INFORMATIOM TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1.T he sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 74 - 17,766 DEVINE, Michael John, 1945- JOHN W. FOSTER AND THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1974 History, modern

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© 1974

MICHAEL JOHN DEVINE

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED JOHN W. FOSTER AND THE

DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Michael J. Devine, B.A. * M.A.

* * * *

The Ohio State U niversity 1974

Reading Committee: Approved by Dr. Marvin Zahniser

Dr. Alfred Eckes

Dr. Tien-yi Li ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Numerous individuals have given me valuable assistance in the preparation of this study. My adviser* Professor Marvin Zahniser has guided this project from its beginnings. Professor A1 Eckes and

Professor Li Tien-yi have been most considerate and helpful; they have given generously of their time and energy in order that I could finish my work Without delay or undue expense.

X am especially grateful to Professor John Gaddis of Ohio

University for reading the entire manuscript and providing important and constructive critic ism s. Also Professor James Cunningham of Ohio

University read certain chapters and offered substantial advice, and

Professor Hal Williams of Yale University contributed valuable.

Insightful information on Foster*s relationship with Blaine. I greatly appreciate the efforts of all of the men mentioned above have made to improve the q u ality of th is paper.

My lovely vlfe, Maija, has suffered many hardships in order th at I might fin ish th is work. She helped earn the family income, cared for our child and typed the various drafts and the dissertation

Itself. Without her assistance and cooperation this dissertation could not have been written.

i i VITA

January 5 , 1945...... Bom - Aurora, Illinois

1967 ...... B.A., Loras College, Dubuque, Iowa

1968 ...... M.A., Ohio State U niversity

1968-196 9 ...... Instructor of History, Loras College

1969-1970...... Peace Corps Volunteer, Assigned to Sogang University, Seoul, Korea

1971-1972...... Teaching Associate, Department of History, Ohio State U niversity

1972-1974...... Instructor of History, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: United States Diplomatic History

U.S. Foreign Policy. Professor Marvin Zahniser

American Colonial and Revolutionary Era. Professor Bradley Chapin

History of Modern East Asia. Professor Tien-yi Li

History of Modem Latin America. Professor Stephen Stoan

i l l TABLE OP CONTENTS

Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... ii

VITA ...... i l l

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter

I. MIDWESTERN ORIGINS ...... 6

II. THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE, 1873-1880:

The Porf iriato ...... 18

III, POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY IN THE “AWKWARD YEARS'* . . 47

IV. A HARBINGER OF IMPERIALISM IN THE HARRISON ADMINISTRATION...... 77

V. THE ANNEXATION OFHAWAII ...... H ?

VI. NEGOTIATIONS AT SHIMONOSEKIS THE DIPLOMACY OF INTRIGUE AND IMPERIALISM ..... 161

VII. A CONCEPT OFAMERICAN MISSION ...... 201

VIII.FINAL YEARS: A “HANDY MAN*’ IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ...... 232

IX. CONCLUSION...... 255

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 259

Iv INTRODUCTION

'•My grandfather, whose name I bear, exerted a great influence over my life, and he had ideals and purposes which I have tried to make my own. He was a deeply patriotic American. He belonged to the period which saw this country rapidly developing from a small Atlantic coast group into a nation that spread across the continent. He fought to preserve the Union; and then on diplomatic missions and as Secretary of State he helped to spread the influence of this nation throughout the world both in Europe and in Asia .'1

John Foster Dulles, speaking at the University of Indiana commencement exercises, 1955

During the final decades of the nineteenth century the United

States underwent a tremendous transition in its foreign relations.

While the nation seemed content to maintain a politically isolationist

posture prior to the war with Spain, subtle changes had been developing

in the role the United States played in world affairs for at least a

generation before Admiral Dewey's fle e t sailed into Manila Bay. A new internationalism in foreign policy emerged, characterized by

increased foreign trade, expanded frontiers for national defense in

the Caribbean and Pacific, and an enlarged navy. When the United

States entered the twentieth century as a recognized world power the expansionist ambitions of adm inistrations from Grant to McKinley had been realized.

The growth of the United States as an imperial nation has been studied in recent years by a multitude of historians—William A.

Williams, Walter LaFeber, Ernest May, John A.S. Grenville, H. Wayne

Morgan and David Pletcher ranking perhaps as the most prominent.

1 2

Although these historians differ in their interpretation of the causes for the adoption of an expansionist and aggressive foreign policy, all agree that by 1900 the United States had evolved from its classic period of political isolation and assumed an increasingly intemation- 1 alist posture.

John W. Foster, a diplomat whose career spanned the years in which the United States gradually came to a realization of ’’Manifest Destiny",, fully approved of the trend towards an activist foreign policy. Begin­ ning with his appointment as M inister to Mexico in 1873, Foster p a r tic i­ pated in foreign policy decision making which had as central purposes to increase the trade of the United States in Latin America and the

Pacific, establish the prestige of the United States throughout the world and expand and secure the frontiers of the republic in the Caribbean and

Pacific. In a career that included service as Minister to Mexico,

Russia and Spain, numerous special missions, and nine months as

Secretary of State, Foster continually labored, in the spirit of the age, to bring to his young country the status of a great power.

Following his most active years in diplomacy, Foster wrote several histories of United States foreign relations in which he justified America’s policies from the time of the founding fathers.

He called for an even greater commitment from future American generations to the cause of world leadership. American diplomacy,

*For an interesting and thoughtful critique of the historiography of American imperial diplomacy, with particular emphasis on Far Eastern policy, see Marilyn B. Young, "The Quest for Empire," American-East Asian Relations; A Survey, ed. by Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 131-142. 3 as he viewed it, was a kind of Christian and philanthropic enter­ prise, When he died in 1917 at the age of eighty four, the Civil

War veteran and former small town newspaper editor from Indiana, whose son-in-law was now Secretary of State, believed his beloved country to be championing the cause of western civilization as it entered World War I,

For better than forty years John W, Foster held a place in the vortex of foreign policy activities. He dealt directly with those nations and areas of the world where United States interests in the late nineteenth century were most vitally concerned. A study of

Foster’s career could be justified simply as a consequence of his intimate involvement in the important diplomatic matters of his day, but his extensive writings on foreign policy merit him additional consi- 2 deration. Furthermore, because several of his descendants became prominent figures in twentieth century United States foreign policy 3 making, Foster’s life and career take on additional significance.

No complete biography of Foster has ever been published. The best account of Foster’s career is provided in William R. Castle, "John W. Foster," American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed.by Samuel F. Bemis and Robert Farrell (New York: Pageant Book Co., 1958), VIII, 185-223. Also of interest is a study by Daniel W. Snepp, "John Watson Foster, Soldier and P o litic ia n ," Indiana Magazine of History. XXXII (September, 1936). Foster has been the subject of two doctoral dissertations. Chester C. Kaiser, John W. Foster: United States M inister to Mexico. 1873-1880 (American University, 1954), d e tails Foster’s role in Mexico during the first years of the Diaz regime. A description of Foster's life and career in sympathetic and uncritical terms is presented in Francis M. Phillips, John Watson Foster. 1836- 1917. 2 vols. (New Mexico, 1956). Phillips' work is useful for information regarding Foster's family life and military career.

^Because so little has been written about Foster his contri­ butions to American foreign policy are often neglected, or he is confused with other public men who shared his surname. For examples of mis- identification regarding John W. Foster, see William A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 201; 4

This examination of Foster's influence on American diplomacy will focus on the following aspects of his career: 1 ) efforts to acquire for the United States insular possessions, particularly the Hawaiian

Islands, to serve as outposts for trade and bases for naval power;

2) work in the area of reciprocity with regard to Spain for Cuba and

Puerto Rico; and 3) contributions as a spokesman and defender of

American imperialism; 4) participation in peace organizations which attempted to impose Anglo-Saxon standards of order and law on non­ western people, and 5) support for Christian missionary activities.

In spite of the tremendous amount of printed material left by

John W. Foster, any historian attempting to reconstruct the details of his lengthy association with American foreign policy faces a severe hardship. Ironically Foster, a historian by avocation who knew the value of documents, tried to make certain that few of his important papers survived for future historians. As Foster told it,"I destroyed most of my voluminous papers and correspondence thinking them of no 4 further use." It is impossible to explain this act on Foster's part unless one assumes that he felt critical evaluation of this material would diminish the credibility of the careful and measured testimony he 5 presented in his two-volume Diplomatic Memoirs.

David S. Muzzey, James G. Blaine (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1963 [1934) ), 451. ^Foster to Otto Gresham, April 24, 1916, Walter Q. Gresham Papers. ^Foster wrote his autobiography at the age of seventy three, and these two volumes were his final major literary effort. Obviously written before he destroyed his personal papers, Foster relied heavily on his private correspondence and the materials in the State Department archives, to which he had complete access. See Foster to Wilson, December 8, 1908, Wilson Papers IX. Most useful in preparing this study have been the manuscript collections in the Library of Congress that contain Foster*s letters to colleagues and associates. Among the richest sources are the much examined papers of James Harrison Wilson and those of Walte r Q. Gresham.

Also of value are the papers of John Hay, who seemed to have a special fondness for Foster, and those of Hamilton Fish. The John Bassett

Moore papers provide important insights into Foster*s role during the

Harrison administration, and the collection of Secretary of the Navy

Benjamin Tracy*s papers have information regarding the annexation of

Hawaii. The Presidential Papers (Microfilm) of Benjamin Harrison include letters and memoranda pertinent to the long association of the two men.

The manuscript collections of the Department of State hold a wealth of fascinating m aterial as do numerous congressional documents. I

MIDWESTERN ORIGINS

The long and varied career of John Watson Foster in international

diplomacy had its origins in the tough environment of state politics

in Indiana. In 1872 Foster served as the chairman of the Republican

State Central Committee in a campaign that proved to be exceptionally .

difficult for the supporters of the incumbent, Ulysses S. Grant. A

Liberal Republican or Mugwump party had risen to challenge the old guard or "Stalwart" Republicans who remained loyal to Grant. In addition to facing the combined challenge of the renegade Republicans and the Democrats, Grant's forces had to defuse such explosive issues as the involvement of the administration in a filibuster to annex Haiti, racial troubles in the occupied South, the exposing of the scandalous conduct of the William M, Tweed Ring in New York city, and the demand for civil service reform -- a cause the Mugwumps had made central to their program. Everywhere the campaign was prosecuted with the utmost b itte rn e ss, but perhaps no sta te witnessed greater p o litic a l vehemence than Indiana; here, Grant's foremost, loyalist., the powerful Senator

Oliver P. Morton, fought fiercely for his political life . 1

lAn added problem for Republicans in Indiana was the removal of Schyler Colfax from the ticket as the vice-presidential condicate. Foster had attended the party convention and worked for Colfax. Col­ fax to Foster (telegram) June 6 , 1872, Foster Papers. For an account

6 7

Senator Morton, a crippled and weathered veteran of innumerable political wars, believed with grim determination that his only chance for survival was to keep the Republican party in his state united by 2 firin g the hatreds of the recent war. Morton also trie d to keep the political machinery well lubricated with generous doses of campaign money. In March the Senator wrote to instruct John Watson Foster regarding.the strategy he was to adopt. Morton ordered Foster to patch 3 up local differences for the coming election. Later he informed

Foster that money was being raised and assured the State Chairman by writing "we have the greatest faith in your ability to organize the party... and believe you have already succeeded in in alarming the 4 democrats." However, the election of. a Democratic governor in October shook the Republicans, and Morton desperately dispatched a lieutenant 5 to New York for thousands of dollars of additional funds. In the end intensive campaigning and enormous expenditures paid off; Indiana joined those states which provided Grant an overwhelming victory in electoral votes. -

The months following the great v icto ries of Grant and Morton were a time for paying political debts and rewarding party loyalists. John of the Campaign of 1872 see Matthew Josephson, The Pol it ic o s .1865- 1896 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), 142-165.

2 Josephson, P o litico s. 165.

^Morton to Foster, March 15, 1872, Foster Papers.

^Morton to Foster, April 2, 1872, Foster Papers.

^Morton to E.D. Morgan, August 12, 1878, in Josephson, The P oliticos, 168, 8

W. Foster ranked among the first to be considered. Foster's work in

the campaign had not only won him the gratitude of Indiana Republicans 6 but had attracted the attention of the ambitious James G. Blaine.

Foster was soon in Washington where Senator Morton to ld him to look

through the register of Federal offices, known then as the "Blue Book".

Morton assured Foster that he need not concern himself with qualifica­

tions or experience, and Foster took this to mean that the Senator had the influence to secure almost any appointment. After discussing the

matter with his wife, and deciding that "a brief residence in Europe would be both pleasant and useful," Foster requested assignment to 7 Switzerland. Morton failed to procure the position in Switzerland but offered instead the prospect of an appointment as Minister to Mexico.

Foster recorded his reaction to Morton's suggestion in his Memoirs s

"I was bewildered by the proposition. It was with much misgiving as to my fitness for the office tthat)I had chosen the Swiss Mission, one of the lowest and most unimportant of the diplomatic posts; and now I was tendered the highest and most difficult mission on the American hemisphere. I frankly told the Senator that I very much doubted the wisdom of accepting such a post with my entire inexperience in diplomacy. I at the time spoke no foreign language, had never been out of my own country, and had only a text-book knowledge of international law. But the Senator only smiled at my hesitation, reasserted his confidence in my ability, and said I was much much better fitted than most of those who were appointed to our diplomatic service."g

Morton's confidence in Foster was to prove well founded as his protege soon demonstrated remarkable diplomatic skill under difficult

^Blaine to Foster, November 10, 1872, Foster Papers. Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, I, 10-11.

^Memo i rs . 1, 3-4.

8Ibid.. 4-5. 9

circumstances in Mexico City. Although inexperienced in diplomacy and unfamiliar with foreign affairs Foster had received a fine education and his participation in domestic politics had provided him with the opportunity to develop his talent for political maneuvering. Following his appointment to Mexico Foster was never again to return to live in his native Indiana and was destined to spend the next forty years in international diplomacy.

it * *

The son of a sturdy and energetic merchant-farmer, the new

Minister to Mexico was born near Evansville, Indiana on March 8,

1836. His father, Matthew Watson Foster, had immigrated to the United

States with his family from England at the age of twelve, and, after liv in g b rie fly in New York, the young Matthew se ttle d on eighty acres in Pike County, Indiana in 1819. Energetic and resourceful, Matthew prospered economically and socially. He married Eleanor Johnson, the daughter of a member of Indiana*s first territorial legislature and a former aid to William Henry Harrison. By the time the couple's third ch ild , John Watson, was born, Matthew had moved to the nearby town of

Petersburg where he operated a successful store and won election as a

Probate Judge. In 1839 the family moved to Evansville where "Judge"

Foster achieved success in the wholesale business and later became interested in banking and railroad ventures. Described by a contem- 10

porary as ’'one of our roost enterprising, upright, enlightened and philanthropic c itiz e n s ," Matthew Foster headed a household of ten children -- eight by Eleanor, a sincere and pious woman who died helping victims of a riverboat d isaster in 1849, and two by a second 9 wife, a socially prominent widow named Sarah Kazar.

The Calvinistic discipline and hard work characterized the Foster home, Matthew Foster encouraged his children in their studies and enrolled them in subscription schools. John Watson, a p artic u la rly bright student was sent to the Academy of a Professor M.W, Safford to 10 prepare for studies at the State University of Indiana. At the

University he excelled and graduated in 1855 as the valedictorian of his class. Following a year of study at Harvard University Law School and a brief legal apprenticeship in Cincinnati, he began practice in his native Evansville at the age of twenty one. The young lawyer’s first law associates included Conrad Baker, who later became Governor of Indiana.**

While still in college John Foster became active in politics, and his outspoken views on the slavery issue caused him to be called "an abolitionist’’ by his disapproving classmates. Although too young to

g Information regarding family background can be found in F o ster's Biographical Sketch of Matthew W. Foster (Washington, D.C.: Printed for private circulation, 1896). Also see Edward White, ed., Evansville and Its Men of Mark.(Evansville. Ind.: Historical Publishing Co., 1873), 72-73.

^ Biographical Sketch. 38, 57, 61.

**Memoirs. I, 8; William R. Castle, "John W. Foster," American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. VIII, 188. vote, he worked in the Fremont campaign in 1856 and became even more

deeply involved in political organization during the presidential 12 election of Lincoln, Like many abolitionists, Foster viewed the Civil

War as a kind of crusade to purge the nation of the evils of slavery.

nMy whole soul was enlisted in the anti-slavery cause," Foster recalled a half century after the fall of Fort Sumter, "and when the Civil War,.. burst upon the country, my first impulse was to join the army of the 13 Union.. . . "

Foster was not anxious to adopt the hardships of military life, but he felt that his moral convictions left him no choice. In 1859 he had married Mary Parke McFerson, a young lady of social standing.

By the time the war broke out Foster and his bride had settled into a comfortable home in Evansville with their infant daughter. The Fosters were relieved that the initial rush of volunteers to the union cause was so great in Indiana that the supply of manpower greatly exceeded the apparent need. However, after the defeats suffered by the northern armies in the f i r s t months of the war Foster f e lt compelled to answer

President Lincoln*s renewed request for volunteers. Having been an outspoken abolitionist and loyal Republican, Foster believed "the call was loudest upon those who had professed devotion to the anti-slavery cause." Following the news of the disaster at Bull Run, he journeyed

12 Memoirs. I , .9; Located on the Ohio River, Evansville was a hotbed of racial tension where slave raiding was common. For an interesting contemporary description of ante bellum Evansville see Frank M. Gilbert, History of the City of Evansville. I (Chicago; Pioneer Publishing Co., 1910), 164-177.

13 Memoirs, I, 9; War St-ories for My Grandchildren (Washington, D.C.: Printed for private circulation, 1918), 2-3. 12

to Indianapolis and enlisted.

During his college days Foster had regarded himself as a "peace

man," and upon deciding to enter the army he held serious doubts about

his fitness — physical and mental -- for the life he knew he would 15 experience as a soldier. In spite of his lack of military training

or in clin atio n , Foster received a commission from Oliver P. Morton,

then Governor of Indiana, As a major in the Twenty F ifth Indiana

Volunteers, Foster soon saw action in some of the war's most cruel battles and came into personal contact with commanders Ulysses S. 16 Grant, George Thomas, and William T. Sherman. At Shiloh, Foster was 17 involved in the bloodiest of warfare and narrowly escaped death.

Incredibly, Foster emerged from the fie rc e st b attle s unscratched, and his health, never robust, remained good despite the numerous hard 18 campaigns, poor living conditions and despicable medical facilities.

Actually, Foster's physical constitution probably improved as a result of the rigorous army life, and, from his actions in leading men under 19 enemy fire, he gained self-confidence he had never known before.

*^War S to rie s. 2, 177.

^Foster's recollections of his military career as stated in his Memoirs and War S tories include numerous excerpts from his private correspondence which were apparently destroyed after Foster's death.

*^Memoirs. I, 9. l^War Stories, 61-67. Foster wrote a description of the battle of Shiloh in a letter to his father, who had it published in the New York Tribune (April 22, 1863). The young officer was upset about his father's action and did not appreciate the notoriety it brought him. 78.

I8War S tories. 20.

1 9Ibid.., 19, 20, 57, 116, 177; Memoirs. I, 9. 13

While involved in the most brutal warfare, Foster did not feel

th a t he compromised his C hristian p rin cip les; indeed, if anything, the ,

wartime experiences deepended his religious convictions. "I will not

forget my Christian standing," he wrote, "I want to come home as good

a Christian at least as when I left, though the temptations to evil and

bad habits are great." Unlike many 5f his fellow officers, Foster kept

the Sabbath by attending services whenever possible and longed for the 20 day when he could spend his Sundays attending services with his family.

Before leaving to join the army Foster had established a Mission Sunday

School in Evansville, and the survival of this effort was constantly on

his mind. In his letters to his wife he gave detailed instructions as

" 21 to how the school should be operated in his absence. Throughout his

long life Foster held tight to his fundamentalist Presbyterian faith, and he never ceased to support Christian missionary efforts and various philanthropic organizations.

Foster's most difficult assignment during the war came in Kentucky where he was placed in command of the union forces in that border state and charged with maintaining civil order. In January, 1863 Foster

reported that rebel guerrillas were causing trouble by stopping mail

deliveries, interrupting river traffic and forcing some men of union sympathies to flee the area. He described the tactics of the confederates

in the area as "cowardly and cruel and entirely unwarranted csic'j by the rules of civilized nations." - Realizing that the guerrillas operated

? 0 War S tories. 33, 34, 38, 53, 167-168.

2 1 Ibid., 9-10. 14

with the support of local sympathisers who made life difficult for union people, Foster forced, a harsh levy on individuals suspected of aiding the rebels and had the revenue distributed to union families 22 "in proportion to their necessities and losses."

Protests against Foster's actions from prominent Democratic 23 politicians reached President Lincoln, who decided that Foster's

"cause of procedure, though just and politic in some cases, is so liable to gross abuse as to do great injustice to some other and give 24 the government immense trouble." Foster denied that the confiscations of rebel property involved any wrongdoing and sent his commander a 25 detailed report on the subject. Foster’s account of his actions met with approval as far as his superior was concerned, but Foster never- 26 theless requested and received a transfer.

^Foster to General Boyle, January 6 , 1863, Robert Todd Lincoln Papers, XCIX.

^Senator Powell to President Lincoln, January 31, 1863, Robert Todd Lincoln Papers, Cl. Senator Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana denounced Foster as the d ic tato r of Kentucky, Congressional Globe. 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1863-1864, Pt. 3, 2536,

^President Lincoln to General Boyle, February 1, 1863, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler, ed., (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953-1954), VI, 85-86.

Foster to Boyle, February 16, 1863, Robert Todd Lincoln Papers, C III; General Boyle to President Lincoln, February 11, 20, 1963, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. VI, 87.

War S tories, 116. F o ster's actions in Kentucky remained a source Of bitter feelings for many years. In 1893 an angry citizen raised the issue of Foster's confiscations in Kentucky to protest his appointment to be the agent for the United States government before the Paris Tribunal. See Blanton Luncan to Secretaries Gresham and C arlisle, March 31, 1893, Gresham Papers, XL. 15

Foster participated in the war because he believed he had a moral obligation to fight for the righteousness of the union cause.

His wartime adventures took place entirely in the border regions where he viewed closely the sufferings of union sympathisers, and the situa­ tion he witnessed hardened his convictions. In August, 1863 Foster's regiment was ordered into eastern Tennessee to take part in a planned

invasion of that area of pro-union sentiment, and here he became even 27 more deeply concerned about the condition of union people.

Because he was so committed to the cause fo r which he fought,

Foster was tempted to pursue a military career. In August, 1864 he wrote "I take so much interest in the war and am so thoroughly satis­ fied with the correctness of the principles for which it is being 28 prosecuted, that I must confess I do not like to leave the army,..."

The strenuous objections of his wife and increased family responsibilities, however, compelled him to leave the military when his service ended in 29 September, 1864.

* * *

97 " ; ————— — — See F o ster's le tte rs of September 12 and 16, 1863, in War Stories. 130-135.

^ F o s te r to wife, August 7, 1864, Ibid. . 174.

29’A complete resume of Foster's military career can be found in the "Statement of Military Service of John W. Foster," as provided by the Adjutant General's Office of the War Department, printed in War Stories. 191-192. AC the conclusion of the war Foster spent a few months

practicing law in Cincinnati and then returned to Evansville where

he purchased and edited the city's Daily Journal. As a journalist

he sharpened his ideas on politics and public issues and developed an

interest in the problems of reconstruction. He also became active

in state politics through the election of 1872. After his appointment

to Mexico Foster kept an address in Evansville fo r many years and 30 maintained close ties with numerous Midwestern politicians. Among

his most important contacts were Walter Q. Gresham, Benjamin Harrison,

two men he had come to know personally during his wartime experience*

Throughout the remainder of their lives, Foster was to be intimately associated with these two important political figures.

The diplomatic career of John W. Foster was initiated in his thirty-eighth year and resulted enitrely from his service as a

Republican Party loyalist. Nothing in Foster*s life prior to his appointment as Minister to Mexico indicated that he possessed the qualifications for a skilled diplomat. He had never been abroad. He spoke no foreign language. Like most Americans of his time, Foster

indicated little concern for foreign affairs and seemed untroubled by

international politics before he entered the foreign service. However,

Foster was a diligent and scholarly individual; he quickly learned the art of diplomacy and became a sophisticated and capable diplomat.

His involvement in the rugged world of Indiana statehouse politics had provided him with an excellent education in the art of political

30Memoirs. I, 10-12. 17 expediency. Foster quickly proved that he had acquired a sense for the pragmatic from the elderly Senator Morton. Furthermore, Foster's military service had a maturing effect on his development. He emerged from the war with recognizable leadership qualities, and he had the confidence of knowing that he could perform efficiently under even 31 the most severe form of pressure. Foster's diverse background in the military, politics, journalism and law would serve him well through­ out his diplomatic career.

31 After having risen to the office of Secretary of State Foster became involved in efforts to reform the foreign service. He proposed that secretaries of Legations enter the service through com petitive exams, but he doubted the wisdom of appointing m inisters and ambassadors from the ranks of the secretaries. He believed that the United States had been well served by the practice of appointing ministers with diverse backgrounds. See Foster's The Practice of Diplomacy. 7-14; Memoirs. I, 12-13; also Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy In the United States, 1799-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 63, 8 8. II

THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE 1873-1880:

THE PORFIRIATO

Following the official notification of his appointment the new minister studiously set about briefing himself on recent develop- 1 ments in United States relations with Mexico. Early in 1873 the

United States looked with favor upon the liberal administration of

President Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada and an increasingly cordial relatio n sh ip with it was an ticipated. Expanded commercial relatio n s 2 between the two countries also seemed likely. Before leaving the

United States to assume his post the newly appointed m inister had an

Foster to Fish, March 27, 1873, Despatches, Mexico* 47. According to the New York Times. President Grant sent Foster’s nomination to.the Senate as one of ”a batch of nominations of more than average importance.” (March 15, 1873), 1. Foster to R.S. Chew, Chief Clerk of the State Department, March 29, 1873, Despatches, Mexico, 47.

A Upon the sudden death of -Benito Juarez, Lerdo. de Tejada became President of Mexico in July 1872 and, at first, enjoyed great popular support. He offered amnesty to the followers of Porfirio Diaz who had rebelled in opposition to the election of Juarez. Diaz accepted a full pardon and turned to sugar planting. A man of great intellect and wide learning, Lerdo lacked the ability and will to act decisively and firm ly. Within two years he had lost much of his initial popularity. See Henry Baniford Parkes, A History of Mexico. 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), 281-283; Herbert Howe Bancroft, story of Mexico. 6 vols. (San Francisco: The History Co., 1888), VI, 390-407.

18 19

opportunity to express his views on the prospects for increased

trade and improved re la tio n s with Mexico.

Foster and his family were to travel to Mexico aboard the U.S.S.

CanandaIgua from New Orleans to Vera Cruz, but because of a misunder­

standing in communications Foster spent several extra days in New 3 Orleans awaiting instructions and credentials. While thus delayed,

Foster responded to a request from the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce

and addressed a gathering of that organization on May 17. Knowing

that this southern city was anxious for increased trade with Latin

America, Foster cautioned that commerce and prosperity depended on

domestic order and peaceful submission to constituted authorities.

He pointed out that the establishment of a direct steamship line

between New Orleans and Vera Cruz would be useful. The remarks seemed to make a favorable impression on the audience of businessmen whose 4 fortunes had not been happy since the war years. Preoccupation with

improving commercial relations between the two nations was to charac- 5 terize Foster's diplomatic service during his years in Mexico City.

The address before the New Orleans businessmen indicates that Foster had given matters of commercial activity serious consideration at the earliest stage of his diplomatic career.

3 George M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, to Foster, May 8, 1873, Foster Papers; Foster to R. S. Chew, May 17, 1873; Foster to Fish, May 19, 1873, Despatches, Mexico, 48.

4New York Times (May 18, 1873), 1.

5 Memoirs, I, 108-109. 20

Despite persistent problem of looting by bandits and Indians along the United States border with Mexico, no urgent problems seemed to await Foster in Mexico. Encouraging friendly relations between the

United States and the republican government in Mexico was to be 6 F o ste r's primary assignment. A rriving in Mexico on May 27, he 7 presented his credentials on June 16 , and quickly set himself to the tasks of acquiring a working knowledge of the Spanish language and acquainting himself with the diverse community of United States 8 citiz en s living in Mexico. During his f i r s t months in Mexico Foster made routine reports to Washington on Apache Indian a c tiv itie s along 9 Mexico's border with the United States, and in December he relayed information concerning violent political protests and armed uprisings 10 in Yucatan. However, the difficulties facing the Mexican government

Foster's instructions indicated the major issues of concern to be implementation of the Conventions of 1868 and 1872 regarding claims of United States citizens against Mexico for property losses. Foster was also instructed to afford as much protection as possible to United States citizens residing in Mexico. Fish to Foster, April 26, June 25, 1873, In structions, Mexico, 18, 19. The condition of US- Mexican relations in 1873 is discussed in Callahan, American-Mexican Relations, 341-349.

^Foster to Fish (u n o fficial), May 30, 1873; June 18, 1873, Despatches, Mexico, 48. O Foster to Fish, July 10, 1873, with newspaper clippings, Despatches, Mexico, 49; Memoirs. I, 19.

^Foster to Fish, August 27, with enclosure of press clippings from The Two Republics (August 23, 1873) and E stralla de Occidente (July 11, 1873), Despatches, Mexico, 49.

^ F o s te r to Fish, December 31, 1873, Despatches, Mexico, 50. The rebellion by the fiercely independent natives of primitive Yucatan was the resumption of a long struggle against federal authority. Lerdo's in a b ility to put down the revolt or s e ttle for a compromise 21

at this time did not appear to be serious, and there seemed to be

good reason to believe that Lerdo's government would prove to be dom estically stab le. Hoping to help the frien d ly Mexican regime

Secretary of State Fish instructed Foster to urge support for Lerdo 11 and to avoid saying anything which might weaken his administration.

While the United States continued to hold great hope for the

Lerdo regime, powerful anti-government forces within Mexico began to emerge. In January 1874 the Mexican Congress had demonstrated strong opposition to the President, and many newspapers which had previously been government organs now turned against the administration because 12 of the P resid en t's increasingly d ic ta to ria l methods,. A year la te r 13 Lerdo survived an attempted coup, and demanded from Congress excep­ tional executive powers to meet what he recognized to be a crisis 14 situ a tio n . By the summer of 1875 the economy of the country was in

F o ste r's opinion, completely paralyzed as g u e rrilla bands rampaged the weakened'his adm inistration. See Bancroft, History of Mexico. VI, 408-418.

**Fish to Foster, January 16, 1874, Instructions, Mexico, 19. This order probably resulted from Foster's comments which appeared in the New Ynrk Tribune (January 15, 1874), 1.

l^This observation came from Foster and appeared in the New York Tribune (January 15, 1874), 1.

^ F o s te r to Fish, March 2, 1875, Foreign Relations. 1875, 885-887.

*^Foster to Fish, March 4, 1875 and May 25, 1875, Foreign Relations. 1875, 913, 922. 22

countryside and tension between the President and the legislative , 15 increased.

The leader of the revolutionary forces, General Porfirio

Diaz-, operated along the Rio Grande riv e r where he set up headquarters 16 in Brownsville, Texas and then raided in Mexico with great success.

The strength of Diaz* forces increased throughout 1876, and on

November 21 Lerdo evacuated the capital. As the triumphant Diaz entered Mexico City worried diplomats from various countries gathered with Foster in the United States Legation to discuss policy.*^

Diaz had created numerous problems fo r the United S tates.

As a revolutionary, leader attacking a government friendly to the

United States he had interrupted lines of communication, forced United

States citizens living in Mexico to loan money to his cause, and 18 repeatedly crossed into United States territory. Furthermore, Diaz had denounced all foreign investors and accused the Lerdo government of sacrificing the country to foreigners. In his Plan of Palo Blanco,

March 31, 1876, a modification of his e a r lie r Plan of Tuxtepec, Diaz

^ F o s te r to Fish, July 28, September 23 and 27, 1875, Foreign Relations. 1875, 947-948, 950, 951.

^ F o s te r to Fish, February 2 and April 22, 1876, Foreign Relations. 1876, 392, 396-398; Foster to Fish (unofficial) March 14, 1876, Hamilton Fish Papers, CXII.

^ F o s te r to Fish, November 28, 1876, Despatches, Mexico, 57.

*®F. W. Seward to Foster, May 16, 1877, Instructions, Mexico, 19; Report of the Committee on Foreign A ffairs on Relations of the United States with Mexico, House Report. No. 701, 45th Cong., and Sess. Appendix G., 447. 23

claimed that Lerdo was attempting to"rob Mexicans of their future, and sell the country to foreigners."^ After the generally moderate and constitutional governments of Benito Juarez and Lerdo, the arrival of the apparently revolutionary Diaz caused consternation and alarm in 20 Washington.

As Diaz took control of the capital Foster requested instructions regarding official policy toward the new regime. On November 28, the minister summarized the situation for Secretary Fish and asked for 21 instruction. Foster stated that he could not be certain immediately as to the a b ility of Diaz- to govern a ll of Mexico effectiv ely , but he did feel that the revolutionists had the military capabilities necessary to hold the capital. Foster also advised Secretary Fish that Diaz would make an effo rt to produce a payment on a claims settlem ent to the United States in January as a means of prodding Washington into

^ " P la n de Tuxtepec Reformado en Palo Blanco,M March 21, 1876, Archivo de General Diaz: Memorias v Documentos. Prologo y notas de Alberto Maria Carreno, XII (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1951), 97-10.0, Also see Bancroft, History of Mexico, .VI, 420-423. 20Whether Diaz was truly a revolutionary or merely a political opportunist has never been resolved. Mexican historian Daniel Casio- Villegas has stated, "Porfirio Diaz in his revolutionary days was what the press today would call a pink: a fierce anticlericalist and a Jacobin Liberal who was both xenophobic and anti-imperialist." Casio- Villegas bases this assessment on the fact that Diaz, while seeking to broaden his support in Mexico, threatened to void a ll contracts made by Lerdo with foreign governments. The United States versus Porfirio Diaz trans. by Nettie Lee Benson (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1963), xi. Also see Robert D. Gregg, The Influence of Border Troubles on Relations between the United States and Mexico. 1876-1910 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 17-18.

21 ■ Foster to Fish (personal and confidential) November 18, 1876, Fish Papers, CXVII. giving him diplomatic recognition. Realising that the Grant admini­

s tra tio n would want to proceed with caution, Foster concluded, "I

have to respectfully request your views upon the situation at as

early a day as possible, even though you and the President may not be 22 prepared to take definite action."

The question of extending diplomatic recognition to Dias troubled Secretary of State Fish, and he delayed making a decision.

By January Foster had still not received orders from Washington; thus he offered an "unsolicited” opinion given in "confidential and unoffi­ cial form," hoping that his suggestion might help the formulation of a policy in Washington. Foster recommended that recognition of Diaz be withheld u n til a fte r the Mexican elections which were only a month away and would be largely controlled by Diaz. Since the elections would show Diaz to have a mandate the United States could then extend recognition. Foster did not believe it likely that Diaz would survive his term of four years, but the minister did not see how the United

States could delay any longer extending recognition to a de-facto government in a country with which the United States had extensive 23 contact.

At almost the same instant that Foster was writing his despatch

Foster to Fish (personal) November 28, 1876, Fish Papers, CXVII. The payment resulted from a decision of the Claims Commission Convention of 1868. Diaz negotiated a loan of $500,000 in Mexico City fo r the purpose of making the January payment. See Stuart A. MacCorkle American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U niversity Studies in History and P o litic a l Science, Series LI, No.3, 1933), 6 8i ^ F o s te r to Fish, January 20, 1877, Fish Papers CXVIII. to Fish suggesting recognition following the February elections,

Secretary Fish was sending Foster his long awaited instructions.

Fish’s orders offered Foster little guidance and instructed him only

to use his ’’best discretion" on the matter. Secretary Fish could not

see how the United States could possibly receive a payment from a

government it did not acknowledge, and left the decision regarding

recognition entirely in the hands of Foster, who Fish believed could 24 best judge the actual control that Diaz enjoyed. Fish demonstrated

great confidence in Foster's judgement; and, had the minister been

allowed to make policy on his own, diplomatic recognition probably would have been extended to the Diaz government following the elec- 25 tions. But the Grant administration was replaced in May 1877 by that of Rutherford B. Hayes, and the instructions from Washington

soon reflected a hard-line policy towards Mexico.

While Foster was becoming increasingly enthusiastic about

General Diaz, the Hayes administration, responding to domestic

pressures, adopted an increasingly u.nfriendly and, at times,- bellige­

rent posture towards Mexico. Foster believed that Diaz demonstrated

genuine qualities of leadership and felt that the lack of United

States recognition created an additional hardship and embarrassment

^ F is h to Foster, January 19, 1877, Instructions, Mexico, 19; Foster had established in the meantime a procedure whereby the Diaz government would make the January payment through Lerdo's minister in Washington, thus putting aside temporarily the issue of recognition. MacCorkel, American Policy of Recognition. 70-71. C asio-V illelas, U.S. vs P o rfirio Diaz. 22-26.

Callahan, American-Mexican Relations. 371; MacCorkel, ibid., 72-73; Gregg, Border Troubles. 26-27. 26

26 for the new government In Mexico. In April Foster urged Secretary

of State William M. Evarts to consider recognition and stated that

he regarded Diaz “as the only hope of the country from within itself,

much as I deprecate his revolutionary conduct.” Foster maintained

that without Diaz the country would ”fall into anarchy,” and he further

stated that the return of Lerdo would only bring continued guerrilla warfare. Foster also pointed out that many of the problems between the United States and Mexico could be better resolved if formal diplo- 27 matic recognition existed. For months Foster continued to suggest 28 recognition, but the Hayes administration listened to other voices.

Hayes and Secretary of State William Evarts took the position th a t the problems existing along the Rio Grande border needed s e t t l e ­ ment before recognition could be considered. The Hayes administration demanded that the Mexicans cooperate in ending border incidents, even to the extent of allowing United States troops into Mexican territory 29 in pursuit of outlaws. The problem of checking the depredations of

bandits along the Rio Grande fro n tie r had a long and sordid history by 30 1877, and there was great pressure on Hayes from prominent Texans

^ Memoirs. I, 87-88.

^Foster to Evarts (private and unofficial) April 28, 1877, Despatches, Mexico, 59. 2®Foster to Evarts, July 30, 1877, Foreign Relations. 1877, 426; Foster to Evarts (unofficial) November 13, 1877, Despatches, Mexico, 60. on ^Evarts to Foster, May 16 and August 2, 1877, Instructions, Mexico, 19; MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition. 74-77; Pauline S. Relyea, Diplomatic Relations between the U.S. and Mexico under Porfirio Diaz, 1876-1910, Smith College Studies in History, Vol. X, No. 1, (October, 1924), 29. 30 Documents relating to border problems between the United 27

and Che military to end the border problems permanently by means of 31 written guarantees or treaties prior to recognition.

The Mexican government was n a tu ra lly upset the the United

States withheld diplomatic recognition, and the situation became further complicated by two events over which Foster had no control.

The first involved the strange mission of General John B. Frisbie, a would-be American railroad entrepreneur who suddenly appeared in the Mexican capital with his father-in-law, General M.G. Vallego, who had been prominent in the fight for Galifornia*s independence.

Evarts had advised Foster that the two men were coming, and they seemed on the Surface to be interested in winning a legitimate rail­ road contract from the Dias government. But the railroad project fell through, and soon the real purpose of their mission was exposed. The two men were involved in an attempt to pressure the supposedly finan­ cially desperate Diaz into selling a large part of northwestern Mexico to the United States. The extent to which Secretary of State Evarts had involved himself in the scheme was unclear, but the incident aroused 32 Mexican public opinion against the United States.

The second, and considerably more serious, development which

States and Mexico are contained in Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Relations of the United States with Mexico, 45th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Report No. 701; also see Gregg, Border Troubles. 11-17. 3 AFor1 a thorough discussion of these pressures see Gregg, Border Troubles. 31-34.

32 Foster to Evarts (confidential) October 6 , 1877, Despatches, Mexico, 60; Memoirs, ■ I, 92-94; Callahan, American-Mexican Relations. 379-381, 400; Chester L. Barrows, William M. Evarts (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,. 1941), 355. 28

further strained the already tense relationships between the United

States and Mexico concerned the attacks by General E.O.C. Ord on

bandit strongholds inside Mexico. Pressure within the United States

for such military operations had not deterred the Grant administration

from a moderate course, but Hayes could not withstand the demands for 33 action. Thus, early in June 1877, General Ord received authoriza­ tion to chase desperados across the United States border and into 34 Mexico. The Mexicans, understandably, were suspicious of any United

States military operations along their northern frontier and viewed

Ord's operations as either an attempt to return Lerdo or a filibuster 35 aimed at provoking war. To Foster came the responsibility of assuring the Mexican government th at Ord was acting in a lim ited operation aimed only at ending border incidents.

Trying to present a calm and rational posture in the anxious and angry Mexican capital, Foster explained the United States position

in the dispassionate and reasoned language of the skilled lawyer- diplomat. Several weeks after Ord's military operations started

Foster sent the Mexican Foreign Office a carefu lly worded memo

^Callahan, American-Mexican Relations. 355-357, 374-375.

-^Evarts to Foster, June 4, 1877, enclosure of Secretary of War to General Sherman, June 1, 1877, House Executive Document. No. 13, 45 Cong., 1st Sess., 14-15.

35 Foster to Evarts, June 22, 1877 with Enclosures, Despatches Mexico, 59; Foster to Evarts, June 28, 1877, and enclosure from Diario Official (June 21, 1877), 28, 53; Callahan, American-Mexican Relations. 398; Gregg, Border Troubles. 51-54; Pauline S. Relyea, Diplomat ic Relations between the United States and Mexico. 41-42. 29

explaining the reasons behind this extreme measure. Foster pointed out that the instructions given to Ord were not. entirely original and recalled to the Mexicans that the United States had frequently sugges­ ted such a plan and had previously informed Mexico of the possibility of such action. He claimed that the depredations of the past four years were not common to both sides of the frontier and that bandits from Texas did not raid Mexican territory. Further, Foster asserted that adequate measures to prevent raiding and punish criminals had not been employed with vigor by the Mexican a u th o ritie s, and he reminded the Mexican government that it had even acknowledged an inability to cope with border problems. Foster pointed out to the Mexican govern­ ment that the instructions to General Ord were "not unconditional" --

Ord was ordered to seek the cooperation of local Mexican au th o rities and pursue bandits into Mexico only as a last resort. Finally, Foster pro tested the public claims by the Mexican M inister of War that the

United States was seeking to discredit the Diaz government or support 36 the ambitions of Lerdo's anti-government forces. The excited state of the Mexican capital over what he viewed as a minor police action frustrated Foster and at one point the exasperated minister unkindly remarked that the Mexicans exhibited a "volatile and childish charac-

Memo to the Mexican Foreign Office, June 23, 1877, Mexican Border Troubles, 45th Cong., 1st Sess., House Executive Document. No. 13, 104-105.

1 7 Foster to Evarts (confidential) June 30, 1877, Despatches, Mexico, 59. The Hayes administration had taken a tough stand towards Mexico* and this belligerent posture was motivated in large mea-sure by factors not connected with problems along the Mexican fro n tie r. Hayes had been urged by some of his supporters to seek a war with Mexico "to turn public thought from our unhappy internal affairs," and because war would "furnish immediate employment to thousands now starving for 38 bread." Although Hayes may not have desired war himself, powerful forces within his administration were clearly anxious for hostilities.

Foster claimed that he was "informed on good authority that certain gentlemen...had conceived the idea th at....it would divert attention from pending issues and tend greatly to consolidate the new Administra tion, if a war could be brought on with Mexico and another slice of 40 its territory added to the union."

Believing that the United States was following an unwise course and "satisfied that the Government at Washington misapprehended the situ a tio n in Mexico and the s p ir it of the Diaz Government," Foster requested permission to visit Washington to present his arguments

38 W. C. Stuart to President Hayes, April 23, 1877; W. H. E stell to Hayes, August 7, 1877, quoted in William A. Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 215, 481.

30 W. R. Lewis,"The Hayes Administration and Mexico" South- westem Historical Quarterly. XXIV (October, 1920), 140-153. Also see Callahan, American-Mexican Relations. 390.

Memoirs. I, 92. directly. Evarts rejected Foster's request, but soon the diplomat

was called to Washington anyway to testify before Congress.

The Mexican question had become such an important p o litic a l

issue that both the House and Senate were holding investigations of 43 the Hayes administration's handling of Mexican policy. Foster

te s tif ie d before a House Sub-Committee on February 9, 1878. Answering

questions candidly Foster stated that, in his opinion, Diaz was making

a genuine effort to control the border situation, and further claimed

that Diaz surpassed his predecessors in efforts to police the frontier

regions. However, the minister refused to answer when asked what his

policy would be regarding recognition, pointing out that policy making 44 should be left to the Secretary of State and the President. Testi­

fying again one week later Foster was cautious not to contradict

official policy, but he did admit that non-recognition had a negative

effect on commercial intercourse and had "a tendency to irritate the

Mexican people (who viewed it") as an unfriendly act." Once more Foster

urged improved transportation facilities, particularly the construction

^ Memoirs, I, 94; Foster-Evarts (personal) September 10, 1877, Despatches, Mexico, 60. / O Evarts to Foster (unofficial) October 5, 1877, Instructions, Mexico, 19.

^Gregg, Border Troubles, 78-79; Charles W. Hackett, "The Recognition of the Diaz Government by the United S tates," South­ western Historical Quarterly. XXVIII (July, 1924), 53.

44 Substance of Remarks made by Mr. John W. Foster, the Mini­ s te r to Mexico, before the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign A ffairs to Investigate the Mexican Question, on Saturday, February 9, 1878, at the Department of State. Despatches, Mexico, 61. 32

of railroads which would assure American trade "a great advantage 45 over European nations."

Apparently Foster's presence in Washington helped alter United 46 States policy towards Diaz. Before returning to Mexico Foster

received a new set of instructions which authorized him to recognize 47 the Diaz government. These orders were written by Foster himself after Evarts sent hifn to Assistant Secretary of State Fredrick W.

Seward with the understanding that the minister could draft the exact 48 instructions he wanted. Foster returned to Mexico and immediately extended the long delayed recognition and thus ended what he considered a "period of intense anxiety to the Diaz Administration and great 49 embarrassment to me personally."

Report of the Remarks on February 16, 1878 of Mr.-Earts, the Secretary of State and Mr. Foster, the Minister to Mexico, before the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign A ffairs appointed to examine into the Mexican Question. Despatches, Mexico, 61.

4 6 Memoirs. I, 95.

47 Evarts to Foster, March 23, 1878, Foreign R elations. 1878, 543-544. 48 Memoirs.I I . 262-263; Foster to V allarta, April 9, 1878, enclosure No. 1, Despatches, Mexico, 61. Evarts had designated much of the re sp o n sib ility for Mexican a ffa irs to Seward. See F.W. Seward, Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat (New Y 0 rk: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), 435.

4 ^Memoirs. I, 95. 33

The recognition of Diaz ended an anxious and unpleasant situa­ tion, but border raids continued to be a serious problem for several years, and, in sp ite of o ffic ia l recognition, obstacles to improved commercial relations still existed* For the remainder of his tenure in Mexico Foster spent long hours reporting on border incidents and making p ro tests to the Mexican government th at ’’crim inals habitually take refuge with th e ir plunder in Mexican territory.Foster demanded th at the Mexican government agree to ex trad itio n for those committing crimes in United States territory, but the Mexicans 51 insisted that the United States agree to reciprocity in such cases.

The order allowing General Ord to pursue bandits into Mexico was revoked 52 in March 1880, much to the delight of the Mexican government; and,

■^Foster to Avila, November 21, 1878, enclosure, Foreign Relations. 1879, 735; also see pages 730-734; Foster to Evarts (telegram) July 20, 1878, Despatches, Mexico, 62; Foster to Evarts, July 17, 1880, Foreign Relations. 1880-1881, 724-725.

■**Avila to Foster, November, 25, 1878, enclosure no. 3, Foreign Relations. 1879, 739.

52 Evarts to Foster, March 1 , 1880, with enclosure Alex Ramsey, Secretary of War, to Evarts, February 29, 1879, Foreign Relat ions, 1880-81, 735. 34 f in a lly in 1882 — a fte r Foster had departed from Mexico -- a convention was signed which provided that ''Regular federal troops of the two Republics may reciprocally cross the boundary line of the two 53 countries" in pursuit of bandits and Indians. This agreement became 54 a major step in establishing improved border conditions.

Throughout his years in Mexico Foster devoted a great deal of time and energy to improving commercial relations. He viewed the principal obstacles to increased trade to be the revolutionary nature of Mexican politics and the poor lines of communication between the 55 United States and Mexico. Foster rejected schemes fo r establishing a type of protectorate over Mexico as a means of exploiting trade opportunities, and as Porfirio Diaz established himself in power,

Foster maintained that "the only pressure or influence we ought at present to exert in the internal affairs of this country is that which will secure the peace and good order of our frontier and the protec- 56 tion of American citizens and their interests in this Republic."'

