness to more secular institutional and sociocultural evolution . alism enjoys wide appeal among Blackamerican Muslims, as the "natural," or The problem, of course, as with all accommodation, lies in the difficulty of perhaps default, mode of theological reflection ." sustaining the distinction between the contemporary is and the permanent ought. In accommodating or rejecting a contemporary practice or notion for which there is no scriptural imperative or proscription, one runs the risk of conflating secu- Relevant Details of Traditionalist Theology lar appeal or the lack thereof with transcendent normativeness . Over time, such judgments are likely to evolve into permanent and presumably universal features As indicated, Traditionalism is neither static nor monolithic . In order to of an ostensibly normative religious landscape . This is perhaps an even greater impose the needed degree of coherence on its theology, I have chosen to privi- liability for Traditionalism, given its added tendency to privilege the past over the lege the writings of the redoubtable Hanbali jurist and theologian Tag-1 al-Din present and the fact that (Sunni) Islam never recognized an ecclesiastical author . Ibn Taymiya. While Ibn Taymiya represents obviously only a part of the Tra- ity capable of wiping the books clean of outmoded conclusions . ditionalist whole, he is easily, perhaps only after Ahmad Ibn Hanbal himself, In strictly theological terms, the challenge of establishing and policing the the most influential Traditionalist theologian in Muslim history. Indeed, mod- expiration date on historically informed conclusions exposes Traditionalism to ern Traditionalism, in virtually all its manifestations, invariably imbibes-even the fallacy of confusing its prescription that religious doctrine not be informed if it does not always accurately reflect-a healthy regimen of Ibn Taymiya . by (or at least not derive any permanent authority from) secular history with a A staggeringly prolific writer, Ibn Taymiya remains the prism through which description of its own theology at any given time and place . As I have established all modern understandings, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, of the Traditiona- elsewhere, extrascriptural implications and criteria are often as plain and iden- list legacy is invariably filtered . tifiable in Traditionalist articulations as they are in Rationalist ones .28 Indeed, Abu al-'Abbas Tagi al-Din Ahmad b . 'Abd al-Halim b . Taymiya was born as Joseph N . Bell points out, premodern Rationalist defenders of `ilm al-kalam in the northern Mesopotamian city of Harran in 661/1263 . In 667/1269, he (speculative theology) argued, not entirely without justification, that by affirm- moved with his family to Damascus, fleeing the Mongol onslaught. In Damas- ing such doctrines as the uncreated nature of the Qur'an without explicit proof cus, he received his religious education and developed his commitment to what from the Qur'an or Sunna themselves, Ibn Hanbal and his followers were Laoust calls a "conservative reformism ." Ibn Taymiya's courageous pursuits effectively engaging in a methodological equivalent of Rationalism! 29 And, as I in this regard earned him several stints in Syrian and Egyptian prisons, as will show in my treatment of Ibn Taymiya, Traditionalist methods of argumen - well as years of exile in Egypt. In fact, he died a prisoner in the citadel in Syria tation show clear signs of (secular) evolution over space and time . in 728/1328, having remained embroiled in controversy all the way up to the Today, Traditionalism remains a live, authoritative theological expression time of his death . His influence spread well beyond his homeland and the with broad recognition across the Muslim world and beyond . While the modern Hanbali school, extending to any number of Shafi'I, Hanafi, and Maliki admir- movements known as Wahhabism and Salafism are rightly identified as draw - ers, including, to take just one example, the interesting figure of Umm Zaynab ing heavily on the Traditionalist legacy, they represent neither the full range (d. 711/1311-12), a woman who led a public campaign in Damascus against ts nor necessarily the finest expression of Traditionalism . Not all Traditionalis pantheistic Sufism . 33 Today, Ibn Taymiya remains one of the best known and are Wahhabis or Salafis, even if all Wahhabis and Salafis are, broadly speaking most celebrated-not to mention most controversial-intellectuals in the Traditionalists . Similarly, Traditionalism is no more a strict monolith today history of Islam . than it was in classical times (though it generally evinced more doctrinal cohe- Ibn Taymiya's theological agenda reflects at least three main challenges sion than did Rationalism) .` Nor is it today any more a strictly Arab phenom e- to what he would consider a normative theological order: (I) pantheistic, anti- non than it was in the past . Indeed, Arabicized non-Arabs, despite their hailing nomian Sufism; (2) Ash'arism; and (3) Shi`ism . Of the three, the excesses from pagan and ~--ton-Islamic backgrounds, readily recognized the genius of of Sufism and Ash'arism were most prominent. Given, however, what he 13 6 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 137

perceived to be the theological support that antinomian Sufism drew from This critical posture would ultimately inform Ibn Taymiya's approach to Ash'arism, Ibn Taymiya came to see Ash'arism as the greater threat-eve n God's omnipotence and omnibenevolence . Like the Ash'arites and Maturidites, greater than Mu'tazilism! And yet it would be precisely in his engagement with against the Mu`tazilites, 39 he affirms God's complete and absolute monopoly Ash'arism that Ibn Taymiya would take Traditionalism itself through perhap s over effective power. For him, God is sovereign over both nature and history, its greatest transformation. While he never accepted Rationalism's regime of and the dictum "Whatever God wills happens, and whatever He does not will sense as the normative universe of meaning with which scripture had to be does not ("ma sha' Allahu kana wa ma lam yasha' lam yakun") recurs almost like reconciled, he made palpable concessions to the proposition that scripture a mantra throughout his works . While God is ultimately the source, however, afforded reasoned responses to all possible theological questions . Whereas of everything that comes into actual existence, and nothing can come into exis- ancient Traditionalism had been known to defer to scripture's "problematic" tence independent of God's will, Ibn Taymiya emphatically presses the distinc- references and "lacunae" as self-validating, condemning attempts to impose tion between God's ontological decree and God's normative preference, what he speculative meanings on this as unsanctioned innovation (bid`ah), Ibn Taymiya calls the difference between God's ontological will (iradah kawniyah) and God's inclined more and more toward harmonizing the Qur'an and Sunna into ratio- deontological will (iradah shar`iyah) .40 Interestingly, Ibn Taymiya's primary tar- nally defensible doctrine .34 Thus, while he ultimately remains true to the basic get in this regard is almost never Mu'tazilism and almost always the Ash'arites, Man of Traditionalism, there is much in his theological articulations that can despite the Ash'arites' general endorsement of this same distinction . only be described as speculative . As I have shown, the going opinion in Ash'arism was also that God's onto- At the most basic level, a key insight into the thrust and texture of Ibn logical decree is separate and distinct from God's deontological decree . Thus, Taymiya's thought emerges from a review of his position on the existence of not everything God decrees ontologically could be said to reflect God's plea- God. Here he reveals his recognition of a range of epistemologies, over against sure. Nor could one assume that because God prefers a particular thing that the singular mode-systematic kalam-privileged by Rationalism and those God would necessarily bring it into actual existence ." Ibn Taymiya proceeds falling under its influence ." According to Ibn Taymiya, human beings have a on the assumption, however, that this is not the position of Ash'arism and that natural, instinctual ability-a fitra-via which they can know God, just as they according to them, God's will, love, pleasure, desire, displeasure, wrath, and t know that two is more than one or that material objects fall from up to down . the like are all synonymous . This is clearly an overstatement on his part. And This, according to him, is the primary means of knowing God, a medium that he appears to have been compelled to this move in order to pull the rug out renders rational "proofs" largely superfluous, except for those whose natural from underneath a particularly intractable form of antinomian Sufism that had disposition has been corrupted . For such people, systematic reason may pro- located in the articulations of a few prominent Ash'arites a theological justifica- vide a way to knowledge of God, but this will not come without a number of tion for antinomianism . practical liabilities and theological costs .", I showed earlier that the works of al-Ash`ari and al-Juwayni contained I have described the basic Rationalist argument for the existence of God ." language suggesting that there is no distinction between God's will, love, Ibn Taymiya's problem with this argument is at least threefold. First, it is of desire, and the like .42 Ibn Taymiya proceeds as if this represents the position questionable religious value, as it does not, according to him, prove the exis- of Ash'arism as a whole .43 Clearly, however, he could not have been unaware tence of God, certainly not the God of the Qur'an . Second, it does not Sup- of other statements by these men-not to mention other Ash`arites-that port belief in prophethood and the Last Day, cardinal tenets of the religion ." flatly contradicted this view .44 Indeed, the very works he cites of al-Ash`ari and Third, it actually distorts the God of Muhammad by identifying accidents al-Juwayni contain language that differentiates between God's will and God's (a`rad/s . `arad) with proof of createdness, which means that God cannot actu- Preference . For example, in al-`Agidah al-Nizamiyah, which Ibn Taymiya cites ally be possessed of the attributes mentioned in the Qur'an and Sunna such as by name, al-Juwayni uses the unequivocally explicit terms amr al-takwin (onto- a hand, a face, or mounting the Throne, since these imply size, shape, motion , logical command) versus amr al-taklif (deontological command) .45 These cor- t' and the like . Even more important for my discussion, God, on this argumen respond exactly to Ibn Taymiya's own iradah kawniyah and iradah shar`iyah, cannot be possessed of any affective traits: God cannot actually love, detest, be respectively. In a similar fashion, Ibn Taymiya quotes al-Bagillani (whom he angry, or be pleased, because all of these constitute accidents (in the form of identifies as the greatest Rationalist of all times) as affirming God's love, plea- change from one state to another) . sure, wrath, and the like ." While al-Bagillani explains these attributes in terms 138 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 139 of God's will to reward or punish,41 this is clearly not the same as saying that Similarly, the fact that God detests or disapproves of a thing is no proof that an God's will was identical with these attributes, certainly not in any sense that entity other than God must be responsible for that thing's coming to be . would justify antinomianism . It is difficult, given his otherwise keen attention In all of this, Ibn Taymiya opposes both the doctrine of kasb (certainly in to subtlety and detail, to imagine that Ibn Taymiya actually held the going opin . the form he attributes to Ash'arism) and the doctrine of jabr, at least asjabrwas ion in Ash'arism to be that God's will and love were functionally synonymous. generally understood . This raises the question of how he would reconcile divine This appears, rather, to have been a purely tactical move on his part . omnipotence with the notion that humans enjoy freedom of choice . Here he In justifying their antinomianism, certain Sufi groups affirmed that divine ends up going farther than any of the other schools in his commitment to "tra- will was identical with divine love, such that everything that God decreed ontologi. ditional omnipotence." At the same time, however, his ability to see through cally God also loved . In a summary of this view, William Chittick, for example, some of the exaggerated dismissals of certain Mu'tazilite views results in a writes in The Svfi Path of Love that "things are good and evil only in relation to us, number of unexpected compromises and alignments that totally scramble the not in relation to God, for in His eyes all things are performing but one task : mak- boundaries separating the Sunni theological extremes from the middle . ing the Hidden Treasure manifest."" On this understanding, these Sufis could The whole point of kasb had been to provide humans with the ability to act claim to be unbound by the religious law, on the argument that God loved all of in accordance with their own choices without encroaching on God's monopoly their actions, no matter how remiss or depraved . In such a context, statements by on power. Among Ash'arites, with the exception of al-Juwayni and to a lesser al-Ash`ari and al-Juwayni that seemed to equate divine will with divine love could extent al-Bagillani, the power granted via kasb was not generally considered be easily appropriated and turned into support for this position . At the same time, to be efficient (mu'aththir) .51 Pace the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites insisted that the general Ash'arite proscription on God's having affective traits could be called efficiency remained the exclusive preserve of God . What God granted by way of on for additional reinforcement, since it denied that God could actually love or kasb, in other words, was simply an indication or guarantee of where God would hate anything . All of this, however, was more a matter of certain Ash`arite bits and place God's own efficient power ." It was completely and solely God's power, pieces being placed in the service of views with which Ash'arism as a whole would in other words, and not at all that of humans, that actually translated human disagree . Indeed, the whole point of al-Bagillani's attempt, for example, to explain choices into ontological reality." God's love and wrath in terms of God's will to reward and punish was merely to From Ibn Taymiya's perspective, kasb on this understanding amounts preempt the notion that God could be possessed of accidents in the form of affec- ultimately to a nothing-burger, an empty theological fiction in which humans tive traits . This was hardly the same as saying that God's love, pleasure, wrath, and effectively receive no power at all and therefore effectively enjoy no agency ." For the like could not be differentiated from God's will . Indeed, al-Bagillani is abso- him, while the Mu'tazilite attribution of full, independent efficiency to humans lutely explicit in stating that while all human acts are contingent on God for their constitutes a mistake, the Ash'arite response is an even greater miscalculation, ontological instantiation, some earn God's pleasure and reward while others incur an ill-considered overreaction that rests on an occasionalist cosmology that so God's displeasure and punishment. If, however, God's will and pleasure were empties everything but God of inherent capacity that it explicitly negates cause synonymous there would be nothing to will to punish people for, as everything and effect in nature and implicitly negates human accountability . As I have they did would be consistent with God's pleasure.49 shown, fire, in Ash'arite cosmology, has no inherent capacity to burn but is From Ibn Taymiya's perspective, however, the convergence ofthese Ash`arite simply an indicator of where God chooses to instantiate burning." Similarly, - bits and pieces with Sufi antinomianism was simply too felicitous and too power the created capacity granted humans by way of kasb is not an efficient means of ful a tool in Sufi hands for him to be able to rely on the idea that its utility could be translating their petitioned acts into existence ; it is simply an indicator of where undermined by mere dissection . And even if he could prove that this was not the God will place God's own power in order to instantiate these acts . going position among Ash antes, the appearance of vindicating Ash arism itself As an alternative to this cosmology, Ibn Taymiya introduces what I shall n could ultimately backfire . In this light, he opted instead to accept this attributio term a "theory of complementarity ." According to this theory, everything has to Ash'arism and to refute it through vigorous, almost ad nauseam attack .$° In so a nature and an inherent capacity, which is instilled in it by God .56 Neither y doing, he threw his own view on the matter into bold relief: God is emphatic all this nature nor this inherent capacity, however, is absolute ; each functions, sovereign over nature and history, but there is a fundamental difference between rather, with one effect or another, depending on whether and how it comes what God decrees ontologically and what God loves as a matter of preference. into a relationship with its complement . Fire, on this understanding, does not ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY '4I 140 burn in the absolute ; it merely burns in the presence of a complement, such His theory of complementarity is a noticeable divergence, as is his rejection of as paper or wood; it does not burn in the presence of asbestos, magnesium their essentially "empty" cosmology ." But on the matter of free will and human oxide, or certain metals . None of this negates or detracts from the fact that agency, his differences with the Maturidites appear to be more attitudinal than fire does burn (e.g., paper, wood, etc .) and that it is in its God-given nature to substantive . For example, he agrees with them on attributing quasi-efficient do so . Ibn Taymiya insists, however, that complementarily is the only way that power to humans in the form of the qualifying capacity (what the Maturidites things operate in the world. And according to him, the notion that things have call the "operational soundness of the means and members" (salamat al-asbab an absolute, independent (i.e., noncomplementary) nature is a fallacy popular- al-alat) ) . In contradistinction to the Maturidites, however, he states that the ized by the philosophers, among others, on the basis of a failure to distinguish attribution of general efficiency to humans does not at all constitute an act of external reality from abstractions that exist only in the human mind .57 shirk, or associating divinity with other than God-an apparent reference to Now, human beings, according to Ibn Taymiya, like fire, rain, and the rest the Maturidite charge against the Mu'tazilites for holding humans to be inde- of the elements, are also endowed with an inherent nature and a set of inborn pendently capable of instantiating their choices." Of course, Ibn Taymiya's tendencies, all of which is included in what he refers to as their "qualifying own qualifying capacity differs significantly from the completely autonomous capacity" (qudrah musahhihah) . This qualifying capacity includes, inter alia, Mu'tazilite block-grant. Yet, he makes it a point to say-and here he apparently a primordial knowledge of God ; an instinctual love of pleasure, praise, and also has the Ash'arites in mind-that the mere attribution of some level of power; the inclination to indulge the "lower" desires ; self-absorption ; and heed- quasi-efficiency to humans neither poses a problem nor constitutes the most lessness . It also includes a general will (iradah), the basic instincts (fear, hope) significant threat posed by the Mu`tazilites .66 Rather, for him (and here again and a modicum of quasi-efficient agency (qudrah), represented by the normal he agrees with the Maturidites) ' G 1 the real problem with the Mu'tazilites is that functioning of the limbs and senses ." According to Ibn Taymiya, all humans, in imputing to humans not simply a "general" quasi-efficiency but a complete, mutatis mutandis, receive these endowments, and this is what renders them independent, noncomplementary moral efficiency, they render God function- legally/religiously responsible (mukallaf), whence the designation "qualifying ally superfluous to the religious enterprise. As he puts it, capacity" (qudrah musahhihah) .59 The position of the Qadarites [i.e., the Mu'tazilites] is based on their By themselves, these endowments are all complementary . At the same fallacious principle to the effect that God grants the exact same [type time, they are essentially "morally blind," flailing about in heedless pursuit and degree of] agency to the believer, the unbeliever, the pious, and of expression and self-fulfillment. In order for them to be directed toward the the perverted. They do not concede that God singles out the obedient purpose for which humans were created-a proper relationship with GodGO- believer with any [special] grant of assistance on the basis of which these endowments require the complement of another type of capacity, what he or she sustains belief. They say, rather, that God grants the exact Ibn Taymiya calls the "causative capacity" (qudrah mujibah)G1 or, even more same assistance to the disobedient that He grants to the obedient . explicitly, the "complementary capacity" (qudrah mugarinah) .G2 This causative The latter simply chooses to give preference to obedience, on his or or complementary capacity does not come to all humans as part of their natu- her own accord, while the former chooses to give preference to dis- ral endowments ; nor is it under the autonomous control of humans them- obedience, on his or her own accord .68 selves. This power is dispatched, rather, as part of a special "something" or consummating complement that humans receive when they make petitions The Mu'tazilites, in other words, understood the general, qualifying capacity to God communicated through the general will (iradah) that is included in the (qudrah musahhihah) to be sufficient to attain and sustain belief and obedience . qualifying capacity . This special "something" carries moral/religious efficiency In fact, for them, there was no "special something," or consummating comple- (ta'thir) and can only be used for the specific activity for which it was peti- ment, that humans either needed or received from God . "Being guided," on tioned .G3 It is through this power that humans are able to resist and direct to this understanding, was simply a matter of acquiring religious knowledge-for their proper end the tumultuous goadings of their inborn capacities . example, by learning the Qur'an, Sunna, and so on-and then independently To be sure, the parallels between these articulations and those I have resolving oneself to live accordingly. "Being guided" was unrelated to any psy- described in Maturidism suggest that while he never credits them, Ibn chological, affective, or even religious relationship with God .69 At the same Taymiya's debt to MaturIdism may have been greater than his writings indicate . time, others-for example, the so-called Jabrites (Ibn Taymiya uses this name TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 143 142 as a pejorative code name for Ash'arites)-in holding that the occasionalist Of course, this was precisely the conclusion from which the Mu'tazilites, and after them the Ash'arites, fled in order to avoid the charge of jabr (crass power received by way of kasb conferred no independent, effective capacity but merely represented God's own power directly-effectively negated the human determinism) and the idea that God is not just (`adl) . For were God, not humans, element in the religious enterprise. Both of these positions Ibn Taymiya char- the source of humans' moral/religious choices, God and not they would be . Similarly, were humans not the orig- acterizes as "foul mistakes" (khata' gabih) .70 responsible for their moral/religious acts While Ibn Taymiya's "qualifying capacity" parallels in some ways the inators of their moral/religious choices, it could not be just to reward or punish Mu`tazilites' block-grant agency, it would be a mistake to see it as a mere restate- them for actions whose choosing did not originate with them. ment of Mu'tazilite free will wrapped in a more circuitous locution . To begin For his part, with a counterintuitiveness that one eventually comes to with, in the context of his theory of complementarity, this qualifying capacity is expect of him, Ibn Taymiya denies that God's sponsorship of human choices not-certainly not with regard to religious morality-fully efficient or indepen- amounts to jabr. Jabr, according to him, is an act of coercion . One speaks of it, for example, when referring to the action of a guardian who coerces his ward dent. On the contrary, it requires the assistance of its causative complement . As for the causative complement or "special something" itself, at some point into marriage against the ward's will . The reason, however, that a guardian change control it may begin to sound a lot like Mu'tazilite lutf according to which God can resorts to such action is that he is unable to or the will of his force manipulate extrapsychological forces in order to promote internal decisions ." ward. As a result, he is compelled to his ward to act against his or her This, too, however, is more illusory than real . For while Ibn Taymiya would wishes . By contrast, according to Ibn Taymiya, none of this applies to God, probably accept the broad outlines of lutf, 72 at least as a possibility, lutfplays because God has complete control over all the complements affecting human a much more tangential role for Mu'tazilites, as essentially a compensatory beings' qualifying capacity, as well as a complete monopoly over their causative against doctrine designed to make up for deficits on the front end of human decision- capacity . Thus, rather than having to force individuals to act their wills, making. By contrast, Ibn Taymiya's complementary "something" is neither God has the capacity to inform, to whatever end God pleases, that very will tangential nor compensatory. It functions, rather, as a necessary, consummat- itself. Thus, there is never any need for God to resort to jabr, in the sense of ing complement on the back end of human decisions that confirms or final- forcing individuals to act against their will . As for jabr in the sense of affording izes them and carries them to instantiation . Finally, contrary to Mu'azilite free humans no alternative to acting in accordance with the impulses and choices will, according to which humans can live morally independent of lutf, in Ibn that God does install, Ibn Taymiya openly accepts this and proclaims that on Taymiya's theology, humans remain ultimately contingent on God and God's this definition, he is a jabrti .75 special "something" for their ability to sustain a religiously moral life . This leads, of course, directly into the question of God's omnibenevolence, Beyond the matter of efficiency, Ibn Taymiya also veered from the doctrine or 'adl. For the idea that human choice is not under the complete control of of kasb-in its Ash'arite form-on the question of the nature and provenance humans is difficult to square with the claim that God is just in rewarding and of human choice (ikhtiyar), that is, as the directing component to the general punishing people for the choices they make . Ibn Taymiya takes a two-pronged will that comes along with the qualifying capacity . As I mentioned in chapter 3, approach to this problem . First, he insists that inasmuch as humans act on the while the Ash'arites generally affirmed freedom of choice, they neither firmly basis of choice (ikhtiyar), it is just for God to reward and punish them, since nor consistently committed themselves on the question of where these choices they do in fact choose to perform the acts they perform . Whether this choice actually originate-with humans or with God.73 The issue itself was, of course, of or ability to choose originates with them or with God is of little relevance : for no small significance, as it impinged directly on the question of God's omnipo- it remains, all the same, choice, against which there are no other identifiable tence and indirectly on that of God's omnibenevolence . For this reason, perhaps psychological impediments . At some remove, even Mu'tazilites would concede Ibn Taymiya saw fit to address it directly . Emphatically and unambiguously, he that human choice ultimately comes from God, albeit in the form of a non- affirms that every choice (ikhtiyar) via which humans control or direct their nat- complementary block-grant . Ibn Taymiya simply draws out of this the logical ural capacities falls squarely within the domain of al-lahu's sovereignty and is conclusion that the idea of God compelling one to choose or compelling one to a under the direct control of God . This, in fact, is the basic meaning he imputes to particular choice is essentially a contradiction in terms . such Qur'anic verses as "And you do not will except that God wills [that you will]" Second-and this appears to be his main argument in this regard-Ibn ("wa ma tasha'una illa an yasha'a Allah") (76:30, 8I :29)." Taymiya insists that God's omnibenevolence is preserved by the fact that it ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 145 144 is actually not God but the human self (nafs), in cooperation with Satan, that attributable to God. For according to Ibn Taymiya, "a privation has no agent is the ultimate source of moral evil . In yet another counterintuitive gesture, and is not a thing; a thing is simply something that exists . And God is [simply] he ardently defends this position, despite his persistent and emphatic decla- the creator of every thing . Thus, it is not permissible to attribute a pure priva- ration that God is the creator of all things and that nothing enters into God's tion to God."82 kingdom against God's will . To be sure, Ibn Taymiya is keenly aware of the By contrast, where the qualifying capacity is used to petition the special logical tension here . And he goes to significant lengths to resolve this apparent "something" from God, it is granted, and in its train come good deeds and the contradiction . resulting good impulses they promote . This, however, occurs through an action First, Ibn Taymiya insists that absolute moral evil is a privation (`adam), by God, in consequence of an action by a human being, as opposed to a with- that is, the absence of being .' Second, God, according to him, does not relate holding by God in consequence of a nonaction, that is, neglect, by a human to good in the same manner that God relates to evil ; good is conferred gratis ; being." This raises, of course, the question of how or why some people petition evil is produced only as recompense for disobedience ." Finally, against what originally for the special "something" while others do not . Here Ibn Taymiya, he depicts as the "empty" cosmology of the Ash'arites and Maturidites, Ibn at least as far as I can tell, is simply not totally clear. On the one hand, he gives Taymiya insists that human actions, like fire or rain, have intrinsic qualities, the impression that the qualifying capacity entails the independent ability to among them being the production of psychological impulses that lead to other petition. At the same time, he seems unwilling to abandon the implication good or evil acts . This is all validated by such verses as "Then the consequences that God plays a decisive role in the religious enterprise .84 In the end, this lack for those who committed evil was evil" and "Verily, prayer prevents lewdness of clarity might be best understood as signaling his recognition-indeed, his and evil" (30 :10 ; 29:4.5).78 In other words, Ibn Taymiya understands the Qur'an insistence-that the religious enterprise, based as it is on a relationship with an to indicate that the "natural" effects of good or bad deeds are, respectively, good ultimately ineffable God, must remain shrouded in an element of mystery. or bad impulses, which in turn promote other good or bad deeds and impulses . Even on the understanding, however, that God unilaterally chooses to These natural qualities function, however, in an ultimately complementary inspire some to petition for the initial "something" while withholding this fashion and must be understood in the context of Ibn Taymiya's theory of the from others, Ibn Taymiya insists that God remains just . For God's lack of guid- general human capacity (qudrah musahhihah), which both endows humans ing some remains both a divine prerogative and a privation, in which capacity with an instinctual knowledge of God and renders them capable of willing and it cannot be counted an actual act of God .85 To explicate, he offers the following carrying out, inter alia, morally blind, undirected actions .79 hypothetical : "If we imagine a righteous scholar who commands people to do Now, Ibn Taymiya insists that the first "sin" (dhanb) or evil act that a what benefits them, then helps some of them achieve this goal but does not human being commits is neglect of the duty to commit to fulfilling his or her help others, he will have treated the first group to unalloyed goodness, but he obligation to God . In other words, rather than petitioning, via the qualifying will not have treated the second group unjustly ."86 capacity, for the special "something" through which to direct one's general Clearly, Ibn Taymiya does not equate divine justice with formal equality, endowments, this is neglected in favor of heedless self-indulgence, routinely a position easy enough to vindicate, given the massive differences in human strengthened where not actually spawned by the beguilements of Satan ." This endowments overall . His ultimate point, however, is that God's justice is mea- negative gesture both constitutes and produces an evil action, which in turn sured by what God does, not by what God does not do. Everything that God does generates a second negative impulse, which in turn translates into further dis- is good and just. obedience . Through the "natural qualities" deposited in human acts, this cycle In this context, Ibn Taymiya vehemently rejects the notion that the initial continues naturally, unless it is arrested by repentance, countervailing good act of negligence could be the result of God's spontaneous installation of evil deeds, or God's gratuitous intervention. For God's part, God is responsible for impulses. This, he implies, simply goes against God's "character," which is all the actions that follow the initial sin of negligence ; for these produce their always to prefer good over evil ." In fact, not even all the evil impulses that fol- effect through God's creative power, working through the agency of their God- low the initial act of negligence are directly deposited by God. Rather, some- given natural qualities and God's manipulation of their complements . But God presumably most-come as the "natural" consequence of the evil acts that flow is not responsible for the initial act of negligence ."' For this "act" is essentially from the initial nonact, in the same way that vegetation comes as a natural con- a nonact-a privation (`adam), not a "thing." As a nonthing, its existence is not sequence of rain." God may, however, directly deposit or strengthen negative ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 146 TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 14.7 impulses as recompense for negligence and disobedience ." But this can only brings them to their highest selves, by protecting them from the ravages of occur as recompense . And here, Ibn Taymiya rails against those-namely their undisciplined endowments ." This is the general context in which he Ash`arites,90-who, having stripped God of all affective traits, and thus of con- insists that all of God's actions, including the microevil God sponsors, are ulti- crete benevolence91-effectively come to view the All-Merciful as an "angry mately wise . As with Maturidite hikmah, humans may not always be able to deity" whose unbridled caprice all humans should fear, whether they have com- apprehend the workings of God's wisdom, but it is always there . In fact, Ibn mitted sins or not, "just as they fear a lion or a tyrannical ruler whose actions Taymiya observes that it may not always be in humans' interest to know the and use of force are completely arbitrary ."92 Against such an understanding, actual wisdom behind every divine act; indeed, such knowledge may actually Ibn Taymiya, insists, again, on God's benevolent character and points to such even harm them." Unlike the Maturidites, however, Ibn Taymiya appears to verses as "Whatever evil befalls you, it is from your self" ("wa ma asabaka min embrace (at times at least) a much stronger moral ontology, which, given his sayyi'atin fa min nafsik") as proof that God does not spontaneously or gratu- naturalistic cosmology, seems to approach that of the Baghdadi Mu'tazilites . itously sponsor evil impulses and that disobedience (ma'siya) is the only basis Thus, for example, at one point he appears to indicate that the human soul's for such action by God." procurement of its naturally desired pleasure and its avoidance of its natu- This brings me to the final point of this section . Given that God does rally undesired pain are, ceteris paribus, good and their opposite evil ." And in sponsor evil impulses (even if only as recompense), and given that God con- expounding on God's omnibenevolence and the claim that categorical evil has firms the evil effects of prior misdeeds, how can it be maintained that God is no way to God, he writes in a manner that appears to recognize the objective omnibenevolent? According to Ibn Taymiya, God remains omnibenevolent for evil of calamities that befall even evil people . two reasons. First, in a move reminiscent of Ash'arite ethical subjectivism, he Everything He creates in which there is some partial, relative evil insists that nothing that God does amounts to universal, categorical evil (sharr contains many times that in general good, wisdom, and mercy . For mahd) . Rather, whatever evil God sponsors is relative (idaft) to a particular indi- vidual, group, place, time, or context. Second, and related to the first point, all example, sending Moses to Pharaoh : this entailed the rejection of the the (relative) evil that God sponsors is directed to a wise end . Here, in a move former and the destruction of the latter and his people . And this was reminiscent of Maturidite hikmah, Ibn Taymiya insists that wisdom (hikmah), evil with regard to these parties . But a benefit to humanity as a whole also obtained, one that will last till the Day of Judgment . Thus, the in addition to mercy (rahmah), goodness (khayr), and the like, are all forces that inextricably inform God's actions . This was part of his campaign against those lesson learned from the saga of Pharaoh is nothing but general good, who argued that God proceeds capriciously on the basis of sheer will and brute the number of people benefiting from it being many, many times the prerogative . Against this view he adduces such verses as "The All-Merciful, number of those who suffered from it ." taught the Qur'an" (55 :1) : "Inform My servants that I am The Forgiving, The The utilitarian connotations of these articulations are clear and seem to call to Merciful" (15 :49); "Shall We treat those who surrender to God as We treat crim- mind the likes of Bentham and J . S . Mill. Meanwhile, despite their clear com- inals? What is the matter with you? How do you reckon?" (68 :35-36). And he monalities, Ibn Taymiya's position subtly departs from that of the Maturidites adds from the Sunna such reports as "God is more merciful to His servants (or at least from al-Maturidi himself) . For Ibn Taymiya explicitly denies the than a mother is to her child" and "Goodness is in Your hands [0 Lord], and possibility that God could create absolute evil (sharr mutlaq)-evil that is not evil has no way to You ."94 relative and does not serve an absolute greater (not necessarily long-term) Of the principles and qualities informing God's "character" and actions, good.100 This is the meaning of such statements of his to the effect that "God however, wisdom (hikmah) appears to assume pride of place . By wisdom, how- commits no evil at all" ("fa inna al-rabb la yaf al sayyi'atan gatt") .101 ever, Ibn Taymiya expressly opposes the Mu'tazilite notion that wise actions In the end, all of this was connected to Ibn Taymiya's campaign to uphold are only those that serve the interests of others . Rather, wise acts, according God's omnibenevolence as a substantively concrete dimension of the divine to Ibn Taymiya, also serve the interests of the actor ." Now, what Ibn Taymiya "character" against the tendency on the part of the Ash'arites to negate divine seems to be implying here is that it is in the interest of both God and humans affective traits and reduce God's goodness to a sheer matter of provenance .102 that God be properly worshipped-God because it serves God's pleasure, and This was critical in the intellectual and religious context of his time, where the humans because, in addition to earning reward and averting punishment, it latter understanding could be taken as a basis for an antinomian argument to ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 149 148 the effect that everything in existence is good because it issues from the (onto- Ash'arism, and Maturidism in their fundamental challenge to Jones . In agree- logical) decree of God . This was also perhaps part of the reason Ibn Taymiya ment with all three of these schools, Traditionalism (I) complicates, if not under- embraced the main features of the Mu'tazilite doctrine recognizing reason's mines, the charge of divine racism; (2) refutes the presumed link between belief ability to apprehend good and evil (al-husn wa al-qubh al-`agliyan). In fact, he in divine omnipotence and the necessity of quietism ; (3) unequivocally affirms goes so far as to claim that this was "the doctrine of most Muslim groups, along divine omnibenevolence and refutes the connection between it and quietism, as with the Jews and Christians .""' The whole point of this endorsement was, of well as the idea that the occurrence of black suffering necessarily disproves God's course, to preempt all antinomian tendencies toward moral agnosticism . goodness/justice ; and (4) points up the superfluousness, if not outright disad- To conclude, I have shown the ways Traditionalism approached the semi- vantage, of a secular, nontheistic approach . Beyond this, Traditionalism joins nal questions surrounding the cluster of issues relating to theodicy. While there Ash'arism and Maturidism in refuting the idea that black suffering cannot be were clearly points of convergence with and divergence from the other schools, reconciled with God's omnipotence (i.e., God's sovereignty over nature and his- Traditionalism clearly played in the same league . In fact, the traditional West- tory) . Far more unexpectedly, Traditionalism actually joins Mu'tazilism in hold- ern tendency to place Traditionalism at one end of the theological spectrum as ing out the possibility for a far more humanocentric expression of theism .105 the close-minded, fideistic sneer of a small group of "backwater theologians," In going at least as far as Ash`arism and Maturidism in denying secondary with Mu'tazilism at the other end as the "progressive" voice of reason, calls for causation, Traditionalism upholds the view that God is absolute sovereign over serious reexamination. The following chart from chapter 4, with the addition nature and history . At the same time, Traditionalism resists what it sees as an of Traditionalism (represented by Ibn Taymiya), lays out the basic positions of unnecessary overreaction to Mu'tazilism and recognizes a degree of human all four schools .'°4 agency that Ash'arism would not recognize at all and Maturidism would only very guardedly acknowledge as such.116 Still, nothing, according to Traditional-

