I Mineral Resources Governance and Socio-Economic Development

Mineral Resources Governance and Socio-Economic Development

Zimbabwe

Chrispen Tauya Chawatama (201105368)

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development

Studies

Date of Submission: 4 February 2020

Supervisor: Prof PB Monyai

University of Fort Hare

Republic of South Africa.

i TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... vii DECLARATION ...... ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... x DEDICATION ...... xi LIST OF TABLES ...... xvi LIST OF FIGURES ...... xvii CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY ...... 1 1.1 Introduction and Background ...... 1 1.2 Problem Statement ...... 8 1.3 Research Questions ...... 10 1.4 Objectives ...... 11 1.5 Significance of the Study ...... 11 1.6 Delimitations ...... 14 1.7 Conclusion ...... 15 1.8 Chapter Outline ...... 16 CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUALISING MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ...... 17 2.1 Introduction ...... 17 2.2 Approaches to Natural Resource Governance ...... 17 2.3 Natural Resources and Governance: An Analytical Framework...... 22 2.4 The Post-Colonial State Mining Governance Models ...... 25 2.5 Zimbabwe’s Principal Mines and Minerals policies and Laws ...... 28 2.5.1 Zimbabwean Constitution Amendment (No.20) Act, 2013 ...... 28 2.5.2 Mines and Minerals Act, 1961 (MMA), (Chapter 21:05) ...... 28 2.5.3 Precious Stones Trade Act, 1978 (Chapter 21:06) ...... 29 2.5.4 The Indigenisation Policy: Resource Nationalism in Zimbabwe ...... 29 2.5.5 The Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, 2014 ...... 30 2.5.6 Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) ...... 30 2.6 International Natural Resource Frameworks, Protocols and treaties ...... 31 2.6.1 World Charter for Nature, Resolution 37/7 (1982) ...... 31 2.6.2 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) ...... 32 2.6.3 Berlin Guidelines for mining and sustainable Development, 1991 (revised 2000) ...... 32 2.6.4 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED): The Rio Declaration, 1992 ...... 32

2.6.5 World Summit on Sustainable Development: The Johannesburg Declaration and Action Plan, 2002 ...... 33 2.6.6 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ...... 33 2.6.7 Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) ...... 34 2.6.8 Publish What You Pay (PWYP) ...... 35 2.6.9 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) ...... 35 2.6.9 African Mining Vision (AMV) 2009 ...... 36 2.6.10 Applicable Sub-Regional Protocols: The 1997 ‘SADC Protocol on Mining ...... 36 2.7 The evolution of the concept of socio-economic development ...... 37 2.7.1 Development as Economic Growth ...... 37 2.7.2 Socio-economic development ...... 40 2.8 Theoretical framework ...... 43 2.8.1 Governance Theory ...... 43 2.8.2 Rent seeking Theory ...... 63 2.8.3 Natural Resource Curse Theory ...... 74 2.9 Conclusion ...... 84 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN ...... 87 3.1 Introduction ...... 87 3.2 The study methodology ...... 88 3.3 Research Paradigm ...... 91 3.4 Research Design ...... 92 3.5 Qualitative Research Methodology ...... 93 3.6 Quantitative Research Methodology ...... 95 3.7 Units of Analysis ...... 96 3.8 A profile of the Mining Districts ...... 98 3.8.1 Background and Profile of Mhondoro-Ngezi district ...... 98 3.8.2 Background and Profile of Chegutu district ...... 99 3.8.3 Background and Profile of Kwekwe district ...... 101 3.8.4 Background and Profile of Shurugwi district ...... 102 3.9 Population and Sampling ...... 103 3.9.1 Sampling techniques and sampling procedures ...... 105 3.10 Data Collection Procedures and Methods ...... 109 3.11 Data collection techniques ...... 110 3.11.1 Questionnaires ...... 113 3.11.2 In-depth Interviews ...... 115 3.11.3 Archival Data Collection ...... 117

iii

3.12 Data Analysis Framework and Procedure ...... 118 3.13 Ethical Considerations ...... 121 3.14 Conclusion ...... 122 CHAPTER FOUR: MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE COMMUNITIES AND AUTHORITIES ...... 123 4.1 Introduction ...... 123 4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Household Sample ...... 124 4.2.1 Gender ...... 125 4.2.2 Age Groups ...... 126 4.2.3 Marital Status ...... 126 4.2.4 Educational status ...... 127 4.2.5 Household sizes ...... 128 Fig 4.2.6: Source of Income ...... 129 4.3 Contribution of the mining sector to Socio-economic Transformation ...... 131 4.3.1 Education and Household Conditions in Households ...... 132 4.3.2 Unemployment ...... 136 4.3.3 Monthly Income ...... 138 4.4 Heavy dependence on the mining sector and Economic Stagnation ...... 140 4.5 Limited Transparency in the mining sector ...... 144 4.5.1 Provision of information ...... 147 4.6 Mandatory Disclosures and Tax Havens ...... 148 4.7 Public Access Laws and information Asymmetries ...... 150 4.8 Lack of accountability ...... 152 4.9 Inadequate mechanisms for transparency and accountability ...... 155 4.10 Lack of stakeholder inclusion ...... 156 4.11 Zimbabwe Alternative Mining Indaba (ZAMI) ...... 159 4.12 The Mining Affairs Board (MAB) ...... 161 4.13 Lack of Corporate Community Engagement ...... 161 4.14 Consultation of community members by the government ...... 164 4.15 Inadequate citizen engagement during budget formulation ...... 166 4.16 Zimbabwe’s mining fiscal regime ...... 167 4.16.1 Double taxation Agreements and Amortization ...... 171 4.16.2 Limited Capacity of Revenue Collectors at all tiers of government ...... 172 4.17 Subnational revenue sharing ...... 174 4.18 Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) ...... 176 4.18.1 Mondoro Ngezi Chegutu Zvimba Community Shareownership Trust .... 178

4.19.2 Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trust ...... 182 4.19.3 Improper use of CSOT funds ...... 187 4.19.4 Participation in CSTOs ...... 189 4.20 Employee Share ownership trust/employee equity ...... 191 4.21 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ...... 193 4.21.1 CSR in Mhondoro-Ngezi ...... 197 4.22 Disequilibrium in Development ...... 199 4.23 Poor Governance of the ASM Sector ...... 201 4.24 Mining Title Management System ...... 205 4.25 Conclusion ...... 207 CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESOURCE CURSE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE ...... 210 5.1 Introduction ...... 210 5.2 Political Economy and the Resource Curse ...... 210 5.3 Weak State structures and Patronage Systems ...... 220 5.4 Centralization and Politicization of the Mining Sector ...... 223 5.5 Lack of Diversification and Economic Stagnation ...... 231 5.6 Mineral Resource Property Rights ...... 237 5.7 Conclusion ...... 243 CHAPTER SIX: TOWARDS A HOLISTIC MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK ...... 244 6.1 Introduction ...... 244 6.2 A holistic Framework ...... 247 6.3 Conclusion ...... 251 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 252 7.1 Introduction ...... 252 7.2 Conclusion of the Study ...... 252 7.3 Policy recommendations ...... 259 7.3.1 Repeal the MMA and gazette a more comprehensive legal framework ... 259 7.3.2 Deliver on transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion reforms in the mining sector as mandated by the Constitution ...... 260 7.3.3 ASM legal framework and its regulation ...... 261 7.3.4 Earmarking and Publicising of Mineral revenue for Development ...... 262 7.3.5 Adoption of online tools ...... 262 7.3.6 Implementation of international frameworks, protocols and initiatives ..... 263 7.3.7 Use information disclosed by companies listed on mandatory disclosure Stock Exchanges ...... 264 7.3.8 Modernization of the Mining Title Management System ...... 264