53 Treaties and Conventions between the United States of America and Other Powers, ed. by William M. Malloy, I (Washington, D.C.; USGPG, 1910), 1144-1145.

^Gregg, Border Troubles, 152-155; Relyea, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico. 45.

^ Memoirs. I, 109. While in Mexico the industrious Foster made a study of the coffee industry and his report was published by the Department of Agriculture. "The Cultivation of Coffee in Mexico," Monthly Report of the Department of Agriculture. XIV (July, 1876).

•^Foster to Evarts (private and u n o fficia l), April 28, 1877, Despatches, Mexico, 59, 35

Foster believed that United States interests were assured by a stable and independent Mexico that enjoyed peaceful relations with the United

States and remained open to foreign investors. Foster considered the construction of railroads connecting Mexico with major United States cities in the southwest of paramount importance if the United States 57 was to enjoy advantages over European investors.

Commercial recip ro city seemed to Foster a device which could

improve the position of the United States in trading with Mexico.

Foster had initiated informal discussion on the topics of reciprocal trade with the Lerdo Government, even without instructions to do so, and forwarded to Washington information favorable to.a reciprocal trade 58 agreement. In January 1876 Foster informed Secretary of State Fish that a representative from the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce had arrived in Mexico and that the delegation "had for its object the cultivation of more intimate commercial intercourse between New Orleans and Mexico." Foster related that the delegates had stressed the need 59 for an agreement on reciprocity. Several months later Foster transmitted to Washington an article by.a prominent Mexican politician which expressed the desirability of a reciprocal trade agreement with

57 Report of Remarks on February 16, 1878 of Mr. Evarts and Mr. Foster before the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign A ffairs. February 16, 1878, Despatches, Mexico, 61.

58 Foster to Fish,January 17, 1875, Fish Papers. Foster to A rias, Acting M inister of Foreign A ffairs, January 29, 1876, Des­ patches, Mexico, 58.

59 Foster to Fish, January 16, 1875, Foreign Relations. 1875. 36

the United States. . Any hopes for reciprocity with Mexico in the

1870‘s were distroyed by the confusion that followed the fall of

Lerdo, but the concept of reciprocity grew among United States foreign policy makers in the following decades and Foster would play a promi­ nent role in seeking trade agreements with several Latin American states. His efforts to promote commercial reciprocity at this time 61 proved premature but significant.

Always an advocate of improved railro ad connections between the

United States and Mexico, Foster found that Mexicans did not share his enthusiasm for trunk lines linking central Mexico with the United 62 States. Soon after arriving in Mexico Foster reported that a contract to construct a railroad joining Mexico with Texas had been awarded to

Edward L. Plumb of the International Railroad Company of Texas. How­ ever, the plan met opposition in the Mexican Congress where there was fear that the neighbors to the north might use the lines for future invasion of Mexico. Foster sympathized with Plumb’s e ffo rts, but a fte r long delays Plumb withdrew his project when Diaz gained control of the 63 government. Congressional opposition in Mexico also halted a plan

^®See the a r tic le by Matias Romero of July 7, 1876 in El Correo del Comercio. Despatches, Mexico, 55.

^Foster had an interesting correspondence with Senator John Tyler Morgan regarding reciprocity with Mexico. Morgan to Foster, September 27, 1878, Foster Papers; Foster to Morgan, July 2, 1878, Morgan Papers X. Also see David Pletcher, The Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations under Garfield and Arthur. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,. 1962), 181.

62 Foster to Evarts, December 27, 1879, Foreign Relations. 1880-1881, 726.

^•Hiemoirs, I, 160; Gregg, Border Troubles. 19-21. 37

to connect Mexico City with California during the first years of the 64 Diaz regime, and although a New York company did win a contract to construct a railroad on the Isthmus of Tehuantepee, the Mexican government refused to allow for lines joining with the United States 65 until the 1880s.

In the years following the recognition of Diaz commercial relatio n s did improve somewhat despite lingering problems. In

February 1879 a trade delegation from the United States visited

Mexico and some of the members commented that the situ a tio n appeared 66 favorable. Foster reported that this group was well received by th e ir Mexican hosts and th at President Diaz had greeted the business­ men personally. Foster was enthusiastic about the possibilities of expanded trade and "regretted that the representation of the commercial 67 interests of the United States was so meager." However, Secretary of State Evarts was not in favor of increased trade with Mexico while border conditions remained unsettled and there still persisted danger 68 to the lives and property of United States citizens in Mexico.

64 Memoirs. I, 110.

^ Memoirs. I, 110-111, Foster to Evarts January 28, 1879, with enclosures, Foreign Relations. 1879, 774-779, 780-795; Foster to Evarts, May 31, 1879, 811-812; Foster to Evarts, August 16, 1879, enclosure, 826-833; Foster to Evarts, December, 24, 1879, enclosure, 719-722.

^^New York Times (February 13, 1879), 2. an Foster to Evarts, February 7, 1879, Foreign Relations. 1879, 796.

6 ® E v a r t s to Foster, February 20, 1879, Foreign Relations. 1879, 799. 38

F oster was not blind to the difficult conditions that existed, nordid

he seek to gloss over the problems that awaited United States inves- 69 tors. In fact, Foster's candid and realistic appraisals of condi­

tio n s in Mexico on occasion upset both Mexican o ffic ia ls and foreign

investors.^ Nevertheless, Foster remained committed to the goal of

increasing United States trade with Mexico despite numerous discoura­

gements.

Foster’s admiration of the character and ability of President

Diaz helped to develop a close personal friendship between them, and

some years later a profitable business relationship resulted as Foster

^Foster to Evarts, December 9, 1878, with enclosure of letters from United States citizens complaining of unfair taxation, Foreign Relations, 1879, 416-449.

^Foster to Carsile Mason, October 9, 1878, Foreign Relations. 1877-78, 641-649. In this letter Foster informed potential investors that conditions such as unfair taxation, banditry and an unstable economic situation made Mexico unfavorable for investment. This generally negative assessment sent to the spokesman of the Manufac­ turers Association of the Northwest brought Foster severe criticism when Mr. Mason sent F o ster's le tte r to Mexican M inister of Finance, Mafcias Romero. Romero denounced Foster's letter in a lengthy and detailed report which attempted to refute definitively all of Foster's charges. Report of the Minister of Finance of the United States of Mexico on the 15th of January, 1879. on the Actual Condition of Mexico. (New York; Ponce de Leon, 1880). Some U.S. citizen s in Mexico thought Foster should be recalled because of his letter to the Manufacturers A ssociation. See Edmund D. Hatton to President Hayes, March 8, 1879, National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Appointment Papers (hereafter referred to as Appointment Papers). Historian David Pletcher credits Foster with a valid evalua­ tio n of the conditions in Mexico, Rails. Mines and Progress, Seven American Promoters in Mexico, 1867-1911 (Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell Univ­ ersity Press, 1958), 296-297. 39

became the legal counsel fo r the Mexican Legation- in Washington.-*

As the Diaz regime demonstrated the a b ility to estab lish order and

promote m aterial progress in Mexico, Foster remarked credit was “to

be attributed, in great measure, to the personal qualities of Pre­

sident Diaz. Probably no other individual in the republic could

so fully have controlled the turbulent and discontent elements of his own revolutionary party, or have inspired so much fear in the 72 ranks of his opponents.“ Writing in 1910, the year Diaz was driven into exile and the porfiriato finally ended, Foster still viewed Diaz as a man who had done remarkably well fo r his country:

71 Memoirs. II, 282-285. Manuel Romero Rubid, the Mexican President's new father-in-law became a leading financier in the Diaz regime.

79 Foster to Evarts, September 24, 1879, Foreign R elations. 1879, 837. After 1880 Diaz grew increasingly favorable to foreign investment in Mexico, and as a result outside intervention in internal affairs became prevalent. During the Pbrfiriato industry, railroads and financial in terests expanded. Diaz provided the order and s ta ­ bility and his principal advisers, trained in positivism created a government of m aterialism and dehumanization. Freedom and individual liberties were put aside in the name of progress and prosperity. Daniel Casio-Villegas argues that the- Porf iriato was necessary for Mexico's national development, in "El Porfiriato, era de consolida- cion," Historia Mexicana, XIII (1966), 76-87. For a more critical evaluation of Diaz and his regime, see Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genisis under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952), 3-28. 40

President Diaz was able, through his successful administra­ tio n of a ffa irs , to accomplish what at the time seemed hope­ less. He gave the country a long era of peace and order. He forced the Congress to grant liberal concessions for railroads connecting with the United States. He established protection and security to life and property. He restored public confidence. He brought about great development of the resources of the country. Under his regime, commerce, internal and foreign, flourished beyond the dream of the most hopeful.

While Foster was minister, President Diaz frequently visited the United States legation for social affairs. At one of the Fosters* usual Tuesday night receptions the Mexican General was introduced by

Mrs. Foster to the beautiful daughter of a wealthy Mexican land­ owner. When the woman eventually became the wife of Forfirio Diaz 74 the friendship of the Fosters with the President became intimate.

Because of Foster*s close relationship with Diaz, Secretary of State

Frelinghuysen asked Foster in the spring of 1883. to act as President

Arthur*s special representative in escorting the Mexican leader, his wife, and her parents through a tour of the eastern United States.^

F o ster's popularity in Mexico extended beyond the personal

73 Memoirs. I, 116. Foster expressed sim ilar sentiments in "Porfirio Diaz: Soldier and Statesman," The International Quarterly, VIII (December* 1903) 342-352; "The New Mexico. 11 National Geographic XIII (January, 1902), 1-24. Foster argued that Latin American nations needed strong executive government because the history and culture of the Latins made Anglo-Saxon type constitutional democracy impossible. "The Latin American Constitutions and Revolutions," National Geo­ graphic. XII (May, 1901), 169-175.

^ Memoirs. I, 106-107.

75 Memoirs. I, 98-99, 240-241; Foster to Frelinghuysen (unofficial) October 20, 1883 Dispatches, Spain, 107. 41

friendship he enjoyed with the president. Foster travelled widely,

met and mixed with the Mexican people and, unlike previous M inister to 76 Mexico, he learned to read and speak Spanish well. United States

citizens in Mexico found Foster to be a dedicated and capable diplo- 77 mat whose home had been '‘long the center of social h o s p ita lity ."

The B ritish c itizen s in Mexico also thought highly of Foster and were

grateful to him for the work he did on th e ir behalf in the absence of 78 representation by their own government. When Foster received word

of his nomination to be Minister to Russia he viewed the appointment

as recognition of his accomplishments in Mexico on the part of the 79 administration in Washington. Indeed, the Secretary of State was

pleased with Foster's performance, and in spite of differences they

F.W. Seward, Acting Secretary of State, to Foster, August 14, 1879; Evarts to Foster, December 5, 1879, In structions, Mexico XX. For detailed accounts of F o ster's tra v e ls into Oaxaca and the in te rio r states of Mexico, see Memoirs. I, 61-70, 121-136. Among those who consider Foster to have been a capable and well-informed diplomat with a solid knowledge of the Mexican language and p o litic a l environment are: Casio-Villegas, U.S. vs Diaz. 221, 228, 234, 235- 236; Louis M. Drago, introduction to Jose Leon Suarez, John W. Foster (Buenos A ires: "Suiza", 1918); Gerano Estrada, prologo to "Las Memoias Diplomaticas de Mr. Foster sobre Mexico," Archivo Hjstorico Diplomatico Mexicano, No. 29 (Mexico: Publications de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1929); Pletcher, R ails, Mines and Progress. 174. ^Statem ent of United States c itiz e n s, March 2, 1880, Foreign Relat ions, 1880-81, 738,

^ Foreign Relations. 1880-81, 738-739.

Memoirs, I, 137. F o ster's nomination was confirmed on January 27, 1880. Senate Executive Journal. 46 Cong., 2nd Sess., XXII, 171, 198, 205, 208-209. 42

had endured, Evarts wrote "It pleases me that the Russian mission has fallen into such competent hands as yours. There are international opportunities there, waiting for the man with the ability and the . 80 desire to improve them."

The appointment to Russia marked a turning point in Foster’s career. Still in his early forties, Foster had served seven years at a most d iff ic u lt diplomatic post, and distinguished him self.

Furthermore, he had an honorable war record -- a prerequisite to political advancement in the post Civil War era. Foster had returned briefly to Indiana in 1876 to aid in the presidential campaign, 81 advised Benjamin Harrison on campaign strategy, . renewed p o litic a l contacts, and earned consideration for a cabinet position in the 82 Hayes adm inistration. Before accepting the position in Mexico,

Foster had been just another midwestern politician who would have been content to accept a minor diplomatic mission in an obscure but pleasant

European capital as a reward for political services; now Foster was a proven and .ambitious diplomat. With the appointment to St.

Petersburg the opportunity for a career in international diplomacy presented itself.

Following a lavish banquet given by President Diaz at the national palace, Foster departed from Mexico on March 13, 1880 amid

80 Evarts to Foster (personal) February 10, 1880, Foster Papers. 81 Foster to Benjamin Harrison (telegram), August 5, 1876; Foster to Harrison, August 15, 1876, Harrison Papers, reel 2.

82Williams, Haves. II, 23. A3

“atten tio n s of the most marked and fla tte rin g character from

Mexicans and fo re ig n e rs ." ^ His f i r s t experience in diplomacy had been

a marked success, and he had every reason to expect that a b rillia n t

future awaited him. But the 1880’s were an uncertain decade in

American foreign re la tio n s, and John W. Foster would find himself

charting an ambiguous and irreg u lar course.

* * *

The seven years in the turbulent,revolutionary Mexican capital provided a valuable diplomatic education for the small town newspaper owner. Foster had been quick to recognize the political strength of

Porfirio Diaz, skillful in negotiating the recognition issue, and

intelligent in handling the problems between the United States and

Mexico concerning border raiding. He managed to estab lish firm and genuine friendships with Diaz and key members of his administration.

Learning to speak and read Spanish with skill, Foster became popular with the Mexicans. His frequent social functions at the legation brought him into contact with numerous American residents, and both

United States and British citizens, in Mexico found him not only

83 Edward M. Neil to Evarts, March 18, 1880, Foreign Relations. 1880-81, 337. 44

competent but approachable. The diplomatic ability Foster demonstra­ ted was not overlooked in Washington, where Secretaries of State Fish' and Evarts appreciated Foster's sound advice and allowed the minister considerable in itia tiv e in making policy.

While in Mexico Foster displayed ch arac te ristic s which would mark his entire career in diplomacy. Sympathetic to and interested in

Mexican culture, Foster never doubted the superiority of his own values. He considered the Catholic Church in Mexico to be unenlight­ ened and unprogressive, and he felt that the activities of Protestant m issionaries in Mexico would create "a s p ir it of riv a lry in the old 84 religion and awaken its energies to new life and activity." While the Mexicans celebrated Sunday with dancing, p arties and bull fig h ts, the Fosters remained at home and spent the Sabbath exactly as they would have in Evansville, Indiana. Only "tea and light refreshments" were ever served at gatherings in the United States legation,while 85 Foster served in Mexico. A self-righteous Presbyterian and nation­ alistic midwesterner, Foster never shed his provincialism despite his many years of foreign residence.

Foster's interest in reciprocity as a device for bringing

Latin America into closer economic tie s with the United States began during his tenure in Mexico. Eventually Foster's interest in recipro­ cal trade involved him in attempts to secure reciprocity from Spain for the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Foster's expertise in matters of recip ro city also led to a key position in the Benjamin

^ Memoirs. I, 59. ^ Memoirs. I, 29. 45

Harrison administration as a special assistant and counselor to

Secretary of State James G. Blaine. Never did Foster believe th at the

United States required additional territories in Latin America.

His stand in opposition to those who would have welcomed a war with

Mexico as an opportunity to secure areas of land adjacent to the southern border of the United States was to be repeated decades later when, as a senior American statesman, Foster would point out the un­ wisdom of the acquisition of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines.

To Foster, United States interests in Latin America were commercial and economic. He viewed the inclusion of enormous masses of non-

Anglo-Saxon, Spanish speaking peoples into the Union as a potential political disaster.

Because he judged progress and order in Mexico to be directly related to the economic influence of the United States, Foster believed that domestic political order and stability should be the paramount concerns for any Mexican government. Porfirio Diaz, through efficient, forceful, brutal means managed to bring to Mexico the type of order­ liness that Foster viewed as a prerequisite for vital United States investment. As Foster prepared to leave Mexico, the Diaz government was becoming increasingly friendly to foreign investors, and over a period of more than thirty years the Porfiriato would centralize

Mexican governmental operations, improve internal lines of communi­ cation and transportation, and open the country to extensive foreign economic penetration. In regarding the dictatorial aspects of Diaz as unavoidable under the re a litie s of the Mexican situ a tio n , Foster firmly established a close, harmonious, and mutually profitable 46

relationship between the United States and Porfirio Diaz. Ill

POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY IN

THE "AWKWARD YEARS"

The 1880s proved to he an awkward period in United States foreign relations as the rapidly expanding nation took tentative and uneasy steps towards.enlarged influence ahorad. As yet the United

States had not known a great need for a diplomatic service and many isolationist-minded taxpayers viewed the State Department as a waste of money. When John W. Foster assumed his duties in St. Petersburg he was one of only twenty-five ministers in resident representing his 1 country in foreign capitals. Americans desiring an active foreign policy hoped in l88l that President James A, Garfield and his dynamic

Secretary of State, James G, Blaine, would herald a new policy of increased foreign trade, extended coastal defenses in the Pacific and 2 Caribbean, and greater prestige abroad. Although Garfield and his successor, Chester A. Arthur, failed to realize their designs for a

Foster Rhea Dulles, Prelude to World Power (New York: Macmillan Co., 1 9 6 5 ), 120; Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1799-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961)23-2^; Milton Plesur, America*s Outward Thrust; Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), 35-39.

^David M. Pletcher, The Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations under Garfield and Arthur (Columbia: University of Missouri P ress, 1 9 6 2 ), 11, 3^8-352. 47 48

more internationalist policy, they did call attention to foreign policy

problems. Historian David Pletcher has argued persuasively that even

in failure Garfield and Arthur had significance in that they clarified

foreign policy alternatives from which Americans would eventually be

forced to choose. Pletcher has demonstrated also that foreign policy

situations which emerged during this era "foreshadowed attitudes and 3 expedients of later imperialist years."

Throughout the l880's Foster’s diplomatic career was to be

characterized by frustration, vacillation and uncertainty; however,

this was to be an important time for him because it provided an

opportunity to acquire the expertise and experience which would prove

valuable in coming years. Particularly with respect to the issue of

commercial reciprocity, a concept in which he had expressed interest while in Mexico, Foster was to find his initial endeavors fruitless, but these frustrated efforts on behalf of reciprocal trade would

qualify Foster for an important appointment in the Harrison administra­

tion which led him eventually to the office of Secretary of State.

Twice during the l880’s Foster resigned from diplomatic service

to pursue an exceptionally profitable career in international law.

At the time of both resignations Foster stated that he was leaving

government service forever, but it seems he never really intended

to drift far from the State Department as his residence in Washington

and legal work kept him in close personal contact with the shapers

of United States foreign policies. Furthermore, the efforts Foster

3Ibid, , 355. 49

made on behalf of Walter Quinten Gresham's unsuccessful attempts to secure the Republican Party's presidential nomination in 188U and again in 1888 seems to indicate that Foster held ambitions for a cabinet appointment.

Foster's tenure in Russia did not last much beyond a year, and his record at St, Petersburg indicates no tangible impact on United

States relations with Russia, To Foster's great disappointment the prestigious assignment to St. Petersburg proved dull and uninteresting compared to the challenge of diplomacy in Mexico. The most urgent and time-consuming matter with which he dealt concerned the unjust and discriminatory treatment of Jewish United States citizens residing in or travelling through Russia, and on this subject Foster displayed the zeal of an abolitionist. Foster not only undesitatingly protested the unfair treatment of Jewish-Americans but even lectured the Russian regime on the evils of religious discrimination. Despite Foster's protests the history of Russian anti-semitism continued and it is doubtful that the United States M inister’s words received much atten­ tion. Beyond the protesting of mistreatment to United States citizens

Foster’s duties proved quite routine; but because this was his first assignment in Europe, and to a major capital, the time in Russia was not without importance.

Upon arriving in St. Petersburg in June, 1880 a despatch from

Secretary Evarts awaited Foster's attention. The message stated that the Union of Americarx-Hebrew Congregations had expressed anxiety about the condition of Jews in Russia and the Secretary advised Foster to 50

look into.the matter, Evarts also cautioned the minister that it ’’would of course be inadmissable for the Government of the United

States to approach the Government of Russia in criticism of its laws and regulations, except so far as such laws and regulations may injuriously affect citizens of this country, in violation of natural rights, treaty obligations or provisions of international law ,.,.’1

Foster also discovered that the charge ad interim already had in his hands the case of Henry Pinkos, an American Jew expelled from St.

Petersburg where he. had been involved in a modest business. Because of assassination plots aimed at Emperor Alexander II, in which some

Jews were said to be involved, a decree demanded that all Jews leave

St. Petersburg, and apparently United States citizens were not to be exceptions. Foster's orders were to protest the expulsion of a citizen of the United States merely because his religion was not 5 acceptable.

The case of Henry Pinkos and his family along with that of

Marx Wilezynski, who was expelled from St. Petersburg under circumstances similar to Pinkos', formed the basis for a number of exchanges between

Foster and Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the courtly Nicholas 6 de Giers. During one conversation Foster went beyond the mere

Evarts to Foster, April lH, 1880, Foreign Relations. 1880-1881, 873; Memoirs, I, 1 6 3 .

^Evarts to Foster, June 28, September 1880, Foreign Relations, 1880-J.881, 8 7 6, 880; Plesur, America's Outward Thrust, 6 9 .

^Foster to Evarts, September 16, 1880, Foreign Relations, 1880-1881, 881-882; Memoirs, I, 16U-166. 51

protestation of the treatment of United States citizens. In a

despatch to the Secretary of State, Foster reported:

In the course of the conversation I stated that while the object of the interview was to obtain proper recognition of the rights of American Jews, my government took deep interest in the amelioration of the condition of the Jewish race in other nations, and I was satisfied that it would be highly gratified at the statement of the minister that a commission was now considering the question of modification in a literal sense of the Russian laws regarding the Jews

These remarks did not seem to move Giers who retorted that few nations 8 escaped the problem of race prejudice, including the United States.

Evarts felt compelled to remind Foster that the United States protested

Russian policy "not because they (United States citizens) are Jews 9 but because they are Americans," Evarts was pleased, however, with

Foster’s vigorous presentation of the United States position in the

Pinkos and Wilczynski cases and his spirited defense of American policy 10 in the general questions involved.

Through the final months of 1880 Foster witnessed and reported on growing discontent within Russia but believed there had "not developed 11 any wide-spread or very alarming conspiracy against the Government."

^Foster to Evarts, December 30, 1880, Foreign Relations, l88l, 998-999. ^Memoirs, I , 16 6 ,

^Evarts to Foster, March 31, .18.81, Foreign Relations,1881, . . 1007- 1008.

"^Evarts to Foster, March 3, 1881, Foreign Relations. 1881, 1007. Foster made a long and careful study of Russian law concerning Jews, found the statutes confusing and vague, and reported his findings to Washington. Foster to Evarts, December 31, 1880, Foreign Relations, l88l, 1005-1006; Memoirs, I, 166 - 1 6 7 , ' ^Foster to Evarts, November 18, 1880, Foreign Relations, 1880, 995. 5------52

Because the Tzar's police seemed to have quieted the capital,th£

"brutal assassination of Alexander II on March 13, l88l came as a 1 2 chock to the American Minister, The United States government had viewed Alexander II as a friend, and Foster immediately made an 13 official expression of sympathy on behalf of the United States,

The excitement and drama surrounding the death of Alexander II probably provided the single most profound experience of Foster's tenure in Russia.

Foster had been in Russia six months when he began to show concern about being removed from his position as a new Republican administration prepared to enter office, Benjamin Harrison, a long­ time political cronie from Indiana, assured Foster that he need not lU worry about being replaced by President Garfield, but while Foster felt prepared to remain at his post for a short time longer he was also "quite ready to give way to some Indiana or other patriot who is anxious to serve his country and spend his money for the Govern- 15 - ■ ment," Apparently Foster had found court life in St, Petersburg

^Foster to Blaine, March l1*, 1881, Foreign Relations, 1881, 1008-1009; Memoirs, I, 181-18U,

•^Foster to Blaine, March 15, l88l (with enclosure), Blaine to Foster, April 13, l88l, Foreign Relations. l88l, 1009-1010. For a discussion of United States policy and public opinion toward Russia at this time see Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia (Ithaca, N,Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950), 122-12V.

^Harrison to Foster, December 1880, Foster Papers. Foster had encouraged Harrison to seek a seat in the United States Senate a few months earlier. Foster to Harrison, October 23, 1880, Harrison Papers (microfilm), reel 3. Also see Harry J. Sievers, Benjamin Harrison, II (New York: University Publishers, 1959), l8l. ^Foster to Harrison, January 1, l88l, Harrison Papers, reel 3. 53

beyond his means. In August l 8 8l Foster took a leave of absence and returned to the United States. He tendered his resignation a few months later without returning to Russia. Although Secretary of State

James G. Blaine and the President would have preferred that the

Minister remain at his post or take another assignment, they accepted 1 6 his wishes to enter a private law practice in Washington.

Foster was not pleased with what he saw of Russian society.

Upset about the treatment of Jews, Foster considered the Russian government brutal, unenlightened and autocratic. To the god-fearing, religious Foster it seemed that "the country must pay dearly in the IT end for the unjust treatment of six million of its people." The violent attacks against the government by youthful nihilists also upset Foster, who came to believe that orderly reform in Russia would be impossible. Through his diplomatic career Foster would maintain an unfavorable view of Russian foreign policies, particularly with regard to Russia's ambitions in the Far East. Clearly, Foster's experience in St. Petersburg did nothing to provide him reason to be sympathetic to the Russian rulers.

_ ^Memoirs, I, 213-21?! " ~ ~

17 ‘Foster viewed the disorders in Russia following the Russo- Japanese war as evidence of the Almighty's displeasure. Memoirs, I, 167. 54

For more than a year following his resignation from the State

Department the former diplomat applied his energies to the pursuit of fortune, Foster was concerned about "accumulating a competency" for his family and providing his teenage daughters with an education in their homeland. The legal work went extremely well for Foster; his practice proved profitable beyond his expectations and offered great prospect for an even more profitable future. It was there­ fore with some misgivings that Foster received a note from President

Arthur asking that he call at the White House, On February 21, 1883

Foster met with the President and discussed the possibility of an 20 appointment to Spain as a special envoy. After discussing the matter with his wife and political associates, principally Senator

Harrison of Indiana, Foster accepted what he considered "an appeal

_ y ------Ibid., I, 213, II, 281,

19Ibid. , I, 239, II, 281- 2 8 2, 301.

gQIbid. , I, 239. 55

21 too flattering to my pride and patriotism to be resisted,"

President Arthur desired a reciprocity treaty with Spain for the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Already former

President Grant had negotiated a reciprocal trade agreement with

Mexico and Arthur hoped that such reciprocity treaties would further 22 increase Latin American trade to the United States, Other matters of importance awaiting settlement involved claims of United States 23 citizens against Cuba stemming from damage done in a recent rebellion.

The Government viewed the problems with Spain regarding her Caribbean colonies to be serious and Foster was apparently chosen for the assignment not out of political considerations; rather Secretary of

State Fredrick T. Frelinghaysen chose Foster because he knew the 2b language and had experience in difficult diplomatic situations.

Foster reported that he was "very graciously welcomed" by

King Alfonso XII and his Cabinet when he presented his credentials on June 16, and the Envoy read a brief statement before the court

pi Ibid., I, 2l*0. Foster apparently did not seek the appointment of Spain nor did Indiana politicians push his nomina­ tion upon the administration. It also seemed that Foster stood to take a temporary financial loss by accepting the assignment. New York Times (February 25, 1883), 7; (February 26, 1883), 5. Foster's appointment was made as Envoy Extraordinary and M inister Pleni­ potentiary to Spain on February 26. Senate Executive Journal, b7 Cong,, 2nd Sess., XXII, 671, 672, 6W,

22 Pletcher, Awkward Years. 170, 289-290.

^^Memoirs, I, 2k0.

^Nev York Times (February 26, 1883), 5. Foster delayed his departure for Spain in order to escort Porfirio Diaz on his tour of the United States. Memoirs, I, 2b0-2bl. 56

in which he expressed the hope that "through increasing and improved

commercial relations the United States and ^pain may reciprocally 25 share each other’s prosperity." Despite the welcome and public

statements favoring reciprocity the Spanish government was not parti­

cularly enthusiastic about an agreement. Cuban members of the

Spanish Cortes or National Congress favored reciprocity, especially a fte r the Grant-Romero Treaty provided Mexican sugar with free entry

into the United States. Also, despite exhorbitant duties, trade between the United States and Cuba in 1882 to ta lle d $82,585,476 as opposed to $12,674,157 for Spain, The government in Madrid feared, however, that a reciprocity agreement might further weaken Cuba’s ties with the mother country and lead to rebellion and annexation by the United 27 S tates.

The hesitancy of the Spanish government to agree to a recipro­ city treaty was made apparent by the stalling tactics employed by the

Spanish negotiators. Foster attributed much of the delay to "the

Spanish temperament £which}does not admit of celerity in the dispatch of public business," but he also acknowledged as significant obstacles the tour of Alfanso XII to Berlin and Paris which caused an inter-

95 ———————————— Foster to Frelinghuysen, June 16, 1883, Despatches, Spain, 106. 26 See the remarks of the Spanish Foreign Minister before a delegation of the Tariff Reform Society in New York city. New York Times (October 21, 1883), 8.

27 Pletcher, Awkward Years, 289-290. Foster believed that most enlightened Spaniards were reconciled to the eventual loss of Cuba. Memoirs. I, 256. 57

national uproar, the C arlist movement, which sought to place the pretender Don Carlos on the throne, and numerous m inisterial 28 changes. When given the opportunity for discussion, Foster negotiated with force and vigor, threatening United States trade reprisals to pressure the Spanish into an agreement. Finally on

January 2, 1884 Prime M inister Antonio Canovas del C astillo consented to remove d iffe re n tia l levies and consular fees from products imported from the United States and in return was assured that the United States 29 would remove a recently imposed re ta lia to ry duty of 10%. Following the signing of a temporary agreement in March which anticipated a future reciprocal trade agreement Foster optimistically instructed the State Department to proceed with plans for a reciprocity treaty.

Viewing reciprocal trade to be "the true American commercial system, as it combines the best elements of 'protection* and 'free trade,*"

Foster was now convinced that the United States could drive for a

.treaty with Spain that would secure for the United States "almost the complete monopoly or control of the rich commerce of these 30 islan d s."

In the Spring of 1884 Foster's attentions turned suddenly from diplomacy to party p o litic s . Negotiations in Madrid had reached a

28 Foster to Frelinghuysen, October 19, 20, 27, 1883, Des­ patches, Spain, 107; Memoirs. I, 244-246.

29 Foster to Frelinghuysen, December 17, 27, 1883, Despatches, Spain, 107, 108; January 3, 4, 1884, Foreign Relations. 471-472.

ifi Foster to Frelinghuysen, January 11, February 28, 1884, Despatches, Spain, 108; Pletcher, Awkward Years. 291. For a detailed analysis of the reciprocity issue in 1884 see Tom Terrill, The Tariff, P o litic s and American Foreign Policy, 1874-1901 (Westport. Conn.: Green­ wood Press, 1973), 79. 58

point where some delay was necessary before Foster could proceed to a

permanent reciprocity agreement, and although Foster was authorized

to continue on in the Spanish capital he requested and received a 31 recall to Washington for consultations with Frelinghuysen. Foster

did not really desire serious discussions regarding reciprocity with

the Secretary of State; rather, his true motive for arranging his

recall at this instant stemmed from his intention to aid his former 32 college classmate and •’intimate" friend, Walter Quintin Gresham.

A liberal Republican with great popularity in the midwest, Gresham

was anxious to have Foster’s support in taking the Republican Party's 33 nomination away from the incumbent president. When Gresham began

maneuvering for the nomination Foster wanted to return home where he

might "turn the tid e " and keep Indiana’s Senator Benjamin Harrison from

"antagonizing" Gresham's support in their home state where Foster felt

31 Frelinghuysen to Foster (confidential), March 19, 1884, Frelinghuysen to Foster (cipher telegram) March 28, 1884, Instructions, Spain, 19.

32 Foster to Gresham, March 30, 1884, Gresham, X III. To Gresham Foster wrote, "I have not intimated to him CFrelinghuysen} any other interest." According to Matilda Gresham's biography of her husband the Greshams were very close to the Fosters and lived in the Foster home in Washington while the Fosters were in Spain. Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832-1895, II (Chicago! Rand McNally & Co., 1919), 271.

33 As a presidential candidate Foster saw Gresham as intelli­ gent, bright and blessed with a "winning smile." A favorite of General Grant, Gresham was appointed to a judgeship when Grant became president. In 1883 Gresham was named Postmaster General by President Arthur. As a judge and public servant Foster believed Gresham to be of "incorruptable in te g rity and lo fty patriotism ." Memoirs, II, 271, 274. 59

3d he still had some influence. With Gresham in Arthur’s cabinet

subtly urging Foster’s recall for consultations, the Minister was soon 35 returned to the center of party activity.

Foster viewed Gresham as a possible compromise candidate ’’not

mixed up in the old quarrels and yet one who had a good record and 36 shown administrative ability." However, this was not to be a year

for such a nominee. At first, Gresham had discounted the threat from 37 Harrison, but the Indiana Senator demonstrated increasing strength

in his own delegation, and at the party convention a "Harrison move­

ment" emerged. At the convention Foster, who seemed to be leading the

Gresham forces, tried to resist Harrison pressure by supporting

President Arthur as a tactical ploy, but the. Harrison people in the

Indiana delegation succeeded in winning the right to place their man 38 in nomination. On June 6 , Foster telegrammed Gresham from the convention to inform him that Harrison men had made a deal with James

G. Blaine which would assure the nomination for the Senator from 39 Maine. Later the same day Foster sent word to Gresham that he was

being considered for the vice-presidential nomination and asked his

^ F o s te r to Gresham (confidential), February 11, 1884, Gresham Papers, XX.

^Gresham to Foster, February 27, March 20, 1884, Gresham Papers, XIII.

■^Foster to Gresham (confidential) February 11, 1884, Gresham Papers, XX.

^Gresham to Foster, March 20, 1884, Gresham Papers, X III. OO Foster to Gresham (telegram) June 1, 1884, Gresham Papers, XXVII, and Foster to Gresham (telegram) June 3, 1884, XXVIII, 39 Foster to Gresham (telegram) June 6 , 1884, Gresham Papers, aaVlllf 60

friend what his feelings were regarding this possibility. Gresham

quickly rejected the idea and suggested Harrison as a suitable

runnlngmate.

Both Foster and Gresham were disappointed with the outcome of

the convention, not only because their ambitions had been checked

but because they disliked the man chosen to be the party standard

bearer. Foster remained a solid party man although unenthusiastic

about the campaign which he viewed as "one of f i l t h beyond precedent"

and with such scandal that he believed Gresham fortunate not to be on 42 the ticket. Following the Republican defeat by Grover Cleveland ,

Foster confided that during his return to the United States for the convention and campaign he "learned things which confirm my anxieties 43 th at he fBlaine} would have been an unsafe ru le r." For his part,

Gresham avoided campaigning for the Republican nominee, expressed admiration for Cleveland and began to experience grave disillusion- 44 ment with the party of Lincoln.

Within weeks following the Republican convention, Foster was back in Madrid prepared to pursue negotiations with increased force

^Foster to Gresham (telegram) June 6 , 1884, ib id .

^Gresham to Foster (telegram), June 6 , 1884; S.P. Thompson to Gresham (p riv a te ).June 12, 1884, ib id .

^ F o s te r to Gresham, September 3l , 1884, ib id .

^ F o s te r to Gresham, December 14, 1884, ib id . . XXXII.

44 Memoirs. II, 272. 61

*»5 and determination. The Spanish agreed to appoint Salvador de Albacete t® hold discussions with Foster and facilitate the negotiating process. Prolonged and complicated sessions were conducted over a period of several months with Foster exerting pressure on the

Spanish that approached outright threats.

At one point Foster employed "a little plain speaking" to present the Spanish Plenipotentiary with three reasons why Spain should agree to reciprocity. These were: one, the lack of a treaty would cause great dissatisfaction in Cuba against Spain and lead to the "early loss of the island to be Spanish crown."; two, the

United States would make trade agreements with other tropical countries which would ruin the economies of Cuba and Puerto Rico; three, failure to make a treaty "would cause such disappointment and resentment in the United States as would almost inevitably affect unfavorably our present friendly relations" and surely exacerbate h6 the difficulties concerning unsettled claims against Spain.

Faced with such prospects the Spanish agreed to a treaty in November, and Foster h urriedly returned to Washington with the

V £ 5 Foster returned to Spain with an approved draft for a treaty and full power to make necessary alterations. Frelinghuysen to Foster, June 7, July 2, August 29, 188^4, Instructions, Spain, 19.

H6 Foster to Frelinghuysen, November 25, 188^, enclosure, Notes of Conferences with Minister of State, President of the Ministry and Senor D. Salvador Abacetem Special Plenipotentiary, Despatches, Spain, 111 . 62

• hi document. Foster "believed that Cuba's destiny was to be indepen- 1*8 dent of Spain and economically, but not necessarily politically, tied to the United States:

Cuba lives off the United States,... .and if Spain away off here in Europe is not willing to make a fair treaty with us relative to trade, it will be in our interest to see the island independent in the hands of natives who are and will be our friends. And that can be brought about by a little sympathy or indifference to neutrality matters on our part. We have plenty of grounds for a quarrel with Spain, but I do not think we want Cuba, although a war might not be the greatest evil that could befall us Just now. 1*9

Ironically, after the Spanish government agreed to reciprocity, the treaty was killed by politicians in Washington — an eventuality that Foster had not considered possible. Among the opponents of

Foster's reciprocity treaty were both protectionists and free traders,

Free trade advocates viewed the reciprocity system as sugar pills 50 which might satisfy the patient but could not cure the illness.

European governments also disliked the reciprocity agreement Foster had worked out, although several nations were anxious to have the provisions of the treaty apply to their trade under the most favored

3+7 The text of the treaty can be found in the Congressional Record, U8th Cong., 2nd Sess., XVI, pt. I, 1U8-156.

Foster to Gresham, September 28, October 26, 188U, Gresham P ap ers, XXX, XXXII,

1*9 Foster to Gresham, September 31 (?) , 188U, i b i d . , XXX.

^Pletcher, Awkward Years, 30U, 306-307, 353. 63

51 nation concept and the British had asked for a similar agreement 52 for their West Indies. Numerous special interest groups within the 53 United States voiced strong opposition to the reciprocity treaty, hut it was finally political considerations not economic arguments that defeated the reciprocity treaty.

The Republican party had been beaten in November and the ambitions of the Arthur administration were about to be replaced by the more negative and essentially defensive foreign policies of 5U Grover Cleveland, an enemy of reciprocity. Democrats favorable to reciprocity before Cleveland’s election became cool toward Foster's treaty as Cleveland prepared to assume office. Furthermore, the

Republicans were not united behind reciprocity, and the powerful

James G, Blaine headed Republican opposition to the treaty out of 55 personal animosity for Arthur. Foster's treaty also had the mis-

51 Foster argued that the U.S. formula for interpreting the "most favored nation clause" held the conditional benefits such as reciprocity could be extended to other nations only if these nations met all the conditions of the reciprocal trade agreement. Foster persuaded Abecete to accept this formula. Frelinghuysen to Foster, June 28, 18U8, Instructions, Spain, 19; Foster to Frelinghuysen, September 9, 25, and November 5, 18U8, Despatches, Spain, 110, 111, Also see Pletcher, Awkward Years, 295-296. Cp Frelinghuysen to Foster (confidential), July 9, 188U, and Frelinghuysen to Foster (cipher telegram), July 2h, 188U, Instructions, Spain, 19.

^ Congressional Record, U8th Cong., 2nd Sess,, XVI, p t. 1, 300, 5^0, ISC^iTW TW r

^ Memoirs, II, 1; Pletcher, Awkward Years, 3^8.

55poster believed that Blaine opposed the treaty largely because he s till harbored resentment at having been dropped from the Cabinet by Arthur after the death of Garfield. Memoirs, I, 259- 2 6 0 . 64

fortune of going before the Senate at the same time as a number of important foreign policy measures including a Nicaragua canal treaty and a reciprocity agreement with Santo Domingo. With all these matters awaiting action it seemed to many that Arthur's "lame duck" administration was attempting to push through last minute legislation 56 without proper deliberation. Thus, Foster’s treaty became a political football, kicked by both Blaine and Cleveland from different 57 directions and allowed to die, battered and abused.

Foster's mission to Spain was as a special envoy and he had been promised leeway to use his own best judgement regarding resig­ nation; however, Frelinghuysen asked that Foster remain in Washington 58 during the debate on the treaty. Shortly after the Cleveland a d m in istra tio n took o f f ic e ,.S e c r e ta r y o f S ta te Thomas A. Bayard asked

Foster to return to Spain to seek modifications to the reciprocity agreement that would satisfy those American business interests which had opposed reciprocity, Foster was skeptical, but he agreed to

Pletcher, Awkward Years, 305.

^ Memoirs, I, 1; Denna F. Fleming, The Treaty Veto of the American Senate (New York: Garland Publishing, 1971), 73; William S, Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 196U), lUO-1^1. The failure" of the reciprocity treaty probably hurt the Cuban economy and might have even hastened the independence movement in Cuba according to Herminio Portell Vila, Historia de Cuba en sus Relaciones con los Estados Unidos y Espana, I I I (Maiami, F i a . : Mnemosyne P u b lish in g I n c ., 19^9 ( o r ig in a lly published, 19393 ), 39. eg Frelinghuysen to Foster (cipher telegram) October 10, 188U, and Frelinghuysen to Foster, January 15, 1885, Instructions, S pain, 19. 65

; 59 return to Madrid.

Foster again encountered difficulties in trying to get the

attention of Spanish officials because of cholera epidemic and

increased instability in the internal political situation. The

changes desired by Secretary Bayard could not be secured as the

exchange products which Bayard wanted omitted were precisely those

most desired by Spain, Also, the failure of the previous treaty

had made the Spanish reluctant to enter into any new agreements.

After a summer of enjoyable travel across the Iberian Peninsula but

no progress regarding reciprocal trade, Foster resigned effective 6 0 September 1, 1 885.

Following his unsuccessful attempt to secure a revised

reciprocity treaty with Spain, Foster again turned his attention to

legal practice in Washington. Through his diplomatic contacts

Foster built a clientele that included the Washington legations of

Mexico, Russia, Spain, China, Peru, Nicaragua and, according to the - 6l New-York Times, more than half the Republics in South America.

•^Memoirs, I, 296-297; Bayard to Foster, April 15, 18, 1885, Instructions, Spain, 19.

^^Memoirs, I, 297, 312; Bayard to Foster (telegram) August U, 1 8 8 5, Instructions, Spain, 19.

^New York Times (June 30, 1892), 1*; (July 1, 1 8 9 2) , U; "Foster's Many M asters(July U, 1 8 9 2), 5. As Foster described it, a significant aspect of his legal practice was*'in acting as counsel for foreign embassies and legations, either or by special arrangement, ....they felt that they could profit by my diplomatic experience and my knowledge of the institutions of our country. My advice always was to avoid controversies with the Department of State, and I feel that in this capacity I have been able to render a service to both our own and foreign governments. Memoirs, II, 300-301. 66

Foster was proud of the success he attained in his legal career and 62 toasted of the financial rewards his work brought him. While

Foster served a number of countries as their legal adviser in

Washington he also accepted cases for United States citizens against some of the very countries whose legations in Washington employed 63 him. The matter of possible conflict of interest never seemed to trouble Foster personally and he insisted that he scrupulously avoided business involvements in countries where he served in an official 6k c a p a c ity .

Foster enoyed a particularly close relationship with the

Chinese Legation in Washington. In St. Petersburg, Foster had made the acquaintance of Marquis Tseng, then China's ambassador to Russia, and their friendship led to a long association between Foster and

Foster to Gresham, February 26, 1 8 8 5, and O ctober 18, 1885, Gresham Papers, XXXII, XXXIII.

For example Foster won a settlement for General Lew Wallace of $15,000 from the Diaz government. Through contacts in Washington and Peking, Foster arranged for a handsome payment to the family of General Fredrick T. Ward. Foster managed to have the payment taken out of the Boxer indemnity fund. Memoirs, II, 288-289, 296-297.

6k, Memoirs, II, 301. Within weeks of his appointment as Secretary of State Foster was arguing a case for the Mexican govern­ ment before the U.S. Congress. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court and was decided in favor of Mexico. See The Mexican Fraudulent Claims Arguement of John W. Foster before Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, in Support of Senate B ills No. 539 and 6b6~ (W ashington, D.C.: 1892). F o ste r p re se n ts a complete account of the case, known as the Weil and Abra claims, in The Practice of Diplomacy, 37k-377. Also see John B, Moore, Inter­ national Arbitrations, II, 132^-13^8, 67

65 prominent officials within the Chinese Empire. The central issues of concern between the United States and China in the l880's regarded protection for Chinese citizens in the United States and efforts by the Chinese to mitigate legislation prohibiting Chinese from entering the United States. Following an attack by an angry mob against Chinese workers in Rock Springs, Wyoming on September 2,

1885, one that left twenty-eight Chinese killed and fifteen seriously injured, Foster helped the Chinese Minister draft a letter of protest 66 to Secretary of State Bayard. Cleveland and Bayard expressed

"strong feelings of indignation and commiseration," but refused to acknowledge that the United States owed an obligation of indemnity to the Chinese. Bayard did submit the matter of indemnity for

Congressional consideration "solely from a sentiment of generosity 67 and pity," and eventually he recommended compensation to the

Chinese because he thought such an act might put China’s new Minister to Washington, Chang Yen-hoon, in a mood to negotiate a treaty to 68 restrict Chinese immigration. Congress did recommend compensation

— T-l " r ~ _r‘ ~ ' -”r" " "" ' ' ' ” ” ‘ ’ "'■ _ ' ' " " " "■ " ‘ I I . - M Memoirs_, I, 155-157. For a discussion of the public careers of the nineteenth century Chinese diplomats in Washington, see Earl Swisher, "Chinese Representation in the United States," University of Colorado Studies in History, No. 5 (January, 1967). Swisher's study provides useful background information on the nature of the Chinese Legation, however, it completely ignores Foster's r o le .

^Cheng Tsao-ju to Bayard, November 30, 1 8 8 5, with enclosures, Foreign Relations, 1886, 101-109, 109-15^; Cheng Tsao-Ju to Bayard, February 1 5 , l886>, 15 U-I5 6 , House Report No, 20bk (May, 1886), ^9th Cong., 1st Sess., U-7. 67Bayard to Cheng Tsao-ju, February 18, 1 8 8 6, ibid.^ 159, Charles C. Tansill, Foreign Policies of Thomas F. Bayard, 1885-1897 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1 9 ^ 0 ),1 ^ 2 , 60Tansill, Bayard, IU 8-IU 9. 68

as a humanitarian gesture but refused to consider the question of 69 liability. * Poster viewed the award as only a partial victory and believed that the United States needed federal legislation to protect resident foreigners in the same manner the United States demanded 7° protection for its citizens overseas. Poster understood that pro­ tection of Chinese in the United States was necessary to insure the safety of American investments and missionary projects in China.

The issue of Chinese exclusion became the subject of great political interest in the election year 1888. On March 12, Bayard and Chang signed a treaty excluding most Chinese labours for a period 71 of twenty years but the initial reaction to the treaty in China made ratification by that country doubtful. Assuming rejection,

Rep. William L, Scott, a close associate of Cleveland, proposed a b ill in the House of Representatives excluding all Chinese labor- 72 ers. The bill was passed quickly and the President approved it on October 1, This anti-Chinese gesture failed to win the election for Cleveland and virtually ruptured diplomatic relations with China

------£9------;------Congressional Record, U 8th Cong., 1st Sess., XVII, pt. V, 5110-5115, 51^-5190, 5196-5199, 5229-5315; Tansill, Bayard, IU 9.

^^Memoirs, II, 2 8 7. Also of interest regarding Foster's views on the fair treatment of Chinese people in the U.S. is "The Chinese Boycott," Atlantic Monthly, XCVII (January, 1906), 118-127.

^ Foreign Relations, 1888, 393-39^.

72According to John Bassett Moore the b ill for the summary exclusion of the Chinese (known as the Scott Bill) originated in the Democratic National Committee without the Department of State being consulted. Letter of Moore to C.C. Tansill, June 1 6 , 1939, in Tansill, Bayard, 175. 69

for several years. 73

Foster was much involved with the work leading toward the 7k treaty of March 12, and he was pleased with the agreement. There­ fore, Foster was opposed to the Scott b ill as he believed the Chinese government would ratify the treaty. On September 19, Foster called at the State Department and had a conversation with John Bassett Moore, the brilliant Third Assistant Secretary of State. Foster told Moore that the reports about the Chinese having already rejected the treaty were false, Foster claimed that opposition to the treaty came from

British merchants in Hong Kong engaged in transporting Chinese 75 laborers to the United States and Chinese merchants in Canton,

After the Scott Act became the law Foster assisted the Chinese 76 Minister draft letters of protest to the Secretary of State.

