Politics and Relief in Minneapolis During the 1930S

Home , 1930s, August 1932, August 1935

POLITICS and

p??»—j

in Minneapolis During the 1930s

RAYMOND L. KOCH

THE GREAT DEPRESSION that over economic collapse and the ensuing unem shadowed the 1930s brought New Deal re ployment. The fact that people had to be forms which in turn had widespread impact kept from starving influenced many of the on local government. In particular there was actions of various organizations and indi a rapid expansion of public relief depart viduals, especially politicians and social ments, vdth attendant unrest, in larger cit workers, throughout a harrowing decade. ies. A study of the turbulent situation in At the outset of the 1929 crash, Minne Minneapolis offers insight into the serious apolis did not experience the immediate rise diflficulties encountered in the almost over in unemployment that the Eastern cities did night development of public welfare serv and consequently weathered the winter of ices. The one overriding factor behind the 1929-30 remarkably well. The traditional troubles was the intense pressure for im philosophy of relief-giving — that private mediate action due to the severity of the charitable agencies should care for the tem porarily unemployed — prevailed then in Mr. Koch is assistant professor of history at Minneapolis as elsewhere. Eastern Illinois University. This article is from Ry the fall of 1930, however, the number his University of Minnesota doctoral disserta of unemployed requesting aid from the tion on "The Development of Public Relief Pro Family Welfare Association, the largest cash grams in Minnesota, 1929-1941." assistance private agency in Minneapohs,

Winter 1968 153 rose at an alarming pace. The Union City way riot," as it was called the next day after Mission, after the onset of an early October pofice broke up the assembled group.^ cold wave, bedded more than a thousand As the depression intensified with every homeless and jobless men nightly. A similar passing week during its second year, pri development occurred at the Salvation Ar vate agency social workers and administra my's Industrial Home where scores of men tors realized they could no longer assume were forced to sleep under newspapers be responsibility for cases ignored by the pub cause of a scarcity of blankets. As a result, lic relief department. The government — by the end of 1930 private agencies were the common social instrument of all the swamped with the first victims of the de people — was the only effective means of pression despite the fact that such agencies alleviating the situation. So, as pressure had long borne only a small proportion of mounted on local politicians, tension de the total cost for cash assistance. The pub veloped in Minneapolis beween the city lic relief department still shouldered the council, the board of public welfare, and greatest cost for needy cases, including resi the division of public relief. Although the dent unemployed and aid to dependent chil relief division dated back to the 1890s, the dren (or mothers' allowances as the program welfare board dictated city relief policies. was then called). Estimates of the total The board included the mayor, three coun- number of unemployed in Minneapolis ran cilmen, and three lay members. The mayor as high as 35,000 in January, 1931.^ appointed the latter six for four-year over After the fall elections of 1930, which saw lapping terms, subject to city council ap- the Farmer-Labor party gain prominence at the state level of politics with the elec ' Minneapolis Journal, October 19, sec. 2, p. 2, tion of Floyd R. Olson as governor, pressure 15, October 20, p. 15, 1930; Alvin H. Hansen, Nelle for action on relief needs rapidly increased M. Petrowski, and Richard A. Graves, An Analysis from organizations of unemployed persons of Three Unemployment Surveys in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, 5-7 (University of Minnesota, which had sprouted immediately after the Employment Stabilization Research Institute, Bul great crash.^ The day after Olson's first in letins, vol. 1, No. 6 —August, 1932). augural speech, a group of Twin Cities ^ Several such groups were active in Minneapo lis. The major ones were the United Relief Workers Communists arranged a march to the Capi Association, the Unemployed Council, the Work tol and staged a demonstration for unem ers Alliance (which subsequently absorbed the ployment relief. They were led by Karl first two), and the Federal Workers Section of Min neapolis Teamsters Local 574 (in the later 1930s, Reeve, district organizer of the Communist 544), which after 1935 expanded to include not party in Minneapolis and leader of a local only the unemployed but also direct relief clients chapter of the Trade Union Unity League, and WPA workers. An excellent brief statement on organizations of unemployed in general is Helen a Communist-front organization. The group Seymour, When Clients Organize (American Pub distributed a circular that blasted the lic Welfare Association, Chicago, 1937). American Federation of Labor and the ^ A copy of the circular is in the unemployment file, Olson Papers, 1931, Governors' Archives, in the Farmer-Labor party and even accused Ol Minnesota State Archives. For a description of the son himself of being a "henchman of the Trade Union Unity League, see Irving Howe and Steel Trust." Several weeks later the Trade Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party: A Critical History, 255 (New York, 1962). For back Union Unity League scheduled William Z. ground on the Minnesota political scene during the Foster, a leading national Communist fig 1930s, see Arthur Naftalin, "A History of the ure, to speak on March 2, 1931, in the Min Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota," unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Minnesota, 1948 neapohs Gateway district, a haven for (copy in the Minnesota Historical Society), and transients and local homeless and jobless in George H. Mayer, The Political Career of Floyd B. dividuals. Mayor William F. Kunze banned Olson (Minneapolis, 1951). Minneapolis Journal, March 3, 1931, p. 1 describes the Gateway riot. the speech, but the league tried to hold a Unless otherwise noted, all newspaper citations in meeting anyway. The result was the "Gate this article occur on front pages.