7.3.9 Adherence to the Constitutional Mineral Revenue Sharing Mechanism .. 265 7.3.10 Capacitation and implementation of Devolution ...... 265 7.3.11 Consolidation of the Mining Fiscal Regime ...... 266 7.3.12 Agreements for Community development and Best Practise ...... 268 7.3.13 Social Movements for Good Governance of Mineral Resources and Tax Justice ...... 268 7.3.14 Formulation of a clear legislation on local equity and empowerment ..... 269 7.3.15 A resettlement policy ...... 269 7.3.16 Beneficiation and diversification ...... 269 7.4 Areas of further research ...... 270 REFERENCES ...... 271 LIST OF ANNEXURES ...... 330 Annexure 1: Questionnaire for Households in the Mining Communities ...... 330 Annexure 2: Shona Version of the Questionnaire ...... 340 Annexure 3: Interview Guide for Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners Council (Zamsc) official...... 353 Annexure 4: Interview guide for Mining Company officials ...... 354 Annexure 5: Interview Guide for Officials the Ministries of Mines and Mining Developmnet, Finance, Education and Health ...... 356 Annexure 6: Interview Guide for RDCs, CSOs, CSOTs and Traditional Chiefs ... 358 AnnexureI 7: Interview guide for Mining Company officials ...... 360 Annexure 8: Ethical Clearance Letter ...... 361 Annexure 9: Letter from Language Editor confirming proof-reading of the Thesis ...... 364

ABSTRACT This study focused on investigating mineral resources governance (reflected in terms of three indicators of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion) and its effect on socioeconomic development (in terms of three indicators of education, health and household incomes. Mineral resources can be a blessing and can lead to socioeconomic transformation of a country if they are managed transparently, accountably, inclusively equitably and sustainably. On the other hand, these subsoil capital assets can be a ‘curse’ and lead to poverty, conflicts amongst interest groups, elite capture, corruption and economic stagnation if they are not properly managed.

Good governance of mineral resources seeks to ensure that the harnessing of mineral resources benefits the economy, enhances the quality of life and reduces poverty amongst citizens.

The mining sector of Zimbabwe has risen to be the key economic sector in terms of its contribution to the GDP, FDI, fiscal revenue, exports and employment creation, particularly after the discovery of diamonds and more gold deposits in the country.

However, in spite of the growth of the mining sector and its elevation to the mainstay of the economy, glaring dire socioeconomic conditions in terms of unemployment and high poverty levels, poor health, education and household incomes, leads one to question the way the country’s opulent mineral resources are being governed.

The study used a mixed methods approach, through use of primary data (quantitative and qualitative data) and secondary data (archival data) as the basis for the collection as well as analysis of data. Complementarity of the research methods was achieved through use of data from household survey with 160 households in Mhondoro-Ngezi,

Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi and in-depth interviews with officials of government ministries; of Finance and Economic Development, Health and Childcare, Primary and

vii

Secondary Education, local councillors, CSOs; ZELA and ZIMCODD, Traditional chiefs and ZASMC.

The study established that mining growth is contributing somewhat to socio-economic development through employment creation, corporate social responsibility, CSOTs,

ESPOs, taxation and royalties, but broad-based development has not taken place in the four districts. The study proposes a holistic mineral resources governance and socioeconomic development framework. The study recommends the Repeal of MMA and gazetting of a more comprehensive legal framework, implementation of constitutional provisions on transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion, adoption of free online tools for mineral processes disclosure, consolidation of the mining fiscal regime and so on.

viii

DECLARATION I, Chrispen Tauya Chawatama, the undersigned principal researcher sincerely and solemnly declare that this research document is my own original work and was not reproduced or submitted to any other institution before submission to the University of

Forte Hare. Where information from other sources was used, proper referencing was duly followed in order to avoid impinging on the intellectual property rights of the authors. The author, except where it is acknowledged that it is other authors’ work, drew all the tables, figures and flow chart. All the editor’s comments were incorporated and the Letter from Language Editor confirming proofreading of the Thesis is attached in this document.

Signature … ……………. Date…10/12/2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I thank God for giving me the courage, strength and wisdom to undertake and complete this research project. The journey towards completion of this thesis was not easy but through the grace of the Almighty God, it was gloriously accomplished.

Surely, he is a faithful God. May he be glorified forever and ever, Amen!

Secondly, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Professor PB Monyai for her scholarly guidance, mentorship and assistance in this research project. I will be forever grateful for her professional etiquette and consistent motivation during the course of my studies. May the Almighty

God bless her abundantly and manifoldly so that she can continue to guide and mentor the current and future generations into the fraternity of academia.

I would like to thank my parents (Mr and Mrs Chawatama) for raising me to be an honourable man and culturing me into work ethics. ‘A can-do attitude, a positive personality, and a strong work ethic are still the primary ingredients for success’-

Robert Spector. I also thank my parents and siblings for supporting me financially, academically and emotionally throughout this journey. Deep appreciation goes to my brother, Dr Wayne Malinga for the assistance proffered during the conceptualization stage in 2017 and I also tender my deepest gratitude to my friend Dr Achoja Roland

Onomu for the academic support rendered during the statistical analysis processes.

DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation to my parents (Mr Percy and Mrs Martha Chawatama) as well as brothers and sister.

Acronyms

ACHPR African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights

AFRODAD African Forum and Network on Debt and Development

AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

AIPPA Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act

AMV African Mining Vision

ASM Artisanal and Small Scale Mining

AU African Union

ASX Australian Stock Exchange

BEE Black Economic Empowerment

BSE Bombay Stock exchange

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CBNRM Community Based Natural Resources management

CBOs Community Based Organizations

CDA Community Development Agreements

CICID Interministerial International Cooperation and Development Committee

C-GIDD Global Income Distribution Database

CMV Country Mining Visions

CMI Chartered Management Institute

CSOTs Community Share Ownership Trust/Schemes

CRC Citizen Report Cards

CSC Community Score Cards

CSR Corporate Social Responsibility

EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

EMA Environmental Management Agency

EU European Union

xii

DA District Administrator

DDF District Development Fund

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

DFID Department of International Development EMA Environmental Management Agency ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programs ESOTs Employee Share Ownership Trust/Schemes

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent

FLTRP Fast Track Land Reform Program

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNP Gross Income Per Capita

GNU Government of National Unity

HDI Human Development Index

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IEEA Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act

IFC International Finance Cooperation

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IUCN International Union for Conservation

KPCS Kimberly Process Certification Scheme

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MAB Mining Affairs Board

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MMA Mines and Minerals Act

MMCZ Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe

xiii

MMD Ministry of Mines and Mining Development

MNCs Multinational Companies

MPSE Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education

MSIs Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives

NASSA National Social Security Agency

NDPs National Development Plans

NGOs Non- Governmental Organizations

NRM Natural Resources Management

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAYE Pay as You Earn Income

PETS Public Expenditure Tracking Survey

PDL Poverty Datum Line

PWYP Publish What You Pay

RBZ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

RDC Rural District Council

SADC Southern African Development Community

SALO Southern Africa Liaison Office

SPSS Statistical Package for Social Sciences

TAs Transparency and Accountability Initiatives

TCL Total Consumption Line

TNCs Transnational Companies

UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNESC United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP United Nations Development Program

USA United States of America

xiv

USD United States Dollar

VAT Value Added Tax

VIDCOs Village Development Committees

WB World Bank

WHO World Health Organization

ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

ZASMC Zimbabwe Artisanal & Small Scale for Sustainable Mining Council

ZEPARU Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit

ZAMI Zimbabwe Alternative Mining Indaba

ZELA Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association

ZIMCODD Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development

ZMDC Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation

ZIMRA Zimbabwe Revenue Authority

ZIMSTATS Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency

ZMRTI Zimbabwe Mining Revenue Transparency Initiative

ZSE Zimbabwe Stock Exchange

ZW Zimbabwe

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: A summary of the methods of data collection used and the issues encapsulated 114

Table 1.2: Demographic Characteristics of the Household Sample 127

Table 1.3: Education and Health Conditions in Households 135

Table 1.4: CSR implemented in Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi 199

Fig 1.5: Educational Investments in Mhondoro-Ngezi 201

xvi

LIST OF FIGURES Fig: 1 Sources of Income 132

Fig 2: Employment Status 139

Fig 3: Monthly Income 141

Fig 4 Revenue contribution by head: 2018 Fiscal year 149

Fig 5: Provision of information 150

Fig 6: Revenue Use and Socio-economic Development 157

Fig 7: Consultation of community members by the government 168

Fig 8: Participation of local people in CSOTs 193

Fig 7: Flow chart of the Holistic framework for mineral resources governance and socio-economic development 252

xvii

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction and Background

The focus of this study is on minerals resources governance and socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. The concepts of natural resources governance and socio- economic development are interwoven and one cannot be without the other. The significance of natural resources for socio-economic development is a combative issue. Some scholars view natural capital assets as a blessing whereas others view them as a curse. The human society’s evolution has rested on the unremitting interaction between human beings and their natural environment. The interaction principally depends on the ability of man to design tools within a social organisation for harnessing of natural resources in a quest to meet his survival as well as development needs.

