THE CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE of TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: an Update in Light of Regional Turbulence

CIDOB • Barcelona Centre Affairs for International

documentos E-ISSN: 1887-1801 CIDOB Mediterráneo y Oriente Medio 18 THE CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: An update in light of regional turbulence

Eduard Soler i Lecha Research Fellow, CIDOB

ords matter. Con- Abstract: This document examines the way in which Turkish foreign litical transitions in the Arab cepts such as policy has adapted to a turbulent regional context. The author car- countries were natural and ries out this examination by reviewing some of the concepts that strategic depth, are commonly used in political discourse and academic analysis on inevitable and that the “best Wrhythmic diplomacy and mul- this country’s foreign policy. The lexicon of Turkey’s current foreign course of action is to develop tidimensional foreign policy policy reflects the systemic changes made since the end of the Cold a sound understanding of the have been popularised by the War, as well as the doctrinal contributions of Ahmet Davutoğlu, causes of this transformation the current foreign affairs minister. This evolution took place at current minister of foreign af- a time in which Turkey has made great efforts to improve its rela- and develop suitable strategies fairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and tions with its neighbours and to diversify its priorities in terms to cope with the change”. are broadly used when analys- of international alliances. The speed and virulence with which the ing Turkish foreign policy. But regional context is evolving – especially since the Arab spring and This is not the first time that the conflict in Syria – has forced Turkey’s diplomacy to revise not what happens to these words only its priorities but also its conceptual architecture. Turkey has had to reinvent when reality changes sud- its foreign policy as a result of denly? Since 2011, Turkish Keywords: Turkey, foreign policy, European Union, Middle East, de- changes originating beyond mocracy foreign policy doctrine has its borders. In the early 1990s, been challenged by the po- following the disintegration litical changes and growing instability in the Middle East. One of the Soviet Union, relations with Turkey’s neighbours (the of the flagship initiatives of the current government, the zero- Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the problem approach to its neighbours, no longer corresponds to Black Sea) gained in importance, and Turkey added to its tra- the situation on the ground. And Turkey, forced to take sides, is ditional foreign policy toolbox soft-power instruments such as not hiding any more behind the principle of non-interference in trade and cultural co-operation. Turkey also tried to make its internal affairs. In his victory speech in June 2011, Recep Tayyip Western and European aspirations compatible with increasing- Erdoğan promised to adapt Turkey’s foreign policy to a chang- ly diversified foreign policy priorities. It is premature, and per- ing regional environment and announced Turkey’s support haps disproportionate, to draw parallels between the impact for democratic forces across the Middle East and North Africa1. of the Arab Spring and the disintegration of Soviet Union. In a recent article, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2011: 1) also said that po- However, seen from Ankara, Istanbul or Diyarbakir, the fall of autocracies in its southern vicinity, the rise of Islamist parties, the growing regional competition for leadership in the Middle East and the risk of sectarian conflicts spreading near Turkey’s 1. Susanne Güsten “Mandate for a new Turkish era” in The New York Times, 15 June 2011. borders raise many concerns. Moreover, the coincidence of

documentos cidob MEDITERRÁNEO 17 . JUNE 2011 1 these regional turbulences, with transformations on a global the vocabulary of Turkish foreign policy reflects the changes in scale (featuring the rise of re-emerged powers), in Europe (with Turkish foreign policy discourse and acts as a litmus test for a the multiple crisis affecting the EU), and in domestic politics dynamic country that has successfully multiplied its influence (mounting tension on the Kurdish issue) magnify the challenge in global and regional affairs. to Turkey’s foreign policy.

On the one hand, these factors are accelerating Turkey’s evo- Strategic depth lution from a status-quo power, as defined by Philip Robins (2003) in his book Suits and Uniforms, to a more assertive and In military literature, strategic depth means the distance interventionist actor. On the other, they are also paving the way between front lines and densely-populated and indus- for a more pragmatic foreign policy2. Turkish diplomats, when trial areas. This term has a completely different meaning asked about the validity of the principles that guided Turkey’s when applied to an analysis of Turkish foreign policy. foreign policy until 2011, argue that the values, the vision and Strategic Depth (in Turkish, Stratejik Derinlik) is the title of the doctrine of Turkish foreign policy are uncontested but they Davutoğlu’s masterpiece, and according to Heinz Kramer acknowledge that actions on the ground have to take into (2010: 4), this concept provides the intellectual underpinning account the profound changes in the regional context. To put for a certain vision of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. it in a nutshell: an idealist long-term vision is coexisting with Davutoğlu argues that Turkey should not content itself with pragmatic and reactive actions on the short term. being presented as a bridge between regions and, more spe- cifically, between Islamic countries and the West. Nor should The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, to assess whether, Turkey perceive itself as a mere regional power. Due to its his- and in which direction the current government is updating its tory, its size and its geography, Turkey is and should act as a foreign policy. Secondly, to decode the terms which are either central state, a country with interests and influence in multiple unknown to those who do not follow Turkish politics closely or regions (the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black which have a specific meaning Sea, etc.)4. In itself, the out- when applied to the Turkish Turkey has evolved from a status- come of becoming a “central context3. Thirdly, to reinterpret state” is distinctly consensual the meaning of these terms in quo power to a more assertive and among Turkish elites, and it accordance with the changes interventionist actor pleases Turkish public opinion. that are taking place in the The debate, therefore, is how global, regional and domestic to achieve this goal and what arena. This paper argues that the revision of priorities and price Turkey is prepared to pay. instruments will also alter Turkish foreign policy vocabulary.