154 MINNESOTA History proval. While the board was the official policy-maker, the council voted the relief appropriations to be distributed by the board, a function that in many instances proved to be an effective control device.^ Mounting demands for relief gave Farm er-Labor candidates their best issue in the 1931 city elections. Farmer-Labor endorsed William A. Anderson replaced conserva tive William F. Kunze as mayor, and the party's representation increased on the Min neapolis city council. Following the Farmer- Labor victories, the welfare board was del uged with complaints about lengthening relief lines, delays in processing applica tions, and inadequate food orders. Richard S. Tattersfield, long-time superintendent of the division of public relief, came under Mayor Williatn A. Anderson heavy attack for showing more interest in conserving public funds than in supplying least a measure of privacy during its the needy. He resigned effective Septem interviews.^ ber 15, 1931, and was succeeded by his chief The combined efforts of public and pri critic. Alderman Melchior U. S. Kjorlaug, vate welfare agencies helped Minneapolis who, unlike Tattersfield, was trained in so to emerge from the winter of 1931-32 in cial work.^ better condition than many other cities. The shift of superintendents marked the However, local resources were nearing de beginning of a decade-long effort to achieve pletion. Social workers warned that larger greater efficiency and effectiveness in expenditures would be needed for the processing relief applications. Kjorlaug coming year. The arrival of spring failed undertook department reorganization and to decrease unemployment. Families who promoted the adoption of professional case had already skimped along at a minimum work techniques. Several trained social level of subsistence were, in increasing workers were added to the staff. Also, the numbers, forced to make their first appli intake department took steps to insure at cation for relief. While most private relief- giving agencies had nearly doubled their * For information about the administrative struc budgets over the previous year, they could ture of the relief department, see Florence W. Hut- not begin to keep up with demands. In the sinpifiar and Clara Paul Paige, Report of the face of mounting tax delinquencies and Division of Relief of the Department of Public Welfare, Minneapolis, June, 1931, issued in mimeo persistent agitation by taxpayers' associa graphed form by the United States Department of tions for reduced government spending, Labor, Children's Bureau; and Division of Public municipalities had to spend more and more Relief, Historical Review: Four Years of Depres for relief. In 1932 Minneapofis issued over sion 1931-1934, a mimeographed report prepared for the Minneapolis board of pubfic welfare. two million dollars in bonds for direct re- ^Minneapolis Journal, July 23, p. 17, Septem hef alone. The year 1932 also proved to be ber 4, 1931. the last in which private agencies shared "Under Tattersfield, applications for assistance were taken over the counter in full view and hear any important part of the cost of unem ing of others in the cramped quarters. Tattersfield ployment refief. The Family Welfare Asso would scribble "Same old bum," "Chronic indi ciation of Minneapolis in that year was gents," and other comments on case records. See Hutsinpillar and Paige, Report, 56. allocated over $600,000 from the Commu-

Winter 1968 155 groceries-for-work system because they were encouraged for many months to be lieve that the groceries were rightly theirs without any adequate return in labor." In evitably, the editorial went on to cite in stances of "sponging" in which several heads of families were found to have some means of support other than direct refief. The Journal misplaced the blame, however, since the relief policies were established by the board of public welfare, not the divi sion of relief. Ultimately, the policies of the board were controlled by the' city council, which determined the amount of money to be spent and in what manner it should be granted.^ The summer relief crisis reached a peak on July 8, 1932, when approximately seven hundred "hunger marchers" demonstrated again in front of City Hall. They demanded a five-million-dollar appropriation for city relief, an eight-dollar-a-week grant to un employed workers, and a slum clearance program. Invading the city council cham Relief Superintendent M. U. S. Kjorlaug bers, the demonstrators listened to two Farmer-Labor aldermen protest Mayor An nity Chest, most of which went to aiding derson's reappointment of one of the con jobless families. In 1933 this sum dropped servative members of the board of public below $500,000 and kept on dropping welfare — Mrs. H. S. Godfrey — to another thereafter to a low of $200,000 in 1938.^ four-year term. One of the aldermen, Al Left-wing dissidents intensified their ac bert G. Rastis, was a vitriolic politician tivities in 1932, further compounding the who contributed considerably to the refief tense relief situation. Ry srnnmer large turmoil for the next few years. Rastis de numbers of the unemployed were appear clared that the mayor's appointee did not ing at City Hall, invading council meetings understand the relief problem and that the and heckling aldermen whose proposals welfare board was obsolete. He also ac dissatisfied them, particularly those who cused private agencies of making money on suggested a work relief program. Objecting the transients, since these agencies charged vigorously to any work arrangement, they the city for the price of meals given to favored direct relief only, and that prefera homeless men seeking aid. Rastis created bly in cash. Late in June, when the relief a sensational disturbance several weeks division was faced with an imminent shut later at another council meeting when he down owing to the inability of the board of estimate and taxation to sell relief bonds ^Division of Pubfic Refief, Historical Review, at less than the prevailing interest rate, 7; Family Welfare Association, Agency Report, vol. 18 of Community Survey of Social and Health the Minneapolis Journal ran an editorial Work in Minneapolis, appendix 1, table 1 (Minne condemning relief division policies which, apolis Councfi of Social Agencies, 1938). it said, had led to its current plight. "Rene- ' Minneapolis Journal, June 27, 1932, p. 18. By 1932 many professional social workers, public and ficiaries .now boo and jeer backers of the private, favored some type of work relief program.

156 MINNESOTA History brought in a sack of stale bread and other food in various stages of decomposition, saying it had been given to a woman by the relief department. When Alderman Frank H. Rrown ventured to challenge Rastis, his remarks were "met by catcalls and im precations from the rear of the room .... 'That is exactly what we get,' 'eat it your self and see,' and other such cries were heard above the din." Such skirmishes turned out to be the preliminary events of a battle that would continue for a number of years as the Farmer-Labor party in creased its membership, both on the coun cil and on the board of public welfare.^