There are various productive activities, which are undertaken by people to leverage socio-economic development in a society. Productive sectors such as the extractive, agriculture, manufacturing and tertiary industries are essential in the creation of the nation’s wealth, which is important in the promotion of socio-economic development.

Saurabh (2016: xv) conceptualises socio-economic development as the improvement of the lifestyles of people through improved incomes, health care employment, literacy and life expectancy. Traditionally, socio-economic objective or social indicators such as educational outcome, household income, employment levels, health care, and life expectancy have measured socio-economic development and so on. According to

Roode et al's (2004) the notion of socio-economic development provides a human- centred view of development, in contrast with the economically centred notions, which have been heavily criticised. This study conceptualises socio-economic development

1 as generally the improvement in the quality of life and focuses on three objective socio- economic development indicators, which are health care, household income and education.

In order for the productive sectors to generate wealth, which can be utilised to enhance socio-economic development and improvement of the quality of life for all, there has to be good governance and management mechanisms. Natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, represent an indispensable source of wealth globally.

Goods that are produced from renewable resources include timber as well as non- timber forest products, fish and so on. Goods that are produced from non-renewable resources mainly include minerals and oil. Natural capital is said to be renewable if natural processes can restock it. If the extraction rate respects the reproductive capacity limitations, renewable resources can provide yields infinitely (Pittel et al,

2014). On the other hand, non-renewable resources cannot regenerate at the rate commensurate with extraction rate. According to OECD (2015) to create wealth, which can sustain socio-economic development, in the long run, mineral resources should be transformed into other capital firms such as financial, social, manufactured and human capital. However, mineral wealth does not automatically lead to socio- economic prosperity and poverty reduction. According to Diallo (2015:3), “Natural resource endowments are no guarantee of socio-economic development”. Mineral wealth value is temporal, situational and subject to change over a period, which packages the natural resource governance complexity.

When allocated accountably and effectively, natural resource revenues can finance public goods as well as services such as healthcare, education and training, which contribute to the improvement of the quality of life. One fundamental obstacle, which prevents resource-rich nations from utilising mineral wealth to enhance socio-

2 economic transformation, is poor governance. According to Wise and Shtylla (2007) there is usually a mismatch between the revenues generated from the natural resources and the local benefits, which in most cases is principally due to lack of transparency and accountability. The challenge is to recognise the “resource curse” phenomenon (which denotes a paradoxical situation where countries rich in non- renewable resources tend to have worse socio-economic indicators) and to work to counter it effectively.

In order to make sure that natural resources help not only in promoting but also in sustaining socio-economic development, they should be utilised efficiently, accountably, transparently, sustainably and equitably. It is imperative to create conditions for the effective transformation of natural resource wealth into sustained socio-economic development. According to OECD (2011) natural resources are fundamentally important and it is therefore the role of the government to put policies into place that ensure there is long-term socio-economic development of nations and avoid short-term revenue as seen in most cases (OECD, 2011). Good governance, effective regulation, strong institutions and rigorous social and environmental safeguards are requisite to realise mineral wealth potential to promote socio-economic development. CICID (2008) stressed that misgovernance of natural resources results in the ‘poverty amidst plenty’ paradox as well as both social and environmental externalities for most resource-rich developing countries.

The notion of mineral resource governance is at the heart of development discussions and debates around the world. It is widely argued that there are links between natural endowments and poor socio-economic development indicators such as income, literacy, life expectancy among other things. Mineral resource governance has since

3 become an important concept because of the resource curse phenomenon, which has gripped most resource-rich countries on the globe. Good mineral resource governance seeks to ensure the exploitation of mineral resources for the benefit of the economy, improvement of the quality of life and poverty reduction (Diallo, 2015:3). The mineral resource governance concept speaks about how natural resources should be managed and advocates for policies and regulations, which should be put in place in order to promote socio-economic development. The World Bank advanced six good governance indicators and these include Accountability and Voice, Transparency,

Inclusiveness, Regulatory and Institutional Quality, Government Effectiveness, Rule of law and Control of Corruption (McMahon and Moreira, 2014). Three good natural resources governance indicators were used in this study, as it is not feasible to measure all the natural resource indicators in a single study. These include i)

Accountability; which entails the process of holding resource governance actors

“responsible for their actions” ii) Transparency; which refers to the disclosure of vital, accessible and relevant information, plans, rules, actions as well as processes throughout the mineral value chain iii) Inclusiveness; which seeks to ensure that all natural resource stakeholders are included and also empowered governance processes. The concept also seeks to ensure that all groups in the society are afforded an opportunity to enjoy the benefits derived from harnessing of mineral resources

(World Bank, 2018). Transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion are pivotal to the concept of governance and generally the measurement and definition of development. Whereas transparency and accountability superficially appear to be opposites, clearly one is the enabler of the other. Accountability and transparency is partly measured by the extent to which all-mineral decision-making processes are subject to stakeholder consultation and reviews (Arifin and Alizar, 2016). Murombo

(2016) argued that an analysis of Zimbabwe’s mining legislation shows that there is limited space for stakeholder consultation, which raises a question on accountability and transparency issues in the country’s mining sector.

The promotion of accountability, transparency and inclusivity is viewed as a vehicle towards good management of revenues derived from high-value natural capital assets.

In order to promote transparency, accountability and inclusiveness, influence and decision-making power should be invested in the hands of stakeholders, for instance through multiple approaches, formal participatory governance processes, local association or social movements.

Murombo (2016) stressed that for natural resources to contribute significantly to sustainable socio-economic development there has to be accountability, transparency

(fostered through inclusion of all stakeholders) as well as overall good economic, political, social and environmental governance. Mineral resources are finite hence the increased calls to implement sound policy frameworks and regulations so as to foster accountability, transparency and inclusivity mechanisms which are instrumental in unlocking the potential contribution of mineral resources towards sustainable development and poverty reduction. Therefore, this study explores how transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion can enhance socio-economic development measured in terms of health, education and household income in Zimbabwe.

The decline of agriculture, manufacturing and other sectors in the Zimbabwean economy especially after the year 2000 has seen the elevation of the mining sector as a crucial pillar for socio-economic development in the country. The Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (2015) stated that the country has shifted from being “an agro-based to being a mining country”. Reports indicated that in 2015, mining reflected growth of more than 3,5 % in spite of the negative impact of the falling international process

(Segula, 2013:3). In spite of the remarkable growth of the mining industry, the country has continued to reflect worsening socio-economic indicators. BTI report (2016:16) noted mismanagement of revenues saw 72% of the country’s population living on below $1.25 per day in the years 2013 and 2014 and the proportion of poor people in the rural areas increasing from 63% to 76% in 2013 and 2014 respectively. Poor governance of mineral wealth has resulted in poor socio-economic outcomes such as soaring poverty and unemployment rates, declining household income, low life expectancy and so on (Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development, 2016).