Mu'tazilism Ash'arism Maturidism Traditionalism ism, could come into existence outside of God's will and power . For "Whatever (Ibn Taymiya) God wills happens, and whatever He does not will does not" ("ma sha' Allahu kana wa ma lam yasha' lam yakun") . Husn/qubh Yes No (Buhkaran) No Yes On such an understanding, black suffer- (Samarqandi) Yes ing, like everything else, remains ultimately contingent on God . Given, how- Can impose Impossible No Yes (Buhkaran) Yes No + ever, Traditionalism's emphatic insistence on the distinction between God's duty (Samargand3) No ontological will and God's deontological will, the notion that God desires or Kasb No Yes Yes No + Must observe human Yes No No Yes - must be pleased with black suffering is completely obliterated . interest Meanwhile, while ostensibly rejecting the doctrine of kasb-at least in its `Iwad (must) Yes No No most popular form-Traditionalism essentially arrives at the same basic con- Lutf(must) (Basran) Yes No No (Baghdad3) N clusion regarding the role of humans in the promotion of evil. It is ultimately Can reward unbelievers No Yes No No humans' failure or refusal to will or prefer good to evil and to petition God for God can do as God pleases No Yes No Yes - the ability to carry this preference out that sets in motion the cycle of acts and Free will (choice) Yes Yes Yes Yes impulses that generate and sustain evil . God, for God's part, even as Master Humans create own Yes No No No + actions Executor, does not inspire humans, at least not ab initio, to commit evil . Of God can do evil No No Yes No+/Yes- course, neither does God necessarily intervene with gratuitous grants of the spe- Moral ontology "Hard"/ Strong Strong Weak "Soft" cial "something" that would preempt such suffering . But given, as I will show, Traditionalism's religious teleology, where the ultimate consideration is one's fate in the Hereafter, refusing gratuitous grants to whites in order to stop their Traditionalism and Jones oppression of blacks would not make God a white racist . For this could hardly be considered a favor that God confers on the dominant, oppressing group . Despite its fundamental difference with Rationalism, manifested in its rejection , As for the concern about quietism, the notion that blacks must acquiesce of Rationalism's normative regime of sense, Traditionalism joins Mu`tazilisln in the face of white oppression, on the insistence that it could not exist apart 150 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 151 from God's creative power, finds no support at all in Traditionalism . To begin business practices-that both promote one's quotidian interests and procure with, in agreement with the Mu'tazilites, pace the Ash'arites, Traditionalism God's aid, not by directly earning God's pleasure per se but via the natural pow- recognizes evil as a concrete, palpable reality that can be apprehended by reason ers that God deposits in good deeds . It rains, in other words, for the weeds just independently . Second, the distinction between God's ontological and deonto . as it rains for the flowers . This is clearly the meaning behind such statements logical will preempts the conclusion that just because an act/event occurs, it cited by Ibn Taymiya as "God will aid a just nation, even if it is an unbelieving must be good. Finally, in agreement with all the schools, Traditionalism recog- one [Allah yansuru al-dawlata al-'adilah wa law kanat kafirah], and He will not nizes scripture as an absolutely authoritative basis of moral instruction. Thus, aid an unjust nation, even if it is a believing one ."109 On this understanding, the numerous scriptural imperatives that either require or exhort believers it could be argued that Traditionalism would not summarily dismiss Jones's to resist oppression-for example, "Fight them until there is no oppression humanocentric theism as a totally baseless-cum-useless concept . [fitna]" (2:193; 8:39) ; "Fight the patrons of Satan" (4:76); "Permission has been It it precisely here, however, that Traditionalism presents its major chal- granted to those who fight because they have been wronged" (22 :39)-remain lenge to both Jones and Blackamericans. Jones's humanocentric theism, with binding, regardless of any conclusions about whether humanity or God is ulti- its "functional ultimacy of man" and its "all is in man's hands approach," is mately responsible for the evil of oppression . In fact, speaking in this regard, ultimately about agency. It largely ignores, at least as a primary concern, the Ibn Taymiya states explicitly : issue of values, meaning, and weltanschauung, beyond the basic priority and propriety of "liberation ." As suggested earlier, 110 in the absence of an indepen- There is not a single verse in the Qur'an nor a single hadith from dent epistemology, a separate psychological space from which to understand, the Prophet commanding humans to be pleased with everything critique, and evaluate the dominant order, as well as contemplate and craft, that God determines and brings into existence in the way of human where appropriate, responsible alternatives to it, "liberation" may ultimately actions, good or evil. This is an important principle that must be duly amount to no more than successfully breaking into a burning building . Jones, observed . [On the other hand] humans are obligated to be pleased however, seems to proceed as if the attainment of complete agency alone is with what God commands . Indeed, no one is permitted to resent enough to guarantee liberation. God's command ."' And yet even in the post-civil rights era of Blackamerican political and eco- Thus, evil, even if it is ontologically dependent on God, can be looked on as nomic empowerment-with the proliferation of black mayors and congress- a thing to be eliminated . Traditionalism, therefore, like all the other schools, persons, even two secretaries of state, the rise of black CEOs of Fortune 500 summarily disposes of the charge of quietism . companies, indeed a Blackamerican president!-the majority of Blackameri- Turning to Jones's proposal of "humanocentric theism," a hasty reading cans continue to nurse disquieting feelings of oppression . This is because, as of Traditionalism (or at least Ibn Taymiya) might suggest complete incompat - I have noted, oppression-and thus liberation!-is not limited to the denial ibility between the two. Closer examination, however, suggests that the matter (and attainment) of agency . It is not simply such restrictions on black agency as is not so simple . On Ibn Taymiya's approach, as a completely secular enter- lynchings, "Whites Only" signs, or economic redlining that inform this sense prise-that is, with no view to satisfying any conscious duty or commitment to of oppression but the deeply felt paucity of avenues to healthy, life-affirming God-Blackamericans (or any suffering group) can mount a campaign against self-definition-that is, access to a universe of values and meanings over which oppression, independent of any divine guidance or aid . This is because the the dominant group does not preside as judge and owner . Blackamericans, "qualifying capacity" (qudrah musahhihah) that all humans enjoy is both real in other words, may not still be the objects of another's will, but they remain 10s and, ceteris paribus, efficient enough to sustain quotidian, secular pursuits . imprisoned by liminal psychological, moral, and cultural spaces whose param- It is primarily, if not only, with regard to religion and morality-that is, as eters are largely defined and controlled by another group's fears, imagination, conscious pursuits-that the special "something" from God is needed . Crudely perceptions, and interests . In such a context, protest becomes a natural reac- speaking, and at the risk of overstatement, beyond the qualifying capacity tion. But blind protest for protest's sake is ultimately meaningless and may that God bestows, ab initio, one does not need God in order to unleash one's even serve the interests of the dominant group . For if one does not know endowments on what one identifies as one's goals . In fact, in pursuit of such where one is going, any road will take one there . And modern, market-driven, goals, one may even land on moral principles and behaviors-for example, fair consumerist capitalism is never short on roads to nowhere . TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 1 152 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 53 In sum, Jones's valuation of the functional ultimacy of human beings This is precisely the danger that the (uncontrolled, undirected) natural seems to assume that once in a position of free agency, "man,"-that is, the desire for praise poses for Blackamericans, most particularly in a context where black man-will automatically get it right, that he is not subject to being misled the most pervasive criteria and channels for such praise are set and controlled either by others or even his own self (nafs) . Traditionalism, on the other hand, by the dominant group, or where the rejectionist alternatives, spawned by blind affirms that in the absence of a commitment to God, human beings-all human protest, tend to lead down one-way avenues to nowhere-or worse . Whereas beings, indeed, society at large-are subject to the beguilements of Satan as well Jones addresses the issue of Blackamerican agency, he does not appear to be as those that come along with humans' qualifying capacity . Chief among the equally concerned about the use to which such agency might be put . By con- latter, Ibn Taymrya points out, are the twin vices of the desire to be worshipped, trast, Traditionalism-especially Ibn Taymrya-insists that this is emphatically that is, made the object of unjustified praise and adoration (which he identifies the issue and that it cannot be effectively addressed outside a conscious com- as the vice of Pharaoh,)"' and the desire to be obeyed, that is, made the subject mitment to God . Indeed, not only does Ibn Taymrya not see secularized and of unjustified power and the ability to coerce (the vice of Pharaoh and Satan) . 112 atheistic approaches as preferable, let alone more effective, he would argue that How, in the absence of divine aid, can humans navigate their way around they are outright detrimental to humans in general and (I would add) Black- these vices? Ibn Taymrya affirms that they simply cannot. For "in the soul of americans in particular . For not only do they leave Blackamericans vulnerable every human being . . . is a bit of both of these [vices]. And if God does not aid to the ravages of normalized domination, they offer no special "something" via a person and guide him [or her], they will pursue, to the extent that they can, which their desires and energies might be redirected . that which Satan and Pharaoh pursued .""' Moreover, he notes, "every soul has And yet the most unanticipated irony of all of this is that after Mu'tazilism in it that which Pharaoh's soul had, except that Pharaoh was powerful enough (which, of course, effectively denies the special "something") Ibn Taymiya's to show his openly, while others have no such power and are therefore forced theology is perhaps the most accommodating of a truly humanocentric the- to conceal it ." 114 ism. For according to him, God will not unilaterally intervene with the spe- In most societies, the pursuit of power, even legitimate power-that is, the cial "something" via which persons may overcome the ravages of their inborn power needed to promote and protect a dignified existence-is a risky enter- nature. Rather, humans, albeit through their God-given qualifying capacity, prise, especially for the historically marginalized, and even more so for those must take the first step and continue thereafter putting one foot perpetually in whose most obvious marker has historically connoted the propriety of their front of the other . status as objects of power. The pursuit of praise and adoration, however, is a Here one comes to see that of all the classical Islamic theodicies, Ibn different matter . For it can be undertaken in a manner that not only does not Taymiya's is perhaps the most explicit in imposing a burden of religious com- threaten the powerful but actually confirms their authority and the order of mitment on human beings. Given his understanding of the divine "charac- normalized domination they aim to uphold . Normalized domination occurs, ter," he would certainly respond in the negative to the question of whether of course, when humans are reduced to such a state of self-doubt and self- God is malevolent toward blacks . At the same time, he might also reverse the contempt that they internalize a vague but inextricable feeling that they can question: Are blacks malevolent toward, or perhaps heedless of, God? As in only redeem themselves, that is, earn the praise and validation they desire, by the case of the antinomian Sufis of his time, the question here would not be living up to the norms and expectations of those who dominate . When this one of simple belief in God but of how that belief manifests itself (or not) in happens, the ability to arrive at realistic understandings and engage in prin- the form of responsible, disciplined behavior-obedience to God's command . cipled critiques of the prevailing order (as well as of oneself) is lost to the feel- Does Blackamerican belief translate into obedience? Or does Blackamerican ings of triumph that occur as one approaches redemption . For such feelings oppression function in effect as a slick, would-be equivalent of a theological have the effect of obliterating or reducing to meaninglessness all recognition justification for religious antinomianism? Do Blackamericans tend, in other . In of the provenance or falsity of the criterion on which redemption is based words, to say in effect, "We are oppressed ; therefore, outside the most obvi- this context, basic truths that contradict the reigning order and threaten the ously egregious acts, whatever we do-or do not do-is okay, because God promise of validation are confronted agnostically, and individuals are given loves the oppressed?" ar over to anesthetizing ideologies, idolatrous consumerism, or plain old popul Assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is true that God does love the ,'morality.""' oppressed, how, even in such light, does one assess the cumulative effect of TRADITIONALISM AND BLACK THEODICY 154 ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 155 Blackamericans' own actions on the Blackamerican plight, especially given the routinized lives of heedlessness that result in perdition, in this world, the next, "natural powers" that Ibn Taymiya attributes to human acts? In other words, or both. Having said this much, Ibn Taymiya would agree with Jones that all what indications does one have that God's love of the oppressed is enough to suffering should ultimately be looked on as a thing to be eliminated, or at least override-consistently and permanently-the "natural," cumulative effects of as something that humans are justified, if not duty bound, to oppose ."' His dif- their deeds and non-deeds? Ibn Taymiya would simply argue that ignoring this ference with Jones would be, ironically, in the role he assigns to humans in the concern is but another version of the spurious divine love of the antinomian elimination of that suffering . For Ibn Taymiya, the primary ground for human Sufis, according to which God loves everything and the dialectical effects of suffering is heedlessness and disobedience . And it is humans, not God, who their own actions can simply be ignored. Such a position could not, of course, play the primary role in eliminating these . In other words, rather than relying be reconciled, according to Ibn Taymiya, with the plain sense of scripture : "Cor- on miraculous, unilateral divine interventions, Blackamericans must conduct ruption has spread on land and at sea by what the hands of people have sent their affairs in a manner that earns God's pleasure and prompts God to use forth" (30:41); "Is the recompense for evil but evil like it?" (55:60); "So when God's sovereignty over nature and history in a manner that benefits them-for they diverged (from the truth), We caused their hearts to diverge" (61:5). While example, by unilaterally depositing benevolent impulses in them as well as in Jones does not appear to give much consideration to this dialectical dimension those of the oppressor class,"' or even by refusing to translate into reality some of the God-human relationship, this is woven into the very warp and woof of of the latter's evil impulses . On this understanding, one is tempted to sug- Ibn Taymiya's theodicy . gest that Ibn Taymiya actually assigns a greater role to humans in eliminating Having said this much, this may be the most enlightening context within human suffering than Jones does . which to ponder Ibn Taymiya's notion of hikmah, or wisdom. According to that Of course, Jones might correctly point out that none of this explains why notion, black (or any human) suffering cannot exist for its own sake but must the arrogance and evil deeds of whites who support oppressively racist orders serve a higher, broader purpose . For Ibn Taymiya, that cause is invariably the seems to exert no similar effect on them . Here, Ibn Taymiya would have no establishment of a proper relationship between humans and God . Here, the other response than to invoke the quintessentially Islamic religious argument issue goes back to some of the kinds of considerations I described in my discus- on the Hereafter . His is not, in other words, a "prosperity gospel" or theology of sion of Maturidite hikmah. Again, the very suffering that impedes their induc- guaranteed worldly "success," and he is far removed from the kinds of utopian tion into a mindset that perpetuates intellectual, psychological, and emotional thinking that would impose such culminations as the criterion for determining dependency, leaving unobstructed the road to heedless indulgence, might be religion's'truth . Believers will suffer, taste poverty, hardship, persecution, even seen as operating in Blackamericans' ultimate interest. Indeed, as a Tradition- death, in the cause of God . And the ultimate reward for all of this may not be alist, Ibn Taymiya would have little problem sustaining this logic on the basis dispensed now but in the Hereafter . So, too, however, will the ultimate punish- of scripture: ment for the wicked . For his part, Ibn Taymiya would have no apologies at all for this view of reality . Indeed, as his own life demonstrated, he would find in And We sent messengers to nations before you, seizing them with it-and only in it-the kind of death-defying courage, commitment, and sac- distress and affliction, that they might humble themselves . Why, rifice that makes it possible to face any and every challenge a human existence when our tribulations came to them, did they not humble them- could possibly offer . selves? Instead, their hearts became hardened and Satan made The modern, secular mindset tends to judge religion primarily if not solely seemly to them the deeds that they had wrought . So when they suc- on the basis of what it can contribute to secular, human happiness . In and ceeded in neglecting Our admonishments, We opened up the gates of itself, this is understandable, indeed, on some level entirely fair . Ironically, to every felicity, to the point that they rejoiced in what they had been however, this very modern orientation tends to minimize the role and respon- given. Then We seized them of a sudden, at which time they sank sibility of humans, even as it declares at the top of its lungs its commitment to into utter despair. (6 :42-44) ever greater levels of human autonomy . Meanwhile, God's role (read "responsi- The suffering that God inflicts, in other words, either through direct interven" bility"), to the extent that God is recognized as having a role, is emphatically (and s tion or through the natural effects of human misdeeds, is never gratuitou ironically) maximized . Thus, for example, while Jones insists on the functional but always functional, part of its function being to steer humans away from ultimacy of man and an all-is-in-man's-hands approach, he also insists that ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 156 the very fact of black suffering calls into question not humans' effectiveness, wisdom, or level of discipline, sacrifice, or commitment but the sovereignty and goodness of God!"' God, in other words, regardless of the actions or non- actions of blacks, remains ultimately responsible for guaranteeing Blackameri . can welfare . From Ibn Taymiya's perspective, however, for God to be good, just, wise, and all-powerful does not mean that God must effectively function as a divine Santa Claus, regardless of whether God's wards are naughty or nice . Conclusion This, however, is hardly enough to render God a divine racist .

In one of his essays, in the context of contemplating some of the differences between the white and black communities of faith in America, J. Deotis Roberts wrote : "the white suburban Christian may have lost his faith because he has too much ."' By "too much," Roberts was referring of course to material comfort and possessions . Similarly, in comparing William Jones's critique of theism (not to mention the more radical extensions of it, such as that of Pinn) with the views of the classical schools of Sunni Muslim theology- Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, Maturidism, and Traditionalism-one is tempted to hazard that contemporary Blackamerican critics of theism may have lost their faith in it because they also have had "too much" faith . As widespread a concept as omnipotence may be in theistic religion, this book has demonstrated that no one religion or single party within a religion has an exclusive monopoly on its definition . Omnipotence is an elastic concept that is open to numerous and, indeed, competing constructions . The Mu'tazilites, for example, while holding God to be omnipotent, saw no problem with human beings having both freedom of choice and the independent ability to instantiate their choices, literally to create their own acts. The Ash'arites, meanwhile, like the Maturidites and Traditionalists, flatly denied that this kind of complete, independent human (moral) agency could be reconciled with God's monopoly on effective power and or God's inextricable role in the religious enterprise . And yet CONCLUSION ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 1 59 158 even they generally upheld human choice, even as they imputed to it various ultimately left them with no objective standard via which to pass judgment on God's acts and not always unambiguous degrees of independence . This is clear in the . As for the Maturidites, while they also held God to be good and just, . Meanwhile, even Ibn their conceptions of goodness and justice were ultimately teleological ; that is, case of Ash'arite and Maturidite kasb, or Acquisition Taymiya, the Traditionalist, would ultimately straddle the difference between they looked not to the immediate but to the ultimate effects of God's acts and the Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite understandings of how God dispenses agency, allowances. This is captured in their commitment to divine wisdom or hikmah . essentially arriving at a tacit endorsement of what might be considered a ver- The Traditionalists essentially follow a similar line, albeit with a bit more indul- gence of human moral perceptions and judgments . sion of Maturidite kasb. In sum, despite their emphatic and explicit endorsement of divine omnip- Of course, if one is not careful, it is easy to dismiss the notion of teleologi- otence, none of the schools of classical Muslim theology embrace as their going cal, divine wisdom as unfalsifiable and, therefore, ultimately an exercise in pie- in-the-sky theodicy . Here, however, one might do well to remind oneself that opinion the denial of human choice . At the same time, none of them, certainly this kind of fallibilism is hardly the preserve of premodern Muslim theologians . not explicitly, deny human agency . Ultimately, all of them insist that human beings are responsible for human actions, especially the evil they wreak . The Even modern science evinces an element of it when it posits, for example, that Mu`tazilites, for example, virtually remove God altogether from the process via species always evolve toward adaptation and improvement, even if one may not be able to discern what a particular improvement is (e.g., which humans commit evil. The Ash'arites, on the other hand, insist that God why gorillas evolved provides agency (or instantiation) but only at the request of human beings. In into having the unnecessarily massive craniums they have) . With the exception of the Mu'tazilites, Sunni Tradition's understanding other words, human beings are the chronological "first cause" of all intentional human acts, inasmuch as without these petitions, communicated through the of the relationship between omnipotence and omnibenevolence defies Jones's human will, God would not grant the agency via which humans carry out their contention that the only reason that God would not change an evil such as black suffering is that God is either pleased with it or is incapable actions-good or evil . The Maturidites and Traditionalists hold that humans of changing it. For basically have enough inherent agency to carry out their will to commit (at least the Ash'arites, Maturidites, and Traditionalists all embrace concepts of divine some) good or evil without any additional grants from God. But humans also power that challenge the notion that the only reason to have power is to place have the ability to turn to God for assistance in avoiding the ravages of this it in the service of desire, in order to be able to translate wants and preferences into reality inherent agency . In the end, it is only human dereliction that consigns humans . These schools all recognize a fundamental distinction between God's ontological will and God's deontological will . As a result, God may pre- to evil. For if humans petition God to instantiate their will to do good, God will invariably respond . fer things that God chooses not to translate into reality . And God may abhor It is clear from all of this that none of the classical schools of Muslim things that God chooses to instantiate, namely but not exclusively, on petitions theology would stand for Jones's charge that God is a white racist . And none from human beings. None of this, however, can stand as proof, according to of them embraces constructions of omnipotence that would bind God-fearing the Ash`arites, Maturidites, and Traditionalists, that God must be pleased with Blackamericans to a piety of quietism . For, again, all of them hold humans to or incapable of changing black or any other instance of ethnic suffering. On be responsible for the evil they commit . As such, to revolt against the evil of the contrary, it is precisely God's ability to transcend desire that confirms God's Power and wisdom suffering would not, according to classical Sunni Tradition, in any way amount . And it is precisely the dictates of God's deontological will, to a revolt against God . that is, God's revelation, that sustains the status of ethnic suffering as an evil As for the matter of omnibenevolence, all of the classical schools of Muslim to be eliminated. . For the Mu'tazilites, this was simply a In general, all of the schools agree with Jones that God plays an essen- theology hold God to be good and just s nonnegotiable grundnorm that was actually indexed into human perception tially persuasive rather than compelling role in determining human choices . All of them reject the doctrine of jabr, and expectations . As for the Ash'arites, God's goodness and justice were an or crass determinism, as all of them inextricable entailment of God's all-powerfulness, which itself implied a divine acknowledge (or at least none of them definitively deny) human choice . This n prerogative that placed God beyond any judgments other than God's ow ' does not mean that they all agree that God can only engage in distinctly posi- COU1 Moreover, the Ash'arites insisted, human perceptions of good and evil tive forms of persuasion or that God enjoys only the power of persuasion itself.' never transcend the social and historical contexts that produced them, which With the exception of the Mu'tazilites, all of the schools uphold God's ultimate