The following pages analyse the terms most often used in the Emerging power political discourse and academic analysis of Turkish foreign policy, emphasising to what extent the current context modi- Erdoğan and Davutoğlu claim that Turkey’s goal is to be fies their meaning or, in some cases, increases or diminishes among the tenth largest economies by 2023, the year Turkey their relative importance. The obvious starting point for this will celebrate the 100th anniversary of its republic5. Despite exercise is Strategic Depth, a concept that encapsulates Ahmet the fact that in 2012, Turkey’s economic growth could fall to Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision (Aras, 2009, Grigoriadis, 2 per cent, Turkey has been growing at rates similar to those 2010, Kramer, 2010). It is followed by the recurrent charac- of China during the last decade and has become the world’s terisation of Turkey as an emerging power and by the changes 16th largest economy. Due to both its economic and politi- in the decision-making process. The analysis continues with cal assets, Turkey is often described as an emerging power, four attributes that have defined the current foreign policy even if it does not fall into the same category as the BRICS. approach: multidimensional, autonomous, multilateral and Some claim that Turkey is part of a second generation of rhythmic diplomacy. The paper then focuses on the analysis of emerging economies, which the Economist Intelligence Turkey’s EU aspirations and the possibility of increasing dia- Unit coined “CIVETS”, and Goldman Sachs referred to as logue with the EU on foreign policy issues. It also tackles con- the “Next Eleven”6. Turkey also aspires to be recognised as cepts which are central to Turkey’s relations with its Middle a power with global influence. To reach this goal, Ankara Eastern neighbours: the zero-problem approach, the emphasis on soft-power instruments, the role of the Kurdish issue, the criticisms of Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, and the discussions over the attractiveness of a Turkish model for the Arab 4. This idea is central in Davutoğlu’s articles and speeches. Davutoğlu (2007: 78) argues that “Turkey’s new position has both an ideational and a geographical basis. In terms of geo- countries. Finally, Syria is presented as a case in point in which graphy, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of manoeuvring in 2. According to Şaban Kardaş (2011a:1) Turkish officials may stick to an idealist vision of several regions simultaneously”. regional order in their rhetorical parlance, but pragmatism and realpolitik considerations 5. See Davutoğlu’s speech entitled “Vision 2023: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives”, delive- are likely to prevail when reacting to crises in the Middle East. red to the Turkey Investor Conference: The road to 2023 organised by Goldman Sachs, 3. According to Ibrahim Kalın (2011: 6), chief advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister, there is a London, 22 November 2011. new “geographic imagination” and “it is possible to produce its own concepts and build a 6. CIVETS stands for: Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa, while new vocabulary”. He adds that “the new vocabulary and concepts of Turkish politics and the Next Eleven include (apart from Turkey): Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South foreign policy should be noted as indicators of a profound mental transformation”. Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Philippines.

2 documentos cidob MEDITERRÁNEO 18 . JUNE 2012 has pursued a threefold strategy. Firstly, it has emphasised Davutoğlu’s actorness in defining Turkish foreign policy is its attributes as a pivotal regional power. Secondly, it has producing two distinct and mutually reinforcing effects. The diversified its foreign policy priorities to include areas such first is that foreign policy has become important in electoral as Latin America and the African continent, which were campaigns, and Erdoğan has built on his international image marginal in previous foreign policy agendas7. Thirdly, it for domestic consumption. The second is that foreign policy has multiplied political and economic links with the first discussions are increasingly politicised, making consensus division of emerging powers. For instance, in 2008 Russia on foreign policy more difficult. became Turkey’s top trading partner, while a timetable has been set with China to increase the country’s trade volume to $50 billion by 2015 and, in the second phase, to $100 Multidimensional foreign policy billion by 20208. It would not come as a surprise if, in the future, Ankara pleads for its inclusion into the BRICS club, This idea was already popular in the 1990s and particularly as President Gül already suggested in an interview with the during the time of the late foreign affairs minister Ismail Cem. Financial Times in 20109. In the meantime, its strategy is to This term was at that time associated with a deliberate attempt behave as if it were already included. to put an end to Cold War confrontation and thus promote an opening-up towards the former Soviet space and to a lesser extent to its southern neighbours. Under the AKP, the accent Foreign policy agency is placed on the refusal of a predetermined hierarchy among foreign policy priorities, in an attempt to put an end to Turkish As in many other countries, for almost two decades now, foreign policy subordination to a “threat perception which civil society organisations, think-tanks, business associations tended to securitize relations with all “non-Western neigh- and public opinion in general have become more interested bours” (Kramer, 2010: 24). Turkish officials argue that none of in foreign policy, and thus are more influential in what used Turkey’s top priorities, including the EU accession process or to be the monopoly of diplo- Turkey’s Western alignment, mats and security personnel10. The diversification of priorities are by nature more important In parallel, the prime minister than the rest. From this per- has also become more active and the possibility of disagreeing spective, all priorities are com- and has increased his power with traditional Western allies have patible and should adapt to a and influence in foreign increased the visibility of Turkey’s changing and dynamic envi- affairs. This process, which ronment. Indeed, the diversi- in other countries is called Foreign Policy fication of priorities and the “presidentialisation”, has possibility of disagreeing with taken place at the expense of traditional Western allies have the role of the Presidency of the Republic, the armed forces increased the visibility of Turkey’s Foreign Policy and have and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs11. Consequently, the enjoyed much support among AKP’s constituency, in addition views or even more explicitly the likes and dislikes of the to other segments of Turkish society. Nevertheless, opposition prime minister have an immediate and visible reflection on parties, as well as some academic circles, claim that such a the country’s foreign policy12. On a different scale, Ahmed strategy leads to inconsistencies and could be counter-produc- Davutoğlu, first as a chief adviser to the prime minister’s tive for Turkey’s long-term national interests14. This debate is office and then as a minister of Foreign Affairs, has also had a likely to intensify if there is an escalation of tensions between strong personal influence on the definition of Turkish foreign Western countries and Iran, or between the latter and Israel. policy doctrine13. The confluence of these two trends: the democratisation of foreign policy-making and Erdoğan and Autonomy