According to UNDP (2019:6) report, 28.9% of Zimbabwe’s population were found to be multi-dimensionally poor whilst an additional 29.3% lived very close to multidimensional poverty in 2016. Currently employment is estimated to be well above

80% in the country. The UNDP (2016:6) report further indicated that life expectancy at birth decreased by 0.4 years between the years 1990 and 2015.The country is now categorised amongst countries with low Human Development Index and is positioned

154/188 nations.

The diversified mineral resource base of Zimbabwe is dominated by two geological topographies namely the relic Greenstone Belts and Great Dyke. The former stretches from Odzi River in the west right to the Mozambique border in the east and the later stretches for more than 550 kilometres northeast to southwest across the centre of Zimbabwe (Chenjerai, 1991:337). The Great Dyke contains the country’s richest mineral deposits, which includes gold, silver, vanadium, copper, platinum, chrome, nickel asbestos, tin amongst others (The Herald, 2018).

The country has more than 40 different mineral types and is ranked among the top producers of platinum and gold- the latest being the diamonds in Marange, which were described as one of the biggest discoveries of the century (Zimbabwe Coalition on

Debt and Development, 2016). According to Segula (2016), the country’s mining sector has more than 800 operating mines, which range from artisanal and small scale to large-scale mines. A significant number of indigenous Zimbabweans participate in the Artisanal and Small Scale Mining (ASM) subsector of the mining industry. There are about twenty- two large-scale mines investments, which are mainly controlled by

Multinational Companies (MNCs) or Transnational Companies (TNCs). The indigenous blacks mostly control about two hundred small-scale mines around the country (Gochero and Kadira, 2015:70). Foreign companies hold most of the mining stakes and in some cases collaborating with the government through its mining investment vehicle, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation (ZMDC) (Segula,

2016). Mining provinces of Zimbabwe includes the Midlands, Mashonaland West and

South, Matebeleland South and Masvingo. The custodian of all mineral resources in

Zimbabwe is the state and it has the power to issue prospecting permits and to afford mining rights. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development and its various departments has the constitutional mandate to govern the mining sector as provided in the Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05) of 1961.

Despite all the mineral glory, the country has lost many opportunities to use the mineral resources for socio-economic transformation. The failure of the state over the years to come up with initiatives which promote accountability, transparency, stakeholder inclusion and generally good governance in the mining sector has spawned maldistribution of mineral resources which led to the foundation of the rent seeking elites (Kaseke et al., 2015). Mining and minerals in the country controlled by the archaic Mining and Mineral Act Chapter 21:05, which have been subject to numerous amendments since the colonial era and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of

Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 21:04) in terms of licencing, exploration and marketing

(Gochero and Kadira, 2015). Zimbabwe’s gamut of legislative and policy frameworks governing the sector have been roundly criticised that it is devoid of the modern modus operandi for the mining industry (Shumba, 2015:3). Therefore, it is important to understand how mineral resource governance can promote socio-economic development in Zimbabwe.

The mining legislative frameworks aim to sustain the development of the mineral resources of the country and translate the wealth into inclusive sustainable socio- economic development. “Yet, the bleeding and leakages continues” (Shumba,

2015:3). The country’s legal and policy frameworks have failed to ensure that mineral wealth is used to promote socio-economic transformation mainly due to the high costs of rent seeking. Therefore, it is important to understand how mineral resource governance can promote socio-economic development in Zimbabwe.

1.2 Problem Statement

The collapse of agriculture and other sectors such as manufacturing in the country has seen the increased significance of the mining sector, particularly after the discovery of diamonds in Marange, to stimulate socio-economic development. Several reports produced by the Chamber of Mines have indicated significant growth of the mining sector. Nyoni (2015:13) stated that there was a significant contribution from the mining sector to the country’s economy, constituting around 15% of the Gross Domestic

Product.

However, despite the mining sector’s significant growth, the country continues to reflect poor socio-economic indicators in terms of health care, unemployment levels, education, household income, poverty and so on (Malinga, 2017). Nyazema (2010) noted that poor governance of wealth from mineral resources and other productive sectors of the economy has seen the drastic reduction of per capita financing of the

8 health system, which stood at USD 23.6 in 1997 and was reduced in 2000 to 8.55, which was further dramatically eroded to USD19 in 2008. He further stressed that this negative trend has similarly taken place in the education system. This socio-economic deterioration has been aggravated by the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the country.

Therefore, this study was motivated by the need to model pathways for transparent, accountable and inclusive governance, which is integral for socio-economic transformation.

Mtandwa (2018) conducted a study that focused on minerals development and policies that influence the mining sector and socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. The study confirmed that political instability, corruption, opacity and un-accountability by public officials, policy inconsistence and poor revenue management were among the underlying factors for the disconnection between mineral opulence and socio- economic development in the country. Mtwandwa (2018) alluded that whereas his study used benchmarked data from secondary sources, another research could use survey and interviews with mining industry stakeholders and policy experts to understand the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development in Zimbabwe.

All minerals are owned and governed by the state in Zimbabwe and the question is why has the government failed to use the mineral wealth for socio-economic transformation. Apart from the fact that the country’s principal legal framework is too out-dated and is lagging behind regional as well as international best practises, it has further been rendered ineffective by the proliferate rent-seeking activities in the mining sector (Shumba, 2015). Lack of inclusiveness in the mineral resource sector has spawned opacity and un-accountability in the sector. Evidence of mineral resource mismanagement was for instance, revealed when the former president, Robert

Mugabe, opined in March 2016 that the nation lost US$15 billion from shady diamond mining operations in Manicaland province (Sibanda, 2016). BTI (2016) stressed that corrupt high-level government officials and an entrenched patronage system affect the mining regime of Zimbabwe. The country has adopted the global best practises for mining revenue transparency and accountability but these have largely failed to ameliorate the situation (ZELA, 2016).

Malinga (2017) investigated the linkages between mineral resources and economic growth in Zimbabwe. They concluded that the lack of proper management of mineral resources have resulted in the inverse relationship between growth and resource endowments. Many studies related to the subject have mainly focused at the macro level (Deacon and Rode, 2015). Literature review shows that there is scant literature on how mineral resources can be governed in a way that promotes socio-economic development at the micro level. This study therefore seeks to explore how transparency, accountability and inclusivity can be operationalized in order to eradicate the resource curse and promote socio-economic transformation in the mining districts of Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu (Mashonaland West province) Kwekwe and Shurugwi (Midlands province).

1.3 Research Questions

Zimbabwe is endowed with mineral resources and as proven in other countries, these natural endowments can be used effectively to promote socio-economic development and thereby reducing problems such as poverty and inequality. In this study, mineral resource governance is discussed in terms of three indicators of accountability, transparency and inclusiveness and, socio-economic development were discussed in terms of three indicators, which are healthcare, household income and education. The research therefore addresses the following questions:

a) What is the effect of the regulatory framework governing the mining sector on

socio-economic development in the country?

b) To what extent has growth in the mining sector contributed to growth of the

three socio-economic indicators of health, household income and education?

c) To what extent do the stakeholders participate in the governance of the mining

sector?

1.4 Objectives

The main objective of the study is to investigate the governance of mineral resources and its effect on socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. The following are the overall objectives of the study:

a) Evaluate the regulatory framework governing the mining sector for socio-

economic development in the country

b) To investigate the extent to which growth in the mining sector has contributed

to growth of the three socio-economic indicators of health, household income

and education.

c) To examine the extent to which stakeholders are participating in the

governance of the mining sector.

d) To propose a framework for good mineral resources governance and socio-

economic development in Zimbabwe.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The research findings add several dimensions to the understanding and knowledge for the mineral resources management subject and socio-economic development challenges in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa. Previous research on this subject has focused on the mining sector’s contribution to economic growth in Zimbabwe and other

SADC countries. Awolusi (2016) investigated the mining sector’s contribution to

11 economic growth in the Southern African economies. Mahonye and Mandisharay

(2015) also investigated the mechanism between the mining industry and economic growth in Zimbabwe. Murombo (2016) investigated on the effectiveness of the various initiatives that are aimed to encourage good governance, accountability and transparency in the Zimbabwe’s extractive sector.

