MP_C46.qxd 11/23/06 2:43 AM Page 375

46

John Duns Scotus on Natural Law and Divine Law

The Decalogue and the Law of Nature (Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 37) In regard to the thirty-seventh distinction [of Bk. III] I ask: Do all of the commandments of the decalogue belong to the law of nature?

[Arguments pro and con] For the negative view: [1] In those things which pertain to the law of nature it does not seem God can dispense; but he has done so in some matters that run counter to precepts of the decalogue; therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise: What pertains to the law of nature is either a practical principle known immediately from its terms or necessary conclusions that follow from such principles. In either case they possess necessary truth. Therefore, God cannot make them false. Hence, he cannot make what they say is good to be anything but good, or what they say must be avoided to be anything but evil, and thus he cannot make what is illicit licit. Proof of the minor premise: To kill, to steal, to commit adultery, are against the precepts of the decalogue, as is clear from Exodus [20: 13]: “You shall not kill” [etc.]. Yet God seems to have dispensed from these. This is clear in regard to homicide from Genesis 22, regarding Abraham and the son he was about to sacrifice; or for theft from Exodus 11: [2] and [12: 35] where he ordered the sons of Israel to despoil the Egyptians, which despoilment is taking what belongs to another without the owner’s consent, which is the definition of theft. As for the third, there is Hosea 1: “Make children of fornications.” [2] Furthermore, the Apostle says to the Romans 7: [7]: “It was only through the law that I came to know sin. I should never have known what evil desire was unless the law had said: ‘You shall not covet.’ ” But what is known from the law of nature is recog- nized as something to be done or not to be done, even though it is not written, just as what is known naturally in theoretical matters would still be known naturally, even if it were not revealed. MP_C46.qxd 11/23/062:43AMPage376

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 376 promulgated, nordiditseemtoobligebeforewasgiven. obligatory ineverystate,forinstance,thestateofinnocence,lawhadnotyetbeen it isknownwhatsuchanaturemustdoandnotdo.Butthedecaloguewas by differentindividuals,tobeprohibitedandillicitinone case andnotprohibitedbutlicit hibited inanother,couldGodcausethatactwhichiscircumstantially thesame,butperformed act ofkillingamanexceptthecircumstancesitsbeingprohibited inonecaseandnotpro- dispensations –onerevokesthelaw,otherclarifiesit. is torevokethepreceptordeclarehowitbeunderstood. Fortherearetwokindsof letting thepreceptstandandpermittingonetoactagainst it. Todispense,onthecontrary, do notseemtosavewhattheywereintendedsave.For todispensedoesnotconsistin dispensation insofarasitisagainstaprohibition. but anactinsofarasitviolatesaprohibitionisinordinate.Therefore, itcannotbesubjectto against theprohibition.Putanotherway,anactthatisinordinatecannotbecomewellordered, innocent neighbor],andhence[killinganunjustaggressor,forexample]wouldnotbe insofar asitisprohibitedaccordingtotheintentionofcommandment[e.g.,killingan to anactthatfallsunderagenericdescription[likekillingingeneral],itcouldneverbegiven a dispensation.Onewayofdoingthisistoclaimthatthoughdispensationcouldbegranted good. AndthenonewouldhavetoexplainawaythosetextswhereGodseemsgiven evil, andsonowillingextrinsictowhatarethecircumstancesofcasecanmakekilling such andaperson,forinstance,neighbor.Thengiventhissituation,itwillalwaysbe