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Home , Dam, Nile Basin, Water politics

12 2013 SUPERSTOCK/SUPERSTOCK/SIPA SUPERSTOCK/SUPERSTOCK/SIPA

Water in the basin by Any Freitas

Sharing such a vital and potentially scarce resource ­countries over the last decade has resulted in a sub- as is seldom easy. In the case of the Nile, water stantial ­increase in their water needs. According to management has always been a delicate exercise. With the UN, the overall population in the basin is set to a combined population of nearly 430 million spread double by 2050, with some of its largest cities tripling over eleven countries (, the ­Democratic in size over the same period. ­Republic of Congo (DRC), , , , , , , , and Demands for water have also increased in the food ), the Nile is one of ’s most complex and energy production sectors. Although only 2% cross-border basins. of the Nile’s are currently used for , this is set to change. This is not only due to progress To date, however, there is no commonly agreed vi- in irrigation techniques but also to the farming of sion on how its waters should be shared. Several water-intensive crops in the region (often by foreign ­arrangements have been put in place but only a few ­companies). Escalating energy demands in fast-grow- have become meaningful tools for cooperation. Still, ing economies also heavily dependent on ­ with no major event disrupting the status quo, water (like Ethiopia and Uganda) represent an additional politics in the Nile has long remained relatively low- source of on the Nile. key. Growing on the river, however, may be about to change that situation. Such pressures on the demand side have been ex- acerbated by current water stress levels. Water scar- Demand on the rise city is one of East Africa’s main challenges and will remain a defining feature for the foreseeable future. After decades of imbalanced colonial-era Projections are disputed, but most experts agree that and piecemeal bilateral agreements, the Nile ­Basin ­environmental and climatic changes may significantly ­Initiative (NBI) was created in 1999 to establish a alter the basin’s water flows in the coming decades. multilateral, basin-wide framework for coopera- tion. Supported by the international community, and Upstream and downstream originally signed by nine countries (Burundi, DRC, Egypt, ­Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania Pushed by their growing needs, NBI parties ­reopened and Uganda), the NBI aimed to introduce a more talks to review the current water-sharing ­principles. ‘sustainable and equitable’ approach to the use of the After lengthy negotiations, the ­Cooperative river’s waters. ­Framework Agreement (CFA) was drafted in 2010 to replace the NBI, and has, so far, been signed by six - However, the rapid demographic growth and mostly ­upstream - states (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, ­urbanisation process experienced by many NBI ­Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda). Opposition from

European Union Institute for Security Studies May 2013 1 ­Sudan and Egypt, however, has prevented the CFA Indeed, water management in the Nile basin is not from ­becoming operational: the two downstream just about water. It is about managing growth and countries claim i.a. that the text overlooks their reconciling different economic plans and political own needs. ambitions. In other words, it is about politics in its rawest definition of ‘who gets what, when, and how’. In parallel to the CFA discussions, Ethiopia’s decision to continue with the construction of the ­so-called In recent years, the politics of water-sharing and its Grand Renaissance has recently heightened related diplomatic frameworks have become less pre- disputes over . The dam is set to be- dictable. The resignation of in 2011 come one of Africa’s largest hydroelectric plants, but and the death of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles some studies indicate it could have a major impact ­Zenawi in 2012 removed two old regional hands, on the whole basin and significantly affect the water raising many questions about the future. Domestic supplies of neighbouring countries. As an effort to instability has come to characterise also the DRC, settle the disputes, a ‘Tripartite ­Technical ­Committee’ ­Eritrea, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, and Somalia. Inter- was created to assess the dam’s impact in ­Ethiopia, state tensions remain dormant, but could ­suddenly Egypt and Sudan. The inclusion of high-level NBI (re)awaken: despite the formal end of the conflict in representatives in the Committee is worth noting, 2000, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain but its limited technical mandate may hamper its shaky; South Sudan has recently declared its intention capacity to provide political solutions. to use the Nile to develop its hydropower ­potential, which may revive disputes with Sudan; and cross- Indeed, technical and political aspects have become border tensions over the Great Renaissance Dam are increasingly intertwined, with tangible and achiev- far from abating. able technical goals often providing the basis for ­successful political commitments. However, these in the Nile may thus be reaching a criti- disputes also demonstrate that basin-wide agree- cal juncture, especially if local political ­‘entrepreneurs’ ments like the NBI may no longer be the only avail- decide to use the Nile as a ‘trump card’ in elections. If able – or desirable – tool for regional partners. To this is the case, the stability of the whole region may some, the combination of sub-level (bilateral, sub- then be put at stake. regional) and multilateral (NBI-like) arrangements now appears to be a more appealing and more ef- A conflict prevention role for the EU fective way to address diverging interests and differ- ing approaches. ­Water ­management arrangements The EU and its member states have a particular role should thus allow for some degree of flexibility in to play in the Nile basin’s water politics, notably by order to offer real incentives for cooperation. facilitating dialogue, building trust, and supporting efforts to revamp cooperation. Drawing on their long Game changers experience in (and knowledge of) the region, they can help partners reframe and accommodate conflict- More recently, the emergence of new sources of ing interests so that political, technical and funding funding has made water cooperation even more challenges can be tackled more easily. This is in fact ­complex. For years, the Nile Basin Trust Fund ­quintessential conflict prevention, combining dip- (NBTF), established with the NBI and managed by lomatic initiative with technical assistance, advice the , was the main source of support and financial support – all things Europeans have for countries wishing to develop water and infra- ­traditionally been good at. structure projects. Importantly, the NBTF and other international funding ­institutions have been tradi- Encouraging regional players, downstream and tionally reluctant to finance regional projects with- ­upstream, to come up with more appropriate out the agreement of other NBI parties. ­cooperation tools is also key as it can increase both the value-added of and the incentives for joint ac- With the emergence of ‘new donors’ like , tion. As many experts point out, although the ­impact ­ and the Gulf states, some of these restrictions of ­ change will be felt most acutely in the have suddenly been lifted. Offering reasonably flex- ­mid-term future, concerted action to mitigate nega- ible (and often non-conditional) loans, these new tive ­effects is required now. On this, the EU can also donors have allowed some to press push - in ­collaboration with other international play- ahead with narrower, national ambitions whilst ers - for coordinated, ­long-term planning and action overlooking the impact of their schemes on other on the root causes of water depletion.­ regional partners. In doing so, they have seriously disrupted the delicate balance of water cooperation Any Freitas is Senior Programme Manager of the in the basin. Observatoire de l’Afrique at the EUISS.

European Union Institute for Security Studies May 2013 2

QN-AL-13-012-2A-N | ISSN 2315-1129