However, no aforementioned researches and studies have looked at how transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion can leverage socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. How the mineral resources can be governed, in a way that improves the quality of life of the ordinary Zimbabweans has not been fully explored.

Growth in the mining sector of Zimbabwe has not translated into inclusive socio- economic development (Solomon, 2012; Malinga, 2017). Therefore, this study constructs a model that addresses the question of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion and socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. The main theory underpinning this study, the resource curse theory is instrumental in the construction of the model because it provides a comprehensive analysis of the various political and economic transmission channels that undermine transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion in the mining sector. From the participatory natural resource governance, co-management and interactive natural resource models, the question of poverty amidst plenty has not been addressed. Reforms have substantially remained on paper whereas the power for resource allocation remains a monopoly of the central players in an approach that is entirely neo-patrimonial. Many participatory governance and co-management models has been instigated and have taken “place in the gaps left by the logic of the dominant model of interaction between the Government and the local communities characterised by rent-seeking” (Ballet et al., 2009:6. Johnson, 2013:27). State control has rigorously undermined the prior

12 models of community natural resource management (Ribot Peluso, 2003; Ballet et al,

2009) and this has conspicuously contributed to resource curse phenomenon and natural resource depletion.

This study is integral in the current efforts to unlock the mining potential of Zimbabwe and other African countries to leverage inclusive socio-economic development as envisaged by the African Mining Vision. The fact that the Finance Act of 2018 and the

2019 budget statement repealed indigenisation requirements and opened investment to anyone in the mining sector calls for research into this topic as this legal move affects revenue sharing schemes and socio-economic development in mining communities. According to Xinhua News (2018:1) “Ownership in mining sectors where indigenisation requirements were repealed, can be with or without the participation of a community share-ownership scheme or employee share-ownership scheme or trust.” This gives some mining companies an opportunity to revise implementation plans of the mandatory indigenisation law of 2010.This sector has been chosen amongst others in the extractive industry because it represents an indispensable indigenous economy part in which there is significant foreign ownership.

Historically, natural resource availability on the continent has strongly motivated external involvement. The colonial era was characterised by an unprecedented exploitation of mineral resources by the Western powers. The Post- Colonial state in

Africa has retained economic links with the European powers, with a sustained dependency on exports of raw commodities (Rodney, 1973; Githinji and & Adesida,

2011). Given the international economic systems’ competitive nature and the upstaging of industrial globalisation, Africa’s governance of raw material extraction and export become a linchpin for inclusive socio-economic development in the continent.

The researcher drives further the current scholarly debates around the future of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development in Africa.

Additionally, the research provides academic material, which is crucial in future for policy planning in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa. This study is beneficial to the generality of Zimbabweans in that it comes up with recommendations on how mineral resources can be governed in a way that promotes inclusive socio-economic development. The study theorises and models pathways for transparent, accountable and inclusive mineral revenue management for broad-based socio-economic development in Zimbabwe.

1.6 Delimitations

This study is delimited to stakeholders (government ministries and departments, mining companies, civil society and mining communities’ members) in the mining sector of Zimbabwe. It is worthy to note that not all provinces in Zimbabwe can be covered in one study due to feasibility factors hence this study is confined to Midlands province where there are more concentrated mining activities. The study is confined to four rural mining districts Chegutu and Mhondoro Ngezi (Mashonaland West province), and Kwekwe and Shurugwi (Midlands province). It is not possible to consider every member of the population and therefore the study relies on a representative sample of mining communities’ households and relevant government ministries and departments, civil societies, mining companies, traditional chiefs and

CSTOs. The study is limited in that the research did not manage to collect data from every available source due to financial constraints, limited time and mobility. The study is confined to three mineral resources governance indicators of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion as well as socio-economic development indicators of health, education and household income in Midlands Province,

Zimbabwe. It is worthy to note that not everything concerning these concepts can be exhausted in a single study due to feasibility factors.

1.7 Conclusion

Zimbabwe is endowed with different types of mineral resources whose exploitation has been key to economic growth in the country. However, the main challenge has been to translate growth in the mining industry into sustainable and inclusive socio- economic development. Zimbabwe has continued to reflect poor socio-economic indicators despite growth in its mining sector. Poor governance, which has manifested in the form of corruption, rent-seeking and illicit mineral deals, has resulted in maldistribution of mineral wealth and lack of socio-economic development in the country. For mineral wealth to translate into broad-based socio-economic development there is need for transparent, accountable and inclusive governance in the mining sector. Regulatory institutions should play a crucial role in the establishment of a complimentary relationship between mineral resource governance and socio-economic development in the country. The necessity to assess the degree to which mineral resource extraction has contributed to socio-economic development in Zimbabwe informs this study. There is need to look into the policy and implementation context for transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion in the mining sector in order to maximize the benefits derived from mineral exploitation.

The fact that mineral resources are location-specific and finite, calls for transparent, accountable and inclusive governance in the country’s mining sector in order to promote its contribution to a broad-based and sustainable socio-economic development.

1.8 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 introduces the study; state the research problem, research questions, and study objectives, significance of the study, ethical considerations and outlining chapters of the study. Chapter 2 provides a review of theoretical as well as empirical literature on the nexus between mineral resource governance and socio-economic development, rent seeking and the resource curse. It also focuses on determining and modeling pathways to eradicate the natural resource curse and promote socio- development in Zimbabwe. It reflects on the macro environment of mineral resources governance and socioeconomic development and it provides an overview of mining, the relevant legislation and the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 3 focuses on detailing the methodology and design, population, sample and study area, scope of the study consisting of data collection methods and data analysis techniques used in this study. It also profiles the study area. Chapter 4 provides a research report and discussion of the research findings arranged in themes. Chapter

5 provides an interpretation and analysis of the research findings. Chapter 6 evaluates the findings of the study to the ideal context of development and it models pathways for mineral resources governance and socioeconomic development. Chapter 7 concludes the study and provides recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUALISING MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE

AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

The chapter analyses how local, regional and international trends are depicted in literature on mineral resources governance and socio-economic development. The understanding of development has evolved from the convectional approaches marked by classical and neo-classical thinking informed by classical economic thinkers like

Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Mills, to neo-liberal and modernization theories of development and postmodernism theories where human-centred development is at the core of theoretical frameworks. It further provides a critical discussion of the theoretical frameworks and related literature. It reflects and generates debates around issues of mineral resource governance and socio-economic development and establishes research gaps. The three theoretical frameworks, which underpin this study, the Governance, Rent-Seeking and Natural resource curse, were used to understand how mineral resource governance influence socio-economic development.

2.2 Approaches to Natural Resource Governance

The historical roots of the concept of natural resource governance as an autonomous field of inquiry is traceable back to the early collective action models and theory of

‘neo-institutionalists’ which evolved within the neoclassical economics. Seminal work by Douglas North (1990, 1994a,1994b) indicated that institutions are shaped as a rejoinder to the imperfections of the market arising from costs of transaction in exchange, as a tool through which unpredictability in exchange can be abridged. Some of the “institutionalist” theorists like Alchian and Demsetz (1973), Clague et al, (1997) and Wegenast and Schneider (2017) elevated property rights governance, and their

17 protection, enforcement and allocation as underlying factors in explaining market mechanism efficiency and institutional transformation. By incorporating historical, political and social factors in the property rights framework, debates on property rights governance arising from natural assets capital were extended beyond the traditional economic analysis to the indeterminate concepts like ideologies, interests and culture

(Ushie, 2013). However, the natural resource governance foundations of the institutionalists raise significant questions. Firstly, whether the governance mechanisms subsist to principally satisfy the functionalist criteria in the market system i.e. assuagement of the negative externalities which arises from natural resource exploitation or natural resource governance ought to reflect wider structural factors like unequal power relations in natural resource use.