CONCLUSION 161 I6o ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING

monopoly over ontological instantiation. This includes both the quality and the through which to pursue these, ultimately turn the tables on Jones by insisting degree of power granted by way of kasb . Thus, where two individuals will to that God can only be implicated when humans commit to acting in an effort carry out a deed, God may grant one of them a quality of power that transform s to please God . Otherwise, humans, not God, remain ultimately responsible for his or her deed into one that is qualitatively superior or inferior to that of his or their quotidian and historical failures . her counterpart. In other words, when Michael Jordan wills to play basketball, As I mentioned in the introduction, almost a hundred years have passed he is granted a power that is superior to that granted me when I will to do the since the original establishment of Islam as a communal phenomenon in black . Despite this lengthy tenure, Blackamerican Sunnis have yet to pro- same. Inasmuch, however, as both of these grants remain outside humans' America power as individuals, these schools would insist that God retains significantly duce a theological articulation that grows out of and explicitly seeks to address more than the simple power of persuasion . Blackamerican reality. Assuming the continued pattern of Blackamerican As for God's persuasive capacity itself, only the Mu'tazilites explicitly limit Muslims receiving traditional training in the Muslim world, overall exposure to it to a necessarily positive role. The Ash'arites credit God with being able to do classical Islamic theology is likely to increase . The question, of course, at least as God pleases . The Maturidites admit that God can sponsor evil. And the Tradi- for the foreseeable future, is essentially the same as it was for Blackamerican tionalists affirm that God can deposit evil impulses, even if only as recompense Christians in the I96Os-I970s : What relationship will develop between this for dereliction . For all of these schools, however, with the possible exception of theology and the far more diffuse and "natural" agenda of Black Religion? the Ash'arites, God's persuasive role remains dialectical rather than unilateral, To date, the status and priority of the classical schools among Blackameri- and humans are assigned a critical role in whether or not they are positively can Muslims has been determined almost entirely by the realities of the mod- persuaded, even by God . God's positive persuasion, in other words, functions em Muslim world, primarily through the medium of the kinds of study-abroad less as a guarantee than as an opportunity . And this raises the stakes for human opportunities made available to Blackamerican Muslims . Ultimately, however, beings to their most critical level . For in the end, men and women, God's ulti- given the perduring reality of blackness in America, alongside the apparent mate goodness and all-powerfulness notwithstanding, play a real, albeit ulti- racial agnosticism of global Islam, one wonders whether systematic theol- mately contingent, role in shaping their quotidian and ultimate realities . ogy among Blackamerican Muslims will include a reevaluation of the classi- This does not mean that God is "neutral relative to human affairs ." Even cal schools on the basis of considerations that, while alien to the history that the Mu'tazilites, who go farthest in vesting humans with autonomous agency, brought them into being, significantly alter the status and perhaps even the hold God to operate in the interest of creation . Maturidites arrive at a similar substance of these schools among Blackamerican Muslims, as American Islam conclusion via their concept of hikmah . And Traditionalists add to this the posi- continues in its quest to find its own indigenous intellectual footing . tive, affective features of the divine "character." Even the Ash'arites, who deny In the interim, I would like to conclude this effort with a word on the lim- the necessity of God's working toward any humanocentric purposes or goals, its of theology itself. And I would like to begin by acknowledging that none of recognize God's voluntary commitment to promoting human welfare . Given what I have presented in this book rises to the level of an evidentiary response their obsession with avoiding certain concessions to Mu'tazilism, this is only of the type that Jones seemingly demands at times (and Pinn, e .g., consistently vaguely articulated in their theological declarations . It is clearly expressed, how- demands) wherein God conducts God's affairs in a manner that empirically ever, in their legal writings, where they consistently interpret the religious law proves God's power and goodness by enabling us to point to concrete and in light of the principle that its aim must be to promote human welfare .' objective manifestations of divine benevolence that refute the charge of divine As for the concept of humanocentric theism, Mu'tazilism comes perhaps malevolence toward blacks . What I have presented in this book-and all that closest to a full endorsement of it . Humans, according to them, are both the can be asked of any theological tradition-is a theological response. Rather than reference point for determining what is good and what is evil and are function - leave my reader, however, vulnerable to some of the misguided aspersions that ally ultimate in terms of being able to pursue either of these independently . As might be cast by some, on the basis of either a misunderstanding of theology for the Ash'arites, they flatly deny that humans can know or be the reference for or a willful attempt to distort or abuse it, I will conclude with a word on what objective good and evil . The Maturidites simply deny that humans can always theology is and is not and what it can and cannot be called on to do . know ultimate good and evil . The Traditionalists, while granting that humans Theology is ultimately a negotiated product, the medium through which have a basic ability to know good and evil as well as a basic store of quasi-agency religious communities conceptualize and talk about God in the public space,

ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK SUFFERING 162 CONCLUSION 163 where the only valid form of knowledge is objective knowledge to which informed, rather, by the actions, inactions, and indeed even the attitudes of everyone has ostensibly equal access . This discourse serves the community those on whom they are visited . by enabling it to settle on conceptual frameworks and concrete understand . My point in all of this is that God may be omnipotent, omnibenevolent, ings that are broad and resonant enough to draw its disparate members into and wise. Whether, however, Blackamericans experience God's power and a common and commonly owned religious identity . At the same time, the- goodness in ways that benefit them will depend on the kind of relationship- ology strengthens the rational element in religion and helps retard the drift individually and collectively-that they establish with God . In this context, prov- into superstition and unwarranted syncretism . All of this is critical to religion's ing theologically that God is good and wise and powerful may ultimately be no ability to establish and sustain a corporate sense of truth that can be embraced more valuable and no more meaningful than proving that Warren Buffets or and pointed to as "Christianity" or "Islam ." In this capacity, theology plays an Bill Gates are generous men. For God is not a static concept but a concrete real- indispensably crucial role in the collective life of religious communities . ity possessed of "character ." And "character" routinely manifests itself in rela- At the same time, as a publicly negotiated construct, theology will almost tional situatedness and context . Some of what one learns in this relationship invariably tend to "freeze" God into strict and static descriptions : omnipotent, may be concrete and palpable enough to put into words and share with others . benevolent, merciful, severe, loving, vengeful . While static, such descriptions And some of what one learns may simply reduce one to a calm and speechless still offer the advantage of being stable and thus capable of sustaining mutual knowing, a knowing that might be ultimately only cheapened by the words one agreement and communal contemplation over space and time . While this kind uses to try to express it . of knowledge may be the most that can be hoped for in any publicly negoti- In the end, whatever "empirical" proof of God's goodness, power and wis- ated process, it is ultimately limiting and limited . For as communal property, dom comes to us will come not through theology but through our relationship it will invariably tend toward unidimensionality and objectification, feigning with God. And here one might pause to ponder the respective contributions of imperviousness to variations of depth, awareness, or vantage point, and evinc- our individual versus our collective relationship and the circumstances under ing a palpable hostility toward change . Indeed, as public property with uni- which one might take precedence over the other in determining what we come versal pretensions, theology is almost bound to indulge the subtle fiction that to know of God. Ultimately, however, the boundary that theology seeks to it is transcendent and speaks from beyond the pale of human history and the maintain between understanding and superstition must not be taken to imply perspective of any particular group .' an equally emphatic ban on mystery. It may be, though, that in these mod- There is however, another kind of knowledge: experiential knowledge . This ern times; the mysterious and ineffable have been so badly maligned, so thor- knowledge is highly subjective, private, and hopelessly contingent on a live and oughly misunderstood, and so banished from quotidian consciousness that we personal relationship. Experiential knowledge need not be viewed as a mutually no longer know how to accommodate, let alone appreciate, them . exclusive, hostile competitor of theology's "public reason" ; ideally, experiential knowledge is simply a complement to theology . This is the kind of knowledge that alerts us to such differences as those between knowing, for example, as a conceptual fact, that so and so is a generous person and knowing, as an inef- fable truth, that so and so will share his or her wealth with me . Knowing of someone's generosity may be learned through reliable reports, communal con- sensus, or even rational deduction . Knowing, however, that this person will share his or her wealth with me is contingent on the kind of relationship I have with him or her. Time and again, this is what we witness in Qur'anic depictions of the prophets and their respective communities . It is God's relationship with Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Pharaoh, the Children of Israel-even Satan-that informs God's actions toward them, not a fixed list of names and attributes , even if such a list might rightfully apply to God . God's mercy, wrath, wisdom , power, and so on, are not static and unchanging in their application . They are Notes

INTRODUCTION

i . See my Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking toward the Third Resurrection (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29-31, where I explain that "Black Religion" is simply a subset of the mother-set of what may be considered "African-American Religion ." Not all religious orientations among Blackamericans are protest-oriented or sensitive to race . 2. Actually, I overstated the matter in Islam and the Blackamerican, speaking of the need for Blackamerican Muslims to "master" the supertradition of Islam . That criterion was both unnecessary and unreasonable . All Blackamerican Muslims need to do is gain enough facility in Tradition to display the requisite degree of "rhetorical etiquette" to be recognized as playing by the rules of Islamic "public reason" when vindicating, crafting, or critiquing doctrinal and practical positions . For an informal definition of Islamic public reason, see below, pp . 9-II. 3 . The events and aftermath of September ii, 20oi, have changed this a bit, as many immigrant Muslims have come to a keener recognition of both the racialization of Islam (and thus they now speak of "racial profiling") and of their own status as a socially nonwhite group (even if many of them remain legally white) . 4. J . Hick, Evil and the God of Love, rev . ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 3 . 5 . Hick, Evil, 4 . 6 . On black theology, see below, pages 13 -15 . 7. See S . K . Pinnock, Beyond Theodicy: Jewish and Christian Continental Thinkers Respond to the Holocaust (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), ioo . Emphasis mine . 166 NOTES TO PAGES 5-7 NOTES TO PAGES 8-9 167

8. Hick, Evil, 333 . 17. E. W. Blyden, Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race (Baltimore: Black Classic 9. Hick, Evil, 334 . Press, 1994), 50 . 1o. See, for example, D . A. Carson, "The Suffering People of God," in How Long, 18. Actually, in 1913, Ali reportedly founded the Canaanite Temple in Newark, O Lord: Reflections on Suffering and Evil, and ed . (Grand Rapids, Mich .: Baker Academic New Jersey. Not until he moved to Chicago in 1923 did this evolve into the Moorish Press, 2006), 63-81, on where he speaks of, among others, Christian martyrs . Holy Temple of Science and then into the Moorish Science Temple of America ii. William R. Jones, Is God a White Racist? A Prolegomenon to Black Theology in 1928. See R. B . Turner, Islam in the African-American Experience (Bloomington : (New York, Basic Books, 1973097 (hereafter IGWR) . Indiana University Press, 1997), 92 . 12. See, e.g., E. L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over 19 . We should note that this is not unique to Blackamerican Muslims . On the al-Ghazali's "Best of All Worlds" (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1984) . contrary, it is a stage through which other religious communities whose religious Ormsby even registers the opinion that "the allied problem of evil does not appear to capital and or intellectual center are located outside the United States have also had to assume the dominant position in Islamic theology which it often occupies in Western pass. For many years, e .g., American Catholics confronted what scholars have referred tradition" (q.) . to as the "American Problem," wherein they struggled to find ways to come to terms 13. I do not wish to be overly irenic here . Blackamerican religious scholarship with Rome's understanding of America . It was not until the American Catholics exhibits a sustained and marked prejudice when dealing with Islam, a trend that John Ireland and John Courtney Murray, among others, emerged with a vindicated extends all the way back to conceptualizations of "African Religion" itself. Whereas American expression of the Faith that American Catholics became far more self- Christianity as a communal phenomenon among Blackamericans is only about two authenticating. On John Ireland, see S . Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American hundred years old, it is considered an authentic Blackamerican religious expression. People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 828-36 . On John Courtney Murray, Islam, by contrast, while second only to Christianity in its popularity among see D. A. Hollinger and C . Caper, The American Intellectual Tradition, 3rd ed., 2 vols . Blackamericans, is often ignored, caricaturized, or dismissed as inauthentic . As for (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2 :308-15 . "African Religion," only the "pagan" expressions of religion in Africa are deemed 20. This is not to deny antiblack tendencies in the global Muslim community . authentically African . And in this context, Islam is, again, ignored or dismissed as a It is simply to suggest that in our post-9/11 world, there is a presumed (if fallacious) possible source from which Blackamerican religion and theology could justifiably draw dichotomy between "Islam" and "the West," while no such dichotomy exists between or benefit. This is not simply a trend among so-called Afrocentrics . "Mainstream" Islam and blackness . It is thus easier to imagine a black as a Muslim than it is to black scholars indulge in this practice as well . To take, for example, the era of slavery : imagine a Westerner as one (Western-ness and whiteness, incidentally, being largely while we are called on to entertain all kinds of theoretical possibilities regarding the synonymous in most of the world) . In this context, a black who has memorized the development of Blackamerican religious orientations (e .g., how black slaves stole Qur'an, e .g., will take precedence over and receive his or her due from Muslims of away from the watchful eye of "Massa" and independently developed their own less learning from any country . For example, he or she will be more likely to be called interpretations of religion), the physical record (e.g., Arabic manuscripts) left by upon to lead prayers or teach classes ; and he or she will enjoy a level of social prestige African Muslim slaves is summarily ignored as proof of a broader range of sources and a presumption of religious knowledge, even over many of his or her immigrant for the "invisible institution" of "slave religion ." Even in the field of literature-and co-religionists . A white Westerner may additionally have to overcome certain at the expense of forfeiting proof against racist arguments about the intellectual suspicions (expressed or not) about his or her political affiliations and or civilizational inferiority of blacks, based on the presumption that black slaves had no written loyalties . language-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literary productions by Muslim slaves 21. A. Maclntyre, After Virtue : A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed . (Notre Dame, are just beginning to receive their due, and this by and large from black Muslim Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 223. or non-Muslim white scholars! See, e .g., R. A. T. Judy, (Dis) forming the American 22. On basic issues, e .g., the prohibition on murder or adultery, the Canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the Vernacular (Minneapolis : University of designation "known by necessity to be a part of the religion" ("al-ma `lam min al-din Minnesota Press, 1993) ; A. Austin, Muslim Slaves in Antebellum America : Transatlantic bi al-dararah"), expressed the unanimous consensus of the entire community . Stories and Spiritual Struggles (London : Routledge, 1977). Notable exceptions, for On other, more complicated matters, e .g., whether pregnancy can stand as legal example the works of Sylviane Diouf or Michael Gomez, are clearly of a nonreligious proof of illicit sex, only the unanimous consensus of the community of scholars bent. was considered. We might note incidentally, that while there was an inevitable 14. For more on this point, see Jackson, Islam and the Blackamerican, 11-13- relationship between the religious establishment and the state (or central 15 . William Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul : The Pertinence of power), religious thought maintained a palpable degree of independence . This is Islamic Cosmology in the Modern World (Oxford : Oneworld, 2007), 19. manifested in the fact that the four main schools of law, as well as the four (and 16. Cited in Charles Long, Signification, : Signs, Symbols, and Images in the then three) schools of theology, persisted through countless (often violent) changes Interpretation of Religion (Aurora, Colo .: Davies Group, 1995), 150 . of political regime .

NOTES TO PAGES 13-18 169 168 NOTES TO PAGES 10-13

23. In effect, al-`aql performs the same function as science in modern secular and unsettling an intervention was Cone's work that it earned him an invitation discourse . That function, popular notions notwithstanding, is not always to establish to teach at the prestigious Union Theological Seminary . Cone was followed in influence perhaps by J. Deotis Roberts, whose Liberation and Reconciliation first truth but to validate arguments and terminate disputes in the public square in terms that are deemed fair and neutral, science being presumably neither rich, poor, appeared in 1971- black, white, male, or female. Thus, for example, while Christian, Muslim, or Jewish 3o. Harvard Theological Review 64 (1971) : 5411-57- sensibilities may dictate that incest should be outlawed because it is repulsive or 31. Thus, the subtitle to IGWR was A Preamble to Black Theology . because the Qur'an or Bible says so, such arguments would find difficulty sustaining 32. IGWR, 151 . themselves in the liberal, secular public square . To argue, however, that incest 33. IGWR, 57. . IGWR, 172. promotes genetic defects, even if this is not the real reason behind the Christian, 34 Muslim, or Jewish position, is likely to validate this position and terminate the dispute 35 . IGWR, 177. in a manner deemed fair and impartial . 36. IGWR, 191-94- 24. Thus, for example, the rational distinction between the general (`amm) and 37. A. B. Pinn, Why Lord? Suffering and Evil in Black Theology (New York: specific (khass) reference of words is invoked to explain that though the Qur'an states Continuum, 1999), 96 . that God is "the creator of all things" (khaliqu kulli shay')," this does not mean that the 38. IGWR,186 . Qur'an itself is created, as "all" in Qur'anic locution is a general reference to which 39. IGWR, 195 . certain exceptions are occasionally made . As is well known, the uncreatedness of 40 . James Cone, God of the Oppressed, rev . ed. (New York : Orbis Books, 1997) 24.5 the Qur'an eventually came to represent Sunni orthodoxy, being from that point on n. 23 (originally published 1975) . Emphasis in original . assumed rather than contested. Of course, this was not the only argument in defense 41 . J. D. Roberts, Black Theology Today : Liberation and Contextualization (New of this position . But from the time of the early triumph of this doctrine, it would be York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1983), 37 . impossible to argue against it based on such Qur'anic passages . See also pages 23-24 42. Major Jones, The Color of God : The Concept of God in Afro-American Thought for an important clarification regarding "Sunni orthodoxy . (Macon, Ga .: Mercer University Press, 1987), 73. 25. Of course, what is presented to be the view of Abu Hanifa, Thomas Aquinas, 43. This work was based on his master's and Ph .D. theses at Harvard . See Why or the Founding Fathers is itself informed by the understandings and deployments of Lord, 184-85, n. 23. successive custodial generations and is not necessarily a pure product of the minds of 44. Pinn insists that his nontheistic approach is still religious "because it these authorities themselves . provides a framework that guides human conduct and connects this conduct to the 26. This is not a commitment to elitism, as I am not limiting myself to turbaned larger reality of Black community ." Why Lord, 19. shaykhs. Anyone whom religiously literate Muslims recognize as an interpretive 45. Pinn, Why Lord, 1o . authority is an interpretive authority . To this end, in a recent book, the grand mufti of 46. Pinn, Why Lord, 97-99- Egypt, Shaykh `Ali Jum'ah, refers to the lay-intellectual Sayyid Qutb as "shaykh Sayyid 47. Pinn, Why Lord, 99 . In fact, as recently as 2004, I heard Pinn respond to a questioner at a panel at the annual American Academy of Religion conference in Qutb," a clear reference to his status as an interpretive authority, though he was not a formally trained cleric. Apparently, Qutb simply displayed enough of what might be Atlanta that blacks should simply stay away from the question of theodicy, because it called "rhetorical etiquette" to be seen as playing by the rules of the game . Of course, draws them into a theological argument that they just can't win . the fact that he was recognized as an interpretive authority does not automatically 48. Pinn, Why Lord, 147. See also, on "Black humanism" : "Black humanism, as render his view the view of Islam. It simply qualifies his views to enter the competition found in Black oral tradition and later, Black literature, denies the existence of God over the definition of Islam among those recognized as authorities . For Sh. 'All and holds humans fully accountable for the existence and removal of moral evil in : Dar Jum'ah's reference to Sayyid Qutb, see his al-Hukm al-shay i `ind al-usaliyin (Cairo [sic] the world" (n) . The last chapter of Why Lord? is entitled "Black Humanism and al-Salam, 1427/2006), 199 . Black Religion." . 27. Recall, again, my important caveat on my use of the term Sunnism earlier 49. For more on this point, see my discussion on Maturidite hikmah in chapter 28. First printed in Theology Today 20 (April 1963-January 1964) and reprinted 4 below, pages 109-15, as well as the discussion of the Ash'arite rejection of moral in Black Theology: A Documentary History, ed . J. Cone and G. Wilmore, 2 vols . (New objectivism, in chapter 3, pages 83-85, 95-97 . York: Orbis, 1993), 92-100 . For a more detailed description and typology of Black 50. Pinn, Why Lord, 114 . Religion, see Washington's Black Religion : The Negro and Christianity in the United 51. That is, the simultaneous notion that God prefers all that God wills and that States (1964; reprint, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984) . independent human agency contradicts divine omnipotence . 29. Washington's Politics of God was also a major contribution to the black 52. As Baldwin put it, "slaughtering the cattle, poisoning the wells, torching theology project . But it was Cone who took the field by storm . Indeed, so powerful the houses, massacring Native Americans, raping Black women." "On Being

NOTES TO PAGES 22-30 171 170 NOTES TO PAGES 18-22

'White' . . . and other Lies," in D . R . Roediger, ed., Black on White: Black Writers on Harvard University Press, 2006), 2 . Here, however, the presumption of hierarchical What It Means to Be White (New York: Schocken Books, 1998), 178-79 . authenticity is reversed : Ivy League, George Bush, and ABC news-anchor whites Refusing to Be a Man : Essays on Sex and justice, rev . ed exercise a superior claim of authority over "mafiosos," Michael Dukakis, and Eminem- 53 • Cited in J . Stoltenberg, . (London : UCL Press, 2000), XVIII . whites . : DuBois and the Illusion of 72 . This all confirms a point I made earlier regarding the difficulty of producing 54. K . A. Appiah, "The Uncompleted Argument Race," in Writing and Difference, ed. H . L. Gates, Jr. (Chicago : University of Chicago alternative orthodoxies outside the parameters of existing orthodoxy . With regard to Press, 1986), 35- Blackamerican cultural production, I would argue that among the most successful 55 . P . Gilroy, Against Race : Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line attempts to create an alternative that freed blacks from many of the stultifying effects (Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 2000), 15 . of blind rejectionism was that of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of 56 . Gilroy, Against Race, 6 . Islam. For more on this point, see my Islam and the Blackamerican, 157-58, on what I 57. Against Race, 6, 13-14, but see overall 11- 53 . call the "BASp," or "Black Afro-Saxon Protestant ." 58. V . Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness : An Essay on African American 73. This obsession with making sure that God, and not humans, is the only Religious and Cultural Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1995), 11 . source of binding value is most explicitly reflected in Islamic legal theory (usal 59 . Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness, 14 . al figh), which emphatically and explicitly requires that every claim of a legal or 6o. Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness, 15 . moral obligation or right be grounded in scriptural deduction . In fact, I should 61. Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness, 87 . perhaps clarify in this context what I mean by "religiously sanctioned regimes of 62 . Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness, 92 . domination." It is not domination to be faced with a command by God with which 63 . Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness, 103 . one disagrees (any more than it would necessarily be in secular terms to be faced with 64. Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness, 117- a requirement by the state with which one disagrees) . But where one party is able to 65. I am not speaking here, of course, of race as a biological reality but as a socio- impose its view as the unassailable law of God, denying the clearly plausible basis of historical construct. For more on this point, see my Islam and the Blackamerican, 13-15 . all alternative views and implying that one can only challenge the imposing party's 66. Richard Dyer, White (London : Routledge Press, 1997), xiv . view by challenging God, the result is a usurpation of divine authority by human 67 . Indeed, in the crowning scene in George Orwell's classic 1984, a state official authority and a denial of any right to criticism or appeal . For more on this point, see holds up four fingers and asks the protagonist Winston how many fingers he sees . my "The Alchemy of Domination? Some Ash'arite Responses to Mu'tazilite Ethics," When Winston responds, "Four," the official "informs" him that he sees five and International Journal of Middle East Studies 31 (1999) : 185-201. tweaks the dial on the pain chair into which he has been strapped . This exchange continues until Winston finally exclaims that he is trying to see five! Of course, the CHAPTER ONE "pain chair" into which blacks and other nonwhite Americans have been strapped is the sociocultural reality over which the dominant group reigns, a reality that carries i. See A . Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 8 . the power of definition-cum-validation . 2. This is not to ignore the dialectical relationship between preexisting "regimes 68 . The general exception in this regard, at least since the second half of the of sense" and transformative interventions, such as the Qur'an, which typically result twentieth century, being perhaps sports and entertainment . in new, hybridized regimes of sense that proceed to function as the criterion with 69. Cited in M . F . Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color : European Immigrants which subsequent reality is judged and reconciled. and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1998), 2 15. 3 . Watts, Zen, 9-10 . 70 . Indeed, in its exaggerated form, blackness can work much like the neologism 4. Muslim b. al-Ha]jaj, Sahth Muslim, 4 vols . (Beirut : Dar Ibn Hazm, 1416/1995), "Islamic," which some have used to produce such unassailable constructs as "Islamic 1:139-40 . 6 traffic ." See my critique of the term "Islamic" in Islam and the Blackamerican, 154-5 - 5 . Cited in Ibn Taymiya, "al-`Agida al-hamawiya al-kubra," in Majmu`at al-rasa'il . Jacobson highlights a parallel development among 71 . Interestingly, M . F al-kubra, 2 vols . (Cairo : Muhammad `Alt Subayh, n.d.) 1:445. "ethnic, Ellis Island whites" over against the hegemonic claims and pretensions of 6. Ibrahim b. Musa al-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat ft usal al-shara`ah, 4 vols . (Cairo : "Plymouth Rock whites ." "The example of Black Nationalism and the emergence of al-Maktabah al-Tijarlyah, n.d.) 2:69, 2 :70, 2 :72, 2 :79 . multiculturalism had provided a new language for an identity that was not simply 7. Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat, 2 :69 . Al-Shatibi cites in this context several other `American .' After decades of striving to conform to the Anglo-Saxon standard, statements from the Qur'an and hadith, e.g., the Prophet's statement "We are an descendents of earlier European immigrants quit the melting pot . Italianness, unlettered community ; we neither calculate nor write" ; and, from the Qur'an, "And Jewishness, Greekness, and Irishness had become badges of pride not shame" ; you were not given to recite [anything of this] before this ; nor did you write it down Roots Too : White Ethnic Revival in Post-Civil Rights America (Cambridge, Mass . : with your right hand." (29 :48)