Although the Chinese were understandably b itter about the settlement of the immigration issue, they appear to have been most pleased with

Foster’s efforts. The Chinese Empire displayed its confidence in

Foster by continually entrusting him with important matters and

73 Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America: The Story of Their Relations since 178U (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^V," 92; S.W. Kung, The Chinese in American Life (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1 9 6 2 ) , 63 "; John A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign P o lic y , 1873-1917 (Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 19^), 59-63.

^Foster to Gresham, May U, 1888, Gresham Papers, XXXVI.

^Memorandum written by John Bassett Moore after a conver­ sation with John W. Foster, September 19, 1888, Bayard MS, found in Tansill, Bayard, 17*». 76f .R. Dulles, China and America, 92. In 190^ Foster wrote 70

seeking his advise on international problems.

# * *

At the Republican Convention in 1888 Foster again supported

Gresham for the presidential nomination. Since his unsuccessful bid to capture the nomination in 1881*, Gresham had been appointed

Federal Judge of the Chicago district where he gained popularity for his anti-railroad reputation. The friends Gresham had made in the

Midwest among Mugwumps and independents caused party regulars to be that the "Scott act of 1888 was a deliberate purpose to abrogate by indirect legislation the Chinese immigration treaty of 1880. Its impropriety was aggravated by the fact that it was passed while a treaty dealing with the subject was pending ratification." American Diplomacy in the Orient. 308.

^Chinese Legation to Foster, June 19, 1906, Foster Papers. Also see Foster’s remarks on Chinese immigration in Senate Report No. 776, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Part II, 53 ff. Foster denounced a Supreme Court ruling excluding the re-entry of Chinese immigrants in an article entitled "A decision of the Most Profound Importance," Independent, LVIII (June 8, 1 9 0 5 ) 1292-1293. Foster’s efforts to assist the Chinese government are recorded in Mary Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 19&9 219, 21*6-2Vr, 2 5 0 . 71

7 8 suspicious of him. Early in the campaign Foster warned Gresham to avoid friction with Senator Harrison, financier Jay Gould or the powerful Blaine. Foster also cautioned Gresham about the necessity of presenting the impression that if nominated he could hold the party 79 together. In February Foster assured Gresham that the Judge would receive support from newspaper men, and Foster secretly managed to arrange for the New York Herald to print an account of Benjamin

Harrison’s opposition to Chinese exclusion in an effort to undercut QO the Indiana Senator’s bid for the nomination. To aid Indiana politico Charles V. Fairbanks manage the "Gresham boom", Foster wrote 8 1 editorials for the Evansville Journal in his old home town. In late

April Foster carried word to Gresham that he had the support of Senator

Thomas P la tt of New York, the man Gresham probably would have 82 preferred as his runningmate.

Although committed to Gresham, Foster diplomatically tried to maintain unity within the Indiana delegation and carefully guarded his old friendship with Benjamin Harrison. Foster spoke with Harrison

7 0 H. Wayne Morgan, From Haves to McKinley: National Party Politics. 1877-1906 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969) 286; Josephson, The Politicos. 415-416.

^ F o s te r to Gresham, May 11, 1888, Gresham Papers, XXXVI. OA Foster to Gresham, February 24, 1888, ib id . ; Matilda Gresham, Walter Q. Gresham, II, 570-571; Seivers, Beniamin Harrison. II, 251. ®*Foster to Gresham, March 16, 28, 1888, Gresham Papers, XXXVI; Matilda Gresham, ib id .. II, 570.

®^Matilda Gresham, ib id .« II, 579. 72

83 and explained his support for Gresham and hopes for party unity.

To some in Gresham's camp it appeared that Foster was hedging on his commitment to Gresham as the convention drew near* and when Foster did not attend the convention it appeared to his critics that Foster had deserted Gresham for a position of neutrality. However, while he may have taken care to keep his fences mended on all sides* it seems un­ likely that Foster deliberately backout out of Gresham's campt at the last minute; instead Foster excused himself from participating in the 84 convention because of the tragic death of his youngest daughter.

The outstanding characteristic of the campaign of 1888 was the extraordinary financing by c a p ita lis ts in support of Benjamin

Harrison* who won the Republican nomination as a compromise candidate 85 with the backing of big money and the bosses. Carl Schurz remarked that the party '’gave itself over body and soul to the money-power interested in the protective tariff, expecting from it substantial 86 aid in the election." Following the convention Foster expressed similar sentiments to Gresham and remarked that if the party was making a mistake by so enthusiastically associating itself with 87 protectionism. So disillusioned did Gresham become that he refused

00 Matilda Gresham, ib id . . II, 571; Seivers, Beniamin Harrison. II, 251. ®^Foster to Gresham, June 10, 1888, Gresham Papers, XXXVI. Only two of the Foster's children reached adulthood, Edith and Eleanor.

®^H.W. Morgan, From Haves to McKinley. 277-319; Josephson, Pol it icos, 417-418.

Q£ Speeches. Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz. ed. by Fredrick Bancroft, V (New Yorks Knickerbocker Press, 1913),

^^Foster to Gresham, June 27, 1888, Gresham Papers, XXXVII. 73

88 to support the Republican ticket and eventually left the party.

Foster remained a party loyalist although he considered his political and diplomatic career at an end. Confiding to Gresham, Foster wrote:

...personally it makes little difference to me who is President, I have a business in Washington from which I am accumulating a competency for my family, and I ought not allow myself, for the next few years, to be diverted from it by any official position and of which I have a surf it already. 89 When- Benjamin Harrison was elected President in November it was unlikely that Foster could have imagined that the most important and demanding aspects of his diplomatic career remained before him.

It was ironic that both Foster and Gresham were destined to become Secretary of State; and, in light of Gresham's anti-imperialist policy in Cleveland's cabinet, the close association of Foster and

Gresham during the 1880's seems a strange companionship. Foster's actions in the second Cleveland administration seem uncharacteristic considering the Intimacy he had enjoyed with the ideas of the expansionist Foster.

Why did Foster prefer Gresham to Harrison in both 1884 and

1888? The answer appears that Foster understood Gresham to be sym­ pathetic to the concept of expanded United States influence abroad, and th at Gresham, whose experience was confined to midwestem domestic politics, never really had firm ideas regarding foreign a ffa irs . The likable and sen sitiv e Judge Gresham, who proved to be

8 8Memoirs. II, 272.

80 Foster to Gresham, June 27, 1888, Gresham Papers, XXXVII. 74

misplaced in the State Department* was agreeable to Foster's nascent

plans for an aggressive American foreign policy,but in 1893 he

adjusted to the anti-expansion1st policies of Grover Cleveland. It

also seems probable that Foster supported Gresham because the

Judge, an attractive and personable man with a liberal record,

appealed to Foster's sense of idealism and inspired visions of

American greatness. Harrison, although always cordial with Foster, 90 must have seemed remote and unimaginative.

The 1880's had been a time of vacillation in United States

foreign policies. In 1885 the Democratic administration of Grover

Cleveland had repudiated the principal expansionist policies of the

Republicans. In 1889, following an election campaign in which

increased interest had been demonstrated in foreign policy issues

such as the protective Tariff, the Bering Sea fur seal controversy, and the Sackville-West scandal, a Republican administration favoring an aggressive foreign policy prepared to reverse the generally 91 inactive diplomatic course set by Cleveland. To regard the elec-

90 For Foster's candid evaluations of Harrison, Blaine and Gresham, see Memoirs. II, 249-254, 263-264, 267-270, 271-274.

017iThe protective Tariff was undoubtedly the central issue of the 1888 presidential campaign. Harrison, backed by manufacturers and big business interests, allied himself with the tariff interests. The question of rights over the fu r seals in the Bering Sea emerged as an issue in the northwest, and because it involved negotiations with Great Britain, Americans appeared to want their government to take a strong stand. Sir Lionel Sackville-West, British Minister to Washington became a campaign issue when he fo o lish ly indicated in writing a belief that Cleveland was preferrable to Harrison for the improvement of Anglo-American re latio n s.. The best account of the election of 1888 and the issues involved is presented in H.W, Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley. 277-319. 75

tion of Benjamin Harrison as having occurred in response Co a popular demand for increased national self-assertion would be a misinterpretation. Politicians found it difficult to discern what the American public really wanted in terms of foreign policies, and 92 attention remained primarily concentrated on domestic problems.

However, while the public may have been confused, uneducated, misinformed or unconcerned about foreign affairs, Harrison and the men he looked to for advice clearly wanted to bring about a change in United States foreign relations.

During this awkward period in United States foreign policies

Foster had gained experience in varied diplomatic activities. Upon leaving Mexico he left behind a solid friendship between the United

States and Porfirio Diaz that proved to be advantageous for American investors and the Diaz regime. Foster himself profited from this commercial intercourse as he acted as counsel for the Mexican

Legation in Washington. As Minister to Russia Foster forcefully argued for the rights of United States citizens and sought_to bring recognition of American influence in St. Petersburg. In urging the

Spanish government to agree to a reciprocal trade agreement Foster was cognizant of the potential for such a treaty to lead to Cuban independence from Spain and into a dependent relationship with the

United States, and he welcomed such a prospect. The exclusion of

Chinese from the United States upset Foster, and he fought it not

Grenville and Young, Politics. Strategy and American Diplomacy. 75-77; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the U.S.. 51. 76 only because he was legal counsel for the Chinese Legation in

Washington but because he saw the potential for anti-American retaliation in China that would hinder the commercial and missionary activities of Americans in the Chinese Empire. As the decade of the nineties began Foster was probably the diplomat most experienced in the policies and tactics necessary for an expansionist and imperial­ ist foreign policy, and his knowledge and skills soon were to be of s e rv ic e . IV

A HARBINGER OF IMPERIALISM IN

THE HARRISON ADMINISTRATION

Although John W. Foster vas not initially a member of the

Harrison administration he was to become increasingly important in the formulation of foreign policy during Benjamin Harrison's term of office. Foster's friendship with Harrison extended back through their early careers in Indiana politics, and, the two men had remained 1 close in spite of Foster’s support for Gresham. Because of Foster's experience in diplomacy, which was in most ways more extensive than that of Secretary of State James G. Blaine, it was natural for Harrison to look to Foster for informal advice — especially since Foster was conveniently residing in Washington. Blaine too appreciated Foster's talents and brought him into the administration as a special agent for negotiating important reciprocity agreements. The President and

^Of his relationship with Harrison, Foster stated: "It is to his great credit that he never allowed my attachment to Gresham to interfere with our friendship." Memoirs, II, 250. Foster was quick to telegram congratulations to Harrison following his election victory, and as the President-elect prepared to come to Washington Foster offered him the use of the Foster family pew at the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church. Foster-Harrison (telegram) November 9, 1888; Foster to Harrison, January 6, 1889; Harrison Papers, reel 12, 15.

77 78

his Secretary of State were never close, and, as Blaine's health declined Foster's counsel was sought increasingly. When Blaine abruptly resigned in July 1892 Foster was appointed Secretary of

State. The defeat of Harrison in the elections in November meant that Foster was to head the State Department for only nine months — hardly enough time to leave evidence of his personal contributions.

But by the time of his appointment as Secretary of State Foster had already been deeply involved in drafting policy. Indeed, throughout

Harrison's administration Foster had immediate access to the President and State Department, 2 The honest, intelligent and hard-working Harrison brought to

Washington an administration committed to an assertive and aggressive foreign policy that would definitely and irrevokably start the United

States on a course of imperialism. During Harrison's four years in the White House the United States initiated a program of ertensive naval construction under the able leadership of Secretary of State Benjamin

F. Tracy. The United States attempted to acquire the Danish West

Indies, tried to secure a lease for Samana Bay in San Domingo, sought the concession of the Mole St. Nicholas in Haiti, and seriously considered the possibility of establishing a naval base in Chimbote,

Peru. All of Canada was considered a legitimate area for acquisition, including sole jurisdiction of the Bering Sea and rights to the fur

2 An interesting sketch of Harrison's career and character is presented in John A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth, 1877-1890 (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 6 8), 297-298; Harry J. Sievers, Benjamin Harrison, 3 vols.,is a complete biography, but the third volume, Benjamin Harrison: Hoosier President, offers little insight into foreign policy m a tte rs . 79 seal trade. In the final months of Harrison's administration the com­ plete annexation of the Hawaiian islands almost became a reality. A protectorate in Samoa was successfully arranged, plans were drawn for an enlarged merchant marine, and renewed interest was devoted to the prospects of increased trade in the Caribbean, South America, and the

Orient. In a diplomatic crisis with Chile, the United States took a belligerent and jingoist stand that demonstrated a self-confidence bordering an arrogance. It may be argued that the annexations of im perialistic policies of succeeding administrations were possible because of the decidedly expansionist policies developed during the 3 Harrison administration.

In an administration seeking an increased international role

The thesis that U.S. imperialism began with the Harrison administration is advanced in Albert T. Volwiler, "Harrison, Blaine and American Foreign Policy, 1889-1893," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, LXXIX (1938), 638-639. Also see Foster Rhea D u lle s, The Im p erial Years (New York: Thomas Y. Corwell C o., 1956), 52-53; Prelude to World Power, 1860-1900 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), 120, 123-125, 132-133; Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1 9 6 1 ) , 1 7 . Walter La Feber argues that a search for new markets dominated Harrison's administra­ tion in its formulation of a policy for building a "new empire", The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, I 86O-I898 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1 9 6 3 ), 102-112, 127-130, 121-127, 137-138. William A. Williams proposes that "Metropolitan Republicans" committed themselves to market expansion at this time to hold the support of midwest farm-businessmen, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York: Vintage Books, 19&9), 319-3^8. John A.S. Grenville and George B. Young suggest that the building of capital ships during the Harrison years enabled the United States to conduct a more aggressive foreign policy, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 6 6 ), 1-38'. For details of the naval building program under Benjamin Tracy, see Walter R. Herrick, J r., The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1 9 6 6 ), 202-217. 80

the office of Secretary of State is a key appointment, and Harrison

decided to choose Blaine for his cabinet only after considerable U delay and tremendous pressure from powerful Republicans. Blaine

was anxious to return to the State Department and supported Harrison

vigorously in 1888. However, the President-elect did not consult him

about important appointments in the diplomatic service. Finally and

reluctantly, Harrison extended an offer to Blaine in January following

extended deliberation.^ Harrison was concerned that the popular

Blaine would try to dominate the administration, and the President warned

Blaine when he offered the appointment that as Secretary of State he was 6 not to have the independence he enjoyed in the Garfield Administration.

Harrison’s fears of Blaine's ambitions were unfounded, as the 7 Secretary of State soon demonstrated that he had lost his old fire,

5 : ! Private Memoranda of Harrison on his relations with Blaine, May 22, 1893. Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine, coll. and ed. by Albert T. Voiwiler (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 19^0), 299-301, also see 9-12 (hereafter referred to as Correspondence). For an excellent account of the political factors that led to the selection of Blaine, see H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, 320-322. Also see J.A. Williams, "Stephen B. Elkins and the Benjamin Harrison Campaign and C abinet,1887-1891," Indiana Magazine of H istory. LXVIII (March, 1972), 1 -8, 12-16. ^Stuart, Department of S ta te . 171-173; David S. Muzzy, James G. Blaine (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1963 C19343), 390-391, 462-463.

^Harrison to Blaine (private) January 17, 1889, 44-45; also see draft of this letter which more clearly indicates Harrison*s true feelings, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine, 45-48; Muzzy, Ibid.. 388-389, 462, 464-465; Stuart, Department of State, 172.

'^Dulles, Imperial Years. 51-52; Muzzy, Blaine, 424-425. Alice Felt Tyler, The Foreign Policies of James G. Blaine (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1927), 367. 81

8 but Harrison never trusted Blaine as a confidant or adviser. Suspi­

cious of his Secretary of State, the President refused to accept Walker 9 Blaine, the Secretary’s son, as Assistant Secretary. Harrison very

much wanted to be his own man and personally handled foreign policies s 10 to great extent, especially during Blaine’s absences from Washington.

Left out of policy planning, Blaine had no interest in routine admini- 11 strative tasks and proved to be a poor administrator. Of their

strained relationship Harrison remarked: ”My association with Mr. Blaine

covers some of the most pleasant experiences of my public life, and some 12 of the most try in g .”

Although Harrison and Blaine were not personally close, they

demonstrated no disagreement on major foreign policy objectives.

Blaine believed that the United States was assigned by fate ultimately

8 See Valwiler's introduction to Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine for an interesting account of the personal relationship between Blaine and Harrison, 1-17. Muzzy, Blaine, 390-391, 464-465.

Q S tuart, Department of S tate, 172. Walker Blaine was-appointed S o licito r as a compromise. William F. Wharton of Massachusetts was named Assistant Secretary of State at the suggestion of Sen. Henry C. Lodge. Walker Blaine served as Solicitor in the State Department until he died in January, 1890, 173, 178.

10Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years in Public Service. 252-253; Muzzy, Blaine. 388-389; May, Imperial Democracy. 17.

11 This assessment is made by Valwiler in Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine, 2-3; Start, Department of State. 177; Grenville and Young, P o litics. Strategy, and American Diplomacy. 89.

1 2 Private Memoranda of Harrison, May 22, 1893, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 295. 82

13 to absorb a ll of Canada, and the Caribbean Islands and Hawaii were

viewed as preordained to become part of an American empire and the

administration committed itself to their annexation. In August 1891

Blaine wrote to Harrison that the purchase of the Danish West Indies

could wait since these islands were "destined to become ours, but among

the last of the West Indies that would be taken." Blaine clearly

outlined his vision of the future course of United States expansion.

I think there are only three places that are of value enough . to be taken, that are not continental. One is Hawaii and the others are Cuba and Porto Rico. Cuba and Porto Rico are not now imminent and w ill not be for a generation. Hawaii w ill come up for a decision at any unexpected hour and I hope we shall be prepared to decide in the affirmative."^

Blaine viewed commercial reciprocity as a useful diplomatic

device for drawing vital areas of Latin America, the Caribbean, Hawaii and Canada into a special economic sphere of interest and increase

inter-American trade generally.To this end Blaine used his considera-

13 Blaine to Harrison (confidential), September 23, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 194.

*^Blalne to Harrison, August 10, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 174; Muzzy, Blaine . 392-394; Wilfred H. Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States. 1890-1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 57-58.

*^Blaine to Harrison, June 19, 1890, Senate Document. No. 158, 5 lst Cong., 1 Sess. Blaine to Harrison, July 24, 1890; Harrison to Blaine, September 10, 1890; Blaine to Harrison (confidential) September 23, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 113, 126, 193-194. For an examination of Blaine's views on reciprocity regarding Latin America, see A. Curtis Wilgus, "James G. Blaine and the Pan-American Movement," Hispanic American H istorical Review. V (November, 1922), 694-708. Philip Fonner views the reciprocity system as a scheme to incorporate Cuba into a United States empire. A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States, II, (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 337-341. William A. Williams. Roots. 327-328, Caribbean Policy of U.S.. 60-61, La Feber, New Empire. 112-121. 83

ble leverage in Congress to fight for an expanded reciprocity 16 amendment to the McKinley T a r if f , The complex and burdensome

task of negotiating numerous recip ro city agreements under the McKinley

Tariff was assigned to Foster by the President upon the recommendation 17 of Blaine. Soon Foster was given an appointment to negotiate a

reciprocal trade agreement with Spain for Cuba and Puerto Rico which

gave him official status within the administration, but he had already

been active in advising the President, the Secretary of State, Repre­

sen tativ e William McKinley, and members of the Senate Committee on 18 Finance regarding technical matters concerning commercial reciprocity.

In la te January 1891, Blaine and Foster agreed that before in itia tin g negotiations in Madrid Foster should make an unofficial journey to Cuba to confer with the commercial and industrial leaders on the island.

While still a private citizen Foster spent ten days in Cuba, ostensibly 19 for reasons of health and vacation. He carried with him a handwritten

letter from Blaine to the United States Consulate-General in Havana stating; "He£Foster) goes to you officially with the fullest credit and confidence of the State Department. Please respond to any and all

^ Memoirs. II, 2-5; Muzzy, Blaine, 442-451; Tyler, Foreign Policies of Blaine, 183-187.

^ Memoirs. I, 329-330; II, 5-6, 8; Memoranda of Harrison, May 22, 1893, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 302.

18 Memoirs. II, 5-8. Memo to Dr. Salvador Mendonca (Minister from B razil), November 14, 1890, Foster Papers. The f i r s t reciprocal trade agreement Foster arranged was with Brazil. He felt this treaty would improve his position in negotiating with Spain. Memoirs. I, 7. For the te x t of the tre a ty with Brazil see Senate Executive Document. No. 119, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess. Also see Foster’s views regarding reciprocity expressed in Proceedings of the Banquet of the Span l'sh-Amer lean Commercial Union, NewYork, May 1, 1889 (New York: Hispana-American Publishing Co., 1889), 17-19.

*^Memoirs. II, 8-9. 84 requests he may make. I give no specific directions. Mr. Foster is 20 accredited carte blanche . 11 In Cuba he labored to persuade planters, exporters and the Governor-General that since a reciprocal agreement between the United States and Brazil had been negotiated, failure to achieve a reciprocity treaty for Cuban sugar would be ruinous for the 21 island. After returning to Washington from Havana Foster received 22 official instructions and sailed for Madrid where the Spanish govern- 23 ment proved anxious to reach an agreement.

Conferences were held between Foster and Canovas during March and negotiations proceeded smoothly. However, two difficulties existed: first, Spain had treaties with European powers and might be obliged to grant these nations any favors given to the United States; and, second, the Spanish government was in the process of converting the the Cuban debt at a lower in terest and feared recip ro city would reduce government income. To avoid the problem of European interference Foster urged acceptance of the United States interpretation of the most favored nation clause which granted favors "only for equivalent compensations."

Regarding items covered by the agreement Foster believed that United

^®Blaine to Ramon 0. Williams (confidential), February 6 , 1891, facsim ile printed in Memoirs, II, 9.

^ Memoirs, I, 329; II, 9. H. P o rtell Vila, Hi star la de Cuba en sus Relaciones con Los Estados Unidos y Espania. I l l (Maimi, Florida: Mnemosyne, 1969 (1941) ), 74-77.

2 2 Memoirs. II, 9.

E. C. Grubb to Blaine, March 4, 1891, Despatches, Spain; Memoirs. I, 332-333. 85

States in terests were best served by a l i s t composed of a rtic le s with which European nations could not compete. Foster was confident he could

secure free admission for all cereals, meats, lard, fish feeds, seed and

oil, cotton, coal, naval stores, lumber, sewing machines and crude

petroleum. Foster also felt that he could secure such a low Cuban duty

on flour as to give the United States "a complete monopoly and double 24 (Cuba's} import at ion . 11 Harrison remained concerned about other nations,

particularly Canada and Argentina, gaining access to the Cuban market 25 through the most favored nation clause, but once the treaty had been agreed to in Madrid he was anxious to have the Secretary of State sign 26 the document.

Blaine was in no condition to sign anything when Foster returned

from Spain with the treaty. Violently ill, Blaine found himself unable

to consider matters of state, expressed to the President his confidence

in Foster's discretion regarding the treaty and indicated a willingness 27 to let Foster sign the document. However, Harrison desired that

24 Foster to Blaine (telegram), March 31, 1891, Harrison Papers, roll 31. Complete record of the conference is contained in Exhibit No. 1. in Foster to Blaine (confidential), April 17, 1891. Despatches, Spain, 122.

25 See Harrison's notes on despatch of Foster to Blaine, March 31, 1891. ib id .

26 Foster announced success in a telegram to Blaine on April 17, 1891. Despatches, Spain, 122. Harrison-Blaine, June 8, 1891, 159 and June 14, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 159, 1 6 1 .

Blaine-Harrison, June 11, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine, 160. 86

Blaine sign the treaty and sent the appropriate papers to the Secrer

tary at his retreat in Bar Harbor, Maine -- an act of kindness for 28 which Blaine was grateful.

While Blaine rested and tried to regain his vigor, Harrison spent

considerable time consulting with Foster on reciprocity and ’’some 29 matters that are his charge." Since his return from Spain Foster had 30 been a private citizen involved with his law practice in Washington,

but he remained an unofficial adviser to the President with special privileges in the Department of State, Subjects to which Foster addressed himself in Harrison's administration included nearly every major foreign policy problem.

Charged with the major responsibility for negotiating reciprocity agreements Foster held numerous meetings in a room set aside for him in the State Department or at his residence. The British were anxious for reciprocal trade agreements for their colonies in the West Indies and the Colonial Office was disposed to allow each colony to pursue its own negotiations. Throughout the autumn of 1891 delegations arrived from the Barbadoes, Trinidad and British Guiana and were presented to Foster

^B laine-H arrison, June 21, 1891, ib id . . 162.

po Harrison to Blaine, June 25, 1891, ib id . . 163. 30 During 1891 and 1892 Foster was involved with legal matters concerning claims of the Diaz government over the fraudulent La Arba and Weil mine claims. See Memoirs, II, 282-285; Before the Congress of the United S tates; the Mexican Fraudulent Claims Arguement of John W. Foster before the Committee of Foreign Affairs (Washington, D.C.i 1892). Fleming, The Treaty Veto of the Spnate. 57-58. John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law, VII, 6 8 ; xx, 114. 87

by Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British Minister in Washington, who, with the Secretary of the British Legation, the youthful Cecil A. Spring

Rice, demonstrated little interest in the details and complexities of 31 the negotiations.

At the same time Foster was working with the British colonies the arrangement of a protocol with the German government regarding American 32 pork presented a major task for the State Department, and Harrison 33 looked to Foster to handle the matter. Foster conferred with Count

Arco Valley and Charge d'Affairs Alfons Von Munn Schwarzenstein during 34 the summer of 1891 while Blaine remained secluded at Bar Harbor. In

August an agreement was reached at Saratoga, New York in which the

German government promised to end its import re s tric tio n s on American *

31 Memoirs, II, 10. Diplomatic correspondence concerning reciprocity for the British islands in the Caribbean is contained in Foreign Relations, 1892 and 1893.

32 For a complete background on the pork dispute which argues that protection of German pork producers rather than possible disease in the American product caused the German restrictions, see L.L. Snyder, "The American-German Pork Dispute, 1879-1891," Journal of Modern History. XVII (March, 1945), 16-28. Also see Jeannette Keim, Forty Years of German-American P o litica l Relations (P hiladelphia: Witlian J. Doraan, 1919), 67-78; John L. Gignillat, "Pigs, Politics and Protections The European Boycott of American Pork, 1879-1891," Agricultural History. XXXV (January, 1961), 3rl2.

33 Harrison to Blaine, May 28, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 156.

34 Harrison to Blaine, May 28 and August 1, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine, 156, 167-168; Blaine to Harrison, August 22, 1891, 180-181; Foster to Harrison, July 18, 1891 and Foster to Elijah W. Halford, (Private Secretary to the President), August 3, 1891. Harrison Papers, reel 32. 88

pork as soon.as the United States put into force the Meat Inspection

Act of March 1891. The German government also agreed to admit American agricultural products at some reduced tariff rates in return for free 35 entry for German sugar. Foster believed that the announcement of the 36 Saratoga agreement should have been delayed for several months, but the overanxious Secretary of Agriculture Rusk betrayed Harrison's con­ fidence and leaked word of the agreement to a delegation of. Chicago 37 packers. The exposure of the deal caused some embarrassment for the 38 administration but constituted no significant inconvenience in United

States relations with the German Empire.

Relations with neighboring Canada occupied much of F o ster's time and energies. Besides the fur seal controversy which had been raging fo r years, problems regarding Canada included Chinese immigra­ tion from Canada, jurisdiction along the great lakes, cattle and pork 39 regulations, railway competition, canal tolls and reciprocity.

35 Confidential minutes of interview between Foster and Von Munn at Saratoga, N.Y., August 22, 1891, Harrison Papers, reel 32; Foster to William W. Phelps, August 23, 1891, reel 32; Von Munn to Blaine, September 3, 1891, Foreign Relations. 1891, 528.

36 Foster to Halford, September 3, 1891, Harrison Papers, reel 32.

37 Von Munn to Foster, September 5, 1891 and Wharton to Harrison September 7, 1891, Harrison Papers, reel 33; Harrison to Foster (personal), September 10, 1891, Foster Papers.

38 Foster to Von Munn, September 7, 1891 and Foster to Halford, September 7, 1891, Harrison Papers, reel 33.

39 James M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations (New York: Macmillan Co., 1937), 413. 89

Foster viewed the United States relatio n sh ip with Canada as an

extremely important matter as Canada represented the presence of a

major European power in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, Foster

regarded border problems with Canada as far more serious than incidents 40 with Mexico. For more than a decade Foster was to be deeply involved

in long and difficult negotiations regarding the Alaskan boundary question and the fur seal trade.

Chances for a recip ro city tre a ty with Canada seemed hopeful

in early 1892, and a conference with a delegation from the Canadian

Cabinet was arranged for February 10 in Washington. Foster was 41 requested by Blaine to participate in these informal discussions.

Blaine believed that the economically troubled Canada needed recipro­ city with the United States far more than the United States desired ferny such agreement. Fearing that the Canadians were scheming to dump their excess farm products on the United States, Blaine had previously demon­ strated little enthusiasm for reciprocity with Canada, convinced as he 42 was th at Canada eventually would seek annexation to the United S tates.

Harrison and Foster were also skeptical about reciprocity with Canada,

/ but nevertheless agreed to the discussions with the Canadian delegation.

^ Memoirs. II, 176.

41 Memoirs, II, 179; Callahan, American-Canadian Relations. 422.

42 Blaine to Harrison, September 23, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 193-194.

43 Harrison to Blaine, September 26, 1891, ibid.. 195; Callahan, American-Canadian Relations, 422-423. 90

The discussions Foster and Blaine held with the Canadian

representatives during February failed to produce an agreement on

reciprocity as Blaine declined a proposal for reciprocity on natural

products and the Canadians rejected Blaine’s plan that amounted to a 44 complete commercial union between the two countries. It was soon

apparent that the Canadians were not sincerely interested in recipro­

city but were in Washington in hopes of boosting the popularity of the 45 Conservative Party in elections back home. The conference did pro­

duce agreement for cooperation on several subjects including the

establishment of a joint commission to investigate complaints of poaching on the Great Lakes and agreements for a joint survey of the

boundary between Alaska and British Columbia. Toward the close of the conference Blaine, acting on Foster's suggestion, vehemently protested 46 against Canadian discrimination in tolls along the Welland Canal.

Foster prepared a report of the conferences which Harrison delayed in

sending to Congress so as to avoid aggravating the Bering Sea fur seal 47 question which was pending. "

In June 1892 the question of canal tolls was again the topic of

4 4 Callahan, ibid.. 422-423.

^Goodwin Smith to Foster, February 16, 1892; J.D. Edgar to Foster March 23, 1892, Foster Papers. Also see John B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), 256.

4 **Callahan, American-Canadian Relations, 424.

4^Foster to Harrison, June 6 , 1892, Senate■Executive Document. No. 114, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 43, Callahan, Ibid. , 425. 91

48 a conference between Blaine, Foster and two Canadian commissioners.

Foster urged Harrison to assume a strong position on the canal toll 49 issue and thereby enhance his position in the coming election.

Harrison apparently agreed with this advice as he demanded and recei- 50 ved from Congress power to r e ta lia te against Canadian to lls .

In the spring of 1892 an additional matter fell under Foster's

supervision as Blaine's illness prevented him from preparing the

case of the United States regarding the Bering Sea fur seal question.

It had been agreed by Blaine and Lord Salisbury to submit the issue 51 to International arbitration, and when Blaine's incapacity became

apparent President Harrison asked Foster to handle the preparations 52 for the United States. Foster was engaged in this task when

Harrison appointed him to be Secretary of State.

48 Callahan, ibid.. 425-426.

49 Foster to Harrison, June 11, 1892, Harrison Papers, reel 35; Howard B. Schonberger, Transportation to the Seaboard; The "Communications 1 Revolution” and American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971), 153.

"^Harrison to Foster, August 17, 1892, Harrison Papers, reel 36; Congressional Record. 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., 6428, 6680, 6950.

^*For the correspondence leading to an agreement to accept a modus vivendi in the Bering Sea and submit the issue to international arbitration see, Foreign Relations, 1891, 524-643.

52 Blaine to Foster, June 1, 1892, Instructions, Special Missions, IV. Harrison to E.J. Phelps, March 8, 1892. Harrison confided to Phelps, a former Minister to Great Britain, that "Blaine has become too ill to even confer with me upon the subject." Harrison Papers, reel 34. Blaine to Harrison, May 12, 1892, Correspondence No incident demonstrated the unofficial influence Foster

enjoyed within the State Department more clearly than the "Chilean

c r is is " o f ■1871-1891. In fa c t, Foster was in large measure respon­

sible for causing the strained relationship that developed between the United States and the revolutionary government of Jorge Montt

that wrested control from President Jose Manuel Balmaceda. Foster was the legal counsel fo r the Balmaceda government in Washington, and he used his access to Harrison and Blaine to reverse the State

Department's neutral position on the civil war in Chile to one of partiality to Balmaceda. This policy shift caused resentment on the part of the revolutionists; and, when Congressional forces emerged as the victors despite the United States demonstrated antipathy for their cause, popular emotions exploded into a riot in which United States naval personnel were killed.

In January 1891 a large segment of the Chilean navy revolted along with the Congressional party against the liberal administration of President Balmaceda, claiming th a t the President had assumed d ic­ ta to r ia l power. Balmaceda held the loyalty of the army in Santiago but could not move against the revolutionaries in the north because they controlled the navy; neither could the Congressional forces move 53 against Balmaceda since he had a su p erio rity of f ir e power on land. between Harrison and Blaine. 281. Memoirs. II, 20.

53 John Bassett Moore, "The Chilean Controversy," Pol it ical Science Quarterly. VIII (1893), 467-468. Moore's article on Che Chilean matter is extremely valuable. At the time of the controversy Moore was 3rd Assistant Secretary of State, and his writing reflects his empirical knowledge. He also used State Department documents, and his understanding of the legal questions involved makes his study most a u th o rita tiv e . Also important is Osgood Hardy, "The Itata 93

To break the stalemate both sides sought armaments in the United

S tates. Balmaceda tr ie d to purchase a man-of-war through the United

States Minister to Chile, Thomas Egan, but this request was ignored by the State Department. The Congressionalists sent an agent, Ricardo

Turnbull, to buy arms in the United States and send them to the revolu­ tionary headquarters in Iquique. Turnbull arrived.in New York, pur­ chased a large amount of arms and had them transported to San Diego,

California where they were to be shipped to Chile. Trying to maintain a neutral posture, the State Department rejected the idea of the United

States government se llin g a warship to Balmaceda but did not view allowing the purchase of arms in the United States as an unneutral 54 a ct.

The M inister of the Balmeceda government in Washington, Prudencio

Lazcano, became aware of Turnbull’s arras buying mission, and Lazcano informed Blaine by formal note on March 10 that the Government of Chile hoped the United States would take measures to prevent these weapons 55 and munitions from leaving the United States. Blaine requested John

Bassett Moore, the Third Assistant Secretary of State, to draft a

Incident,” Hispanic American Historical Review, V (May 22, 1922), 195-226. United States relations with Chile during this period are described in Fredrick Pike, Chile and the United States. 1808-1962 (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1963), 66-85; William R. Sherman, The Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between the United States and Chile. 1820-1914 (Boston: The Gorham Press, 1926), 143- 193. ^E gan to Blaine, April 23, 1891, Foreign Relations, 1891, 110; Egan to Blaine, (telegram) May 8, 1891 and despatch of same date, Foreign Relat ions, 1891, 122; Moore, "Chilean Controversy,” 468.

^Lazcano to Blaine, March 10, 1891, Foreign Relations. 1891, 314. 56 reply to the Chilean note. Moore believed that the purchase of

arms by the Congressional forces was legal under the Treaty of Wash­

ington of 1871. On March 13, Blaine signed the document, drafted by

Moore, which in part stated i

The laws of the United States on the subject of neutrality,... while forbidding many acts to be done in th is country which may affect the relations of hostile forces in foreign countries do not forbid the manufacture and sale of munitions of war. I am therefore at a loss to find any authority for attempting to forbid the sale and shipment of arms and munitions of war in this country, since such sale and shipment are permitted by

Blaine's note explaining the United States position received no

reply from the Chilean M inister. Meanwhile the arms and munitions

purchased by Turnbull reached San Diego and were ready for shipment to 58 Chile aboard the Itata. a Congressionalist transport ship.

The Itata might have sailed for Iquique unhindered had not an

unusual meeting taken place in Blaine's home on the night of May 3.

Among Blaine's quests were Minister Lazcano, Foster, and Charles R.

Flint, a New York businessman and friend of Blaine with power of attorney from President Balmaceda. The object of meeting was to consider.whether the war materials should be seized and held for violation of United States neutrality laws. In spite of his hote of

March 13,. which claimed no infraction of neutrality laws, Blaine now

John Bassett Moore, "Some Incidents in the Chilean Contro­ versy," a sixteen page handwritten memorandum written by the 3rd Assistant Secretary of State for his personal records. John Bassett Moore Papers, I (Hereafter referred to as "Incidents").

^ B la in e to Lazcano, March 13, 1891, Foreign R elations, 1891, 314. e o Moore, "Incidents," Moore Papers, I 95

decided to halt the Itata and impound her cargo. Foster immediately

drafted instructions for the Attorney General ordering him to take

prompt measures to prevent United States neutrality laws from being

violated and injury done to a friendly government. Because the

instructions were written on ordinary paper and in Foster's own

handwriting, he probably delivered the message personally to the 59 Attorney General to insure direct action. The District Attorney

in Los Angeles ordered the United States Marshal at San Diego to keep

the Itata from leaving port but the vessel was able to escape and to

rendezvous at San Clemente Island with the schooner Robert and

Minnie, which transferred its cargo to the Itata steamer. Soon the 60 Itata was in open waters racing to Chile.

Immediately orders were issued to United States naval forces

to pursue and seize the Itata on the high seas as a fugitive from 61 custody; however, the skillful crew of the Chilean transport

managed to reach Iquique where the Ita ta and its cargo were surrender­

ed to representatives of the United States by the Congressional 62 government. Meanwhile, in San Diego legal questions concerning the

On the morning of May 4, Foster visited Moore in the latter's office to discuss the proceedings of the previous evening. Moore reiterated his position that the purchase of arms by the Congressional forces was legal under the Treaty of Washington, 1871. Ibid.

^Lazcano to Blaine, March 5, 1891, Foreign R elations, 1891, 316; A detailed description of the escape of the Ita ta from San Diago can be found in Hardy, "Itata Incident," 207-217.

61. Moore, "Chilean Controversy," 469,

^ E rra z u riz to Blaine (telegram) June 5, 1891, Foreign Rela- t ions, 1891, 317; Egan to Blaine, June 27, 1891, enclosure of Rear- Admiral McCann to Egan, June 12, 1891, Foreign R elatio n s.1891. 140, 141; Hardy, " Ita ta Incident," 217-221. 96 seizures of Itata and Robert and Minnie were pondered by Solicitor

General William Howard Taft. Ultimately the court held that the ships and their crews were involved in a legitimate commercial ven- 63 ture and released. In August, the Congressionalists were victori­ ous, and President Balmaceda committed suicide. The whole m atter might have been insignificant had not this incident, combined with other United States activities created a bitterness in Chile against 64 the United States.

As the relationship between the United States and Chile

increasingly came before public attention, Foster took steps to assure that his involvement with the Balmaceda regime remained un­ recognized. The State Department’s John Bassett Moore kept a careful record of the inner workings of the administration as the Itata incident developed, and he noted that Foster soon found his position

"growing warm" and became "apprehensive lest his connections with the matter might become known, and in view of his connections with the

Department of State, and his great privileges and opportunities in it, be the subject of comment." Foster therefore employed an attorney to

63 Moore, "Chilean Controversy," 269; Hardy, "Itata Incident," 214. 64 Moore, "Chilean Controversy," 469-473. Minister Thomas Egan, a Midwestern "Blaine Irishman" was considered by his contemporaries to be largely responsible for the deterioration of relations with Chile, especially by antagonizing the British interests in that country. See Sherman, U.S. and Chile. 145-152. Osgood Hardy finds Egan’s performan­ ce in Chile at a difficult time to be highly competent; Hardy views the Chilean crisis as manufactured in Washington, not Santiago. "Was Egan a Blundering Minister?" Hispanic American Historical Review. VIII (September, 1932), 285-292. 97

act as his go-between with the Balmacedists, but Moore knew that

Foster’s connection with the Chilean government continued. Foster

even drafted a memorandum* ostensibly from Minister Lazcano, stating

reasons why the United States should not support the Congressional

forces. Foster wrote th is document while using as reference works the 65 law books in Moore’s own State Department o ffice .

In spite of an unfriendly attitude toward the Congressionalists,

the United States seemed prepared to establish normal relations with

th e Montt government a fte r the f a ll of Balmaceda. On September 1,

Minister Egan reported from Santiago that the revolution was successful and that the Congressionalists were now in control, and he asked for 66 permission to recognize the new government. Several days later Egan

informed Acting Secretary of State Wharton that the Congressional forces appeared to have the support of the majority of the people and claimed that his relations with ’’all members” of the regime were 67 '•entirely cordiali 1 However, there remained a problem regarding the status of refugees who had found asylum in the United States

65 Moore, ''In cid en ts,” Moore Papers, I; Memorandum handed by the Chilean Minister to the Acting Secretary of State (WhartonJ , June 22, 1891, Foreign Relations. 1891, 317-319.

^Egan to Blaine (telegram) September 1, 1891, Harrison Papers, reel 32. 6 7 Egan to Wharton (telegram) September 7, 1891, Harrison Papers, reel 32; Egan to Blaine, September 7, 1891, Foreign Relations. 1891, 160. 98

68 Legation, and many Chileans harbored resentment against the United

States for the Itata incident and other acts which they deemed to be 69 Intervention in the recent civil war.

While Chile appeared outwardly to be at rest following the

revolution, tension was still very strong, and the continued presence

of the United States navy in Chilean waters did nothing to relieve the 70 situation. On the night of October 16 an altercation erupted in a

saloon In Valparaiso in which United States sailors from the Baltlmore

were attacked by a mob. Two sailors were killed and several others 71 injured. This incident caused a severe rift in United States rela­

tions with Chile and ignited jingoist emotions in both countries.

Following the attack on the seamen of the Baltimore. an already

tense diplomatic situation was further irritated by an undiplomatic

and insulting public circular from the Chilean Foreign Minister, and by

Harrison's demands for an apology and compensation to the injured

68 Wharton to Egan (telegram) October 1, 1891, Foreign Rela- tio n s. 1891, 177; Egan to Blaine, October 6 , 1891, 179-183; Egan to Blaine, October 13, 1891, 184. The legal aspects of the p o litic a l asylum question are discussed in Moore, "Chilean Controversy," 475-482. 69 Moore, ibid.. 475; Hardy, "Itata Incident," 221-222.

^®The Baltimore was one of several ships dispatched to Chilean waters during the early stages of the revolution in response to Egan's request for naval forces for the "protection of United States interests." Egan to Blaine, January 17, 1891. Foreign Relations. 1891, 93; Blaine to Egan, March 23, 1891, 107.

^*Egan to Blaine (telegram) October 18, 1891, Foreign Rela- tio n s. 1891, 194; Egan to Blaine, October 10, 1891 and enclosures, 194-195; Egan to Blaine, November 3, 1891 with enclosures, 213-217; Relations with Chile. 52nd Cong., 1st Sess. House Executive Document. No. 91. 99 72 crewmen of the Baltimore and the survivors of the dead sailors. 7 3 By January war seemed a very real p o ssib ility . As the Chilean controversy ran its course Foster was a principal presidential adviser, in an entirely unofficial capacity. He studied the State Department correspondence, reviewed the Department’s trans­ lations, and reported directly to the President.^

During the crisis with Chile Blaine’s role in the administration regarding relations with Chile was not of great significance. Blaine was ill much of the time, and State Department business was handled 75 by a ssistan t secretaries Francis Wharton, Moore and Alvey A. Adee;

Secretary of the Navy Tracy also played an important role, and his 76 aggressive attitude on the Chilean matter was forcefully presented.

72 Message of the President to the Senate and House of Repre­ sen tativ es, December 6 , 1891, Foreign Relations. 1891, ix; Pedro Montt to Blaine, December 11, 1891, 325-326; Montt to Blaine, December 19, 1891, 326-330; Relations with Chile. House Executive Document. No. 91; Moore, "Chilean Controversy," 490-492.

73 Foster very candidly wrote in his Memoirs that the "revolu­ tion which occurred in Chile...occasioned the Government of the United States much trouble, even bringing it to the brink of war; but it furnished me some professional business." The Congressional govern­ ment, apparently aware of Foster's great influence within the admini­ stration, asked Foster to remain on as counsel to the Chilean Legation in Washington. Foster refused, not wanting to involve himself further with the Chileans in this controversial situation, II, 289-290.

^ H arriso n to Blaine, October 1, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine, 201.

^Valwiler, "Harrison-Blaine Foreign Policy," 639.

^John K. Mahon, "Benjamin Tracy: Secretary of the Navy, 1889-1893," New York Historical Society Quarterly. XLIV (April, 1960), 179-201. 100

Even when well enough to work Blaine proved unreliable. On January 2 he lost an important message from Harrison under a mess of paper on his cluttered desk, and, as a result, he failed to attend a crucial meeting at the White House where the Chilean c r is is was to be 77 discussed. Blaine also disagreed with Harrison's hard-line stand which held the Baltimore incident to be a premeditated assult on the uniform of the United States and therefore an act that demanded prompt 78 and complete reparation. In January Blaine read the notes and enclo­ sure of Chilean Minister to Washington, Pedro Montt (brother of the

Congressionalist leader), and the Secretary of State found these 79 carefully worded documents to constitute an apology. To the

President, however, Montt's messages of late December did not seem conclusive, nor did they express the degree of contrition Harrison SO desired.

Harrison, finding Blaine's attitude incompatible with his own, dispatched Foster to the State Department where he unofficially reviewed the correspondence from Chile, checking and verifying the 81 : translations made by the Department's language experts. The

^Harrison to Blaine, January 2, 1892 and Blaine to Harrison, January 5, 1892, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 226, 233.

^Message of the President to the Senate and House of Repre­ sentatives, December 6 , 1891, Foreign Relations. 1891, ix. In response to Blaine's moderate views, Harrison reportedly erupted in a cabinet meeting and emphatically stated, "Mr. Secretary, that insult was to the uniform of the United States sailors." Volwiler, "Harrison-Blaine Foreign Policy," 640.

79 Blaine to Harrison, January 2, 1891 2 , Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 226. 80Harrison to Blaine, January 4, 1892, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine, 231-232. ^ F o s te r to Harrison, January 12, 27, 1892, Harrison Papers,reel 101

Secretary of State’s strong note of January 21 to the Chilean government reflected the jingoist spirit that Blaine had advised 82 ag ain st. In demanding an apology and reparations from Chile fo r the

Baltimore incident, and risking war with Chile in doing so, Harrison disregarded the advice his Secretary of State offered. Blaine was embittered that his Pan-American policies were jeopardized by Harri­ son’s demands on Chile, and the President was upset that his Secretary of State had not shown greater concern over an affront to the uniform 83 of United States servicemen. From January the relationship between

Harrison and Blaine declined steadily.

Foster staunchly supported the President's position on the

Chilean affair. Foster believed, with the President* that the attack on the sailors at Valparaiso was an attempt by the Congressionalist forces to "manifest their unfriendly feeling toward the United States," and he firmly believed that a show of force was called for against the offending Latin American nation. "Our government," Foster wrote, some years later, "could not have done less and retained the respect of other nations, but its action has left a feeling of resentment in 84 C hile."

Relations between Chile and the United States were normalized in the summer of 1892 by Chile’s proposal to pay an indemnity of

^^Blaine to Egan (telegram ), January 21, 1892, Foreign Relations. 1891, 307-308.

®^Volwiler, "Harrison-Blaine Foreign Policy," 640, 643, 644, 647; Dulles, Imperial Years. 60-61; Muzzy, Blaine. 471; La Feber, New American Empire. 134-135.

84poster» "Pam American Diplomacy," Atlantic Monthly. LXXXIX (A pril,1903), 485. 102

seventy-five thousand dollars to the Baltimore's injured crew members and relatives of the dead sailors. Ironically, it was Foster, now

Secretary of State, who informed Minister Egan in Santiago that the 85 Chilean offer would "be accepted cordially." Thus, John W. Foster, the lawyer whose intervention in the State Department on behalf of his

Chilean client had led to seizure of the Itata and the subsequent contro­ v ersies, the man who gave counsel to both the Balmaceda government and

President Harrison, now signed as Secretary of State the documents which ended an ugly situation that his action was responsible for creating.