Other natural resource governance models in the early 1980s and beginning of the

1990s by Krasner (1983) and Keohane (1988) were centred on how countries could develop systems and institutions for natural resource management within the international political economy context where the diplomacy of resource-security was dominant- mostly preferred by the then world superpower, the USA. The recent shifts in the international political economy ensuing from the East Asian Tigers’ unprecedented rise, the emerging economies in the BRICS and the rise of the international middle class have significantly impacted on the conceptualisation of natural resource governance around the world (OECD, 2011). The rising demand for natural resources-rare minerals, energy, land, water and food- to feed a growing world population as well as structural transitions in BRICS countries have exerted unprecedented environmental pressures. According to Ushie (2017), the entrenchment of the ‘resource curse’ phenomenon in most resource-rich countries in

18 the global south and the widening of the global divide between the poor and the rich have continued to shape the concept of natural resource governance.

In the current discourse, the consensus has shifted to supranational or global collective action on natural resource governance, with a realization that responses of policy should extend beyond nation-states boundaries. Goldthau and Witte (2010) elaborated in their influential work that a historical intersection between natural resource governance and energy security is being substituted by a novel approach, which reflects the incidence of the emerging economies (East Asian Tigers, Arab Gulf

States and the BRICS) in the ‘international political economy of natural resources’.

Therefore, there has been a shift of emphasis to “globalisation of natural resource governance as a transnational as opposed to a purely national issue” (Hale and Held,

2011:48). Resource industry or private natural resource governance models are also replacing public (traditional) regulation instruments especially in the mining sector

(Vogal, 2009; Ushie, 2017). These natural resource governance alternative mechanisms have the capacity to marshal non-state actors in the civil society, private sector as well as local communities on compliance with the international standards on environmental and social impacts of exploitation of natural resources, transparency and accountability of extractive processes. This demonstrates the increasing significance of discretional self-regulation by the global players in natural resource industry and, generally the increasing non-state actors’ influence in shaping the public discourse on natural resources governance. Initiatives of transnational natural resource governance came into picture as a response to the pressures by the international civil society activists to tackle the links between lax regulation of the natural resource sectors and the negative economic, political and social outcomes.

According to Watts and Ibaba (2011) these negative externalities range from bribery

19 and corruption scandals, through environmental catastrophes and conflict between the local communities and large scale mining companies to full scale civil wars as well as rebellions bankrolled by revenues from natural resources and culminating in political collapse, state failures with security and geopolitical implications.

The initiatives for transnational governance are being structured around the disclosures of mining revenues, contractual agreements, environmental and social impact assessments, and generally transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion in the extractive sector. According to Ushie (2017), governance of natural resources should be viewed as an issue of ‘global collective’ as extractive companies and nation-states are growingly mandated to comply with global principles and standards. Correspondingly, in the preceding fifteen years, a proliferation of initiatives for transnational natural resource governance has been witnessed such as the OECD

Due Diligence Guidance, UN Global Compact, World Bank’s health, environmental and safety Guidelines, and the Natural Resource Charter. In additionto the list,

Kimberly Process for the Certification of Diamonds, the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) Resource Revenue Transparency Guidelines, the Extractive Industries

Transparency Initiative (EITI) among others. This is supplemented by a formal recognition of the affected communities’ rights in resource-rich areas under the ‘UN

Declaration of the rights of Indigenous Peoples’ which warranties the Indigenous

People’s rights to ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)’ (Colchester and Ferrari,

2007). Extractive companies, which are operating in some parts of Latin America

(Peru, Ecuador and Colombia), as well as the Northern parts of Canada have espoused the FIPC as a primary tool for the engagement with the local affected communities. The ‘International Finance Cooperation (IFC) Performance Standards’

20 refers to the IPC as a yardstick for all the private extractive companies (Colchester

&and Ferrari, 2007; Ushie, 2017). Zimbabwe adopted the EITI; the ZMRTI under the previous coalition government (2009-2013), nonetheless with the lapse of the lifespan of the government, the initiative stalled. However, the growth of these transnational natural resource governance initiatives does not imply the irrelevance or insignificance of national structures and systems for natural resources. In fact, the impact of these diverse mechanisms of transitional resource governance is contingent on the efficacy of the domestic institutional structures (regulatory institutions, judicial and legal frameworks and political systems that can facilitate compliance with the global standards and norms by extractive companies and governments (Ferreira, 2012).

The fact that national governments (European Union, USA and United Kingdom) have created the initiatives for transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion indicates that the nation-state play a critical role in regulating the conduct of actors in the extractive sector. Therefore, a strong interdependence subsists between the domestic and transnational domains of natural resource governance (Ghate and

Chaturvedi, 2016). Transnational initiatives are required to be flexible to fine-tune to the varying policy priorities for the diverse natural resource actors at the global, national and local levels. Environmental sustainability, climate change, resource nationalism, accountability, transparency, multi-stakeholder inclusion and ethics of extractive companies as well the emergence of initiatives for transnational resource governance mentioned in the forgoing, are amongst the fundamental issues dominating the contemporary policy debates on governance of natural resources. This denotes a shift towards multidisciplinary natural resource governance models.

Transnational governance instruments in the mining industry are critiqued that they

21 fall short of compliance and enforcement mechanisms, which has left most kleptocratic, and rentier states to operate with impunity.

2.3 Natural Resources and Governance: An Analytical Framework. The finiteness of mineral resources actuates rent seeking, corruption and capture by influential interest groups (OECD, 2011). Both the OECD and some developing countries have epitomised how good governance of mineral wealth can power socio- economic development. An understanding of natural resources governance is fundamental, as the paradoxical situation of natural resources has become a common phenomenon around the globe. On one-hand natural resources can play an indispensable role in sparking innovations, poverty alleviation as well as promoting socio-economic transformation (Boserup, 1965; Barbier, 2003; Sanginga et al., 2010).

On the other, if misgoverned, natural capital assets can derail development efforts, spark conflicts and deprive citizens of their means (Sachs &and Warner, 1995; Obi,

2009 and OECD. 2011). In such a paradoxical situation, stakeholders, institutions, and policies have a critical role to play in fostering accountability, transparency and inclusive governance of the sector.

Most of the literature maintains that natural capital assets are managed more soundly for the common good by democratic rather than autocratic regimes. The better management of mineral resources by authoritarian resource-rich states and the resource curse intransigence in some democratic jurisdictions in the recent decades sternly challenges this argument. An emerging generation of scholars upholds that beyond analysis of stakeholders, institutions and policies, it is a prerequisite to focus on relations between stakeholders, institutions and policies (Davies and White, 2012;

Paletto et al., 2015). They appraise the horizontal, multi-actor navigation as a prerequisite means for the establishment of accountability, transparency and inclusive

22 governance mechanisms, which are key to converting natural assets into a nation’s blessing.

The processual comprehension of the concept of governance emphasises horizontal interdependencies amongst actors and, therefore the necessity to interact in order to govern composite systems. Furthermore, the need to interact is prolonged by the policies and institutions, which characterise a particular society (Rapp, 2017). Bodin and Crona (2009:366) are of the view that “Natural resource governance means the interactions between interdependent and power-asymmetric actors that (aim to) steer natural resources and deriving revenues, as well as the institutions and policies that embed these interactions”. It entails natural resources management and the structures as well as processes which provide the institutional and social environment in which management transpires. Other scholars like Carlsson and Berkes (2005) and Armitage et al. (2009) views natural resources governance as ‘co-management’ or extends it to

‘adaptive co-management’. These concepts have the propensity to undermine state authority, engender power asymmetries, and limited citizen participation if they are not implemented properly. Decision-making sharing does not do away with the power imbalances intrinsic in the top-down procedures of mineral resources governance agencies. Furthermore, institutional mechanisms established for allocation and controlling of governance rights by the different stakeholders are often complex and entail high costs for communities and the government. The state is not a lone entity and various government agencies or branches can have power over the same constituencies regulating mineral resources. Under such circumstances, endeavours at co-management can be compromised when agencies working with communities have discordant policies. Therefore, the efficacy of co-management systems depends

23 on the decision-making powers that the state grants or retains, and whether benefits and responsibilities are proportionated between the various stakeholders.