The quest for what Şaban Kardaş (2011) has defined as strategic 7. For instance, in 2009 Turkey announced the opening of 15 new embassies in African autonomy emerges the ultimate goal of this multidimensional countries. approach. In the Turkish context, autonomy is understood as 8. “Turkey, China hail ‘strategic cooperation’ amid protests”, in Hurriyet Daily News, 8 Octo- ber 2010. the capacity to pursue policies in areas that are of vital interest 9. “It wouldn’t be surprising if we start talking about Bric plus T,” suggested Gül in this inter- which could eventually contradict the priorities and diverge view, published in The Financial Times, 8 November 2010. 10. According to Meltem Müftüler-Baç (2011), the attempt to join the EU has been from the strategies of the Western allies. Recent examples critical factor in broadening the actors that are influential in the decision-ma- include the Brazilian-Turkish-led negotiations on the Iranian king process. 11. This was a recurrent idea in the interviews with Turkish foreign policy experts. 12. The best example is the deterioration of Turkish-Israel relations since 2009. The Prime Minister’s positions regarding Israel policies got tougher as he had felt personally betrayed by his Israeli counterparts when in December 2008 he continued to mediate between Syria and Israel while the latest was preparing the 14. See, for instance, Ziya Öniş (2011:59) when he says: “At the moment, there is a certain Operation Cast Lead. The Prime Minister was particularly disappointed as he inconsistency in Turkey’s style of foreign policy activism which is clearly noted by foreign had received Ehud Olmert in Ankara few days before the attack and, not only he observers. In spite of the inherent problems in the negotiation process, Turkey is still for- was not informed but was asked to continue mediating with Damascus. Some mally a candidate country. At the same time, it seems to be implementing a unilateral incidents and declarations, particularly regarding the Gaza Flotilla raid, conti- foreign policy style and behaving as a kind of independent regional power”. Ioannis Gri- nued to empoison bilateral relations. goriadis (2010: 9) also argues that “there is a serious contradiction in relegating Turkey’s 13. Bülent Aras (2009: 139) argues that, before being appointed minister, Davutoğlu was EU membership ambition to simply one of Turkish strategic priorities. (…) What this po- more than an adviser as he became the “intellectual architect of Turkey’s new foreign sition misses is the importance of Turkey’s reform process and EU membership for the policy”. management and resolution of its own domestic conflicts”.