On June 4, 1892, just three days before the opening of the

Republican National Convention, Blaine abruptly resigned as Secretary 86 of State, and the President immediately accepted his departure. The resignation was not entirely unexpected as Blaine had been for several months unable to carry out his duties as head of the Department of State

OC Egan to Foster (telegram, confidential) July 11, 1892, enclosure of President Montt's message to Congress, June 1, 1892, Harrison Papers, reel 36; Foster to Egan, July 15, 1892, Foreign R elations. 1892, 63.

Blaine to Harrison, June 4, 1892 (12:45 p.m.); Harrison to Blaine, June 4, 1892. Harrison's private secretary, Elijah Halford, delivered the President's letter to Blaine personally at 1:30 p.m. Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 288. 103 because of poor health complicated by personal anguish over tragedies 87 in his family. Furthermore, many leading Republicans were disappo­

inted over Harrison’s colorless leadership and interested in the prospect of Blaine heading the party’s ticket in the November elec- 88 tions. Just what motivation Blaine had in quitting the Cabinet when he did was open to speculation, but he proved to be unable to command a significant following at the convention and ceased to be active in 89 national politics. He died six months after his resignation.

Following his party’s re-noroination Harrison faced the matter of

appointing a new Secretary of State in the midst of an election campaign.

Upon Blaine’s resignation Assistant Secretary Wharton once again had been named Acting Secretary, and there was speculation that he might 90 hold the job permanently, or at least until after the election.

Secretary of the Navy Tracy was mentioned prominently in the press as

Sidney Smith (Blaine's secretary) to Halford, March 6 , (1892}, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 243; Harrison to E.J. Phelps, March 8, 1892, Harrison Papers, reel 34; Muzzy, Blaine. 467. 88 Numerous letters warning Harrison of Blaine's disloyalty and the possibility of Blaine’s threat to capture the Republican nomination can be found in the Harrison Papers, reel 35. Of parti­ cular interest is Foster to Halford, June 7, 1892.

89 Regarding the Uneasy relationship between Blaine and Harrison during the months prior to Blaine’s resignation, Foster wrote,. "In my relations with the Department of State during his (Blaine's) incumbency, I had a difficult part to act in preserving the confidence and esteem of both President Harrison and himself, especially when tension between them became more and more acute." Memoirs. II, 268. Foster believed that Blaine’s illness and the deaths of his sons, Walker and Emmons, led to his resignation, not presidential ambitions. 267-268.

^®New York Times (June 24, 1892), 4. 104

91 a man well suited for the post. The railroad entrepreneur Chauncey 92 Depew of New York also figures in the speculation; and, in fact,

Harrison offered the position to his political ally but Depew decli- 93 ned. In deciding to appoint Foster to his Cabinet, Harrison chose a man who had already familiarized himself with the current State

Department matters through both official and unofficial assignments. 94 It appeared to be a "safe , 11 sensible and businesslike selection; but, because of F o ster's previous allian ces with Gresham, Foster 95 probably did not add any political strength to the administration.

^F.G. Shanks, (President of National Press Intelligence Co.) to Tracy, June 11, 1892, Tracy Papers, X III; New York Times (June 30, 1892), 4.

^New York Times, ibid., QO ^According to Depew, Harrison said, "It was largely through your efforts that I became President, and I am greatly indebted to you for my nomination." After turning down the job, Depew claimed he had the President's assurance that the position would be waiting fo r him in a second adm inistration. Chauncey Depew, Memories of Eighty Years (New York: Charles S cribner's Sons, 1924), 138, 139.

94 Within a week following his appointment as Secretary of State, Foster wrote to Blaine that he had never aspired to the post and accepted it only out of loyalty to Harrison. Foster also informed Blaine that he would "strive to follow the policy you have marked out in the Department." Foster to Blaine, July 8, 1892, Blaine Papers. Also see Nation. LV (July 7, 1892), 1; New York Times (June 24, 1892), 4. Harrison sent F o ste r's nomination to the Senate on June 29, 1892, and it was confirmed without debate. Senate Executive Journal. XVIII, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., 253, 254.

95 Donald M. Dozer, "Benjamin Harrison and the P residential Campaign of 1892," American H istorical Review. LIV (October, 1948), 72. In September 1891, the New York Mall and Express had reported a breakfast meeting in a New York Hotel between Foster and leading Gresham backers including Indiana Republicans Charles Fairbanks, Otto Gresham, and the younger Oliver P. Morton. The meeting spurred speculation of a Gresham boom, but Foster told reporters the meeting was just an accidental encounter. Foster also denied iinvolvement in a Gresham plot to the President. Foster to Halford, September i, 105

Although a practical choice, especially since Foster was already occupied at the State Department with the preparation of the Bering

Sea fur seal case for an international tribunal, the nomication of

Foster brought some severe criticism. Nat ion pointed out that Foster appeared well qualified for the position but questioned his involve­ ment with legal matters concerning foreign claims settlements . 9 6 The

New York Times was exceptionally critical of Foster and stated that both Tracy and Wharton would have been better choices. In an editorial the Times stated that Harrison should not have appointed a man who had been retained and paid as a private counsel to prosecute claims against the United States government as Foster had done for the Legations of

China and Mexico. The e d ito ria l claimed th at the Times had been in stru ­ mental in helping to defeat Foster's reciprocity treaty with Spain in

1884 and predicted that "his (Foster's) secretaryship will be distinc­ tly not 'brilliant' and not sensational." Regarding the sudden depar­ ture of Blaine and the selection by Harrison of an old political associate from his home state, the Times reported:

One Secretary of State has just "thrown up his job" with about as much form and ceremony as a bricklayer might exhibit in a similar proceeding. Another Secretary of State succeeds to the portfolio the news of whose appointment will be received with a shrug and a smile in more than one Foreign Office. There are still a few Americans, not all living east of the State of Indiana, who are capable of shame and mortification when our State Department is made the laughing stock of foreigners . ^

1891, with enclosure of Mail and Express a r tic le , Harrison Papers, reel 32.

9 6 Nation, LV (July 7, 1891), 1.

^"Not a Proper Appointment," New York Times (June 30, 1892), 4* On July 4th the Times featured the new Secretary of State*s

career in an expose entitled "Foster's Many Masters." The article

criticized the Senate for approving of Foster's nomination with

haste and without debate. Claiming that Foster's popularity with the

Diaz government while M inister to Mexico had led to his employment by

that government to handle legal disputes between Mexico and the United

S tates, the Times viewed it as sig n ifican t th at the new Mexican Lega­ tion in Washington was constructed next door to the Fosters' home on

I Street. Since Foster represented the interests of Russia and Spain

in Washington the Times argued that Foster took diplomatic assignments

in these countries to advance his legal practice and stated "there is every reason to believe that Foster has been as prosperous in diplo­ macy as most commercial men have been in trade of a different kind."

The matter of Foster's opposition to Chinese exclusion, an unpopular political position, was also discussed. Finally, the Times article reported that State Department sources had leaked word of Foster's work as agent for the Balmaceda government and his u n o fficial role in the administration during the Chilean crisis. "It may be," the Times stated, "that the blunders of the Chilean controversy, the wrong in the 'Itata* case, like the blunder in the Barrundia case, may be 98 traced to Foster's door."

^New York Times (July 4, 1892), 5. 107

While not bringing political advantages to Harrison's re-

election bid, Foster did have a familiarity with current State Depart­

ment matters which provided a consistancy in the Presiden'ts foreign

policies. During its final year the Harrison administration pointed

to the success of reciprocal trade agreements in increasing exports,

promised a tough stand by American negotiators in dealing with Great

Britain over matters including Atlantic fisheries, the Pacific fur

seal industry and the Welland Canal tolls. In the interest of improved commerce Harrison supported the establishment by the International

Monetary conference at Brussels of a bimetalic money standard utilizing the free coinage of silver at a fixed international ratio. The

President proposed an extension of foreign commerce through the restoration of the merchant marine with American-built ships and the enlargement of the navy to protect national interests and compel respect for the flag of the United States. The President also called attention to American concern for Hawaii, advocating the placement of a communications cable connecting the islands with the west coast.

On international questions the Harrison position was for the construc­ tion of a Nicaraguan canal, home rule for Ireland, and continued 108

99 p rotest to persecution of Jews in Russia. The Party Platform reaffirmed the principle of the Monroe Doctrine and supported "the achievement of the manifest destiny of the Republic in its broadest sense."*00 During the final months of Harrison's administration

Foster would work tirelessly in support of Harrison's foreign policy aims, but the Republican defeat by Cleveland meant frustration for most of the administration's foreign policy initiatives.

Like his predecessor, Foster took a strong stand against

British aggressions in what he believed to be American spheres of interest. Foster was not happy about the policy of joint ownership of Samoa, and he was more demanding than Blaine to make sure American rights were respected, even though he considered Samoa outside the

American sphere of interest.On November 21, 1892 Foster instructed charge d 'a f fa irs Henry White in London to inform the B ritish of the

United States concerns about British activities near Pago Pago in

Samoa.- F oster’s powerfully worded message stated th at White was to

"make known the President's conviction that any attempt on the port of Her M ajesty's Government to occupy any part of the port of Pago Pago as a cooling or naval station could not fail to be regarded by this

^M essage of the President, December 6, 1892. Foreign R elations. 1892, v ii, ix, x ii, v i i . Also see H arrison's campaign statements as recorded in Thomas Campbell-Copeland, Harrison and Reid. Their Lives and Records (New Y0rk: 1892), Pt. I, 29, 30.

^^Campbell-Copeland, Pt. I, 30.

*^*Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient (Bostons Houghton Mifflin Co., 1904), 386; Muzzy, Blaine. 400-402; George H. Ryden The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relation to Samoa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), 532-533. 109

Government as an unfriendly act, because tending to impair our 102 vested rights therein." Foster also took notice of British

activities along the Mosquito Coast and protested the expansion of

the British in the area of Nicaragua near the site of a planned 103 canal. Foster also vigorously demanded that the British take

measures to assure that an illegal traffic in Chinese workers by the 104 Canadian Pacific railroad be brought to a halt.

In keeping with the ambition of the Harrison administration to

expand the defensive frontiers of the United States, Foster attempted to secure a ninety-nine year lease on Samana Bay in Santo Domingo but the plan fell through when the Haitian strongman Ulises Heureaux, demanded cash and the appropriation was delayed in Congress. Event­ ually Heureaux secured a loan from New York Bankers and lost interest 105 in a sale of land which might have created domestic opposition.

The International Monetary Conference in Brussels seemed to offer commercial interests in the United States an opportunity for

increasing the money supply through the free coinage of silver at an

102Foste r to White, November 5, 21, 1892, Foreign R elations. 1892, 237-239, 245.

103 John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law. Ill, 238-241; Callcott, Caribbean Policy. 75-76.

* ^ F o ste r to Robert T. Lincoln, October 6, 1892, Foreign R elations. 1892, 234-235; Foster to Harrison, August 12, 1892, Harrison Papers, reel 36.

^^Callcott, Caribbean Policy. 65-66. Foster was also inter­ ested in the p o ssib ility of establishing a naval base in Chimbote Peru. See Foster to Hicks, January 23, 1893, Instructions, Peru, 17. Also of interest on the Chimbote matter is Seward Livermore, "Ameri­ can Strategy and Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890-1914," Pacific H istorical Review. XII (March, 1943), 36-37. 110

' ^iSced^ratic-and'ti'iereby improving conditions for

internatfSigsT trade.As Secretary of State Foster advised Harrison on the selection of a bipartisan delegation to represent the United 107 States and issued instructions to the delegates which proclaimed the administrations faith that the free and full rise of silver

’’would verySighly promote the prosperity of all the people of all the countthe world." poster informed the American represents- tives that "your first and most important duty will be to secure* if possible* an agreement between the chief commercial countries of the world looking to international bimetalism --th at is, the unlimited coinage of gold and silver ... at a fixed ratio in coinage common to all the agreeing powers." Failing to secure such a sweeping agreement the United States delegation was instructed to attempt to bring about some understanding for the larger use of silver as a currency to end 108 depreciation of that metal. In Brussels the American delegates deviated from Foster’s instructions as a tactical maneuver. Instead of first seeking a broad agreement for unlimited use of silver* Senator

William B. Allison urged the Conference in an opening statement on

November 25th to consider first those plans for a limited use of silver.

*®^See Harrison’s position on the silver question in Campbell- Copeland* Harrison and Reid* P t. II* 39-40.

*®^Foster to Harrison, August 3, 1892, Harrison Papers, re e l 36. 108 Foster’s instructions to the United States Delegates to the International Monetary Conference in Brussels, November 10, 1892, found in Henry Russell* International Monetary Conferences (New Y0rkJ Parper & Bros,, 1898), 379. I l l

The strategy failed, and after ten long sessions the Conference

disbanded without ever considering the Allison proposal and without 109 a single vote being taken on any matter.

Because Blaine had frequently absented himself from Washington

due to his poor health, routine work at the State Department had been

left unattended, and Foster was pleased to be able to report as he 110 left the Department that all business had been brought up to date.

This was a significant accomplishment considering that much of

Foster*s time as Secretary of State was occupied with two unusual

situ a tio n s. The most time consuming was the preparation of the fur

seal case which Foster continued to preside bver after his appoint­

ment to head the State Department. With Robert Lansing, his son-in-

law and junior law partner, Foster worked far into the night pondering 111 the complex legal, questions involved. The second extraordinary

I0 9Ibid., 377-378, 379-382, 408.

* ^ Memoirs, II, 250, 270-271; S tuart, Department of S tate, 178, 179; Castle, "J. W. Foster,” American Secretaries of State. VIII, 203.

**^Arbitrat ions with Great Britain regarding the Bering Sea fur seal question and other rather insignificant disputes provided Foster with periodic employment for over a decade. Foster describes h is role before the A rb itral Tribunal in Paris in his Memoirs. II, 20-50. Also see U.S. Department of State. Fur Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration Convened at Paris.... 16 vols (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1895); Report upon the Present Condition of the Fur Seal Rookeries off the Prifilof Islands (some­ times referred to as the Elliot Report) 54th Cong., 1st Sess., House Document No. 175. The historical material on the Fur Seal question is enormous, considering the relative insignificance of the dispute. The most important works include William Williams, "Reminiscences of the Bering Sea Arbitration," American Journal of International Law, XXXVIII (October, 1943), 562-548; John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations to Which the United States 112

development: occurred when a revolution in Hawaii by a pro-American

group of white planters and traders presented the possibility of

annexation to the United States. The failure to bring about annexa­

tion during the final weeks before the inauguration of Cleveland

presented Foster with probably his greatest disappointment in diplo­

macy.

Upon leaving the State Department Foster attempted to cooper­

a te fu lly with his successor* Walter Q. Gresham. A week before he 112 resigned as Secretary of State, Foster sent congratulations to his old friend Walter Gresham, who had just been appointed by Cleveland to the State Department portfolio. Since Foster was planning to leave

Washington for Paris before the inauguration, he offered to meet with the Secretary designate in New York. A meeting was arranged for

February 24th, but Gresham first held a discussion with Cleveland at

Lakewood, New Jersey in which the situation in Hawaii was viewed as 114 a top p rio rity . It seems doubtful th at Gresham informed Foster of

Has Been a Party (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1898), I, 755-959; Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, 147-154. For an analysis of the final settlement of the fur seal controversy, see Thomas A. Bailey, *'The North Pacific Seal Convention of 1911,11 Pacific Historical Review. IV (biarch, 1935), 1-14.

112 Foster to Harrison, February 21, 1893, Harrison Papers, reel, 38; New York Times (February 23, 1893), 1 . Assistant Secretary of S tate Wharton served as interim -Secretary fo r the fin a l week of the administration. Foster left the Department a week early to travel to Paris where the fur seal case was to be presented.

113 Foster to Gresham, February 16 , 1893, Gresham Papers, XXXIX. H^M atilda Gresham, Walter Q. Gresham. II, 744; George Dulebohn, Principles of Foreign Policy under the Cleveland Administra­ tion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1941), 38. 113

Cleveland's views on Hawaii when the two men met la te r in New York.

Gresham assured Foster of support in Paris but indicated a belief that the United States case before the tribunal would stand little 115 chance of success since the jurors were all European. Cleveland and Gresham must have viewed the election as a repudiation of the aggressive and expansionist foreign policies of the Harrison admini­ stration, and during their first months in office would do much to frustrate the foreign policy initiatives of Harrison, Blaine and 116 Foster. Foster's offer, to "hold myself ready to do anything I can,"^^was never accepted by the new administration.

The actual foreign policy achievements of the Harrison admini­ stration appear meager and insignificant because the Cleveland administration repudiated many of its predecessor's actions and the

American public in the early 1890's was as yet generally unaroused 118 by foreign affairs and unconcerned about overseas expansion. The

Harrison years were important, however; because his administration was the first since the Civil War to coordinate diplomatic planning.

Harrison's attention to an overall foreign policy can be seen in his

ll5 Matilda Gresham, ib id .. II, 717, 727.

* ^Dulles, Imperial Years. 71-72; Montgomery Schuyster, "Walter Q. Gresham," American Secretaries of St-ate. VIII, 244-248.

*l^Foster to Gresham, February 10, 1893, Gresham Papers, XXXIX; also pertaining to the New York meeting is Foster to Gresham (confidential) March 3, 1893.

1X 8 Grenville and Young, Politics. Strategy and Foreign Policy. 74-75, 8 6. 119Ibid.. 87. 114

naval building program which placed the United States naval forces

seventh in world ranking in 1893 as opposed to twelveth in 1889.

Conscious of American prestige and image overseas, Harrison managed

to have the rank of the highest United States diplomats abroad raised

from Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Ambassador 120 Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. In seeking to extend

the fro n tiers of the nation beyond the North American Continent the

Harrison adm inistration drew renewed a tten tio n to Cuba, Puerto Rico,

Central America, and Hawaii; and, in so doing, outlined areas of

American expansion for the coming decade.

The heavy handed methods employed by the United States in the

Chilean controversy indicated a new confidence, if not belligerence, on the part of American foreign policy planners and this attitude carried over into negotiations with Britain and other powers. This new aggressiveness would not diminish appreciably during the Cleveland adm inistration and would re-emerge s t i l l stronger a fte r the election of McKinley in 1896. Cecil Spring-Rice, a young B ritish diplomat in

Washington during the weeks when war with Chile seemed possible, viewed the affair as indicative of a new American attitude. On

January 19, 1892 he wrote, "the moral for us is : what w ill the U.S. be like when their fleet is more powerful, if the administration acts 12l in a similar manner?"

...... Volwiler, "Harrison-Blaine Foreign Policy," 648.

1 O l * ^Quoted in Alexander De Conde. A History of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 314. Foster's effect on foreign policy must be measured by viewing the whole of Harrison's administration, since Foster was active in planning and executing policies from the first year of the administra­ tion when he helped arrange for the inclusion of a reciprocity amend­ ment in the McKinley T ariff. As the agent charged with establishing reciprocity agreements with various countries Foster performed an important function which the Secretary of State probably could not have carried out himself. Foster rendered valuable service in personally negotiating the German pork agreement and assisting the ailing Blaine in conferences with Canadian officials. As Blaine and

Harrison drew apart, Foster seemed to serve as a middleman, remaining on cordial terms with both parties as a kind of diplomat within the administration. Foster's power in the State Department and his access to the President were clearly demonstrated in the Itata case, when he reversed the previously stated position of the Secretary of State on a vital issue with just a few minutes of conversation. That Harrison appointed Foster to act as the agent for the United States in preparing the Bering Sea case, and that the President left him on to head this mission even after naming him Secretary of State, testified to the confidence Harrison had in Foster's ability.

Had Harrison won re-electio n in 1892, what would have been

Foster's role in a second administration? It seems likely that whether or not Foster continued as Secretary of State his influence would have remained enormous. Certainly he would have advocated a still more aggressive foreign policy. He would have urged a tough stand in negotiations with Britain. He may have brought areas of the

Caribbean into an association with the United States. And, undoubted­ U6 ly, he would have supported the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. V

THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII

For many years Hawaii had attracted the attention of American expansionists, and Harrison and Blaine harbored a strong ambition 1 for the annexation of these Pacific islands. In listing policy priorities in August 1891, Blaine wrote to the President that

"there are only three places that are of value enough to be taken that are not continental. One is Hawaii and the others are Cuba and

Porto Rico. Cuba and Porto Rico are not now imminent and w ill not be for a generation. Hawaii may come up fo r decision at any unexpected hour and I hope we shall be prepared to decide in the 2 affirmative."

When the opportunity for annexation arose in January 1893, the task.of arranging for a treaty of annexation fell to Blaine's

For the history of United-States relations with Hawaii in the ..decades preceeding the Harrison .administration see Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii. 1842-1898 (Harrisburg, Pa.: Archives Publishing Co., 1945), 1-186; Merse Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968). Also of value for an examination of expansionist ambitions fo r Hawaii is Fredrick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (New York: Vintage Books,-1963), 231-236.

^Blaine to Harrison, August 10, 1891, Correspondence between Harrison and Blaine. 174. On October 14, 1891 Harrison wrote to Blaine that "the necessity of maintaining and increasing our hold in the Sandwish fHawaiian} Islands is very apparent and very press­ ing." 206. 117 118 successor. Himself an expansionist* Foster labored unsuccessfully during the final weeks of the Harrison administration to bring

Hawaii into union with the United S tates. While Foster fa ile d in this effort, his desire to make Hawaii a United States territory remained unaffected. He became a leading spokesman for annexation, involved himself in business ventures in Hawaii, and played a vital role in bringing about a joint congressional resolution for the annexation of Hawaii in 1898. No diplomat played a greater part than Foster in the imperial diplomacy that brought Hawaii into the

American empire.

After 1890 the business and commercial leaders in Hawaii, most of who were the children of American Protestant missionaries, became increasingly favorable to the prospect of annexation by the

United S tates. The McKinley T ariff which severely hurt the island sugar economy and the authoritarian and nationalistic tendencies of the native Queen, L iliuokalani, convinced sub stan tial numbers of the white residents that their interests would best be served through 3 union with the United States. Early in 1892 a prominent Hawaiian attorney, Lorin A. Thurston, was dispatched to Washington by a secret Annexation Club to inquire about the administration's attitude regarding the Hawaiian situation. Upon his arrival in the capital

3 ' Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii. 188-203; Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 111-115; William A, Russ, "The Role of Sugar in Hawaiian Annexation," Pacific Historical Review. XII (December, 1943), 339-350; Richard D. Weigle, "Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution," Pacific Historical Review, XVI (February, 1947), 41-58. 119

in March, Thurston received assurances from Congressman James

H. Blount, the Democratic chairman of the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs, that if the question of annexation were to arise

in the near future it would not he treated as a partisan issue* A

few days after his discussion with Blount, Thurston met with

Secretary of State Blaine and explained that the Annexation Club

would not attempt to depose the Hawaiian monarch unless she tried

to promulgate a new constitution giving herself increased powers.

Blaine, too ill to burden himself with the Hawaiian matter* sent

Thurston to see Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Tracy, who interviewed A the Hawaiian representative on behalf of the President. Tracy

informed Thurston that Harrison did not wish to see him personally

but had authorized the Secretary to say that the administration would be exceedingly sympathetic If conditions in Hawaii compelled

the annexationists to act against the Queen and a new government

presented itself in Honolulu requesting annexation. "That was all 5 I wanted to know," replied Thurston. "

In the summer of 1892, as tension between the Queen and

Hawaii*s prominent white residents became more intense, Foster succeeded Blaine as head of the State Department and became heir to a policy which had encouraged pro-annexationist elements in

Hawaii. Foster also inherited John Stevens, a friend of Blaine and

^Lorrin A. Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution. ed. by Andrew Farrell (Honolulu; Advertiser Publishing Co., 1936), 230-232. 5Ibid., 232. 120

Minister to Honolulu who enthusiastically encouraged the efforts 6 of the Annexation Club. While the Hawaiian Queen struggled with the legislature over the creation of a ministry, Stevens kept Foster informed as to developments on the islands. Stevens reported

"considerable excitement here in regard to a new cabinet," and claimed that the Queen was dominated by a Tahitian favorite Charles

B. Wilson, and other "persons in whom the best portion of the citizens had no confidence." To Stevens it seemed that the Queen was being advised to "resist the responsible men of the islands and 7 the majority of the legislature." The Minister stated:

The unscrupulous adventurers of different nationalities - Americans, English and Germans, without character, and most of them without property--are with the half-caste Tahitian fav o rite CC.B. Wilson) and the Queen. A m ajority of the Legislature and the best citizens of the islands are exercising remarkable forbearance and self-control. 8 Foster read Stevens’ reports concerning the deadlock between the

Queen and the Legislature and forwarded these despatches to the 9 Secretary of the Navy for his "confidential information."

By late October it appeared to Stevens that the Queen had come completely under the domination of the Tahitian and his followers

^Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii. 194-196; Tate, U.S. and the Hawaii Kingdom. 149-152; Hawaii. Reciprocity or Annexation. 236. 7 Stevens to Foster, September 9, 1892, Foreign Relations. 1894, App. II, 360. For information on C.3. Wilson, see Tate.U.S. and Hawaiian Kingdom. 113, 115, 125, 162, 169, 171, 184.

8Stevens to Foster (confidential), September 14, 1892, ibid.. 361.

^Foster to Stevens, September 29, 1892, ib id . . 361. 121

including ’’most of the anti-American element" on the island.

Stevens believed that the Queen's friends were supported by the

British Legation in Honolulu because of their anti-American activi- 10 ties. Stevens maintained that only the presence of a United

States naval force near Honolulu kept the "Tahitian marshal and his gang" from inducing the Queen "to attempt a coup d'etat by proclaiming a new constitution, taking from the legislature the power to reject ministerial appointments."**

Knowing that the Minister was in close contact with members of the Annexation Club and other politicians favorable to annexa­ tion, Foster instructed Stevens to take care not to mention his involvement in Hawaiian politics in his official diplomatic corres­ pondence. Foster advised the use of two separate reports "one of which shall aim to give the narrative of public affairs in their open historical aspect, and the other to be of a strictly confiden­ tial character, reporting-and commentating upon matters of personal intrigue and the like so fa r as you may deem necessary for^ray f u ll 12 understanding of the situation."

In November the ministerial crisis in Honolulu subsided temporarily when the Queen asked George N. Wilcox, a legislator of

^S tevens to Foster, October 19, 1892, ib id .. 362.

**Stevens to Foster (confidential) October 31, 1892, ibid.. 374. 12 Foster to Stevens (confidential) November 8, 1892, ib id .. 376 122

13 pro-American sympathies* to foiyn a new ministry. The restoration

of political calm did not, however, deter Stevens from continuing

efforts on behalf of annexation. On November 20, Stevens authored

a confidential eighteen-page report on political, social and

economic conditions in Hawaii. Stevens concluded his lengthy

despatch to Washington by stating that an ’'intelligent and impartial

examination of the facts can ,hardly fail to lead to the conclusion •' *

that the relations and policy of the United States towards Hawaii

will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive

measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future

supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote

responsible government in these islands." Stevens presented a

collection of geographic and economic data to indicate the strategic

and commercial value of Hawaii. He also pointed to the distressing

increase in Hawaii’s Asian population. "Hawaii has reached the parting

of the ways," wrote Stevens, "she must now take the road which leads'

to Asia, or the other which outlets her in America, gives her an

American civilization and binds her to the care of American destiny."

Failure to act at th is crucial time would make Hawaii a B ritish

colony, Stevens warned. To avoid a British takeover, he urged rapid

annexation.

13 Stevens to Foster (confidential) November 8, 1893, ib id . . 1894, App. II, 376.

*^Stevens to Foster (confidential) November 20, 1892, ibid.. 188-196. 123

Foster was sympathetic to the cause of manifest destiny in

Hawaii, but he also realized the political problems that annexation

presented--especially if it were attempted by a lame duck adm inistra­

tio n during its fin a l months. Foster thought Hawaii v ita l to American 15 interests in the Pacific, but he believed Americans also had a

mission to perform in the islands, Foster noted Hawaii’s native

population had declined from over 130,000 in 1822 to less than 35,000

in 1892. Foster viewed as evidence of racial backwardness the incapa­

city of the royal family in Hawaii to govern by western standards, 16 despite the best efforts of Christian missionary advisers. When

years later Foster wrote his history of American diplomacy in the

orient he ju s tifie d the course of American expansion in Hawaii th is way: "the native inhabitants had proved themselves incapable of

maintaining a respectable and responsible government, and lacked the

energy or the w ill to improve the advantages which Providence had

given them in a f e r t i l e s o il. They were fast dying out as a race, and their places were being occupied by sturdy laborers from China and Japan. There was presented to the American residents the same problem which confronted their forefathers two centuries before their contact with the aborigines of the Atlantic coast.

During the final months of 1892 Secretary of State Foster

^ Memoirs. II, 167.

1^American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1904), 366.

17Ibid.« 385. 124

directed efforts in Washington to bring about annexation. Foster

knew that annexationist forces were at work on the islands, and for 18 this reason he did not press for a reciprocity agreement with Hawaii.

Apparen tly Foster believed that the islands could be annexed to the

United States if the Queen were offered a substantial monetary award

to abandon her homeland to the United S tates. In mid-November

Archibald Hopkins, a representative of the Annexation Club in

Washington wrote to annexationists in Honolulu that he was authorized to report an offer by United States government to ’’pay to Queen

Liliuokalani, and those connected with her, the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the assignment to the United States of 19 the Sovereignty of Hawaii." Members of the Annexation Club and

Minister Stevens did not favor the plan for several reasons. They f e l t the Queen would scoff at a mere quarter of a m illion d ollars and knew that certain Hawaiian members of the legislature would have to be bought off too. Those in Honolulu opposed to the plan also believed native Hawaiians would oppose this form of annexation and the further loss of control of their government to foreigners.

Finally, cautious annexationists worried that some planters on the islands would oppose annexation because they feared the United

States would limit the supply of cheap labor from China and Japan.

18 Tate, Hawaii. Reciprocity or Annexation. 235-236.

19 Hopkins to Thurston, November 15, 1892, in Thurston, Memoirs. 233. 125

Under these conditions Thurston suggested postponing action on 20 annexation.

When no progress towards annexation had been made by late

December, Foster advised Hopkins th at it would be "useless to attempt to bring matters to a head during the short time which remains to this administration." Foster advised the annexationists that the

incoming Cleveland administration would be "if not aggressive, at least positive and active" on the Hawaiian matter, and speculated that if E.J. Phelps were to be named Secretary of State, Phelps would "likely be favorable to the acquisition of Hawaii and do all 21 he could to push it." Foster, while sympathetic to annexation, did not expect to see the issue arise during his last weeks in office.

■it i t it

20 Thurston to Hopkins, December 14, 1892, ib id .. 235-236.

21 Hopkins to Thurston, December 29, 1892.ib id . , 242-243. 126

Overthrow of the Queen and establishment of a Provisional

Government dram atically brought the question of annexation before 22 the Harrison administration and the American public. On January

14, the Queen indicated that she intended to promulgate by executive decree a new constitution more favorable to native Hawaiians. Promi­ nent whites reacted by forming a committee of public safety to protect their privileges and interests against the sovereign’s actions; and, following a mass meeting staged by the Annexation Club on January

16, marines from the U.S.S. Boston marched ashore at the orders of

Minister Stevens "for the protection of the United States Legation and the United States Consulate, and secure the safety of American 23 citizens." However, strategically placed around all important government buildings in Honolulu the troops quickly brought about the fall of the Hawaiian monarchy. Helpless in the face of American

22For accounts of the events of the four days of revolution see Tate, U.S. and Hawaii. 155-193; Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii. 215-229; W.D. Alexander, History of the Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 1893 (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., 1896), 29-71. An exhaustive study of the entire revolution can be found in William A. Russ, The Hawaii Revolution. 1893-1894 (Selinsgrove,.Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1959).

23 Stevens to Foster (telegram) January 18, 1893, Foreign Relations. 1894, App. II, 385. Stevens claimed in testimony before a Senate Committee that "the only government was the 1000 citizen s who called the mass meeting and the presence of the ship Boston in the harbor. I had got information that I deemed reliable that a government springing out of that condition of things had become a de facto government, and by the invariable usage of the word I was bound to recognize it," 53rd Congress, 2nd Sess., Senate Report. No. 227 (known as the fJohn Tyler1) Morgan Report). 561-562. Tate proposes that Stevens led the Queen into a trap by departing from Honolulu on January 4 to v is it the town of Hilo on the island of Hawaii. In the absence of the Minister the Queen took aggressive steps which brought the reaction Stevens had planned. U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 129-130. 127

troops, the Queen surrendered to superior force and Minister

Stevens immediately extended recognition to the de facto Provisional

Government, which held power with the support of the troops from the 24 Boston. Stevens telegraphed news of the revolution to Foster on

January 18, and the following day he reported that the new govern­

ment in Hawaii had despatched a special commission to Washington,

headed by Lorin Thurston and representing "a large preponderating

proportion of the property holders and commercial interests of these 25 islands,” to negotiate with the United States.

In Washington, Foster reacted to the events in Hawaii by taking

immediate steps to help insure annexation. On January 28, the

Secretary of State telegrammed Stevens instructions approving ofhis

recognition of the de facto government and informing him th at hewas to continue to keep in close communication with naval forces in

Honolulu "with a view to acting, if need be, for the protection of the interests and property of American citizens and aiding in the preservation of good order under the changed conditions reported."

Foster also expressed the hope that Hawaii’s new leaders would "tend to draw closer the intimate ties of amity and common interests which 9fi so conspicuously and increasingly link them with the United States."

. — ; . _ Stevens to Foster, January 18, 1893, and enclosures, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 387-388, 388-397.

^Stevens to Foster, January 19, 1893, ibid.. 398.

9ft Foster to Stevens (telegram) January 28, 1893, ibid.. 399-. 128

Foster was fully aware of the international implications of

annexation, and he made a systematic effort to collect information

regarding the attitudes of foreign powers on the developments in

Hawaii. In a lengthy State Department memo to the President, Foster

reported on the attitudes of the foreign ministers in Washington and

found most favoring United States annexation. The Japanese Minister expressed some concern about the treatment of the fifteen thousand

Japanese in Hawaii, but 'seemed to feel that the interests of Japanese subjects in Hawaii would be respected by the United S tates. The

Japanese M inister stated that his government would not welcome the annexation of the islands by any European power, and he asked to be kept informed of the mission of the Hawaiian commissioners reported to be coming to Washington. The M inister from France also demonstrated an interest in the Hawaiian commissioners, but he did not feel that h is government would look upon annexation of Hawaii by the United

States with any disfavor.

The German and Russian Ministers were both friendly to American annexation. According to Fosterfs memorandum the German remarked that his country "had always considered the relation of the Hawaiian

Islands to the United States as one of quasi protectorate—the King and Royalty being virtually under the predominating influence of the

United S tates, and if those puppets were to pass away, he anticip ated that the Sovereignty of the Islands would be transferred to the

United States." The Russian Minister to Washington was even more encouraging and suggested th at his government would applaud annexa- 129

tion by the Americans. The Russian diplomat also claimed he knew from the British Minister that Great Britain was hostile to American plans in Hawaii and warned th at the B ritish would soon interpose 27 obstacles in the way of annexation. The Russian*s information, however, proved to be either in error or a deliberate attempt at subterfuge.

Foster was most concerned about British reaction to American policy in the Pacific. On February 1, Foster instructed Minister

Robert Todd Lincoln in London that "recent events have made our paramount concern (in Hawaii} more evident. You will carefully note and fully report by cable any governmental action adverse to our 28 confirming our position." Lincoln responded by taking a careful reading of British public opinion. He found no great concern in 29 Britain over the future of Hawaii, and the British government made no official statement on the Hawaiian £meute. Lincoln concluded that public opinion "recognized the predominance in the interests

27 Department of State Memorandum to the President, February 2, 1893, Harrison Papers, ro ll 38.

28 Foster to Lincoln (cipher telegram, confidential) February 1, 1893, Instructions, Great B ritain, 30.

29 Lincoln-Foster (telegrams) February 2, 10, 17, 1893, with newspaper clippings, Despatches, Great Britain, 173. Also see Tate, "Great Britain and Hawaiian Sovereignty," Pacific Historical Review. XXXI (1962), 337-344. 130

30 of the United States .'1 In Washington the British Minister appeared 31 to be totally unconcerned about Hawaii. From his survey of the

diplomatic situation Foster detected no opposition to United States'

annexation of Hawaii as the commissioners from the islands arrived

in Washington.

While foreign powers seemed to view Hawaii's union with the

United States as inevitable, the administration encountered strong

opposition within the United States, Much of this resistance resulted

from popular outrage at the aggressive and injudicious actions of

Minister Stevens in Honolulu. On the morning of February 1, Stevens

declared a United States protectorate over Hawaii and ordered Captain

G.C. Wiltse of the Boston to take military action to insure the 32 preservation of the Provisional Government. Stevens feared an attack on the new government by "the lower class of natives, led by unscrupulous foreigners of little property, mostly of California,

A ustralia, and Canada, who wish to maintain the Hawaiian monarchy and

its corruptions for. their own purposes." Having raised the"United

States flag over Honolulu Stevens believed he had saved the Provisional

Government from the evil designs of the "hoodlum foreigners and more

30 Lincoln to Foster (cipher telegram) February 10, 1893, Despatches, Great Britain, 173; also in Harrison Papers, 38.

31 State Department Memo to the President, February 2, 1893, Harrison Papers, 38.

"^Stevens to Foster, February 1, 1893, Foreign Relations. 1894, App. II, 399. Stevens also asked for naval reinforcements as "precautionary measures." For events in Honolulu leading to the establishment of the protectorate see Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 210-211. 131

vicious natives"; he now feared only British imperialism. Stevens.,

advised the Secretary of. State that the "Hawaiian pear is now fully

ripe, and this is the golden hour for Che United States to pluck

The revolution in Hawaii was its e lf a controversial event, and

Stevens' placing Hawaii under the United States flag just as negotia­

tions were about to begin with the Hawaiian commissioners put the

administration's diplomacy in an awkward position. The protectorate 34 intensified a furious debate over events in Hawaii, and diminished

the credibility of Foster's claims that Minister Stevens had not 35 acted in cooperation with the revolutionists. The high-handed

methods employed in Hawaii provoked Carl Shurr to w rite in Harper's

Weekly that if the adm inistration sought to annex Hawaii in its fin al

33 Stevens sent two despatches dated February 1, but these were probably written earlier and dated just before being placed on a steamer departing Honolulu. Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 400-402, 404. Also see enclosures No. 1, Stevens to Captain Wiltse, February 1, 1893 and No. 2, Provisional Government to Stevens, - January 31, 1893, 404, 405. On February 8, Stevens reported with great satisfaction that the "natives showed unexpected regard for the flag of the United States." Stevens to Foster (telegram), 405.

■*^An indication of the newspaper opinion viewed by leading member of the administration can be found in the memorandum entitled, "Opinion of the Leading Newspapers on the Hawaiian Question." Tracy Papers, 31. This report contained editorial comment from 37 prominent papers and found opinion evenly divided without regard to party affiliation or geographic location. Among the most outspoken in opposition to the administration was the St. Louis Republlean, which demanded the immediate recall of Stevens. For the.public debate on Hawaiian annexation see Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 213- 215; Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy. 13-17; Foster Rhea Dulles, Imperial Years. 68-70.

■*^New York Times (February 10, 1893)’. 132

hours through dubious diplomacy "it will commit an act utterly 36 inconsistent with the true spirit of democratic government."

Although many newspapers and journals advocated acceptance of an

imperial diplomacy in Hawaii, the administration's plans for

annexation were damaged by the extent to which public opinion had

been polarized by the questionable activities of Minister Stevens

and the maneuvers in the State Department.

Ultimately Foster felt compelled to disavow Stevens' declara- tion of a protectorate in Hawaii, but the Secretary of State carefully worded his instructions so as not to denounce the Minister's continued

cooperation and support for the Provisional Government. On February

14, Foster informed Stevens by telegram that the administration in

Washington interpreted his actions as mere cooperation with the

Provisional Government and in no way ’’tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights and obligations which the term implies." Foster continued by stating: _

So fa r as your course accords the cte facto Sovereign Government, the material cooperation of the United States for the mainte­ nance of good order and protection of lif e and property from apprehended disorders, it is commended; but so far as it may appear to overstep that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government in the capacity of protector or to impair the independent sovereignty of that Government by substituting the flag of the United States, it is disavowed . ^

3 6 Harper's Weekly. XXXVII (February 25, 1893), 170.

o 7 •^'Foster to Stevens (telegram) February 14, 1893, Foreign R elations. 1894, A pp.,II, 406-407. 133

Stevens did not interpret Foster’s telegram as a disavowal of his

conduct and replied to Washington that his ’’understanding of the

spirit and terms of our temporary protectorate is in entire accord 38 with the spirit and terms of the Secretary of State’s dispatch."

At no time did Stevens believe his course of action was being ques- 39 tioned or disavowed by Foster; and, therefore, no matter what

Foster’s intentions might have been in his despatch of February 14,

the United States flag continued to fly over government buildings

in Honolulu while a delegation from the islands negotiated annexation

to the union.

* * *

■^Stevens to Foster, February 27, 1893, ibid.. 409.

39 In testimony before a Senate committee investigating a f f a ir s in Hawaii Stevens stated th at he did not understand F o ster’s instructions to be a renunciation or repeal of the protectorate; rather, Stevens believed his orders to be "to sustain the sovereignty of the Provisional Government--that their sovereignty was threatened under the circumstances." When questioned as to whether or not he had received a despatch disavowing the protectorate, Stevens replied: "I shall object to the term disavowal; I do not admit there was a disavowal." Morgan Report. 555, 556. 134

The Secretary of State was well aware of political opposition

to annexation and he knew overthrow of the Hawaii monarchy and

subsequent declaration of a United States protectorate over the

islands had stirred controversy and upset a large segment of the

American public. Furthermore, hard experience had taught him the

difficulties of trying to push a controversial treaty through the

Senate on short notice. Nevertheless, when the Hawaiian commissioners

arrived in Washington Foster applied his considerable diplomatic

skills to the task of preparing a treaty that might win Senate

confirmation in spite of the many obstacles.

Negotiations on a tre a ty to annex Hawaii to the United States

began on the morning of February 4 when the Hawaiian Minister to

Washington, J. Mott Smith, introduced the commissioners to Foster.

The representatives from Honolulu presented th e ir credentials and a

w ritten statement describing the uprising in Hawaii and the events . . 40 leading to the formation of the Provisional Government. Accepting

these papers, Foster informed the Hawaiian representatives that

Protocol of the First Conference between the Hawaiian Commissioners and the Secretary of State, February 4, 1893. USDS, Hawaii, Notes from, the protocols are under the date February 4, 1893, The Hawaiian Special Commissioners to Mr. Foster, February 3, 1893, with enclosures, Foreign R elations. 1894, App., II, 224-233, Credential Letters of the Hawaiian Commissioners, exhibited to the Secretary of State, February 4, 1893, 233-234; Commission of the Hawaiian Special Commissioners, exhibited to the Secretary of State, February 3, 1893, 234. The protocols, stenographic reports of the conferences and other pertinent documents can be found in "Negotia­ tions of the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty of 1893,'* Hawaiian Historical Society, 5lst Annual Report. 1942 (Honolulu, 1943), 6-64 (hereafter referred to as HHS, 5 lst Annual Report). 135

President Harrison had just received a letter of protest from the

deposed Queen, asking that no action be taken by the United States

until she had been granted an opportunity to present her side of the

issue. Foster asked the commissioners to prepare a written reply to

the Queen*s charges that Minister Stevens aided those who plotted 41 her downfall and established the Provisional Government. The

Secretary of State then announced that he had been directed by the

President to receive any propositions which the commissioners might

care to make, and the Hawaiians offered to prepare a formal statement 42 regarding the objectives of their mission. At an afternoon meeting

the commissioners set forth in detail the conditions under which

they were prepared to negotiate a treaty of annexation. Foster accepted the document and asked the commissioners to allow him time

to study their proposals. A second conference was scheduled for the morning of February 7 .^

As a lawyer acquainted with international law and a presidential adviser familiar with political realities, Foster found several objectionable conditions for annexation in the commissioners* proposal.

Foster and Harrison were both anxious for annexation now that the

^ P ro to c o l of the F irst Conference, February 4, 1893; Liliuokalani to President Harrison, January 1 8, 1893 (Received February 3, 1893), Foreign Relations, 1894, App., II, 219-220.

42 Protocol of the First Conference.

43 Stenographic Report of the First Conference, in HHS, 51st Annual Report. 22-24. Hawaiian Special Commissioners to Foster, February 4, 1893 (received February 4), Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 235-236. 136

opportunity for such an event had occurred, even though Foster doubted that Senate approval could be won before Cleveland’s inau- 44 guration on March 4. To facilitate the ratification of a treaty of annexation the President and the Secretary of State knew that an agreement had to be arrived at quickly, and that the treaty must be free of objectionable and controversial questions. In meeting with the commissioners on February 7, Foster said he had been authorized by the President to enter into negotiations for annexation of the

Hawaiian Islands and only the final terms of a treaty remained to be worked out. Regarding the specific proposals of the commissioners, the Secretary bluntly stated that some points presented "some serious embarrassments" to the administration as it was "difficult to recon­ c ile them to the C onstitution and laws of the United S tates, and our 45 existing system."

In an attempt to eliminate all provisions which might stir

Senate debate, Foster rejected the idea of incorporating into a treaty any agreement to lay a cable to Honolulu as it was contrary to the policy of the United States government to engage in such work, and the Secretary disapproved of incorporating into a treaty a

44 Thurston to Dole, February 9, 1893, HHS, 51st Annual Report. 44. On February 6 , at the President’s request Foster submitted to Congress a ll correspondence between Hawaii Commissioner David L. Gregg and Secretary of State Marcy and the u n ratified tre a ty of 1854. Senate Executive Document. No. 45. Also printed in Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 3.

45 Stenographic Report of the Second Conference, February 7, 1893 (10 O’clock, a.m.), HHS, 5lst Annual Report. 26-27. 137

provision that the United States should open and improve Pearl

Harbor and establish a naval station at that location in a specified

period of time. Further, the Secretary of State informed the

Hawaiians that United States laws regarding"Chinese exclusion would

go into effect on the islands and that the exceptions the Hawaiians

wanted for their contract labor could not be allowed. Foster also

advised the commissioners that their desire for a bounty on sugar

would be one of the most serious obstacles to the passage of a treaty.

The question of whether or not a ll federal government appointments

in Hawaii could be made from among persons who had lived on the

Islands for at least five years was discussed and on this issue the 46 Secretary insisted that no guarantee could be made.

On February 9, Foster provided Thurston with a tentative draft

fo r a tre a ty of annexation. The document had been prepared by Foster

following a conference with members of the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations. Secretary Foster made it clear that the draft was as far

as the administration could go toward meeting the conditions stated

in the proposition of February 4. He informed Thurston that the

Stenographic Report of the Second Conference, February 7, 1893, ib id . . 27-40: Protocol of the Second Conference. Thurston recalled Foster stating that "our main problem was to secure annexation, and that whether Hawaii should be annexed as a state or a te r r ito r y was secondary." Thurston, Memoirs. 283. For a compre­ hensive study of the statehood question at this time see Charles -H. Hunter, ^'Statehood and the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty of 1893," Hawaiian Historical Society, 59th Annual Report. 1950 (Honolulu, 1951). 138

proposed draft left out the whole question of bounty and tariff in 47 order to avoid potential partisan opposition to the treaty. When

Thurston met with the Secretary of State the following day at 10 o'clock in the morning he reported that his colleagues were reluctant to accept the terms offered in Foster's draft as they differed greatly from the instructions the commissioners had received from the

Provisional Government. Stating that the commissioners were unwilling to accept Foster's proposal unless they found that these were the best terms they could hope to obtain, Thurston informed the Secretary that he and his associates would discuss the matter further before reaching a conclusion. Before departing, Thurston indicated that he hoped to be able to give the Secretary the commissioners' decision before the 48 day ended.

Late in the afternoon the commissioners met privately at

Wormley's Hotel in Washington. Present besides the commission members were Hawaiian Minister J. Mott Smith, Archibald Hopkins, and

Charles R, Bishop, a wealthy Hawaiian Banker. Thurston, acting as chairman of the meeting, argued that the Secretary of State had been an advocate for the annexationists* cause within the administration, pointing out th at the Secretary had labored hard to overcome President

______Protocol of the Third Conference between the Secretary of State and Mr. Thurston, Chairman of the Hawaiian Commission, Thursday, February 9, 1893; Draft of Treaty handed to Mr. Thurston-by Secretary of State Foster at Third Conference, February 9, in HHS 51st Annual Report, 47-49.

^Protocol of the Fourth Conference between the Secretary of State and Mr. Thurston, February 10, 1893. 139

Harrison's belief that the matter of annexation should be put to a

plebiscite throughout the islands. Urging the commission members to

accept Foster treaty draft, Thurston stated that the Secretary

believed this to be the best agreement possible under the circum­

stances and pointed out that Foster had rejected some of the commi­

ssion's proposals only because he wanted the treaty to receive approval

in the Foreign Relations Committee and be submitted to the Senate

during the current session. After some discussion, Thurston put to

his fellow commissioners the question of whether to accept the treaty

in its present form or retu rn to Honolulu with nothing. The unanimous 49 vote was to accept Foster's terms.