through anywill.Forinstance,killingisanevilact,fromthefactthatitdirectedagainst cannot dispensefromsuchcases,forwhatisunlawfulofitselfcannot,itseems,becomelicit On thisview,then,itseemsthereplytofirstargumentshouldbethatGodsimply prohibited thereisnotevilmerelybecauseitprohibited,butforbiddenevil. because itiscommanded,butcommandedgoodinitself.Likewise,what which turnsonefromtheultimateend.Hence,whatiscommandedtherenotgoodmerely a manisdirectedtowardshisend.Similarlyeverythingprohibitedtherehasformalevil formal goodnesswherebyitisessentiallyorderedtoman’sultimateend,sothatthrough decalogue followseithermediatelyorimmediately.Forallthatiscommandedtherehasa is naturallyinclinedtoassentwhattheydictate.Fromsuchprincipleseverythinginthe terms. Theintellectisnaturallyinclinedtotheirtruthbecauseofterms,andthewill principles knowntoholdforactions;theseareseminalpracticalfromtheir and explainsitinsomesuchwayasthis.Thelawofnatureisaproceedingfromfirst [View ofothers]Oneviewhereclaimsthatthewholedecaloguepertainstolawnature [Body ofthequestion] but anoldonewhichyouhadfromthestart.”Thisfornegativeview. without keepinghiscommandmentsisaliar.ItnonewcommandmentIwritetoyou, has theloveofGodbeenmadeperfectinhim.Themanwhoclaims,‘Ihaveknownhim,’ knowledge ofhimistokeephiscommandments,becausewhoeverkeepsword,truly In thebeginningof For theoppositeview: [3] Besides,thelawofnatureisobligatoryforeverystateinwhichmanfindshimself,because My questionthenisthis.Grantedthatallthecircumstances arethesameinregardtothis [Refutation ofthisview]Buttheseexplanations,whichcome downtothesamething, And lookinthecanonicalepistleofJohn,ch.2[ Decrees [ of Gratian , indist.6],thefirstgloss“Illisomnino.” VV . 3–7]: “Thewaywecanbesureofour . 3–7]: MP_C46.qxd 11/23/062:43AMPage377 conclusions fromsuch.Fortheycontainnogoodnesssuch asisnecessarilyprescribedfor practical principlesthatarenecessaryinanunqualifiedsense, noraretheysimplynecessary [of thedecalogue].Forreasonsbehindcommands andprohibitionstherearenot immutably permanent”–andthisIconcede. law beginsfromtheverybeginningsofrationalcreatures,nor doestimechangeit,butitis It istothesethatthecanonof and therecanbenodispensationintheirregard,astheargument forthefirstopinionproves. necessarily entailedbythem.Thesearesaidtobelongthe naturallawinthestrictestsense, to thelawofnatureintwoways: conformity tothatdictateandhencecannotwilltheopposite. of nature,namely,whenthewilldoesactinregardtothem,ithasnecessarily truth theypossesspriortoanyactofhiswillinregardthem,thenthesecondsign propositions inquestion]andcanunderstandfromthemthatthearetrue,a one timebutnotatanother],forwhenthedivineintellectapprehendstheseterms[of the opposite[namely,thatGodcannotmakeanactwithsamecircumstanceslicitat because itwillsaccordingly,thereforetheyaretrue. it istoberight,thisstilldoesnotsaythatthedivinewillwillsinaccordwiththem;rather except contingently. dist. 2,wherewediscussedthefactthathiswilltendstonothingotherthanhimself other thanhimself,theoppositeofwhichwasassertedtobecasealsoinfirstbook, that hiswillisnecessarilydeterminedinanunqualifiedsenseregardtowillingthings denied inthefirstbookquestionaboutpraxis.Itwouldalsobenecessarytoassume one wouldhavetoassumeGodhaspracticalknowledge[asregardscreatures],whichwas then thedivinewillwouldnecessarilyagreewiththemoritnotberight,andthus from allvolitionthedivineintellectwouldseesuchpropositionsastrueofthemselves,and hated orkilled,”“Theftshouldneverbecommitted,”andthelike),itwouldfollowthatapart from thempossessedsuchnecessity(e.g.,ifthesewerenecessary:“Noneighborshouldbe Therefore, ifthosepreceptsofthedecalogueorpracticalpropositionsthatcouldbeformed