documentos cidob MEDITERRÁNEO 18 . JUNE 2012 3 nuclear dossier in 2010 and the uninterrupted dialogue with with an even stronger emphasis on multilateral cooperation Hamas since their victory in the 2006 elections. These contro- as a way to resolve conflicts (in Syria and elsewhere) and with versial decisions triggered debates, in Turkey and abroad, on Turkey’s active participation of in multilateral organisations. an eventual axis-shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. Some analysts, For instance, Turkey will continue to promote its candidacy to such as Ian O. Lesser (2011: 61-62) and Ziya Öniş (2011), quali- occupy a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for fied this stance as being more typical of a non-aligned leader, the 2015-2016 term, disputing this position with two friendly whereas other analysts follow Soner Çağaptay’s (2011) thesis countries: New Zealand and Spain18. The Turkish government that there is an Islamisation and a de-westernisation process of will certainly attempt to take advantage of its presence in the Turkish foreign policy. In fact, divergence in priorities, alliances G-20 at a crucial moment for global economic recovery and, to and strategies with the country’s Western partners represents a lesser extent, of the fact that a Turkish citizen, Ekmeleddin only one side of the coin. Turkish and American officials have İhsanoğlu, is since 2005 been the Secretary-General of the not had – since long ago – such an intense and productive dia- Organization of the Islamic Conference. logue as they have nowadays, particularly at the highest level15. On the ground, Turkey’s constructive role in Afghanistan has also been praised by its Western allies, Ankara has announced Rhythmic diplomacy the deployment of missiles on its soil as part of NATO’s missile shield and Turkey’s influence in Iraq is widely seen as a coun- Ahmet Davutoğlu often mentions this idea when outlining ter-weight to the Iranian influence in this country. Moreover, it his vision of what Turkey should achieve through a reno- could be argued that the Arab Spring has somehow induced vated foreign policy. The basic assumption is that Turkey Turkey to seek greater cooperation with Western countries should not only have the means but also the mentality to rather than freelancing in the neighbourhood16. Critical deci- adapt to a rapidly-changing international agenda, to be sions such as Erdoğan’s calls to Hosni Mubarak to step down, prepared to act, to be present where critical decisions are as well as the policy U-turn in the case of Syria, were appar- being taken, to anticipate the challenges and to be proac- ently taken after consultations tive rather that reactive when with Washington. Interestingly, problems arise, emphasising Turkey’s collaboration with its Trying to keep the balance between the idea of mediation. One of Western allies has not watered resources and expectations, on the one the most visible attempts to down the government’s asser- put these ideas into practice tive and sometimes aggres- hand, and the identification of which has been the sustained effort sive rhetoric in foreign affairs, issues matter more than others, on the to increase the Turkish dip- which has earned Erdoğan other, is the key to maintaining Turkey’s lomatic service, (not only in much applause at home, but terms of recruitment but also also in the streets of the Middle rising influence in international affairs by opening new embassies)19. East. Nevertheless, the problem with rhythmic diplomacy is that by trying to be everywhere, one may risk being less Multilateralism influential where the real interests actually lie. A parallel could be drawn with economics, in that Turkey could face a Since the early days of the Republic, Turkey has made a great “diplomatic overheating”. Thus, trying to keep the balance effort to be admitted, as a full member or as an observer, between resources and expectations, on the one hand, and in as many international organisations as possible17. Turkey the identification of which issues matter more than others, has also supported multilateral consultations as a means on the other, is the key to maintaining Turkey’s rising influ- to appease tensions in the Caucasus (in 2008, following the ence in international affairs. Russia-Georgia war, Ankara proposed the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact), in the Middle East (with the series of Iraq’s neighbours’ conferences and now with the Friends of EU bid Syria meetings) or in Afghanistan with the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference. However, when Ankara has consid- The critics of the AKP’s foreign policy often mention the ered that its vital interests were under threat, it did not hesi- paralysis in the EU accession process, which contrasts with tate to move unilaterally. It happened in 1974 in Cyprus and it the country’s rediscovery of the Middle East, as an example has been a recurrent trend in extra-territorial activities in Iraq of the side-effects of this rhythmic diplomacy. At the begin- against PKK terrorism. In the years to come, the current gov- ning of the 21st century, EU-Turkish relations had its golden ernment is likely to combine such sporadic unilateral moves age. Recognised as a candidate country in the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Turkey found the right incentives to pro-

15. Soner Çağaptay, in an article in The Washington Post put it thus: “Today (…) the United States and Turkey are on a honeymoon, with President Obama and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having formed what is probably the best relationship between a US pre- 18. “Turkey to make bid for new seat on UN Security Council” in Hurriyet Daily News, 18 May sident and a Turkish prime minister in decades”. 2011. 16. The author thanks Nathalie Tocci for this particular idea. 19. A decade ago, Turkey had fewer than 1,000 diplomats. A recruitment strategy, as well 17. This has brought Turkey to achieve an observer status in the Organization of as the fact that almost 800 consular and specialised officers (Konsolosluk ve Ihtisas Me- American States (OAS), the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and the African muru, KIM) are considered part of the Turkish diplomatic service has almost increased Union. the number of diplomats to 2,000.