Immediately following the meeting at Wormley's Hotel the

commissioners informed Foster they had decided to accept substantially

his draft of the articles for a treaty; however, they still desired

some modifications. These included: 1) a time limit with regard to final and complete commercial union with the United States; 2) reten­ tion of the Hawaiian flag as a local banner to gratify the '’native population; 3) permission for the Provisional Government to remove officers until Congress legislated a permanent form of government;

4) provision for the registration of Hawaiian merchant ships; 5) the right of Chinese lawfully domiciled, but absent from the islands, to return, and no perpetual prohibition as to immigration; 6 ) a clause allowing cancellation of the treaty should Congress fail to

49 Minutes of the Meeting held February.10, 1893 at 4:00 p.m., Wormley’s Hotel, Washington, D.C., in HHS, 51st Annual Report. 50- 52. 140

elim inate duties on imports from Hawaii w ithin a d e fin ite period.

Foster believed the final point would meet with disfavor in the

Senate and suggested instead a clause guaranteeing that such legis­

lation would take place within a year of ratification of the treaty.

The Secretary stated that the registry of vessels might be safely

left to Congress and that Chinese already domiciled could be allowed to return. The commissioners accepted Foster's statements on these matters and his promise to take under consideration for the next conference the remaining points as well as the subject of citizenship 50 and provision for the royal family.

The following day, February 11, Foster informed the commissioners that he had reached decisions on several matters concerning the final version of the treaty. The Secretary announced that it would be best to strike out all references to the question of Hawaiian citizenship, leaving the issue for Congress to decide at a later time. Regarding the use of the Hawaiian flag as a local emblem, Foster again eliminated reference to the question from the treaty, but assured the'commission- ers that the flag could -be kept for the people of the island if not ■ made equal to the national flag. The wording of Article IV of the treaty was reconstructed in such a way as to make it clear that prohibition of Chinese laborers into the islands would not necessarily be perpetual, and Article VI, providing for the royal family, was

^Protocol of the Fifth Conference between the Secretary of State and the Hawaiian Commissioners, February 10, 1893; Report of the Fifth Conference, HHS, 51st Annual Report. 54-58, 141

modified so as to stipulate an annuity of $20,000 for the Queen and a gross payment of $150,000 for the Princess, The commissioners 51 agreed to all the modifications Foster proposed; and, after some

"slight liberal corrections" were made, the treaty was signed and sealed on February 14 and submitted to the Senate within twenty four 52 hours.

The idea of annexation appeared to have considerable support

in Congress and Foster lobbied for the treaty of annexation hoping for success in the slim chance that the treaty might gain quick ra tific a tio n . While negotiations between Foster and the Hawaiian commissioners were proceeding, petitions favoring annexation arrived

in Washington from the state legislatures of Oregon, California,

Colorado, Pennsylvania, Illinois and New York as well as from

■^Protocol of the Sixth Conference, February 11, 1893.

52 Protocol of the 7th Conference, February 14, 1893; The Treaty and the accompanying messages of Harrison and Foster are found in Foreign Relations, 1894, App., II, 197-205. Also in Senate Executive Document, No. 76, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess. several chambers of commerce. Four resolutions c allin g for 54 immediate annexation were introduced in Congress. Foster personally contacted Blount, chairman of the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs,- and expressed a desire that the congressman would help gather Democratic support for annexation. Blount, who planned to retire from Congress within weeks, indicated no opinion on the

Hawaiian situation, but he did promise to forward the confidential information entrusted to him by the Secretary to influential congressmen such as Robert R. H itt and James B. McCreary, of the 55 House Committee on Foreign A ffairs.

While the treaty awaited Senate action, Foster instructed his

Minister in Hawaii to continue to maintain close contact with United

States naval authorities in Honolulu. On February 23, just a few days before he was to resign as Secretary of State, Foster informed

Stevens that the treaty was still pending in the Senate and told the

Minister that he was "directed, in cooperation with the naval authorities, to support the Provisional Government in the maintenance of security to life and property and good order, until action shall

— Congressional Record. 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1027, 1091, 1170, 1563, 1605, 2086; New York Times (January 30, 1893); Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 198.

5 4 Ib id ., 1037, 1406, 2032, 2086.

5 5 Senate Report. No. 227, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 403-405. 143

be had Upon the treaty." Apparently, whether or not the Senate approved of the treaty of annexation, Foster was prepared to have the United States continue indefinitely a relationship with the

Provisional Government which amounted to a quasi protectorate.

A factor complicating ratification of the treaty was the arrival in Washington of Paul Neumann,a lawyer who represented the interests 57 of the deposed Queen. C onflicting reports of the Hawaiian revolu­ tion had already created some sympathy for Liliuokalani and Foster's concluding a treaty for annexation before meeting with the Queen's 58 delegation aroused public suspicion, Neumann had wired the Secretary of State from San Francisco upon his arrival from Honolulu expressing the hope "that no action be taken by the President in relation to 59 the affairs of the Hawaiian Islands until my arrival." Foster was not anxious to meet with Neumann as he was busy negotiating with the representatives of the Provisional Government. Furthermore, the

Secretary had been forewarned of the nature of Neumann's mission by

Stevens. According to the Minister's despatches Neumann was a "good natured and politic lawyer," a card shark who had won money from the la te Hawaiian King, and a man of "unsavory reputation." While

^Foster-Stevens (telegram) February 22, 1893, Foreign R elations. 1894, App., II, 408.

”*^Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 214. For a brief biographical sketch of Neumann, see 232-233.

58 E d ito rial, Washington Post, and "Envoys of Queen Bring Different Story," New Y@rk Herald (February 10, 1893).

^Neumann to Foster, February 9, 1893, Harrison Papers, re e l 38. 144

Neumann was being sent to Washington ostensibly to advocate the

restoration of the Queen, Stevens alerted foster to the possibility

that Neumann’s teal mission might be to arrange a good cash settle- 60 ment for the Queen.

Foster finally met with Neumann on February 21. At the commencement of their interview Neumann presented Foster with a statement, prepared on behalf of the Queen which denounced the Pro­ v isional Government and the actions of M inister Stevens. Neumann 61 asked that the document be placed before the Senate. The Secretary of State replied by agreeing to forward the message to the President but stated that he could make no promises regarding the course of action the President might take. After careful questioning by

Foster, the Queen’s representative was forced to agree that his mission did not have diplomatic character, and that he was acting in the capacity of a private individual. Neumann claimed that a referendum would show that only one in ten of the island residents favored annexation under the Provisional Government, and he' stated that he would be agreeable to the restoration of the Queen under a

United States protectorate . Foster asked his v is ito r if he would accept annexation without the restoration of the Queen provided a reasonable provision was made for her financial security. Neumann

^Stevens to Foster (confidential) January 26, 1893, Foreign R elations. 1894, App. **, 398-399; Stevens to Foster, February 1, 1893, 402-403.

^Neumann to Foster, February 21, 1893, Hawaii, Notes from IV. 145 responded that he would accept annexation only if the present govern­ ment were ousted and Congress allowed to determine Hawaii’s form of government. Foster stated: "Your opposition then...is not so much to annexation as it is to the Provisional Government that now exists." Neumann replied that this was correct, alluded to the long and frien d ly relationship between Hawaii and the United S tates, and asserted that the Queen herself would welcome a United States pro­ tectorate because she did not want the islands taken over "by some other foreign power." Upon receiving this information Foster con­ cluded the meeting by promising to put Neumann’s message before the 62 P resident.

Neumann failed to change Foster’s course of action but he did manage to put the administration in an embarrassing position.

Foster's refusal to listen to the Queen's protests before negotiating the the Hawaiian commissioners raised additional public suspicion about khe en tire Hawaiian a f f a ir . The San Francisco Morning Call criticized the haste with which Foster had negotiated with-the commi­ ssioners: "It was unjust and indecent. The care taken to suppress the Queen's side of the story in order that the treaty might be made irrevocable before public opinion could judge the facts is more than suspicious. If the statements of Mr. Neumann are true the treaty

62 Stenographic Notes of an Interview between the Secretary of State and Mr. Paul Neumann at the Department of State, on Tuesday, February 21, 1893. Harrison Papers, reel 38. Also in Hawaii, Notes from IV. 146

ought not be confirmed at all, and Minister Stevens should be

dismissed in disgrace from the diplomatic service. Let us have all 63 the facts before we act upon them." In sp ite of public criticism ,

Foster believed he had been given assurances from congressional

leaders that the treaty had sufficient votes for ratification from 64 both Republican and Democrats. However, questions raised by the

presentation of the Queen’s story eroded some support for annexation

among members of Cleveland’s party, and the President-elect and some

of his closest advisers appear to have been influenced by the Queen’s pleas.

* * *

For whatever reasons the treaty failed to win quick Senate approval and once the Democratic administration was installed the prospects for annexation suddenly grew dim. Within a week of his

San Francisco Morning Call (February 24, 1893), E ditorial (February 25, 1893), quoted in Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 215.

6 AMemoirs. II, 167-168. 147

inauguration Cleveland withdrew the 'treaty from the Senate for pur- 65 poses of reexamination. Several days later Blount, the former

chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs who had just re­

tired from a long congressional career, was appointed special

commissioner to v is it Hawaii and investigate the situ a tio n on the

islands. Blount was also given '•paramount*' authority in all matters 66 pertaining to the Provisional Government. As these events were

taking place the Hawaiian commissioners noticed an abrupt change in

United States policy and began to believe they had made a serious

error in "risking all on Foster's success" and in retrospect wished

they had made greater efforts to press this case before President- 67 elect Cleveland.

Foster sensed a change in the attitude of Democrats during the

fin al two weeks of H arrison's adm inistration, and he believed it

resulted from a decision made by Cleveland and his principal cabinet

appointees during a conference on February 22, at Lakewood, New

Jersey. Attending th is meeting were Walter Q. Gresham, the designated

Secretary of State, John G. Carlisle, a former SGnator and prospective

Secretary of Treasury and two other cabinet appointees. The topics

^Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents. IX, 393. ^Gresham to Blount, March 11, 1893, enclosed Cleveland to Dale and Gresham to Stevens, March 11, 1893, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 467-469.

67 ^William R.j Castle Diary (March 9, 10, 14, 1893), quoted in Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 231-232. "Hawaii Must Wait a While," New York Times (March 11, 1893). 148

of discussion were the letters of protest from the Hawaiian Queen

to Harrison and Cleveland asking that the United States take no

action on the Hawaiian affair until her side had been heard and

claiming that her downfall had been brought about with the assistance 68 of United States naval forces. Following the meeting Carlisle

went directly to Washington where he was observed lobbying among

Democratic Senators for delay on the pending treaty. Foster believed

that Gresham had influenced Cleveland's decision to block the annexa-

tion of Hawaii. Knowing that Gresham had developed a hatred for

Harrison, Foster viewed the unexpected action of the new administra­

tion to be the results of Gresham's personal vendeta against 69 Harrison.

Whether or not Gresham sought to embarrass Harrison by

investigating and exposing irregularities in the Hawaiian affair, the ultimate consequence of withdrawing the treaty was the complete

frustration of the attempted annexation. Commissioner Blount arrived

in Hawaii in late March and immediately hauled down the United States

i O Matilda Gresham. Walter Q. Gresham, II, 168. The le tte rs of the Hawaiian Queen to Harrison and Cleveland can be found in Foreign R elations. 1894, App., II, 219-220, 1278.

69 Memoirs, II, 168. Senator Shelby Cullom, a powerful Republican from Illinois, believed that the hatred Gresham had for Harrison went beyond reason. Cullom wrote that Gresham became upset at the mere mention of Harrison's name. Fifty Years of Public Service. 262. 149 flag arid ended the protectorate.^ After conducting extensive

Interviews for several months with participants on both sides of the recent events, Blount wrote a report which stated that annexation­ ists in Honolulu acted only after receiving assurances of support from the United States Minister, that Stevens gave recognition to the

Provisional Government before the Queen's forces had been asked to surrender, and that the overwhelming sympathy of the Hawaiian people 71 supported the Queen and opposed to the Provisional Government.

Gresham accepted Blount's findings; and, on October 18, the Secretary of State inquired of the President: "Should not a great wrong done to a feeble but independent State by an abuse of authority of the United

States be undone by restoring the legitim ate government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of 72 ju s tic e ."

The President accepted Gresham's analysis of Blount's report and informed Congress on December 18, 1893 that the United States would not annex Hawaii and expressed the hope that the Queen would 73 be restored and amnesty extended to the rev o lu tio n ists. The announcement of Cleveland's position created shock waves in both the

■^Blount to Gresham, April 6 , 1893, House Executive Document. No. 47, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session (commonly referred to as the Blount Report). 4-5. The Blount Report is printed in Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 443-1150.

^B lount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, Blount Report. 118-119, 120, 133.

^Gresham to Cleveland, October 18, 1893, Foreign Relat ions. 1894, App., II, 463. 73 Message of the President, December 18, 1893, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 445-458. 150

74 United States and Hawaii.

Restoring the deposed Queen presented a dilemma which Cleveland

and Gresham were unable to solve. In an attempt to persuade the Queen

to act with restraint if returned to power, Albert S. Willis of

Kentucky was appointed Minister and dispatched to Hawaii to urge

Liliuokalini to adopt a conciliatory course of action toward the 75 revolutionists and "to pursue a wise and humane policy." The Queen

resisted Willis' counsel, insisting on beheading the leaders of the

Provisional Government as soon as she regained her throne; when Willis 76 finally convinced the foolish Wueen to grant amnesty, Sanford B.

Dale, the President of the Provisional Government, p o lite ly refused

74 For a discussion of the angry reaction to Gresham's plan fo r Hawaii see Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 238-239; Donald Rowland, "The Establishment of the Republic of Hawaii, 1893-1894, P acific H istorical Review, IV (March, 1935), 205-206. Within government circles there was considerable apprehension about Gresham's position on the Hawaiian matter. John Bassett Moore wrote to former Secretary of State Bayard that "Mr. Stevens' course was unprincipled, false and indefensible, but it will not be possible to make out that the leaders in the revolutionary movement were equally censurable, nor is there any reason why we should attempt to do so ....(it is! specially unfortunate that any ground should have been afforded to our people to suppose that the administration was fatuously pursuing a policy that looked solely to the restoration of the Queen, Moore to Bayard, December 13, 1893, quoted in Tans il l , Bayard. 406. Cabinet member Richard Olney tried to warn Gresham about the danger of attempting to remove the now firmly established Provisional Government, s ta tin g : "It must be remembered that the Stevens Government is our government; that it was set up by our Minister by the aid of our naval and military forces and was accorded the protection of our flag; and that whatever be the views of this administration, its predecessor practically sanctioned everything Minister Stevens took upon himself to do." Olney to Gresham, October 9, 1893, in Henry James, Richard Olney (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1923), 215.

^Gresham to Willis (confidential) October 18, 1893, Foreign R elations, 1894, App., II, 1191.

^A lexander, Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy. 96-108. 151

77 to leave office upon the Minister's request. Faced with the

prospect of having to intervene with force in Hawaii to restore a

monarchy, the Democratic administration did nothing. The Provi­

sional Government remained in control and eventually established the 78 Hawaiian Republic on July 4, 1894.

The Cleveland-Gresham policy of attempting to replace the

Provisional Government with the deposed Queen led to partisan strife

in Washington. The Republican controlled Senate launched an investi­ gation of the President's Hawaiian diplomacy and filed a majority report that found the Blount mission to be unauthorized and illegal, deplored the lowering of the United States flag in Honolulu, and criticized the attempt to overthrow a recognized government friendly 79 to the United States. The policy of the Cleveland administration demonstrated little understanding of the political realities in

Hawaii. While the Harrison administration had acted with improper haste in an effort to secure the annexation of Hawaii, Cleveland and

^ D a le to W illis, December 23, 1893, enclosed with W illis to Gresham (confidential) December 20, 1893, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 1274; W illis to Gresham, December 23, 1893, with enclosures, 1275-1282.

^®For a history of the politics leading to the declaration of the Republic see Donald Rowland, "The Establishment of the Republic of Hawaii, 1893-1894, Pacific H istorical Review. IV (March, 1935), 201-220; Russ, The Hawaiian Republic. 1-48.

79 Senate Report No. 227 (Morgan Report), 33-34. The Demo­ crats on the committee submitted a minority report in which they denounced Stevens for his reprehensible conduct in Hawaii, 36. 152

ou Gresham were responsible for a quixotic policy.

The issue of annexation lay dormant throughout the remaining

three years of the Cleveland administration, but the annexations were

not at rest. With the election of a Republican President in 1896

the annexationists were quick to present their case before the new adm inistration, and Foster was to assume a leading role in the fin a l

drive for annexation.

* * *

Despite extensive travel in Europe and Asia and prolonged absences from Washington, Foster devoted considerable energy to the cause of annexation during the Cleveland years. Maintaining his close contacts with annexationists, Foster wanted to attempt annexation by joint resolution in the session of Congress beginning

80 Russ, Hawaiian Revolution. 350-351. 153

in December 1895, but leaders in Honolulu were content to bide 8l their time and wait for a new administration in Washington.

In late 1896 Foster became the agent for the Pacific Cable Company

of New Jersey which was headed by Colonel Z.S. Spaulding, himself an

annexationist. Arriving in Honolulu on November 2, Foster attempted

to negotiate a new contract with the Hawaiian government. Even before

news of McKinley's election reached the islands, Foster's proposal

was rejected because the Hawaiian leaders were not disposed to involve

themselves in international contracts which might complicate annexa- 82 tion procedures. Foster was not at all upset that his mission for

the cable company was a failure, and he enjoyed elaborate Hawaiian

h o sp ita lity among members of the Hawaiian government. Accompanied

by his wife, Foster spent several days touring the island of Oahu.

The former Secretary of State also took every opportunity to sound

out political sentiment. Foster left Hawaii determined to see the 83 islands annexed to the United States.

Upon returning to Washington Foster immediately began publicly

promoting annexation. In an interview with the press Foster claimed

that he had found the islands happy and prosperous under their

present government, but he urged annexation to end any anxiety over

© 1 Russ, Hawaiian Republic. 109-110.

8 2Ibid. , 270-272.

83 Memoirs, II, 169-170. Liliuokalani viewed Foster's trip as an agent for the cable company to be merely a cover for annexa­ tion activities. Hawaii's Story. 330. 154

- 8& Hawaii’s future. Several weeks a fte r McKinley’s inauguration,

Foster delivered an address before the National Geographic Society in

Washington in which he advocated annexation. In attendance were members of Congress and the diplomatic corps. Foster's remarks were published as a Senate Executive document and given wide distribution 85 as a pamphlet.

The address before the National Geographic Society was an attempt at complete justification of United States imperialism in the Pacific. Reporting on his recent visit, Foster reminded his audience of the growing importance of the Pacific to the United States.

He alluded to the historic westward movement of the Anglo-Saxon race, called attention to the Increasing interests of Britain, France and

Germany in Polynesia, warned of increased Japanese commercial activity in the Pacific, and cited Captain Alfred T. Mahan in pointing to the 86 s tra te g ic importance of Hawaii and p a rtic u la rly Pearl Harbor.

Believing America was justified in taking Hawaii, Foster stated:

...we have a strong equitable claim to the islands. The people of the United States contributed millions of dollars to bring the inhabitants out of a wretched state of barbarism

Q/ These remarks appeared in the New York Morning A dvertiser. December 1, 1896, cited in Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 264-265. 85 Memoirs. II, 170; The annexation of Hawaii; An Address Delivered before the National Geographic Society. March 26, 1877 (Washington, D.C,: Gibson Bros., 1897), also Senate Document. No. 23, 55th Cong., 1st Sess.

86 Annexation of Hawaii, 1-15. 155

and servitude and secure them a place among the civilized peoples of the earth. Americans gave them a written language, taught their kings the principles of government, for a century and a half were the real administrators of public affairs, and until their rulers demonstrated their utter incapacity were the firm est supporters of native Government. 87 Foster rejected proposals of a permanent protectorate believing that

the United States should not assume responsibility for territory

without annexing it to the Union. While he did not approve of

extending the United States beyond ’'present ocean limits," he encou­

raged the annexation of Hawaii to protect United States commercial

interests in the Pacific and to secure that area from the encroach- 88 ments of other imperialist powers.

In addition to his public statements advocating annexation,

Foster performed an unofficial but important role later within the

McKinley administration. On March 15, 1897 Foster and Senator William

P. Frye of Maine, the president pro tern of the Senate met with the

President to discuss the diplomacy and politics of annexation. Foster

recommended that a jo in t resolution on annexation would be preferable

to a tre a ty which would require a tw o-thirds majority of the Senate 89 for ratification. Although the proposal for a joint resolution was put aside in favor of a treaty, Foster remained involved in the

8 7Ib id ., 15.

88 T . . , Ibid. , 1 6 .

89 Tate, U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 270; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, N.Y,: Syracuse U niversity Press, 1963), 294. 156 annexation process because his experience was needed in the State

Department. McKinley’s Secretary of State, the aged and senile

John Sherman, remained uninformed of the strategy for annexation 90 during the initial stages. William R. Day, a close personal friend of the President but a man entirely lacking in diplomatic experience, was appointed First Assistant Secretary of State, and Day in turn asked Foster to prepare a draft of a treaty. Foster quickly prepared a document sim ilar in terms to the u n ra tified tre a ty of 1893. Within a few weeks the tre a ty was signed and sent to the Senate where it too 91 would remain unratified.

The announcement of the treaty signing created an incident with Japan. The Japanese M inister in Washington had asked Sherman about reports that a treaty of annexation was being prepared, and the bewildered Secretary of State assured the Minister that no such action 92 was being taken. When it became apparent that a treaty had in fact been signed, the Japanese were understandably upset and made a strong protest since tension existed between Japan and the Hawaiian govern- 93 ment because of discrimination against Japanese workers in Hawaii.

90 ' ’ Tate, ibid.. 270-271.

91 Memoirs. II, 172-173. The text of the tre a ty is recorded in Senate Report, No. 681, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2873.

^ Memoirs, II, 173.

03 Hoshi to Sherman, June 15, 1897 and Hoshi to Sherman, June 19, 1897, enclosed in Sherman to Sewall, June 26, 1897, Instructions, Hawaii, 8; John Bassett Moore, Digest, I, 348-350, 504-505, Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan’s Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," Journal of Modem History. H I (March, 1931), 46-61, 157

The Japanese protest contributed to delaying ratification for a year.

The var with Spain finally provided the atmosphere which 94 moved Congress to approve of annexation through a joint resolution.

In the spring of 1898 McKinley again turned to Foster for diplomatic and political expertise, asking that the former Secretary work among leading Congressmen to secure prompt passage of the necessary le g is­ lation. Foster labored to convince legislators that the war situation 95 demanded use of the joint resolution instead of a treaty. On June

6 , 1898 a joint resolution passed both houses of Congress and the

President signed the measure the following day. Hawaii became an

American te rrito ry on August 12. Foster was personally g ra tifie d by the fact that the joint resolutions received two thirds majorities 96 in both houses of Congress.

94 Merk, Manifest Destiny. 255; Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii during the Spanish-American War," American H istorical Review. XXXVI (April, 1931).

QS Memoirs. II, 174. Foster to H itt, June 19, 1898, H itt Papers, 2. Robert R. Hitt was the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and a former classmate of Foster at Indiana U niversity. Memoirs. I, 145.

96 Memoirs. II, 174. American Diplomacy in the Orient. 383. Congressional Record, 5770-5973, 6140-6693. 158

Perhaps it vas his complete conviction in the righteousness of his course that made Foster such a persistant advocate of the 97 annexation of Hawaii. Foster believed in manifest destiny and viewed the annexation of Hawaii as inevitable. In February 1893,

Foster wrote that "from an early day the policy of the United States has been consistantly and constantly declared against any foreign aggression in the Kingdom of Hawaii inimical to the necessarily paramount rights and interests of the American people there, and the uniform contemplation of their annexation as a contingent 98 necessity." As Secretary of State, he was well aware of the obstacles to attempting the annexation of Hawaii during the final months of the Harrison administration, and he did not order or explicitly provoke the coup against the Queen in January 1893 although he knew the Annexation Club contemplated such action. When the news of the Queen's overthrow reached Foster he was not displeased and saw in the sudden change in the Hawaiian situation an opportunity

^ C a s tle , "John W. F oster," 219.

98 Foster to Harrison, February 16, 1893, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 5. 159

to fulfill what he believed to be the destiny of history.

From a practical standpoint Foster had no alternative but to

recognize the Provisional Government which emerged with the coopera­

tion of the United States Minister. Not have recognized the de facto

government in Hawaii would have invited chaos and resentment as well as public criticism in the United States, possibly even from Cleveland and his supporters. Foster knew that Cleveland had seriously consi­ dered the annexation of Hawaii during his first administration, and he had no way of knowing Cleveland and Gresham would oppose annexat ion

in 1893. In fact, Gresham may not have been really opposed to ulti­ mate annexation, but merely desirous of damaging the reputation of 99 his political enemy, Harrison. When the Hawaiian commissioners appeared in Washington the only reasonable course Foster could pursue was to negotiate a treaty that would have a chance of receiving Senate approval. Foster had good reason to hope th at the tre a ty would be ratified, at least during Cleveland's term if not during the remaining days of Harrison's administration. Although Gresham and Cleveland, unlike Foster, did demonstrate concern over the plight of the Queen, they were never prepared to see her restored to the throne on her

99 John Bassett Moore recorded a conversation with Gresham on May 5, 1894 in which the Secretary of State claimed th at he would have carried out the policy of the Harrison adm inistration in Hawaii had not Minister Willis complicated matters by upsetting the members of the Provisional Government. Gresham stated that he wanted to appoint someone other than W illis to Hawaii, According to Gresham, had not the members of the Provisional Government been led by Willis to believe that the United States was hostile to them, matters might have proceeded smoothly toward eventual annexation. Memorandum of conversation with Gresham, May 5, 1894, in "Diary," entry of May 9, 1894, Moore Papers, I. 160

own terms. As subsequent events proved, the revolution In Hawaii

left the United States no alternative but to recognize the de facto

government and then to respond to that government's request to

negotiate a treaty of annexation.

Failure of annexation in 1893 appeared to make Foster more

determined than ever to see Hawaii annexed. Foster maintained his

contacts with leaders of the Hawaii government, and, in his typical

fashion, involved himself in a business venture through contacts he

established in diplomatic service. As a spokesman for annexation,

Foster provided the prestige of a former secretary of state to the

imperialist arguments for annexation. Foster insited that the

Anglo-Saxon race had a duty to rule Hawaii, and he believed if the

United States did not assume the burden of empire in Hawaii the

American people would be rejecting a historic mission* During final

stages of the struggle for annexation Foster provided valuable

expertise in McKinley's State Department at a time when it was needed,

and his service helped smooth the way for passage of the joint

resolutions on annexation.

Annexation of Hawaii in 1898 had immediate consequences for

United States foreign policy Foster had not anticipated. Within months of the joint resolution on Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the

Philippines also became objects of imperial expansion. Foster did not approve of the acquisition of these territories, but his long promotion of Hawaiian annexation helped to prepare the nation for further ventures in imperial diplomacy. VI

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT SHIMONOSEKU

THE DIPLOMACY AND INTRIGUE OF IMPERIALISM

No event in John W, Foster’s long career in diplomacy had

greater importance than the peace conference at Shimonoseki, Japan

in the early months of 1895. F o ster’s p artic ip a tio n in the confer­

ences as counsel to the Chinese plenipotentiary, Li Hung-chang, measurably altered the final terms of the settlement which ended the

Sino-Japanese war. While on this six-month assignment in the service

of the Chinese government Foster found himself in the middle of a

plot, formulated by Americans with interests in China, to overthrow

the ruling dynasty, place Li Hung-chang on the throne, and thereby open the ^hinese empire to American economic penetration. While the plot failed to materialize, it was significant nevertheless because the men involved in the scheme remained committed to furthering

United States influence in China.

The Sino-Japanese war grew out of a conflict for control over the Korean peninsula. For centuries Korea had been under the suzerainty of China, but with the decline of the Manchu dynasty

Japan had been able to estab lish an economic and m ilitary foothold

in Korea. As the result of an agreement between the Chinese Viceroy

161 162

Li Hung-chang and M inister Ito Hirobumi of Japan at T ientsin in

1885, the Japanese were allowed to quarter detachments Of troops in

Seoul. Ten years la te r, when the Korean Emperor seemed incapable of

suppressing a revolt of the Tong-haks, a fanatical, ultra-national­

istic and anti-foreign Buddhist sect, both China and Japan dispatched 1 additional troops to the Korean capital. By June 1894 the situation had grown tense, and in Seoul the ministers of the United States,

Great Britain, France and Russia sent appeals simultaneously to

Tokyo and Peking requesting the withdrawl of foreign soldiers from 2 Korea. However, war proved to be unavoidable as it soon appeared th at Japan was clearly prepared to w restle Korea away from the 3 uncertain hold of the Chinese.

Being on friendly terms with both China and Japan, the United

States maintained a policy of strict neutrality throughout the con­ flict and rejected several requests to intervene, including a propo­ sal by the British that the United States participate in a joint

For a documentary history of the events leading to the outbreak of the war, see Vladimir (pseudo, Zerone Volpicelli) , The China-Japan War (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1896), 1-86. Also see Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times. 6 th ed. (New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), 130-136,

o Joint note from the Foreign Representatives at Seoul (Still, Gardner, Lefevre and Kehrberg) to the Imperial Chinese and Japanese Representatives, June 25, 1894, Foreign Relations, 1894, App. I, 23-24.

^ S till to Uhl, June 24, 1894; Denby to Gresham, June 26, 1894. Ib id .. 22, 25. 163

effo rt with the European powers jt.o . impose a peace. Finally, in

November, Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham made cautious moves

toward assisting in the creation of a settlement. In messages to

m inisters Charles Denby in Peking and Edwin Dun in Tokyo Gresham

announced that President Cleveland was willing to use his "good 5 offices" in the interests of peace. By the time the United States

government made the offer to assist-dn negotiations, the Chinese

government had already expressed a w illingness to end the war,

recognize the independence of Korea from Chinese control, and pay 6 an indemnity to Japan. The Chinese immediately accepted Cleveland’s 7 offer to mediate, but the Japanese, enjoying military success on

all fronts, demonstrated an unwillingness to end the hostilities.

From Tokyo Minister Dun predicted that before ending the war the 8 Japanese would "drive a hard bargain."

While Gresham did not believe the war endangered any policy

of the United States in Asia, the Secretary of State was concerned

Denby to Gresham, July 8, 1894; Gresham to Goschen (B ritish M inister), October 12, 1894, Gresham to Denby, November 6 , 24, 1894, ib id . . 30, 70, 76, 82. Payson Treat, "The Good Offices of the United States during the Sino-Japanese War," Political Science Quarterly. XLVII (1932), 547-563. Also of interest is the description of American policy during this period presented by Foster in American Diplomacy in the Orient. 332-339.

^Gresham to Denby and Dun, November 6 , 1894, Foreign R elatio n s.1894, App., I, 76.

^Tsung-li Yamen to Denby, November 3, 1894, ib id . . 75. Korea was at this point already independent of Chinese control. For. the text of the Korean treaty with Japan signed July 25, 1894 see 93-94. ^Denby to Gresham, November 10, 1894, ib id . . 76. ®Dun to Gresham, November 16, 1894, ib id ., 79. 164

that excessive m ilitary success by Japan would cause the European

powers to intervene. In Washington Gresham advised Japanese

Minister Kurino that "Japan should bring the war to a conclusion.

If she continues to knock China to pieces, the powers, England,

France, Germany and Russia, under the guise of preserving order, will 9 p a rtitio n China." Whether moved by Gresham’s warnings or other developments, the Japanese government began to communicate with the

Chinese through the United States ministers in Tokyo and Peking, and by mid-December ten tativ e arrangements had been made for the commence- 10 ment of peace negotiations.

As the long-time legal counsel to the Chinese Legation in

Washington, Foster was concerned about the course of the war; and in addition to his sources within the legation, the former Secretary of State kept himself well informed of events in China through personal contact with expansionist minded Americans who held great hopes for the future of United States business interests in China.

Chief among these associates was James Harrison Wilson, probably the most ambitious of the American railroad builders dreaming of the unlimited possibilities for United States investors in the Orient.

9 Quoted in Schyier, "Walter Q. Gresham," American Secre­ taries of State and Their Diplomacy. VIII, 265. Also see Matilda Gresham, Walter Q. Gresham. II, 788, 789, 334.

^ Foreign Relations. App., I, 80 ff.; Charles Denby, China and Her People. II (Boston: L.C. Page and Co., 1906), 130-138; Treat "Good Offices of the U.S.," 564-569; Roy A. Hidemichi, Japan’s Foreign Relations. 1542-1936 (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1937), 149-153. 165

Since 1884, when he first contacted the Chinese Legation about

railroad concessions, Wilson and Foster had maintained a close

friendship; and in the closing months of 1894 the entrepreneur

involved Foster in an incredible plot to end the rule of the

reactionary Manchu dynasty and install a new leadership favorable 11 to American business interests.

Wilson was in communication with Denby in Peking, and the

United States* Minister shared Wilson's desire to see American

businessmen dominate the China market. Like Wilson, Denby believed

that modernization and westernization would come slowly as 12 long as the autocratic and xenophobic Manchus ruled China. During

the Sino-Japanese war Denby and Wilson believed they saw an opportuni­

ty to replace the ancient Manchu dynasty with Li Hung-chang or L i's 13 western educated adopted son, Li Ching-fong, and Wilson informed

Foster of the plan hoping that his friend's connections with Chinese 14 officials would smooth the way for future railroad concessions.

Marilyn B. Young, The Rhetoric of Empire. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 35, 56-57. Tragically, much of the correspondence between Foster and Wilson for the years prior to 1895 is no longer to be found in the Library of Congress. For an in terestin g biographical sketch of Wilson see David Healy, U.S. Expansionism (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 68-95.

*^Healy, ibid. . 182-183. Richard Van Alstyne, The United States and East Asia (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1973), 65-66, 6 8 .

l^Wilson to W.D. Smith (confidential) September 23, 1894, Wilson Papers, 24.

14 Young, Rhetoric of Empire. 27-30. 166

During Che f i r s t months of the war William Pethick, Li*s private secretary, was by coincidence in the United States promoting 15 railroad investment in China. Pethick, an American soldier of fortune, had known Wilson since the railroad builder toured China in 1885 in search of a railroad concession,and from that time the 16 two men had continued a close correspondence. In September Pethick presented Wilson with a memorandum on conditions in China. Pethick wrote that the Manchu dynasty would not survive a defeat by the

Japanese, and stated that his employer, Li Hung-chang, was clearly 17 best suited to emerge from the chaos as ru le r of China. Knowing of Wilson*s close friendship with Foster, Pethick was concerned that the Emperor’s agents in the Chinese Legation might uncover the plot through their counsel "in a moment of confidence." In a secret letter to Wilson, Pethick urged that Foster not be informed of their plans.

So concerned was Pethick about secrecy that he signed his message

^ P e th ic k to Wilson, August 31, 1894, Wilson Papers, 18.

*^The correspondence between Wilson and Pethick during the years 1885-1895 is located in the Wilson Papers, 18, According to Foster, Pethick journeyed to China following military service in the Civil War and mastered the Chinese language as well as any foreigner. Also fluent in French and German, the American adventurer found employment as the private secretary for Li Hung-chang, and he assisted the Viceroy in conducting foreign affairs. Regarding Pethick's position Foster stated: "His influence upon that states­ man c Li Hung-chang) and upon Chinese p o litic s was very decided, and always in the direction of liberal ideas and progress." American Diplomacy in the Orient. 296; "The Great Chinese Viceroy and Diplomat," International Quarterly. II (November, 1900), 589.

*^Pethick to Wilson, Memorandum to China (September, 1894), Wilson Papers, 18. 167

•’Man in the Moon” and added as a post script the unheeded instruc- 18 tion to "Please bum this,”

Wilson knew that an experienced diplomat like Foster could keep a secret, and at Wilson’s urging Pethick visited with Foster after calling upon the Chinese Legation in Washington, Pethick talked at length with Foster and found him to be in agreement about the need for new leadership in China, "It was a relief to pass from the insanity of the Legation to the bright intelligence of your friend,"

Pethick wrote, "he himself said it would be better to change the dynasty and put Li in power.” After the conversation with Foster,

Pethick o p tim istically concluded, "Your Igreat scheme, General—the changing of the dynasty,£and placing} your friend £Li} on the throne—is becoming more feasible with every day’s fresh news from 19 China." Within a few weeks of his meeting with Foster, Pethick was in route back to China, convinced that the collapse of the dynasty was imminent and that Li Hung-chang would emerge with the help of 20 certain Americans to rule China. —

Foster was also conducting a correspondence with the United

States minister in Peking. Besides sharing a common background in 21 law and politics in post-war Evansville, Indiana, Foster and Denby

1 8 "Man in the Moon" £Pethick) to Wilson, September 20 £?} , 1894, ib id .

^Pethick to Wilson, September 28, 1894., ibid.

90 Pethick to Wilson, October 6 , 16, 1894, ib id . Pethick devised a secret code in order to continue his correspondence with Wilson after returning to China. 2lDgnby, however, was a democrat. Healy, U.S. Expansionism, 178-179. ------168 held in common a belief that the Chinese leaders needed American guidance. After discussing the prospect of replacing the Manchu dynasty with Pethick, Foster wrote to Denby and suggested to the minister that a Japanese victory over China might produce some favorable results if the Manchu dynasty were overthrown. Foster also informed Denby that the Chinese Minister in Washington was interested in a loan from American bankers and that he had already contacted New York financiers on behalf of his Chinese clients.

Foster claimed that he had urged the Chinese to seek a loan in the

United States because American bankers were independent of the government, unlike their European counterparts, and therefore not 22 likely to threaten Chinese autonomy.

From Peking Denby informed Foster of the hopelessness of the Chinese war effort and the need in Peking for the diplomatic aid of the United States in the present crisis. "Instinctively the

Chinese turn to u s," wrote Denby. "The members of the Yamen CTsung-

11 Yamen or Foreign Off ice 3 are great school boys looking for a 23 teacher... .They know the United States have no axe to grind."

Within days of receiving these words from Denby, a messenger arrived at Foster's Washington residence with a telegram in cipher from the

Tsung-li Yamen requesting Foster's "wise counsel" in assisting a

22 Foster to Denby, September 28, 1894, in Wilson Papers; see Young, Rhetoric of Empire. 40, 241.

23Denby to Foster, November 13, 1894, quoted in Memoirs. II, 106. 169

24 Chinese commission appointed to negotiate a peace with Japan.

The request from the Chinese government for Foster's

services was logical considering the American diplomat's long and

satisfactory performance for the legation in Washington. Furthermore,

Foster had the prestige of having been Secretary of State and

experience in international arbitration. Another factor the Chinese

must have considered was the visit Foster and his wife had made to

China the previous year. On this occasion Foster met several key

government o ff ic ia ls , including Li Hung-chang, who seemed to take an 25 immediate liking to the American. Although Foster had been in

contact with the Tsung-li Yamen for years, he claimed the petition

for his services at the peace conferences came as a surprise. It

seems highly probable, however, that either Denby, Pethick or Foster 26 himself urged the appointment upon the Chinese officials.

Foster received the telegram from the government in Peking

early in the morning of December 22, and he immediately decided to accept the assignment, believing it to be "the most important duty

^ Memoirs. II, 102.

25 Foster's account of his first visit to China is extremely interesting in light of his long relationship with the Chinese government. While in China Foster met Li Hung-chang, Sir Robert Hart and W.A.P. Martin. Surprisingly, Foster did not encounter Pethick on this occasion. Of particular interest is the descrip­ tion of Li's banquet in honor of Foster written by Mrs. Foster in a letter to one of her daughters (probably Eleanor Foster Lansing), March 23, 1893, Memoirs. II, 92-93, 94-96.

2 6 Memoirs. II, 102. Treat, "Good Offices,*' 569-570. 170 which had even been entrusted to me, as it not only concerned two important nations* but was connected with one of the greatest 27 problems of the future -- the political relations of the Pacific."

Within a few hours of reading the message from China Foster arrived at the State Department and called upon the man who had succeeded him as Secretary of State. Foster assured his old friend that as adviser bo the Chinese negotiators he would act as a private citizen and sake it clear to all that he did not in any way represent the

United States government. Gresham seemed to view Foster’s mission, while unofficial in nature, to be in harmony with American interests 28 in the Far East. Upon leaving Gresham’s o ffice, Foster went directly to the Japanese Legation in Washington to explain the pur­ pose of his mission. Foster was proud of his close friendship with the Japanese in Washington, and he had for some years advocated the abolishing of extraterritoriality in Japan. Therefore, Foster was pleased when Japanese Minister responded favorably to the news that

27 Memoirs. II, 102.

28 Senate Executive Document. No. 25, 53rd Congress, 3rd Sess. Matilda Gresham, W. Q. Gresham, II, 788. Although they were old friends and former political allies, Foster did not view Gresham to be a capable Secretary of State because he lacked experience in foreign affairs and proved sensitive to public criticism. Foster frequently met with the Secretary of State on matters of official business, and stated that "our old time friendship was renewed, but it was not resumed with the unrestrained c o rd ia lity of former days. There was an inexplicable something in his new environment which seemed to c h ill our intercourse," Memoirs. II, 273. 171

Che American diplomat would be assisting the Chinese peace commi- 29 ssioners.

When the brief public announcement of the mission in the Far

East was made on December 28, Foster refused additional comment to the press; however, speculation as to the significance of Foster's presence at the negotiations appeared immediately. Some news sources expressed the opinion that Foster would somehow speed up the peace conferences and arrange for a ceasefire once the talks were underway.

There was confusion over whether or not Foster was really on good terms with the Japanese government, and false reports were circulated in Washington which accused Foster of authoring anti-Japanese propa­ ganda while in the service of the Chinese Legation. Speculation in

Washington also centered around rumors that Foster planned to arrange a loan for the Chinese government to help pay the war debt and possi- 30 ble indemnity. The various sto rie s forced Foster into making a public statement that he had no personal interest in a silver loan for the Chinese government as reported in some news papers 7 Never- 31 theless, suspicion persisted about possible business dealings.

Generally, however, there seemed to be a feeling that F o ster’s services would be of value to the defeated Chinese. A veteran

2g Foster's statement to the United Press, New York Times (December 28, 1894), 5.

■*®New York Times (December 28, 1894), 5; (December 29), 5.

^New York Times (December 30, 1894), 5. 172

international lawyer in Washington remarked that "If anybody can purchase a peace China will be able to get it if she will do the handsome thing by her agent. And China w ill find th at her American agent will adapt himself very readily to all the methods of Oriental 32 diplomacy. Smart fellow, that Foster."

* * *

Accompanied by his aide, John B. Henderson, the son of a senator from Missouri, Foster arrived in the Bay of Yokohama on

January 21, 1895. F o ster's three-week journey had taken him by r a il across the vast Canadian wilderness in the dead of winter and in a rickety steamer from Vancoover through the ice filled Pacific. Upon landing in Japan Foster was presented with a telegram from Chang

Yen-huan, who had recently been appointed head of the Chinese peace delegation, Chang, now a high ranking member of the Board of Revinue, had previously represented his nation as Minister to the United 33 States and Spain and was therefore an old acquaintance of Foster's.

"^New York Times (December 29, 1894), 5.

33Foster held Chang in very high regard, viewing him as one of the leading modernizers in China. A pleasant and openly friendly 173

The telegram from Chang asked that Foster proceed to Shanghai and

meet the peace commissioners there before proceeding to Hiroshima

where the conferences were scheduled to begin. After short meetings

with Edwin Dun and the heads of the British and Russian Legations

in Tokyo, Foster continued on to the Japanese port of Kobe where

another telegram from Chang awaited. Now the Chinese plenipotentiary

had decided to meet Foster at Kobe and sail with his American adviser

to Hiroshima, Foster understood these vascillating messages from 34 , the Chinese diplomat to be delaying tactics.

During the weeks Foster had been in transit from Washington,

the situation for the Chinese government had worsened dramatically

as a result of military defeats. Li Hung-chang, as the man respon­

sible for fortifying Port Arthur and the development of the modernized

navy distroyed by the Japanese, became the object of harsh criticism

before the court in Peking. Many of Li*s former supporters deserted 35 him in this period of public disgrace. Perhaps Li's long political

man, Chang was famous in Washington for giving elaborate p arties at the Chinese Legation on Du Pont C ircle. Chang worked closely with Foster on the Rock Springs indemnity case and the question of Chinese exclusion. In 1898 Chang was involved in the "100 day" reform move­ ment and f e ll into disfavor with court conservatives and the Empress Dowager. Exiled to Mongolia, Chang was beheaded as a tr a ito r during the anti-fo reig n hysteria of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. See Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient. 339; A. W. Hummel, ed.» Eminent Chinese of the Ching Period. I (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1944), 62- 63. Earl Swisher, "Chinese Representation in the United States," University of Colorado Studies Series in History, No. 5 (January, 1967), 21-24.

34 Memoirs, II, 110-114, Hosea B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, III (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), 40. •^Foreign Relations. 1894, App., II, 85-87, 90-91, 96; Morse, ib id . , 38-40. 174

career would have ended ignominously a t th is point had not the

Japanese demanded a man of his stature and prestige to negotiate a

peace settlement.

The selection of Chang Yen-huan to serve as a peace commi­

ssioner to Japan along with Shao Yu-lien, the former Governor of

Taiwan, proved to be a mistake. Because of their military losses

the Chinese understood themselves to be in a weak negotiating posi­

tion, and no officials wanted to assume the responsibility of

signing an unfavorable treaty. The reluctant Tsung-li Yamen accepted

Denby’s offers of unofficial counsel to the extent that he was 36 beseeched to "take charge and conduct all negotiations." Denby urged the appointment of Li Hung-chang to head the peace delega- 37 tions, but instead the assignment went to Chang and Shao. Neither were men of great national prestige, and Shao was extremely unpopular in Japan because he had offered cash rewards for the heads of slain

36 Denby to Gresham, December 1, 1894, Despatches, China, 98. Denby found working with the Tsung-li Yamen exceptionally frustrating, and wrote, nI beg to say here conf ident ially and not for publication that the ignorance and helplessness of these people pass all compre­ hension. International law is a closed book to them. They know absolutely nothing." Denby to Gresham, December 8, 1894. When Foster arrived in China Denby felt relieved that he need no longer act as adviser to the Chinese officials. Denby, China and Her People. II, 138-139.

37 Denby to Gresham, December 8, 20, 1894, Despatches, China, 98. Denby wrote in his despatch that "it is generally believed that whoever negotiates the projected treaty will lose his head." Also see Denby, China and Her People. II, 136-137. 175

Japanese soldiers while Governor of Taiwan. Furthermore, the

two commissioners arrived in Japan without proper credentials.

The original fu ll power le tte rs of credence had been drafted fo r the

plenipotentiaries by Denby, but they were altered by officials in 39 the Tsung-li Yamen. Upon meeting with Chang and Shao in Japan,

Foster immediately informed the Chinese diplomats that the Japanese

would be technically correct in asking to have the Chinese delegates

recalled; and as expected Marquis Ito, the chief Japanese negotiator,

rejected the credentials of the Chinese officials when they were

presented at Hiroshima. At the urgent request of Chang and Shao, who feared reprisals by their government over the failure of their 40 mission, Foster agreed to accompany the two men back to China.

As Foster and his Chinese companions prepared to depart from

Hiroshima on February 3, Henry W. Dennison, an American who had 41 served as an adviser in the Japanese Foreign Office for several years,

O O Denby (Charles Jr., charge d'affairs) to Gresham, September 6 , 1894, enclosure No. 1, Proclamation issued by Shao, Governor of Formosa, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., I, 57-58; Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire.III. 40-41.

39 Denby to Gresham (telegram) February 4, 1895, Despatches, China, 98; Denby, China and Her People. II, 134-136. Foster recorded a slightly different version of this peculiar incident, claiming that Chang told him the improper credentials were w ritten by the Emperor but no Chinese official had the courage to inform the ruler of his mistake or substituted the corrected form drafted by Denby. Memoirs. II, 118.

^ Memoirs, II, 113-116. Dun to Gresham, February 4, 1895, and enclosure No. 2 from the Japan Daily Mail. Foreign Relations. 1894, App., I, 97-99; also Dun to Gresham, February 15, 1895, and enclosures, 99-103. Vladimir, China-Japan War, App,, I, 391-402; Morse, Inter- national Relations of the Chinese Empire, III, 42.

^Payson Treat, Japan and the United States, 1853-1921. (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1921), 103, 156. 176

asked for an appointment to speak with Foster. In their discussion

Dennison informed Foster that Marquis Ito doubted the sincerity of

the Chinese since they had sent envoys of such low standing. Dennison

to ld Foster the Japanese desired to negotiate with Li Hung-chang and

warned that in Japan the war party was insisting on no peace agree­

ment until Peking fell into Japanese hands. From this conversation with Dennison two factors became evident to Foster. First, it

appeared that the Japanese were uneasy about their rejection of the

Chinese commissioners and hoping to justify their conduct before world opinion. Second, it seemed clear that the Japanese were trying to buy time in the hope that additional m ilitary successes would 42 strengthen their position.