Keping (2017:8) posited the view that market and state failure to allocate resources has been an increasing enthralment with utilising the governance mechanisms as a panacea to the market failure ‘and/or that in State coordination’. However, it is worth noting that governance can recompense for some deficiencies of the market and state in coordination and regulation, but it has not been a panacea. The market and state can flop in social resource allotment, so can governance (Srivastava, 2009 and Reis,

2012). Nevertheless, since the early 1990’s, the concept of governance, which had been the erstwhile dominant political ideal, has been sternly challenged around the globe by the emerging concept of good governance, which has since then became a buzzword in literature and development strategy. Maldonado (2010) noted that the term was first introduced in the World Bank development discussions which paid particular attention to the state’s role in development process.With the new focus on the role of the state as well as its performance, new several topics became significant for development discussions such as the negative impact of corruption, the requisite for stakeholder inclusion ,transparency, accountability, and the siginificance of human rights.

The notion of good governance symbolizes a robust normative agenda. The emphasis on governance in the natural resource sector has typically consisted of concerted efforts to attain an ideal form of ‘good governance’, (Ghate and Chaturvedi, 2016). At the core of good governance, there are definitive fundamental and inter-related principles. These are transparency, accountability, rule of law, participation, responsiveness, efficient and effective governance, inclusiveness and equity, governance that is consensus oriented. Each of the principles elaborated is

24 multidimensional and complex and, from an operational view, subject to vigorous debate. For example, in the context of participation, there is an intense debate on who should participate and how the participation process should be invoked and the impact of participation on the outcomes. Likewise, upholding of the rule of law may also be contentious in the cases where the law and the legal processes are contested

2.4 The Post-Colonial State Mining Governance Models The government inherited the economic substructure and fiscal mining regime, which has proven to be problematic for local resource mobilisation. State engagement around the mining industry, revenue extraction as well as development planning in the post-colonial Zimbabwe saw the implementation of at least three natural resource governance models analogous with forms of institution building, state-citizen engagement and donor interventions (Saunders, 2008). The first decade of the country’s independence saw the endeavoured implementation of the socialist ideology. The government aimed to bolster inclusive and broad-based socio-economic development through implementation of the 1981 ‘Growth with Equity’ policy and the

1983 ‘First Transitional National Development Plan’, which were hinged on participatory and inclusive development processes. Marked improvements were noted in the general living standards for the back majority in the 1980s. Primary education access was made free, adult literacy rate rose to 97% and life expected peaked to 60 years (Murombo, 2016:23). The government made strides in the provision of public health.

Saunder (2017:12) noted that

“In sum, a suite of reforms in the early 1980s appeared to establish the institutional and political basis for mining as a more equitably managed sector, with greater opportunities for social participation and revenue mobilization”. However, the state

25 role became subservient to the ‘forces of capital’ and the policies of the government had to be enacted to the tune of the needs and demands of capital, which effectively reshaped the socialist agenda and modified any attempts for the worker control and ownership of the production means

In the early 1990’s, the government shifted its agenda towards ‘Market Driven

Approaches’ to social development underpinned by the implementation of Economic and Structural Adjustment Programs. By the early 2000’s, the government adopted a new approach, prompted by the economic and political crisis sparked by the failure of

Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAP). Nonetheless, the gains that had been made on the socio-economic front were reversed rapidly from the early 1990’s onwards as the government began cutting public expenditures at the behest of ESAP

Nyazema, 2010).

The government shifted to a somewhat resource nationalist model in a bid to leverage revenue sharing and socio-economic development beginning in 2007. According to

Saunders (2017) in reality empowerment and restructuring processes in the large scale mining sector have mainly been dominated by the bigger mining houses, resultantly domestic participation patterns in the large scale mining sector have not significantly changed since independence, through the 1990’s to date- or not at least through any transparently, publicly-acknowledged means. According to Mzaranye

(2016) to have an understanding of mining sector’s development trajectory and the

“indigenization” failure there is need to trace the impact of the State restructuring programs under neoliberalism in the early 1990’s, and later on, ZANU PF’s rear- guard power defence in wake of democracy movement on the turn of the millennium.

The ESAP of the 1990’s as well as the partisan militarisation of state institutions in the

26 post 2000 period, eviscerated the state capacity, and made the formulation and implementation of policy vehemently partisan, elitist, unpredictable, reactive and more ad hoc.

These natural resource governance models never emphasised the key issues of transparency, accountability and inclusivity in the mining sector. What raise concerns to scholars is the way in which the forces of the emerging class moulded the post- independence state and “the way in which the pre-1980 economic sub structure was transferred almost untouched into the post-independence period” (Machinya, 2014:6).

According to Murombo (2016), the mining sector of Zimbabwe has remained under colonial legislation for the three-phased period and issues of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion have remained inadequately provided for.

Most importantly, the case of Zimbabwe’s mining industry highlights the degree to which the state was crippled by multinational capital, government corruption and generally the colonial legacy in its bid to effect structural change as well as equitable, transparent, accountable distribution of wealth. The advent of the 2013 constitution somewhat indicates the country’s intention to incorporate provisions for accountability, transparency and good governance in the mining sector. The political-economic and regulatory context of the country necessitated the establishment of global as well as non-state actor accountability and transparency initiatives. Murombo (2016:263) argued that, “but the same context makes it a quandary to implement and enforce against the state and non-state actors as well as corporates”. The government has not readily embraced such initiatives, which albeit, are fundamental drivers of legal and policy reforms in the mineral sector. The country’s legal frameworks and the various global and non-state initiatives are analysed in their own sections below.

2.5 Zimbabwe’s Principal Mines and Minerals policies and Laws

2.5.1 Zimbabwean Constitution Amendment (No.20) Act, 2013 The Zimbabwean Constitution Amendment (No.20) Act, 2013 (section 73) embodies the rights of all citizens to utilize natural resources and to ecologically sustainable socio-economic development. Zhuwarara (2017) suggests that there are no specific provisions for the rights of communities to mineral resources in this Act. Murombo

(2016) noted that although the new constitution reflects the Zimbabwe’s willingness to incorporate issues of transparency and accountability mining sector, the lack of political will to implement the provisions remains the challenge. Most national laws have not been aligned to the new constitution for facilitation of implementation. Several years after the enactment of the supreme law, the country continues to reflect poor socio-economic indicators, which reflects implementation gaps (Sibanda, 2019).

2.5.2 Mines and Minerals Act, 1961 (MMA), (Chapter 21:05) In Zimbabwe, the main law governing all mining activities is the colonial Mines and

Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05 (1996), amendments, and associated regulations

(hereinafter MMA). The MMA bestows extensive powers on the minister of Mines to make determinations and decisions relating to the cancellation or granting of mining licences. According to Garufu (2015:124), “The extensive powers conferred on the

Minister could allow him or her to act unilaterally without consultations”. The 1963 Act in its current amended state lacks provisions that prevents leakages of mineral revenue, human rights violations and corruption, shady mining licensing, the fiscus mining regime (Dhliwayo, 2014). Policy disharmony as well as failure by the government to adapt the international best practises like the EITI in the country’s principal mining law has largely contributed to mineral resources mismanagement and violations of human rights (Chamber of Mines, 2017). The Act has been criticised for its lack of comprehensive provisions for ASM.