4 documentos cidob MEDITERRÁNEO 18 . JUNE 2012 mote major political reforms and modernise the economy, Strategic dialogue the EU bid stood out as Turkey’s top foreign policy priority, Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly supported member- The accession negotiations on foreign and security policy ship of the EU and accession negotiations could finally start are paralysed, EU-NATO cooperation is blocked due to the in 2005. From then on, the situation rapidly deteriorated. As Cyprus conflict and yet, despite all this, Turkey and the EU noted by Atila Eralp (2011: 204), conditionality rather than have many interests in common in international affairs. incentives seemed to dominate the negotiations and, conse- This is the reason why Turkish and EU analysts have pro- quently, the process became less attractive for Turkey. The posed the launch of a strategic dialogue (Grabbe & Ülgen, results of these negotiations are rather poor, particularly in a 2010). That is, a new coordination mechanism between comparative perspective: Turkey and Croatia started negotia- Turkey and the EU in foreign and security matters. This tions at the same time and while the latter is going to join the idea is gaining momentum because since the Lisbon Treaty EU in 2013, many chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations came into force, candidate countries are no longer invited remain frozen due to either the Cyprus conflict or the French to join European Council discussions, and this has reduced veto on opening negotiations on other chapters that could reaf- the space for high-level consultation. Traditionally, Turkish firm Turkey’s membership prospects. Moreover, dialogue on authorities were suspicious of any mechanism which could visa-liberalisation, a repeated demand by Turkish authorities be seen as an alternative to the accession process, or even and business circles, has not made any significant progress20. worse, as a consolation prize after half a century knocking Both Turkey’s elites and public opinion still believe that keep- on the EU’s doors. Yet, more recently, Turkish authorities ing the accession process alive has positive effects, but there is have pressed to increase high-level consultations, to be a widespread feeling that achieving its ultimate goal is becom- involved in discussions on issues of shared and vital inter- ing more and more difficult. Frustration, disappointment and ests, and to lay the basis for regular cooperation with the mistrust have become the dominant trend and the political recently-created European External Action Service (EEAS). and economic crisis in the EU has given additional arguments Accordingly, Commissioner Füle has proposed the launch of to Turkish euro-sceptics. In a “positive agenda” of coop- other words, while the EU is While the EU is losing its appetite for eration, which would include, losing its appetite for further among other issues, dialogue enlargements, many in Turkey further enlargements, many in Turkey on foreign policy23. If in 2012 believe that the EU anchor is believe that the EU anchor is no longer the EU is not able to sub- no longer as fundamental as as fundamental as it used to be stantiate this idea and cannot it used to be and some pol- offer some sort of response icy-makers claim that while to Turkey’s demands, Ankara Turkey and the EU need each other, actually the EU needs will find even fewer incentives to converge with EU policies. Turkey more than the other way round21. In the second half Moreover, when Turkey needs to discuss foreign policy mat- of 2012 the situation could get worse due to Ankara’s threat ters with the Europeans, priority will be given to cooperation to freeze ties with the EU during the Cypriot term-presidency with specific member states rather than with the EEAS24. starting in July. Nobody seems interested in a train-crash scenario but tensions with Nicosia, for instance in relation to gas exploitation rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, could Zero problems with neighbours further damage relations with the EU as a whole. Some advo- cates of EU-Turkish relations, such as former Commissioner The AKP government and Ahmet Davutoğlu himself have Günter Verheugen (2012), claim that the Arab Spring, and popularised the idea of the “zero problems principle” as one of the possibility of increasing cooperation with Turkey in this the flagships of their Turkish foreign policy vision and a neces- particular domain, should serve as a catalyst to give a new sary step to upgrade Turkey to the category of a central state. boost to EU-Turkish relations. Notwithstanding, as important Before the AKP came to power, Ismail Cem had already made as developments in the Middle East might be for both the EU efforts to resolve longstanding conflicts with Greece. With the and Turkey, it seems unlikely that this will suffice to restore current governments, these efforts attempted to cover all the trust between Ankara and Brussels (and Paris and Berlin), and neighbours of the country. Two of the most important areas to create momentum for a re-launch of accession negotiations of progress were the boosting of political and economical rela- (Soler i Lecha, 2011). Only a deep and substantive policy- tions with Syria and Iraq, including with the semi-autonomous review in France and Germany or real progress in resolving Kurdish region in Northern Iraq (Hale, 2009)25. Less successful the Cyprus conflict could break this vicious circle22. were, nonetheless, the attempts to reunify Cyprus and pave

23. “Positive EU-Turkey agenda launched in Ankara”, Press Release, MEMO/12/359, Brussels, 17 May 2012. 24. This trend could be reinforced if, as suggested by Emiliano Alessandri (2010: 15), the 20.. Gerald Knaus & Alexandra Stiglmayer “Being fair to Turkey is in the EU’s interest” in EUob- degree of convergence in foreign policy between Turkey and specific member states is server, 12 March 2012. greater with countries such as France and Germany, which cannot be listed among the 21. See, for instance, Egemen Bagi’s interview in Today’s Zaman (7 January 2011) and Ahmet vocal supporters of speeding up accession negotiations. Alessandri points out, for instan- Davutoğlu’s interview in Der Spiegel (6 November 2011). ce, that in issues such as relations with Russia, the Iranian nuclear programme or energy 22. In the light of political changes in France, Şahin Alpay argues that “it seems that Turkey’s infrastructure, Ankara is closer to Berlin and Paris than to London or Washington. friends in Europe, alarmed by the stalled talks with Turkey, are exerting efforts to help 25. According to Turkish official data, in the case of Syria, trade volume rose to $2,272,415 save relations from total derailment” in his article “‘Positive agenda’ from the EU most in 2010 (it was $729,507 in 2001), and the balance of trade has been very favourable to welcome” in Today’s Zaman (20 May 2012). Turkey’s interests.