The returning negotiating party arrived by steamer in

Shanghai on February 15th, within days of the Chinese catastrophe at the battle of Weihaiwei, and the wrath of the Chinese court could

easily have turned against the unfortunate Ministers Chang and Shao had not their American counsel been present to soften the group's reception. During the next few weeks Foster took advantage of the opportunity to brief himself on oriental political matters. He made a brief visit to Peking where he shared intelligence with experienced

British diplomats and made use of the library in the British Legation.

Conversations with Li Hung-chang in Tientsin also proved rewarding,

42 Memoirs, II, 117. , American Diplomacy in the Orient, 340. 177 and Foster found the Chinese statesman alert, well-informed and 43 knowledgeable. Presumably, Foster- also had time to -discuss private matters with Li's secretary, the opportunistic Pethick.

Since his return to China in early December Pethick*s mind had not been id le. While Li brooded about the fate of China and his own uncertain future, Pethick tried to encourage his dejected employer but did not inform him of the plans of American empire builders. In a letter to Wilson, Pethick forecast two acts necessary for the success of American business interests in China. The first act, as Pethick viewed it, was the rapid conclusion of the current hostilities, second was to be the division of the Chinese Empire into two "spheres of influence." The southern region in Pethick*s scheme would be controlled by Britain, because of its proximity to India, and the northern half would be under the United States and serve as a buffer areas between British imperial holdings and "our friends" the Russians. Military advisers from the United States and Britain would then, in a few short years, "give China a good navy, superior to the Japs. 11 Pethick viewed the United States as particularly well suited for the role of guardian in China because Americans had "no political or territorial aims to serve." Lamenting the "woefully weak and incompetent sjtaff" of the United States Legation in Peking,

Pethick stated that a more aggressive American Minister was needed.

"Denby endorses this scheme," Pethick wrote, "but his position will

43 Memoirs, II, 120-121. 178

prevent him from actively pushing it."

In March Foster and Pethick accompanied a new Chinese peace

delegation. Restored to his former exhalted titles and honors, Li

Hung-chang relu ctan tly headed a peace mission that departed for Japan

on March 15 (however, the date of departure in the ship’s registers

was officially set at the 13th in an attempt to fool the gods into

believing the steamers had le ft on a day which supposedly held good

fortune). The Chinese entourage included in excess of one hundred

and thirty persons, including cooks, secretaries, doctors and body

guards. Accompanying Li was his son, Li Ching-fong, known to

westerners as Lord Li. Foster, Pethick and Henderson were the only

Americans in the enormous delegation that sailed from the Chinese

port of Taku in two steamers and arrived in Shimonoseki after a four-

day voyage. The new location for the peace conference was a minor

port with little housing for foreigners; and, while the elder Li

would have preferred to remain living on the ships (because he

feared assassination), the delegation accepted housing provided in

44 Pethick to Wilson, January 7, 1895, Wilson Papers, 18. Denby had not been entirely neglectful of American business interests in China during th is period. Denby informed Gresham th at China would be in great debt at the war's end because of military expenditures and a possible indemnity. Because of China's reluctance to take out loans with foreigners, Denby stated that the Chinese might be willing to sell concessions to various syndicates. In his message to Gresham, Denby concluded, "The present purpose is simply to suggest to American capitalists, rail road men, ship builders, bankers, and merchants to consider the desirability of securing for themselves the great franchises to which I have alluded." Denby asked the Secretary of State to be "active" in this matter. Denby to Gresham, December 28, 1894 Despatches, China, 98. 179

45 the c ity .

Two days before leaving for Japan Pethick found time to

dispatch a progress report to Wilson in which the writer evaluated

the prospects for the success of their scheme to be "about even.1*

Again Pethick denounced Denby as "the weakest minister we have out

here," and suggested that Wilson himself seek the post once a

Republican administration was restored. Warning that rival commercial

syndicates had already appeared on the scene, Pethick predicted a rush of European competition once peace returned, and he urged Wilson to attempt to "concentrate American influence in one powerful China

Improvement Co. instead of scatterin g it among several weaker concerns," Promising to send further reports in code as events unfolded, Pethick assured his reader that he and Foster would be very close to Li throughout the negotiations in Japan. As he prepared to embark for the peace conference in Japan Pethick concluded, " Act

1 over -- now for Act 2."^

Memoirs, II, 127-128; History of the Peace Negotiations. Documentary and Verbal, between China and Japan, March-April, 1895 (Tientsin, China: The Tientsin Press, 1895), frontpiece, 3 (hereafter referred to as History of the Negotiations); Denby to Gresham, March 15, 1895, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., I, 166; Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire. Ill, 42-43.

Pethick to Wilson (private) March 13, 1895, Wilson Papers, 18. 180

Within twenty-four hours of their arrival in Shimonoseki the Chinese Viceroy and his American counsel met with the Japanese negotiators, Marquis Ito and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu. At the first conference session held March 20, Li Hung-chang presented a proposal for an armistice calling for the suspension of combat at the status 47 quo. Alluding to the common cultural heritage of the two nations

Li tried to impress upon the Japanese the arguement that prolonged 48 hostilities would but injure China without benifiting Japan. Ito replied to the Chinese proposal the following day demanding that the

F irst Interview, March 20, History of the Negotiations. Verbal Discussions, 2-4. All the discussions and written communi­ cations at Shimonoseki were in English. The editors of the History of the Negotiations claimed "English seems to have been the clear medium in which both Plenipotentiaries found relief from the vague­ ness and ambiguity of their languages," i-ii. As Li did not speak English, Foster drafted all his documents. Foster, Memoirs, based on the official notes of the conferences are a very reliable source for the history of the peace negotiations in spite of the emphasis Foster placed on his own role, see, II, 129 ff.

^ 8Ibid. Li appeared to be following advice given by Denby. Before the Viceroy departed for Shimonoseki the American Minister to ld Li he should try and "reason with Japan that if she crippled China her trade and commerce would suffer; that he would use all the arguements drawn from geographical situation, national analogies and commercial interests to induce Japan not to diminish China; and he should strenuously endeavor to save from cession any of the mainland." Denby to Gresham, March 5, 1895. Despatches, China. 98. 181

c itie s of Taku, Shan-kai-huan and Tientsin (L i's c ity of residence)

be surrendered to the Japanese army prior to any armistice. The

Japanese negotiator also insisted on Japanese control of the rail­ road between Tientsin and Shan-kai-huan and an indemnity. Li replied that these harsh terms had to be submitted to Peking for consideration as he could not take the responsibility of agreeing 49 to them. The following day,- Li informed the Japanese that he had received a telegram from Peking instructing him to reject the Japanese armistice plan. With the prospects for a ceasefire gone, the Chinese plenipotentiary then asked the Japanese to outline their conditions for peace, and with this request the meeting was adjourned until ten 50 o'clock the following morning.

Throughout their first three meetings the Chinese had been negotiating from the weakest possible position, while the Japanese stand seemed to be constantly gaining strength. Recently the Japanese

Imperial Diet had voted unanimously to grant any amount of money 51 necessary to accomplish Japanese war aims, and Ito announced at the close of the third meeting that a Japanese fleet was preparing to 52 attack Formosa momentarily. Against such unpleasant r e a litie s L i's only recourse was to attempt to gain a psychological edge. Attempting

— History of the Negotiations. 3-4.

5 0 Ibid., 4; Third Interview, March 24, Verbal Discussions, 9-11. ^Dun to Gresham, February 5, 1895, Foreign Relations. 1894, App., I, 99.

52 History of the Negotiations, Verbal Discussions, 10. 182 to appeal to the traditional oriental reverence for superior age, the elderly Chinese statesman compared his seventy three years to the re la tiv e youthfulness of Ito and Matsu, both of whom were in th e ir early fifties. Li also ineffectually warned the Japanese that, in an era of western imperialism in Asia, great oriental peoples should not 53 seek to exploit one another. However, as the third day of conferen­ ces drew to a close on the afternoon of March 24, it appeared that the Japanese were completely unmoved by the words of the Chinese 54 viceroy.

As the Chinese plenipotentiary and his party left the conference hall at the end of the third day to return to their quar­ te rs , a Japanese fanatic emerged from a crowd of curious onlookers, drew a pistol and fired a shot into the face of the aged viceroy.

Although in great pain, Li heroically maintained his composure and remained seated on the sedan chair upon which he was being carried.

The bullet had lodged in the old man's cheek about an inch below the le ft eye. Bleeding profusely, Li somehow managed to get up and walk to his apartment, holding a handkerchief over his wound. In his quarters Li remained conscious, though in tremendous agony, as sur- 55 geons probed for the deeply imbedded bullet.

**^Ibid.. Verbal Discussions, 2, 3, 6 , 10.

•^Memoirs. II, 130-131.

e e Telegram (from Shimonoseki, written by Foster) to Peking Government, March 24, 1895. The message stated in p a rt: "Wound serious but not fatal. Viceroy shows great fortitude, converses freely with clear mind and insists on attending to public business." History of the N egotiations, 4. Memoirs, II, 131-132. 183

Li had suspected a Japanese plot to assassinate him, and now felt disgraced because he had been shot by a mere Japanese commoner.

Tactfully, Foster tried to contort the old man, telling him that he would be regarded throughout the Empire as a hero and that the injury would prove beyond doubt his loyalty to the Emperor and Empress

Dowager. Naturally the Japanese were horrified and humiliated by the shooting incident. Ito and Matsu both made visits to Li’s bedside, and the Emperor of Japan quickly ordered three . physicians and two special nurses to serve the Chinese statesman. As was customary, the chief of police in Shimonoseki and the governor of the province were immedicately removed from o ffice. Li received messages of regret and sEympathy from embarrassed Japanese officials at all ranks and levels, and presents of poultry, fruits and vegetables poured into the

Chinese quarters of Shimonoseki. Li appeared moved by the acts of sympathy on the part of the Japanese and heartened by the encourage­ ment of Foster.^

Li’s American adviser recognized the assassination attempt to have tremendous international importance, and he prepared to make the most out of this unexpected opportunity. On the evening of the shooting, as surgeons attempted in vain to remove the bullet from

Li's head, Foster prepared a communication to the Japanese plenipo-

^Report on Assassination Attempt (unmistakably Foster's work) History of the Negotiations. 5-6. Li's assailant was an un­ employed laborer and p o litic a l fanatic who believed Li was responsi­ ble for the war. The would-be assassin was tried within a week of the shooting incident and sentenced to life imprisonment, 6 , Memoirs, II, 133-135. 184

tentiaries informing them that the Chinese would be unable to attend

the meeting scheduled for ten o'clock the next morning and asking

that a memorandum on conditions for peace be sent directly to Li's

apartment.^ On March 28 news reached Shimonoseki that the Emperor

of Japan had ordered his ambassadors to agree to an immediate and 58 unconditional armistice. Foster viewed this development as an

important step toward a peace settlement and believed the viceroy's

misfortune to be "the most effective shedding of blood on the Chinese

side during the entire war, as it brought the sympathies of the whole

world, and made the Japanese plenipotentiaries more considerate of 59 him, if not less exacting in the terms of peace." Indeed, the

shooting incident did nothing to lessen the severity of the Japanese

demands.

A memorandum detailing the Japanese terms arrived at Li's

residence on March 30, and the conditions stated were so extremely

harsh th at the viceroy was overwhelmed and prepared to despair of

ever reaching any settlement. However, Foster was convinced that the

Japanese could be forced to make significant modifications because of

their, known desire to hold the respect of western nations. Since

"^Li to P lenipotentiaries of Japan, March 24, 1895, History of the Negotiations, 10. The request was renewed on March 26 and 30 when a Japanese reply was not forthcoming. 10-11.

58 Memorandum from Viscount Matsu, March 28, 1895, ib id ., 9. On March 30 the armistice was extended for a period of 21 days. Convention of Armistice, March 30, 1895, 9-10.

^ Memoirs. II, 134. 185

his arrival from the United States and his first meetings with

Japanese and American o ffic ia ls the previous month in Tokyo, Foster

had anticipated harsh initial demands by the Japanese; and, therefore, 60 he had been preparing material to counter the Japanese treaty draft.

The initial Japanese draft demanded independence for Korea

and the cession of the southern part of Sheng-king Province (Liatung

Peninsula), Taiwan (referred to as Formosa), and the Pescadores. The

Japanese also called for an indemnity of three hundred million Kuping

taels and the opening to Japanese commerce of seven major cities 61 including Peking, Chung-king, and Hang-chow. Foster prepared a

lengthy reply to the Japanese demands which expressed a willingness

for the independence of Korea, but sought to mitigate the other 62 points. During the subsequent negotiations Foster based the Chinese

arguement on western historical and legal precedents. Foster pointed

out that the Japanese were requesting that the Chinese give up terri­

tories not taken by the Japanese in battle, that the Japanese demand

for an indemnity of 300 million taels was more than twice the cost of

the war, and that Japanese demands for commercial privilege were 63 unwarranted and unusual under the existing circumstances.

Ib id ., 137-138. According to Pethick, Foster drafted all documents for the Chinese plenipotentiary including the detailed reply to Japan's proposals. Pethick wrote that Foster's retort "had an excellent effect upon the Japs... ([and helped1) to reduce their demands." Pethick to Wilson, September 17, 1895, Wilson Papers, 18.

6 lJapan's First Treaty Draft, April 1, 1875, History of the Negot iat ions. 11-14.

6 2 China's Reply, April 5, 1895, ib id .. 16-19.

^Counter Proposals of April 6 , 9, 1895, ib id . . 19-21. Lord Li had been appointed plenipotentiary to act in place of his 186

On April 10, Marquis Ito informed the Chinese that Japan

would reduce its te r r it o r ia l demands to Taiwan and the Pescadores

and the Liao-tung Peninsula. The indemnity request was cut by 100

m illion ta e ls and the number of open c itie s was lowered from seven to

four with Peking excluded. The Japanese also gave up their insistence 64 on the occupation of Mukdan until paid their full indemnity. The

Chinese asked for further reduction of the indemnity and bulked on 65 surrendering the Liaotung area, but Ito insisted that the Japanese 66 terms were "final £and} no longer open to discussion." At the fifth

and final negotiating session held April 15, Ito rejected Li's final

desperate pleas for a reduction in the territorial demands and the

indemnity figure. Li then advised Ito that the residents of Taiwan

had a long history of rebellion and would be troublesome subjects for 67 the Japanese, but Ito was unmoved. The formal signing of the peace

treaty took place in Shimonoseki on the 17th, with ratifications 68 scheduled to be exchanged at Chefoo, China within a month.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki provided for the following:

(1) recognition of Korean independence; (2) an indemnity of 200

father at the negotiating sessions when necessary, Imperial Decree. April 6 , 1895, 6 .

^Fourth Interview, April 10, 1895, Verbal Discussions, 13; Japan’s Reply to China's Counter Proposal, April 16, 1895, 21-23; Ito to Li, April 11, 1895, 23-24.

^Fourth Interview, ibid., 14-15; Li to Ito, April 12, 1895, 24-25. 66Ito to Li, April 13, 1895, ib id .. 25.

^ F i f t h and Last Interview, April 25, 1895, ib id . . Verbal Discussions, 17-26. fi Q Treaty of Peace between Japan and China, April 17, 1895, ibid.. 26-29. 187

m illion ta e ls ; (3) the cessation of Formosa, the Pescadores and the

Liaotung peninsula to Japan; (4) the opening of Chungking, Soochow,

Hangchow and Sha-shih as treaty ports; and (5) the right of Japanese citizens to open factories and engage in manufacturing in China. In effect, the treaty gave the Japanese rights in China equal to those granted to the Western powers (by the most favored nation clause) 69 in addition to important and sizable territorial gains. Foster 70 considered the terms of the treaty extremely severe, and he suspected that the Japanese demands for the Liaotung peninsula were made against the wishes of Marquis Ito, who Foster believed, recognized the danger of intervention by the European powers against a Japanese attempt to 71 gain a foothold on the Asian continent.

69For an evaluation of the treaty’s effects on China and the political situation in the Far East see Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. 410-411; Vinache, History of the Far East in Modern Times. 142-144, 146-165. ^ Memoirs, II, 138-139.

71 Ibid., 153; Foster,"Marquis ItoJ The Japanese Statesman," International Quarterly, IX (June, 1904), 270. 188

During the negotiations at Shimonoseki, Li Hung-chang had taken great care to make sure that the European powers were informed of the details under discussion. Li was hopeful that the Russians or Germans, out of concern fo r Japanese expansion in Korea and the 72 Liaotung area, would intervene on behalf of China. As early as

April 10th Russia and Germany had been pressuring Japan to leave the

Liaotung Peninsula with China, and on April 23rd representatives of

Russia, Germany and France jointly called on the Japanese to abandon 73 their efforts to acquire the Chinese territory. The chief promoter of the three-power intervention was the Russian Foreign Minister,

Count Sergi Witte, who claimed that he foresaw that "it was to Russia’s best interests to have as its neighbor a strong but passive China, and 74 that therein lay the assurance of Russian safety in the East." In spite of assurances by the German Minister to China that there would be intervention against Japan, Li appears to have signed the treaty

72 Denby believed Li was actively seeking assurances of foreign intervention before leaving for the negotiations in Japan. Denby to Gresham, February 26, 1895, 152-153| Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire. I ll , 47; William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, 2nd ed. (New York: A lfred A. Knopf, 1965), 179; Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1907 (Ber­ keley: University of California Press, 1958), 63.

^Morse, 1810, 47; Hidemichi, Japan’s Foreign Relations. 161-i63; Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations. 2nd printing (New York: D. Van Norstrand Co., Inc., 1950), 56; Edward Zarbriskie. American Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, Pa.: U niversity of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), 27-29.

74 ✓ Memoirs of Count W itte, ed. by A. Yarmolinski (London, 1921), 83; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism. 180-181; Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 58-66. 189

without a sure knowledge th at Germany or Russia or both would act to force the Japanese to relinquish their claim to the Liaotung penin- 75 sula.

Foster accompanied Li back to his home in T ientsin, where the elderly Chinese statesman received a friendly reception, but Li remained fearful of presenting the treaty before the court in Peking.

Li therefore asked Foster to go to the capital in his place to argue the merits of the treaty before the highest government officials. 76 Foster agreed to appear before the court, and conferred with the

Chinese Cabinet on April 30th. Here Foster met with the most power­ ful leaders of China (excluding Prince Kung who was ill). Already the Russian, German and French ministers in Peking had been lobbying against the treaty, and opposition to the treaty at the court by such powerful enemies of Li Hung-chang as Weng Tung-ho and Li Hung-tsao presented a difficult challenge for the American diplomat. Foster urged the Chinese to ratify the treaty because it was not Li Hung- chang^ treaty but the Emperor's treaty. Foster carefully pointed out that the text of the treaty had been telegraphed to Peking and th at the Emperor himself had authorized it. To re ject the tre a ty at this point, claimed Foster, would disgrace the Emperor in the

^ Memoirs, II, 152-153; Langer, ib id . . 84; Vinacke, History of the Far East in Modern Times. 143-144.

^Pethick to Wilson, September 17, 1895, Wilson Papers, 18. Foster believed that Li's fears about going to Peking were justified, see "Great Chinese Viceroy," 591. 190

eyes of the world. Foster*s presentation was followed by two hours

cf extensive questioning by members of the Tsung-li Yamen in which

the former Secretary of State found the Chinese leaders woefully 77 uninformed about the outside world.

After his meeting with the officials in Peking, Foster returned to Tientsin where he again met with Li who now informed him that Russia, Germany and France had made clear their intention to force the Japanese to back down on the issue of the Liaotung Penin­ sula -- up to this time Foster had only heard rumors about the possible intervention. Because of the action by Russia, Germany and

France, Foster decided to remain in China until China and Japan signed the treaty. Foster was anxious to return home, but he wrote to his wife that "ray reputation as well as my duty are involved in the success of the treaty, and I have to agree to remain in China for one or not 78 to exceed two months." Foster witnessed the signing of the treaty at Chefoo on May 8 amid a great show of force by the German, French and Russian naval forces. The Japanese, faced with the overwhelming force of three European powers had little choice but to give up their ambitions in the Liaotung Peninsula at least temporarily. In spite of the alterations brought about by the intervention of the "triplice,"

77 Memoirs. II, 147-150.

78 Ibid., 151. 191

Foster was pleased that the treaty was ultimately ratified by both

p a rtie s. 79

One final issue remained to be settled before Foster’s mission to China could be concluded. This involved the transfer of

Taiwan to the Japanese. On May 25, 1895 the people of Taiwan declaired their independence and established the Republic of Taiwan. It seemed as though the Japanese would have to fight to gain control of the 80 island. Li Hung-chang saw events in Taiwan as an opportunity fo r the Chinese to renege on the recent Treaty of Shimonoseki, but Foster advised Li against a policy of delaying the transfer of the island to the Japanese. When Li Ching-fong received an appointment from the

Tsung-li Yamen to be the commissioner in charge of handling the trans­ fer with the Japanese authorities in Taiwan, the elder Li became upset that his family was being further connected with the unpopular treaty.

Foster agreed to accompany Lord Li to Taiwan, and so e ffic ie n tly were the unpleasant business matters dealt with by the younger Li and Foster that the two men actually spent a total of only thirty-six 81 hours in waters about Taiwan.

Before leaving China to return home, Foster was offered a position to serve as a permanent adviser to the Chinese government

79 Ibid., 152. For a description of the politics surrounding the intervention see Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy. 66-67. o0 Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire. Ill, 5; Hsu, Rise of Modern China. 408.

81 Memoirs, II, 154-160. 192

by a grateful LI Hung-chang. Foster declined the offer, saying he

had to tend to business interests. Li replied that the Chinese could

make it extremely profitable for him to remain in China; .but, Foster

insisted on returning home and politely turned down the Viceroy’s

graceous offer by telling of a promised fishing trip he had made to

grandson and namesake, John Foster Dulles. Li said it would be no problem to bring the seven-year old boy to China and let him fish in the Lake of Summer Palace, but he respected Foster's wishes and let the matter drop. The promised fishing expedition, although probably a tru e commitment, was used by Foster to avoid statin g his real motive for declining the Chinese offer. Foster believed that the Manchu dynasty was hopelessly corrupted and unable to bring about the domestic reforms necessary if China's foreign policies were to be 82 strengthened. Since Li Hung-chang proved loyal to the declining

Manchu dynasty, and indicated stubborn resistance to any attempt to 83 place him on the throne, Foster viewed the prospects for internal p o litic a l and economic modernization to be non-existent. While Foster declined the request that he stay on in Peking in the service of the

82 The British Minister to Peking, Sir Nicholas O'Connor also urged Foster to remain on as an adviser to the Chinese Government, ibid.. 156. In 1904 Foster wrote in an article for a national magazine that in the Sino-Japanese war "China was shown to be a great helpless giant, having no competent rulers or leaders...," "China," National Geographic. XV (December, 1904), 467. OO Foster viewed Li as a great patriot, concerned more with the future of China than with his own life and property. Foster to Wilson, January 12, 1908, Wilson Papers, 9. Also see, Young, Rhetoric of Empire, 30; Van Alstyne, U.S. and East Asia. 6 8 . 193

Chinese government, he did remain legal counsel to the Chinese V. Legation in Washington, and there he continued to be of service to

the Empire for more than a decade.

Almost totally obscured by the tumultuous events of the

negotiating sessions, the attempted assassination of Li Hung-chang

and the triple., intervention, the business ventures of Wilson, Denby 84 and Pethick fail'ecVjjto materialize. Furthermore, by intervening on ; the side of the Chinese to force Japan to relinquish its claim to the

Liaotung Peninsula, Russia gained enormous prestige with the Chinese officials who looked increasingly to Russia for financial aid and 85 military support. The neutral position of the United States

government throughout the war, and the reluctance of the Cleveland

administration to actively promote independent American investment

* - V schemes left en$I'

84 Rival American syndicates appeared in China at the war's end and appeared to have better financial backing than Wilson. Foster to Wilson (in code) April 23, 1895, Wilson Papers, 9. For a detailed study of the various speculators and investment schemes, see Young, Rhetoric of Empire, 56-73. OC Hsu, -Rise of Modern China. 413-415. Zarbriskie, American Russian Rivalry. 30-31.

86 8rice, a U.S. senator and corporate lawyer, headed a syn­ dicate which competed with Wilson's. Foster gave some assistance to the Brice group in the hope th at they would open fu rth er opportunities for American investors. However, Foster warned the Brice people to be serious and evenhanded in their negotiations with the Chinese. Foster to Wilson, August 9, September 21, 1896, Wilson Papers, 9. Also see Young, Rhetoric of Empire. 249; Van Alstyne, U.S. and East Asia, 72, 74. C.S. Campbell, Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 21-23. 194

the failure of the scheme for replacing the Manchu dynasty, a dejected

Pethick wrote with disappointment to Wilson:-"Here we are at the old stand. We started here last Spring; took a big climb; got to the top, 87 and then -- tumbled back again to £thej original starting point .n

The failure of the Wilson and other American businessmen to find tremendous opportunities in the China market at the close of the

Sino-Japanese war did not stifle the ambitions of promoters and investors in the United States. After 1895 the United States govern­ ment took a more positive role in support of American investors as the 88 international rivalry for concessions in China intensified. Both

Wilson and Denby remained active in the prospects for railroad building 89 in China; and Foster, as legal counsel for the Chinese Legation in

Washington continued to act as a middle-man between the Chinese 90 government and American investors. The influential Foster also arranged for Li Hung-chang to v is it the United States in February

1896 on his return from the coronation of Nicholas II in Russia. In

Washington and New York Li met with prominent businessmen interested in commercial relations with China and received a warm and enthusiastic reception.-• 91

^ P e th ic k to Wilson, September 17, 1895, Wilson, 18,

®®Young, Rhetoric of Empire. 15, 52-53; McCormick, China Market. 70-71.

®9Burnham, Williams and Co. to Wilson, March 6 , 1896, and attached le tte r of Burnham, Williams and Co. to Denby, March 6 , 1898, Wilson Papers, 7. Denby appeared to be prepared to quit the foreign service at this time to work for American railroad builders.

9 0Memoirst II, 298-299. 91 Ibid., 309-312; New York Times (February 24, 1896), 1; Denby to Olney, April 6 , May 25, 1896, Despatches, China, 101; Van 195

Foster played an important role at the peace conference which ended the Sino-Japanese war. The effects of the near assassi­ nation of the Chinese plenipotentiary and the triple intervention on the final peace settlement should not detract from the significance 92 of the actual negotiating sessions, Foster not only drafted all the important communications to the Japanese negotiators for the Chinese side, he suggested lines of arguement based on the prevailing standards of international law which the Chinese diplomats were unfamiliar with.

Knowing that the Japanese were cognizent of the necessity of maintain­ ing favorable public opinion in the western nations, Foster argued that the Japanese were not adhering to accepted standards of conduct in making th e ir demands on China. The American counsel did ^rin a lower indemnity figure, force the Japanese to settle for four open

Alstyne, U,S, and East Asia. 73-74; Young, Rhetoric of Empire. 53-55,

92 For accounts which downplay or ignore the role of Foster at Shimonoseki see M.B. Young, Rhetoric of Empire. 32-33; McCormick, China Market,58, 67-68. Young views Foster's presence at the nego­ tiations as insignificant and credits Li Hung-chang's clever phrases and pathetic begging with softening the position of the tenacious and ambitious Ito. McCormick seems to believe that Foster's only mission in China was to act as a front man for sinister American bankers, McCormick incorrectly implies that Foster tried to get the Chinese to accept a high indemnity figure for the sole purpose of providing an oppoi*tunity for American financiers. 196

port cities instead of seven, and move Premier Ito to drop his

demand for the occupation of certain Manchurian cities until the

indemnity was paid. Criticisms that Foster was guilty of a conflict of interest because he was involved with certain American banking

interests while on his mission to China are unfounded. Foster did have contacts on Wall Street, and he inquired about the possibility of a loan to China before leaving for the Orient, But Foster was employed by the Chinese precisely because he did have powerful associates in United States financial circles, and Foster contacted

New York bankers at the request of his Chinese clients. The records of the peace conferences also prove to be unfounded any accusation that Foster urged the Chinese to accept a high indemnity figure so that

American bankers could finance its payment.

Foster clearly approved of the Wilson-Pethick plan to overthrow the ancient Manchu Dynasty and replace the inefficiency and incompe­ tence of the Manchus with a strong and dynamic leader who would do for

China what Ito Hirobumi had done for Japan. In F o ster's opinion Li

Hung-chang had the qualities necessary to bring about the moderniza- 93 tio n of the Chinese empire. Viewing p o litic a l and economic reforms

93Foster viewed both Ito and Li as great forces for moderni­ zation in the Orient and leaders who had accepted western standards. See, "Marquis Ito: The Japanese Statesman," 261-273; "The Viceroy Li Hung Chang" Centurv. LII (August, 1896), 560-571; "The Great Chinese Diplomat," 584-596; "Introduction," Memoirs of Li Hung Chang. William F. Mannix, tran s. and ed. (Boston: Houghton M ifflin & Co., 1913). The Memoirs edited by Mannix were the work of r. fraud based on newspaper stories. However, Foster's introduction appears to be genuine. 197 in the empire as potentially beneficial to both the Chinese and Ameri­ cans, Foster saw nothing incompatible about the prospect of United

States investors p ro fitin g from b e tte r government and an improved material standard of living for the people of China. Foster believed a governmental revolution to be necessary for progress in China, but his great mistake was in thinking that he, Wilson, Denby and Pethick could provide the vehicle for Chinese modernization. United States diplomacy in China during the twentieth century would be characterized 94 by a self-righteous, paternalistic mentality, and that a few American seriously contemplated a coup d’etat in 1895 indicates that an attitude of moral superiority already infected American policies regarding the

Chinese.

Upon his return from the Orient Foster immediately began to predict further problems in the Far East. Arriving home in early July

1895, fatigued but in good health and planning a fishing vacation in upper New York, Foster granted an interview to reporters from the New

York Times in which he suggested that any failure of the treaty of

Shimonoseki would be the resu lt of 11 intermeddling by European powers."

Foster stated that the Japanese were angered by Russian intervention in coordination with France and Germany. Except for the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula, Foster viewed the terms of the treaty to have been "observed and carried out by China with scrupulous faith.

Her conduct in this respect has created a very favorable impression

— John K. Fairbank, China and the United St-ates. 3rd. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 401-403. 198

in Japan." Foster also expressed a belief that future American-

Japanese relations would be generally harmonious due to the neutral 95 stand the United States had maintained during the war. Having been

at Chefoo and seen the display of navel force that faced Japan to

abandon claims to territory in mainland China, Foster was quick to see

the growing rivalry between Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Korea.

As the hostility between the two nations intensified Foster predicted the possibility "this competition in Korea will bring about the next 96 conflict in the Pacific, and even menace the peace of the world."

The treaty of Shimonoseki proved to be disastrous for China.

The defeat by Japan and the terms of the peace agreement exposed the helplessness of China and encouraged foreign powers to increase their 97 demands for concessions. Meanwhile, Japan emerged as the leading

Asian power, and Foster viewed this development as encouraging because

Japan could check further Russian expansion in Manchuria and the

Japanese nation could serve as a model of successful modernization 98 through the adaptation of western thought and technology. - Foster

^New York Times (July 9, 1895), 5.

^ American Diplomacy in the Orient, 343.

^Hsu, Rise of Modern China, 410-411. Vinacke, Far East in Modern Times. 142-144, 146-165.

98 American Diplomacy in the Orient. 360-361, 436. Foster wrote "It is especially gratifying to Americans to note the triumphs of Japanese wisdom, persistency and patriotism, - to feel that they were instrumental in awakening that people to tbe high ideal which they fixed for themselves, and that they have stood by them as their adviser and friend in their long struggle for recognition and independence." 364. 199 saw no reason why China, given proper leadership, could not recover from adversity and emerge as a modern, progressive nation like Japan.

With the continued deterioration of the Chinese Empire, Foster believed that the Chinese war-lord Yuan Shih-kai, a former lieutenant 99 of Li Hung-chang, would reform China. Foster's favorable evaluation of Yuan potential to create a modern and viable state in China probably

influenced United States policy in the direction of giving support to an individual who proved to be an incompetent dictator.

Following the Sino-Japanese war the United States became

increasingly involved in Far Eastern affairs and continually more concerned about preserving Chinese territorial integrity and the balance of power in eastern Asia. Foster publicly and privately expressed concern about Russian attempts at exclusion of foreign 100 investors in Manchuria; and when Japan challenged Russia for control

99 "Questions of the Far East," Atlantic Monthly. XCVII (April, 1906), 545-546; "Present Conditions in China," National Geographic. XVII (December, 1906), 652-653, 660-662. Foster's favorable, view of Yuan and h is sym pathies fo r th e Japanese ended when th e Japanese continued to force concessions from China and Yuan proved concerned only with personal pleasure and glory. In 1916 Foster stated "It seems to me that Yuan Si Kai's (Yuan Shih-kai") assumption of imperial rank is the greatest mistakes that a Chinese ruler ever m ade...(it) affords (a pretext fori Japan to intervene still more arbitrarily and completely in the control of the internal administration of that unhappy country... (Japan's China policy ) distinctly lowers my confidence in the good judgement of her leading people." Foster to Wilson, January 10, 1916, Wilson Papers, 9.

^ ^ American Diplomacy in the Orient. 436. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war Foster wrote! "I have not a single good word to say for her fRussia") in the present contest. She got Manchuria under false pretenses, has maintained herself there by barefaced lying, and has done everything possible to obstruct our negotiations with China. She was dead against us in the Spanish War, whatever she did during our Civil war was purely out of hatred of England and its value to us greatly exaggerated, and her treatment of the Fins and 200

of Korea, he wrote privately.to his old friend Wilson that "I prefer

to see the triumph of the spirit of government animating Japan than

that which controls Russia - autocracy and despotism," and "I hope 101 Russia will be soundly thrashed by Japan." During this era of

expanding United States interests in the Pacific, Foster assumed the

role of principal American scholar-diplomat on United States diplomacy

in China, and Japan. Foster’s chief contribution to the literature of

American diplomatic history* American Diplomacy in the Orient (published

in 1903), would serve as the only assessment of United States foreign

policy in East Asia from the conclusion of the Open Door notes to the 102 end of World War I. Foster's experience in the Far East had great

importance, therefore, because he influenced American public opinion

on matters of Far Eastern diplomacy, and helped shape American policy

in Asia through the first decades of the twentieth century.

Jews deserves the condemnation of the civilized world," Foster to Wilson, April 8, 1904, Wilson Papers, 9.

*^*Foster to Wilson, April 11, June 25, 1904, Wilson Papers, 9. 102 Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: Macmillan Co., 1922), 490. VII

A Concept of American Mission

Seldom do men approaching their sixteeth year embark upon a new career as easily as did John W. Foster. After having served as Secretary of State in the cabinet of Benjamin Harrison and agent for the United States government before the International Tribunal in

Paris, Foster leisurely returned home to Washington where he accepted a position as a senior lecturer at Columbian (later George Washington)

University.* While he never completely abandoned his active parti­ cipation in international affairs, Foster's primary interests during the final decades of his long life centered around his voluminous writings and extensive involvements in organifcations promoting inter­ national law and world peace. Always an erudite, lucid writer,

Foster encountered little difficulty in undertaking scholarly projects.

The valedictorian of his class at Indiana University, Foster was a matter of the classics with a keen interest and aptitude for language 2 and grammar. As the editor of the Evansville, Indiana Daily Journal

James Brown Scott, "John W. Foster: An Appreciation," American Journal of International Law. XII (January, 1918), 132.

^Foster believed that the study of Greek and Latin diciplined the young mind. In an essay on the merits of a classical education he wrote: "Greek and Latin should not be regulated to an important position in the curriculum, nor their study discouraged." He requested educators to restore the "old condition of things, when the degree Bachelor of Arts meant classical education." "Classics as a Training for Young Men of A ffairs," School Review. XVII (June, 1909), 375-380;

201 202

in the years following the civil war Foster gained experience as a writer, and his long career in international law and diplomacy prepared him with a wide range of empirical knowledge upon which to 3 base histories of nineteenth century diplomacy.

In the preface of his first book, A Century of American

Diplomacy, Foster stated that his purpose in writing was ’’that by a study of this review of the diplomatic conduct of our most distin­ guished statesmen, the young men of the country may have their patriotism quickened, and be inspired with a new zeal to assist in maintaining the honorable position of our government in its foreign r e l a t i o n s . 11 With the United States on the threshold of becoming a world power, and therefore called upon, Foster believed, to play an ever increasing role in world affairs, the author expressed the hope that his volume would fill the need for a study of American foreign policy. Foster held that such a work was necessary to aid in solving future problems in the expanded political and commercial relations of 4 the United States. Believing that past American foreign policy had

"Letter Regarding Training in Universities for Diplomatic and Consular Service," American Journal of International Law. IX (January, 1915), 162-163. The grammatical question of whether the singular or plural verb should be used with the proper name "United States" seemed to hold Foster's interest. See Are or Is? Washingtons 1901, a pamphlet which thoroughly considers the complexities of the matter.

^Memoirs. I, 10.

Century of American Diplomacy: Being a Brief Review of the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1776-1876. (Boston! Houghton Mifflin Co., 1900), iii. 203

consistently and continually been one o£ enlightenment and reason,

Foster saw in the history of United States from 1776 to 1876 numerous valuable lessons indicating proper courses of conduct. From his examination of the historical record he attempted "to show that the

United States, in the first hundred years of its existence, has had a marked Influence in shaping and improving International law. Its influence in elevating the diplomatic intercourse of nations has been scarcely less conspicuous."^ Foster found few actions by American diplomats deserving of censure, and appeared to conclude that a nation which possessed such a great history must be destined for even more benevolent policies in the century ahead. As an author he implied that other nations would be in error not to recognise an American claim to world leadership based upon the righteous conduct of past diplomatic relations.

Nationalistic and partisan throughout, Foster's first historical monograph met an enthusiastic reception with American readers both in the intellectual community and diplomatic service.

In a lengthy review The Independent acclaimed Foster's book and expressed complete agreement with his conclusions. "The history he gives us is one we can be proud of," the reviewer stated, for it

"shows that this country began its course on a higher plane than the

~*The Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Foreign Relations of the United States. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1901), 1. This book was written as a companion to A Century of American Diplomacy. 204

others.In the Atlantic Monthly. S.M. Macvane praised Foster for

incorporating important diplomatic correspondence in writing a

“readable" and "impartial" examination of American foreign policy,

and pronounced Foster’s work to be "a decided advance, in my humble opinion, on earlier efforts along the same line."^ Prominent historian John Holladay Latane of Johns Hopkins University also credited Foster with "a high degree of success." Although he found the book "very readable," Latane questioned the w riter’s presentation of serious historical analysis "enlivened by incident, anecdote and 8 character sketch."

Among his acquaintances and colleagues in American diplomatic service Foster might have expected his book to receive a polite and favorable reception: however, the laudatory comment expressed by government officials indicates that the men shaping United States foreign policies shared Foster's concept of American history and delighted in his articulation of the nation's diplomatic achievements.

Former Attorney General and Secretary of State Richard Olney wrote to

Foster that the book seemed "a marked as well as deserved success in a field so peculiarly your own." Olney stated that "all my anticipa­ tions have been exceeded. I have not only found the work instructive

^"Review of A Century of American Diplomacy." Independent. LII (December 20, 1900), 3048.

7 S.M. Macvane, "Review," A tlantic Monthly. LXXXVII (February, 1901), 271. g Latane, John Holloday, "Review," American Historical Review. VI (April, 1901), 588. 205 in matter and lucid in style but extremely entertaining as well* I 9 should think it would meet a popular demand and have a large sale*"

Secretary of State John Hay* who corresponded frequently with Foster* confided that he enjoyed reading his friend's diplomatic history* adding that the conduct of foreign policy proved "so dry a subject in daily life that I was surprised to find it so readable and so 10 interesting in your book." The highly complimentary reviews and correspondence Foster received concerning his initial project as an author and historian must have encouraged him to elaborate on his central theme* that American diplomatic history, because of its generally exemplary nature, was worthy of further study because it provided lessons which would lead to the betterment of international relations and progress, stability and order in a civilized world.

In 1904 Foster published his most significant contribution to the study of United States foreign policy, American Diplomacy in the Orient. Interpreting United States policies in the Far East as being characterized by "a spirit of justice, forebearance, and magnanimity," Foster argued that American "intercourse with China,

Japan* and Korea has been that of a friend interested in their welfare, ready to aid them in their efforts to attain an honorable peace among nations,and willing to recognise the embarrassment which attend those efforts." Foster was uncomfortable about the United

^Richard Olney to Foster (Personal) November 16, 1900, Foster Papers.

*^John Hay to Foster, October 11, 1900, ibid. 206

States acquisition of the Philippines because the control of this

oriental real estate left the United States no longer a disinterested,

non-colonial western state. Nevertheless, he believed that an

Inescapable consequence of the Spanish-American war was the establish­

ment of the United States as an Asian power. As a nation with new

responsibilities in the Far East, Foster maintained that future American

policies in Asia should strive towards "giving the world a freer

market, and the Inhabitants of the Orient the blessings of Christian 11 Civilization."

Despite the departure from tradition which resulted in the

taking of the Philippines, Foster held that Americans harbored "no

scheme of territorial aggrandizement" in Asia, and he characterized

United States interests as limited to securing "mutual benefit from

the establishment of trade" and the promotion of Christianizing actlvi- 12 ties among native populations. Like expansionist-minded Josiah 13 Strong, Brooks Adams and Alfred T. Mahan, Foster considered the Orient to be the next great theater of American commercial and economic activity, and he acknowledged that expanded American production would meet stiff competition in the China market from Britain, Russia and

**American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1904), 399, 436, 438.

1 2 Ibid., 399.

13 Walter Lafeber, The New American Empire (Ithaca, N*Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), 100-101. 207

Japan. Foster saw Japan as the most serious threat to United States ambitions in China, and he correctly prophesised the problem of enlarging American commercial interest in China without antagonizing

Japan would present a serious challenge to the United States in coming 14 decades.

While desirous of witnessing the conversion of the Chinese to

Christianity, Foster demonstrated an understanding of the Chinese 15 people unusual for his era. Long active in the fight against Chinese exclusion, Foster argued forcefully in American Diplomacy in the Orient that racial prejudice and extremism in American public opinion had caused the United States to violate its own set of high principles by the unjust treatment of Chinese in the United States and by refusing 16 to trade with Chinese on equal terms. In describing the causes of the recent Boxer Rebellion, Foster stated that anti-foreign feelings existed in all parts of China and throughout the entire population with few exceptions. As factors leading to the Boxer uprising Foster properly listed the opium trade, railroad and steamship lines which

14 American Diplomacy in the Orient. 434-437.

^Foster records an unpleasant incident which occurred on his visit to China in 1895 when he was informed that he could not bring Chinese guests, including high ranking officials into the forei­ gners' dining area of a restaurant in Shanghai. Foster was quite upset and solved the problem by having the Chinese served in his private quarters. See Memoirs. II. Foster was also an outspoken and often unpopular critic of American discrimination against orientals, see for example, The China Indemnity! Vlas It a Punitive Measure.(Washington, D.C.: Beresford, 1908; "The Chinese Boycott," Atlantic Monthly. XCVII (January, 1906), 118-127; "Decision of the Most Profound Importance," Independent. LVIII (June 8, 1905), 1292- 1293. ^ American Diplomacy in the Orient. 305. 208

put Chinese out of work* the dlstruction of the Chinese clothing

industry by the introduction of American and British cotton, the

upsetting of burial grounds by railroad lines, and the opening of the

Interior of China to further inroads of foreign commerce because 17 of the defeat in the war with Japan. Viewing contemporary specula­

tions about a ’’yellow peril” os no exaggeration, Foster warned his

American readers of Sir Robert Hart’s prediction that ”Four hundred

millions, sturdy and passionately devoted to their ancient customs,

might in time, under the Influence of an all-prevailing race hatred,

be changed from a peace-loving community into a warlike people, bent 18 upon avenging their wrongs.” Foster believed the China market

essential to American economic progress, but he did not feel that

American commercial interests in China must necessarily hurt the 19 people of China.

l 7 Ibld.. 412-414.

18 Ibid., 435. Foster expressed similar views in an article entitled ”Present Conditions in China” in which he stated that it seemed ’’perfectly natural that a feeling of resentment against fore­ igners should prevade the Empire.... £and") in view of the spoliation of their territory, the enormous endemnities extracted, and the dis­ position to establish a foreign monopoly for the exploitation of their Industries and mine3, it must be admitted that this feeling is not without some Justification.” National Geographic. XVII (December, 1906), 671.

*^In reviewing American Diplomacy In the Orient historian Theodore S. Woos ley wrote that Foster’s work was fair and ’’balanced” although he criticized the superficial treatment of American involve­ ment in the opium trade and complete neglect of the Hawaiian annexa­ tion affair. American Historical Review. LX (October, 1903), 180-182. The reviewer in the Independent found Foster’s book "well written” and suggested that Foster’s ’‘diplomatic career has given him the power of stating unpleasant truths in courteous language.” LV (March, 1903), 623. 209

Although as Secretary of State Foster advocated annexation of Hawaii* he frequently opposed acquisition of overseas possessions after 1900. In his opposition to insular imperialism Foster shared a belief in common with the anti-im perialists of his era who opposed colonial expansion not for commercial, humanitarian or religious reasons but because it ran counter to traditional American ideal that government should not rule without the consent of the governed. Anti­ im perialists formed a diverse group including William Jennings Bryan,

Grover Cleveland, Carl Schurs and David Starr Jordan. Even former president Benjamin Harrison was among the old guard Republicans of the Fremont-Lincoln generation who viewed the anti-colonialism as an 20 extension of the anti-slavery fight. Foster did not participate in the anti-im perialist movement but was sympathetic to their arguement.

With regard to the question of Cuban annexation Foster warned against incorporating into the Union an additional Negro population which was also Roman Catholic. "Catholics in the United States are among our most patriotic and useful citizens," Foster wrote in 1906, "but it would not be desirable to have one more of our states composed entirely

2 0 ' F. Harvey H arrington, "The A nti Im p e ria lis t Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review. XXII (1935), 211-213, 218; Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America*s Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 50. 210

-•'of - fchenu-,*^!L‘s'

Unlike Hawaii, where Anglo-Saxons decimated and replaced

natives, Foster viewed the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico as

territories composed of alien peoples who could be governed only

through undemocratic and authoritarian measures. The history of

United States policy in the former Spanish possessions convinced 22 Foster that- the imperialist impulse of 1898 was a mistake. Although * 4 } he had labored in the I890*s to annex Hawaii, bring Cuba and Puerto

Rico into a close economic relationship with the United States, and

secure for his government naval stations in the Caribbean and Pacific,

Foster's expansionist designs stopped short of advocating the subjuga­

tion of foreign peoples into an American colonial system.

The late nineteenth century produced a school of scholars

included Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Adams, James Ford Rhodes and

21 "Annexation of Cuba," Independent.LXI (October 25, 1906), 967. In 1899 Foster wrote to General James H. Wilson, who was with the United States army in Cuba, expressing a pessimism about the ability of the United States to provide democratic institutions for the Cubans* "We have become responsible for good government there, and cannot allow its people to get into chaos. I do not have as high an opinion of the capacity of the Cuban for independent self- government as you seem to entertain; however, we must let him try the experiment. I fear if left alone he will tread the same road as San Domingo and the Spanish American republics generally." Foster believed that the United States should establish commercial recipro­ city with Cuba to insure close economic ties. Foster to Wilson, December 23, 1899; December 19, 1902, Wilson Papers, 9.

War Not Inevitable. World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, No. 3, Part II (October, 1900), 8-9. 211

Alfred T. Mahan. These socially established amateur historians*

securely entrenched among the nation's ruling elite* aligned themselves

with successful forces in American history and sought to inform and

instruct their fellow countrymen in the practical lessions of the 23 national experience. Although Foster was not in complete agreement

with the social Darwinist doctrines of these writers, his nationalistic

sense of American destiny places him among the aristocratic, evolu­

tionist historians of his era. Like the more famous and accomplished

patrician historians, Foster exhibited a faith in the inevitability

of progress, pronounced moral judgements and explained with certitude

to his readers the verdict of history. Unfailingly he expressed an

optimistic hope that the lessons he derived from his study "might be

useful in the solution of the questions of foreign policy now so 24 urgently presented to the American people."

Before 1914 American diplomatic history was almost completely

ignored by historians, and those few who did make studies in the field

of foreign policy concentrated on United States relations with Europe 25 rather than diplomacy in Latin America or the Pacific. Therefore,

in spite of his reliance on personal recollections, his failure to

23 - ■ — - For a comprehensive analysis of the school of conservative amateur historians see John Higham with Lenard Kreiger and Felix Gilbert, History? The Development of Historical Studios in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).

24 A Century of American Diplomacy. H i.

^Higham and others, History. 187. 212

make critical analysis of the public papers and documents of United

States foreign policy makers and his complete disregard for private manuscript sources, Foster*s historical studies had considerable importance since they were virtually the only works available on the topics he covered.