NOTES TO PAGES 172 NOTES TO PAGES 3 0- 34 34 -3 8 173

8. Al-Muwafaqat, 2:87 . 'Umar's point was that the operative meaning or gist of religious knowledge his face would contort (in disapproval)" (15) ; "al-Hasan al-Basra the verse was accessible without the meaning of this particular word. Thus, there was used to say, 'Non-Arabness destroyed them, as it made seemly to them unjustifiable no need to make it a point of concern . interpretations'" (22-2 3)- 9 . Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat, 2 :87. 24 . Muhammad b . Idris al-Shafi`I, al-Risalah, ed . A. M . Shakir (Beirut : io . See, e.g ., Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat, 2:82-84 . Al-Shatibi is careful not to al-Maktabah al-'Ilmiyah, n.d .), 21. Note that "original" Arabs were not limited to the overstate his case . There are instances where proper interpretation may be contingent Arabian peninsula . Even prior to the Prophet Muhammad, small Arab communities on individual words, in which case it becomes incumbent on an interpreter to know were scattered across the Syrian and Mesopotamian deserts . See, e.g ., H. J . W . the meaning of individual words in order to apprehend overall meaning . This, Drijvers, "Arab," in G .W. Bowersock, P . Brown and O . Grabar, ed., Late Antiquity : however, is judged on an individual basis and is not to be relied on as the sine qua non A Guide to the Postclassical World (Cambridge, MA : The Bell-nap Press of Harvard of all interpretive activity. See al-Muwafagat, 2:87-88 . University Press, 1999), 308 . These peoples, however, were clearly not the point of ii . Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat, 2:84-85 . reference that at-Shafi`I (or Abu 'Amr b . al-`Alt') had in mind . 25 . Al-Shafi`i, al-Risalah, 46 . 12 . Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2:87- 26 . Al-Shafi`I, 52 . 13 . Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat, 2 :89 . al-Risalah, 14. Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafagat, 2:89 . 27. See, e.g ., al-Umm, 8 vols ., ed . M . Z . Al-Najjar (Beirut : Dar al-ma'Rifah, n.d.), 15 . See, e.g ., W. M . Watt, The Formative Period ofIslamic Thought (Edinburgh : 4:215, 4 : 223 - Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 18o ; B . Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: 28 . See Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Manaqib al-imam al-shafti, ed. A. H . al-Saga (Cairo : Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 1998), ix-x ; Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyah, 1406/1986), 23-29 . R. Martin, Defenders ofReason: Mu`tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol 29 . See his "Exotericism and Objectivity in Islamic Jurisprudence," in Islamic (Oxford : Oneworld, 1997), 10-19 . Law and Jurisprudence: Studies in Honor ofFarhat J. Ziadeh, ed. N . Heer (Seattle : 16. I have established this in my On the Boundaries ofTheological Tolerance in University of Washington Press, 1990), 53 -71- Islam: Abu Hamid al-Ghazalt's Faysal al-Tafriqa (New York: Oxford University Press, 30 . See Badr al-Din Muhammad b . 'Abd Allah al-Zarkashi, al-Burhan fi `ulum 2002), 16-29 . al-qur'an, 4 vols ., ed. M . A. Ibrahim (Cairo : Dar al-Turath, n.d.), 1:329. Of the seven 17 . R . Bulliett, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period : An Essay in Quantitative canonical recitations, the two that have been most widely embraced have been that of History (Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1979) . Warsh from Nafi' and that of Hafs from 'Asim . 18. See "Samarkand," Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden : E .J .Brill, 1950- ), 8:1031-38 ; 31 . See, e.g ., Abu Zakariyah Muhyl al-Din b . Sharaf al-Nawawi, Tahdhib al-asma' "Balkh," Encyclopedia of Islam, 1:1000-iooi . wa al-lughat, 2 vols . (Beirut : Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyah, n.d.), 1:89, where it is stated that i9 . On al-Maturidi, see chapter 4 . Muslim was from the well-known Arab tribe of Banu Qushayr . 20. See my Boundaries, 15-16 . 32. Ibn Khaldun, al-Mugaddimah (Beirut : Dar wa Maktabat al-Hilal, 1987) , 33 8. 21. Herein, incidentally, lies the most primitive and fundamental difference 33 . It is perhaps another sign of the thrust of the new sciences that subjects such between Sunnism and ShI`ism, subsequent theological differences being secondary as asbab al-nuzul (Occasions of Revelation), that provided the historical context in to this . which the verses of the Qur'an were revealed turn out to receive scant attention and 22 . Indeed, Ikhtilaf al fugaha,' the book in which the famous Abu Ja'far b . Jarir are extremely poorly developed. Indeed, among the most authoritative (or certainly al-Tabari (d . 310/923) catalogued all the disagreements among the scholars of Islamic widely cited) of these works is that of al-Wahidi . But this work does not give occasions law in the various lands of Islam, turned out to be some three thousand pages in for every verse, and some chapters receive no attention at all. Clearly, context, which, manuscript! For a description of this work, see Y . al-Hamawi, Mu jam al-buldan (a.k.a. again, could only privilege those who shared and descended from a particular history, Irshad al-anb ila ma`rifat al-adib), 8 vols ., ed . D . Margoliouth (London : Luzacs, 1929), is being marginalized in favor of a more level playing field based on linguistic formalism . Otherwise, one would have to ask why, even in the absence of authentic 6:447 . By contrast, the work Kitab al-ijma', by al-Tabarl's contemporary Abu Bakr b. Muhammad b . Ibrahim b . Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 318/930), which catalogued all the material on the Occasions of Revelation, more fabricated material was not "put points on which the jurists unanimously agreed, was barely 130 pages in print! See Ibn into circulation," as is commonly assumed, following the lead of J . Schacht, to have al-Mundhir, Kitab al-ijma` (Riyadh : Dar al-Tibah, 1402/1982) . occurred in the case of Prophetic hadith . See Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b . Ahmad al-Wahidi, 23 . See Ahmad b . Yahya b. al-Murtada Tabagat al-mu`tazilah (Die Klassen Der Asbab al-nuzul (Cairo : Maktabat al-Mutanabbi, n.d .) . Mu'taziliten), ed. S . Diwald-Wilzer (Weisbaden : Franz Steiner, 1961), 83 . See also 34. See my discussion of "rhetoric of transcendence," p. 32 above ; see also my Ahmad `Awad Allah b . Dakhil al-Luhaybi al-Harbi, al-Matundiya : Dirasatan wa tagwtman Boundaries, 10-14 . (Riyadh : Dar al-'Asimah, 1413/2003), who attributes similar quotations to other early 35 . R . Martin, M . Woodward, and D . Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: authorities . For example : "Whenever Sufyan al-Thawri saw Nabateans recording Mu`tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol (Oxford : OneworldPress, 1997) 14, NOTES TO PAGES 40-42 175 174 NOTES TO PAGES 38-39 give the following description of Traditionalism and Rationalism : "'Traditionalist' 42. The most concise and useful presentation on this particular issue appears Islam refers to the counter-tendency to renew and revitalize the status-quo, usually in Hartshorne's Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers (New York: State University from within, by criticizing present interpretations and practices with reference to of New York Press, 1983), 40-56, esp . 43 Another important and relevant work an idealized past . `Rationalist' Islam refers to the historical impulse of the Mu'tazila of his is Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany : State University of mutakallimun in particular (but kalam more generally) to articulate the meaning New York Press, 1984) . For reactions to Hartshorne from numerous philosophers, see of Islam within any given age's contemporary intellectual and social trends ." This L. E. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 11991) . depiction is not without merit . But to my mind, it severely underplays Rationalism's 43. See my discussion of anthropomorphism below, p . 50. claim to transcendence, imputing to it an intentional transparency about being a 44. Indeed, there are aspects of Hartshorne with which both Rationalists and product of any particular age or trend . On the contrary, Rationalism's 'aql (reason) was Traditionalists would take issue . For example, the idea that God is the creator of intended to be understood as transcending all of these . As for Traditionalism, here, processes of becoming rather than states of being renders problematic (or at least too, their pretensions to transcendence are underplayed . For their attempt was (is) not changes the meaning of) the notion of God's complete omnipotence or control over to preserve any status quo but only the purportedly original status quo, which dates reality . Similarly, the idea that created entities carry in themselves an element of back to the period of the Pious Ancestors. choice in their own coming to completion problematizes the notion of unilateral 36. Abu al-Yusr Muhammad al-Bazdawi, Usal al-din ed. H.P . Lens (Cairo : divine intervention . In fact, on such an understanding, basic concepts like prayer ai-Maktabat al-Azhariyah li al-Turath, 1424/2003), 14 . and miracles would have to be radically reinterpreted . On these and related critiques . Basinger, (Albany: State 37. See al-Bazdawi, Usal al-din, 15: "He [Abu Hanifa] stated explicitly in the book of process theology see, D Divine Power in Process Theism al-'Alim wa al-Muta'allim [The Teacher and the Student] that there was no blame in University of New York Press, 1988), 5 . learning this science . There he stated : `A student said, "I have encountered people 45 . Traditionalism locates what might be termed "sacred history" in the first who say, `Do not enter into these openings . For not a single one of the Companions three generations or centuries of Islam . This is based on a well-known hadith of the of the Prophet, God's peace and blessings be upon him and may God be pleased Prophet to the effect that the best generation (qarn) would be his, and then the one with them, entered into any of this . Thus, what sufficed them should suffice you ."' following it, and then the one following that . Because Barn, however, can mean both The teacher said, `Say to them [i.e., those who say this], "Indeed, what sufficed them "generation" and "century," the sacred history of the Traditionalists appears at times to would suffice me were I in the same circumstances as they were . But I do not have oscillate between "the first three generations" and "the first three centuries" of Islam. in my presence the likes of whom they had in theirs . And we have been afflicted by 46. Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the those who condemn us and hold our blood to be licit . Thus, we have no choice but to African Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)- know who is wrong and who is right among us. And in this regard, the Companions 47. Gyekye, Tradition, 219. of the Prophet, God's peace and blessings be upon him, are like a people who are not 48. ' Gyekye, Tradition, 219 . confronted with those who attack them, so they have no need to bear arms. We, on the 49. Gyekye, Tradition, 221. other hand, have been afflicted by those who attack us . So we have no choice but to 50. Gyekye, Tradition, 221. bear arms ."'" 51. Abu Ja`far Muhammad b . Jarir al-Tabari, Tankh al-tabari, ed. Muhammad 38. Tagi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiya, Dar'ta`arud al-'aql wa al-nagl (a.k.a. Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim, 9 vols . (Cairo : Dar al-Ma`arif, n.d), 8 :639. A more contemporary Muwafagat sahih al-mangal li sarih al-ma`gal) 5 vols . ed. `Abd al-Latif `Abd al-Rahman example of this `processing' appears in the work of a leading authority in the Salafi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyah, 1417/1997) . There are several editions of this work . movement, the late Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Talkhis sifat salat al-nabi I have been informed that a newer edition takes up eleven volumes . (Beirut: Jam`iyat Ihya' al-Turath al-Islami, 1972), 26 . In describing the tashahhud 39. Pace Abrahamov, Islamic Theology, 81 n. 37: "Anthropomorphism (supplication made in the sitting position at the end of the second and final units of [tashbih] means likening God to man ." Abrahamov is, of course, technically correct prayer) al-Albani notes that after the death of the Prophet one should say "Peace unto ("anthropomorphism" being from the Greek anthropos, "human," and morphe, the Prophet" ("as-salamu 'ala `n-nabi"), instead of "Peace be unto you, 0 Prophet" "form"). But the concept as such is underinclusive in the context of Muslim theology ("as-salamu 'alayka ayyuha `n-nabi"), as explicitly handed down in hadith . Al-Albani For tashbih, takyf tamthil, and even tajsim covered not only human likenesses to God appears to be motivated here by a desire to avoid implicating the Prophet in the but all created likenesses to God, God being distinguished from created entities by the practice of calling on dead saints (known as tawassul and or istighathah) as practiced fact that they are possessed of accidents . by some Sufis. He cites in support of his view the practice of the Companions Ibn 40. As I have established elsewhere : see my Boundaries, 16-24. Mas`ud, `A'ishah, Ihn al-Zubayr, and Ibn `Abbas . This, however, i.e., the fact that 41. On the continued obsession with being as the "ultimate concern" of theology, see these Companions "processed" what was handed down, actually supports rather than P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2 vols . (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966),1 :2, 0. detracts from my point. On the Mihna in general, see note 18, chapter 3 below.

-48 176 NOTES TO PAGES 43 -45 NOTES TO PAGES 47 177

52. See his "A Creative Response to Racism : Black Theology," in The Church and CHAPTER TWO Racism, ed. G. Baum and J . Coleman (New York: SeaburyPress, 1982), 41 . Similarly, i. Actually, what I might term the "protorationalist" instigators were not limited the increasing estrangement of the modern mind from the intellectual schemas of the to Mu'tazilites . Among the important players was an amorphous group identified Aristotelian-Neoplatonic tradition (not from "religious reason" per se, as some seem (by their detractors at least) as the Jahmites, the putative followers of Jahm b . Safwan to think) goes a long way (along with the massive increase in global literacy and the (d. 128/746), himself an Arabicized non-Arab (mawla) from the Central Asian town availability of books) toward explaining the increasing popularity of "fundamentalist," of either Tirmidh or Samarqand . See "Djahm b. Safwan, Abu Muhriz," Encyclopedia i.e., literalistic, interpretations of scripture in both Christianity and Islam . In the of Islam, 2:388. Ibn Taymiya, e.g., notes that the promoters of the Inquistion (Mih absence of broadly recognized regimes of sense, in other words, there is often no na), including Ibn Abi Du'ad, were actually not Mu'tazilites but rather Jahmites . See agreed-on basis on which to justify divergence from literal constructions of scripture . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah wa al-Sayyi'ah, ed. M. J. A. Ghazl (Cairo: Matabi` al-Madani, . Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-adillah ft usul al-din, 2 vols ., ed. H. Atay 53 1391/1971), 106-7 . See also C . Melchert, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (Oxford: Oneworld, and S. A. Duzgun (Ankara : Nashriyat Ri'asat al-Shu'un al-Dlniyah li al-Jumhuriyah 2006), 9, for an almost identical observation . Ibn Taymiya also says, however, that al-Turkiyah, 2003), 1 :403-4. In translating al-Nasafi's description of the Mu'tazilite many premodern theologians (Rationalists and Traditionalists) overlooked the position, I have opted to use "trait" instead of "attribute" for sifah, in order to honor distinction between Mu'tazilites and Jahmites and referred to the protorationalists the Mu'tazilite rejection of divine attributes . Al-Nasafi is well aware of this position overinclusively as Mu`tazilites . See Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 107. This appears to have and makes no attempt to misrepresent it here . In speaking about the Mu'tazilites, he been more the tendency among Ash'arites, who once the actual Jahmites died out simply uses the term sifah in a general sense . came to focus almost exclusively on the Mu'tazilites . Meanwhile, later Traditionalists, . Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 1:404-5. See also Taymiya, Dar'ta`arud al-`aql wa 54 apparently detecting what they deem to be vestiges of Jahmism in Ash'arite thought, al-nagl, 1 :20-21 for a similar notion, along with the observation that such a fortiori appear to use the name Jahmite (al-Jahmiyah) as a veiled pejorative against Ash`arites . analogizing was practiced by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal among other early masters . He is See, e.g., chapter 5 below, note 9o . careful to note, however, that there is a difference between abstract possibilities in 2. On this movement, see "Kharidjites," Encyclopedia of Islam, the mind and concrete, a fortiori analogies based on empirical observations in the 5:1074-77; W. M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh : Edinburgh University real world. See also Abu Bakr Muhammad b . al-Tayyib al-Bagillanl, Kitab at-Tamhid, Press, 1 ed. R. J. McCarthy (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1957), 26-27, for a similar view, 973) 9-37. 3. On the Murji'ites, see "Murdji'a," Encyclopedia of Islam, 7:605-7; Watt, i.e., that God must have speech (kalam) because the opposite, dumbness (kharas), Formative Period, 119- would be a defect . Interestingly, al-Nasafi insists that the Maturldites have no need 34. 4. See Abu al-Fath Muhammad b . `Abd al-Karim b . Abu Ahmad al-Shahrastanl, for such distinctions, i.e., between essential and performative attributes, since they al-Milal wa al-nihal, ed. A. A. Muhanna and A . H. Fa'Ur, 2 vols . (Beirut : Dar hold all of God's attributes to be essential . This would appear to have far-reaching al-Ma'rifah, 1417/1997), 1 :61-62 . implications for such doctrines as predestination . According to the Maturidites, all of 5 . Al-Shahrastanl, al-Milal, 1:62. God's actions occur sempiternally, even if the result of these may be delayed in time . 6. See, e .g., Watt, Formative Period, 209-10. This was the point of their distinction between the act of creation (takwin) and the 7. See, e.g., Abu al-Faraj Muhammad b. Abi Ya`qub Ishaq al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, created entity (mukawwan) . For Ash'arites and Traditionalists, on the other hand, who ed. Y. 'A. Tawil (Beirut : Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1416/1996), 282, in which the hold that God's actions can occur in time and space, i .e., that they can be muhdath, Mu'tazilite Abu Bakr b . al-Ikhshld summarily rejects this account. On Ibn al-Ikhshid predestination would not seem to preempt God's spontaneous intervention in human himself, see al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, 303-4. See also Abu al-Hasan al-Ash`arl, Kitab history. For a more succinct statement of the Maturidite position see Abu al-Thana' al-Luma`fi al-radd ala ahl al-zaygh wa al-bida`, ed. M. Gharabah (Cairo : Matba`at Misr, Mahmud b. Zayd al-Lamishi, Kitab al-tmhid li gawa`id al-tawhid, ed. A. Turks (Beirut: 1955) 124, in which al-Ash`ari insists that the Mu'tazilites acquired their name from Dar al-Gharb al-Islaml, 1 -78. 995) 74 the charge that they separated themselves from the unanimous consensus (ijma) of . For example, speaking of some of the pressures to which the Maturidite 55 the Companions and Successors, who held that miscreants were either believers or Turks subjected Ash'arites in the central lands, W . Madelung writes : "The Shiite 'Abd nonbelievers but never neither . See also al-Lamishl, al-Tamhid, 122, for an almost al-Jalil writing in al-Rayy about the year 565/1170 could remind Shafi`ites that if one identical explanation . of them were asked by a Turk in the market or the army camp concerning his belief, 8. See, e.g., al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, 282 . See also Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 105, where he certainly would not dare to confess his Ash`arism, but would prefer to exercise he claims not only that Qutada and 'Amr b . 'Ubayd were the actual protagonists but precautionary dissimulation [taqiyya] ." "The Spread of Maturldism and the Turks," that the event itself actually took place after the death of al-Hasan . in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 9. See, e .g., G. Hourani, "Islamic and Non-Islamic Origins of Mu'tazilite 237; originally published in Actas do IV Congresso de EstudosArabes e Islamico, Coimbra - Ethical Rationalism," International Journal of Middle East Studies 7 (1976) : 59-87, Lisboa, 1968 (Leiden: Brit, 1971) .

17 8 NOTES TO PAGES 48-50 NOTES TO PAGE 50 1179

for a convincing argument for the predominance of Zoroastrian influence. 116. See, e.g., Abu al-Hasan al-Ash`ari, Magalat al-islamiyin wa ikhtilaf al-musallin, Meanwhile, al-Shahrastanl notes that the Mu'tazilite Abu Hudhayl's doctrine on the ed. M. M. `Abd al-Hamid, 2 vols . (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1389/196 9) , divine attributes was an exact replica of the trinitarian notion of hypostasis (ugnum) . 1:271- See al-Shahrastanl, al-Milal, 11:64. He also cites the Mu'tazilites Ahmad b . Khabit 17 . See, e.g., al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 6(B):6i. and al-Fadl al-Hadathi as agreeing with the Christians that Jesus would be judge 118 . Note that classical jurists and theologians in general developed mechanisms in the Hereafter, Ahmad b. Khabit even holding Jesus to be the logos . See 1.74. for controlling the impact of isolated hadith . The Mu'tazilites, however, followed Meanwhile, the Mu`tazilite leader al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar displays a clear preoccupation perhaps by the Maturidites, are simply the most explicit in identifying "reason" as a with refuting the proponents of dualism, karma, and transmigration of souls (ahl basis for setting them aside . For the Maturidite approach to this issue, see chapter 4 , al-tanasukh) . See, e.g., al-Mughni fi abwab al-tawhid wa al-`adl, ed. A. F. al-Ahwani p. ioo below. and I. Madkur, 15 vols . (Cairo : al-Mu'assasah al-Misriyah al-Ammah li al-Ta'llf wa 119. In terms of their quantitative characteristics, i.e., their rate of diffusion, al-Tarjamah wa al-Tiba`ah wa al-Nashr, 11359-89/196o-69) (incomplete), 5 :9-79, Prophetic reports are divided into two basic groups : mutawatir (diffusely congruent) 13:459-61. and ahadi (of palpably limited diffusion) . Diffusely congruent reports are those that io. See his Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany, have been transmitted by such a broad and variegated chain of transmitters that it New York: State University of New York Press, 11995), 182-85 . is considered impossible for them to have colluded to falsify the report . It is on the ii . Cited in Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Managib al-imam al-shafii, ed. A. H. al-Saga basis of mutawatir reports, for example, that people in modern times know of such (Cairo : Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyah, 11406/1986), 99 . things as a human being landing on the moon or the existence of far-off places . 12. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh al-usul al-khamsah, 3rd ed ., ed. 'Abd al-Karim Reports of palpably limited diffusion, on the other hand, are those that fall short of the `Uthman (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 114116/11996), 39 . In addition to the views of standard for being considered diffusely congruent. The majority of Prophetic reports al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, to whom it is attributed, this work contains the opinions and are considered to fall short of diffuse congruence . See, e.g., my On the Boundaries of commentary of his disciples Mankdim and Ibn Mattawayh . See M . T. Heemskerk, Theological Tolerance in Islam, 47-48. Suffering in the Mu`tazilite Theology : 'Abd al Jabbar's Teaching on Pain and Divine 20. al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-i`tizal, 148. Justice (Leiden: Brill, 200), 3-9 . On another note, as "systematic, formal reason" is 21. In order to determine the quality of a hadith's reliability, hadith criticism too cumbersome to repeat consistently, I will simply use "reason" as a shorthand focused on the status of the persons in the chain of transmission . Where the narrators reference to it. Where other forms of reason are intended, I will either indicate such or were all known, were known to be upright, and could be proved or assumed to have rely on the context to make it clear . direct contact with each other, going all the way back to the source, namely, the 13. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-i`tizal wa tabagat al-mu`tazilah, ed. F. Sayyid Prophet, the chain, and thus the hadith, was deemed sound (sahih) unless there was (Tunis : al-Dar al-Tunislyah li al-Nashr, 1393/1974), 139- evidence that such a prima facie perfect chain had been fabricated . Other designations, 14. On this basic proof of the existence of God, see, e.g., al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, e.g., good (hasan) or weak (da`if) applied to reports with less admirable chains . Beyond Sharh, 92. ; Abu Bakr Muhammad b . al-Tayyib al-Bagillani, Kitab at-Tamhid, ed. these qualitative judgments, there were also quantitative criteria, e.g., how consistent a R. J. McCarthy (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 11957), 21-25, esp . 24-25; Abu Bakr hadith was with well-known facts or other accepted hadith . Where an otherwise sound Muhammad b . al-Tayyib al-Bagillani, al-Insaffima yajibu i`tigaduh wa la yajuz al jahl hadith contradicted well-known material, it was classed as "strange" (shadhdh) or bih, ed. M. Z. al-Kawthari and S . A. A. al-Husaynl (Cairo : Maktabat Nashr al-Thagafah "unconfirmed" (munkar) . For an introduction to this nomenclature, see A. M. Shakir, al-Islamiyah, 11369/11950), 14-17 ; Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Igtisadfi al-i`tigad (Cairo : al-Ba`ith al-hathith sharh ikhtisar 'ilm al-hadith li al-hafiz ibn kathir, 3rd ed. (Cairo : Dar Mustafa al-Babe al-Halabi, n.d.), 15-21; Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-adillah fi al-Turath, 1399/1979), 47, 49 . usal al-din, ed. H. Atay and S . A. Diizgiin, 2 vols . (Ankara : Nashriyat Ri'asat al-Shu'un 22. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-i`tizal, 1168. See also Fadl al-i`tizal, 195 . For a al-Diniyah li al-Jumhuriyah al-Turkiyah, 2003), 11 :1105-i6 ; Abu al-Muln al-Nasafi, Bahr similar maneuver, see al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 268. al-kalam, ed. W. al-Farfur (Damascus: Maktabat Dar al-Farff1r,113117/11997), 94-96; 23. This applied primarily to the central lands . Beyond the central lands, however, Abu al-Thana' Mahmud b. Zayd al-Lamishi, Kitab al-tamhid li gawa`id al-tawhid, ed. Sunni Mu'tazilism lasted (in Khawarzim, for example) well into the second half of `A. al-Turki (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islam11, 11995) 47 -50, 55, 57-59. the eighth/fourteenth century . See W. Madelung, "The Spread of Maturldism and the 115. On the role of allegorical interpretation in Mu'tazilism in general, see Turks," in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London: Variorum Reprints, al-Shahrastanl, al-Milal 11 :57: "They agree on the proscription of likening God to 1985), 11116; originally published in Actas do IV Congresso de EstudosArabes e Islamico, creation [tashbih] in every form, i.e., by holding Him to be in a direction, to occupy a Coimbra-Lisboa, 1968 (Leiden: Brill, 119711) . See also W . Madelung, "al-Taftazani, Sa'd place, have a form or a body, be a substrate, move, end, change or be affected . They al-Din," in EI, 110:89, where the Mu'tazilite Nu'man al-Din al-Khawarzimi judges require that verses that appear to connote these things be interpreted allegorically, and against al-Taftazani in a debate with Sharif al-Jurjani before the ruler Timur as they call this monotheism [tawhid] ." late as 789/1387 .

18o NOTES TO PAGES 5 1- 5 3 NOTES TO PAGES 53-55 181

24 . See On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam : Abu Hamid them, rather, as "causers" or "producers" (mujid, muhdith) of their actions . It was the al-Ghazali's "Faysal al-tafriga bayna al-islam wa al-zandaqa," trans . S . A . Jackson leader of the Basrian school, Abu `Alt al-Jubba'i (d . 303/915-16), who, recognizing no (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002), 90 . difference between producing and creating, made the move to referring to them as 25. On this point, see, e.g., al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 322-23, 334 . , 355, 381 "creators" of their own actions . See al-Nasafl, Tabsirat, 2:74- At Sharh, 381, for example, al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar notes that he does not adduce 32 . See, e.g ., my discussions in chapter 3 of Ash'arite kasb or Acquisition ; in scriptural proofs in response to his Ash'arite interlocutors because such proofs would chapter 4 of Maturidite kasb; in chapter 5 of Traditionalism (or more precisely Ibn only be probative, "assuming that God was just and wise and that He would not send Taymiya) and jabr . Incidentally, note in this context that "especially in late antiquity liars with miracles, whereas you (Ash'arites) theoretically allow this ." and the Middle Ages, philosophers used to explain the link between action and 26 . I use "moral evil," i.e., the creation or sponsoring of immoral human acts, freedom of action in terms of the will . . . . Freedom applied to action, then, because in contradistinction to metaphysical evil, i .e., the creation of nonhuman destructive to act was to exercise a free will ." T . Pink, Free Will: A Very Short History (New York : forces such as earthquakes, diseases, and the like. Oxford University Press, 2004), 6 . Emphasis mine . 27. Ahmad b . Yahya b . al-Murtada, Tabagat al-mu`tazilah (Die Klassen Der 33 . Ibn al-Murtada, Tabagat, 5-18 . Mu'taziliten), ed. S . Diwald-Wilzer, Die Klassen Der Mu`taziliten (Wiesbaden : Franz 34 Ibn al-Murtada, Tabagat, ii . Steiner, 1961) . Even here, however, there were some who were counted at least as 35 . Ibn al-Murtada, Tabagat, ii . "proto-Mu'tazilites," e.g ., Dirar b . 'Amr, who rejected the notion that humans created 36 . See Ibn al-Murtada, Tabagat, 9, for a whole series of such examples . their own actions . See, e.g ., M . Schwartz, "Acquisition (Kasb) in Early Kalam," 37. Watt, Free Will, 48-49. See also, however, Ibn Taymiya, "al-Iradah wa in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, ed . S . M . Stern, A. Hourani, and al-amr," in Majmu`at al-rasa'il al-kubra (Cairo : M . `A . Subayh, n.d .), 1:346, where he V. Brown (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 364 . applies it to those who overindulge the notion that God is directly responsible for 28 . Ibn al-Murtada, Tabagat, p . w (Arabic introduction), p . 3 (German everything in existence, an indirect indictment of Ash'arites and antinomian Sufis, introduction) . both of whom he holds-at least in this regard-to be worse than the Mu'tazilites . 29 . According to al-Shahrastani, there were actually several versions of this See also chapter 5 , PP . 137-39, however, for an assessment of Ibn Taymiya's depiction doctrine . Some determinists (1'abrtiyah) held that humans had absolutely no power ; of the Ash'arite position . others held that they possessed a created power but that this power was not an efficient 38 . See, e .g, Abu al-Hasan al-Ash`ari, al-Ibanah `an usul al-diyanah, ed. A . cause in producing action ; still others held that the created power that humans Sabbagh (Beirut: Dar al-Nafa'is, 1414/1994), 31-32 ; al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1 :56 ; possessed was efficient-these, according to al-Shahrastani, not being technically Abu al-Yusr Muhammad al-Bazdawi, Usul al-din ed . H .P . Lens (Cairo : al-Maktabat among the determinists . See al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1:97 . See also al-Bagillani, Kitab al-Azhariyah li al-Turath, 1424/2003), 112 . 163, at-Tamhid, 293, on jabr implying the denial of choice ; al-Nasafl, Bahr al-kalam, For a Mu'tazilite response to this effort, see al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-i`tizal, where he describes jabr as follows : "Humans are compelled [majbur] to unbelief and 167-70 . Similarly, the Ash`arite-leaning Maturidite al-Taftazani tenders a more ." See disobedience, like the wind passing over grass and turning it left and right level-headed denial that the Mu'tazilite position amounted to associationism (shirk), also W. M . Watt, "Djabriyya a .k .a. Mudjbira," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2:365, where he since they neither attributed necessary existence nor the right to be worshipped to ." It is translates jabr as "compulsion, viz ., that man does not really act but only God other than God . He claims that it was only the "shaykhs of Transoxiana," i.e ., central perhaps noteworthy in this context that Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafl claims that the crass Asian Maturidites, who exaggerated in their criticism to the point of claiming that and their doctrine had completely passed out of existence by determinists (al jabriyah) the Mu'tazilites were actually worse than the Zoroastrians, since the latter only . See al-Nasafl, Tabsirat, 2:1 his time 77 . acknowledged two creators, while the Mu'tazilites affirmed an infinite number . See The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York: Oxford 30 . See R. Kane, ed ., 8o . For an actual instance of the Maturidite charge of shirk against the Mu'tazilites, see . I cannot concur, in this light, with the University Press, 2002), 5 . Emphasis mine chapter 4 below, p . 105 . view of Watt that "the conception of Free Will, in the strict sense, does not occur at 39 . Abu Bakr Ahmad b . al-Husayn b . `All b . 'Abd Allah b . Musa al-Bayhagi, Kitab all in Muslim thought" ; Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (London : Luzac, al-asma' wa al-sifat (Beirut : Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, n.d .), 35- 184.8), 1. See also in this regard R . Frank, "The Autonomy of the Human Agent in the 40. Al-Bayhagi, Kitab al-asma' wa al-sifat, 35 . In other words, one says ya rahman, Le Museon 3-4 (1982) : 332, where he cautions against Teaching of `Abd al-Gabbar," 95, instead of ya al-rahman, since rahman is derived from rahim . But one always says . As I will show, however, all off the schools overindulging Western notions of free will simply ya Allah, i.e ., with the alleged definite article fully intact. and the Maturidites and Traditionalists even affirm freedom of choice (ikhtiyar), 41. Al-Bayhagi, Kitab al-Asma' wa al-sifat, 21 . This is the general rubric under endorse a modicum of inherent human agency . which he cites this view . 31 . According to the Maturidite Abu al-Mu'in al-Nasafl (d . 508/1114), the early 42 . See al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, p . 323 . Mu'tazilites actually eschewed the attribution of creation to humans, referring to 43. Al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1 :57 .