least theywouldbetrueevenif,toassumetheimpossible,noactofwillingexisted. diately soorconclusionstherefrom,havetheirtruthvaluepriortoanyactofthewill,at Abraham andinmanyotherinstances. cumstances, thenhecannotmakekillinglicit–butthatdidsoisclearinthecaseof circumstances wasformerlyprohibited,tobenolongerevenunderthesamecir- illicit nowlicit.ButifGodcannotcausethisact[ofkilling],whichundersuchand or precepttoremainasbefore,butremovestheprohibitionmakeswhatwasformerly he revokesapreceptofpositivelawmadebyhimself.Hedoesnotallowtheprohibitedact to dothisashedidbefore.Thisisalsothewayanylegislatordispensesunconditionallywhen by lettinganactremainthesame[e.g.,eatingonlykosherfood],butnotrequiringanyone by lettingtheceremonialpreceptsstand,butnotrequiringthemtobeobserved,rather he gaveanewlaw.Anddidthisinregardtotheceremonialfunctionsrequired,not in theother?Ifso,thenhecandispenseunconditionally,justaschangedoldlawwhen But thisisnotthecasewhenwespeakingeneralofall preceptsofthesecondtable [1] Onewayisasfirstpracticalprinciplesknownfromtheir termsorasconclusions [Scotus’ ownopinion]Tothequestion,then,Isaythatsomethingscanbesaidtobelong The proponentofthisfirstviewrepliestothequestion[Iraise]thatreasonproves And evenifyousaythatacreatedwillmustnecessarilybeconformedtothesetruths Also, thosepropositionswhicharetruebyreasonoftheirterms,whethertheybeimme- Decrees ofGratian refers, whereitissaidthat“thenatural 377

DUNS SCOTUS ON NATURAL LAW AND DIVINE LAW MP_C46.qxd 11/23/062:43AMPage378

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 378 with thefirstpracticalprinciplesthatareknownofnecessity. Andinthiswayonehas also belongtothenaturallawinthisway,sincetheirrightness isverymuchinharmony intellect understandingthoseterms.Now,itiscertainthatall thepreceptsofsecondtable practical principlesknownfromtheirterms,which arenecessarilygraspedbyany ingly inharmonywiththatlaw,eventhoughtheydonotfollow necessarilyfromthosefirst law, thenitmustbejudgedlikethepreceptsofsecond tableofthedecalogue. to oneindeterminateone.Butifthisthirdcommandmentis notstrictlyamatterofnatural of speech,evenasdoestheconverse,whereonearguesfrom severaldeterminateinstances gular instancestoauniversalstatementdoesnothold,but representsafallacyoffigure from “Godmustnotbehated”orsomeothersuchprecept, thenthisargumentfromsin- some opportunitiesfordoingsopresentthemselves. undefined timeanactwhichheisnotobligatedtoperformatsomedefinitewhen anyone isboundatsomeundefinedtimetodoso,fornooneobligedperform infer thatapersonisboundthenornowtoworshipGodand,bythesamereasoning,how token, foranyspecifictime.Therefore,strictlyspeaking,itisnotclearhowonecould need toshowworshipGodnow,holdsalsoforthen[i.e.,theSabbath]and,bysame good inanunqualifiedsense.Forthesamereasonthatexcludesfromstrictnaturallaw attain thatend,andthusthispersonwouldneverbeboundtowillanythingissimply God astheultimateend,onecouldnotdoanythingsimplygoodthatwouldbeneededto for God.Thisdoesnotseemprobable,withoutsomeactofgoodwillorlovetowards man fortheentiredurationofhislifewouldneverhavetomanifestanyaffectionorlove be showntoGod.Forifitdoesnot,thenGodcoulddispensefromabsolutely,sothata to thenaturallawstrictlyextentthatitrequiresatsomedefinitetimeworship is commanded. to him.Forsuchworkisonlyprohibitedbecauseitimpedesorkeepsonefromthecultthat forbids servileworkforadefinitetimethatwouldinterferewiththeworshiptobeshown of naturestrictlyspeaking.Similarlywiththenegativeportionincludedtherein,which time, butsofarasthespecificationtothisorthattimegoes,itdoesnotpertainlaw Sabbath. ItisaffirmativeinsofarasitprescribesthatsomeworshipbegiventoGodataspecific this putthetwoauthoritiesherethatarefoundinRichard,ch.5.) these sothatsomeonecoulddotheoppositeofwhatthisorprohibits.