IN RETROSPECT, 1932 was no doubt the year of discontent. The state and national governments had refused to act. Left-wing agitators were active everywhere. Social workers had long since abandoned the be lief that local relief agencies could handle Relief Superintendent Richard Tattersfield the crisis. Consequently, relief operations in Minneapolis throughout the winter of dicated that the relief department was in 1932-33 continued on the precarious pay- adequately staffed and placed the blame on as-you-go system. When the situation grew the lack of leadership exerted by the board drastic, the relief department threatened to of public welfare. This report pointed out close down, forcing the city council to is that in September the fifteen investigators sue bonds to provide relief for one more each averaged 311 visits, and then they month. Relief rolls increased sharply in reached only 4,662 cases out of a total of November with the arrival of bitterly cold 8,611 families on the relief roll. Professional weather. Union City Mission reported that social workers insisted that 150 visits per it was serving 1,800 homeless men daily. month should be the maximum for ade The Community Fund drive fell short of its quate service. While this recommendation goal, and a resoliciting campaign had to be was heeded and the staff increased, the initiated to meet its budget. Meanwhile, proportionate rise in family cases (to over several studies of city relief operations 13,000 by March, 1933) cancelled out any were being conducted. One report pre decrease in the number of visits assigned to sented to the council recommended the di each investigator.^^ vision of the city into four rehef districts The Minneapolis mayoralty campaign in and a complete reorganization of the relief May, 1933, centered almost entirely on the department. Another study prepared by a refief issue. Incumbent Mayor Anderson committee which included University of lost the support of his own local Farmer- Minnesota sociologist F. Stuart Chapin in- Labor Association, which contended that he had failed to improve relief standards. ^ Minneapolis Journal, July 8, p. 1, 8, July 22 The Farmer-Laborites backed Thomas E. (quotations), 1932. Latimer, who had served as an attorney for ^° Minneapolis Journal, November 25, Decem one of the local organizations of unem ber 7, p. 1, 26, 1932; Division of Pubfic Rehef, ployed. Conservatives backed Alexander G. Historical Review, 6.

Winter 1968 157 staff of fifty-seven social workers be abol ished. Rainbridge argued that the police department could better handle investiga tions. Trained social workers, he declared, were not required in public welfare admin istration. Rainbridge also contended that Minneapolis had become a haven for "float ers from all over the country" and that the relief department's paternalistic policies to ward unemployed transients cost the city an unwarranted thirty cents a day for each case. The new mayor proposed that all aid to nonresident transients be stopped by Oc tober 1. A majority of both the board of pub lic welfare and the relief department reso lutely objected to Rainbridge's scheme, and the investigative procedure remained in tact. The squabble, however, opened up a split between Superintendent Kjorlaug and the mayor, who presided over the board. The feud flared publicly in September when Kjorlaug charged that the relief de Mayor A. G. ("Buzz") Bainbridge partment had become a "political foot ball" because of Rainbridge's irresponsible ("Ruzz") Rainbridge, a local theater mana charges. Kjorlaug called for a public inves ger and director of a stock company known tigation of his department to clear its name. as the Rainbridge Players. Anderson and The mayor responded by demanding Kjor- Rainbridge survived the primary, while the laug's resignation on the grounds that the Communist candidate, Morris ("Red") Kar- superintendent was "temperamentally un son, for all his popularity among the unem fitted for the position." ^^ ployed groups, polled only 978 votes. Following the primaries, Rainbridge stri The dispute was augmented when sev dently attacked the failure of the board of eral workers in the department informed public welfare to carry out a large work the mayor of procedures they considered relief program. He advocated a compulsory unsatisfactory. One social worker, Mrs. work program and a complete reorganiza Rlanche R. van Poll, even congratulated tion of the relief department. Anderson, Rainbridge on his election victory. This who tried to steer a middle course between proved too much for Kjorlaug, who sus Rainbridge's position and the radical de pended her for ninety days. Throughout mands of the Farmer-Laborites, was de the controversy, Kjorlaug could count on feated easily by 10,000 votes in June. Thus, support from a large majority of his staff, while the remainder of the country had the board of public welfare, and several swung to the pofitical left in the 1932 elec prominent civic organizations and church tions, seven months later Minneapolis elected a conservative mayor."

Rainbridge erased all doubts about his ^^ Minneapolis Journal, May 9, June 13, June 14, intentions when, a month after his election, p. 1, 6, 1933. Another factor in Rainbridge's elec he presented his reorganization plan. Un tion was that he was a "wet," while Anderson had der the guise of economy, he proposed that earlier vetoed a beer ordinance for Minneapolis. '^^Minneapolis Journal, July 18, September 9, the relief department's entire investigative 1933.

158 MINNESOTA History leaders. Eventually Rainbridge retreated became more interested in relief conditions. from his adamant demands. Ry winter, Such "awareness" served to form at least a 1933, the development of the National Re measure of public support for the relief covery Administration and the creation of department. the Civil Works Administration had di The unfortunate aspect of the debate was verted newspaper headlines away from the the continued exploitation of the relief mayor's scrimmage with the relief de question by city politicians — both liberal partment.^-^ and conservative. Ultimately, it was the re The burst of publicity over the relief sit lief client who suffered. There was little uation (it made front-page news through doubt even in the most "liberal" of minds out most of July, August, and September) that a small percentage of the clients con had both good and bad effects. On the posi stituted a "professional relief class" that tive side it made many private citizens and schemed and contrived to get a living out most public officials aware of the difficult of relief without any effort to seek work. problems faced by the relief department. These usually formed the nucleus of groups For all of Rainbridge's fulminations against which demonstrated at City Hall, where relief policies, his battle with Kjorlaug left-wing agitators could count on them served to educate the mayor on matters he for support. Ry far the largest number of knew little about. Ry 1934 the fuss sim cases, however, were heads of families who mered down, and Rainbridge took a more would have preferred work could they have moderate position on relief policy. The dis found it and who applied for relief only as pute also produced careful and more re a last resort against starvation. This group liable checks on outside income of clients, seldom made newspaper headlines. a classification of transients, and an im proved rent policy. The rent issue provided THE RAPID EXPANSION of the relief one of the major causes of the periodic load from 1931 to 1935 was reflected in the "invasions" of the relief offices by client or size of the department itself. Its 1930 staff ganizations which protested the eviction of seven had grown to more than 350 by notices renters all too often received.^^ the close of 1935. The average monthly case With the advent of the federal relief pro load was around two thousand during the grams (Minneapolis received its first ship winter of 1930-31; by December, 1934, it ment of surplus commodities in October, was over 21,000. In the meantime a detailed 1933), unemployment demonstrations de system of investigative procedures and a creased. Left-wing agitators could not stir up comprehensive set of written personnel as much sympathy for their marches when qualifications had been established. This stomachs were filled. In addition, a number process of reorganization was accomplished of civic associations and religious groups by Kjorlaug, who labored long and hard to bring order and efficiency into his adminis tration.^^ " Minneapolis Journal, September 12, 1933. For The year 1935 saw the program involved background on the NRA and the CWA, see Wfi- in another political crisis. Certain politi liam E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and cians— especially those with a large num the New Deal, 1932-1940, 64-66, 121 (New York, 1963). ber of needy constituents — had long "Division of Public Relief, Historical Review, exerted pressure on relief officials to place 22-25. their "boys" on the relief rolls. This pres ^^ Harry Fiterman, "Refief Shown City's Greatest Problem," in Minneapolis Journal, April 20, 1936; sure increased in 1934 after the outbreak of Division of Public Relief, Historical Review, 6. the sensational and violent truck strike, ^*'The strike is dealt with at length in Charles R. with many of the pickets demanding and Walker, An American City: A Rank-and-File His getting public refief.^*^ tory (New York, 1937).