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44. Al-Shahrastanl, al-Milal, 1:57. Emphasis mine . The doctrine that God must 63 . Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 302; 313-15 ; al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, act in the interest of God's creatures did not necessarily imply that God must do 6(I) :127-28. what is best (aslah) for them. On this, see e.g., `Abu Muhammad b . Mattawayh, Kitab 64. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 303. 65. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, . al-majmu`fi al-muhit bi al-taklif, ed. J. Peters (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1999), 134-55 . al-Mughni, 6(I):3i 66 . Al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, 6(I)a8 . 45 . See, e.g., Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, Kitab al-tawhid, ed. F. Kholeif (Beirut : Dar al-Mughni, al-Mashriq, 1986), 215-16 . 67. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 6(I) :48. 46. This distinction between inherent properties and effect was the dividing 68. Al-Q54! 'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 6 (I):34 . line between the strict ontology of the Baghdadi school, which G . Hourani refers to 69 . Heemskerk, Suffering, 115, 117, asserts that al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar held as "moral objectivism," and the more nuanced position of Mu'tazilites of the Basrian injustice or zulm to be inherently evil . While this may be true, one must keep in persuasion, such as al-Jubba'i, Abu Hashim, and 'Abd al-jabbar . According to mind that no one act, qua the act itself, would be deemed by al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar Hourani, "moral objectivism" is the belief that value has a real existence in things and to be unjust in all circumstances . See 'Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 564-65; 'Abd al-Jabbar, actions themselves and is not contingent on the wishes or opinions of any judge or al-Mughni, 6 (I):77. observer. See his "Islamic and Non-Islamic Origins," 269 . 70 . Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 6(I):77. 71. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, 6(I):8i . 47. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 309. By "properties" here one must understand al-Mughni, the tendency or capacity to produce certain effects, not any inherent ipseity . 72. See al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 6(I) :82. 48 . See, e.g., al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1:58; G . F. Hourani, "Two Theories of Value 73. See, e.g., al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 514. in Medieval Islam," Muslim World 50, 4 (1960) : 269. 74. Al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 486 . 49. The former is the Baghdadi position, the latter the Basrian . For more on 75. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 11:134. this, see my discussion of Ash'arite weak ontology in chapter 3 below, pp . 83-85. 76. See al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-i`tizal, 1171; al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, 50. See R. M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975), 31 . al-Mughni, 11:127-28 ; al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 51o-ii. 51. On this point, see R. Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction (New York: 77. Indeed, according to al-Ash`ari, Bishr b . Mu'tamar and the Baghdadis held Oxford University Press, 2001), 32-40, esp ., 36-37 . In a sense, one might say that on that since there was no limit to the secular good that God could sponsor, God was the fundamental question of whether it is one's thought that determines the a priori only bound to do what was best for humans religiously. For al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar and nature of the (moral) world or the world that determines how one must think of it, the the Bahshamiyah, however, God's omnibenevolence was so unrestricted that it would Basrians inclined toward the former proposition while the Baghdadis inclined toward even bind God to compensate animals for the harm they suffered as a result of God's the latter. permitting their slaughter. See al-Ash`ari, Magalat, 1:313- 52. See Reinhart, Before Revelation, 40-43, 151-56 . 78. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 13:9. See also al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, 53 Al-Shahrastanl, al-Milal, 1 :59-96. Sharh, 519, for an almost identical definition . More generally, see Heemskerk, . 54. On the Bahshamiyah, see Heemskerk, Suffering, 13-71. Suffering, 148-51 79. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, 13:12. 55. His Tanzih al-Qur'an `an al-Mata`in (Raising the Qur'an Above Criticism) al-Mughni, has also survived and been published (Cairo, 1326/1908), along with his al-Muhit In 8o . Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 13:15. It should also be noted that the term al-Taklif. maslahah in Mu'tazilite parlance is a synonym for lutf See, e.g., al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, 56. See, e.g., the statement of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash`an., al-Ibanah, 30: "They [the Sharh, 774. Mu`tazilites] claim that God The Exalted may will that which does not occur and that 8, . Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 521. At Sharh, 520, incidentally, al-Qadi `Abd that which He does not will may occur ." See also Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 76, for an al-Jabbar cites the Baghdadi's rejection of this doctrine, i.e., that God must act via lutf. identical statement . 82. See Heemskerk, Suffering, 155. 83. Heemskerk, 57. Al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 466. Suffering, 156-9o, in her useful treatment, refers to `iwad as 58. See, e.g., al-Ash`ari, al-Luma` 57; al-Ash`ari, al-Ibanah, 30. "compensation ." I have chosen "indemnification," however, because it captures more 59 . Al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 58. effectively that one is being compensated specifically for harm suffered . 6o. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 301. "Incumbent" (wajib) here should not 84. Al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 498, mentions that the only forms of 'iwad be confused with the Baghdad-1 notion (to which some Basrian Mu`tazilites-e .g., that must be postponed to the Hereafter are those that restitute for death or instances al-Nazzam, al-Jahiz-also subscribed) that God was under an absolute obligation to do where a victim dies before being restituted . good and was incapable, therefore, of committing evil . 85. Generally, Muslims are indemnified by increased pleasures in Paradise, while 61. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 313-16. non-Muslims are indemnified by decreased torments in Hell . See, e.g., al-Qadi `Abd 62. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 315. al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 13:522-23. 184 NOTES TO PAGES 63-68 NOTES TO PAGES 68-76 185

86 . In apparent conversation with proponents of transmigration of souls io8 . IGWR, 189. (tanasukh), al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar emphatically rejects the notion that animals' 109. IGWR, 193 . The Mu'tazilites do not hold humans and God to be partners in suffering is deserved, which he seems to see as reclining on a belief in karma . As creating human acts and certainly not in suffering the indignities of human vice . such, he argues that animals must be indemnified in order that their slaughter not iio . See al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 464. See also al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, amount to evil . See al-Mughni, 1345 2. al-Mughni, 6(B) :51, 6(B) :56 . 87 . Al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 13 :472. iii . See, e.g ., IGWR, 195. 88 . Al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 13:47 2-73. 112 . On these renderings offitna, see my Islam and the Blackamerican, 76-80. 89. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 489. 113 . IGWR, 6-15, 22, 33- 9o . In a passing comment on slavery, al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar acknowledges the 114 . IGWR, i86 . suffering that accompanies the abuse to which masters subject their slaves and the 115 . IGWR, 193-94 . The reference here is actually to Burkle, whose position psychological pain that comes to slaves as a result of their loss of freedom . In fact, Jones appears to identify with his own . Jones affirms that there are only two pace the ultraliberal and "progressive" image commonly imposed on Mu'tazilism by reasonable choices confronting Blackamericans desirous of a dignified existence : moderns, al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar states explicitly that since God permitted and even "adopt a theodicy based on God's benevolence, or opt for atheism." IGWR, 33 . Jones, commanded slavery on occasion, slavery must be "good," i.e., it must serve some of course, ostensibly rejects God's omnibenevolence . human interest . Of course, slaves must be indemnified, but only for the nonessential 116 . IGWR, 196. abuse and psychological pain they suffer, not for the mere fact of being enslaved . 117 . IGWR, 195 . See al-Mughni, 13 :465-66 . Note again in this context that slavery was not a racially 118 . IGWR, 197 . exclusive institution in Islam . 119 . Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Black Intellectual (New York: Quill, 1984), 452 . 91. Al-Qadl 'Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 313 . This actually anticipates the objection, This was a reissue of the same work by Cruse that first appeared in 1967 . e.g ., of Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi (Tabsirat, 2:351-52) that children do not consent to 120 . See my discussion on pp. 62-63 above . exchanging suffering for indemnification . 121 . IGWR, 191-92 . 92 . Al-Qadl `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 312-13 . 122 . See, e.g ., Jones's take on John Hicks's "spiritual pedagogy," IGWR, 93 . Jones, IGWR 58. 198-99 . 94. It is interesting that, again, anticipating Jones in his critique of 123 . IGWR, 48- 53- "Whiteanity" (IGWR, xii-xiii), al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar makes the explicit claim that 124 . R. Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribner's, the early Umayyads championed the doctrine of crass predeterminism (fabr) in order 1960), xv . to lend religious sanction to acquiescing to their tyrannical rule . See Fadl al-i`tizal, 125 . Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism 143-48 . (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1983), 1]['- 95. See my discussion of the Mu'tazilite duty to command good and forbid 126 . Nandy, Intimate Enemy, 113 . Emphasis mine . evil above, p . 51. 127 . IGWR, 172 . 96. IGWR, io6,177-78,187,190- . IGWR, xxviii, 52, 213 . 97 CHAPTER THREE 98 . "Man must act as if he were the ultimate valuator or the ultimate agent in human history or both" (IGWR, xxviii) . i. Taj al-DIn al-Subkl, Tabaqat al-shafi'iyah, ed . M . M . al-Tanahi and `A . M 99. IGWR, 186. al-Hulw, io vols . (Cairo : `Isa al-Babi al-Halabi, 13 84/1965), 3:365. ioo. IGWR, xxi . 2 . For other versions, see, e.g., Abu Hamid al-Ghazall, al-Igtisad fi al-i`tigad ioi . On this point, see S . K . Pinnock, Beyond Theodicy, 98-99 . (Cairo : Mustafa al-Babe al-Halabl wa Awladuh, n.d .), 9o ; Sa'd al-DIn al-Taftazani, 102. IGWR, 77, Sharh al-`aga'id al-nasafiyah, ed . T.'A . Sa'd (Cairo : al-Maktabah al-Azhariyah li 103. IGWR, 178 . al-Turath, 1421/2000), 18 ; Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-adillah, 2:325-37, for a 104. IGWR, 178 . See also IGWR, 194-95, for more direct statements on the slightly different version with detailed commentary ; Kamal al-Din Muhammad b . Muh relationship between omnipotence and divine racism . ammad b . Abi Sharif al-Magdisi, Kitab al-musamarah fI sharh al-musayarah, 2 vols . 105 . IGWR, 187 . (Cairo : al-Maktabah al-Azhariyah Ii al-Turath, 2006), 2 :34-35 . io6. IGWR, 184. 3. Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari, al-Ibanah `an usul al-diyanah, ed. A. Sabbagh (Beirut : 107 . IGWR, 132 . Dar al-Nafa'is, 1414/1994) 124 . See also Abu al-Hasan al-Ash`arll, Kitab al-Luma`ft 186 NOTES TO PAGES 76- 79 NOTES TO PAGES 79 - 8 0 187 al-radd ala ahl al-zaygh wa al-bida`, ed. M . Gharabah (Cairo : Matba'at Misr, 1955), 16. M. Watt, "al-Ash`arI, Abu al-Hasan, `All b . Isma`il," in Encyclopedia of Islam, 117-18, for an identical argument . 1:694, gives 260/873 -74, while Ibn Khalikan gives 270/883 . See Ibn Khalikan, 4. See my discussion of the Rationalist proof of God in chapter 2, p . 49 . Wafayat al-a`yan wa anba' abna' al-zaman, ed . I . 'Abbas, 8 vols . (Beirut : Dar 5. Abu Mansur `Abd al-Qahir b . Tahir al-Tamimi al-Baghdadi, Kitab usul al-din al-Thagafah), 3 :284 . (Beirut : Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyah, 1346/1928), 69 . 17 . There are also several dates given for al-Ash'ari's death . Ibn Khalikan, for 6. See K. Ward, Pascal's Fire : Scientific Faith and Religious Understanding example, cites c . 333/945 , 330/942, and 324/936, agreeing with Ibn `Asakir that (Oxford : Oneworld, 2006), 27 . 324/936 is the preferred date. See Khalikan, Wafayat, 3:284-85 . 7. See Ward, Pascal's Fire, 54. On Ash'arite moral ontology, see below, 18. The Inquisition (c . 218/833-234/848) was initiated by the Baghdad caliph pp . 83-8 5- al-Ma'mun over the question of the nature of the Qur'an . Theologians and jurists were 8. Indeed, they would add, at the very least, such essential attributes as hearing asked if the Qur'an was created or untreated. Those who responded that it was created (sam), vision (basar) and speech (kalam), not to mention such performative attributes were given a pass . Those who insisted that the Qur'an was untreated or refused to as mercy (rahmah), forgiveness (maghfirah), pleasure (rida) and wrath (ghadab) though affirm that it was created were imprisoned and tortured . Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, who they would interpret away the affective connotations of these "wrath," e.g ., becoming refused to cede to the "created" position, spent a number of years in prison and simply the "will to punish ." See my discussion of affective attributes in chapter 5, endured the molestations of four successive 'Abbasid caliphs : al-Ma'mun, al-Wathiq, PP . 137 -39- al-Mu'tasim, and al-Mutawakkil . Al-Mutawakkil finally terminated the Inquisition as a 9. This was essentially the understanding that Charles Hartshorne, e.g ., lost cause. See "Mihna," in EI, 7:2-6 . See also chapter 2, note i . attacked in his Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State University 19. Given their purported opposition to "reason," Hanbalism has been depicted of New York Press, 1984), 1o-i1 : "to be God, that is, worthy of worship, God must as a movement that appealed to the "lower classes ." The late George Makdisi, however, in power excel all others (and be open to criticism by none) . The highest conceivable who single-handedly established Hanbalism's proper place in Western studies of form of power must be the divine power . . . [which] must be the power to determine Muslim religious history, takes exception with this depiction . See his "Hanbalite every detail of what happens in the world ." Islam," in Studies on Islam, ed. M . Schwartz (New York : Oxford University Press, io. Ash'arites actually disputed whether the created power (qudrah hadithah) 1981), 216-74, esp . 223 . that God extended to human beings was effective in bringing about the actions 20 . See, e.g ., al-Ash`ari, al-lbanah, 35, where he refers to Ibn Hanbal as "the humans willed . On this point, see, e.g ., al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1 :110-12 . See also my virtuous imam and perfect leader through whom God made manifest the truth, discussion of the efficiency of the created human power in chapter 5, p . 139 . There was repelled falsehood and made clear the path [to salvation], checking the innovators unanimous agreement, however, among Ash'arites that humans could not create their along with the deviation of the deviants and the doubts of the doubters, may God have actions independent of God, pace the Mu'tazilites . mercy upon him ." ii . From Shaykh Ahmad al-Dardir's Sharh al-kharidah al-bahiyah, appended 21. Khalikan, Wafyayat, 3:285. to Shaykh Muhammad BakhIt al-Muti`Ts commentary Hashiyat al-shaykh muh 22 . See, e .g ., my Boundaries, 61-64 and esp ., 120 . Ibn Taymiya, incidentally, ammad bakhit al-mutt't `ala sharh al-dardir `ala al-khartdah (Cairo : Dar al-Basa'ir, reports that this tendency in al-Ash`ari was part of the residue left over from his 2006?), 68 . Mu'tazilism . See his "Risalah fi al-kalam `ala al-fitrah," in Majma`at al-rasa'il al-kubra 12. See my discussion of the divergences of al-Bagillani and al-Juwayni in this (Cairo : M .'A . Subayh, n.d .) 2:34 6-47 . regard,in chapter 5, p . 139 . In his commentary, incidentally, al-MutI'i claims that 23. See, e.g ., M . M . Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, 2 vols . (Wiesbaden: al-Ash`ari himself ultimately attributed efficiency to the created power granted human Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), 1 :220-22 . See also G . Makdisi, "Ash`ari and the Ash'arites beings . See al-Muti`i, Hashiyat, 66. in Islamic Religious History I," Studia Islamica 17 (1962) : 38-40, where he signals 13 . `A. al-Harari, Mukhtasar 'abd allah al-harart al-kafi bi `ilm al-din (Beirut : reservations about this depiction . Masjid Burj Abi Haydar, 1404/1984), 5 . On "Acquisition," or kasb, see below, 24 . See my discussion of the "false detente" in chapter i above . See also pp. 87-90- chapter 5 PP . 135-43, on Ibn Taymiya's emphatic Traditionalist opposition to 14- See al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1:113 . Ash'arism . 15 . Ash'arism appears, incidentally, to display greater uniformity than 25 . There is also the work entitled Usul ahl al-sunna wa al jama`ah, also known Mu'tazilism, reflected, e .g ., in the fact that the former did not divide into separate as Risalah ila ahl al-thaghr, ed . M .S . al-Julaynd (Cairo : Maktabat al-Taqaddum, branches as did the latter with their Badhdadi and Basrian schools . This may be 1407/1987) . The attribution of this work to al-Ash`ari, however, has been challenged. related to the fact that their identification with the name al-Ash`ari required of 26 . It was the view of the late George Makdisi that Ash'arite theology departed Ash'arite theologians that they minimize, if not disguise, their disagreements with significantly from that of al-Ash`ari himself, to the point that the two constituted in their eponym . effect separate movements . See his "Ash'ari and the Ash'arites in Islamic Religious NOTES TO PAGES 188 NOTES TO PAGES 8 0-82 82-84 189

History I," 37-80, and "Ash'ari and the Ash'arites in Islamic Religious History II," 35 . Al-Ash`arl, al-Ibanah, 118. Al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar and company, meanwhile, take issue with this dictum Studio Islamica 18 (1963) : 20-39. While it is true that al-Ash`ari differed from the . First, they note that it is formally problematic, inasmuch Ash'arites with regard to his attitude toward Traditionalism (specifically Ibn Hanbal), as they themselves oppose those who espouse it, which undermines the claim of he and the Ash'arites remained united, in substance and in spirit, in their direct and unanimous consensus . Second, the probative status of Unanimous Consensus itself sustained opposition to Mu'tazilism . could only be established on the basis of scripture, and scripture itself could only be 27. This list is not exhaustive, though these were clearly the most important probative assuming that God was just, wise, and above committing evil . Otherwise, it could be assumed that the aims of scripture were nefarious, which would render it trendsetters . Other important Ash'arites of the period include Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'Ini (d. 418/1027), Abu Bakr Ibn Furnk (d . 406/1016), Abu Bakr al-Bayhagi (d . 9.58/1065), unreliable . Third, even if they were to accept this Unanimous Consensus, they have a different interpretation of the dictum itself, namely that only what God wills in the way 'Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdad! (d. 429/1037) and al-Kiya al-Harrasl (d . 504/1118) . 28. This point is eloquently argued by G . Makdisi, "Ash`arI and the Ash'arites of God's own actions necessarily happens, which does not preempt the occurrence of in Islamic Religious History I" and "Ash`ari and the Ash`arites in Islamic Religious acts willed by humans but not directly by God . See al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 369. History II ." 36 . Al-Ash`ari, al-Ibanah, 118. 29. See, e.g., his Handbook on Islam, Iman and Ihsan : The Kitab usul ad-deen 37. Al-Ash`ari, al-Ibanah, 118-23 . Al-Ash`ari notes that many of his partisans ("The Roots of the Life-Transaction") and the Kitab 'ulum al-mu`amala ("The Sciences of disliked imputing evil to God, that is, as a matter of "theological etiquette," even as Behaviour"), trans. `Aisha `Ahd ar-Rahman at-Tarjumana (Norwich, England : Diwan they fully acknowledged that God was the creator of all things, including evil . As Press, c . 1978) . for al-Ash`arI himself, he writes, "I say that evil is from God, in that He creates it, 30 . This should be understood, however, as little more than the basic Man of not for Himself but for others ." See al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 84 . Ofcourse, al-Ash`arl is Salafism, especially in its attitude toward African syncretism. Otherwise, Salafism in referring here to what humans generally deem evil, not to any quality inherent in acts black Africa is very different from what we find in the central lands of the Middle East . themselves . Indeed, many Middle Eastern SalafIs might not even recognize black African Salafism 38. See al-Subkl, Tabagat al-shafi`iya, 4:261-62. See also al-Taftazani, Sharh, 82, as such. for an abbreviated version of this exchange . 31. See, e.g., al-Ash'ari, al-Luma`, 47, 49; al-Ash`arl, al-Ibanah, 118,1121 ; Abu Bakr 39. See G. F. Hourani, "Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam," Muslim World Muhammad b. al-Tayyib al-Bagillani, Kitab at-Tamhid, ed. R. J. McCarthy (Beirut : 50, 4 (1960) : 270 . Librairie Orientale, 1957), 296 ; Fakhr al-Din al-Razl, al-Arba`in fi usul al-din, ed. A. H . 40. See, e.g., S. White, "Weak Ontology : General and Critical Issues," Hedgehog 7, 2 (2005) : 11-25 . al-Saga (Cairo : Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyah, 1986), 1 :333. See also R . M. Frank, Review Al-Ghazali and the Ash`arite School (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 41. White, "Weak Ontology," 16. Note that White acknowledges the possibility 38-39, where he suggests a certain equivocation on al-Ghazali's part on the question of reconciling theism and weak ontology, seeing in the work of Charles Taylor an example of this of secondary causes. However, in his chapter "The Human Power of Voluntary . It is difficult, however, given what is found in Muslim theology, to Actions," Frank insists that despite al-Ghazali's engagement in artful ambivalence he understand why such a possibility should seem so remote . sticks to the basic postulates of the Ash'arite school : "his use of `creates' and `creation' 42. See al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Shark 564-65, where he repeats his refutation so restricts the focus to God's determinant power that any question of secondary of the inherent good or evil of acts and affirms that the prophets merely bring that which confirms what is already primordially preestablished in the human psyche causes is formally set aside" (43). Of course, it was Frank's overall objective to prove ("ja'u that al-Ghazali did not adhere consistently to Ash'arism . While al-Ghazali's flirtations bi tagrtir ma clad rakkabahu Allahu fi `uqulina") . It is conformity, in other words, with with Neoplatonism and some of his tortuous attempts at reconciliation might seem the moral schemas that God has impressed on the human mind, not the inherent to justify this assertion, one wonders how many Ash'arites would be counted "true" qualities ofthe actions addressed or the mere fact that the prophets identified them as Ash'arites on the criterion Frank seeks to impose . such, that gains actions recognition as good or evil . 32. Al-Ash`arl, al-Luma`, 47 . 43. See, e.g., al-Bagillanl, at-Tamhid, 341; Abu al-Ma`all al-Juwaynl, Kitab al-irshad fi gawati` al-adillah fi usul al-i`tigad (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 16 / 1 33. See my discussion of the Mu'tazilite position on God's granting humans 14 995007; autonomous agency without contradicting divine omnipotence in chapter . 2, pp. 55 , Abu al-Ma`alI al-Juwaynl, al- Agidah al-Nizamiya fi al-arkan al-islamiyah ed. A.H. al-Saga (Cairo : Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyah, 1399/1979), 57 ; al-Ghazali, 58-59- 121, 122, for an al-Igtisad, 79 ; al-Razi, al-Arba`in, . On this point in general, see the important 34. Al-Ash`arl, al-Luma`, 54 . See also al-Ash`arl, al-Ibanah, 1:346 . Reinhart identical view. We must distinguish here, in order to avoid misunderstanding work by A. K Before Revelation : The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought al-Ash`arl, between God's detesting the substance of an act and detesting the actual (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 65-76 . occurrence of such an act. Al-Ash`ari is speaking here of God's detesting the actual 44. This did not mean that human beings could only do what would be rewarded in the Hereafter (though this is often the popular conception among Muslims) occurrence ofan act . . The 190 NOTES TO PAGES 85-86 NOTES TO PAGE 87 191 point was that the propriety of human wants and the modality via which they may God's love (mahabbah), will (iradah), and pleasure (rida) are all synonymous and be pursued must be measured in terms of what is rewarded and what is punished in that God both loves and is pleased with unbelief. See al-Juwayni, Kitab al-irshad, 99. the Hereafter . I may not be able to argue that owning a Maserati Quattroporte will be Elsewhere, however, al-Juwayni draws a distinction between God's ontological and rewarded in the Hereafter . But I could argue that purchasing one through lawfully deontological decrees, referring to the former as amr al-takwin and the latter as amr gained funds would not be punished . al-takltf. See al-Juwayni, al-Nizamiyah, 52. Al-Bagillani, meanwhile, is less clear but 45. Al-Juwayni, al-Nizamiyah, 56. ultimately seems to be in line with this . See chapter 5, p . 138 below, including note 46. Al-Ghazali, al-Igtisad, 79 . Emphasis mine. See also al-Juwayni, al-Nizamiyah, 49. Cumulatively, all of this ambiguity led a number of non-Ash`arites to claim that 57, and al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:164, where he paraphrases a work attributed to al-Ash'ari, al-Ash`ari and the Ash'arites in general rejected any distinction between ontological Kitab al-nawadir, in which al-Ash`ari declares the same principle . and normative or deontological decree. See, e.g., al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:282; Ibn 47. Al-Ghazali, al-Igtisad, 91. Emphasis mine . Taymiya, "al-Ihtijaj bi al-gadar," in Majmu`at al-rasa'il al-kubra, 2 vols . (Cairo : M.'A. 48. See, e.g., al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 341; al-Juwayni, al-Nizamiyah, 58. Subayh, n.d.) 2:128-30 ; 'Abd al-Rahim b . 'Ali b. al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm 49. See, e .g., al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 338-39 ; al-Ash`ari, al-Ibanah, 127-29. al fara'id wa jam` al fawa'id fi al-masa'il al-mukhtalaffiha bayna al-sadah al-ash`ariyah 5o. See, e.g., al-Ash`ari, al-Ibanah, 127-28. wa al-sadah al-maturtidiyah. Ms. (Cairo : Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyah), 875, 'Ilm al-Kalam, 51 . Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 11-12. 4v. The bulk of this, however, is simply overstatement . No such conflation appears 52. Al-Ash`ari (al-Ibanah, 141) responds directly to the argument that rather in al-Ghazali, for example, (al-Iqtisad, 56), and by the time one gets to Fakhr al-Din than creating the unbelief of unbelievers, God merely abandons unbelievers and al-Razi, the matter is explicitly laid to rest : "While unbelief and disobedience occur thereby "permits" them to engage in unbelief. Against the Mu'tazilite interpretation by the will of God, they do not occur according to His love or His pleasure" ("al-kufr of the Qur'anic term khadhlan (abandonment) he writes : "We say to them, `This wa al-ma`asi wa in kana bi iradat Allah laysa bi mahabbat Allah ta`ala wa la bi ridah") ; abandonment which is from God, is it not the unbelief that He created in them?' If al-Razi, al-Arba`in, 1:345. Eventually, even Ibn Taymiya would concede that "many they respond, `Yes,' they have accepted our position . If they respond, `No,' we say Ash'arites recognized a distinction between will, love, and pleasure, noting that even to them : `Then what is this abandonment which He created?' If they say, `It is His if God wills disobedience He neither loves nor is pleased with it ; rather, He hates and permitting them to engage in unbelief [takhliyatuhu iyyahum wa al-kufr],' we respond, despises it" ; Minhaj al-sunnah al-nabawiyah fi nagd kalam al-sht'ah wa al-gadanyah, 4 `But isn't it your position that God has permitted both believers and unbelievers vols. (Beirut : Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyah, n.d.), 1:266. Meanwhile, later Ash'arites, e .g., to engage in unbelief?' To this they must respond, `Yes.' Then we say to them, 'If Ibn Abi `Udhbah (d. 1172/1758), would attempt to turn the tables by insisting that it abandonment is permitting them to engage in unbelief, then you must accept that was Abu Hanifa (an indirect reference to the Maturidites) who insisted that God's will He (also) abandoned the believers, because He permitted them to engage in unbelief. and pleasure were synonymous, while al-Ash`ari himself allegedly separated the two . And this is a rejection of the Faith ." See Ibn Abi `Udhbah, al-Rawdah al-bahiyah ftma bayna al-asha'irah wa al-maturidiyah, ed 53. Hartshorne, Omnipotence, 11-12. . A. F. Dahruj (Beirut: Dar Sabil al-Rashad, 1416/1996), 58 . 54. See, e.g., al-Qadi `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 433, 439, 464, 468; al-Qadi `Abd 56. See, e.g., al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 83. al-Jabbar, al-Mughni, 6(B):47-54, esp . 54: "Whatever He wills He must love" ("idha 57. Al-Bagillani, for example, seems to suggest that one reason might be to sahha kawnuhu mundan fa yajibu kawnuhu muhibban"), 56 . Again, however, Ash`arites increase humans' awareness of their contingency on God . See al-Tamhid, 294-95. do not admit any affective dimensions to these apparently affective traits . I will present other vindications of God's acts in the more specific context of God's . At 55. This is neither completely nor consistently stated by al-Ash`ari himself wisdom (hikmah) according to the Maturidites. al-Luma', 54-56, for example, he appears to reject any distinction between God's 58. Indeed, on several occasions, 'Abd al-Jabbar and company snidely and ontological and deontological command . Indeed, at al-Ibanah, 132-33, he gives a indirectly refer to the Ash'arites as mujbirah, that is, jabnyah . See al-Qadi 'Abd rather shocking interpretation of the verse "And I have only created jinn and humans al-Jabbar, Sharh, 288, 311. to worship Me," insisting that God did not mean for all humans to worship God 59. See, e.g., al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar, Shark, 333, 343, 353 , 365. but only the believers who actually did, a move apparently designed to preserve the 6o. Ibn Taymiya, "Al-Iradah wa al-amr," in Majmu`at al-rasa'il, 2 vols . (Cairo: integrity of God's will. Otherwise, how could some choose not to worship God if God M. `A. Subayh, n.d.), 1:365 . The other two were the Mu`tazilite Abu Hashim's doctrine actually willed that all should worship God . Meanwhile, at al-Luma`, 80-83, al-Ash`ari of "states" (ahwal) and the Mu'tazilite al-Nazzam's doctrine of "leaping" (tafrah). But states explicitly that we are not required to be pleased with all that God decrees, by see my discussion of Taymiya's specific take on Ash'arite kasb in chapter 5 . which he could only have in mind God's ontological decree . He appears to recognize 61. Sharif, History of Muslim Philosophy, 1:230. "It was really very difficult," Sharif a similar distinction between ontological and normative decree at al-Ibanah, 122-24, continues, "for them to reconcile the absolute determination of all events by God with 138, 141-42 . The same diffidence appears in al-Juwayni, who states in one place that man's accountability and responsibility for his deeds ." 192 NOTES TO PAGES 87-88 NOTES TO PAGES 88-90 1 93