* * *

Foster firmly believed that the United States was destined to play an ever increasing role in world affairs. Pronouncing the

United States to be champion of freer commerce, neutrality, respect for private property and "the most advanced ideas of natural rights 26 and justice," he held his country must always promote ideals of universal justice and humanity. To become Involved in world advance­ ment, Foster understood that the United States would necessarily have to abandon traditional isolation and he wrote that "while the caution which Washington gave his countrymen in his farewell address to avoid entangling alliances has not lost its virtue, the nation has attained

26 A Century of American Diplomacy. 3-4. 213

such a position among the powers of thg earth that it cannot remain a 27 passive spectator of international affairs.” Foster reasoned that the United States could best aspire to its lofty calling by promoting a wider acceptance of international arbitration as a means of assuring the ideas of peace and justice.

Foster tirelessly advocated the acceptance of international arbitration by all nations, and he considered the Hague Court a reasonable and practical instrument for maintaining order throughout the world. During the years between 1865-1900 serious problems between the United States and Great Britain had been submitted to international arbitration with generally favorable results, and diplomats in both countries expressed great confidence in the methods and procedures of 28 arbitration, Foster had participated extensively in the negotiation of disputes with the British and possessed a lawyer's fascination for formal pacts and legal contracts. Understandably he viewed the calling of the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 with great enthusiasm, writing of it as "one of the most important events which marked the'Close of 29 the nineteenth century." Joining with former President Cleveland,

27 American Diplomacy in the Orient. 398.

28 C alvin D. D avis. The U nited S ta te s and th e F i r s t Hague Conference (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 16-17.

^ Arbitration and the Hague Court. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1904), 13. For examples of Foster's early interest in the use of international law as a means of settling disputes between nations, see "Results of the Bering Sea Arbitration" North American Review, CLXI (December, 1895), 693-702; "Permanent Method of Arbitration with Great Britain," Independent. LII (June 4, 1900), 1420-1422; "Prospects of Arbitration with England" LV (December 24, 1903), 3025-26. Also see, Curti, Merle, Peace or War (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1936), 141, 153. 214

former Vice President Levi P. Morton, and former Secretaries of

State Olney, Evarts and Day, Foster signed a petition of the Inter-

national Law Association urging the Senate ratify the Hague convention 30 and make the United States an official member of the court. By its

conspicuous participation at the Hague and the subsequent ratifica­

tion of the convention, the United States claimed to be a leader in 31 the cause of promoting world peace, and the nationalistic Foster

could not refrain from lavishing praise upon his government for its 32 role in the First Hague Conference.

Foster believed the accomplishments of the Hague court to

be real and reasonable rather than illusory and quixotic. In a brief

book written in 1904 at the request of the Mohonk Arbitration Con­

ference, Foster, then serving as President of the National Arbitration

Conference, wrote of the First Hague Conference in the following

term s.

30 Davis, U.S. and First Hague Conference. 200-201. -

3 l Ibid., 2, 202-203, 212-213.

32. Arbitration and the Hague Court. 68-69. Foster proudly pointed out that the United States and Mexico were the first nations to submit a case before the international tribunal at the Hague. This was the Pius Fund claim. 69-71, Also see Foster's pamphlet entitled, What Has the United States Done for International Arbitration? An Address delivered before the New York State Bar Association, January 9, 1904 (Reprinted from the 27th Annual Report of the Proceedings of the New York State Bar Association, 1904), 3-25; “America's Contribu­ tion to the Literature of International Law and Diplomacy," Yale Law Journal. XIII (June, 1904), 409-420; "Pan American Diplomacy," A tlantic Monthly. LXXXIX (April, 1902), 485-486. 215

The delegates to that great assembly were practical men. They did not even condemn war as wholly unrighteous. They did not attempt the impossible. They recognized their work as imperfect, but it was the best then attainable; I think it should be the policy of the friends of universal peace to labor to perfect that instrument (the arbitration co n v en tio n ), and to make th e Hague co u rt p o p u lar w ith th e nations as an effective means of adjusting international differences.“

Foster held the opinion that a “permanent world’s parliament of states'* remained in the far distant future, and that the Hague court presented a viable method of lessening the threat of war until a more efficient 34 international forum could be invented. On the eve of the calling of the Second Hague Conference Foster presented for public considers* tion his own proposals for modifying the structure of the court.

Foster’s suggestions included increased membership from among the

Latin American Republics, payment of a retainer to attract expert judges, consideration of a means for lessening the expenses of arbitration procedures for smaller countries, and a wider use of

English (“now the language most prevailent among the Christian nations") 35 in place of French. "

Foster’s efforts on behalf of world peace through arbitration led to his involvement in the founding of the American Society for

33 Arbitration and the Hague Court. 97.

3 4 Ibid.. 97-104.

35 Ibid., 79-86. 36 xlr&sfnetiGnaS -Lm?.^ -The Idea for establishing such an organisation

grew out of the discussions at the Eleventh Mohonk Conference on

International Arbitration held at the resort hotel of Albert Smileyv

a prominent Quaker. Those attending this meeting in the quiet

surroundings of the New York lake region decided that mere political

pressure by peace groups had proven ineffective. These men believed

.Chat to meet £&e complex problems confronting the peace movement

enlarged and coordinated efforts would have to be made in the area

of public education. They felt that the American citizens were

inadequately informed about international rights and obligations as 37 well as the nature of arbitration procedures. The American Society

for International Law was officially established in January, 1906 in

the offices of the New York State Bar Association, and Elihu Root was * fv made president with James Brown Scott, a professor of international

law at Columbia University, named secretary.

The avowed aim of the new organization was "to foster the

study of international law and promote the establishment of'inter-

By 1904 Foster was recognized as a leading spokesman of the peace movement and the prestiege of his presence was considered Necessary fox the success of national meetings. John Bassett Moore to Foster, January 5, 1904 and enclosures, Moore Papers, 10.

37 "Editorial Comment," American Journal of International Law. I (January, 1907), 130-133; George A. Finch, "The American Society for International Law, 1906-1956," American Journal of International Law. L (A p ril, 1956), 296-297, Sondra Herman, Eleven A gainst War. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 22-23. For a history of the formative years of the Mohonk Conference, see Davis. U.S. and the First Hague Conference. 25 ff. 217

national relations on the basis of law and justice.” The Society proclaimed from its beginnings that membership would not be limited to specialists; however, the method by which the society carried out

its functions tended to limit participation to a close circle of professionals. Professor Scott set up the Society’s offices in his home and accepted no compensation for his services. Contributions to the organization’s official publication, the American Journal of 38 International Law, were always gratuitious. Foster and his son- in-law and junior law partner, Robert Lansing, attended both the

Eleventh Mohonk Conference and the later meeting in which the Society was established, and contributed generously to the first issues of the 39 J o u rn a l.

The determined stand Foster took with respect to arbitration brought him into direct conflict with President Theodore Roosevelt and

Secretary of State John Hay. Lobbying in Washington in support of ratification of ten bilateral arbitration agreements which Hay had negotiated, Foster urged the administration to accept the limitation 40 of Senate amendments. Roosevelt and Hay felt that the Senate's refusal to surrender the power of defining arbitration to the presi-

38 "Editorial Comment,” ibid.. 134; Finch, "Am Society for International Law,” 297; Curti, War or Peace. 201-202.

39 Finch, ibid. ; Oscar Straus, Under Four Administrations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1922), 333-336; Daniel Smith, Lansing and Neutrality. 1914-1917 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 2.

40 Straus, ibid. Also of interest is Foster's brief article, (Objections Urged to Arbitration Treaties," Independent. LVIII (January 5, 1905), 9-11. 218

dent made the treaties meaningless since the Senate would have to approve every special agreement by redefining the questions at issue 41 in each arbitration. The president discussed the controversy personally with Foster and explained his position that the Senate 42 amendments were unconstitutional and made the treaties a "farce."

Foster was not convinced by Roosevelt*s arguements, much to the frustration of the president. In his private correspondence Roosevelt

Wrote that "the people who have exasperated me more than any others a re those* lik e John W. F o s te r, Andrew C arnegie and Wayne McVeagh, who, partly from jealousy of John Hay and partly from that curious vanity which makes men desire to cover up defeat, have Insisted that we ought to take, on the half-loaf principle, a measure which is not 43 a half a loaf at all, but a distinct, though slight, step backwards."

As the commencement of the Second Hague Conference drew near,

Foster continued his work in the cause of international peace. As the president of the 12th Annual Mohonk Conference, held in the summer of

*Roosevelt*s views on the arbitration treaties are stated in a letter to Senator Shelby Cullom dated February 10, 1905 and printed in The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. E.E. Morison, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951-1954), IV, 1119. Also see Shelby Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service. 396-401.

/ o Roosevelt to Hay, February 6 , 1905, Letters of Theodore R oosevelt. IV, 1114.

^ R o o s e v e lt to S ila s McBee, February 10, 1905, ib id . . 1121. Foster knew that the president was angered, but he persisted in his belief that the administration was in error: "I am henceforth persona non grata with the Executive department of the Government, and I am sorry for it, but not sorry that I spoke my mind. Secretary Hay has no use for the Senate and would abolish it tomorrow if he could have his way. But the country never had more use for the Senate than now." Foster to Wilson, February 20, 1905, Wilson Papers, 9. 219

1906, he urged that the United States, in cooperation with Great

Britain, lead the world powers in a campaign to limit armaments.

Foster also expressed the hope that the United States would assume a

leading role at the coming Hague Conference in attempting to bring

about a reduction or limitation in weaponry. With Foster presiding,

the Mohonk Conference adopted a resolution calling for international

action for arms limitation and petitioned President Roosevelt to

instruct the delegates to the Hague Conference to urge that inter- 44 national group to consider a plan for the restriction of armaments.

Although Roosevelt was sympathetic to the idea of the Hague court,

he viewed with alarm proposals for disarmament as presented by those

he believed to be "the preposterous apostles of peace of the type of 45 ex-Secretary of State Foster...." Disapproval from the White House,

however, did not lessen Foster's participation in the activities of

the peace movement.

Although Foster did not plan to attend the Second Hague 46 Conference, considering it to be a work for younger men, he never­

theless agreed to a request that he accompany the Chinese delegation

to the world meeting. In May 1907 the former Secretary of State, his

^Report of the 12th Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference. (1906), 12-16, 139. Resolutions of the Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, (1907), 141, Also see Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion (New York! Macmillan Co., 1942), 313-314.

^Theodore Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan (personal) August 18, 1906, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. V, 366.

^Foster to Wilson, December 23, 1904, Wilson Papers, 9. 220

wife and their grandson, John Foster Dulles, a nineteen-year-old student at Princeton, departed the United States for Europe on what 47 was to be the elderly diplomat's final trip abroad. Because China feared any possible conflict with foreign powers Chinese representa­ tives were issued specific instructions by their government to avoid taking part in arguementation over controversial questions, vote with the majority on all matters, and follow the lead of the United States and Great Britain whenever the two nations were in agreement with each 48 other. Despite limited circumspect instructions given to the

Chinese delegation, Foster viewed the Conference with great optimism because of the expanded representation which included many Latin Ameri­ can countries and the expressed intention of the conference to give all nations equal respect and treatment. The fact that subjected colonial peoples were not included among the forty four states 49 recognized at the conference did not seem to bother Foster. In his

Memoirs he proclaimed the Second Hague conference to be "in some respects the most important event in the history of the human race.

It was the first time that the political representatives of all the

47 Memoirs. II, 211-212; James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909), I, 158; Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles: The Last Year (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), 61-62. John Foster Dulles, because he spoke French, was made secretary of the delegation.

4 ^Memoirs. II, 241.

49Ibid.. 216, 218, 229, 240. 222

nations of the earth had met together."^

Much of the delegates1 time and energies at the conference 51 sessions were expended in elaborate dinners and social gatherings.

Foster*s principal contribution to the work of the conference was a brief speech in support of the United States delegation's proposal on the inviolability of private property at sea during time of war.

In his presentation Foster stated: "I foresee the day when the right of search will be abolished, when the suppression of contraband will be permitted only in the territorial waters of the belligerents, and when the high seas will be open to the peaceful commerce of the whole 52 world and protected from the vexatious proceedings of waring powers."

The American position met with no success due to the opposition of 53 the German and British delegations; but despite this failure over this issue and the general skepticism expressed by many critics of the

Hague Conference, Foster maintained a firm belief in the ultimate 54 success of th e Hague movement.

5 0 Ib id . . 2 1 2 .

5 l Ibid.. 214-216, 218-219, 225, 230-231, 241.

CO •^Proceeding of the Hague Peace Conferences. James Brown Scott, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1907), III, 795. 53 William I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contri­ butions to International Law (New York: Garland Publishing Co. C1972) ), 134-137; Tate, Disarmament Illusion. 342-343.

•^Memoirs. II, 239. Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences. I, 178-179. As positive accomplishments Of th e Second Hague Conference Foster listed the following: 1) creation of a prize court; 2) procedural Improvements for commissions of inquiry and arbitration; 3) prohibition of the use of force in the collection of debts; 4) adoption of new regulations for the amelioration of land and naval warfare; 5) greater protection of neutral commerce during war; 6 ) some advancement towards 222

Following his return from the Second Hague Conference Foster resumed his involvement in various peace societies up until the out- 55 break of World War I. His statements on the question of armaments became more pronounced and determined. He denounced popular historians and politicians who claimed that was was inevitable and charged that all foreign wars in which the American people had engaged were brought about by United States aggression and jingoism. Foster argued that the Roman Empire fell not because it became soft, but because it weakened itself through constant warfare. Theodore Roosevelt, ambitious naval commanders and proponents of an expanded navy became 56 particular targets of Foster's attacks. Because of his critical statements regarding United States foreign policies Foster was accused 57 of being unpatriotic. a goal of obligatory arbitration and establishment of a permanent arbitral court; 7) provision for the periodic meeting of other world peace conferences. Memoirs. II, 240.

^ In 1910 Foster accepted a position on the board of the C arnegie Endowment f o r In te rn a tio n a l Peace. F o s te r to Andrew C arnegie, November 15, 1910, Carnegie Papers, CLXXXII. For some reason Foster became disenchanted with the organization, but was encouraged to remain on by Elihu Root, who wrote in parts "(James Brown} Scott tells me you are thinking of withdrawing....! shall really feel like chucking the whole business overboard if you back out now just when the real work is to begin. You have the knowledge of international affairs and experience which would be of immense service in a great experiment like this, and you have the position of authority to make your knowledge and experience effective, and you have time and strength and ability." Root to Foster, January 31, 1911, Foster Papers.

56por example, see International Arbitration; An Address Delivered in Richmond. Indiana by request of the Commercial Club. December 1, 1909 (Richmond, Indiana, 1909), 5-7, 11-12, 14, 28-32; "War Not I n e v ita b le ," World Peace Foundation Pamphlet S e rie s . No. 3, Part II (October, 1911); Misconceptions of the Monroe Doctrine (Washington, D.C., 1914). 57proceedings. American Society for Judicial Settlement of 223

In February 1909 President Roosevelt, who unlike Foster viewed the Japanese as a genuine threat to American interests in the 58 Pacific, privately expressed his displeasure with Foster to

Philander C. Knox: "The minute we arrange matters so that for the moment everything is smooth and pleasant, the more foolish peace

societies, led by men like ex-Secretary of State Foster and ex-

S e c re tary of th e Navy £ John D.} Long, clam or f o r a stoppage in th e 59 building up of the navy." That John W. Foster, the same man who two decades earlier had participated in the "spirited diplomacy" of the Harrison administration, could now criticize an aggressive foreign policy, obviously left the President confused as well as infuriated.

In actuality, however, Foster*s concept of American mission was not opposed to the president's. Both believed that the United States should aspire to a role of world leadership; their differences centered over the tactics to be employed in achieving this goal. Whereas

Roosevelt accepted the need for armed force to execute strategy,

Foster held that the American mission could be carried out through moral leadership.

International Disputes (December 15, 1910), p. 44. CO In 1910 Foster saw no threat from Japan to the United States or American interests in the Pacific and Far East; nor did he feel the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be detrimental to U.S. policy. "The Japanese War Scare," International Conciliation in the Far East. Pamphlet No. 35 (New York; American Association for International Conciliation, October, 1910, 28-31.

■^Roosevelt to Philander C. Knox, February 8, 1909, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. VI, 1513, 224

The various organisations promoting international peace through law, arbitration and disarmament in which Foster participated all combined a new sense of United States power and prestiege with a desire to create a world of harmonious, order. These apostles of peace believed that the American destiny was one of moral leadership, that it was their duty to spread the western ethic and civilization, and that their nation should use its strength to bestow on the earth's less fortunate peoples the blessings of American democracy and 60 progress. Those peace societies concentrating on the wider accep­ tance of International law tended to be generally conservative and legalistic in orientation, preferring stability over change .and striving to preserve the contemporary distribution of power among 61 national states. Although filled with idealism, Foster was a consumately pragmatic individual. In spite of his own moralistic

60 Osgood, Ideals and Self Interest. 8 6 - 8 8.

Herman, Eleven against War. 24; Robert McCloskey, American Conservatism in an Age of Enterprise. 1865-1910. (New York: Harper, 1964), 22, 27-28; Lloyd C. Gardner, "American Foreign Policy, 1900- 1921," Towards a New Past. Barton J. Bernstein, ed. (New York; Vintage Books, 1969), 211. 225 rhetoric and that of his fellow peace advocates* he never lost sight of the harsh realities of international diplomacy. At times he must have been uncomfortable in the presence of the idealists* pacifists and anti-im perialists who joined the diverse elements comprising the peace movement.

In his private correspondence Foster displayed a sense for political expediency and opportunism that never surfaced in his pious and bombastic speeches and pamphlets extolling the virtues of peace.

Writing to his close friend* General James Harrison Wilson* in

November 1903* Foster expressed complete agreement with President

Roosevelt's actions regarding the recognition of Panama's independence from Columbia which followed a revolt inspired by the United States:

The action of the Government does look a bit premature* and unintelligent criticism is apt to be applied to it. Neither you nor I want to see our country in the attitude of a land-grabber or reckless of its international obliga­ tions* but it has assumed a great obligation respecting an inter-oceanic canal* and it must discharge that duty.... It was our duty to make it an American -- that is a United States enterprise.... £ the United States] should have exclusive police control and sovereignty over it. Columbia should not be permitted to stand in the way of such a great* world work."

Foster disagreed with Wilson's contention that the United States should have taken Panama outright from the uncooperative Columbians.

Instead* the former secretary of state defended the more sophisticated approach of employing a native coup d'etat as he himself had done in an attempt to annex Hawaii in 1893:

"...a better way is opened through the Panama revolt. However that was brought atout it is now a de-facto government and the president would be unfaithful to this great duty assumed by us, if he did not embrace the 226

opportunity. Hawaii is a precedent £or such action, to say nothing of others." 62 While he publicly denounced the use of warfare as "immoral and horrible in its aspects and contrary to the spirit of C hristian* 63 ity," Foster never totally embraced non-violence. He viewed war as an unfortunate necessity that, under certain circumstances, was entirely justified. He considered war even a positive good if engaged

in for the cause of moral progress. The Civil War, in which he had fought, served for him as an example of a just and righteous conflict waged against forces of an unacceptable evil. In an address delivered

in 1902 at the dedication of Soldiers' Monument in Indianapolis,

Foster proudly told his audience that "Never in the history of human warfare has there been a triumph more significant of blessing to mankind....Right, humanity, and progress were on the side of the 64 Union armies." When in 1914 the peace movement failed to avert world war, Foster again saw a classic struggle between the righteous and those who would threaten the democracy and Christian civilisation he held so dear. "I am not well enough to write you my views on the war situation," Foster confided in his last letter to General Wilson,

"Though a pacifist after a fashion, I am so bitter with Germany I 65 rather hope we will get into the scrimage."

^Foster to Wilson, November 21, 1903, and Wilson to Foster, November 23, 1903, Wilson Papers, 9.

International Arbitration. 26. 64 Address delivered May 15, 1902, Indianapolis, Indiana, printed in War Stories. App. 181-190.

65Foster to Wilson, February 9, 1917, Wilson Papers, 9. 227

A dilemma confronting those like Foster who believed in the

inevitability of expanded American influence abroad, was that at the

same time they hoped to see this eventuality arrived at, if possible, 66 without violence. For Foster the solution appeared to be in the

world-wide acceptance of Christianity. A deeply religious man, Foster

had been involved in missionary work his entire life, and served on 67 the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. He contributed generously

of his fortune and energies to further missionary efforts in the Far

East and Turkey. To this conservative, inflexible, fundamentalist 68 Presbyterian, Christianity was a real force in the world, destined

ultimately to encompass all the peoples of the world in a common ethic

and value system.

66 LaFeber, New American Empire. 97-98.

^Rev. Charles Wood, D.C., "Gen. John W. Foster: A Memorial.H Sermon delivered in church of the Covenant, Sunday morning, December 2, 1917. (copy in Library of Congress), 11, 14. Also see Foster’s lecture on missionary efforts in China delivered at the First Presby­ terian Church of Watertown, New York and printed in the New York Times (September 9, 1895), 5; The Value of Investments in Foreign Christian Colleges: An Address Given on Behalf of American College for Girls at Constantinoole. March 24, 1909 (University Press of Sewanee, Tennessee, 1906).

68 Rev. Wood placed Foster in the conservative school of Presbyterianism. In eulogising his parishoner Rev. Wood stated: "Inflexable, as some doubless thought his Presbyterianism, it was not rigid or exclusive. He was tolerent even to an extraordinary degree to phases of Presbyterianism, with which, personally, he could not a g ree....£ but he looked) with some apprehension at even the suggestion of radicalism or liberalism." 12; Also see James Brown Scott, "John W. Foster: An Appreciation," American Journal of International Law. XXII (January, 1918), 134; William R. Castle, "John W. Foster," American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. V III, 208. 228

Foster’s views on the coming millenium of Christian 4*' civilization were clearly expressed in an address delivered before the Presbyterian Ministerial Association meeting in Philadelphia in the final year of the nineteenth century. Not hesitating to state his opinions on theology before the ministers of his churchy Foster rejected those holding to the notion that the church was illiberal and needed 69 to modernize its teachings. "To my mind*" he statedy"the great need of the Church to-day is more preaching of the gospel proclaimed by

Christ and at the day of Pentecost* repentance and remission of sins — the old, old story."^ Sophisticated biblical studies seemed fatuous to a man of Foster’s rigid faith; "The criticism of the Bible which is so greatly in evidence in these days has given much anxiety to many a Christian, but to me it is not a subject of serious concern.

Describing the closing century as one of enormous Christian accomplish­ ment, he pronounced the contemporary era to be ready for the complete 72 conversion of the world to Christianity.

The inherent superiority of Christian ethics, western civ ili­ zation and American values appeared obvious to Foster. He pointed out that only the true faith had "made Christian nations the powerful

^ The Civilization of Christ. (Philadelphia: Printed for the Presbyterian Ministerial Association, 1899), 14-15.

70 Ibid., 16-17.

7llbid.. 13.

72Ibid., 14-15. nations of the earth. What but the influence of Christ's gospel has 73 made the home in our land so different from that in Asia or Africa?"

From world travels Foster believed one could readily distinguish the benefits the almighty bestowed on the chosen:

...no one but he who has visited the lands of the rival system s today, of Mohammedanism, of Bramanism, and Buddhism, can fully appreciate the superiority of the civilization of Christ and the marked difference in system; and when one sees what blind superstition, and what depths of immorality these have led their adherents, it is inconceivable that any one who lives under the light and blessings of the gospel can make any comparison favorable to them.

The duty charged to those given the gift of Christian faith was unquestionably that of spreading the "civilization of Christ•" The elder American statesman summarized his understanding of the mission of Christian peoples with the statement: "God sent forth his Son to give man a system of life which would satisfy the longings of his soul, and enable him to establish a civilization destined to rule the world 74 and abide forever." Thus, Foster believed, by the acceptance of

Christianity throughout the world, peace and order could be maintained under the ideals he so fondly cherished.

While his preoccupation with the power of Christianity as a force in the world was more pronounced than most of his contemporaries,

Foster's conception of the American mission was not at all original.

A reflection of his era and aspokesman of the prevailing intellectual climate, Foster articulated in his diplomatic histories and social commentary a complete adherence of the generally accepted cultural, 230

political and ethical standards of his day. Although some of his

vritings on foreign policy did record previously unexamined aspects

of American history, his conclusions on the nature of United States

policy offered no fresh or provoking theories. Though uninspired and,

to a degree, amateurish by today*s standards of historiography,

Foster’s major works, particularly American Diplomacy in the Orient

and his two volume Diplomatic Memoirs, provide invaluable insights

into the vortex of the United States diplomatic establishment during

the period of American imperialist expansion.

Unquestionably Foster made his most important intellectual contribution through his vritings on American diplomacy in East Asia.

He believed the United States to be a benevolent and self-sacrificing power in the Orient, interested only in open trade and free exchange of ideas, and he denounced factors which would have hindered these

interests. Thus he praised the policy of the open door in China and criticised vigorously proponents of restrictions against Chinese

immigration for he understood that the United States would weaken its claim to moral leadership in the Orient if it allowed its leadership to place political expediency above principle in the Chinese exclusion

issue. He recognized that the United States would face stiff compe­ tition for the China trade with Japan, but the prospect of such a situation did not alarm Foster who considered the Japanese appreciative of the justice of American Oriental relations. Through his writings

Foster helped to establish the myth that because of the altruistic nature of American diplomacy, the people of Asia held a special fond­ ness for the United States. 231

Foster's long and extensive involvement with the peace

movement demonstrated a desire to combine pragmatism with idealism

and thereby give to mundane and unpleasant foreign policy maneuvers a

moral meaning. Thus, for Foster the desire of western nations to

preserve their dominant political position in the world became, through

the Hague court, a drive to insure order, peace and prosperity.

Although Foster encouraged the increased participation of the Latin

American republics at the Hague, he indicated no discontent when the

Second Hague conference failed to include representatives from a

majority of the world's people. Apparently, Foster believed that

among the less developed nations only the Latin Americans, as the

Chinese and Japanese, had reached a stage of modernization which

entitled them to a degree of participation with the major powers at

international conferences.

The most striking characteristic of Foster's public rhetoric

is the intensity of its righteousness. Never experiencing the least

degree of doubt in the truth of the Christian faith, the superiority of western cultural standards or the goodness of the American mission,

Foster expressed himself with a self-confidence known only to the naive. Nothing in Foster'slife had ever caused him to question his faith in his God or his belief in his nation's destiny. He had witnessed the preservation of the Union, the expansion to the Pacific, the rise of the United States to a position of world leadership, and the spread of Christianity to all parts of the globe. To Foster, disillusionment, skepticism and self-doubts were never known. VIII

THE FINAL YEARS: A "HANDY MAN" . IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

During the .years following his departure, from the .office of .

Secretary of State, John W. Foster remained actively involved in the formulation of United States foreign policies for over two decades.

His numerous diplomatic services, both o ff ic ia l and otherwise,

indicated that he enjoyed the confidence of national leaders and that he was recognized as an expert on a wide variety of subjects. Most importantly, a series of presidents and secretaries of sta te employed

F o ster’s ta le n ts for negotiation, his knowledge of Far Eastern a ffa ris and his expertise on the handling sensitive diplomatic problems. In each administration from that of Benjamin Harrison through the re- election of Woodrow Wilson, Foster was never far from the vortex of foreign policy decision making. Because the former secretary of state took on tasks and assignments requiring such a broad background and offered advise on diverse problems, one prominent contemporary 1 referred to Foster as the "handy man" of the State Department.

The most persistent diplomatic problems to which Foster

1This remark is attributed to Chauncey Depew. by Foster's biographer,William R. Castle, in "J.W. Foster," American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. VIII, 223.

232 233

applied himself in his long years of semi-retirement concerned •

United States relatio n s with' Canada, and thereby Great B ritain.

Early in 1892, several months before his appointment as secretary of

state, Foster had been occupied with the international legal dispute arisin g from the desire of the United States government to protect the Bering Sea fur seals surrounding the Pribiloff from pelagic sealing as practiced by Canadians outside United States territorial waters. Following agreement to a modis vlvendi in 1891, B ritain and the United States signed a treaty of arbitration in February 1892 and

submitted the question to an international tribunal. Foster accepted an appointment to act as the agent for organizing and presenting the 2 United States case, and based his government’s argument on the doubtful premise that the Russians, before selling Alaska, had held the Bering Sea as a mare clausum, that the British had recognized this

Russian claim, and that matters affecting the fur seals were, therefore, now under the jurisdiction of the United States. The State Department possessed numerous Russian documents on Alaska, and to bolster the

American contention Foster hired a Russian scholar, -Ivan Petroff, to 3 translate those passages which supported the United States position.

2 Events surrounding Foster’s appointment to act as the agent for the United States government are discussed in Chapter IV. While serving as interim Secretary of State Foster worked with the staff preparing the fur seal case. Castle, ibid.. 193-202.

3 William. Williams, "Reminiscences of the Bering Sea .Arbi- ... tratior.," American Journal of International Law. XXXVII (October, 1943), 562-584, ~ 234

Unfortunately, the overly zealous Petroff knowingly wrote into his translations fraudulent statements justifying the American arguement. A State Department clerk discovered the discrepancies 4 and informed Foster, but only a fte r the bogus tran slatio n s had been 5 made available to the British negotiators. The United States case was further embarrassed when the Russian government, seeking to fur­ ther its own interests in the Bering Sea, signed an agreement with

Great Britain respecting sealing which completely contradicted the

American position. The British managed to conclude this arrangement with Russia in June 1893 as the international tribunal was meeting in

Paris and hearing arguements. The reading of the agreement into the 6 arbitral proceedings damaged the United States case, and the decision rendered by the tribunal in August rejected entirely the Americans* claim of jurisdiction over the fur seal rookeries. However, the judges did establish regulations aimed at protecting the seals from 7 pelagic killing and eventual extermination.

^Memoirs, II, 40-41. Callahan, American-Canadian Relations. 477. ^The Petroff affair, while detected in time to avoid the appearance of fraud on the part of the United States, did weaken Foster's confidence regarding the chances for success. Foster to Henry White (personal), November 10, 1892, White Papers, XIV.

^Gresham to Foster, July 14, 1893, Foster Papers; Foster to Gresham, July 27, 1893, Bering Sea Despatches.

^Malloy, Treatles. I, 753. Callahan, American-Canadian Relations, 488-489. Foster's critics claimed that his concern for the welfare of the fur seal herds was a result of his association with the North American Commercial Company, which was engaged in the seal industry and resented Canadian competition. However, there is no evidence that Foster was in the company's pay. For harsh criti­ cism of Foster's management of the fur seal case see Matilda Gresham, 235

The judgement of the tribunal did not end the controversy

as the establishment of a suitable arrangement for effective execu­

tion of the provisions of the tribunal’s award remained to be

established. Robert Lansing, who worked on the preparation of the

case with Foster, soon expressed doubts about the willingness of the

British to restrain Canadians involved in pelagic sealing. Since

Foster had embarked upon a world tour following the conclusion of

the proceedings in Paris, Lansing was concerned that there would be

no strong voice in Washington to urge the Cleveland administration 8 and Congress to demand British adherence to the tribunal’s decision.

Actually, Secretary of State Walter Gresham,, had already become aware

of the problems involved in enforcing compliance to the sealing

restrictions and had written to Foster stating: "If Great Britain

is willing to co-operate with us the seal industry may be preserved,

but I must say I cannot get rid of the impression that various 9 pretexts may be restored for delay on the part of that Government."

Walter Q. Gresham. II, 728-730. For a more ju d icial evaluation, see Charles S. Campbell, Anglo American Understanding 1898-1903 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 83-84,

^Lansing to E.J. Phelps, October 12, 1893, Gresham Papers. Foster left Paris for a world tour upon the completion of the nego­ tia tio n s in P aris. Before departing he wrote to Henry White at the Legation in London stating:"Cmy journey will be) purely of a personal character and devoid of all political significance; but I want to keep my eyes and ears open.... And I have thought that if I was in an informal manner put in contact with the British officials, for instance at Cairo, Bombay, Calcutta, Ceylon and Hong Kong, it would be profita­ ble fo r me." White Papers, XV.

Q Gresham to Foster, October 9, 1893, Foster Paper. 236

Gresham's doubts about a lack of Anglo-American good will in this

matter would prove well founded. Throughout the remainder of the

Cleveland administration the fur seal matter and several lesser

disputes concerning Atlantic fisheries, reciprocal trade and the 10 Alaskan boundary remained unresolved.

While the actual matters concerned in these disputes between

the United States and Great Britain appeared trivial on the surface,

public opinion and domestic political pressure for a firm stand

against British "arrogance" gave the issues increased significance.

Profitably occupied with his legal practice, Foster was not actively

involved with State Department operations in the Cleveland administra­

tion after 1893, but the election of a Republican president in 1896

brought the former secretary of state back into the diplomatic

service. A fter the inauguration of William McKinley Foster again

turned his attention to the lingering disagreements in Anglo-

American relations.

In the spring of 1897 Foster was called upon to advise 12 State Department officials on the Bering Sea situation. After

giving the question careful study, Foster recommended that a four

power conference including the United States, Great Britain, Russia

*^For an analysis of United States-Canadian relations during the Cleveland administration see Callahan, Amerlcan-Canadian Rela­ tio n s , 449-451, 455-457. T ansill, United States and Canada. 341-352..

**John A. S. Grenville, I-ord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London? University of London, Athlone Press, 1964), 370-371. 12 C ridler (3rd A ssistant Secretary of State) to C.S. Hamlin, June 28, 1897, Special Missions, IV. 237

13 and Japan be held in Washington during the fin a l months of 1897.

Foster's proposal was accepted by the administration and Foster was

given a special appointment with the rank of ambassador to travel to

St, Petersburg and London to discuss prospects for the international 14 conference. Leaving for the European capitals in May, Foster

experienced easy success and found his trip most satisfactory. With

great optimism Foster arranged a conference for October.However,

shortly before the formal sessions were to begin the British decided not to participate, and in spite of Foster's aspirations the Inter­ national Fur Seal Conference of 1897 ended without a settlement on 16 any of the pending matters.

In the spring of 1898 Foster participated in a series of meetings in Washington at which both the American and British sides agreed to establish a Joint High Commission to resolve all outstanding 17 differences between the United States and Canad-. In August the

13 "Handed to Mr. Sherman by General Foster and by the Secretary of State shown to the P resident." April 20, 1897, Special Agents, 48.

14 Sherman to Foster, July 30, 1897, Special Agents, 48.

^ F o s te r to Sherman, June 16, 1897, Special Agents, 48. The social details of Foster's trip to St. Petersburg and London are recorded in Memoirs. I, 216-238.

^Protocols of the Conference, Special Agents, 48; Hay to Foster, October 18, (confidential) November 20, 1897, Foster Papers; Sherman to Hay, November 28, 1897, Instructions, Great B ritain, 32.

^Sherman to Laurier, November 12, 1897, Great B ritain, Notes to, 24; Protocol of the Conference at Washington, May, 1898, in Malloy, Treaties. I, 770-783. Also see Callahan, American- Canadian Relations. 457-458. Working with Foster at these sessions was John A. Kasson, a former minister to Germany and an expert on recip ro city . For a discussion of Kasson's ro le, see Edward Younger, 238

United States commissioners, led by Foster, met with their counter­ parts in Quebec., Although the conferences dragged on for eighteen weeks in Quebec and la te r in Washington, the Joint High Commission 18 ended without a settlem ent. The Commission broke up over the question of the Alaskan boundary which had become an increasingly tense and emotional issue since the discovery of gold in the

Klondike River region in 1897, The Canadians had recently began to vigorously assert that the boundary of the Alaskan pan-handle extended inland about thirty miles not from the shore of the main­ land, but rather from the outermost islands off the Pacific coast.

The Canadian claim would have given that country control of salt water inlets previously regarded as wholly within United States territory. The Canadians could not be induced to accept the separation of the Alaskan boundary dispute from the other issues to be negotiated by the Joint Commission and refused to proceed on the fur seal question until an agreement was reached on the border 19 problem. ___

Eventually a modis vivendi was agreed upon in October 1899

John A. Kasson; P o litics from Lincoln to McKinley (Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1955), 37i ff.

1 R The best account of these lengthy proceedings is C.S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding. 88-137. Also see, Grenville, Salisburv, 272-273; Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapproach- ment: England and the United States. 1895-1914 (New Ygrk: Atheneum, 1968), 163-164, 19 Hay to Choate, April 19, 1899, Instructions, Great Britain, 33. For a detailed study of the long history of the border problem see Tansill, American-Canadian Relations, 121-165. Also of interest on this matter is Foster's analysis of the border situation, presented in "The Alaskan Boundary," National Geographic. X (November, 1899), 425-456. and after several years of refusing, to submit the question,

Secretary of State John Hay signed a treaty in Washington on

January 24, 1903 calling for a panel of six "impartial jurists of repute," three chosen by the president and three by the British 20 monarch, to define the boundary. President Roosevelt selected for the American members his personal friend, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, his Secretary of War, Eljhu Root, and an outspoken advocate of the

United States boundary claim in Alaska, Senator George Turner of

Washington. Foster was named to prepare the arguements for the

United States p osition. He also acted as a spokesman for the administration’s decision to place the boundary dispute in arbitration

After laboring long hours over the United States case,

Foster presented a document of over six hundred pages, including maps and charts, when the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal convened in 22 London in September. The British, aware of the weakness of the

Canadian boundary claim and uncompromising attitude President

Roosevelt regarding the United States position, decided to_accept

20 Foreign Relations. 1899, 328-331, Malloy, T reaties. I, 787-792. Foster gave both Hay and Roosevelt great credit for submitting the Alaskan boundary question to international arbitra­ tio n . Memoirs. II, 192.

2 *W. R. Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hav. 2 vols, (Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1915), II, 212. Foster expressed optimism about the chances for arbitration in "The Prospects for A rbitration with England," Independent (December 24, 1903), 3025. Foster explained the need for arbitration and praised the efforts of Hay and Roosevelt in a le tte r to the editors of the Washington Post. Hay was so delighted with Foster’s letter that the Secretary of State had it printed as a government document and distributed to each member of Congress. Memoirs. II, 194-195; Washington Post (February 24, 1903); Spnate Document. No. 136, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22Foster to Choate, April 3, 1903, Choate Papers; Hay to 240

a judgement wholly favorable to the United States. Roosevelt's

appointment of Lodge, Turner and Root, all ardent nationalists

committed to Roosevelt's foreign policies, indicated that the

United States would agree to no compromise on the boundary question;

the British recognized the political reality and acted accordingly.

By a four to two vote, with the two Canadian jurists dissenting,

the United States was awarded a strip of land continuous around

a ll the in le ts from the Portland Canal north to Mt. Elias, thus

excluding Canada from contact with the sea. The judgement reached

in October, 1903 was clearly diplomatic rather than judicial. The

Canadians felt that the British had betrayed their claim for an

o u tlet to the Pacific for the sake of improved Anglo-American 23 re la tio n s.

F o ste r's e ffo rts before the Alaskan Boundary tribunal ended

for him ten eventful years of sporadic involvement in United States

relations with Great Britain. During this time Foster had gained

recognition and notoriety for his diplomatic labors. He was known

to both the British and Canadians as a stubborn negotiator who

mastered every detail of both the fur seal and Alaskan boundary

Foster, July 2, August 5, 1903, Foster Papers, Foster, to Wilson, August 21, 1903, Wilson Papers, IX. Foster, The Alaskan Boundary Tribunal (Washington, D.C.: Judd and Detweiler, 1903), 10-11.

2-^The best analysis of the terms of the Award is Foster's Alaskan Boundary Tribunal. 8-9; For the p o litic a l side, Charles S. Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding. 311-318, 319-345; Thomas A, Bailey,"Theodore Roosevelt and the Alaskan Boundary Settlem ent," Canadian H istorical Review. XVIII (June, 1937), 123-130. 241

controversies. He was probably more effective as a back room bargainer

than in formal negotiating sessions; particularly since his rough,

country lawyer approach to arguementation in the court sometimes 24 caused his sophisticated English opponents to- feel uncomfortable.

Of his reputation as a fierce, tenacious negotiator, John Hay once

remarked, "Foster's worst enemy would never accuse him of any tendency 25 to mercy or tenderness to an opponent." While F o ster's blunt and

candid speech delighted Secretary of State Hay and provided an 26 amusing topic of conversation in Washington society, his tough,

unyielding manner did not seem to f a c ilita te a s p ir it of compromise

or expeditious settlements.

Throughout his diplomatic career Foster had viewed Great

Britain as a rival and potential threat to United States interests.

While secretary of state Foster had dealt with the problems of the

joint occupation of Samoa, British encroachment along the Mosquito

24 Campbell, ibid., 83. Foster was aware that his style of arguementation upset the British and Canadian commissioners, but he did not feel compelled to change his ways. Apparently, he believed the other side should accommodate themselves to the American approach. Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, 12; Memoirs. I I , 201.

25 Hay to Roosevelt, July 2, 1903, quoted in Tyler Dennett, John Hay; From Poetry to P o litics (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1933), 359. 26 Henry Cabot Lodge to Henry White, November 19, 1897, in Allen Nevins, Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York: Harper Bros., 1930), 187; Henry Adams to Elizabeth Cameron, January 29, 1899, L etters of Henry Adams, W.C. Ford, ed. (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1938), II, 209; Hay to Foster (personal) August 5, 1903, Foster Papers. 242

27 Coast in Central America, and various disputes with Canada with the settlement of the Alaskan boundary question to the satisfaction of the United States, only the persistent fur seal problem, recipro­ city and a controversy over North Atlantic fisheries remained to 28 endanger American relations with Great Britain, Foster sensed that an era of Anglo-American understanding and cooperation was emerging. He was proud of the record the two Anglo-Saxon people had made in the judicial settlement of their international controversies with each other, and he saw no reason why the progress demonstrated in the negotiations between the Britain and the United States could be duplicated elsewhere. He seemed to feel that the negotiations in which he participated had a deeper significance than the mundane task of reaching a settlement on a specific issue. To Foster, who simultaneously was involved in a number of organizations promoting international peace through arbitration, the disputes over the fur seals and Alaskan boundary offered a chance to demonstrate moral leadership. He viewed the manner in which the Alaskan boundary dispute ended as far more important than the actual terms of the 29 settlement, because it demonstrated the highly advanced civilisa­ tion known to the Anglo-Saxon peples.

27 ' See Chapter IV. Also see Foster's views expressed in Memoirs. II, 176-177.

28 C.S. Campbell, Anglo American Understanding, 347.

29 Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, 14; Memoirs, II, 209. 243

*

Foster's diplomatic dexterity proved invaluable in the first years of the McKinley adm inistration in areas other than Anglo-

American relations. Not wanting to separate himself from his family for long periods of time by extended overseas residence, the former secretary of state graciously declined the President's offers of 30 ambassadorships to Peking, Madrid or Constantinople. Instead

Foster accepted several short term assignments such as the work for the Alaskan Boundary trib u n a l, and remained in Washington where he had the opportunity to render advise on specific problems as an unofficial adviser. The State Department turned to Foster often, as the President's initial appointments to the office of secretary of

State proved inadequate.

In choosing John Sherman to head the State Department,

McKinley acted with reluctance under p o litic a l pressure. An elderly senator, enfeebled by his many years, the once powerful Sherman was unable to comprehend the complexities of foreign policy. For

Assistant Secretary of State, the President selected a personal

Foster to Wilson, January 3, 1898, Wilson Papers, IX; Memoirs. II, 255-256. 244

friend and confidant from Ohio, Judge William R. Day, an able and competent individual, but a man utterly lacking in experience with 31 regard to foreign policy. Both Sherman and Day, who succeeded to the post of secretary of state in April 1898, looked to the knowled­ geable Foster for counsel on matters with which the senior diplomat 32 was most fam iliar. The drive for the annexation of Hawaii became 33 Foster's special charge, and his involvement in that work along with the preparation of matters dealing with the Fur Seals and

Alaskan boundary made Foster a vital character within the diplomatic establishment.

When the able and articulate John Hay became secretary of s ta te in September 1898, F o ster's role in policy making was in no way diminished. Their relationship was exceptionally cordial, and

Foster wrote that his association with.Hay was "more intimate and 34 prolonged than with any other of the Secretaries of State." Indeed, while Hay held his cabinet post the two men corresponded frequently on varied and sundry topics. ^

31Foster's candid views on John Sherman and William R. Day are present in Memoirs. II, 275-276.

32Louis M. Sears, "John Sherman," American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. Sanuel F. Bemis, ed., IX, 13, 19; Lester B. Shippee and Royal B. Way, "William R. Day," 33-34.

3^See Chapter V.

34Memoirs, II, 279. 245

Shortly a fte r his appointment by McKinley, Hay asked Foster to visit the State Department and discuss foreign policy, adding 35 '•you know what the place requires better than I do." Hay solicited and received informal counsel from the former secretary of state on questions concerning Congress, Samoa, Latin America, American 36 missionary activities in Turkey and diplomatic appointments.

F o ste r's most important advisory service, however, was rendered in regard to United States diplomacy in the Far East during the issuing 37 of the Open Door notes and th e re after.

Hay sought Foster's opinion on the nature of the Boxer

Rebellion, particularly since Foster was close to the officials in the Chinese legation. A few weeks before dispatching his second circular note proclaiming the American desire to "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of 38 the Chinese Empire," Hay confided to Foster his anger at being accused in the press of pro-British sympathies because of his stand

■^Hay to Foster, October 3, 1898, Foster Papers.

36 Most importantly, see Hay to Foster, July 7, September 26, 1899, April 17, December 18, 1902, Foster Papers.

17 -"Foster confided to a personal friend th at he had been advising Hay on Far Eastern affairs for a considerable period of time. Foster to Wilson, May 16, 1903, Wilson Papers, IX. Regarding the U.S. involvement in the expeditionary force which put down the Boxer Rebellion, Foster wrote: "nothing should be done to cripple or impede the ability of China in the maintenance of a stable government and its territorial integrity. Hence it was necessary to continue in the concert of the powers and as fa r as possible control th e ir action to that end," American Diplomacy in the Orient, 432.

•^Foreign Relations, 1900, 299. 246

on China. "How can we make bricks without straw?" asked Hay,

"That we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of the

greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own policy, because

a l l Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools -- is enough to 39 drive a man mad. Yet we shall do what we can." The extent to which Hay’s actions during the Boxer Rebellion were influenced by

Foster is impossible to discern, but the two men did share a desire to see Chinese territorial integrity preserved and Russian expansion 40 in Manchuria checked.

The nature and diversity of Foster's relationships with the men formulating foreign policies in the twenty-year-period following

1893 indicates that Foster held a unique place in the development of

American diplomacy during an era of American expansionist diplomacy.

The alert, bewhiskered, slight figure of the former secretary of state must have been a common sight in the halls of the State Depart­ ment. Truly a "handy man," Foster served as a professional, convenient and reliable consultant to the diplomatic service during a'period of transition in American foreign policy.

*3 0 Hay to Foster, January 23, 1900, Foster Papers; Dennett, Hay, 233-234.

^°Hay to Foster (private) October 30, 1900, Foster Papers. 247

Foster could never abandon completely his contacts with the

State Department, but through the closing decades of his long life

he became increasingly secluded and drew close to his immediate

family. He devoted extraordinary attention to his grandchildren,

particularly the sons of his elder daughter Edith and her husband,

Reverend Allen Macy Dulles, a pious and scholarly Presbyterian

minister. Although Foster's legal business, teaching and occasional

service in the State Department kept him in Washington, he and his

wife spent ever longer periods of time at Henderson Harbor, New York where the family owned a summer home. There Foster's younger daughter

Eleanor met and married Robert Lansing, a young lawyer in nearby 41 Watertown in January 1891. A few years la te r Allen Dulles succeeded

his fath er as the pastor of F irst Presbyterian Church in Watertown and returned to New York to settle his family permanently in the small town. The grandparents naturally tended to visit the lake region with greater frequency after both daughters set up housekeeping near Henderson Harbor.

^**New Y0rk Times (January 16, 1891), 5. The wedding service was performed by Rev. Alfred Lacy Dulles in the First Presbyterian Church of Watertown. 248

A proud and doting grandfather, Foster enjoyed fishing in

the picturesque area around Lake Ontario with his young grandsons,

John Foster and Allen. The old man demonstrated an unusual affection

for his grandsons and his constant companionship with them clearly

influenced the boys* development. On numerous fishing expeditions

and regular visits to their grandparents* home on Eighteenth Street

in Washington-the Dulles children were enthralled by stories of far

away places and enchanted by the constant presence of prominent 42 statesmen, foreign missionaries and Chinese officials. From an

early age the children expressed a fascination with world affairs,

and their pleased and proud grandfather encouraged their study of 43 history, geography and foreign affairs. Perhaps because he had

/ o Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles; The Last Year (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963), 61-62.. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, a granddaughter of John Foster, describes the Foster residence on 18th Street in Washington as very grand, with reception rooms the size of ballrooms and filled with artifacts collected from around the world. Life in Washington was eventful, and on numerous special occasions Mrs. Mary Parke Foster would “preside like a duchess over the tea table at five o'clock, as Senators, Justices, ambassadors and State Department officials came in early, with plenty of time for a relaxed hour of conversation before dinner,1' 62.