Winter 1968 159 Welfare board members in 1935 included (left to right) Aldermen Edwin I. Hud son and I. G. Scott, Mayor Thomas E. Latimer, and Dr. Albert J. Herbolsheimer.

The mayoralty campaign in the spring of the Hennepin County Farmer-Labor Wom 1935, like the one in 1933, was fought pri en's Federation. Mrs. Seestrom replaced marily on the relief issue. Farmer-Laborites Mrs. H. S. Godfrey, a long-time board mem again backed Thomas E. Latimer. While ber who resigned in August because (so she calling for substantial increases in relief al said) she was threatened with violence by lowances, they also demanded the dismissal relief clients for her opposition to increases of Kjorlaug. Incumbent Mayor Rainbridge in allowances.^^ campaigned mainly for economy — an un After the election the organizations of popular issue — and he was ousted in the unemployed redoubled their efforts to in primary. Enough relief clients and jobless sure that Farmer-Labor campaign promises voters turned out at the polls early in June would be carried out. One factor that un to elect Latimer over Charles F. Keyes. The doubtedly contributed to the increased agi election also gave liberals and Farmer- tation for more relief was the sharp cutbacks Laborites a majority on the city council, in funds made by the Federal Emergency leading to a change in the composition of Relief Administration (FERA) during the the board of public welfare. Two Farmer- spring and summer of 1935. Often clients Labor councilmen, Edwin I. Hudson and eligible for work relief experienced a con I. G. Scott, replaced board members who siderable delay in receiving assistance. They had lost their council seats. The third coun were not always put on direct relief immedi cilman on the board was its vice-chairman, ately, and the Works Progress Administra Wilham J. McCaughren, chairman of the tion (WPA) did not get under way as Hennepin County Farmer-Labor Associa quickly as anticipated. The liquidation of tion, who, paradoxically, was considered a the FERA took place by successive steps conservative in matters of relief. The lay from month to month. The largest cut in members included local businessman I. S. the work program came in August. Many Joseph, the only other conservative on the former work relief clients were thrust on board, and two labor-backed members, Dr. Albert G. Herbolsheimer and Selma See- strom, a member of the executive board of ^''Minneapolis Journal, June 11, August 7, 1935.

160 MINNESOTA History the direct relief rolls, placing an unexpected board of public welfare rescinded its in burden on the city. creased rehef schedule. During this time city The Farmer-Labor controlled board of relief officials saw their funds rapidly dwin public welfare assumed power on July 1, dling away. The situation finally reached a 1935. Two weeks later it publicized its pro crisis late in August when the city comptrol gram, caffing for an increase of up to 130 ler stopped honoring all relief orders be per cent in family rehef grants and a dou cause the allocated funds were gone. This bling of annual relief expenditures by the placed Farmer-Labor officials in an exceed city council. Roard member Joseph pre ingly awkward position. They had, at the dicted that the plan would bankrupt the city insistence of their constituents, increased re in four months.^^ Early in August, however, lief allowances; yet because of that very the majority voted for increases in relief al policy their followers faced the possibility lowances averaging approximately 35 per of receiving nothing. The board had no cent. choice, so it rescinded the higher allowances Meanwhile, Mayor Latimer frantically on August 28. Ry this time several new WPA held meetings with state relief officials. projects had taken some of the clients off Along with representatives from St. Paul the direct relief rolls.^•' and Duluth, he asked the state executive council for more funds. The request was THE AUGUST EVENTS were only pre denied. Then Latimer asked the State Emer liminary skirmishes for the major battle yet gency Relief Administration (SERA) to al to come. For some time city officials had locate more money to Minneapolis. Again, been criticizing the SERA policy of allocat help was denied. Moreover, federal and ing proportionately more funds to the rural state relief officials threatened immediate counties than to the urban areas. During the withdrawal of financial support unless the summer of 1935 the SERA made a vigorous attempt to force the rural counties to furnish ^'^Minneapolis Journal, July 16, 1935. more money — an effort that resulted in the ^^Minneapolis Journal, August 13, 16, p. 1, 28, withdrawal of eighteen southern counties August 28, 1935. The state executive council was from the SERA. With funds from the FERA composed of the governor, attorney general, audi tor, treasurer, and secretary of state. rapidly decreasing, the SERA found it more

From left: William J. McGaughren, I. S. Joseph, Selma Seestrom

/^.