62 . M . Schwartz, "Acquisition (Kasb) in Early Kaam," Islamic Philosophy and on any number of issues, this perhaps being one of them . See Usul ahl al-sunna wa the Classical Tradition, ed. S .M . Stern, A . Hourani and V . Brown (Columbia, S .C. : al jama`ah, 86-88 . University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 381 . 70 . Al-Bagillani makes the additional point that humans could not possibly 63. E.g ., the aforementioned Ibn Abu `Udhbah supported it. M. Ceric, however, calculate all the qualities and characteristics of the acts they willed in order to bring suggests that Ibn Abi `Udhbah was a Maturidite . See his Roots of Synthetic Theology in them into existence as actually willed . Thus, these acts must be both designed and Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abu Mansur al-Maturtdr (d . 333/ 944) (Kuala Lumpur : created, that is, brought into actual existence, by God, via both a prefabricated structure International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1 . See my observation, however, 995) 54 (e .g ., like the movements of a robot) and an instantiating power that God provides . at note 55 above, where his attribution to Abu Hanifa of the view that divine will, love, Similarly, al-Bagillani gives the impression that the "degree" or "quality" of power and pleasure were all synonymous would seem to challenge this . conferred at any given instant remains outside human control . This would explain 64 . See Ibn Abu `Udhbah, al-Rawdah al-bahryah, 74 . See also C . Cahen, "Kash," why humans make simple mistakes, such as my misstriking the keyboard on my word in El, 6 :692-94, where he attributes a similar statement, "more tenuous than processor during the course of writing this book . On the other hand, it would explain a!-Ash`ari's kasb," to Hanbalite detractors . why everyone who wills to play basketball like Michael Jordan is not able to do so . See 65. See, e .g ., R . Kane, ed ., The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York : Oxford al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 303-04 . University Press, 2002) 181-277 ; T. Pink, Free Will: A Very Short History (New York : 71. Al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 73 -74, 7 6 . Oxford University Press, 2004) , 43-72. 72 . Al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 307 . See also al-Ash'ari, al-Luma`, 96-97 . 66 . The Ash'arites diverged from Compatibilism on any number of details and 73. This is the point of the Ash'arite position to the effect that "al-qudrah la tasluh premises, perhaps the most important being their utter denial that humans possessed li al-diddayn," that is, "the granted power cannot be used for a thing and its opposite ." any power that was not directly granted by God in occasionalist fashion. See, e.g ., al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 95-96, 99 ; al-Juwayni, Kitab al-irshad, 93-94 . While the 67 . At a historic Muslim-Buddhist conference held in San Francisco (April Ash'arite foil is routinely the Mu'tazilites, as I will show, the Maturidite theory of kasb 14-15, 2006) and featuring the Dalai Lama, one of the speakers told a joke : "Five birds also dissented on this point, holding the granted power to be capable of effecting the were sitting on a log ; three decided to fly away . How many birds were left? Five . A willed act and its opposite . See my discussion of the Maturidite position in chapter 4. to do something is not the same as actually doing it ." On a more serious note, decision 74 . See my discussion of Maturidite differences in chapter 4 . al-Bagillani makes the insightful observation that the power or capacity through which 75. See al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 73 -74, 93 , 96-97 ; al-Baqillani, at-Tamhid, 286-87, humans undertake action comes to them from without, as confirmed by the fact that 307 ; al-Juwayni, al-Nizamryah, 48-49 ; al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1 :107, 110, 111-12 ; sometimes when a person wills to move or draw a straight line he or she is able to, but al-Razi, al-Arba7n, 1 :319,1 :326-27 . Al-Bagillani, incidentally, is more explicit in sometimes he or she is not. See al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 286 . implying that if humans do not will an act they will not receive the power to do 68 . See, e .g ., al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1 :107 : "Through knowledge ['ilm] it . Thus, they will be incapable of performing this act, not because it lies beyond perfection and precision are effected ; through power [qudrah] occurrence and temporal their theoretical ability (la li 'ajzihim) but because they simply failed to will it . See appearance are brought about ; and through will [iradah] comes the differentiation al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 293 . ." between one time and another, one degree and another, one form and another 76 . On the distinction between the Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite understandings of Knowledge, according to al-Shahrastani, is more germane to divine acts, and he is this dictum, see note 35 above . (perfection and precision) of human acts is entirely determined by clear that the design 77. See, e.g ., E. L . Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought : The Dispute over God . In other words, humans may will to stand or sit or jump, but these actions can al-Ghazalr's "Best of All Worlds" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 17 : "The . This was another aspect only take the form that they were designed to take by God Ash'arite insistence on divine omnipotence led to a rejection of belief in free will ." of the argument against the Mu'azilite contention that humans create their own acts, 78 . See, e .g ., al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 58, where he invokes the verse "And you . which would imply that humans actually design their own acts (humans) only will what God wills" (that you will) ("wa ma tasha'una illa an yasha' 69 . Note that in Usul ahl al-sunnah wa al jama`ah, a .k.a . Risalat ahl al-thaghr, Allah") as evidence against independent choice . humans are credited with two levels of agency, a general, presumably inherent 79 . Al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 293, appears to admit free will . But at 307, on the level and a more specific, acquired one, along lines we will see more explicitly in other hand, he rhetorically suggests that God is the source of all that humans will . . Scholars have my treatment of Maturidism and the Traditionalist Ibn Taymiya In fact, in al-Bagillani one gets the impression that belief, unbelief, and the like are particular challenged this work's attribution to al-Ash'ari, and one wonders what this viewed as actions (afalls . fi`l) that require power (qudrah), just like standing or sitting, point might contribute to this debate . On the one hand, this attribution of an in contradistinction to being mere psychological states or moments . Or perhaps one inherent level of power stands in stark contradiction with later Ash'arite doctrine, might be seeing in al-Bagillani an indictment of psychology itself, that is, as some . which would seem to support the contention that this is not a work by al-Ash`ari sort of near opposite of action or a realm between action and inaction. See, e .g ., 328, On the other hand, late Ash'arites have been known to go against their eponym where he writes : "Had God conferred on them the power to believe, their belief would 194 NOTES TO PAGES 90-92 NOTES TO PAGES 92-99 195 have come into existence, absolutely" ("law fa`ala fthim al-qudrah 'ala al-iman la wujida 89 . I will return to the matter of wisdom more frontally in my treatment of imanuhum la mahalah") . Emphasis mine. Maturidism . 8o. See, e .g., al-Razi, al-Arba'tn, 1:323. This being said, I cannot concur, at least 9o. See my discussion of the various Ash'arite positions on free will at p . 9o not on the basis of al-Arba in, with M. M. Sharif's contention that al-Razi "discarded above . the veil of acquisition in order to escape the charge of fatalism, and advocated naked 91. Al-Ash`ari, al-Luma`, 8o. See, however, al-Bazdawi, Usul al-din, 252, who, determinism." See History of Muslim Philosophy, 1 :230. Indeed, at 1:326-27, al-Razi like other Maturidites, attributes to al-Ash`ari the view that God was pleased with and states explicitly that humans have no efficient power of their own, implying that their loved unbelief and disobedience. See also, however, note 55 above . actions could only occur through a created power granted by God. 92. See "Salah al-Din, al-Malik al-Nasir Abu `i-Muzaffar Yusuf B . Ayyub 81. Al-Juwayni, al-Nizamiyah, 44 . Later in the same work, al-Juwayni writes: (Saladin)," in El, 8 :913- "God has granted human beings choice [ikhtiyar] via which they direct the power 93. Al-Ghazali, al-Igtisad, 81. [God grants them] . When something occurs by means of this power, this occurrence 94. Al-Ghazali, al-Igtisad, 81. is ultimately attributable to God, inasmuch as it occurs via God's [specific] act [of 95. Abu Hamid AI-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa min 'ilm al-usul 2 vols . (Bulaq : granting this power] . And had the wayward party [i.e., the Mu'tazilites] been guided al-Matba'ah al-Amiriyah, 1322/I9040 :58-6o. to this, there would be no disagreement between us . But they claimed human self- 96. Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1:57-58. sufficiency and independence in the ability to invent, create and innovate [actions], 97. On this point, see my "The Alchemy of Domination? Some Ash'arites thereby going astray and leading others astray" (49). Responses to Mu'tazilite Ethics," International Journal of Middle East Studies 31 (1999) : 82. See, e.g., al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 293- 189-9o . 83- See, e .g., al-Magdisi, al-Musamarah, 2:40, 2 :54, on the discussion of the 98. Maturidites and Traditionalists disagree, as do, obviously, Mu'tazilites . hadith: "No fatique, illness, anxiety, sadness, insult, grief, or even the prick of a thorn On the term "theistic subjectivism," see Hourani, "Two Theories," 270 : "theistic shall touch a Muslim but that God will expiate his or her sins in like proportion ." See subjectivism [is] the belief that `good,' `right' and similar terms have no other meaning also 2 :55, where he notes that while the Ash'arites held that God could impose on than `that which God wills' : thus God makes things good or right for us by His humans obligations they could not fulfill (taklif ma la yutaq) as a rational possibility, decision that they should be so . It is denied that these words denote anything that has that is, reason did not impose on God any obligation not to do so, many Ash'arites an objective existence ; their meaning applies only to whatever God wishes, decrees held this to be an actual impossibility, based on such scriptural proofs as the verse "God or approves for the world . . . . This was the theory of value held by Ash`ari and all does not burden a soul with more than it can bear." See also the Ash'arite Shihab Ash'arites ." al-Din al-Qarafi, Sharh tangih al fusul, ed. T. 'A. Sa'd (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyat 99 . Al-Ghazali, al-Igtisad, 82. al-AzharIyah (1393/1973), 143-44, where it is implied that the going opinion is that 100 . Al-Ghazali, al-lqtisad, 82. while God theoretically can impose on humans duties they cannot fulfill, God does not ioi . Al-Ghazali, al-Igtisad, 83. do so in actual practice . 102. Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1:49- 84. On codetermination, see, e.g., al-Juwayni, al-Nizamiyah, 46-51, on 103. For a more detailed treatment of al-Ghazali's critique of moral objectivism, the question of an action falling under two agents ("dukhul magdur wahid tahta see my "Alchemy of Domination," 187-91 . qudratayn") . While Ash'arite kasb recognizes a division of labor between human will 104. This does not preclude the possibility, of course, of multiple and competing and divine execution, what Jones seems to have in mind by codetermination is a more interpretations of scripture . Still, these remain bound and proscribed by the words explicit sharing of agency or power between humans and God . of scripture and Tradition overall . Thus, a Qur'anic injunction, e .g., to "stand up for 85. Note that Jones admits that not all suffering is necessarily evil . With the truth, even if against yourselves" can never be justifiably turned into a license to particular reference to black suffering, however, he writes : "But, collapsing suffering "support or countenance wrongdoers as long as they pay you enough ." into a form of spiritual pedagogy misses the impact of the maldistribution of ethnic 105 . On this notion of normalized domination, see my discussion and suffering." Jones, IGWR, 198. interpretation offitna and the Qur'an's opposition to it in Islam and the Blackamerican, 86. See, e.g., IGWR, 85. 176-83. 87. IG WR,108-9. 88. One could add here the innumerable personal catastrophes he suffered CHAPTER FOUR during his prophethood, including, for example, the fact that with the exception of Fatimah (who died within a year after him) all of his daughters (three) and a young i . W. Madelung, "al-Maturidi," Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1950-), son (Ibrahim) died before him . 6:846. Madelung also cites 332/943 and 336/947 as alternate death dates .

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2. W. Madelung, "The Spread of Maturidism and the Turks," in Religious 15 . See, e .g., al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 265 . Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), iio ; originally 16. Al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 118 . According to this report, Hell will ask God if published in Actas do IV Congresso de EstudosArabes e Islamico, Coimbra-Lisboa, 1968 there are any additions . "The Lord will then place his foot in the Hell-fire to the point (Leiden: F.J. Brill, 1971) . that the latter says, `Enough, enough'!" 3 . See M . Ceric, Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam : A Study of the Theology of 17. Al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 119-32. Abu Mansur al-Maturidl (d . 333/ 944) (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic 18. Al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 137-55 . Thought, 1995), 18-19 . 19. Madelung, "Spread," 117. This may be a bit early, but I suspect that by the 4. Ceric, Roots, 31-34 . See also Fathallah Kholeif, introduction to Abu Mansur time of Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi (d . 508/1115), most of the differences were indeed al-Maturidl, Kitab al-tawhid, ed. F. Kholeif (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1986), m . 3. resolved in favor of the Samarqandis . 5 . Ceric, Roots, 45-46. 20. Madelung, "Spread," 168 . 6. See, however, J . M. Pessagno, "The Uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought," 21. This is according to 'Abd al-Majid al-Turlci, who edited al-Lamishi's Kitab Journal of the American Oriental Society 6o (1984) : 60-62, where the author speculates al-tamhid li gawa`id al-tawhid (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1995), 13 . about the authorship of Kitab al-tawhid and whether it can be wholly attributed to 22 . Ceric, Roots, 228-30 . Ceric does not mention Kamal al-Din al-Magdisi by al-Maturidi . W. Madelung ("al-Maturidl," 6 :846) affirms, however, that this work is name but cites the work of Ibn al-Humam, on which al-Magdisi wrote a famous "definitely authentic." commentary, al-Musamarahfi sharh al-musayarah . 7. Abu ai-Yusr Muhammad al-Bazdawl, Usul al-din (Cairo : al-Maktabat 23 . W. Madelung, "al-Maturidl," in EI, 6:846; Ceric, Roots, 57. Ceric's al-Azhariyah li al-Turath, 1424/2003), 14 . See also Ceric, Roots, 52-56, for additional counterthesis to the effect that Maturldism was more influential than Ash'arism reasons for the diminished influence of Kitab al-tawhid . seems a bit exaggerated, though I concede that it may have had a greater influence 8. I am not sure I concur with the conclusion of Ceric, Roots, 232-33, that the on Traditionalism than heretofore recognized . See Ceric, Roots, 51. On the influence Maturldites added nothing substantial to al-Maturidl's thought . The Bukharans appear on Traditionalism, see my treatment of Traditionalism, particularly Ibn Taymiya, in to have gone against aspects of al-Maturidi's doctrine, e.g., on wisdom and imposing chapter 5 below . impossible obligations . And, if nothing else, later Maturldites had to vindicate their 24. Now published in full under the title Ta'wilat ahl al-sunnah, ed. Fatimah Y. doctrine in light of the formidable challenge of a developing and aggressive Ash'arism . al-Khaymi, 4 vols . (Beirut : Mu'assasat al-Risalah Nashirun, 1425/2004) . 9. Cited in Ceric, Roots, 30. 25 . See, e.g., W. M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: io. Al-Maturidl, Kitab al-tawhid, 3 . Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 312-13 ; Ceric, Roots, 18. One could add to the list of ii . Al-MaturIdi, Kitab al-tawhid, 4 : "Reason and reliable transmission are the those who ignored al-Maturidl and the Maturldites Ibn Khalikan (d . 681/1282), bases of religious knowledge" ("al-'aql wa al-sam` huma asl ma yu`rafu bihi al-din") . al-Safadl (d . 764/1363) and Ibn Khaldun (d . 808/1406) . Incidentally, al-sam` is a synonym for al-nagl/al-manqul. 26. See Ahmad `Awad Allah b . Dakhil al-Luhaybl al-Harbl, al-Maturidiyah: 12. See al-Maqdisi, al-Musamarah, 1:33; and esp ., 2:58, where in considering a Dirasatan wa tagwiman (Riyadh : Dar al-'Asimah, 1413/2003), 79-82 ; Ibn Taymlyah, certain hadith, he also writes : "The occurrence of this hadith in Sahth Muslim and Majma' fatawa shaykh al-islam ahmad b . taymiyah, ed. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad the Musnad [of Ahmad b. Hanbal?] does not negate its status as an isolated report b. Qasim, 37 vols . (Rabat : Maktabat al-Ma'arif, n.d.), 8 :438 . that does not yield certainty. And certainty is the required consideration in the area 27. See F . Kholeif, Introduction to al-Maturldl's Kitab al-tawhid, m. 9, noting of belief." As for zahir expressions, an example would be the word "lion," which in that al-Nasafi's work served for years as the main source for the study of tawhid its apparent meaning refers to a predatory animal but in its less apparent meaning is (monotheism) at al-Azhar. Meanwhile, according to Madelung, "Spread," 11i, the first commonly used to refer to a courageous man . to cite Maturidism as a distinct theological movement was Abu Bakr Ahmad b . : 13. See, e .g, Abu al-Muln al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, ed. W. al-Farfur (Damascus Muhammad b . Furak (d. 478/1085-86), the grandson of the famous Ash'arite Maktabat Dar al-Farfur, 1317/1997), III ; see also 'Abd al-Rahim b . `All b . al-Mu'ayyad theologian Ibn Furak. Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, iov-iir. 28. See, e.g., Ceric, Roots, 52-56 ; F. Kholeif, in his introduction to al-Maturidl's "bi la 14. Al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 111-16 . Line 3 of p . ii5, however, should read Kitab al-tawhid, m . io, singles out geography as the main reason ; Madelung, kayf wa tashbih" ("without speculating about `how' and without assuming likenesses to "al-MaturIdi," adds the interesting view that the negative attention that Ash'arism created entities"), instead of simply "kayf wa tashbih ." For confirmation of this, see the drew from Traditionalism propelled it past Maturidism . , 1911 edition, Kitab bahr al-kalam (Cairo : Matba'at Kurdistan al-`Ilmiyah, 1329/1911) 29 . Madelung, "Spread," 166 . 22 (further references to this work in this chapter are to the 1997 edition, cited in 30. Ceric, Roots, 54-55. . See my note 13) . Resort to bi la kayf as I will show, was a signature of Traditionalism 31. See on this point, Madelung, "Spread," 117 and esp . 125; A. Zysow, discussion of "balkafa" in chapter 5 . "Mu'tazilism and Maturidism in Hanafl Legal Theory, in Studies in Islamic Legal 198 NOTES TO PAGES 104-105 NOTES TO PAGES 106-107 199

Theory, ed . B. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 264, 265 . Madelung ("al-Matur-idi," 6 :847) 44. Here, where the line reads "la yasa'uka illa al-khuruju `an dhalika," I have adds that Maturidie criticism of Ash'arite views occasionally reached the point of dropped the word illa as an apparent mistake. condemning them as unbelief (kufr) . 45. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:362. . See, e.g., C. Salamah's introduction to his edition of al-Nasafi, Tabsirat 32. Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id. 46 33. Madelung, "Spread,"167 n . 154 . al-adillah, ed . C. Salamah, 2 vols . (Damascus : al-Ma'had al-Faransi li al-Dirasat . In fact, Madelung affirms that al-Maturidi's doctrine was closer to the al-'Arabiyah wa al-Islamiyah, 1990-93), z-h ; al-Harbi, al-Maturtidiyah, i19 ; Zysow, 34 "Mu'tazilism and Maturidism," 264 Mu'tazilites than it was to that of al-Ash`arI. See "al-Maturidi," 6 :846. . 35. See F . Kholeif, Introduction to al-Maturidi's Kitab al-tawhid, m . 18, where 47. To take just one example, the view that God must act in the interests of Kholeif himself rejects this notion . humans is shared by Mu'tazilites, but the view that God must do what is best (aslah) is 36. The Buhkaran positions cited here are earlier positions that are still "on disputed among them . According to Ibn Mattawayh, al-Qadi `Abd al-jabbar, e .g., was the books" and are occasionally cited by later authors writing in a diachronic vein . explicit in asserting that it is not incumbent on God to do what is best. See Abu Muh See, e.g., al-Magdisi, al-Musamarah, 2 :35-50. These positions are not, however, ammad b. Mattawayh, Kitab al-majma' fi al-muhit bi al-taklif, ed . J . Peters (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1999), 134-55 . See also the Maturidite al-Bazdawi, Usul al-din, 130, for a generally accepted as the going position of Maturidism. For my purposes, at any rate, to the extent that these Bukharan divergences agree with the Ash'arites, the more balanced depiction, and al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 1417/1997),1 :57, for a more analysis applied to Ash'arism should simply be extended to the Bukharans on these general statement to this effect . points . 48. See al-Lamishi, al-Tamhid, 97, but see the rest of his discussion, 97-102 . Also on Matur-idite kasb, see, e 37. I am ignoring for the moment a detail I pointed out earlier in my .g., al-Bazdawi, Usul al-din, 109; al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, discussion of 'Abd al-Jabbar, where I noted that in contradistinction to other 2:146, 2 :155, 2 :167, 2:175:76; al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 79 ; Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazan-i, Mu'tazilites, he admitted the theoretical possibility of God committing evil . I am Shark al-aga'id al-nasafiyah ed . T.'A. Sad (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyah Ii ignoring this detail here because it does not appear to reflect the general Mu'tazilite al-Turath, 1421/2000), 84-85; al-Magdisl, Musamarah, 2 :12; Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm thrust. Indeed, even 'Abd al-Jabbar effectively overrides this theoretical possibility al fara'id, 24v-25r. See also, al-Lamishi, al-Tamhid, 95 . with his insistence that God's justice, wisdom, freedom of need, and transcendence 49. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:167. of pointlessness all prevent evil from issuing from God. On this detail, see 50. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:113. He prefaces this definition with a note that unlike chapter 2, pp. 59-60. the first mode of agency, the second "cannot be explicitly defined in such a manner that could actually identify it, other than to say that it is the effective cause [`illahj 38. I have already noted the early dissent of al-Ash'ari on this point, though al-Ash`ari' might be read to mean that what humans typically take to be evil is created of the act ." See also al-Lamishi, al-Tamhid, 93-94, where he names a number of by God, not that God creates ontological evil . See chapter 3, note 37. Mu'tazilites who rejected the second mode of agency, arguing that the only agency . See, 39. This does not preclude sharp criticism of Ash'arite theological positions that humans have is the salamat al-asbab wa al-alat, which is for them sufficient for all e.g., Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-adillah 1 :414. Meanwhile, Madelung, "Spread," human action. In response, al-Lamishi adduces a verse from the Qur'an where God 109-68, lays out the sordid history of Maturidite-Ash`arite political clashes . But even says rebukingly of the unbelievers "They were not able to hear" ("ma kanu yastiti `una he notes that a Mauridite critic such as Kamal al-Din al-Bayadi would on the one hand al-sam °') as proof that there is something beyond the mere functioning of the faculty dismiss as a delusion (wahm) the claim that the differences between Maturidites and of hearing that determines whether and what one hears . For while the unbelievers Ash'arites were merely terminological" but acknowledge on the other hand that such were not struck deaf, they were rebuked for "not hearing ." Al-Lamishi also notes that differences "occur only in questions of detail in which disagreement does not justify with no change in physical constitution, a man may be able to do or not do what he charges of heresy." See "Spread," 167 . was not able or able to do on another occasion . This proves, according to al-Lamishi, that something beyond physical constitution and the "normal" functioning of the 40. On this point, see Zysow, "Mu'tazilism and Maturidism," 235-39- . See also al-Bazdaw-i, Usul al-din, 112 ; al-Nasafi, Tab faculties determines which acts are actually executed . For a similar argument, see 41. See chapter 2, note 38 . sirat, 2:361, 2 :266; Mahmud b . Zayd al-Lamishi, Kitab al-tmhid li gawd'id al-tawhid ed al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2 :14.7. `A. al-Turki (Beirut : Dar al-Gharb al-Islam, 1995), 98 . 51. Recognizing this apparent similarity, Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafi has a whole :337, for a 42. See, e.g., al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam 162 . See also al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2 section devoted to pointing up the difference between the Maturidite and Mu'tazilite similar statement . positions . He notes that what is proscribed is attributing the exact same genus 43. It was also anathema to the Ash'arites and Traditionalists, both power or right to two (or more) entities and then recognizing each as exercising its of whose theological and juridical approaches are deeply informed by this power or receiving its right in a manner that mutually excludes the other . Thus, obsession. e.g., Zoroastrians attribute the same general power of creation to the god of good as

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they do to the god of evil. Then each of these gods uses its power to create acts/events 55 . This leaves open, of course, several questions, such as how detailed the that the other cannot/does not create . Similarly, polytheists confer on both God and petition has to be. Is it enough, for example, to petition God for the effective agency to their idols the exact same right to be worshipped . Then they proceed to offer to God be a good parent or to perform an acceptable prayer, or does one have to petition for and their idols mutually exclusive acts of worship . It is this attribution of the same each individual constituent of these complex acts? genus of power or right, according to al-Nasafi, that is the shirk, or associationism, 56 . Al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 63-66 . See also al-Nasafi, Tabsirat: 2:159, unanimously proscribed by Muslims . This is different from allowing two (or more) where he notes that the idea that humans have full, preexisting efficiency "leads to entities with categorically different powers to contribute to the production of a single their being able to dispense with God at the time they perform their actions . And act. For example, Zayd the carpenter and 'Amr the mason may contribute to the believing that humans may dispense with God for one instant during their life-time building of a house, but each in a way that differs from the other, since each has is unbelief." "powers" (that is, skills) the other does not have . Al-Nasafi's point is that while God's 57 . See, e.g ., al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2 :I6o-61 . See, however, al-Lamishi, al-Tamhid, power is original, humans' power is derived. In this capacity, they are categorically 96, where he notes that while this was the view of Abu Hanifa, other scholars differed distinct and can mutually participate in producing things in the world without this on this point. constituting the proscribed shirk . In the same way that it can be said that the house 58. See Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 24r-v; al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:163, where I own is also owned by God (the owner of the universe) without this connoting equal al-Nasafi responds to the Ash'arite objection that if the power granted on a petition ownership, it can be said that God participates in the act I perform, without this for guidance could also promote misguidance, there would be no point in making connoting equal power or participation . Similarly, one can simultaneously greet the petition . Al-Nasafi seems to imply, however, that just as one has the obligation to another's kindness with a "thank you" and recognize God's (categorically different) petition for guidance in the first place, one has an equal obligation to use that guidance role in this kind act by saying, "praise be to God ." On this understanding, al-Nasafi properly once received, suggesting that the effects of guidance are not automatic and states explicitly that "living creatures are partners with God in producing entities that the process itself remains subject to user error and abuse . See 2 :x61-72, esp. in the world" ("al-ahya' shuraka' Allah to `ala ft takhliq al-`alam") and "every living 166-67 . Al-Nasafi appears here to be stressing, again, the centrality of sustained creature in every act it performs is a partner with God" ("kullu hayyin ft kulli filin dialectical contingency in the human-God relationship . yafaluh shankun lillah") (al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:265, but see the entire argument 59. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:161 . We might note here that earlier al-Nasafi had beginning on 2 :264) . In a more succinct vindication of this position, al-Lamishi indicated that al-Maturidi himself had indirectly rejected that the effective power explains that human acts can fall under two distinct powers (dukhal maqdar tahta granted humans could be used for both a thing and its opposite . See al-Nasafi, qudrati qadirayn), i .e ., the self-subsisting power of God and the acquired, executive Tabsirat, 2:117 . On the one hand, power (qudrat al-mubasharah) of humans . See al-Tamhid, ioo-oi . 6o . Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 24V- the Maturidites appear to anticipate Jones's notion of God as "cocreator" or Harvey 61 . See, e .g ., al-Maturidi, Kitab al-tawhid, 217. Cox's notion of God as "codeterminer." (See my discussion of these notions on p . 68 62 . Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-tawhid, 97. in chapter 2 above .) On the other hand, they reject what they see as the Mu'tazilites' 63. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:252 . attribution of an equal genus of power to God and humans, such that humans 64 . Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 12v. Meanwhile, the Bukharan al,Bazdawi have the independent power to create, for example human acts, on a level equal defines hikmah as "flawless execution" (man hakamat sun`atuh) . Usul al-din, 134. to God's ability to create . This is the basic difference between the Maturidite and Al-Bazdawi, however-and apparently the Bukharan school-appears to be more in Mu'tazilite "grants ." And this is why both al-Nasafi (Tabsirat, 2:266) and al-Lamishi agreement with the Ash'arites . Indeed, Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafi gives the Ash'arite (al-Tamhid, 98) say that the Mu'tazilites are worse than the Zoroastrians, because definition of hikmah precisely as "the occurrence of an act in accordance with the aim the the Zoroastrians affirm the existence of only two "equal" creators, whereas of its doer" ("wuqu' (al-fil) ala gasd fa`ilih") . Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 1:505 . Al-Bazdawi also Mu'tazilites allow for an infinite number . agrees with the Ash'arites in not holding God's power to any constraints, manifested 52 . On this point, see al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2 :146-48 ; al-Lamishi, al-Tamhid, 95- in his (somewhat vague) allowance of taklif ma la yutaq (imposing impossible duty) 53- It would certainly seem possible to listen to the Qur'an or avoid eating and in the rejection of the human ability to know good and evil by reason independent pork as purely nonmoral though intentional activities grounded in habit, culture, of revelation . See al-Bazdawi, Usal al-din, 128. . According social acceptability, personal taste, or perhaps even moral sensibilities 65 . See, on this point, al-Maqdisi, al-Musamarah, 2:44-45, where he states that to the Maturidites, however, sustaining moral action, qua moral action, requires the Bukharans differed from the Samargandis in holding that though reason could divine assistance, and it is the absence of this moral contingency that they find so discern good and evil in acts themselves, this did not bind God to reward or punish on objectionable in Mu'tazilite thought . the basis thereof. In this regard, that is, that human reason could not obligate God, the . I have reversed the order of "seeking and 54. Al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 65 Bukharans were in agreement with the Ash'arites . See, however, the entire discussion accepting guidance ." The Arabic reads, "accepting and seeking ." at 2 :35-50 .