43 At the tender age of eight Allen Dulles wrote a brief history of the Boer war which so impressed his grandfather that the old man had it published for private circulation. The former secretary of state also wrote a forward in which he expressed his pleasure with young Allen's independence of thought, stating: "an ardent admirer of the Boers, and this in spite of the fact that all his immediate family favor the British cause." The Boer War: A History, a copy in the Library of Congress. Also see Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles. American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Robert F errell and Samuel F. Bemis ed., XVII, 334; R. D. Challener and John Fenton, "Which Way America? Dulles Always Knew," American H eritage, XXI.I (June, 1971), 84-85; John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), 28. 249 never had a son, the old man demonstrated an unusual affection for his grandsons, and his constant companionship markedly influenced their development.

Without question the grandfather held an exceptional fondness for his oldest grandchild and namesake. Interested in the education of all his grandchildren, the family patriarch assisted his poorly-paid, minister son-in-law finance a college education for his children; but in the case of young John Foster, money was also made available to assist the youthful recepient of Princeton University’s ••Prize for 44 Mental Science 11 in his study at the Sorbonne under Henri Bergson.

At his grandfather’s request the ineteen-year-old John Foster was made secretary for the Chinese delegation to the Second Hague 45 Conference and accompanied his grandfather to Europe in 1907.

When the grandson decided to pursue a.career in international affairs instead of the ministry, he chose George Washington University for his law studies so he could be near his maternal grandfather.

During his two years in Washington the law student lived with his grandparents, became familiar with leading figures in the capital and 46 made the acquaintance of the sons.of William Howard Taft. Upon completing his studies, but not the residency requirement necessary for a degree, the aspiring attorney found difficulty in attaining a

^Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles. 128. -

^ Memoirs, II, 212.

46 Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles. 128. 230 suitable position with any of the major Wall Street law firms.

Again his grandfather offered assistance, asking William N. Cromwell of the prestigeous Sullivan and Cromwell if "the memory of an old 47 association.. . fwas not 3 enough to give th is young man a chance."

The letter from his influential grandfather started the inexperienced and degreeless lawyer on a career that would ultimately lead to his appointment as Secretary of State. John Foster Dulles never forgot the tremendous impact on his life made by his distinguished fore- 48 bearer.

John W. Foster’s influence on the career of Secretary of

State Lansing appears just as pronounced as upon that of Secretary of State Dulles. Robert Lansing was an industrious, hardworking small-town attorney when he married Eleanor Foster, and for a time

Quoted in Gerson, John Foster Dulles, American Secretaries of State. XVIII, 10; Beal, John Foster Dulles, 55. In his letter Foster referred to Algernon Sullivan of Cincinnati, Ohio. Foster was associated briefly with Sullivan after the Civil War. Young Dulles began working with Sullivan and Cromwell for $50 dollar-per-month in 1911 and worked his way up to become head of the firm in 1927. Challener and Fenton, "Dulles Always Knew," 85-86.

^8See Dulles’ remarks in his address upon inauguration as Secretary of State. Department of State Press Release, 50 (January 28, 1953). Dulles meant never to forget the lessons taught by his grandfather. A State Department official in the Eisenhower admini­ stration recalled: "On several occasions, while I and others were discussing a given matter with him he said with a smile, 'My grand­ father had something to say on that subject.' He got up from his desk and knew instantly where to find the books, and opened one of them within a few pages of where the appropriate passage was to be found. Then with his finger on the passage he would read aloud to u s." Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, N .J.: D. Van Norstrand, 1965), 13. 251 after his marriage Lansing continued to practice law with his invalid father in Watertown. Following his father’s death, ’'Bert” and his wife ftioved to Washington where they took up residence with Eleanor’s parents. In 1892 Foster secured an appointment for his son-in-law as Associate Counsel for the United States in the Bering Sea case.

This was Lansing’s first introduction to the specialized world of international law, but with Foster's backing he quickly received numerous opportunities. Associated with his fath er-in -law ’s law frim in Washington, Lansing served as counsel to the Mexican and

Chinese legations and in 1903 received an appointment to be counselor fo r the United States before the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal. Foster interested Lansing ininternational arbitration and in 1907, involved 49 in the founding of the American Society of International Law. When

Lansing's name was under consideration for. the position of counselor

in the State Department, Foster arranged for Elihu Root to recommend 50 his son-in-law for the post. Several years later, Foster’s associa-

49 Julius Pratt, ’’Robert Lansing,” American Secretaries of of State and Their Diplomacy. X 47-48. ’’The Appointment of Mr. Robert Lansing of New York as Counselor in the Department of State,” American Journal of International Law. VIII (April, 1914), 336-337.

■^Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root. 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938), II, 320. Junior staff people in the State Department were impressed with Lansing's schooling and hoped that his appointment would mean that the President would give greater attention to foreign policy. Joseph Grew to T. Sergent Perry, April 6 , 1894, Grew, Turbulent Era; A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years. 1904-1945, ed. by Walter Johnson, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 120- 121. 252 tion with Lansing have helped the latter obtain his appointment as- 51 Secretary of State.

In September 1914, Foster offered to be of assistance to 52 "Bert" and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. While Foster held no official post within the Wilson administration, Foster's views on diplomatic issues must have greatly influenced Lansing's thinking on-foreign policy quest ions .as he had been under the watchful guidance of the senior statesman throughout his entire career in 53 international law and diplomacy. As Secretary of State in Wilson's cabinet from June 1915 to February 1920, Lansing demonstrated in his policies toward Mexico, China and Japan that he was profoundly influ- 54 enced by his close association with Foster.

Upon Lansing's appointment Edith Bolling Wilson recorded the President as saying: "He is a counselor in the State Department and has had a good schooling under old Mr. John W. Foster, his father- in-law, for whom I have great respect. I think he would steer Lansing, and the combination would be of great help to me," My Memoir (New York, 1939), 64. Also see Stuart, Department of S ta te . 238. There was also public speculation that Foster would play an important behind-the-scenes role once Lansing became Secretary jot S tate. Vieillard, "Custos Custodis," Nation. C (June 17, 1915), 680*

52 Foster to Dear Bert (Lansing) September 4, 1914, Lansing Papers, 17.

53 Daniel Smith, Robert Lansing and American N eutrality. 1914-1917 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 179.

'5 4 3urton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American Japanese Rivalry (Durham, N;C.-: Duke University Press, 1962), 28. As the United States moved closer to involvement in World

War I, Foster expressed agreement with Lansing's assessment of the

situation in Europe. Believing that his young protege was correct

in considering as unrealistic all attempts to end the war mediation,

Foster wrote: "I agree with you that the allies will not agree to

any peace negotiations until Germany is beaten so thoroughly that 55 she cannot again be the disturber of the peace of the world."

Although both Foster and Lansing had expended enormous energies in

the cause of international peace and justice, they agreed that the

German Empire presented an unacceptable threat to European civiliza­

tion and the western democracies. Both men believed that the United

States should be willing to fight in order that peace and order might 56 be restored.

The United States was in the midst of waging a "war to end

all wars" when John -W. Foster, the advocate of international peace 57 through arbitration, died at his home on November 15, 1917. The

^Foster to Lansing, September 16, 1916, Lansing Papers, XII.

e c In his final letter to James Harrison Wilson, Foster stated "I am not well enough to w rite you my views on the war situ a tio n . Though a Pacifist after a fashion, I am so bitter with Germany I rather hope we will get into the scrimage." Foster to Wilson, February 9, 1917, Wilson Papers, IX. Lansing's views at th is time were identical to Foster's; see Daniel Smith, The American Diploma­ tic Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), 278-279.

57 Robert Lansing to United States Embassy in Paris (telegram to be forwarded to Allen Dulles at Legation in Berne, Cleanor- Lansing Dulles and Emma Dulles in P aris), November 15, 1917, Lansing Papers. New York Times (November 16, 1917), 1 1 ; (November 28, 1917), 4. Foster was survived by his wife. He left an estate valued at almost a half million dollars. Lansing and John Foster Dulles were named executors of his will. participation of his nation in the bloodshed of the most catastro­

phic warfare the world had known must have troubled Foster- in his

final days. He attended church services with greater frequency and 58 became increasingly secluded. But he must have viewed the terrible

suffering as necessary for the eventual betterment of the human

condition. As he had not questioned the rightness of his involve­ ment in the fight to end slavery in-the United States a half-century

earlier, Foster viewed war with Germany as a struggle against the forces of another evil threatening American democracy and delaying the progress of all mankind. '

Rev. Charles Wood, D.D. Gen. John W. Foster: A Memorial Sermon delivered in the Church of the Covenant, Sunday morning. December 2nd, 1917. Library of Congress. CONCLUSIONS

"His demand on life from callow youth to ripe old age was not for a brilliant career, but for an honorable mission, a place where he might be able to do something for the world," Reverend Charles Wood, Memorial sermon delivered at the Church of the Covenant, Washington, December 2, 1917.

During his long career in diplomacy Foster witnessed the rise of the United States to a status of world power. He considered this expan­ sion as "manifest destiny," and in various roles within the State Depart­ ment establishment he labored to enlarge the scope of American influence abroad. While he advocated and sought to promote increased foreign trade, tried to secure naval outposts in the Caribbean and Pacific, and called for increased United States presence around the world, Foster never accepted the rationale of the imperialists of 1898. He viewed insular imperialism to be a break with traditional United States foreign policy because it meant the acqu isitio n of colonies and the incorpora­ tion of masses of non-white peoples into an American empire. Ironically, the imperial impulse of 1898 was precisely the result of Foster's parti­ cipation in the "spirited diplomacy" of the Harrison administration, his rhetoric demanding that the United States acquire Hawaii, which Foster believed to be the logical limit of continental expansion, and his c a lls for the government in Washington to accept a mission of moral leadership among the races of the earth. In effect, Foster was an unwitting harbinger of American imperialism.

In believing that the type of imperial policy pursued after

1898 was politically unwise, Foster did not reject the idea that the

United States had a mission to perform among the world's less civilized,

255 256

unchristian, and culturally inferior. Foster never questioned the

superiority of western culture, accepted as given the intrinsic worth

of American democratic institutions and held an unflinching belief in

the superiority of Christian ethics. At the same time Foster argued

that the United States had a duty to uplift and enlighten the more

unfortunate elements of humanity, he disagreed with imperialists of

the Roosevelt, Mahan, Adams persuasion. Foster's differences with

these architects of imperial diplomacy was not over goals but tactics.

Foster saw the American mission in the world to be one of moral leader­

ship, not military or economic. The destiny of the United States, as

Foster understood it, was to spread American democracy and Christian

civilization throughout the universe, and he seemed to assume that

a!l of mankind awaited anxiously for these gifts of American beneficence.

Maintaining always a lofty moralistic posture, Foster simultaneously

made important contributions to the development of tactics and strategies

that were pragmatically opportunistic and blatantly nationalistic. From

his earliest years in the diplomatic service Foster expressed an interest

in increasing United States foreign trade and displayed a particular interest in the possibility of reciprocity agreements as a device by

which the Latin American market could be safely secured for his fellow

countrymen. In the Far East, where United States hegemony was impossible,

Foster argued for trade on equal terms for all nations seeking commerce

in the Orient. He also insisted that Americans themselves trade on a

fair and equitable basis with the people of Asia, thereby insuring a free flow of commerce and information. Assuming that in open competi­

tion American products and principles would triumph, Foster advocated 257

an open door everywhere United States influence was not already dom inant.

International organirat ions promoting peace through arbitration and law appealed to Foster's sense of Christian morality and his feel for legal formalities. These groups likewise offered a vehicle for the dispersement of western civilization. Foster's extensive participation in the peace movement and his efforts to establish International organizations to maintain peace through law and negotiation, indicated a desire to see a world order preserved under Anglo-Saxon standards. To a great degree, Foster's confidence in international arbitration resulted from his work in negotiating disputes between the United States and

Great Britain over relatively minor problems. Foster failed to realize that the successful settlement of insignificant differences between two countries, both preoccupied with imperial expansion around the globe, was no reason to expect arbitral proceedings to solve vital problems between nations -- especially if those nations held different ethical values. The optimism Foster frequently expressed about the possibilities for the future of world peace organizations was unwarranted considering the nature of the actual arbitrations in which he was personally invol­ ved.

Because of his own experiences in the Civil War and his Christian education, Foster looked upon warfare as disgusting and unpleasant, but he was not a pacifist and he could tolerate violence if physical force appeared necessary for achieving a just and good end. Thus, the threat of war was proper when employed to teach Chileans respect for 258

the American flag, a coup in Hawaii became acceptable because it

facilitated annexation, and United States involvement in World War

I made that holocaust a crusade to save western civilization. In

Foster’s mind, force, while distasteful, was a perfectly acceptable

diplomatic tool if employed in pursuit of a righteous goal. Fortunately

for his conscience, Foster always found himself allied with the just.

Foster’s career, by spanning the growth of United States foreign

policy from the post-Civil War era to the administration of Woodrow

Wilson, places him in a unique position in American diplomatic history.

Through his long association with the Department of State Foster developed close relationships with men who would conduct American Foreign relations in succeeding generations, and by his writings he influenced the thinking of Americans on questions of diplomacy. Within his

immediate family two future secretaries of state came under his personal guidance. Robert Lansing formed his diplomatic career under Foster's constant direction and it would be difficult to overestimate Foster's effect on his grandson, John ^oster Dulles. John Watson Foster's particular contribution to United States diplomacy was his transmission of nineteenth century American nationalism, idealism and sense of mission to men who were to form American policies in the twentieth century. BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Published Writings of John W. Foster - / A. Books:

American Diplomacy in the Orient. Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1904.

Arbitration and the Hague Court. Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1904.

Biographical Sketch of Matthew Wv Foster, 1800^-1863. Washington: Printed for Private Circulation (J.J. L ittle and Co., New York), 1896.

A Century of American Diplomacy: Being a Brief Review of the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1776-1876. Boston: Houghton M ifflin C o., 1900.

Diplomatic Memoirs. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton M ifflin and Co., 1909.

The Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Foreign Relations of the United States. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1901.

War Stories for My Grandchildren. Washington: Printed for Private Circulation. Cambridge, Mass.,: The Riverside Press, 1918.

B. Pamphlets and Printed Speeches:

Address by Hon. John W. Foster Delivered at the Indiana University Commencement, June 21, 1905. Bloomington, Indiana: Published by the University, 1905.

The Alaskan Boundry Tribunal. Washington, D.C.: Judd & Detweiler Printers, 1903.

The Annexation of Hawaii: an Address Delivered before the National Geographic Society, at Washington, D.C. March 26, 1877. Washington D.C.: Gibson Bros., 1897.

Are or Is? Washington: 1901.

Armaments and the "Next War", The Opening Address at the Twelfth Annual Conference on International Arbitration Held at Mohonk Lake, N.Y. May 30, 1906. Washington, D.C.:Beresford Pr.,1906.

Before the Congress of the United States: The Mexican Fraudulent Claims Argument of John W. Foster before Committee of Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives, in support of Senate Bills No. 539 and 606. Washington, D.C.: 1892.

259 260

The China Indemnity: Was It a Punitive Measure? Washington, D.C.: Beresford, 1908.

The Civilization of Christ. Delivered before Presbyterian M inisterial Association, Philadelphia, October 16, 1899.

• • • in re ftLa Candelaria11. Supplemental Brief for the Government of Mexico. Washington, D.C.: Beresford, 1905.

International Arbitration: An Address delivered in Richmond, Indiana by request of the Commercial Club, Dec. 1, 1909. Richmond, Indiana, 1909.

International Awards and National Honor. Washington, D.C.: Printed for the Author, 1886.

Limitation of Armament on the Great Lakes. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pamphlet No. 2. Washington, D.C.: 1914.

Maximilian and His Mexican Empire. Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University Publications, 1906.

Misconceptions and Limitations of the Monroe Doctrine: An Address by John W. Foster, April 23, 1914. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law Held at Washington, D.C., April 22-25, 1914, Washington, D.C.: Byron S. Adams, 1914.

The Proper Grade of Diplomatic Representatives. Washington, D.C.: Judd & Detweiler, Printers, 1904.

The Relation of Diplomacy to Foreign Missions: An Address at the 5th International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement. Nashville: Sewanee, 1906.

The Value of Investments in the Foreign Christian Colleges: An Address Given on Behalf of American College for Girls at Constan­ tinople, March 24, 1909^ University Press of Sewanee TennesseeT*1906.

Venezuelan Claims: Appendix to the Letter of Mr. John W. Foster to Hon. S.M. Cullom, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the United States. Washington, D.C.: Beresford, Printer, 1908.

War Not Inevitable. World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series. No. 3 , P a rt I I (O ctober 1911).

What the United States Has Done for International Arbitration. Before N,Y. State Bar Association, Jan. 19, 190^. (Reprinted from the 261

27th Annual Report of the Proceedings of the New York State Bar Asso­ c ia tio n , 190k ).

C. A rtic le s :

"The Alaskan Boundry," National Geographic, X (November, 1 8 9 9), U25-U56.

"The Alaskan Boundry Tribunal," National Geographic, XV (January, 190*0, 1-12.

"America's Contribution to the Literature of International Law and Diplom acy," Yale Law J o u rn a l, X III (Ju ne, 190*+), *+09-*f20.

"The Annexation of Cuba," Independent, LXI (October 25, 1906), 965-968.

"Another Step towards International Peace," Independent, LXVIII (June 9, 1910), 1288-90.

"Canada and the Monroe Doctrine," Independent, LIV (March 27, 1902), 721-723.

"The Candidate of Indiana for the Presidency," Independent, LXIV (March 12, 1908), 558-562.

"The Case Against Intervention," Independent, LXXVII (March 30, 191*0, *+*+0.

"China," National Geographic, XV (December, 190*+), *+63-*+78.

"The Chinese Boycott," Atlantic Monthly, XCVII (January, 1906), 118-127.

"Classics as a Training for Men of Affairs," School Review, XVII (June, 1909), 375-380.

"Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," Independent, LIII (May 23, 1901), 1167-1171,

"Commercial Reciprocity with Canada," Independent, LIII (December 5, 1901), 2874-77.

"The Contest for the Laws of Reform in Mexico," American Historical Review, XV (April, 1910), 526-546,

"Cultivation of Coffee in Mexico," Monthly Report of the 262

Department of Agriculture, XIV (July, 1876).

"Decision of the Most Profound Importance," Independent* LVIII (June 8, 1905), 1292-1293.

"The Development of International Law," University of Chicago Magazine. I (February, 1909), 136-148.

"A Foreign Service in an American Court," Yale Law Journal. LX (May, 1900), 283-286.

"Franklin as a Diplomat," Independent. LX (January 11, 1906), 84-89.

"The Great Chinese Viceroy and Diplomat," International Quarterly. II (November, 1900), 584-596.

"International Responsibility to Corporate Bodies for Lives Lost by Outlawry," American Journal of International Law. I (January, 1907), 4-10.

"Introduction," Memoirs of Li Hung Chang. William F. Mannix trans. and ed. Bostoni Houghton M ifflin Co., 1913.

"Is the Forcible Collection of Contract Debt in the Interest of International Justice and Peace?" American Society of International Law, Proceedings (1907).

"The Japanese War Scare," International Conciliation in the Far East. (Pamphlet No. 35) New York: American Association for International Conciliation (October, 1910), 28-31.

"The Latin-American Constitutions and Revolutions," National G eographic. XII (May, 1901), 169-175.

"Letter Regarding Training in Universities for Diplomatic and Consular Service," American Journal of International Law. IX (January, 1915), 162-163.

"Marquis- Ito: The Japanese Statesman," International Quarterly. IX (June, 1904), 261-273.

"Maximillian and His Mexican Empire," Records of the Columbia Htstorical Society. Vol. 14. (Washington, D.C.: 1914), 184-204.

"The New Mexico," National Geographic. XIII (January, 1902), 1-24.

"Objections Urged to the Arbitration Treaties," Independent. 263

LVIII (January 5, 1905), 9-11.

"Pan-American Diplomacy," A tlantic Monthly. LXXXIX (April, 1902), 482-491.

"Permanent Method of Arbitration with Great Britain," Independent LII (June 14, 1900), 1420-1422.

"Porfirio Diaz.: Soldier and Statesman," International Quarterly. VIII (December, 1903), 342-353.

"Present Conditions in China," National Geographic. XVII (December, 1906), 651-672, 709-711.

"President Roosevelt and the Hague," Independent, LXI (December 20, 1906), 1471-72.

"Prospects of Arbitration with England," Independent, LV (December 24, 1903), 3025-26.

"Questions of the Far East," Atlantic Monthly. XCVII (April, 1906), 542-546.

"The Reciprocity Treaties and the Senate," Independent, LII (June 14, 1900), 2897-99.

"Results of the Bering Sea A rbitration," North American Review CLXI (December, 1895), 693-702.

"Review of The British Empire and the United States by W.A. Dunning," American Journal of International Law. IX (January, 1915), 269-272.

"Review of Diplomacy of the War of 1812 by F.A. Updyke," American Journal of International Law. IX (July, 1915), 762-765.

"Review of Notes of a Busy Life by Joseph Benson Faraker," American Journal of International Law. X (April, 1916), 451-457.

"Second Hague Conference and the Development of International Law as a Science," American Society of International Law, Proceedings (1907).

"Status at Washington of International Arbitration," Independent. LVI (May 26, 1904), 1186-1188.

"The Treaty-Making Power under the Constitution," Yale Law Journal. XI (December, 1901), 69-79. 264

"Unlimited Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States,” Lake Mohonk Conference, Report, (1911), 118-125.

"The Viceroy Li Hung Chang," Century, LIT, (August, 1 8 9 6), 560-571.

"Were the Questions Involved in the Foreign Wars of the United States of Such a Nature That They Could Have Been Submitted to Arbitration or Settled without Recourse to War?" Proceedings of International Conference, American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. I (December 15, 17, 1910), Uk- 6 8.

"The Year’s Progress in Peace," Independent, LV (July 2, 1903), 1551-1553.

II. Manuscript Collections

A. Library of Congress:

James G. Blaine Papers

Joseph H. Choate Papers

Hamilton Fish Papers

John W, Foster Papers

Walter Q. Gresham Papers

Robert R. Hitt Papers

Robert Lansing Papers '

Robert Todd Lincoln Papers

John Bassett Moore Papers

John Tyler Morgan Papers

Richard Olney Papers

Elihu Root Papers

Eenjamin F. Tracy Papers

Henry White Papers

James Harrison Wilson Papers 265

B. Microfilm:

Presidential Papers Microfilm: Benjamin Harrison Papers. Washington, D.C,: The Library of Congress, i 9 6 0 .

III. Printed Materials,

A. Government Documents:

United States International Boundry Commission. Joint Report upon the Survey and Demarcation of the Boundry between Canada and the United States from Tonglass Passage to Mount St. Elias in Accordance with the Convention of January 2k, 1903: the Avard of the Tribunal, Appointed under the Convention, Signed at London, October 20, 1903; an Exchange of Notes between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States Relative to the Avard, Signed at Washington, March 25, 1905: and the Treaty Signed at Washington, D.C,, February 2U, 1925.

U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. Washington, D.C.: 1873- 1900.

U.S. House of Representatives. Affairs in Hawaii, 53rd Congress, 3rd Session House Executive Document Ho,' 1 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 189^7 Appendix II).

Havaiian Correspondence. 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, House Executive Document Ifo.~^ 8.

Mexican Border Troubles . l*5th Congress, 1st Session, House Executive Document No. 13.

Mexican Claim s. U8th Congress, 1st Session, House Executive Document No. 103♦

Providing Indemnity to Certain Chinese Subjects. U9th Congress, 1st Session, House Report No. 20UU, May 1 , 188(3.

"Reciprocity with Spain," Reports from the Consuls of the United States. 52nd Congress, 1st Session, House Miscellanious Document No. 18.

Relations with Chile. 52nd Congress, 1st Session, House Executive Document No. 91.

Report and Accompanying Documents of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Relations of the United States with Mexico. 55th Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No. 701. 267

Report of the Commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands (Known as the Blount Report), 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, House E xecutive Document No. U 7 .

Report upon the Present Condition of the Fur Seal Rookeries of the Pribilof Islands of Alaska (some'times referred to as the Elliot Report). 5^th Congress. 1st Session, House Document No. 175.

U.S. Senate,(^Clarification of John W. Foster’s Status as Counsel for China, 1895). 53rd Congress, 3rd Session. Senate Executive Document, No. 25.

Commercial Agreements with Other Countries. 52nd Congress, 1 s t S e ssio n , Senate E xecutive Document No. 119*

Chinese E xclusion. 57th C ongress, 1 s t S e ssio n , Senate R_eport No. 77 6.

Chinese Immigration. 52nd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate E xecutive Document No, 5^.

Hawaiian Islands. 52nd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Execu­ tive Documents Nos, 76 and 77.

Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the^ United States, 1789-1905. 90 vols., Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1828-19^8,

Morgan Report. 53rd Congress., 2nd Session. Senate Report No, 227.

U.S. Department of State. Appointment Papers, 1861-1869.

Fur Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitra­ tion Convened at Paris under the Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Concluded at Washington, D.C., February 29, 1 8 9 2, for the Determination of Questions between the Two Governments Concerning the Jurisdictional Rights of the United! States in the Waters of the Bering Sea. 16> vols. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1895.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D.C.: USGPO 1872-1903.

Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundry Tribunal, 7 vols in 6, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1903-190U, 268

Protocol First Conference between Hawaiian Commissloners and Secretary of State. February 4, 1893.

Register of the Department of State Corrected to September 1, 1892. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1892.

Register of the Department of State Corrected to February 1_7, 1893. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1893.

U.S. National Archives. General Records of the Department of State. (Microfilm).

B. Contemporary Publications, Reminiscences and Compilations:

Adams, Henry. Letters of Henry Adams. 1892-1918. ed. by Worthington Chauncey Ford. Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1938.

Alexander, W. D. A History of the Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 1893. Honolulu, 1896.

Archivo de General Porfirio Diaz: Memorias v Documentos. 30.vols., Prologo y Notas de Alberto Maria Carrerio, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1951.

Basler, Roy P. ed. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 9 vols. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953-54.

C a s tle , W illiam R. Hawaii. Past and P re s e n t. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1917.

Cleveland, Grover. Letters of Grover Cleveland, ed. by Allan Nevins, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933.

Cullom, Shelby M. Fifty Years of Public Service. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1911.

Denby, Charles. China and Her People: Being the Observations. Reminiscences, and Conclusions of an American Diplomat. 2 vols. Boston: L. C. Page & Co., 1906.

Depew, Chancey. My Memories of Eighty Years. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1924,

Gresham, Matilda. Life of Walter Quintin Gresham. 1832- 1895. 2 v o ls . Chicago: Rand McNally & C o., 1919.

Hamilton, Gail £Mary Abigail Dodge^. Biography of James G. Blaine. Norwich, Conn.: 1895. 269

Harrison and Reid* Their Lives and Record; The Republican Campaign Book for 1892. 3 vols. in one. Compiled and E dited by Thomas Cam pbell-Copeland. New Yorks Charles L. Webster & Co., 1892.

Harrison, Benjamin and Blaine, James G. The Correspondence between Beniamin Harrison and James G. Blaine. 1882- 1893. Collected and Edited by Albert T. Volwiler. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1940.

Hawaiian Historical Society. 51st Annual Report. 1942. Honolulu, September, 1943.

Hay, John. Letters of John Hay and Extracts from H

History of the Peace Negotiations. Documentary and Verbal. { between China and Japan. March-April 1895. Tientsin, China: Reprinted from Tientsin Times, 1895.

Kuykendall, Ralph S., ed. Hawaiian Diplomatic Correspondence. Honolulu: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 1926.

Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. Reports. 1895-1916. Mohonk Lake, N.Y.: Published by the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration.

The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. 8 vols. Elting E. Morison,ed< Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951-54.

Liliuokalani. Hawaii^ Story by Hawaii^ Queen. Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., £.19643.

MacMurray, John V. A., ed. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China. 1894-1914. 2 vols. New Y0rk: Oxford University, 1921.

Malloy, William M., ed. Treaties. Conventions. International Acts. Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers. 1776-1909. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1910.

The Memoirs of Count W itte, ed. by Abraham Yarmolinsky. London: William Heinemann, 1921.

Moore, John B. American Diplomacy: Its Spirit and Achievements. New York: Harper & Bros., 1907.

. Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore. 7 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.

______. A Digest of International Law. 8 vols. Washington, D .C .: USGPO, 1906. 270

. History and Digest of Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Seen a Party, together with Appendicies Containing the Treaties Relating to Such Arbitrations, and Historical and Legal Notes. 6 vols. Washington, D. C.: USGPO, 1898.

National Party Platforms, 1840-1960. comp, by Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961.

Report of the Secretary of Finance of the United States of Mexico on the 15th of January. 1879. on the Actual Condition of Mexico, anri th e In crease of Commerce w ith th e U nited S ta te s R ectify in g the Report of the Hon. John-W. Foster Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States in Mexico. New York: N. Ponce de Leon, 1880.

Schurz, Carl, Speeches. Correspondence and Public Papers of Carl Schurz. ed. by Fredrick Bancroft, 6 vols. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1913.

Scott, James Brown. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. 2 vols. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1909.

. ed. The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: Translation of the Original Text. 4 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1907.

Seward, Fredrick William. Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat. 1830-1915. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1916.

Sherman, John. Recollections of Forty Years in the House. Senate, and Cabinet: An Autobiography. 2 vols. Chicago; The Werner Co., 1895.

Spring Rice, Sir Cecil. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, ed. by Stephen Gwyn. London: Constable and Co., 1929.

Straus, Oscar. Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft. Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co . > 1922.

Thayer, William R. The Life, an_d Letters of John Hay. .2 vols. Boston: Houghton M ifflin Co., 1915.

Thurston, Lorrin A. Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution, ed. by Andrew Farrell. Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co., 1936.

White, Andrew D. Autobiography of Andrew D. White. 2 vols. New York: The Century Co., 1906.

White, Edward, ed. Edwardsville and Its Men of Mark. Edwardsville,Ind.: Historical Publishing Co., 1873. 271

Vallarta, Ignacio Luis. La Labor Diplomat:ica de Don Ignacio Luis Vallarta como Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores. con un Estudio Preliminar de Jorge Flores. Mexico! Publicaciones del la Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores, 1961.

V ladim ir [ psuedo, Zerone Volpicelli). The China-Japan War. London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1896.

Yearbooks. C arnegie Endowment fo r In te rn a tio n a l Peace. Nos. .1-7, 1911- 1918. Washington, D. C .: Press of Byron S. Adams, 1911-1918.

C. Contemporary A rticles and Reviews:

"Editorial," Nation. LV (July 7, 1892), 1.

VEditorial Comment." American Journal of International Law. I (January, 1907), 129-134.

Johnson, W. H. "Review of Diplomatic Memoirs by John W. Foster," Dial, XLVIII (May 16, 1910), 353-355.

Latane, John Holladay, "Review of A Century of American Diplomacy by John W, Foster," The American Historical Review, VI (April, 1901), 587-589.

Macvane, S. M. " Review of A Century of American Diplomacy." Atlantic Monthly. LXXXVII (February, 1901), 269-271.

Moore, John Bassett. "The Chilean Controversy," Political Science Quarterly. VIII (1893), 467-494.

______. " Review of A Century of American Diplomacy by John W. Foster," Political Science Quarterly. XVI (1901), 335-336.

"The New Secretary of State," Harper*s Weekly. XXXVII ( July 9, 1892), 655.

"Our First Professional Diplomat," Outlook. CXVII (November 28, 1917), 488.

Phelps, Edward J. "The Bering Sea Controversy," Harper*s Magazine (April, 1891), 766-774.

"Portrait of John W. Foster," Review of Reviews, XXVII (April, 1903), 501. 272

"Portrait of Mrs. John W. Fcfcter," Woman*s Home Companion. XXXI (May, 1904), 15.

"Prominent Men in Pan American A ffairs," Bulletin of Pan American Union. XLV (July - December, 1917), 646-648.

"Review of American Diplomacy in the Orient by John W. Foster," Independent. LV (March 12, 1903), 623-624.

"Review of Arbitration and the Jiague Court by John ..W, Foster," National Geographic^jpp-I(fclarch, 1905), 133.

"Review of A Century of AmerJf&a A i olomacv by John W. Foster," Independent. LII (December 20, 1900), 3048-50.

Schurz, Carl. " The Hawaiian Business," Harper's Weekly, XXXVII (Feb­ ruary 25, 1893), 170.

Scott, James Brown, "John Watson Fosters An Appreciation," American Journal of International Law, XII (January,1918), 127-134.

______. "Review of The Practice of Diplomacy as Illustrated in the Fordign Relations of the United States by John W. Foster," American Journal of International Law, I (January, 1907), 257-250.

Vieillard, "Custos Custodis," Nation.C (June 17, 1915), 680.

Williams, William. "Reminiscences of the Bering Sea Arbitration," American Journal of International Law. XXXVII (October, 1943), 562-584.

Wood, Rev. Charles, D. D. General John Watson Foster; A Memorial Sermon delivered in the Church of the Covenant, Sunday morning, Decem­ ber 2nd, 1917. Printed for Private Circulation. Library of Congress.

Woosley, Theodore S. "Review of American Diplomacy in the Orient by John W. Foster," American Historical Review. IX (October, 1903), 180- 182.

D. Contemporary Newspapers:

Evansville, Indiana Daily Journal. 1865-1873

New York Times. 1872-1917. 273

IV. Secondary Materials

A. Books.

Bailey, Thomas A. America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Earlv Times tro Our Day. Ithica, N. Y. : Cornell Univers­ ity Press, 1930.

Barrows, Chester L. William M. Evarts; Lawyer. Diplomat, Statesman. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941.

Beal, John Robinson. John Foster Dulles: A 3iographv. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957.

Bemis, Samuel F. and Ferrell, Robert, eds. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. 15 vols. New York: Pageant Book Co., 1958.

Berding, Andrew H. Dulles on Diplomacy. Princeton, N. J .: D. Van Norstrand, 1965.

Brown, Robert Craig. Canada’s National Policy. 1883-1900; A Study in Canadian-American Relations. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Callahan, James Morton, American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations. New York: Macmillan Co., 1937.

______. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York: Macmillan Co., 1932.

______. American Relations in The Pacific and the Far East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Scuence, XIX (January-March, 1901), Johns Hopkins Press, 1901.

Callcott, Wilfrid Hardy. The Caribbean Policy of the United States. 1890-1920. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942.

Campbell, Charles S. Anglo- American Understanding, 1898-1903. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957.

. Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.

Commager, Henry Steele, The American Mind. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

Coolidge, Mary Roberts, Chinese Immigration. New York: Arno Press • and The New Ynrk Times, 1969 [1909]. 274

Casio Villegas, Daniel. The United States verses Porfirio Diaz, trans, by Nettie Lee Benson. Lincoln: University of Nabraska Press, 1963.

Cumberland, Charles C. Mexican Revolution: Gentsis under Madero. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952.

Curti, Merle. Peace or War: The American Struggle. 1636-1936. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1936.

Davis, Calvin D. The United States and the First Hague Conference. Ithica N. Y.: Published for the American Historical Association by Cornell University Press, 1962.

DeConde, Alexander. A History of American Foreign Policy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963.

Dennett, Tyler. Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China. Japan and Korea in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Macmillan Co., 1922.

— • John Hay: From Poetry to Politics. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1933.

Dulebohn, George R. Principles of Foreign Policy under the Cleveland Admlnistration. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1941.

Dulles, Eleanor Lansing, John Foster Dulles: The Last Year. New York: Hareourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1963,

Dulles, Foster Rhea. America in the Pacific. Boston: Houghton Mifflin C o., 1937.

. The American Red C ross: A History. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950.

. China and America: The Storv of Their Relations Since 1784. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

The Imperial Years. New York: Thomas Y, Corvell Co., 1956.

. Prelude to World Power: American Diplomatic History. 1860- 1900. New York: Macmillan Co., 1965.

Evans, Henry C. Chile and Its Relations with the United States. Durham, N. C .: Duke U n iv e rsity P ress, 1927.

Fairbank, John K. The United States and China. 3rd ed. Cambridge,Mass•: Harvard University Press, 1971. 275

Fleming, Denna Frank, The Treaty Veto of the American Senate. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1971.

Foner, Philip S. A History of Cuba and Its Relations with Che United States. 2 vols. New York: International Publishers, 1963.

Garraty, John A. Henrv Cabot Lodge. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953.

______. The New Commonwealth. 1877-1890. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Gerson, Louis L. John Foster Dulles. American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. XVII. Robert H. Ferrell and Samuel Flagg Bemis, eds. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1967.

Gilbert, Frank M. History of the City of Evansville and Vandenberg County Indiana. 2 vols. Chicago: Pioneer Publishing Co., 1910.

Graebner, Norman A. ed. Manifest Destiny. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrll, 1968.

. Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Gregg, Robert D. The Influence of Border Troubles on Relations Between the United States and Mexico. 1876-1910. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937.

Grenville, John A, S. Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century. London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1964,

______. and Young, George B. Politics. Strategy and American Diple*- macv: Studies in Foreign Policy. 1873-1917. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Grew, Joseph. Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years. 1904- 1945. 2 vols. ed. by Walter Johnson. Boston: Houghton M ifflin, 1952.

Healy, David. U. S. Expansionism: The Imperial Urge in the 1890s. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.

Herman, Sondra R. Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internetionalist Thoughts 1898-1921. Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1969. 276

Herrick, Valter R. Jr. The American Naval Revolution. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966.

Herring, Hubert. A History of Latin America from the Beglnlnes to the Present. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972.

Hidemichi, Roy Akagi. Japan*s Foreign Relations. 1542-1936. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1937.

Higham, John; with Krieger, Lenard, and Gilbert, Felix. History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States. Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: Prentice-Hail, Inc., 1963,

Hill, Lawrence F. Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil. Durham N. C .: Duke U n iv e rsity P re ss, 1932.

Holt, William Stull, Treaties Defeated by tho Senate. Glouchester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964.

Hull, William I. The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law. Intro, by Warren F. Kuehl. New York: Garland Publishing, Ind., 1972.

Hummel, A. VJ. ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ching Period. 1644-1912. 2 vols. Washington, D. C .: USGPO, 1943, 1945.

Ilchman, Warren F. Professional Diplomacy in the United States. 1799*1939: A Study in Administrative History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.

James, Henry. Richard Olnev and His Public Service. ^Boston:-Houghton Mifflin, 1923.

Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938.

Josephson, Matthew. The Politicos. 1865-1896. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1938.

Keim, Jeannette,Forty Years of German-American Political Relations. Philadelphia: William J. Dornan, 1919.

Kung, S. W. The Chinese in American Life: Some Aspects of Their History. Status. Problems, and Contributions. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion. 1860-1898. Ithica, N. Y.s Published for the American Historical Association by Cornell University Press, 1963.

Langer, William. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902. 2nd ed. New York Alfred Knopf, 1965.

Laugh1 in, James L. and W illis, H. Parker. Reciprocity. New York; Baker & Taylor Co., 1903.

Leopold, Richard. Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition. 1 st ed. Boston: L i t t l e Brown, 1954.

. The Growth of American Foreign Policy. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962.

McCloskey, Robert G. American Conservatism In the Age of Enterprise. 1865-1910. New York: Harper Tourchbooks, 1951.

MacCorkle, Stuart A. American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico. Baltimore: Johns H0pkins Press, 1933.

MacCormiek, Thomas J. China Market: Aroerica*s Quest for Informal Empire. 1893-1901. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967.

McKenzie, R. D. Oriental Exclusion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928.

Malosemoff, Andrew. Russian Far Eastern Policy. 1881-1907. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

Hay, Ernest R. Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1961.

. and Thomson, James C. Jr. ed. American-East Asian Relations: A Survey. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.

Morgan, H. Wayne. From Haves to McKinley: National Party Politics. 1877- 1896. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969.

. William McKinley and His America. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963.

Hussey, David S. James G. Blaine; A Political Idol of Other Days. Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1963 (1934J. 278

Nevins, Allen. Henrv White; Thirty Years of American Diplomacy. New York: Harper Brosc, 1930.

PerkIns, Bradford. The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States. 1895->1914. New York: Atheneum, 1968.

Pike Fredrick B. Chile and the United States. 1808-1962. South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1963.

Plesur, Milton. America*s Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs. 1865-1890. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971.

Pletcher, David M. The Awkward Years; American Foreign Relations under Garfield and Arthur. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1962.

. Ralls. Mines and Progress: Seven American Promoters in Mexico. 1867-1911. Ithica, N. Y.: Published for the American Historical Association by Cornell University Press, 1958.

Portell Vila^ Hermlnio. Historia de Cuba en sus Relaciones con Los Estados Unidos v Espana. A v o ls , Maimi, F la .: Mnemosyne P u b lish in g In c ., 1969 fl94.il *

Osgood, Robert E. Ideals and Self-Interest in Americans Foreign Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Pratt, Julius W. Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931.

Relyea, Pauline S. Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico under Porflrlo Dias. 1876-1910. Northampton, Mass.: Smith College Studies in History, X, No. 1 ( October, 1924).

Russ, William A., Jr. The Hawaiian Revolution. 1893-1894. Selinsgrove, Pa.: Sesquehanna University Press, 1959.

Russell, Henry B. International Monetary Conferences: Their Purposes. Characters and Results. New York: Harper and Bros., 1898.

Ryden, George H. The Foreign Policy of the United States in Relation to Samoa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933.

Schonberger, Howard B. Transportation to the Seaboard: The tfCommunlcation Revolution” and American Foreign Policy. 1860-1900. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co. 1971.

Sherman, William R. The Diplomatic and Commercial Relations of the United States and Chile, 1820-1914. Boston: Gorham Press, 1926. 279

Silvers,'. Harry J. Benjamin Harrlaon. 3 vols. New York: University Publishers Inc,, 1959,

Smith, Daniel M, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-1917. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958,

Sprout, Harold and Margaret. The Rise of American Naval Power. 1776«1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.

Stevens, Sylvester K. American Expansion in Hawaii. 1842-1898. Harris- berg: Archives Publishing Co. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1945.

Stuart, Graham H. The Department of State: A History of Its Organisation, Procedure, and Personnel. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949.

Suarez, Jose* Leon. Mr. John W. Foster. Con una introduccion del Dr. Luis M. Drago. Buenos Aires: Imp. "Suiza," 1918.

Tansill, Charles C. Canadian-Amerlean Relations. 1875-1911. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1943.

______The Foreign Policies of Thomas F. Bavard. 1885»1897. New York: Fordham University Press, 1940.

Tate, Meree. The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942.

. Hawaii: Reciprocity of Annexation.. East Lansing: Michigan . State University- Press, 1968.

. The United States and Armaments. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948.

. The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965.

Tausslng, Frank W. The Tariff History of the United States. 8th ed. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931,

T errill, Tom E. The Tariff. Politics and American ForeignJPolicy, 1874- 1901. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Thomas, Hugh. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

Tompkins, Pauline. American-Russlan Relations in the Far East. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949.

Treat, Payson. Japan and the United States. 1853-1921. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921. 280

Tyler* Alice Felt. The Foreign Policies of James G. Blaine. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press* 1927.

Van Alstyne, Richard W. The United States and East Asia. New York: W. W. Norton Co.* 1973.

Von Dusen, Henry P. ed. The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster JXilles: Selec­ tions from His Articles and Addresses. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.

Varg, Paul A. The Making of a Myth: The United State3 and China. 1897-1912. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968.

"vinacke, Harold M. A History of the Far East in Modem Times. 6th ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959.

White, Andrew D. Autobiography of Andrew D. White. 2 vols. New York: . Century Co., 1906,

White, Edward, ed. Evansville and Its Men of Mark. Evansville, Ind .i Historical Publishing Co., 1873.

Williams, William A. The Roots of the Modem American Empire. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.

Young, Marilyn Blatt. The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy. 1895* 1901. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Younger, Edward. John A. Kasson: Politics and Diplomacy from Lincoln to McKinley. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa, 1955.

Zabriskie, Edward. American-Russlan Rivalry in the Far East.^ 1895-1914. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946.

B. Doctoral Dissertations.

Cassey, John W. The Mission of Charles Denbv and International Rivalries In the Far East. University of Southern California, 1959.

Herrick, Walter R .,Jr, General Tracy*s Navy: A Study in the Development of American Sea Power. 1889-1893. University of Virginia, 1962.

Kaiser, Chester C. John Watson Foster: United States Minister to Mexico. 1873-1880. American University, 1954.

Phillips, Francis. John W. Foster, 1836-1917. University of New Mexico, 1956. 281

Spetter, Allen B. Harrison and Blaine! Foreign Policy 1889-1893,. Rutgers University, 1967,

C. Articles,

Bailey, Thomas A, "Japan*s Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii,H Journal of Modern History, III (March, 1931), 46-61,

."The North Pacific Sealing Convention of 1911,** Paclfic Historical Review. IV (March, 1935), 1-14,

Theodore Roosevelt and the Alaskan Boundry Settlement,” Canadian Historical Review. XVIII ( June, 1937), 123-130.

. The United States and Hawaii During the Spanish- American War," American Historical Review. XXXVI( April, 1931),

Campbell, Charles L. " The Bering Sea Settlement of 1892," Pacific H istorical Review. XXXII(November, 1963), 347-367.

Campbell, Charles S. "The Anglo-American Crisis in the Bering Sea, 1890- 1891," Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLVIII(December, 1961), 393-414.

Casio Villegas, Daniel, "El porfiriato, era de consolidacion," Historia Mexlcana. XIII (1963), 76-87.

Challener, R. D. and Fenton, John, "Which Way America? Dulles Always Knew," American Heritage. XXII(Juno, 1971), 12-13, 84-93.

Dozer, Donald M. "Benjaoin Harrison and the Presidential Campaign of 1892," American Historical Review. LIV(0ctober, 1948), 49-77.

Dunlvay, C. A. "Training in Universities for Consular and Diplomatic Service," American Journal of International Law. IX (January, 1915), 153-156.

&• Finch, George A. " The American Society for International Law, 1906- 1956," American Journal of International Law. L (April, 1956), 293-312.

Gardner, Lloyd C. "American Foreign Policy 1900-192li A Second Look at the Realist Critique of American Diplomacy," Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History. Barton J. Bernstein, ed. New York; Vintage Books, 1969. 282

Garraty, John A. "Henry Cabot Ladge and the Alaskan Boundry Tribunal," New England Quarterly, XXIV (1951), 469-494.

Hackett, Charles W. "The Recognition of the Diaz. Government by the United States," Southwestern Historical Quarterly. XXVIII (July, 1924), 34 -5 5 .

Hardy, Osgood, "The Itata Incident," Hispanic American Historical Review. V (May, 1922), 195-226.

______. "Was Patrick Egan a Blundering Minister?" Hispanic American Historical Review, VIII (February, 1928), 65-81,

H arrington, Fred Harvy, "The A n ti-I m p e r ia lis t Movement in th e U nited S ta te s , 1898-1900," M ississippi Valiev Historical Review. XXII (1935), 211- 213.

Hunter, Charles H. "Statehood and the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty of 1893," Hawaiian Historical Society, 59th Annual Report, 1950 (Honolulu, 1951).

Lewis, W. R. "The Hayes Administration and Mexico," Southwestern Historic­ al Quarterly. XXIV (October, 1920), 140-153.

Livermore, Seward. "American Strategy and Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890-1914," Pacific Historical Review. XII (March, 1943), 33-51.

McClendon, R. Earl. "The Well and La Abra Claims Against Mexico," Hispanic American Historical Review. XiX (February, 1939), 31-54. .

MacCormick, Thomas J. "American Expansion in China," American Historical Review. 75.5 (June, 1970), 1393-1396.

Mahon, John K. "Benjamin F. Tracy: Secretary of the Navy, 1889-1893," New York Historical Society Quarterly. XLVI (April, 1960), 179-201.

Pratt, Julius. "The Hawaiian Revolution: A Reinterpretation," Pacific Historical Review. I (September, 1932), 285-292.

- _ . "The 'Large Policy' of 1898," Mississippi Valiev Historical Re­ view. IX (1932), 219-242.

Rowland, Donald^ VThe Establishment of the Republic of Hawaii, 1893-1894," Pacific Historical Review. IV (March, 1935), 201-220.

Russ, William A. "The Role of Sugar in Hawaiian Annexation," Pacific Historical Review. XII (December, 1943), 339-350, 283

Snepp, Daniel W. "John Watson Foster, Soldier and Politician," Indiana Magazine of History. XXXII (September, 1936), 207-225.

Snyder, L. L. "The American-German Pork Dispute, 1879-1891," Journal of Modern History. XVII (March, 1945), 16-28.

Swisher, Earl. "Chinese Representation in the United States," University of Colorado Studies Series In History. No. 5 (Janyary, 1967).

Tate, Merze, "Great Britain and the Soverignty of Hawaii," Pacific Histor­ ical Review. XXXI (1961), 337-344.

Volwiler, Albert T. "Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy, 1889-. 1893," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. LXXIX (1938), 637-648.

Weigle, Richard D. "Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution," Pacific Historical Review. XVI (February, 1947), 41-58.

Wllgus, A. Curtis. "James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement," Hispanic American Historical Review. V (November, 1922), 662-708,

Williams, F. W. "Review of the Memoirs of Li Hung Chang." American Histor­ ical Review. XIX (April, 1914), 633-635.

Williams, John A. "Stephen B. Elkins and the Benjamin Harrison Campaign "... and Cabinet, 1887-1891," Indiana Magazine of History. LXVIII (March, 1972), 1-23.

Young, Marilyn Blatt. "American Expansion, 1870-1900; The Far East," Towards a New Past. Barton J. Bernstein, ed. New Yorks Vintage Books, 1969.