Winter 1968 161 and more difficult to keep pace with the in conservative in 1935, but they could block creasing demands from city relief officials a bond issue as it required eighteen votes for assistance. to pass. Consequently, the conservatives de The majority on the board of public wel clared they would not vote for the sale of fare, spurred by Hudson and Scott, now any more relief bonds until the council ma tried a new tactic. In a concerted effort to jority (a coalition of Farmer-Laborites and gam control over the distribution of all relief liberals) removed Hudson and Scott from funds, including state and federal, the board the board of public welfare. There the mat in October denied desk space in the central ter stood — deadlocked — with the conserv relief office to SERA's official representative, atives holding the trump card, since relief Edna Dumaresq. Miss Dumaresq's respon bonds would have to be issued eventually.^^ sibility was to see that city officials did not Meanwhile, Youngdahl engaged in a misappropriate federal and state funds. power play of his own. In the spring of 1935 Hudson and Scott charged that the SERA the SERA, following federal instructions to social service director, Renjamin E. Young- get more local financial participation, had dahl, was trying to run the board. made an agreement with the welfare board. Youngdahl responded by intimating that the The substance of it was that the state agency SERA would hold up its monthly allocation would pay direct relief costs for 1935 above to Minneapolis if Miss Dumaresq were the smn of $1,719,000, which the city board not immediately reinstated. The dispute agreed to appropriate. When the dispute brought out into the open the long-simmer erupted in October, Youngdahl, after a pre ing conflict between the right and left wings liminary investigation, decided that Minne of the Farmer-Labor party. Latimer pub- apolis had not lived up to its contract. When hcly favored Youngdahl's position — as the board increased its individual refief did the two conservatives on the board, grants in August, it spent more than the McGaughren and Joseph. Paradoxically, original agreement had called for. Reyond Youngdahl believed in strong central con that, the board had spent over $75,000 for trol— the very thing that the conservatives items the SERA did not consider direct re had always objected to in federal programs. lief, such as mothers' pensions, burials, and To the conservatives, however, the greater housing for homeless men. Youngdahl thus evil at the moment was the blatant attempt refused to release any more funds to the of local politicians to gain control of city welfare board. This prompted Hudson to re relief funds.-° tort: "If Youngdahl is running this board This direct confrontation of federal versus and the relief department, we ought to know local authority was further complicated by it right now." On Monday morning, Novem an announcement from Washington that all ber 18, the Minneapolis rehef department federal refief aid to the states would cease did not open its doors. Hudson and Scott on November 15. Since the WPA could not were now trapped; their ward constituents employ all of those eligible for work relief, could receive no relief funds. After a hasty the city council now had to appropriate even conference between the antagonists, the larger sums for direct relief. While the wel board agreed to reinstate Miss Dumaresq, fare board stumped hard for the sale of after which the SERA released $250,000 to additional relief bonds, the city council re the board.22 mained obstinate. Council conservatives, City funds, however, were still being held weary of the antics of the board and of Hudson and Scott in particular, now saw ^** Minneapolis Journal, October 23, 1935, p. 16. their chance for revenge. During the 1930s ^ Minneapolis Journal, November 1, 8, p. 1, 28, the city council numbered twenty-six alder 1935. ^Minneapolis Journal, November 14, 17, p. 1, men, two from each ward. Only eleven were 2 (quotation), November 18, 1935.

162 MINNESOTA History up by the council conservatives. On No nature of social work itself. Although a com vember 20 the majority liberal bloc at petent and not unsympathetic administra tempted to transfer appropriations from the tor, Kjorlaug was a dedicated practitioner council's permanent revolving fund to the of the case-work method developed by Mary rehef department, but City Attorney Rich E. Richmond, whose emphasis on "adjusting ard S. Wiggin (a Farmer-Laborite) over the individual to his environment" had pre ruled this action. He said it was contrary vailed in social work during the 1920s."^ to the city charter. The next day Kjorlaug cut After 1929 it became ludicrous to ask a re direct relief to food and fuel items only, giv lief client to adjust to an environment that ing nothing for rent, clothes, or electricity. had collapsed about him. Cfients objected The board was now confronted with the ef to the case-work approach. They wanted fects of its own folly. While claiming to neither to be "adjusted" nor to be psycho represent the interests of relief cfients, Hud analyzed; all they wanted was their relief son and Scott had succeeded in reducing order. They got support from relief investi the already inadequate grants to the barest gators, also called "visitors," who by 1935 minimum, leading to even more suffering numbered over a hundred. Most of them be for the recipients. The financial crisis eased longed to the Minneapolis Social Workers' somewhat when state Attorney General Council, local branch of the national rank- Harry H. Peterson (Farmer-Laborite) over and-file movement and essentially a trade ruled Wiggin and allowed the council to union for bettering the lot of relief workers "borrow" money from its revolving fund. who labored long hours with large case This action automatically released addi loads for low salaries.^"^ tional SERA funds which were still being Many Minneapolis rank-and-file visitors withheld pending the issuance of relief publicly opposed Kjorlaug's case-work poli bonds by the city council. Although Peter cies. In response to their objections, the wel son admitted his ruling was contrary to the fare board in August, 1935, appointed five city charter, he said that provision for the special investigators (themselves members poor was paramount and overrode all other of the staff) to examine relief department legal considerations. In December the bond activities. Apparently the Social Workers' question finally was resolved when five lib Council was experiencing its own internal eral aldermen joined the conservatives and power struggle as left-wing relief visitors ousted Scott and Hudson from the welfare tried to gain control of the leadership. Ac board. The conservatives then quickly voted cording to one report, when the "complaint the necessary relief funds.-^ committee" initiated its investigations, The turmod, however, did not cease. One "panic and fear began creeping among the of the Farmer-Labor campaign slogans dur staff. In investigating the investigators it ing the 1935 mayoralty race had been, "Kjor was meeting in semi-secret sessions with a laug must go." The basic reason for this few of the least responsible members of the demand lay beneath the surface of custom S.W.C. Rumors, veiled threats, promises of ary political oratory; it struck at the very better jobs, spying, intimidation served to disrupt morale." The complaint committee made its first report to the welfare board on '-•'Minneapolis Journal, November 20, 21, 25, November 16 at the height of the SERA con December 20, 1935. troversy. Most of the 1,500 client complaints -* See Clarke A. Chambers, Seedtime of Reform: studied, the committee said, were caused by American Social Service and Social Action, 1918- lack of prompt service, but many clients 1933, 97-99 (Minneapofis, 1963). ^For general interpretations, see Jacob Fisher, took strong exception to the case-work The Rank and File Movement in Social Work, method of investigation. This report was 1931-1936 (New York School of Social Work, New one reason why the welfare board sus- York, 1936).

