Deborah L. Norden. Military Rebellion in : Between Coups and Consolidation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. 242 pp. $35.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-8032-3339-6; $17.50, paper, ISBN 978-0-8032-8369-5.

Reviewed by Wayne H. Bowen

Published on H-LatAm (August, 1996)

In Military Rebellion in Argentina, Deborah Norden's book tells a story parallel to much of Norden tells the story of the Argentine military the tragedy of recent Argentine history. In the ear‐ during the twentieth century, focusing on the ly part of the century, Argentina was the envy of painful transition to democracy, 1983 to 1990. In the world, with higher living standards and a these twilight years of transition between military brighter future than even much of Europe. With authoritarianism and democracy, signifcant ele‐ fertile land, burgeoning cattle herds, growing in‐ ments of the Argentine armed forces expressed dustry, and a well-educated population descended their opposition to the new political system from mostly Italian and Spanish immigrants, Ar‐ through four major military uprisings. Although gentina was not only prosperous but also un‐ none of these insurrections proved successful in guardedly optimistic. Although until the 1930s their goals, they did impede the transformation of much of the wealth and political power was held the military into an integral part of the state and tightly by a small oligarchic group of cattle ranch‐ increased the politicization of the armed forces at ers and their industrial and merchant compatri‐ a critical time during the most recent democratic ots, the typical Argentine gaucho or Buenos Aires phase of Argentine history. In this well-written worker could look forward to a better life than his and -researched work, Norden provides readers equivalents in, for example, or Portugal. with a reasoned historical and theoretical inter‐ Indeed, Argentines usually compared themselves pretation of the role of the military in recent Ar‐ to Europeans or North Americans, rather than to gentine politics. Although one might quarrel with their continental brethren, in terms of living stan‐ Norden's optimism about Argentina's future, espe‐ dards, ethnic heritage and national ambitions. cially given its current economic crisis, it is dif‐ The Great Depression, however, shook Ar‐ cult to fnd fault with her explanation of the role gentina to its foundations. The old oligarchic of the Argentine military in the nation's most re‐ class, which had maintained power through elec‐ cent past. toral manipulation, found itself unable to cope H-Net Reviews with the hammer blows to the world economy cuses on the internal cleavages of the military and and Argentine society. By 1930, the political situa‐ their expression in the public arena. tion had become unsettled. The septuagenarian As beftting the work of a political scientist, president, Hipolito Yrigoyen, was sufering from the frst chapter of this book, "Democracy and the the early stages of senility, while Yrigoyen's Armed Forces," focuses on sources, methodology, cronies and less scrupulous political allies took and theory. The author used an ample array of advantage of this opportunity to use the political primary and secondary works, including newspa‐ system and national budget for their own ends. pers, military publications, and underground ma‐ It was in this environment of economic un‐ terials, but her most signifcant source was inter‐ certainty and political decay that elements of the views with dozens of Argentine soldiers, military Argentine military intervened, launching a coup functionaries, and political fgures, retired or ac‐ in 1930. This insurrection, the frst successful mili‐ tive. Though the anonymity of some of these inter‐ tary insurrection in twentieth-century Argentina, viewees could be considered problematic, the au‐ brought the army into the political arena, an are‐ thor's eforts to corroborate non-attributable testi‐ na in which it remains to this day. Norden's book mony largely resolves this dilemma. Given the examines military insurrections in the decades af‐ contemporary nature of many of the events re‐ ter 1930, attempting to explain how military of‐ counted by Norden, and potential dangers to cers became such important players in Argentine those she interviewed, her willingness to conceal politics, deposing, bolstering, weakening or sup‐ her sources is understandable and commendable. planting civilian regimes for the next sixty years. Chapter 1 also includes a discussion of The book is not, however, a history of the Argen‐ democracy and the "variations of military behav‐ tine military in the twentieth century, or even in ior" under such a system (p. 10). Finally, the au‐ the years of dictatorship. It is instead an account thor examines the interaction between profes‐ of the range of military behavior between the sionalism and bureaucratic hierarchy in the mili‐ coup d'etat and submission to civilian authority. tary. These two tendencies, associated in modern It would not be accurate to say that there has military doctrine with apolitical armed forces, been a dearth of writing on twentieth-century Ar‐ can, when combined with a weak political system gentina, or even on the role of the Argentine or other societal defciencies, lead to a more fa‐ armed forces in politics. Much recent work con‐ vorable environment for military rebellions. cerning the Argentine military, however, has fo‐ In Chapter 2, "The Political Roles of the Argen‐ cused on its abysmal behavior during the years of tine Military: Historical Overview," Norden out‐ the most recent dictatorship, 1973-1976.[1] Al‐ lines the increasing involvement of the military in though this work has been necessary, the focus politics since 1930. Whereas after the frst coup has been on a fairly narrow set of subjects: hu‐ d'etat the military gave up power less than two man rights abuses, disappearances, and trials of years later, they seized it again in subsequent re‐ the perpetrators after 1983. Other books have fo‐ volts, most importantly in those of 1943, 1955, and cused on the intellectual origins of military inter‐ 1976. The military insurrectionists of 1943, which ventionism.[2] These are and will continue to be included a group of ofcers led by Colonel Juan important areas of investigation, but too many of Domingo Peron, did not present a clear platform these eforts focus on "the military" as one institu‐ from which to govern, relying instead on a shared tion with one ideology and form of behavior. Nor‐ ideology of extreme nationalism, resistance to U.S. den's book, while admitting the crimes of the and Allied hegemony, anti-democratic sentiments, armed forces during the years of dictatorship, fo‐ a defense of military prerogatives and an unspeci‐