documentos cidob MEDITERRÁNEO 18 . JUNE 2012 5 the way for reconciliation with Armenia (Pope, 2010). Since own problems and the radicalisation and polarisation dynam- 2011 this picture is becoming even less bright: unremitting ics of Middle Eastern politics. In its strategy towards its neigh- tension with Israel, new disputes with Cyprus on offshore gas bours Turkey is currently combining elements of soft power drilling in Eastern Mediterranean; cross accusations between (for instance, investing in links with emerging political forces Erdoğan and the Iraqi Prime Minister, the condemnation of and civil society in the Arab countries) with a more hawkish Al-Asad’s mass repression against protesters in Syria; the discourse, illustrated by more or less explicit threats to Israel, deterioration of relations with Iran as a result of Turkey’s par- Cyprus and Syria, warning that Turkey will not hesitate to use ticipation in NATO’s missile shield and conflicting strategies force to protect Turkey’s national interests. regarding Syria and Iraq. Turkish officials repeat that the zero problem vision is still valid (somehow reinterpreted as a zero problem with peoples rather than with governments26), but on Kurdish issue the ground, Turkey is facing all sorts of problems with almost of all its neighbours27. Or, as former MEP Joost Lagendijk The government has utilised both soft and hard power instru- nicely put it, nowadays Turkey has “zero neighbours without ments to resolve the “Kurdish problem”. This issue illus- problems”28. Regardless of Turkey’s capacity to preserve the trates at best the linkage between domestic and international “zero problems” label, the relative importance of relations with agendas and stands as a major deficit in Turkey’s democratic its neighbours is likely to remain one of the priorities of Turkish consolidation and a burden in its relations with its southern foreign policy. What is more, the neighbourhood could be one neighbours31. After a period in which tensions were reduced of the major topics of the aforementioned strategic dialogue, thanks to the government’s ‘Kurdish opening’ (later rebranded or even the core of a trilateral cooperation between Turkey, the as a ‘democratic opening’), and following the participation EU and the US29. of Kurdish nationalists in the debates and consultations to draft a purely civilian constitu- Turkish officials repeat that the zero tion and flourishing relations Soft power with Kurdish leaders from problem vision is still valid but on Northern Iraq, the situation has The destabilization in the the ground, Turkey is facing all sorts now deteriorated. Two major Middle East and certain criti- tragedies occurred in late 2011 cal decisions such as Turkey’s of problems with almost of all its (the PKK attack committed in participation in NATO’s mis- neighbours October killing 24 soldiers and sile shield is turning back the policemen in Hakkari and the attention towards Turkey’s December airstrike killing 35 hard-power attributes. In the last decade, the current govern- civilians near the Iraqi border) which triggered massive pro- ment tried to leave behind the days when Turkey regarded its tests, fuelling social and political tension. Mounting tension neighbours through a security lens and therefore redefined in Syria could complicate this picture as parts of the country these relations in terms of opportunity and mutual interests. could become, once more, an operational base for PKK terror- Qualified as a trading state (Kirişci, 2009), Turkey presented ist activities. Should some sort of “Kurdish Spring” erupt in itself as a benign power, making use of trade, investment, cul- Turkey and should it be violently stifled, Turkey may find itself tural and educational cooperation, public diplomacy and even in a thorny situation, both internally as well as in the Middle visa liberalisation to multiply its influence30. The Middle East is East. Avoiding this nightmare situation, in which Turkey a region where Turkey has been particularly active in deploy- would have peace neither at home, nor abroad, should repre- ing its soft-policy toolbox but also an area where this strat- sent a top priority for Turkey’s authorities in 2012. egy has found its limits. According to Meliha Benli Altunışık (2008), these limits stem from Turkey’s difficulty in solving its Neo-Ottomanism

It is commonplace to characterise Turkey’s newfound interests 26. Davutoğlu (2012: 6) argues that “We developed ties with these regimes because at the in its neighbourhood as the corollary of a neo-Ottoman vision. time they were not at war with their own citizens. But when they preferred to suppress This neo-Ottoman approach would substitute a decades- the demands of their citizens, we sided with the people and still remain committed to the same democratic vision for our region”. old secular Kemalist foreign policy (Taşpınar: 2008). Turkish 27. Sinan Ülgen affirms that “for such a country, there is no such thing as “no problems.” In authorities dislike this concept, arguing that it is easily associ- an environment that is being reshaped in unpredictable ways by the Arab awakening, Turkey will have to redefine what it means to be a good neighbour” (see “Turkey’s “Zero ated with some sort of imperialistic ambition. This does not Problems” Problem”, in Project Syndicate, 15 November 2011). prevent them from making references to a “common his- 28. Joost Lagendijk “Zero neighbors without problems” in Today’s Zaman, 1 November tory” and “cultural affinity” with the territories of the former 2011. 29. Katinka Barysch, deputy director for the Center of European Reform, argues in her article Ottoman Empire in public discourses. Davutoğlu himself has “The Arab spring, a missed opportunity for Europe and Turkey?” that “the revamping of respective neighbourhood policies could be an opportunity for the EU and Turkey to get serious about foreign policy coordination”. (Today’s Zaman, 1 April 2011). Nathalie Tocci, deputy director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali proposes a “trilateral strategy between Turkey, the European Union and the United States” which would take the form of “a joint strategy that could include the establishment of a standing trilateral working group for 31. Ilter Turan (2011: 4) says that “The AKP (…) is fully aware that without a solution to the the neighbourhood, which would in turn determine whether, when and in what policy Kurdish problem, Turkey will encounter intensifying difficulties in the international arena, areas complementary action should proceed separately or simultaneously (Open Demo- which will undermine its aspirations to regional leadership and being an important actor cracy, 7 March 2012). in the global system. For an in-depth analysis of the which are the policy-options for the 30. On Turkey’s visa diplomacy see Devrim & Soler i Lecha (2010). Turkish government and the Kurdish groups see International Crisis Group (2011).