Winter 1968 163 -^ p • ^ ^ '

Typical of the unrest at Minneapolis City Hall was this CWA demonstration in 1934.

pended Kjorlaug on December 4 for ninety nancial transaction. It did not humiliate the days to "discipline" him for policies it said client by prying into his personal life.^^ were creating turmoil within the relief staff. Meanwhile, increasingly irritated over the The board also recommended immediate re state of affairs, SERA Administrator L. P. organization of the relief department. Roard Zimmerman issued an ultimatum that Min conservatives Joseph and McGaughren op neapolis would receive no additional funds posed the suspension, as did practically all unless all personnel changes in the relief of the city's private social agencies. Kjorlaug department were submitted to the SERA himself refused to resign. At first the board for approval. Zimmerman also insisted that tried unsuccessfully to return Richard Tat relief costs be reduced and that the admin tersfield to his old post and then appointed istration of relief be purged of politics. Rut Norma Fodness, a former president of the Mrs. Fodness, unmoved by SERA threats, Social Workers' Council, as acting relief su said she would continue to make personnel perintendent. She, however, was not accept changes. She proposed elimination of fifty- able to the council.-*^ five investigators and twenty-one clerks and Reset by pressure from all sides. Mayor recommended salary increases of $70 a Latimer organized a citizens' committee of month for some of the remaining workers. fifty prominent civic and labor leaders to This ignited a violent demonstration by investigate afi city relief operations. Labor representatives soon split off to form their own investigating committee in conjunction ^The quotation is from "Shake-up in Minne with organizations of unemployed. Among apofis," in Social Work Today, 3:19 (March, 1936). The editors of this decidedly left-wing national or other things, the labor committee recom gan of the rank-and-file movement attributed the mended the "new system," recently installed article to "a committee of four members of the So by the welfare board in the north and north cial Workers Council." Minneapolis Journal, No vember 16, December 4, 7, 1935. east districts, which operated on the premise "•^ Minneapolis Journal, December 19, 1935; Jan that granting of relief was primarily a fi uary 7, p. 1, 6, 1936.

164 MINNESOTA History rank-and-file workers whose spokesman de clared that the situation had become in tolerable with such "snooping and sniping all the time." The board responded by halt ing staff reductions, removing Mrs. Fodness, and appointing a moderate Farmer-Labor ite, Alderman Ole A. Pearson, relief super intendent. Although Joseph held out for Kjorlaug's reinstatement, most of the board felt the internal conflict within the relief department had become so vicious that he must leave. Kjorlaug finally gave up his bat tle and resigned late in February, 1936.-"*

AFTER PEARSON'S appointment the staff hoped for a breathing spell in the ferment over refief that had been making headlines since the summer before. Rut in April, 1936, the administration of relief again appeared in news stories that revealed what many Norma Fodness, acting superintendent citizens had long suspected. Throughout the battle between relief to have sold books of meal tickets (given workers, politicians, and the welfare board, to them by the relief department) for "de the city attorney's office had been conduct horn" liquor. In addition, nearly two dozen ing its own investigation into relief opera cases of irregularities were uncovered tions. Ry April, Joseph A. Hadley, assistant among merchants who handled relief city attorney, had uncovered enough evi orders.--' dence to bring charges against several relief Pearson, determined that all cases of department employees and clients for de fraud be disclosed, backed the investiga frauding the city. Five investigators had tions. He himself ordered the relief depart posed as "clients," filling out orders to them ment onto a five-day week after it became selves and presenting the orders to mer apparent that some clients who had ob chants. Some transient clients were found tained work still remained on the rolls and were coming to the department on Saturday to obtain relief orders. Pearson subsequently -'' Minneapolis Journal, December 19, 1935; Jan reorganized the payroll investigation divi uary 14, p. 1, 2 (quotation), February 13, p. 15, sion in order to examine as many city pay February 25, March 10, 13, p. 21, 1936. The wel rolls as possible to ferret out those relief fare board obligingly gave Kjorlaug a clean bill of health on his administration record and praised him clients who had acquired jobs. The investi for his honesty. For a brief resume of the battle gations resulted in the sentencing of two leading to Kjorlaug's departure, see "Storm Over clients, two merchants, and one relief em Minneapolis," in Survey, 72:44 (February, 1936). ployee to a year in the workhouse. Further This was reprinted, with a few changes, in Minne apolis Journal, February 14, p. 6, 1936. more, a number of merchants had their ^For major accounts, see Minneapolis Journal, licenses revoked, and several investigators April 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 1936. About resigned. The episode served to increase four hundred merchants were licensed to do busi ness with relief clients on the basis that they give public criticism of the entire relief pro only those articles that were specified in the order. gram.-^" Some were found to have given items other than those specified. Pearson intensified his drive for admin ^"Minneapolis Journal, May 5, 1936. istrative efficiency throughout the summer