2 H-Net Reviews fed commitment to social justice (pp. 23-25). With and, most dramatically, its defeat in the war for some modifcations, most notably the intensifca‐ the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. The dictatorship tion of cultural conservatism and anti-subversion, did crush the guerrilla movements confronting it, this would remain the core of the military's politi‐ but this "Dirty War" was carried out at a terrible cal ideology through subsequent decades. cost: thousands of dead and "disappeared" civil‐ General Peron, however, soon went beyond ians, most killed by the military in the years his erstwhile colleagues, becoming the tribune of 1976-1978 (pp.58-60). Although not all ofcers and the Argentine working classes. After his election noncommissioned ofcers participated in these as president in 1946, Peron attempted to trans‐ human rights abuses, enough did "to lend an ele‐ form the military in a more personalistic direc‐ ment of unity to the military," but also increased tion. He "sought personal loyalty, rather than in‐ divisions between high-level ofcers who issued stitutional obedience" (p. 26). It was this attempt the orders for these actions and the lower-level to subordinate the military to his person, as well ofcers who carried them out. The conficts be‐ as his conficts with the Catholic Church, that led tween these two echelons grew over the corrup‐ to the ouster of the general by the military in tion of the upper ranks, as well as the junta's in‐ 1955. Peron's legacy, however, of a nation polar‐ ability to run the economy, which by 1981-82 was ized between Peronistas and anti-Peronistas, re‐ in a desperate condition: rising foreign debt, bank mained an attribute of Argentine society. failures, and a declining Gross Domestic Product (pp. 61-62, 64-68). The next two decades saw an ongoing contest among the military, the repressed Peronista The invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands movement, and weak democratic forces. Civilian in 1982 did provide a temporary measure of na‐ presidents Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) and Ar‐ tional unity, but the subsequent defeat of the nu‐ turo Illia (1963-1966) governed weakly, unable to merically superior Argentine military by a British prevent the military from inserting itself again Task Force humiliated the government. It also ex‐ and again into politics. Neither was able to institu‐ acerbated the divisions within the military. Not tionalize the armed forces as a part of the state, only did middle-ranking ofcers feel betrayed by and were instead forced to interact with the mili‐ the poor preparation and leadership from Buenos tary as an independent player in national politics. Aires during the brief war with Great Britain, but In 1966, the military once again seized power, the high command's disdainful treatment of vet‐ yielding only to a Peronista government in 1973 erans of the confict drove an even deeper wedge in the face of a weakening economy, violent Pero‐ between the generals and their subordinates (pp. nista and Leftist guerrilla movements, as well as 74-76). In 1983, the military gave up power again the persistent popularity of Peron, then still in ex‐ to an elected president. ile in Spain (pp. 39-45). After the death of General It was in this environment of internal mili‐ Peron in 1974, the weak Peronista governments of tary confict, economic freefall, and the aftermath his supporters prompted the military to launch its of a disastrous foreign war that the new civilian last successful coup, in March 1976. president, Raul Alfonsin, took ofce. In Chapter 4, The story of this new military government is "Quest for Control: Military Policies and the Alfon‐ detailed in Chapter 3, "Disappointments of Mili‐ sin Government," Norden examines the relation‐ tary Rule, 1976-1983." The "disappointments" to ship between Alfonsin and the military. Unlike the which Norden refers are the regime's failures to most recent civilian presidents, Alfonsin chose a accomplish its objectives: national unity, econom‐ confrontational approach to domesticate the Ar‐ ic growth and prosperity, international legitimacy gentine military. Severe cuts in the military bud‐