(Insupport must anyirreverencebeshowntohim.Consequently,Godcouldnotdispenseinregard must belovedasGod.”ItlikewisefollowsthatnothingelseworshipedGod,nor law, takinglawofnaturestrictly,forthisfollowsnecessarily:“IfGodexists,thenhealone your God,invain,”i.e.,“YoushouldshownoirreverencetoGod”–belongthenatural “You shallnothaveothergodsbeforeme”andtakethenameofLord, ately asobject.Indeedthefirsttwo,iftheybeunderstoodinapurelynegativesense–i.e., consistent withtheacquisitionofultimateend. and attained,whereasiftheevilproscribedbythemwerenotforbidden,itwouldstillbe maxims werenotcommanded,thelastend[ofmanasunionwithGod]couldstillbeloved as wouldturnoneawaynecessarilyfromthelastend,forevenifgoodfoundinthese attaining thegoodnessofultimateend,norinwhatisforbiddentheresuchmalice [2] Theotherwayinwhichthingsbelongtothelawofnature isbecausetheyareexceed- But ifthisisstrictlyofthenaturallaw,sothat“Godmustbeloved”followsnecessarily [A doubt]ButthereissomedoubtwhetherthispreceptofobservingtheSabbathpertains The thirdcommandmentofthefirsttableisthatwhichconcernsobservance But itisdifferentwiththepreceptsoffirsttable,becausetheseregardGodimmedi- MP_C46.qxd 11/23/062:43AMPage379 to understandthatstatementinthe in the the onlywayinwhichourneighborislovedoutof[supernatural] charity,asispointedout that hisneighboralsoloveGod;butinsowilling,heisloving hisneighbor.Indeedthisis it followsthatifGodistobelovedperfectlyandorderly,then theonelovingGodmustwill not wantthebeloved[i.e.,God]tobelovedbyothersisinordinate andimperfect.Hence, as somethingbelongingtooneselfaloneisinordinate.Now, theloveofsomeonewhodoes jealous, inthesenseofbeingappropriated[tooneselfalone], becauseloveofthegoodall it wasprovedintwoways.TheperfectloveofGodisawell-ordered loveandcannotbe from loveofGod]:Thisisclearwhatwassaidindist. 28ofthisthirdbook,where drawn fromthesameprinciple.–Proofofassumption [thatloveofneighborfollows cepts ofthesecondtablealsobelongstrictlytothatlaw,eventhoughtheyareconclusions ciple, whichdoesbelongtothenaturallawinanunqualifiedsense,itfollowsthatpre- pertain strictlytothelawofnature,becausetheyareincludedinfirstpreceptorprin- first tolast,followfromthepreceptsoftable.Hence,ifthosetable essary principle:“Godmustbeloved.”Therefore,allthepreceptsofsecondtable,from the wholelawandprophets.”Butloveofneighborfollowsnecessarilyfromthisnec- also provesthis,forthemajor[ofargument]isfoundinMatthew22:[40]:“Onthisdepends thus seemstoconclude“Whoeverloveshisneighborfulfillsthelaw.”WhatSaviorsays the preceptsofsecondtable.ForApostleappearstoprovethispointexpresslyand ”Therefore,inthisprecept,“Loveyourneighbor,”etc.,areincluded your neighborasyourself.’ if therebeanyothercommandments,theymayallsummedupinthis:‘Youshalllove [13: 9]:“Thecommandments,‘Youshallnotcommitadultery;youmurde the lawofnature,speakingbroadly. commandment ofthefirsttable;fourth,weconcedethatallcommandmentsfallunder ments belongstrictlytothelawofnature;third,thereissomedoubtaboutthird table pertainstrictlytothelawofnature;second,weadmitthatfirsttwocommand- universal principletheyclarify. certain particularcases.Nevertheless,theseexplicationsaregreatlyinharmonywiththefirst follow withsimple[logical]necessityfromtheprincipleinquestionorexplicateitasregards principle whichservesasthebasisforestablishingtheselaws,stillpositivelawsdonot occur. Anditisthisway,perhaps,withallpositivelaws,foralthoughtheresomeone the communityanditscustodiansforcommongood,sostrifedisordercould would