Winter 1968 165 of 1936. In July the welfare board ordered vorite, from the board of public welfare. a reregistration of all cfients on the rolls. He thus identified himself with the right- This became necessary for two reasons: it wing Farmer-Laborites and in doing so lost was found that clients on WPA jobs had considerable support from the unemployed represented themselves as "artisans" (thus groups. As a result of this turmoil the making them eligible for higher wages) Farmer-Laborites gave their endorsement when they were actually unskilled workers; to Kenneth C. Hay craft, state director of and the old age assistance program (OAA) old age assistance. Conservatives supported recently had been launched, providing help George E. Leach, who had been mayor of to many former direct relief clients. The Minneapolis four times during the 1920s. procedure for reregistration, which applied The squabbling within the ranks of labor a strict means test to close relatives, also and the Farmer-Labor party took its toD required that the applicant take an oath on election day; Haycraft was soundly and sign an affidavit that his resources, if beaten by Leach. Farmer-Laborites did gain any, were correctly represented. This pre some satisfaction from the aldermanic races; cipitated a great outcry from clients — so the progressive bloc managed to retain much so that Attorney General Harry H. control of the city council.^- Peterson intervened to rule that the oath was Ry the spring of 1937 the national econ not a part of the rehef law and could not omy had shown enough improvement so be enforced legally. During 1936 the Work that President Franklin D. Roosevelt or ers Alliance had emerged as the major or dered a sharp cut in WPA rolls. The slash ganization representing the unemployed. had hardly been made when an acute re Its leaders appeared at meeting after meet cession sent the economy downward dur ing of the welfare board during the fall of ing the late summer and fah. The recession, that year to insist upon a higher food allow coupled with the WPA cuts, thrust a host of ance to counter fluctuations in food prices. families and individuals back onto the direct Their persistence eventually brought a small relief rolls. These events coincided with the victory; in December the board voted a 10 return of Leach to the mayor's office. City per cent increase in the amount allotted for officials, civic groups, and even moderate groceries.-^^ Farmer-Laborites such as McGaughren of the welfare board voiced fears about the RY 1937 INTERNAL relief department con eventual effects of the high cost of relief. flicts ebbed as Pearson worked hard to bring Since Minnesota's recent laws covering old order and stability to his administration. age assistance and aid to dependent chil Outside forces, however, were again at dren required considerable financial partici work. Communist control over the left-wing pation from local political units, city relief elements in the Hennepin County Farmer- costs were rising to new heights in 1937.^^ Labor Association was evidenced when Efforts were made to lower the city's Mayor Latimer failed to gain his party's en direct refief load, which continued to av dorsement for the 1937 election. The pre erage between 12,000 and 15,000 monthly vious year Latimer had charged publicly throughout 1937 despite the advent of the that Communists were infiltrating Farmer- Labor ranks, particularly in Hennepin County. Left-wingers responded to Lati ^^Minneapolis Journal, July 28, September 14, mer's charge with the demand that he be December 1, p. 1, 6, 1936. ^" Minneapolis Journal, Mai'ch 9, p. 6 (quotation), "thrown out of the Farmer-Labor party." 13, June 28, July 31, p. 15, 1936; June 15, 1937. The quarrel intensified during the summer ^''Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 243; of 1936 when the mayor tried unsuccessfully Minneapolis Council of Social Agencies, Commu nity Survey of Social and Health Work in Minneapo to remove Selma Seestrom, a left-wing fa- lis, vol. 1, sec. 5, p. 3 ( Summary Report, 1938).

166 MINNESOTA History old age assistance program. Mayor Leach, pressured by civic groups that had sup ported him during the election, decided to inaugurate his own drive to reduce the re fief rolls. He was supported by McGaugh ren, who suggested that clients should not own automobiles, telephones, and other such luxuries. Area farmers complained bit terly that the WPA had drastically reduced the available number of harvest workers, and McGaughren felt that all able-bodied single men on relief in Minneapolis should be forced to take jobs in harvest fields or be automatically cut off the direct relief rolls. Leach opened his drive by urging all civic organizations to find jobs for employ able relief clients. He requested that at least one be hired in each of the thousand or more manufacturing establishments in Minneapo lis. While it was a commendable idea and highly praised by the Civic and Commerce Associaion, only a handful of businesses hired relief clients. Leach also requested all the case records so that he could go through Relief Superintendent Ole O. Pearson them and personally investigate any doubt ful ones. As far as economy-minded citizens Federal Workers Section of General Drivers were concerned, this was another praise Union 544, which threatened to lead a gen worthy idea. The mayor learned, however, eral march of WPA workers off their proj that case records were confidential; even he ects and onto the direct relief rolls unless did not have access to them.-^^ the supplement was restored. The board not The welfare board itself initiated econ only stood firm on its decision but went omy steps. Since November, 1936, the board even further. In September I. S. Joseph, had allowed a monthly supplement of nine board finance chairman, warned that relief dollars to WPA workers. Originally, this spending must be cut immediately or Min supplement covered only fuel, but it was neapolis would suffer a possible taxpayers' continued through the summer of 1937 as strike and almost certain financial ruin. Jo a food supplement, since WPA employees seph's report prompted the board to enact received equal pay (within each of its classi a series of policy changes, the most stringent fications) regardless of the number of de being the removal of all healthy single men pendents in each family. Early in August, under forty-five and all healthy single however, the welfare board discontinued women under thirty-five from the relief rolls giving supplementary assistance to WPA until December when they would then have workers. This action brought immediate to reapply for aid. Other new regulations protests from the Workers Alliance and the included: the adoption of a clothing-accord- ing-to-need policy, replacing the old set clothing budget allowance; insistence on contributions from all employed unmarried ''Minneapolis Journal, July 21, 28, 29, 1937. children in relief households; removal of Leach also advocated a city sales tax to finance relief automobile owners from the rolls except in costs. See Minneapolis Journal, August 6, 1937.

Winter 1968 167 who were moderately liberal. McGaughren charged that "direct relief in Minneapolis has become a racket," that the leaders of re lief organizations were attempting to build direct refief into a permanent activity, and that these groups actually tried to prevent clients from performing any work. No doubt most of the criticisms against relief clients were justified to some degree, but they ap plied only to a small percentage of the total case load. There were still thousands of in dividuals and famdies suffering great de privation not of their own choosing. The simple fact remained that those desperately in need of economic assistance could not get jobs of any kind.^^ The new regulations served only to in crease agitation by organizations of unem ployed. Five days after the restrictions became effective, representatives of the Workers Alliance and the Federal Workers Section of Local 544 held a stormy session Mayor George E. Leach with the welfare board in which they vigor ously protested the new policies. The meet emergency cases; and refusal of relief to ing ended with a promise by Leach that no any client who was able to obtain credit.^^ needy person would be denied relief. Leach These policy changes were brought about also agreed to ask state WPA Director Vic by a number of factors. The turmoil within tor A. Christgau to increase WPA employ the relief department itself, the lenient atti ment, although he knew very well that tude toward clients by many relief investi Christgau could do nothing because all state gators, the complex of programs which led monthly quotas were determined solely in to considerable case duplication, client re Washington. Relief Administrator Zimmer luctance to take jobs (often in fear that man, however, partially sided with the refief wages would be garnisheed to pay debts) — clients and threatened to withhold state all these produced a ground swell of public funds unless the board of public welfare resentment against certain aspects of the dropped its harsh policy against single men mass relief programs. Many still harbored and women.-^'^ traditional beliefs about relief, feeling that it In the face of the deepening recession should be made as difficult as possible to get and the WPA's refusal to increase its and that any allowance should cover only monthly quotas, organizations of unem the barest of need. Hard-pressed taxpayers ployed increased their agitation. They were resented the use of relief funds to support backed by the tacit approval of Governor such "luxuries" as radios, automobiles, tele Elmer A. Renson and his aides. In October, phones, or even a good suit of clothes. In 1937, WPA workers on Minneapohs projects addition, the influence of left-wingers among the organizations of unemployed (which exacted as much as twenty-five cents •^" Minneapolis Journal, August 6, p. 9, August 16, September 2, p. 1, 21, September 3, 1937. per month from rehef client members) be '" Minneapolis Star, October 5, 1937. came increasingly distasteful to even those ^^ Minneapolis Journal, September 8, 14, 1937.