6 documentos cidob MEDITERRÁNEO 18 . JUNE 2012 mentioned the idea of a “Pax Ottomana” and has therefore example of a successful economic performance. As Nathalie presented Turkey as an order-instituting country. The idea of Tocci (2011: 4) notes, “rather than a black-and-white model of rebuilding ties that were artificially broken with the creation a pro-Western Muslim secular democracy, Turkey may offer of the Republic is also behind the zero problem vision and the a number of different models and ideas to inspire change in AKP’s foreign policy at large32. In a post-2011 context, in which its southern neighbourhood”. Henceforth, discussions on the Turkey seems ready to play a more visible role in Middle Turkish model will evolve depending on which aspect of this Eastern affairs, where political Islam stands out among the model is highlighted and by whom. Moreover, the attractive- winners of the Arab Spring and where disorder rather than ness of the Turkish experience will depend on its capacity to order appears as the short-term dominant trend in the region, tackle its own political deficits, on Turkey’s economic perform- the idea of neo-Ottomanism is likely to become popular again. ance, on the ability to leave aside arrogant and condescending Much to the dismay of Turkish politicians, Turkey’s interfer- attitudes in its relations with the new political leaders of the ence in the domestic affairs of its southern neighbours or even region and on the country’s capacity to join forces with other the idea of Turkey (and its Prime Minister) trying to play a international actors35. leading role in the Muslim world, will be interpreted as new- Ottoman ambitions by those who distrust Turkey’s growing influence in the region. Fine-tuning or comprehensive policy review: The Syrian challenge

Turkish model Syria is a litmus test for Turkish foreign policy’s capacity to adapt to a rapidly-changing environment, as well as case In a recent survey conducted by TESEV, an Istanbul-based in which the concepts outlined in this paper acquire a new think-tank, Turkey enjoys a very positive image in most meaning. Normalisation of relations with Syria was one of Middle Eastern countries, the visible facets of the AKP and a significant proportion Discussions on the Turkish model will zero problem approach, and but not all of those that view an example of its multidimen- Turkey’s involvement in the evolve depending on which aspect of sional foreign policy. Leaving region positively, also agree this model is highlighted and by whom behind the times when the two that Turkey can be a model countries came to the brink of for their countries (Akgün & a war in 1998, Erdoğan and Senyücel Gündoğar, 2012)33. As Meliha Benli Altunışık (2005) Bashar Al-Assad succeeded in overcoming long-standing explained, Turkey was already presented as a model for the conflicts (Altunisk and Tür, 2006). The two countries resolved Middle East in the framework of George W. Bush’s democra- territorial disputes over Hatay, started cooperation on sensitive tisation agenda, and even before then, in the early 1990s, was issues such as the fight against terrorism and the use of water also perceived as an inspiration for the newly-independent resources, introduced a visa-free regime and promoted an Central Asian Republics. As then, nowadays everyone tends exponential increase in trade relations which mainly benefited to interpret this model in a different way. Some actors, particu- border areas and industrial and tourist sectors in cities such as larly in the ranks of the Arab security establishments but also Gaziantep and Aleppo. Soft power was then considered the among some secular circles, view Turkey as a case in which the key to increasing Turkey’s influence in neighbouring regions. army has had a strong influence on domestic politics and has These were the days in which Erdoğan treated Bashar al-Assad acted as a guarantor of constitutional principles. Others view as a good friend and made multiple high-level visits to the the country as an example of coexistence between democracy country. Turkey also appeared to be a country pushing hard and Islam. The AKP is said to be a benchmark for the lead- for the normalisation of relations between Syria and the inter- ers of the Ennahda party in Tunisia and the Freedom and national community36. Justice Party in Egypt34. Finally, Turkey is often praised as an When the first protests started in March 2011 in Daraa, Idlib and the suburbs of Damascus, the Turkish authorities did not react with the same harshness as they had in the 32. Former AK Party Deputy Chairman of External, Affairs Suat Kınıklıoğlu (2011) maintains that “one of the main driving forces of Turkey’s new foreign policy is a distinct reconnec- case of Egypt. Some accused Ankara of double standards tion with the nation’s history, culture and civilisation”. There is a vivid debate on whether and said that their approach reflected the importance of ideology or interests lay behind this policy review. According to academics such as Pinar Bilgin and Ali Bilgic (2011), civilizational considerations are the driving force behind this economic interests in Turkish-Syrian relations, as they also change of orientation. Others, such as Nicholas Danforth, argue that “scholars have ove- remphasized the role of domestic identity and ideology in determining Turkish foreign policy”. 33. An average of 78 per cent of respondents said that they had a positive image of Turkey (varying from 93 per cent in the case of Libya to 44 per cent in Syria) while 61 per cent of respondents stated that they looked at Turkey as a model for the countries of the re- 35. Sinan Ülgen (2011) argues that “for the Turkish model to continue to provide inspiration, gion. Turkey needs to keep improving itself”, and lists issues such as freedom of the press or 34. AKP’s contacts with emerging leaders in the region are an asset that increases Turkey’s the interference of the state in religious affairs as areas where additional reforms are regional role and an area where Turkish and European authorities could cooperate in the needed. Soli Özel (2011: 74) argues that “its real strengths lie in its functioning economy, future. As said by Ibrahim Kalın, Turkish Prime Minister chief adviser, in his article “Tur- secular democratic system and ability to mediate between its Western allies and a region key and the Arab Spring” (Today’s Zaman, 23 May 2011), affirms that “the Muslim Bro- that is at long last joining the 21st-century mainstream”. therhood in Egypt, al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia, and Hamas in Palestine will all play 36. For instance, in 2008 Turkey mediated a peace deal between Israel and Syria, in April important and legitimate roles in the political future of their respective countries,” and 2009 Syrian and Turkish forces conducted a joint military exercise and a few months later suggests that “Americans and Europeans will need to engage these groups publicly and both countries held the first High Level Strategic Cooperation Council involving several directly, as Turkey has done.”. sectorial ministries.