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66 . Al-Maturidl, Kitab al-tawhid, 97, ioo, io8 ; al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:249 ; evil. But 'iwad is essentially a compensatory doctrine that kicks in after the fact . The al-Lamishi, al-Tamhid, 102; al-Magdisi, al-Musamarah, 2:66 ; Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm Maturidites on the other hand do not hold hikmah to be a compensatory doctrine but al fara'id, 12V. an essential attribute of God, that is, a sifat dhat, not a sifat fi`l (performative attribute), 67 . Al-Maturidl, Kitab al-tawhid, 97, ioo, io8, 216, 217 . In a similar depiction, that invariably informs all of God's acts . Shaykh Zadeh responds to the rhetorical argument that there is no wisdom in 82 . Al-Magdisi, al-Musamarah, 2 :38 . condemning nonbelievers to eternal damnation by simply stating : "The inability of 83. Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 14v . human reason to apprehend this does not prove its nonexistence . The most that can be 84 . Al-Maqdisi, al-Musamarah, 2:66 . said is that, due to the limitations of our minds, we cannot identify it [i.e ., wisdom] in 85. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2 :253 . all of His actions ." Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 12v . 86. Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 14v-I5r. 68. See my discussion at p . 114, below. 87. See the discussion in the section on Ash'arism in chapter 3 . 69. See my discussion at note 37, chapter-3, however, where al-Ash`ari explicitly 88. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 1:495. affirms that evil comes from God . Again, the dominant thrust in al-Ash`ari's 89 . Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 1:491. statement, however, based on his conflict with the Mu'tazilites, seems to be that 9o . Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:281. See also 1:491493 , 495, and 2:344-45, for whatever humans deem to be evil in the world must be attributed to God, because further clarification on the distinction between will and desire . nothing can come into existence outside God's creative act . This is not the same 91. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2 :161-62, but see entire discussion, 2 :1161-72 . as saying that God creates substantively evil acts/events . At any rate, for later 92 . Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:118 . Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi goes to great lengths to Ash'arites, human experience constitutes no basis at all for making objective (that ground this in the doctrine that accidents (a`rad/sg . `arad) have no duration of their is, ontological) moral judgments, about either human or divine acts . Also, note that, own and require, thus, perpetual replenishment from God, that is, in occasionalist while Mu'tazilites such as al-Qadl `Abd al-Jabbar acknowledge God's power to commit fashion. See 2:11 9-55 . evil, they insist that God's justice (`adl) and wisdom (hikmah) prevent evil from actually 93. This appears to be what is at stake in the dissenting opinions of issuing from God . al-Juwaynl and al-Bagillanl among the Ash'arites . According to al-Shahrastani, 70 . Al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 165 ; al-Maqdisi, al-Musamarah, 2:58, 2 :60 ; Shaykh al-Milal, 1:109-12, al-Juwaynl-and to a lesser extent al-Bagillanl-insisted, Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 14v- apparently against the majority, that the created power God granted humans was 711 . Shaykh Zadeh, Nazm al fara'id, 13v-14r . effective in bringing about the willed act . Thus, once the power had been granted, 72. This is the definition of al-Qadl `Abd al-Jabbar, which in some of their humans were no longer contingent on God to carry out the willed act, which implied refutations even the Ash'arites and Maturldites tacitly acknowledge . See, for example, that they were less compelled, since they were now acting on the basis of a created my discussion below at pp . 111-15 . power of a category distinct from and inferior to God's direct and uncreated power. 73 . See, e.g ., al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:351-52 . On this depiction, it would seem that al-Shahrastani understood the majority of 74 . F . Kholeif, Introduction to al-Maturidi's Kitab al-tawhid, xxiv-xxv . See Ash'arites to hold that the power granted by of kasb was actually God's untreated, K. Ward, Pascal's Fire : Scientific Faith and Religious Understanding (Oxford : Oneworld, compelling power . This is the view that Ibn Taymlya attributes to Ash'arism as a 2006), 20 . Speaking of the problem of evil and "bad experiences" in the world, whole . See chapter 5 below, p . 139 . Ward writes that "that is the biggest objection to the whole process being created by 94. Since, for the Mu'tazilites, God is not involved at all, as humans freely create a God, and it is a very big objection . Perhaps that is why some scientists will accept their own actions . the existence of a super-intelligence but remain skeptical about whether it is good or 95 . See my discussion at chapter 2, p . 68 . benevolent, whether it is the religious God." 96. See my discussion above at pp . 105-6 . One should remember, Abu al-Mu'In 75. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:254. al-Nasafl's polemical depictions notwithstanding, that the Mu'tazilites do recognize 76 . Al-Lamishi, al-Tamhid, 102. scripture as an absolute, deontological authority . 77 . Al-Maturidl, Kitab al-tawhid, io8 ; also io8-io . 97 . Jones, IGWR, 48- 53- 78. Al-Magdisl, al-Musamarah, 2:66-67 . 98 . IGWR, 58. 79 . Al-Matur1dl, Kitab al-tawhid, 97 . Note, incidentally, that `Abd al-Jabbar et al . 99. IGWR, xxv-xxvi . specifically reject the notion of 'adl as "putting things in their proper place ." See ioo. IGWR, 85 . al-Qadl `Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh, 348. ioi . IGWR, 92 . 8o . Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat, 2:252, but see the discussion from 2 :249 . 102 . IGWR, 94 . 81 . It might be argued that the Mu'tazilite doctrine of iwad essentially represents 103 . This applies, however, not only to Jones but to black theology in the same view, that is, that by compensating humans in the long run, God avoids general . Cornel West, e.g ., observed years ago that black theology "roughly equates

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liberation with American middle-class status, leaving the unequal distribution 112 . Glimpses of this flash through Qur`anic depictions of the encounter of of wealth relatively untouched and the capitalist system of production, along Pharaoh with Moses and the Children of Israel . with its imperialist ventures, intact . Liberation would consist of including black 113 . As a racial minority, for example, in a race-conscious society, the posture people within the mainstream of liberal capitalist America . If this is the social of protest and revolution is easy to assimilate . I sometimes wonder, however, how vision of black theologians, they should drop the meretricious and flamboyant I might respond from a posture of unearned privilege, where I become the object, term `liberation` and adopt the more accurate and sober word `inclusion ."' "Black rather than the subject, of social protest from voices whose history of subjugation at Theology of Liberation as Critique of Capitalist Civilization," in Black Theology: A the hands of my group confers on their cause an automatic semblance of legitimacy . Documentrary History, ed. J . H . Cone and G . S . Wilmore, 2 vols . (New York : Orbis What kind of social morality might I embrace? I am reminded here of the work, Khasi Books, 1 993) 4 1 5 . dar migat, by Jalal Al Ahmad, the Iranian Marxist who turned born-again Muslim after 104 . IGWR, 214. Emphasis in original . a visit to Mecca, wherein he observed that it is in the laboratory of different places, 105. "Are American Negro Churches Christian?" Theology Today 20 (April peoples, times, and experiences that one comes to know what one is truly made of . See 1963-January 1964) ; reprinted in Black Theology : A Documentary History, ed . J. Cone the English translation, Lost in the Crowd, transl . J . Green (Washington, DC . : Three and G . Wilmore, 2 vols . (New York: Orbis, 1993), 92-100 . Continents Press, 1985) . io6 . Washington's Politics of God was the focus of Jones's critique of him in 114 . "The Historicity of Understanding," in The Hermeneutics Reader, ed. IGWR . K. Mueller-Vollmer (New York: Continuum, 1985), 269 . 107 . On this point, see, e .g ., G . Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephant : Know Your 115 . Gadamer, "Historicity," 269 . Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction, Vt. : Chelsea Green, 2004), 19 . 116 . Perhaps this is related to the meaning behind the Qur'anic verse "Verily We Speaking of the 2003 California recall election, which it seems ultimately turned on created you from male and female and made you into peoples and tribes, that you may embattled white identity, Lakoff writes : "In focus groups, they asked union members, mutually attain knowledge" (49 :13) . `Which is better for you, this Davis position or that Schwarzeneggar position?' Most would say, `The Davis one .' Davis, Davis, Davis .' Then they would ask, `Who you [sic] CHAPTER FIVE voting for?' ' Schwarzeneggar .' People do not necessarily vote in their self-interest. They vote their identity ." i. On the Inquisition, see chapter 3, note 18 . io8 . One is reminded here of what John Hick calls "soul-making," as well as his 2 . There were instances, of course, of Hanbalis "dabbling" in Rationalist quotation from the poet John Keats : "Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains thought . Examples include Abu Ya`la (d . 458/1066), Ibn `Agil (d . 513/1119), and Ibn and trouble is to school an Intelligence and make it a Soul?" Cited in J . Hick, Evil and al-Jawzi (d . 597/1200), among others . See J . N . Bell, Love Theory in Later Hanbalite the God of Love, rev. ed . (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 259 n . I . Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), 51-54 ; M . Swartz, A 109 . Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism : Ibn al Jawzi's "Kitab akhbar al-sifat" (Leiden : (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1983), xv-xvi . Nandy adds, "Ultimately, modern Brill, 2002), 48-59, where Ibn al-Jawzi is presented as attempting to reform the oppression, as opposed to the traditional oppression, is not an encounter between the Hanbali school along Rationalist lines . Meanwhile, scholars such as al-Khatib self and the enemy, the rulers and the ruled, or the gods and the demons . It is a battle al-Baghdadi (d . 463/1071) and Sayf al-Din al-Amid! (d. 631/1233) even converted from between dehumanized self and the objectified enemy, the technologized bureaucrat Hanbalism/Traditionalism to Shafi`ism/Ash`arism . and his reified victim, pseudo-rulers and their fearsome other selves projected on to 3 . See my discussion of the Rationalist regime of sense and their proof of the their `subjects .' This is the difference between the Crusades and Auschwitz, between existence of God in chapter 2 above . Hindu-Muslim riots and modern warfare ." 4. See my discussion of 'aql and naql in the Introduction, pp . 9-I1 . iio. From his 1790 "Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode 5 . Ibn Hanbal was himself a scientist of hadith, his Musnad collection exerting Island" in American Jewish Tercentenary, Community Manual, 1654-1954 (New York, significant influence over the centuries . Indeed, the great jurist and Qur'anic 1 954) . exegete al-Tabari (d. 310/923) drew the ire of the Hanbalis by stating that Ibn Hanbal iii . One is reminded by all of this of Edward Said's notion of the "exile- was merely a collector of hadith and not an accomplished jurist, that is, one who intellectual" : "Even if one is not an actual immigrant or expatriate, it is still possible could properly distill the legal implications of hadith . On al-Tabari's statement, see to think as one, to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers, and always to move H . Laoust, "Ahmad b . Hanbal," in Encyclopedia of Islam, 1 :273 . away from the centralizing authorities towards the margins, where you see things 6. On ahadt hadith, see note ig and note 21 in chapter 2 above . that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and 7. One should be careful, however, not to overindulge the notion that the comfortable ." "Intellectual Exile : Expatriots and Marginals," in The Edward Said Rationalists were universally less committed to, and thus less knowledgeable of, Reader, ed. M. Bayoumi and A. Rubin (London : Granta Books, 2000), 380 . Prophetic Sunna . Indeed, in later centuries, some of the most brilliant names in the

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science of hadith, e.g ., al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi (d . 676/1277), 20 . To this day, it is not religious studies but Middle Eastern/Near Eastern and Ibn Hajar al-`Asgalanl (d. 852/1448), were Rationalists, most notably Ash'arites . studies, that is, area studies, that functions as the primary sponsor of Islamic studies . 8 . On these principles, see G . Makdisi, Ibn Aqil: Religion and Culture in Classical 21 . See, e.g ., my Boundaries, 52- 53 . Islam (Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 102-3 . 22. See my discussion of al-Shafi`i and the language of the Arabians in chapter i 9. See Ibn Taymiya, "al-`Agidah al-hamawiyah al-kubra," in Majma'at al-rasa'il above . In a similar vein, interpretive theorists unanimously divided the semantic al-kubra, 2 vols . (Cairo : Muhammad `Ali Subayh, n.d.), 1 :439 . For a fuller discussion of possibilities of the language of the Qur'an and Sunna into "univocal" (qat i al-dalalah) this, see my "Ibn Taymlyyah on Trial in Damascus," Journal of Semitic Studies 39 no . 1 and "speculative" or "ambiguous" (zanni al-dalalah). Traditionalists were no less (1994) : 53 -56 . committed to this distinction than anyone else . Elsewhere, I have made the argument 1o. See Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudamah, Tahrim al-nazarfi kutub ahl al-kalam that Muslims never recognized a literalist canon . What they did recognize-and what (Ibn Qudamah's Censure of Speculative Theology), ed. and trans . G . Makdisi (London : is often mistaken for a literalist canon-is an empiricist canon . See my "Literalism, Luzac,1962), 32 (Arabic text) . Empiricism, and Induction : Apprehending and Concretizing Islamic Law's Magasid ii . For further explication in this regard, see my "Ibn Taymiyah on Trial," 54 -56 . al-Shari`ah in the Modern World," Michigan State Law Review i (2006) : 1-18 . 12 . In fact, Ibn Taymiya indicates explicitly that "the inner essence of the Creator 23 . This is clear, e.g., in the writings of early Traditionalists such as 'Uthman b . cannot be known by humans" ("wa kunh al-bari ghayr ma`lum li al-bashar") . See his Sa'Id al-Darimi (d . 280/893) . See, e.g ., his al-Radd 'ala al jahmiyah, ed. G . Vitestam "al-Hamawiyah," 1:474. (Leiden : Brill, 1960) . 13 . Indeed, Ibn Taymiya points out the impossibility of knowing the modality 24. Laoust, "Ahmad B . Hanbal," 1:2 74 . or "how" of certain attributes of God, given that we cannot know the modality or 25 . I am aware that the verse in question uses the masculine form of the "how" of `God's actual essence : "'How' can only be asked about an entity that comes imperative . But so do many other verses that are universally understood to apply into existence after having not existed . As for He who neither evolves nor ends, who equally to men and women, e.g ., "Establish the prayer" ("agimu 's-salah") . My point is has always existed and has no likeness, only He can know His [actual] modality [or not that a strictly literalist interpretation would limit polygyny to lesbians but simply "how"] ." Ibn Taymiya, "al-Hamawiyah," 11:443- that it might include them. 14. Thus we return to the age-old question of whether one knows in order to 26 . In my view, neither of the two contemporary tendencies, progressivism and believe or believes in order to know . conservatism, achieves this balance . Progressives (as well as some called liberals) 15 . The term "Fundamentalism" originated with a twelve-volume series entitled tend toward impugning if not dismissing the entire past as well as the perspective The Fundamentals that was published by a group of conservative Protestant scholars of the ancients as entirely secular, that is, devoid of transcendent meaning, and thus and theologians between 1909 and 1919, and financed by two brothers, Wyman and entirely-or almost entirely-nonnormative . "Conservatives," on the other hand, tend Milton Stewart, in response to liberal reinterpretations of Christianity . There were toward enshrining the entire past and the perspective of the ancients as the repository five main fundamentals : (1) the inspiration and infallibility of Christian Scripture ; (2) of nothing but transcendent meaning and thus of totally (and totalizingly) normative the divinity of Jesus, including his virgin birth ; (3) the substitutionary atonement of understandings of revelation . Jesus' death; (4) the literal resurrection of Jesus ; and (5) the literal Second Coming of 27. Laoust, "Ahmad B . Hanbal," 1:277 . Jesus . For a good and informative introduction to fundamentalism, see E . Dobson, 28 . See, e.g., my Boundaries, 12-13, where I note that Ahmad Ibn Hanbal's E.E . Hindson and J . Falwell, The Fundamentalist Phenomenon : The Resurgence of arguments against the notion that God is everywhere enshrines an extrascriptural Conservative Christianity, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich : Baker Publishing Group, commitment that defies even the strictest literal interpretations of the Qur'an. This 1986) . is not to say that Ibn Hanbal's arguments are wrong ; it is simply to point out that 16. See G . Makdisi, "Hanbalite Islam," 223 . As mentioned earlier, Makdisi takes history-and from his perspective, ideally the history of the early community or issue with this depiction by Goldziher. Salaf-plays a role in determining meaning . 17 . B . Abrahamov, Islamic Theology : Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh : 29 . Love Theory, 50-51 . Bell accepts the attribution of the work he cites in this Edinburgh University Press, 1998), x. regard to al-Ash`ari (Risalaft istihsan al-khawd fi 'ilm al-kalam) . This, however, has 18. Khaled Abou El-Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (San been severely challenged by G . Makdisi, "Ash'ari and the Ash'arites in Islamic Francisco : Harper, 2005), 89 . Religious History II," Studia Islamica 18 (1963) :19-39 . 19. In fact, this issue has dominated treatment of Traditionalism in Western 30 . For example, J . N . Bell points out that the views of the Hanbali Traditionalists scholarship, as a result of which, on questions relating to free will, human agency, Abu Ya`la and Ibn `Agil on the relationship between divine will and divine love were a ethics, theodicy, and the like, we have very little from a Traditionalist perspective major bone of contention for Ibn Taymiya . See his Love Theory, 47. compared to what we have from a Rationalist, namely Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite, 31 . This is not a negation of the conflict I outlined earlier between Arabian perspective . and non-Arabian regimes of sense . As H . Laoust points out, many, e.g ., Ahmad

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Ibn Hanbal, perceived that behind the hatred expressed by some non-Arabs toward 41. See my discussion of the distinction between God's ontological will and God's the Arabs, "there was concealed a more secret aim, to destroy Islam by reviving the normative preference above in chapters 3 and 4 . ancient empires or reinstating other forms of culture ." Laoust, "Ahmad B . Hanbal," in 42. See note 55 in chapter 3 above . F1, 1:276. 43. Bell, Love Theory, 6,, takes Ibn Taymiya at face value and claims that the 32. This should not be understood to mean that Blackamerican Muslims endorse position of al-Juwayni had become "predominant ." There is no proof, however, of Salafi or Wahhabi political outlooks or cultural hegemony . In fact, many-probably this . In fact, it is well known that Fakhr al-Din al-Razi was by far more influential in most-are opposed to the Wahhabi/Salafi sociocultural and political outlooks and the central lands . Yet, as I have shown, al-Razi clearly recognizes a difference between would be more in sync with classical Traditionalism's emphatic opposition to false God's will and God's pleasure . See note 55, chapter 3, above . universals . Here, in fact, I think Khaled Abou El Fadl's observation about modern 44. In fact, Ibn Taymiya, Minhaj al-sunna al-nabawiya fi nagd kalam al-sht'ah Wahhabism (and by extension Salafism) is apropos : "while condemning all cultural al-gadariyah, 4 vols . (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyah, n.d.), 1.266, openly practices and insisting on strict submission to Islam, in reality Wahhabism was acknowledges that "many" Ash'arites recognized the distinction between God's will thoroughly a construct of its own culture . . . . While insisting that there was only one and God's love, pleasure, and the like, agreeing that even if God wills, e.g., human true Islam, in reality Wahhabism universalized its own culture and declared it to be disobedience, God neither loves or is pleased with it . the one true Islam." Great Theft, 53- 45. See Ibn Taymiya, "al-Ihtijaj hi al-qadar" [Excusing One's Actions on the 33. H. Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya," in EI, 3:951-55 . Basis of Divine Determinism], in Majmu`at al-rasa'il al-kubra, 2:128 ; al-Juwayni, al-Ni 34. I have discussed elements of this, for example, in the foregoing comparison zamiyah, 52. with Ibn Qudamah on the question of God's attributes . 46. See Ibn Taymiya, "al-Hamawiyah," 1 :462-63. 35. See Ibn Taymiya, "Fi al-kalam `ala al-fitra," in Majmu`at al-rasa'il al-kubra, 47. See, e.g., Abu Bakr Muhammad b . al-Tayyib al-Bagillani, Kitab at-Tamhid, 2:340-41 ; 2:346-47. Ibn Taymiya recognizes the following as preferred means of 27-28; Abu Bakr Muhammad b . al-Tayyib al-Bagillani, al-Insaffima yajibu i`tigaduh knowing: primordial (darari) knowledge, that is, via the fitra; inspiration (ilham) ; and wa la yajaz al jahl bih, ed. M. Z. al-Kawthari and S . A. A. al-Husayni (Cairo : Maktabat self-purification (tasftya), which clears the way to primordial knowledge . Nashr al-Thagafah al-Islamiyah, 1369/1950), 34-36. 36. Ibn Taymiya, "Fitra," 2 :345. See also Ibn Taymiya, "Maratib al-iradah," 48. W. C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love : The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi (Albany : in Majma'at al-rasa'il al-kubra, 2:81, where he notes that primordial knowledge of State University of New York Press, 1983), 53- God is much deeper and resilient, whereas theoretically based knowledge is likely 49. In Love Theory, 56, Bell understands al-Bagillani to be in agreement with the to evaporate in times of stress and tribulation . In fact, in his Majmu'at al-tafasir, ed. view that Ibn Taymiya attributes to the Ash'arites as a whole, that is, that there is no `A. Sharaf al-Din (Bombay: Dar al-Qimah, 1384/1 954) , 275-85, he gives an interesting difference between God's ontological and deontological decree, that everything God treatment of self-ignorance and false consciousness, both of which can lead to the wills' God also loves . At times, al-Bagillani's obsession with refuting the Mu'tazilite fallacy of attempting to prove what is already known . In other words, I can know God subscription to secondary causation does seem to push him to overstatement in this but not know that I know God because my inferior social status affords me not enough regard and to give the impression that he holds God to be pleased with everything confidence in what I know without the validation of the dominant group . Similarly, God creates. But when al-Bagillani appears to identify God's love with God's will, I can be a coward, stingy, or shame-driven and not recognize these as the basis of what he says is that God's love is God's will to reward (iradatahu li-al-in`am), that much of my behavior . This lack of self-confidence and or self-knowledge can lead me God's pleasure is God's will to benefit, that God's wrath is God's will to punish. to try to explain my actions and inclinations in ways that are totally unrelated to their See, e.g., al-Bagillani, at-Tamhid, 27-28. See also al-Bagillani, al-Insaf 34-36, for an reality . Similarly, my lack of accepting my knowledge of God as valid in and of itself almost identical presentation. Al-Bagillani's point, however, is to deny the attribution can lead me to try to prove God's existence in ways that are unrelated to God's reality of affective traits (and thus accidents) to God, not to identify God's will with God's or the actual substance of my belief . pleasure or love . After all, were God's will and love identical, there would be nothing 37. See my discussion of the Rationalist proof of the existence of God in chapter 2- to will to punish people for, as everything they did would be consistent with God's love al-Fig-1 : Maktabat al-Sunna 38. See, e.g., his Kitab al-nubuwat, ed. M. H. (Cairo and pleasure, as it would be with God's will. Indeed, at al-Tamhid, 325-27, al-Bagillani al-Muhammadiyah, n .d.), 147. explicitly posits a distinction between God's ontological and deontological decree : "We 39. See, however, below, pp. 137-42 on the qualifications to his notion of say that He decrees [gada] and apportions [gaddara] disobedience according to all of omnipotence, particularly in comparison to the Ash'arite contention that there are these meanings, except the meaning of making it incumbent and commanding it and no subtantive qualities that distinguish God's actions as good and the idea that the imposing it as a duty that humans must fulfill ." See also al-Bagillani, al-Tamhid, 284, human possess no effective agency. for a similar but less direct statement . 40. See, e .g., "Maratib al-iradah," Majmu` al-rasa'il, 76-77; Minhaj al-sunna, 5o. In "al-Ihtijaj bi al-qadar," which was aimed directly at the problem of 1:266; "ai-Iradah wa al-amr," Majmu` al-rasa'il, 1:367-68. antinomianism, Ibn Taymiya singles out al-Ash`ari and al-Juwayni by name as those 210 NOTES TO PAGES 13 9 -140 NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 0-1 4 2 211

Ash'arites who held divine will and divine love to be synonymous . See "al-Ihtijaj bi satisfy). According to him, the qualifying capacity renders humans theoretically al-qadar," 2 :128 and 2 :1 33 . capable of doing whatever they are commanded, even if it cannot guarantee that 51 . See al-Shahrastani, al-Milal, 109-12, where al-Bagillani and al-Juwayni are they will actually do it. See, e.g., Ibn Taymiya, Minhaj, 2:15-16 . presented as exceptions to the generally accepted position laid down by al-Ash'ari. This 6o. On this point, see the discussion at Ibn Taymiya, "Maratib," 2 : 7 6-77. would seem to confirm my contention that Ibn Taymiya's approach to Ash'arism was 61. See his lengthy discussion at Ibn Taymiya, Minhaj, 1 :273 - 74, but also with tactical. On the one hand, he takes al-Ash`ari and al-Juwayni as the basis for attributing his statements at Ibn Taymiya, Majmu ` al fatawa, 8:372 . to Ash'arism as a whole the doctrine of divine will being equal to divine love, pleasure, 62. See Ibn Taymiya, "al-Iradah," 1 :369 . etc. Here, however, he does not take the position of al-Juwayni (and to a lesser extent 63. See, e.g., Ibn Taymiya, Majmu` al fatawa, 8:372 . al-Bagillani) on the efficiency of the created power granted via kasb to be representative 64. See my discussion of Maturidite occaisonalism in chapter 4, where Abu of Ash'arism as a whole . On al-Juwayni's affirmation of the efficiency of the created al-Mu'In al-Nasafi denies the ability of medicine to heal or of clothing to warm or cool power, see al-Nizamtya, 45 -5 1 . the body. One wonders, however, if humans are (at least partially) exempted from 52. Al-Shahrastani, himself an Ash'arite, speaking on behalf of al-Ash`ari, this denial of inherent capacity, as al-Nasafi also states that humans are possessed of summarizes the matter as follows : "God has simply established as His habit that choice and (a modicum of) agency, "al-`abd mukhayyar mustati' ." See Abu al-Mu'In He will bring about the action that a person wills immediately after (the invocation al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, ed. W. al-Farfur (Damascus : Maktabat Dar al-Farfur, of) the created power or under it or with it" ("Allah ta`ala ajra sunnatahu bi an yuh 1 3 1 7/ 1 997) , 67, 68, 16 3- aggiqa `agiba al-qudrati al-hadithah aw tahtaha aw ma`aha al fi`la al-hasila idha aradahu 65. See, e.g., Ibn Taymiya, Majmu` al fatawa, 8:389-90. On this charge against al-'abd") . Al-Milal, 1 :110 . the Mu'tazilites, see chapter 2, note 38 and chapter 4 , note 5 1 - 53. Ibn Taymiya writes at Minhaj, 1:266: "More explicit is al-Ash`ari's statement 66. It goes without saying, of course, that the Maturidite charge of shirk was that God is the executor of human actions [ft'il fi`l al-`abd] and that human deeds are much more serious than the charge of diminishing God's role in the religious not their actions but simply their acquisitions [kasb] . In reality, they are actions of enterprise . In addition, this apparent indulgence of the Mu'tazilites on this score God alone." Meanwhile, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi states that human agency is not efficient should not be taken to imply that Ibn Taymiya would countenance the notion that (al-Arba7n, 1:326-27) and that nothing other than God's agency is efficient (al-Arba 7n, humans possess the same genus of power possessed by God, as implied, e .g., 1 : 333)- by the charge of Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi and al-Lamishi against the Mu'tazilites Majmu`at al-rasa'il al-kubra, 54. See, e.g., Ibn Taymiya, "al-Iradah wa al-amr," in (see chapter 4, note 51) or that he in any way supported the Mu'tazilies in the notion 1:357 ; Majma' fatawa, 8:386. that humans created their own acts . 55. See my discussion of Ash'arite occaisonalism in chapter 3 . See also Ibn 67. See my discussion of the Maturidite insistence on human contingency in Taymiyah, Majmu`fatawa, 8:430, where he states that the majority of Muslims hold chapter 4, note 56 . (bi) the various media, such as rain or fire, against that God does things "through" 68. Ibn Taymiya, Minhaj, 1 :273 . See also Taymiya, "al-Iradah," 1 :355 . the view of those he identifies as deniers of media (nufat al-asbab) who hold that God 69. I do not wish to overstate matters here . Any number of Mu'tazilites were does things "on the occasion of' (`ind) the encounter between things and the various known to be deeply religious, in fact practicing Sufis, as were perhaps many more media. Ash'arites . I might hazard here, however, that Rationalist involvement in Sufism 56. See, for example, Minhaj, 1:266-67, where he states explicitly that entities are may reflect an unspoken recognition of some of the strictures imposed by their endowed with a natural, inherent capacity, albeit complementary such that their actual theological posture, namely, their preempting all affective elements in the God-human functioning is contingent upon God's providing their complements and removing relationship. In other words, Sufism functions as a separate, remedial epistemology impediments. Here, however, Ibn Taymiya admits that some of the followers of Ibn capable of "knowing" and or experiencing what cannot be known or experienced on Hanbal opposed this view. the basis of pure, systematic reason . Traditionalism, on the other hand, by allowing 57. See, e .g., Taymiya, "al-Iradah," 1 :369-70. both "anthropomorphic" and affective elements, allows for a more "spiritual," 58. See the aggregate of a number of statements, e.g., at Ibn Taymiya, affective, "Sufistic" engagement already within the more general framework of Minhaj, 1 :274-75 ; Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah wa al-sayyi'ah, 40, 79-80, 83, 86-87, religiosity. Majmu` al fatawa, 8:389-90 ; 8 ;"al-Iradah wa al-amr," 96; Ibn Taymiya, :437 70. See Ibn Taymiya, Majmu` al fatawa, 8 : 374. Majmu`at al-rasa'il al-kubra, 1 :366 and also 1 :369, where Ibn Taymiya describes 71. See my discussion of Mu'tazilite lutfin chapter 2 . the qualifying capacity as an incomplete or deficient cause ('illah nagisah) of 72. He makes no explicit commitment to the doctrine, at least not by name, as human acts. far as I can tell . , 59 . It is on this basis, incidentally, that Ibn Taymiya, in line with the Mu'tazilites 73. See my discussion of the Ash'arites on free will in chapter 3 above . The rejects the doctrine of takltf ma la yutaq (imposing on humans a duty they cannot Maturidites, incidentally, appear to evince an almost equal level of ambiguity . On the