3 H-Net Reviews get, human rights trials of ofcers for crimes com‐ diciary, human rights groups, and the legislature mitted during the "Dirty War," and attempts to (p. 126). Whereas resistance to criminal prosecu‐ subordinate the military to civilian oversight in tion of ofcers for human rights abuses had pro‐ all areas was received poorly by ofcers of all vided the stimulus for the early rebellions, opposi‐ ranks, despite the earlier cleavages between tion to Alfonsin and the upper ranks of the mili‐ ranks. Alfonsin's eforts to legislate and decree the tary hierarchy soon became the more important military into proper submission, coupled with elements in these rebellions. what many in the military perceived as fanking Faced with growing sympathy in the army for attacks by the judiciary, human rights organiza‐ the rebels, and a consequent inability to repress tions, and other sectors of society contributed to a them with superior power, the Alfonsin govern‐ resurgent military resistance to Alfonsin--the frst ment was forced to negotiate with these forces, of‐ of a new wave of military rebellions. fering amnesties, dismissals of unpopular gener‐ These small-scale insurrections, the sources als, and increases in military salaries to end the of which are examined in Chapter 5, "Emergence insurrections. of Rebellion: Origins of Factionalism," were unlike Even with the election of the Peronista presi‐ previous revolts. These rebellions, however, dra‐ dential candidate Carlos Menem in 1989, the cara‐ matic, were not the beginnings of military coups. pintada movement did not permanently abate. Instead, they were a manifestation of cleavages Early relations between Menem and the armed within the military, not only between ofcers of forces were much improved over those of Alfon‐ fag (generals and admirals) and feld grade (ma‐ sin, with Menem's blanket amnesties for previous jors and colonels), but also based on ideology, pro‐ rebellions and crimes during the "Dirty War" pop‐ fessional orientation, branch of service, and polit‐ ular among soldiers and ofcers. Military salaries ical alignment (p. 108, Table 4). In contrast to pre‐ and equipment, however, continued to deterio‐ vious coups, the vanguard of these uprisings com‐ rate and Menem managed to co-opt many ofcers prised feld grade ofcers, often elite Commandos seen as previously sympathetic to the carapin‐ and decorated veterans of the Falklands/ Malvinas tadas. The movement gradually began to disinte‐ War. Ideologically, they were fervently nationalis‐ grate, as some dismissed or forcibly retired of‐ tic, Catholic and Peronist. Named the carapin‐ cers entered politics, while others attempted to tadas (painted faces) for the camoufaged faces maintain their links with the military. The last sig‐ and battle-dress uniforms worn during their re‐ nifcant rebellion, in December 1990, failed com‐ bellions, they saw themselves as under attack pletely, with troops loyal to Menem quickly crush‐ from the Alfonsin regime, abandoned by their su‐ ing the efort. With the most important leaders periors and unappreciated for their service to the imprisoned or co-opted by the government, the nation during the "Dirty War" and the Falklands/ carapintada movement efectively collapsed. Ar‐ Malvinas confict. gentina has not experienced a signifcant military Their rebellions, in 1987, 1988, and 1990, are rebellion since 1990. presented in Chapter 6, "Evolution of Military Re‐ In Chapter 7, "Foundations of Chronic Inter‐ bellion." Norden argues that the most important ventionism in Argentina," Norden explains the factor prompting these revolts was, rather than reasons behind the role of the Argentine military opposition to specifc policies of the Alfonsin gov‐ as a persistent actor in politics. While many ernment, the perception among many ofcers armies consider themselves the guardians of the that their prestige and status were under attack nation, the Argentine military also regarded itself by Alfonsin and his confederates in the media, ju‐