documentos cidob MEDITERRÁNEO 18 . JUNE 2012 7 did in the case of Libya37. Until summer 2011, Turkey sent The evolution of the Syrian crisis is likely to remain the great- messages urging Al-Assad to pursue meaningful reforms, est challenge for Turkish foreign policy in the months to come. while also hosting meetings with the Syrian opposition in It will determine whether the current adaptation of priorities Antalya and Istanbul. Ahmet Davutoğlu travelled several and discourses will suffice or, on the contrary, a deeper policy times to Damascus, and in August he delivered the message review is needed. The Turkish foreign policy is still the result of that Turkey was running out of patience38. As the situation the end of the Cold War, and as long as the Middle East remains continued to deteriorate, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and also in a period which UK Foreign Secretary William Hague has the President Abdullah Gül stated that Turkey had lost all compared with a new Cold War, the priorities and discourse trust and confidence in the Syrian leadership39. Turkey then of Turkish foreign policy are likely to require much more than applied those sanctions that the EU had imposed beforehand, fine-tuning. closed the land border with Syria and not only non-violent opposition movements but also the Free Syrian Army found a safe haven in Turkey. Up to now, scenarios remain very Bibliography open and, as Joshua W. Walker (2012: 6) has said, Turkey’s leaders “know that they cannot sit idly by as their neighbour AKGÜN, Mensur; Senyüncel Gündoğar, Sabiha. The Perception of disintegrates into civil war, nor can they afford to intervene Turkey in the Middle East 2011. Istanbul, TESEV. 2012 unilaterally”. ALESSANDRI, Emiliano. “The New Turkish Foreign Policy and the This policy U-turn necessarily implied a change of dis- Future of Turkey-EU Relations”, Documenti IAI, no. 10-03. 2010 course. Firstly, because it showed the limits of soft power, as Turkish leaders were unable to persuade a presumably ALTUNIŞIK, Meliha Benli; TÜR, Özlem. “From Distant Neighbors To friendly government to pursue political reforms. Secondly, Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations”, Security Dialogue, vol. because the zero problem approach was reformulated as 37, no. 2. 2006. pp. 229-248. the absence of problems with societies and, therefore, as the need to confront those governments that were massa- ALTUNIŞIK, Meliha Benli. “The Turkish Model and Democratization cring their own people. Thirdly, because Turkish authori- in the Middle East”, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1-2, 2005. pp. ties realised that the country could not influence Syrian 45-63. affairs with autonomous actions, but had to increase consultations with the US, the EU and the Arab League. In ALTUNIŞIK, Meliha Benli. “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s a similar token, Turkish diplo- Soft Power in the Middle East”, macy underlined the impor- The evolution of the Syrian crisis is Insight Turkey, vol. 10, no. 2. tance of multilateral solutions 2008. pp. 41-54. (even if they were to be found likely to remain the greatest challenge outside the framework of the for Turkish foreign policy in the months ARAS, Bülent. “Davutoğlu UN)40. Fourthly, the situation in to come. It will determine whether Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”. Syria began to be presented as Insight Turkey, vol. 11, no 3. an internal affair for Turkey, the current adaptation of priorities 2009. pp. 127-142. not only because of geographi- and discourses will suffice or, on the cal proximity and the evident contrary, a deeper policy review is BILGIN, Pinar; BILGIÇ, Ali repercussions on the Kurdish “Turkey’s “New” Foreign Policy issue, but also because the two needed toward Eurasia”. Eurasian countries have deep cultural Geography and Economics, vol. and historical ties, thus reviving 52, no. 2. 2011. pp.173-195. the debate on Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. Fifthly, being considered an internal affair and in light of an ongo- ÇAĞAPTAY, Soner. “Is Turkey leaving the West? Foreign Affairs, 29 ing politicisation of foreign policy debates, Syria became a October 2011. fertile ground for partisan confrontation between the AKP and the main opposition party, the CHP, which went so DANFORTH, Nicolas. “Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign far as to send in September 2011 a high-level delegation to Policy: From Ataturk to the AKP”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 7, no. Damascus when the government had started to harden its 3. 2010. pp. 83-95. positions against the regime. DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet. Strategik Derinlik, Turkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu (Strategic Depth, Turkey’s International Position), Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari. 2001.

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