preferratherthatthecommongoodsbeassignedtothemthantheygiven the infirmcaremoreaboutgoodsoftheirownthantheydocommonproperty,and such personshavetheirownpossessionsisexceedinglyconsonantwithpeacefulliving,for even inthecaseofinfirmisprivatepossessionanabsolutenecessity;nevertheless,that in agrouporamongthoselivingtogether,evenifeverythingwascommonproperty.Not that everyoneoughttohavepossessionsdistinctfromthoseofanother,forpeacecouldreign life inacommunityorstateoughttobepeaceful,itdoesnotfollowfromthisnecessarily but onlyasregardsthosepertainingtoritual.” change.” Notetheglosswhichsays:“Thelawconcernschangenotasregardsmoralmatters pertain tothenaturallaw,andthereforetheyshownoevidenceofhavingundergoneany [Solution] Tothisonecanreplyinthreeways: [An objection]Againstthefirstofthese,Iargue:AccordingtoApostleRomans To putallwehavesaidtogether,firstdenythatthecommandmentsofsecond This distinctioncanbemadeclearbyanexample.Giventheprincipleofpositivelawthat Glosses , therefore,etc. Decrees ofGratian , dist. 6, canon 3: “The moralprecepts , dist.6,canon3:“The .’and . . r 379

DUNS SCOTUS ON NATURAL LAW AND DIVINE LAW MP_C46.qxd 11/23/062:43AMPage380

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 380 the loveofneighbortobeobservedaccordingprecepts ofthesecondtable. necessity fromthefirstpracticalprinciplesoflawnature, butastheLawgiverintended “Love yourneighborasyourself,”againunderstandingthis not assomethingthatfollowsof – sofarasthesecondtableandprophetsareconcerned dependsonthiscommandment: neighbor followsfromthefirstprinciplesofnaturallaw.In a similarfashion,thewholelaw been explainedthatthislawoflovemustbeobserved,although notinthewaythatloveof and thelike.Henceitistruethatloveofneighborfulfills thelaw,viz.,inwayithas wanting himtobedeprivedunjustlyofcorporeallife,orconjugal fidelity,ortemporalgoods, ing himtheseothergoods,oratleastnotwishing the oppositeevils,suchasnot ChristandPaul]includeswill- him inhimself,stilltheloveofneighborasexplained[by neighbor thatcanbeinferredfromprinciplesofthelawnature onlyrequiresthatwelove follows from,theprinciplesoflawnature.Inotherwords,althoughlove [in theScriptures]ahigherloveofneighborthattranscendswhichisincludedin,or truth. him thisorthatgoodpertainingtothesecondtable,sincelatterisnotanecessary be akindofnecessaryconclusionfromthepracticalprinciples)andstilldonotwill coexist, viz.,thatIwantmyneighbortoloveGodasoughthim(whichwould life orconjugalfidelity,andsoonwiththeotherprecepts.Consequently,thesetwocan to willthatmyneighborloveGodandneverthelessnothepreservecorporeal consists notjustinhonoringthembutalsosupportingthem.Foritispossibleforme he usesareconcerned;orthatonemustwanthimtoshowreverencehisparents,which concerned; orthatonemustnotwanthimtosteal,sofarasthegoodsoffortune or thatonemustnotwanthimtocommitadultery,sofarasthegoodofhispartneris For instance,thatonemustnotkillhim,sofarasthegoodofhispersonisconcerned; love one’sneighbor,thepreceptsofsecondtablestilldonotfollow[logically]fromthis. that onemustwanttheneighborhimselftoloveGod,becausethisiswhatitmeans the naturallawthatourneighborbelovedinwaythiswasexplainedabove,namely, be loved. of naturethateveryoneissuchhisloveacceptedbytheGodwholovedorshould loved,” namely,byonewhosefriendshippleasesthebeloved.Itisnotcertainfromlaw same argumentholdsforthemaxim“Whoeverlovesperfectly,wishesbelovedtobe the other[viz.,sinner],wishingtobegoodofformerbutnotlatter.The such [e.g.,foronewhodieshatingGod],aswhenhedestines[viz.,thesaint]andnot is notnecessarythatIwillthisgoodforanother,ifGoddoeswanttobetheof mon goodpertaintoanotherinsuchawaythat[God]hasbelovedbythisother.Forit