4 H-Net Reviews as the sole creator of Argentina, predating the na‐ case of the carapintadas, cannot project a public tion in its origins. identity without jeopardizing their organizational Ideologically, the expansion of the conception existence. of national security in the 1960s allowed military While in the short term the carapintada rebels to see themselves as opponents of internal, movement failed, Norden argues that it did dam‐ as well as external, enemies of the state and of the age and delay the democratic transition in Ar‐ status of the military. Although these ideological gentina. The early leniency toward the rebellions elements provided the intellectual fuel for mili‐ and the carapintadas weakened both Alfonsin tary rebellion, other more practical factors, in‐ and Menem, impeding at the same time the full cluding the limited legal punishments for insur‐ domestication of the military as a subordinate ele‐ rection and the politicization of fag-rank promo‐ ment of the state. Despite these results, and some tions also played a role. still-troubling elements in Menem's rule, at least In Chapter 8, "Shadows of Military Rule: Lega‐ to all current appearances, we may now be able to cies of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South say that Argentina "is" a full democracy, rather America," Norden broadens her analysis of mili‐ than in transition to that political condition. tary dictatorship to include , , and Beyond an explanation of military rebellions . In this brief comparative examination of in Argentina and their implications for Argentine the respective transitions to democracy in Ar‐ and Latin American history, this book also illumi‐ gentina and the other three nations, Norden nates the general history of the military in the presents the most important factors determining Western world. In recent years, there has been the ease of these transitions: the economic success discussion in the United States and other nations (or lack thereof) of the military regime, the level about the role of the armed forces in what have of "militarization" in the military regimes, and the been called "Operations Other Than War": peace‐ relationship between the military and civilian keeping, humanitarian missions, drug interdic‐ populations during the period of dictatorship, ex‐ tion, nation-building, law enforcement, and other emplifed by the levels of repression practiced operations. As the time spent by the armed forces during these periods. on training and traditional warfghting is re‐ In her fnal section, Chapter 9, "Context, Coali‐ placed by these new missions, some have specu‐ tions and Political Outcomes," Norden explains lated that the military could begin to see itself as the successes and failures of the military rebel‐ more than just the guarantor of the nation's bor‐ lions. These insurrections were most fruitful ders, allies, and foreign interests, as happened to when their appeals went out to the military as a many Latin American militaries in previous professional institution, rather than to individual decades: "As security came to be defned in terms interests or particular ideologies. As the carapin‐ of a broad conjunction of social, economic, and tada movement grew, however, it came to be seen strategic factors, with particular attention to do‐ as a discrete organization, with its own agenda, mestic afairs, military perceptions of their appro‐ rather than as an expression of the general will of priate roles expanded correspondingly" (p. 17). signifcant elements of the armed forces. In a Though this danger can be easily overdrama‐ counterintuitive fashion, the movement lost most tized, there is a risk when the military regards it‐ of its support at the point at which it seemed to be self as the only institution capable of positive developing institutional strength, strong leader‐ change in society. In this light, Norden's fnal ship, and a clear identity. The broader lessons are words about the future of Argentina and Latin that movements of military rebellion, as in the America are perhaps not entirely warranted. We

5 H-Net Reviews can only hope, however, that she is correct in haz‐ "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography. Austin: arding that, at least in Argentina, the "pattern of University of Texas Press, 1991. military intervention may have fnally been bro‐ Copyright (c) 1996 by H-Net, all rights re‐ ken" (p. 206). served. This work may be copied for non-proft With its insightful analysis of the internal pol‐ educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ itics of the Argentine military and broader inter‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ pretation of the role of the armed forces in tact [email protected]. democracies, Norden's book is a valuable contri‐ bution to our understanding of the relationship between military and political structures, transi‐ tions to democracy and military interventionism in Latin America. Throughout, Norden's discus‐ sion of major analytical concepts--military rebel‐ lion, transitions to democracy, political families within the military, the legacy of both military rule and rebellions--remains clear and insightful. Her book makes a strong contribution to recent Argentine history and is recommended for use by researchers, faculty and graduate students, as well as in upper-division undergraduate courses on Latin America. 1. Examples of this type of work include: Jo Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared. Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1995, (recently reviewed for H- LatAm by Virginia W. Leonard); Marguerite Guz‐ man Bouvard, Revolutionizing Motherhood: The Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1994; Iain Guest, Behind the Disappearances. Philadelphia: University of Penn‐ sylvania Press, 1990; Amnesty International, Ar‐ gentina: The Military Junta and Human Rights: Report of the Trial of Former Junta Members, 1985. New York: Amnesty International Publica‐ tions, 1987. On the armed opposition to the Argen‐ tine military dictatorship, as well as other mili‐ tary regimes, see Jorge Castaneda, Utopia Un‐ armed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War. New York: Random House/Vintage, 1994. 2. See, for example, David Rock, Authoritari‐ an Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its His‐ tory and Impact. Berkeley: University of Califor‐ nia Press, 1993, and Donald Hodges, Argentina's

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Citation: Wayne H. Bowen. Review of Norden, Deborah L. Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation. H-LatAm, H-Net Reviews. August, 1996.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=545

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