168 MINNESOTA History threatened to strike unless the welfare board thus backing Leach's demand. Farmer- revoked its new regulations. Late in Octo Labor Alderman Harold Kauth proposed ber the board did rescind the order barring that rehef funds be raised by a public lot single men under forty-five and single tery. This brought an avalanche of criticism women under thirty-five from direct relief from churches, civic leaders, and conserva and the order prohibiting clients from own tive politicians. In the end, the city council ing automobiles. The problem of supple reverted to form. It continued selling refief mentary aid to WPA workers with large bonds.^'^ families still remained, however. WPA em Under the leadership of Pearson, who re ployees continued to protest by threatening mained superintendent throughout the strikes and insisting upon additional sup 1940s, the relief department gradually port. In December the welfare board voted worked its way toward a stabilized and ef to supplement WPA wages for needy fami fective administration. It was aided immeas lies up to 25 per cent if necessary. Thus, if urably by the development of a permanent a WPA worker with a large number of de federal program. Also of assistance was a pendents received a "security wage" of $55 department survey requested early in 1938 (the maximum wage for an unskilled worker by the welfare board and conducted by at the time), he could receive an additional the American Public Welfare Association sum of nearly $14 from the city relief (APWA). Among other things, the APWA department.^^ study concluded that the relief granted was adequate but that the staff lacked knowl THROUGH THE WINTER of 1937-38 the edge of modern case-work techniques. recession continued, causing the highest "Many cases showed an inability to evalu direct relief load in Minneapolis history. ate the situation from any viewpoint other There was a peak of 17,654 relief cases in March. Ry this time President Roosevelt Relief clients picketed City Hall had requested and received increased appro in December, 1937. priations for the WPA. Throughout 1938, as WPA quotas for each state rose, the di rect relief load declined. How to finance direct relief remained a vexing problem. Aid from the state relief administration was limited to the appropriations passed by the 1937 legislature. The president of the Min neapolis board of estimate and taxation pro posed that the Minnesota income tax be increased so that the state could allocate ad ditional sums to the urban areas. The Hen nepin County grand jury, conducting its own study of relief costs, suggested a halt to the issuing of bonds and proposed that relief be financed instead by a city sales tax.

^^Minneapolis Journal, October 28, p. 1, 28, De cember 7, 1937. The December meeting, attended by representatives of WPA workers, labor unions, and unemployed groups, was so stormy that a dozen policemen were cafied into the room to keep order. '=• Minneapolis Journal, April 7, p. 1, 23, June 29, 1938.

Winter 1968 than relief eligibility," the report said. It welfare and in the city council. Organiza contended that visitors ought to aid clients tions comprised of discontented relief cfients in "problem-solving." The study also criti and led by left-wing agitators exerted con cized a lack of co-operation with other agen siderable pressure on the local Farmer-La cies as well as the excessive paper work bor party, and extreme left-wing members necessitated by the setup of four district in of the Hennepin County Farmer-Labor take offices. The welfare board welcomed Women's Federation also became active in most of the association's suggestions and relief politics. A third factor contributing to gave Pearson authority to pursue reorgan the turmoil in rehef administration was the ization as he deemed necessary. One result "pay-as-you-go" system of financing. Relief was a trend toward employing professional bonds were issued irregularly by the city social workers and developing higher mini council on the basis of how much was mum qualifications for visitors.''*^ needed for the next few months. Other un settling ingredients were the uncertainty THE HISTORY of the Minneapohs rehef about the extent and duration of federal re department through the 1930s reveals the lief programs and the continual debate consequences of political intrigue in the de within the relief division between rank-and- velopment of a public relief program. The file workers on one side and the more con constant turmoil over the giving of assistance servative supervisors on the other. was enhanced by several factors present in No one could have divined beforehand the city's relief environment. Obviously, the extensive changes that developed during one factor was the general economic con the 1930s. Most significant was the fed dition. Another was the inffuence of the eral government's acceptance of responsi Farmer-Labor party on the board of public bility for meeting the economic needs of distressed Americans. One historian has cor This Omaha World-Herald cartoon, cap rectly noted that "the New Deal solved a tioned "Will he be able to cope with the few problems, ameliorated a few more, ob Big Bad Wolf?" summed up relief agency scured many, and created new ones. This troubles. Survey republished it in March, is about all our political system can gener 1936. ate, even in crisis." ^^ Despite this pessimis tic observation, relief programs did bring a measure of sustenance and order into the lives of thousands of Minneapolis residents. Ry keeping people alive, the New Deal and the Minneapolis relief department unques tionably achieved their most important and immediate goal.

'"American Public Welfare Association, Public Welfare Survey of Minneapolis, Minnesota (June, 1938), a mimeographed report on the Minneapofis division of pubfic relief. The quotation is on p. 23. *" Paul Conkin, The New Deal, 106 (New York, 1967). THE PHOTOGRAPHS on pages 156, 157, 160, 161 (right), 164, 165, 167, and 169 are reproduced througli courtesy of the Minneapolis Star and Trib une; those on 161 (left and center) are from Divi sion of Public Refief, Historical Review; all others are from the society's picture coUection. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch cartoon on page 153 is from Survey, 72:2 (January, 1936).

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