and well-orderedloveisnotajealousone,Ireplythatdohavetowillthecom- follow thatIoughttowantmyneighborloveGod.Andwhenoneinsistsaperfect belonging tothenaturallawstrictly. although thiswouldfollowfromtheaffirmativeformulation,whichisnotclearlysomething from thenegativeprecept,itdoesnotfollowthatonemustwanthisneighbortoloveGod, God isnotclear,however,aswaspointedoutindiscussingthethirdcommandment.Now, not hateGod,”itdoespertainstrictlytothenaturallaw.Justwhenoneisrequiredlove as itisaffirmative.However,insofarnegative,prohibitingtheopposite,namely,“Do And thenonecouldsaytothequotationsfromPaulandChristthatGodhasnowexplained The thirdwayofansweringtheobjectionisthatevenifitwerestrictlyamatter Second, onecouldreplythatfromthisprecept,“LovetheLord,yourGod,”itdoesnot First, theprecept“LoveLord,yourGod,”etc.,isnotsimplyofnaturallawinsofar MP_C46.qxd 11/23/062:43AMPage381 things arenotknown way –thatsuchsinsoflustareprohibitedbythesecondtable.Onecouldconcede would havebeennecessarytoexplain–eitherbythelawthatwasgiven,orinsomeother men itmightnotbeknownthattheirlustswereagainstthenaturallaw,andtherefore, even ifsomesincouldbeinferredtoagainstthelawofnature,neverthelesscorrupt standing thistomean,ifheneitherhadnorcouldhaveanyotherknowledgeofGod.Thus, to theHebrews11:[6]says:“AnyonewhocomesGodmustbelievethatheexists”–under- unskilled inintellectualmatters,itwouldbeknownonlyfromrevealedlaw.HencetheApostle natural reasonfromprinciplesknowninthemselves,nevertheless,fortheignorantpeople the secondtablearenotpartofnaturallawstrictlyspeaking. [To 1]Asfortheinitialarguments,firstisinmyfavor,itprovesthatpreceptsof [Reply totheinitialarguments] the secondtable. understood ofthelawtakeninabroadsense,andthiscase itextendstothepreceptsof permission ofthesamehigherjudge,theylicitlyandjustly appropriatedthem. to doso,andsincetheJewsacceptedthesethingswhich shouldhavebeentheirsby unwilling togivethemup.InsuchacasethesuperiorjudgecouldhavecompelledEgyptians Egyptians, deservedthethingstheytookaswages,eventhoughEgyptiansunjustlywere their ownerofhispigs.Anotherexplanationcouldbethis:thesonsIsrael,byserving enter thepigs,whichwereimmediatelythrownintosea;forhedidnotunjustlydeprive lower “owners”wereunwilling.InthiswayChristdidnotsininallowingthedemonsto was thehigherowner,hecouldhavetransferredownershipofthesethings,evenif “Do notsteal,”fortheydidsimplytakeawayathingbelongingtoanother.SinceGod ing theEgyptians,itcouldbesaidthatinthiscaseGoddidnotdispensethemfromlaw given andwrittendown. people ofalaterage,atwhichtimetheweaknessrequiredthatlawbe and thepeopleofthosetimeshadlongerliveswerebetterendowednaturallythan written inabook.Norneedithavebeen,becausetheywouldeasilyrememberedit, passed onbyparentstotheirchildren,eventhoughatthattimenothingwouldhavebeen interiorly intheheartofeveryoneorperhapsbysometeachinggivenexteriorlyGodand In thestateofinnocencealsoallwereboundbytheseprecepts,whicheitherprescribed providing themwithwhatisnecessarytosustainlife,fortherenoonewillneedsuchhelp. includes heaven therewillbenonecessityofperformingactions,atleastsofaras“honor” of honoringparents,notbecausetherewillbeanywishtohonorthem,butin vance oftheaffirmativepreceptsandnegativeonesaswell,exceptperhapsthatalone and shouldbeobserved.Inthestateofbeatitude,indeed,therewillhighestobser- [To 2]Tothesecond,IsaythatalthoughGod’sexistencecouldhavebeeninferredby As fortheargumentoppositeviewpoint,canon inquestionhastobe As tothepointtoucheduponinfirstargumentaboutchildrenofIsraeldespoil- [To 3]Totheother,Isaythatineverystateallcommandmentshavebeenobserved per se . 381

DUNS SCOTUS ON NATURAL LAW AND DIVINE LAW