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one hand, they depict humans as having some degree of inherent choice and agency 85. See, e.g ., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 96 . (see, e.g ., al-Nasafi, Bahr al-kalam, 67, 68) ; on the other hand, God is said to be the 86 . Ibn Taymiya, Minhaj, 1 :272 . creator of everything, including the accidents that constitute human choices . See, e.g ., 87. Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 78 . Abu al-Mu`in al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-adillah, 2:497 . 88 . Ibn Taymiya provides an interesting insight into an often overlooked aspect 74 . At times, Ibn Taymiya appears to use iradah as a catchall term for both the of Qur'anic locution : that God often speaks of performing this or that action, e.g ., basic and the specific will . At other times, he appears to distinguish between the sealing the hearts of unbelievers, in a manner that gives the impression that this can general iradah and the specific ikhtiyar. This presents certain challenges in reading only be a direct action on God's part . In point of fact, however, with the exception of his works . miracles (kharq al-'adah), God always works through created media (aabab/s . sabab) . 75 . See, e.g ., Ibn Taymiya, Majmu` al fatawa, 8:394-95 ; Taymiya, Minhaj, 1.271; In other words, though God speaks, e.g., of "bringing forth vegetation," God merely Ibn Taymiya, "al-Iradah," 1:368 . means that God sends rain that is endowed by God with the natural capacity to yield 76 . See, e.g ., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 8o, 93 . vegetation . Similarly, when speaking of any number of actions taken against the 77. See, e.g ., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 40, 41 ; 97-98 . wicked, e.g ., leading them astray or plunging their hearts into heedlessness, God 78 . Cited at Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 5 8, 53- may be merely speaking of the natural effects with which God has endowed their acts 79 . By "morally blind, undirected actions," I mean the willed pursuit of the of disobedience . This is why God frequently follows such references with "And We inborn passions via a sort of "willful obliviousness" to the moral implications wronged them not, but they wronged themselves ." See, e.g., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, thereof, the willing of this obliviousness being necessary in order to drown out or 94 -96. override moral consciousness . In other words, it is not that a person necessarily wills 89 . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 93 . substantively evil acts because they are evil; he or she simply wills them because they go. The Ash'arites, according to Ibn Taymiya, hold God's punishment to be fulfill some desired end-the moral constitution or implications of the acts themselves arbitrary, in that it is not based on God's actual (read effective) dislike or hatred of the being irrelevant to them . acts God punishes . See, e.g ., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 107-8 . Ibn Taymiya implies 8o . See, e.g ., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 61, where he notes that it is not simply that al-Ash`ari inherited this notion from Jahm b . Safwan and the Jahmites . See Ihn the self or soul but also the whisperings and misrepresentations of Satan that Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 106-7 . He sees a similar logic at work in their subscription contribute to human vice . to the notion that God can impose obligations that humans cannot fulfill and then 81. See Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 67, 68. Interestingly, according to Madelung, punish them for not fulfilling them . See 39 . this appears to correspond roughly to something we find in al-Maturidi : "Al-Maturidi 91. While he makes no case against them in this regard, this would also have insisted that God will lead astray (adalla) only those who, He knows, will choose the to be among Ibn Taymiya's greatest differences with the Maturidites, who also deny wrong way and will guide only those who, He knows, will choose the straight path . God's affective traits . Of course, this disagreement might be somewhat mitigated by The initial choice is man's not God's." Madelung, "al-Maturidi," in El, 6 :847. Emphasis the Maturidite commitment to divine hikmah, which would seem to militate against mine. God's arbitrary, capricious use of power . 82 . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 65 : "Wa al-'adamu la fa`ila lahu wa laysa huwa 92 . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 99-10o . shay'an wa innama al-shay'u al-mawjudu wa Allahu ta`ala khaliqu kulli shay'n fa Id 93. Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 100. For Ibn Taymiya, "from your self" is a yajuzu an yudafa al-`adamu al-mahdu ila Allah ." Similarly, at 67, 68, he notes that a reference to the "natural" effects of acts of disobedience that come in the trail of the person's not knowing or not willing to do the right thing are privations that cannot initial act of neglect. be attributed to God. And at 96, he notes that even where God guides some to the 94 . See Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 49 , 44 • exclusion of others, the latter's lack of guidance (as a privation) cannot be attributed 95. See, e.g ., Ibn Taymiya, Majma'at al-tafasir, 52 ; see also 50, 287 ; "iradah," to God. Majma'at al-rasa'il,1 :332 . 83 . See Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 25 . One is reminded in this regard of the late 96. See Ihn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 67-68, 79-81, 83- ." See his Fazlur Rahman's definition of kufr (unbelief) as a "total loss of moral energy 97 . See Ibn Taymiya, Minhaj, 1 :272. Major Themes of the Qur'an (Minneapolis : Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), 27. Emphasis 98 . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 67-68. mine. Note also that Ihn Taymiya appears to recognize a difference between not doing 99. Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 51-52 . See also 68-69, 70 . Note in this context (tark) what one is commanded to do and not doing what one is commanded not to do . the difference between the actual evil of an event and the broader consequences of The former is a privation ; the latter is an actual act . See, e.g., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, that evil . 53 . But see 55, where he appears to contradict this . ioo. On the Maturidite position, see chapter q .. 84 . In fact, he notes that the complementary "something" is the focal point of ioi. Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 44 . Ibn Hanbal, however, is reported to have God's al-gada' wa al-qadar. See Ibn Taymiya, Majmu` al fatawa, 8: 373 . said that if God were incapable of creating evil there would be no point in seeking

214 NOTES TO PAGES 147-155 NOTES TO PAGES 152-162 215

God's aid in preventing or lifting it . See Abu Ya`la, Tabagat al-hanabilah, 2 vols . 117 . One thinks here, e.g., of the role played by the white major league baseball (Beirut : Dar al-Ma`arif, n .d.), 2:304- executive W . Branch Rickey in breaking the color barrier in April, 1947, by signing 102 . Again, this would also apply, albeit in a different sense, to the Maturidites . Jackie Robinson, the first Blackamerican to play in the major leagues . See note 91. 118 . IGWR, 108-9 . 103 . Ibn Taymiya, Majmu` al fatawa, 8:428 . He points out that some people mistakenly understood this to imply full agreement with the Mu'tazilites on the CONCLUSION question of divine justice . In addition, note that Ibn Taymiya emphatically opposes the notion that rationally deduced morality could trump the dictates of scripture . i . J . D . Roberts, Black Religion, Black Theology : The Collected Essays ofJ . Deotis 104. "No+" represents ostensible rejection with the possibility of acceptance Roberts, ed. D . E . Goatley (New York : Trinity, 2003) , 37. with certain adjustments . For example, Ibn Taymiya denies that God can impose 2. See the view of A . B . Pinn, Why Lord? 97-99 . obligations that are beyond the qualifying capacity (qudrah musahhihah) but accepts 3. For example, in conducting analogy, Ash'arite theoreticians consistently that God might impose obligations and then not grant the complementary capacity identify the ratio essendi (`illah) with human welfare . Thus, e.g., they base the (qudrah muqarinah) with which to fulfill them . See, e .g., Ibn Taymiya, "al-Iradah," prohibition on wine-drinking not on its color or price but on the fact that it corrupts 1:368 . Similarly, the complementary capacity might be seen as a form of kasb. the human mind and leads to problematic behavior . Similarly, later Ash'arite jurists Likewise, while Ibn Taymiya rejects that idea that God can create absolute evil, he recognize the principle of maslahah, or public utility, according to which the law does acknowledge God's ability to create relative evil . "Yes-" represents a provisional is assumed to promote interests on which scripture is silent, simply because these acceptance but with such serious qualifications as to alter the meaning of the are seen as integral to human welfare . In fact, the Ash'arite al-'Izz b . 'Abd al-Salam concession . For example, while Ibn Taymiya recognizes God's unbound power, he (d . 660/1262) would summarize the matter as follows : "Whoever wants to know what insists, on the basis of God's benevolent "character," that God cannot arbitrarily is appropriate, what is an interest, what is a liability and what is preponderant . . . and punish people for no reason . See, e .g ., Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 39 . In fact, at Minhaj, what is not, let him present the matter before the court of reason, assuming that 1: 33, he notes that God's praise of God's self for not commiting injustice, evil and the the religious law is silent . Then, let him base his legal conclusions on this . He will like implies God's ability to do these things, since there would be no virtue in God's find that there is almost not a single ruling in the religious law that goes against not doing something that God is incapable of doing . As I have shown, Ibn Taymiya's his conclusions, except what God has imposed as a duty upon His servants without recognition of God's ability to create relative evil is significantly offset by his insistence informing them of the attending interest or liability . And in this way you can know that this must serve a broader good . Finally, the symbol "-" represents no formal good deeds from evil ones, even if God the Exalted is not obligated to secure for doctrinal commitment per se (as far as I can tell) . human beings the advantages of good, as He is not obligated to divert from them 105 . See below, pp . 150-54 on my discussion of Ibn Taymiya and his allocating a the detriments of evil ." Cited in my Islamic Law and the State : The Constitutional more central role to humans in determining their quotidian and ultimate reality . Jurisprudence of Shihab al-Dan al-Qarafi (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 28-29 . Emphasis mine . io6. Recall, e.g., Abu al-Mu'In al-Nasafi's reservations about leading humans to 4. For a fuller explication of this point, see my Boundaries, 63-64, 66-68 . believe that they could dispense with God at any time during their lives . See chapter 4, note 56. 107. Ibn Taymiya, "Maratib," 2:78 . Emphasis mine . 1o8 . The same applies, incidentally, as I have noted, to Maturidism . See my discussion on the Maturidites and the functional operation of the limbs and senses in chapter 4. 109. See Ibn Taymiya, Majmu` al fatawa, 28 :63 . iio. See my discussion of Jones and Maturidism in chapter 4. iii . Pharaoh is the most detestable human mentioned in the Qur'an, the model of rebellion against both one's own humanity and God . 112 . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 86-87. 113 . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 86 . 114 . Ibn Taymiya, al-Hasanah, 86 . 115 . For more on this point, see my Islam and the Blackamerican, 172-83- 116 . Jones, IGWR, 43 , 5 8, 74 • Index

'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Qadi, 49, 50, Appiah, Kwame A ., 18 57-64, 68, 70, 71, 8i, 82, 86, 'aql, 10, 31, 38, 128, 163n23 87, 95 Aquinas, Thomas, io, ii, 86 Abou El-Fadl, Khaled, 131, 2o8n32 Arab(s), 3 1, 32, 33, 34, 35, 3 6, 38, Abrahamov, Benyamin, 131, 174n39 134, 207n31 Abu Bakr (Caliph), 53 Arabian(s), 27, 28, 29, 3 0, 31, 33, 34, Abu Hanifa, io, 11, 99, ioo 35, 36, 37, 38, 54, 1128, 1132 Accident (`grad), 39, 40, 49, 76, Aristotle, 39 , 40, 48, 49 136,138 Aristotelianism, 3 8, 39, 40, 43 Acton, Harry B ., 41 al-Ash`ari, Abu al-Hasan, 75 , 76, 79, Adam, 50 8o, 81, 82, 85, 87, 88, 9o, 93, 99, Adams, Henry, 21 103, 1 37, 138 affective (divine) traits, 50, 76, ioi, al-Ash`ari, Abu Musa 136, 138,146 (Companion), 79 ahadi, 50, 100, 129, 179ni9 Ash'arism, 24, 43, 44, 45 , 54, 55, Ahl al-Hadath, 128,1 31 75-98, 76, 78, 9 2, 97; 99 , 101, Ahl al-Sunnah, see Ahl al-Sunnah wa 102, 103, 104, 105, io6, 107, 109, al Jama`ah 110, III, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jama`ah, 23, 24, 1119, 120, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 38, 103, io6 142, 143, 145, 147, 157, 158, 159, `A'ishah (Prophet's wife), 29 i6o, 187n26, 215n3 ; on kasb, 78, allegorical interpretation, 40, 50, 79 , 86-90, 93, 94,1109 ; on secondary 101, 129, 130, 131, 132, 178n15 causation, 8, 81; human agency, America, 3, 7, 21, 8o, 161 81, 87, 91, 93 ; free will/choice, "American Problem," 167ni9 89, 9o, 93 ; and occasionalism, 77, Anderson, Victor, 19, 21, 22 78, 88, 89 ; on omnibenvolence, al-Ansari, Abu Ayyub 76, 78, 92, 97 ; on omnipotence, (Companion), 99 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 87, 88, 9i, anthropomorphism, 29, 39, 40, 51, 94, 97 ioi, 129,130,174n39 al-Asamm, Abu Bakr, 48

2 18 INDEX INDEX 219

al-Asma`I, 31 Christianity, 12, 13, 16 ; theology, 122 ; 162, Fleischacker, Samuel, 41 Ibn Hazm, 102 atheism, 16, 66, 67,153, 185nmI5 165nI3 Founding Fathers, Io, ii Ibn al-Humam, Kamal al-Din, 102 Auschwitz, 5, 14 Christians, 5, 6, 148, 157 Free will, 158, 159 ; see also Mu`tazilism, Ibn Khaldun, 37 al-Azhar, 78 civil rights movement, I9, 22 Ash'arism, Maturidism, Traditionalism Ibn Mas`ud, 'Abd Allah (Companion), 53 Cleage, Albert, 14 Fundamentalism, 24, 1131, 132, 2o6nI5 Ibn al-Murtada, Ahmad b. Yahya, 53 al-Baghdadi, 'Abd al-Qahir, 76, 102 communal conversion, 8 Ibn Mu'tamar, Bishr, 48 Baldwin, James, 18, 21, 169n52 Companions, 39 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 125 Ibn Qudamah, Muwaffaq al-Din, 130 balkafa, 101, 129 Compatibilism, 88 Gates, Bill, 163 Ibn Safwan, Jahm, 177n1 Banu al-Muttalib, 36 Cone, James, 13, 16, 168n29 al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid, 51, 8o, 85, Ibn Slna, 100 al-Bagillani, Abu Bakr, 8o, 88, 90, 102, Cox, Harvey, 14, 65, 68 95-97,102 Ibn Taymiya, Tag-1 al-Din, 39, 87, 102, 137-38,1901155, 191f57, 193n7o, Cruse, Harold, 70 Gilroy, Paul, i8, i9 129, 130, 134, 135-56 ; causative/ 1931175,193n79, 2o9n49, 21on5i custodial generation, 42 Goldziher, Ignaz, 131 complementary capacity (see also al-Basri, al-Hasan, 47 good, 17, 55, 6o, 78, 84, 95 , 97, 110, 111, "special something"), 140, 142, 143; al-Bayadl, Kamal al-Din, 104 Dan Fodio, `Uthman (Ibn Fudl), 81 116, 143 deontological will, 137-39, 149, 150 ; al-Bayhagl, Abu Bakr, 54 al-Dardir, Ahmad, 78 Gyekye, Kwame, 41 free will/choice, 139, 141, 142, 143; al-Bazdawl, Abu al-Yusr, 38, 39, 100, 101, deontological will/decree, 86, 87, 91, 92, hikmah, 146, 147, 153 ; human agency, 105, 174n37, 2oin64 94, 115, II6, 117, 118, 159, i9on55 hadith, 3 1, 37, 50, 100, 129, 132, 179n19, 139,14I ; jabr, 139, 143; kasb, 139, 142, bell hooks, 19 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 7 179n2I 149 ; lutf 142; occasionalism, 139 ; Bell, Joseph N ., 134, 2o9n49 divine justice ('adl), 4, 78, 82, 143, 145; Hanafi school, 8o, 99, 102, 103, 104, 128 omnibenevolence, 137, 138, 142, 143, Bennet, Lerone, 121 see also omnibenevolence Hanbah school, 42, 8o, 128, 132,187n'9 146,147; omnipotence, 137, 138, 139, Bentham, Jeremy, 1147 divine omnibenevolence, 4, 6, 13, 14, 15, hagigah, 129, 131 142; ontological will, 137-39, 149, 150; bid'ah, 41, 128, 133, 136 16, 17,18, 25, 69, 94, 119, 158,159, 163 Hartshorne, Charles, 39-40, 86, 175n22, qualifying capacity, 140, 141, 143, 144, Bible, 13, 21, 131 divine omnipotence, 4, 6, 13, 14, 15, 17, 1751144, 186n9 145, 150, 152 ; on "special something," bi la kayf see balkafa 18, 25, 54, 68, 69, 94, 118, 119,149, Hellenism, 33 , 79, 131, 132 140, 141, 142, 144,145 ; theory of Blackamerican Religion, 6, 16 157, 158,159,16o, 161 Hick, John, 5 complementarity, 139-40,141, 142 Blackamerican Sunnis, 6, 161 divine persuasion, 15, 16, 159, 16o hikmah, 55, 92,120, 121, 125, 159, 116o, Ibn `Ubayd, `Amr, 34 , 48 black humanism, 14, 17, 65 divine racism, 6, 12, 15, 65, 69, 70, 91, 2oin64, 2o3n81; see also Maturidism, `ilm al-kalam, 37, 49 , 79, 128, 134, 13 6 black liberation, 13, 14, 17,118, 120, 121, 151 92, 93, 94, 97, 117, II8, 119, 125, 149, Ibn Taymiya immigrant Muslims, 3,122, 165n3 blackness, 6, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 161 1156, 158 Hitler, Adolph, 67 imrar, 129 Black Power, 13 Diwald-Walzer, S ., 52 Hourani, George, 83, 1951198 interpretive authority, 9 Black Religion, 3, 12, 65, 161 DuBois, W .E.B., 18 human choice, see free will al-Isfara'ini, Abu Ishaq, 82, 83 black theodicy, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 18,119, 23, Dyer, Richard, 20 Humanism, 14 Islam, 11, 12, 31, 33, 36, 49, 132, 162 70, 78, 91 humanocentric theism, 14, 15, 16, 64, 65, "Islamic," 3 ,112 black theologians, 6, 14, T5,117, 18, 69, eisegesis, 10, 28 66, 67, 69, 91, 97, 98, II8, 149, 150, Islamists, 5 70,119 Enlightenment, 24 1151, 153, I6o 'ismah, 62 black theology, 4, 13, 19, 21, 65 evil, 4,15, 16, 17, 52, 53, 54, 55 , 56, 57, humanocentrism, 52, 6o, 77, 110 isnad, 50 Blyden, Edward, 8 58, 6o 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 77, al-husn wa al-qubh al-`agliyan, 56, 148 'iwad, 63-64, 71, 85, 110, 113, 2021181 Bonhoeffer, Deitrich, 14, 68 78, 82, 83, 84, 85 , 89, 91, 97, 98, al-Hutay'ah, 31 Buber, Martin, 14, 65 II0, III, 112, 113, 114, II6, 120, 122, jabr, 53, 87, 90, 107, 109, 117, 1 39, 143, Buffet, Warren, 163 124, 125, 144, 147, 158, 159, 166nI2 ; Ibn `Abbad, al-Sahib, 57 159, 18on29 Bukhara, 100, metaphysical, 61, 65 Ibn AbI `Uthbah, 87n55, 88 jabriyah, io8, 141 al-Bukharl, Muhammad b. IsmE'Il, 33 exegesis, Io, 28 Ibn `Affan, `Uthman (Caliph), 53 al-Jahiz, `Uthman b . Bahr, 48, 59 Bulliett, Richard, 32 exotericism, 37 Ibn al-'A15% Abu 'Amr, 34.37 Jefferson, Thomas, 124 Burkle, Howard, 14, 65 experiential knowledge, 162 Ibn al-`Allaf, Abu al-Hudhayl, 48 Jesus Christ, 16 Ibn `Emir, Abd Allah, 37 Jews, 5, 67, 148 Camus, Albert, 15, 66 false detente, 38, 45, 8o Ibn `Ata', Wasil, 48 Jones, Major, 14, 16, 68 Catholicism, 7, 167nmg false universal, 3, 6, 20, 96, 98 Ibn Hajar (al-`Asgalani), 102 Jones, William R ., 4, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, central vision, 27-28, 31, 32 figurative interpretation, see allegorical Ibn al-Ha)jaj, Muslim, 37 17, 18, 24, 25, 52, 6o ; and Mu'tazilism, Ceric, Mustafa, 100, 102, 103, 196n8 interpretation Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad, 42, 79, 123, 132, 124, 64-73; 82, 9o, and Ash'arism, 135, 2o7n28 Chittick, William, 7, 138 fitra, 35, 13 6 91-98; and Maturidism, 117-25 ; and INDEX

22 0 INDEX 221

Traditionalism, 148-56, 157, 159, monotheism, 24, 50, 67, oppression, 15, 66, 69, 71, 72, 120, 122, religious authority, 7, 9 124, 125, 149, 150, 151, 153 16o, 161 Moorish Science Temple, 8, 167ni8 revelation, 31, 32, 131; see also wahy moral objectivism, 17, 95, 96 Optimism, 5 rhetoric of transcendence, 38, 39 Jordan, Michael, 107, 16o organized religion, 7 al-Jubba'I, Abu `All, 75, 76, 79 Morrison, Toni, 28 Roberts, J . Deotis, 14, 16, 43, 157, 176n52 al-Juwayni, Abu al-Ma`all, 8o, 84, 87n55, Moses, 50 orthodoxy, 8, 9, 44 Rubenstein, Richard, 14, 66, 67, 70, 82 Orwell, George, 17on67 90, 102, 137, 138, 139, 194n8I, 21on5I Muhammad (Prophet), 6, 27, 28, 30, 38, 41, 42, 53, 54, 128, 129, 131 Ottomans, 102 Said, Edward, 20411111 kalam, see `ilm al-kalam Muhammad, Elijah, 1711172 Salaf, see Pious Ancestors Kant, Immanuel, 56 Murji'ites, 47 peripheral vision, 27-28, 31, 32, Salafism, 43, 8i, 131, 134 kasb, 139, 158, 160, 2o3n93 ; see also Muslim (Sunni) theology, 6, 12, 17, 23, Pharaoh, 152 Salah al-Din (Saladin), 94 Ash'arism, Maturidism 24, 47, 139, 157, 158 Pinn, Anthony B ., 15, 16, 17, 18,157, 161, sam', see naql Kh.arijites, 47, 48 Muslim world, 3, 161 1691147 Samarqand, 33, 99, 101 Kholeif, Fathalia, III mutawatir, Ioo, 129, 179m9 Pious Ancestors, 38, 128 Sartre, Jean Paul, 115, 66 Khurasan, 100, 102 Mu'tazilism, 23-24, 43, 45, 47-73, 76, pointlessness (`abath), 55-56, 6i, Io9, Satan, 87, T44,1152 77, 78, 79, 8o, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, III, 113, Schwartz, Merlin, 87 al-Lamishi, Abu Thana' Mahmud 89, 9o, 91, 92, 94, 97, 98, 101, 102, postmodern blackness, 19, 23, 124 al-Shafii, Muhammad b. Idris, 32, 33, 34, b. Zayd, 101-02, io5, io6, 112, 199n5o, I03,104,105-o6,1107, 108, 1109, 1110, post-ontological suffering, 72, 73, 121, 124 35, 36, 37, 49, 132 2oon5I 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, Process Theology, 39 Shafii school, 8o, 128 Laoust, Henri, 132, 133, 135 12.8, 136, 137, 139, 14.1, 152, 14.3, 146, Protestantism, 7, 131 shahid/gha'ib, 52, 59, 65, 85,114 linguistic formalism, 31, 37, 133 148, 153, 157, 158,159, 16o, 177n7, proto-Islam, 7 al-Shahrastani, Abu al-Fath, 55,102, literalism, 131, 132, 133 1791123, 199n47 ; Basrian school, 50, public reason, 7, 10, 34, 162, 165n2 21on52 lutf 62-63, 70, 85, 110, 142 56, 75, 79, 84 Baghdadi school, 50, shari`ah, 30, 31, 37 56, 84, 95, 147 on commanding good Qadarites, 54 Sharif, Muhammad M ., 87 Maclntyre, Alisdair, 8 and forbidding wrong, 51, 64, 68; Five Qadariyah, see Qadarites al-Shatibi, 30, 31, 37, 17in7, 172n1o Madelung, Wilfred, IOi, 1104 Principles, 50-5r; human agency, 53, qudrah, divine, 77, 78 ; human, 88, 89, Shaykh Zadeh, 'Abd al-Rahim b . 'Ali, Makdisi, George, 187m9, 187n23, 187n26 55, 57, 67, 70, 87 ; on free will/choice, 199n50, I99n51; see also Ash'arites, 102, 104, 109, I10, 113, 114, 2021167 Maliki school, 8o, 128 52-54, 57, 67; on omnibenevolence, 51, Maturidites, Tradtionalists on human ShI`ism, 9, 23, 53, 57, 135 al-Ma'mun (Caliph), 42 52, 56, 57, 61, 62, 65, 68, 70, 71, 76; on agency Shils, Edward, 41 manqul, see nagl omnipotence, 52, 56, 57, 61, 67, 68; on quietism, 14, 15, 64, 68, 70, 71, 72, 911, sifat dhat, 43, 176n54 al-Makdisi, Kamal al-Din, 100, 102, 112, status between two statuses, 51 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 117, 118, 119, 1123, sifat fi`l, 43,11761154 113, 114, 1961112, 2o1n65 125, 149, 150, 158 soft ontology, 1114 ma'qul, see 'aql al-Nadim Abu al-Faraj Ishaq, io2 Qur'an, 6, 10, 11, 21, 27, 30, 31, 34, 42, 43, Sokoto Caliphate, 81 Masruq (Successor), 29 Nandy, Ashis, 72,123, 2o4nio9 49, 100, 123, 128, 133, 134, 136, 141, 144 sola scriptura, 7, 135 al-Maturidl, Abu Mansur, 33, 99, 100, nagl, 9, Io, ioo, 128 Quraysh, 36 Spain, 8o 102, 103, 109, III, 112, 147 al-Nasafi, Abu al-Muin, 43, 44, 101, 103, Qutadah, 48 strong ontology, 114,115 Maturidism, 24, 43, 45, 54, 55, 99-125, 105, Io6, 107, ,o8, 109, 110, III, 112, al-Subki, Taj al-Din, 103 137,140, 159, 16o; and 114, 116, 117, 118, 1991151, 2011156, race, 6, 18, 19, 20, 211 sub-Saharan Africa, 8i hikmah, Io9-10, 111, 112-13, 114, 2011158 racial agnosticism, 3, 161 suffering, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16,117, 22, 23, 115, 116, 122-23,146, 147; on al-Nasafi, `Umar, 102,105 Rationalism, 31, 32, 38, 39-40, 41, 42, 43, 63, 66, 69, 70, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, secondary causation, 1105, io6, 117 ; Nation of Islam, 6, 8 45, 50, 76, 8o, 127, 129, 130, 1131, 132, 118, 1119, 120, 121, 125, 155; ethnic, 5 and occasionalism, 105, 107, 109; on al-Nazzam, Ibrahim b . Sayyar, 48, 59 133, 134, 136,173n35 Sufism, 211n69; antinomian, 136, 137, omnipotence, 105, Io6, Io9, 116, 117 ; Niebuhr, Reinhold, 711 ra'y, 128, 133 138, 153, 154 pantheistic, 135 on omnibenevolence, 112, 113, 118 ; Noble Drew Ali, 8, 167ni8 al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din, 8o, 87n55, 90, 103 al-Sulami, Mu'ammar b . 'Abbad, 48 on free will/choice, 106, Io8, 117 ; on Non-Arab(s), 34, 36, 37, 38, 48, 134 reason, 31, 32, 38, 39, 40, 44, 48, 49, 57, Sunna, 6, Io, 11, 49,128, 133, 134, human agency, I07-o8,109,117 ; on normative (divine) preference, 79, 94, 100, 110, 114,115, 130, T31,132, 136,141 kasb, io6, 107, io8, 109, 117, 118 ; on see deontological will/decree 136 Sunnism, 9, 12, 23-24, 36, 47 . 8o, 134 `illah, 107, io8, 118 redemptive suffering, 16, 17, 120 Sunni Tradition, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, io, II Mihna (Inquisition), 42, 45, 79, 8o, 127, ontological blackness, 19, 20, 22, 125 reform, II, 12 ontological will/decree, 86, 87, 91, 92, regime of sense, 10, 131, 33, 79, 99, 135 al-Tabari, Ibn Jarir, 42, 1721122 128, 187n18 Reinhart, A. Kevin, 48 Mill, John Stewart, 147 94, 115, II8, 159,19on55 al-Taftazani, Sa'd al-Din, 105 222 INDEX tawfiq, 62 Wahhabism, 81, 131,1 34 ta'wil, see allegorical interpretation wahy, 29 theism, 5,16,18, 65, 66, 67, 73 , 1 57 Ward, Keith, 77, 202n74 theistic subjectivism, 83, 96, 195n98 Washington, George, 124 theodicy, 4, 5, 14, 17, 104 Washington, Joseph R ., Jr., 12, 120, 122 theology, 6,13, 28, 31,161-62, Watt, W. Montgomery, 54 tradition, 3 , 7, 8, 41-42, 44, 86 Watts, Alan, 27, 28 Traditionalism, 24, 31, 32, 38, 40-41, 42, weak ontology, 83, 91, 94, 97, 98,115, 119 43, 44 , 45, 54, 55 , 79 , 8o, 81, 99, 101, Weiss, Bernard, 36 -37 102,103,104,127-56,158,159,16o, West, Cornel, 203n111 173n35, 175n45 White, Stephen, 83 Trinity, ii Whitehead, Alfred North, 39 whiteness, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 125 'Umar I (Caliph), 30 whites, 5, 18, 29, 21, 22, 125 ummi, 30 white supremacy, 20 Umm Zaynab, 135 will, 116 ; divine, 86 ; human, 6o, 88, 89, unanimous consensus (ijma1, 9, 10, 33 , 107 ; see also free will, human choice 49,82 usul al figh, 38 Zoroastrianism, 33, 48, 54, 55 , 177n9