2.5.3 Precious Stones Trade Act, 1978 (Chapter 21:06) This Act is the fundamental legislation that makes provision for a legal framework for precious stones regulation. The Precious Stones Act has been subject to several amendments over the previous years to address emerging challenges related to precious stones. Garufu (2015:127) noted that “the Act provides the Minister of Mines with excessive powers which are not regulated; he can make any decision without consultations”. This has implications on accountability, transparency, inclusivity and other principles of good natural resource governance. According to Zhuwarara (2017) the precious Stones Act does not make provision for mining rights acquisition. No regulations or amendments have been effected to augment the diamond regulation and rights acquisition system.

2.5.4 The Indigenisation Policy: Resource Nationalism in Zimbabwe The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (14:33) aimed to redress the historical prejudices and economic imbalances by giving the indigenous Zimbabweans the right to have controlling stakes (51%) in foreign owned mining companies in order to promote broad based empowerment. According to this Act, all mining companies were mandated to cede at least 10% of ownership of their companies’ proceeds to

CSOT/s within their area of operation (Parliament Report, 2015). The legislation gave effect to the establishment of the Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba and Unki Mine’s

Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trusts in 2011 among others Employee

Share Ownership trust were also formed at the behest of the IEA but these had a flaw that there were established by moral persuasion means. This means legally, companies had leverage to shun implementation of ESOTs. The problem with indigenization requirements in the mining sector did not lie with the appropriation itself but the way it was implemented in apparent conflict with the international law minimum requirements (Garufu, 2015). The drafters of the Act, focused only on subsuming

29 shares of operating mining companies without enhancing the capabilities of ordinary blacks to start their own mining companies (Sibanda 2019).

2.5.5 The Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, 2014 The Act was enacted in 2014 and it seeks to facilitate the establishment of reserve fund for the securement of investment for future Zimbabwean generations’ benefit

(Zikiti, 2016:29). It was argued that the fund will be primarily be driven by 25 percent of all the royalties on the country’s mineral exports. The institution of the Fund focused on the principal argument that mineral rents can come in larger quantities but price volatility makes them highly unstable which induces fiscal policy problems.

The establishment of the fund was patently against normal and standard practises given that the government is struggling with unsustainable external debt level as well critically low international reserves (The Herald, 2015). While the Sovereign Wealth

Fund Act fails to meet the International Best Practices encapsulated in the Santiago principles, it also contained some flaws. The Act does not affirm issues of independence, transparency and accountability of the fund and it does not make provisions for the amount that is withdrawable to close budget deficits (The Herald,

2015). Saunders (2017) noted that there was little stakeholder involvement in the instrument’s formulation, and it remained peripheral to the mineral sector developments.

2.5.6 Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) The ZimAsset was the government’s policy for industrial development and anticipated to run from 2013-2018. The policy was designed to achieve social equity and sustainable development anchored on broad-based empowerment, indigenisation as well as employment creation, largely driven by the sagacious and sustainable exploitation of the nation’s natural and human resources. (Government of Zimbabwe,

2014). Dhliwayo (2014) the policy also speaks to issues of accountability and transparency in the mining industry, which was a step towards corruption reduction.

However, lack of funds to capitalise Zimasset has challenged its feasibility in the country. Analysts also argued that the drafting of the policy document was not done through a consultative process; it excluded key stakeholders like the CSOs and the private sector (Mpofu, 2013).

2.6 International Natural Resource Frameworks, Protocols and treaties

Mining activities as well as impacts are confined to state jurisdictions and therefore there is no comprehensive international law that regulates mineral development process; exploration, prospecting, extraction, development, beneficiation, marketing, liability and closure. However, the greater variability in the national mining laws as well as enforcement is mounting the pressure for ‘a level playing field', that is, ‘more uniform’ (thus, international) standards or, as put by others, ‘the globalisation of environmental legislation and standards' (Pring, 2008:53).

2.6.1 World Charter for Nature, Resolution 37/7 (1982) This Charter seeks to give effect to its guiding principles through international practise and national legislation. For instance, Articles 15 mandates states to promote public participation and consultation all the planning. Nonetheless, Zimbabwe’s mining laws do not explicitly provide for public participation and consultation, as well as access to mining information. Sands et al, (2012:31) argued that even though the recommendations of the Charter are ‘unenforceable general principles’ the guidelines are instrumental in persuading developing nations to adopt development strategies that are environmentally sound.

2.6.2 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) Twenty-three States ratified the ILO No.169 convention. This convention provides the indigenous people’s rights to natural resources in respect of their traditional lands, participation rights in their utilisation, conservation and management. Tennant (2017) noted that it also provides that in the contexts where the State retains sub-surface or mineral resources governance, are obliged to establish procedures for consultation with the indigenous people. The Convention does not guarantee the indigenous peoples the right to veto mining projects and therefore indigenous people feel that the absence of their veto powers in the convention allows corporations and governments to do as they please. PWYP Zimbabwe (2015:18) cited that Zimbabwe’s principal mining, the 1961 Mines and Mineral Act “has left communities vulnerable to forced displacements” and violations of their rights most notably in gold and diamond sectors.

2.6.3 Berlin Guidelines for mining and sustainable Development, 1991 (revised 2000) The guidelines call for the participation of the affected communities. In the case of

Zimbabwe, mining laws are not aligned with the Berlin guidelines to establish a comprehensive regime for the participation of indigenous communities as a result most local communities in the country have been side-lined in the making of crucial mining decisions (Murombo, 2016). The main argument put forward by the critics of the Berlin guidelines is that mineral resources are non-renewable and finite and thus the opportunities for the future generations to access them are reduced (Vintró et al.,

2014).

2.6.4 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED): The Rio Declaration, 1992 The Rio Declaration’s Agenda 21 is widely quoted as a success in connecting international governance and local governance of mineral resources. As a result, the status and importance of civil societies in the mining sector has increased immensely

32 over the preceding decades as they play roles as watchdogs, moral stakeholders and advocates. Nonetheless, how much of this “improved participation is simply rhetoric is debateable” (Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future, 2012:6). Agenda 21 is silent on core dimensions of sustainable development, transparency and accountability in the mining sector.

2.6.5 World Summit on Sustainable Development: The Johannesburg Declaration and Action Plan, 2002 The Summit adopted the ‘Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and the Plan of Implementation’. The Johannesburg Action Plan makes provision for inclusive enjoyment of the mining benefits, environmental, social and health impacts, and the requisite of accountability and transparency in the mining sector, stakeholder participation, and inclusion of indigenous local communities among other issues

(Pring, 2008). While there are laws and regulation to regulate mining as well its associated activities in Zimbabwe, these are not adequate as instruments to promote transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion in the mining industry within the subsisting political context. According to Murombo (2016), the political and socioeconomic environment in Zimbabwe influences the regulatory effectiveness as well as responsiveness of the sector.

2.6.6 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) The EITI was initially launched in 2002 at the “World Summit on Sustainable development in Johannesburg”, South Africa. EITI is a multi-stakeholder initiative that involves the cooperation of governments, civil society, communities and private companies in fostering transparency and accountability in the extractive sector (EITI,

2016). According to Rustad et al, (2017), the EITI is currently implemented in 52 nations around the globe, and each of them is required to publish a yearly EITI report disclosing information on: licences and contracts, production, collection and allocation

33 of revenue, socio-economic spending. EITI is not being effective as highly anticipated because the stakeholders in the mining sector (business, civil society and government) have different EITI versions and some do not fully understand its objectives. Rustad et al, (2017) noted that some governments on the continent have not permitted the civil society to fully participate in the EITI process or have not persistently provided the civil society with the prerequisite information to hold governments accountable.

Zimbabwe launched its EITI version, the ZMRTI in 2011 but several years after its institutions there are still calls for transparency and accountability in the mineral sector

(ZELA, 2016). Two major challenges bedevilled ZMRTI-lack of funding and the mistrust between the civil society and the government (Murombo, 2016).

2.6.7 Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) The UN General established the KPCS in 2003 to stop “conflict diamonds” from entering the international rough diamond market following the Fowler Report recommendations. According to Anderson (2016), the present fifty-four signatories comprise about 99.8% of world’s rough diamond production. The scheme leaves the participating countries with the discretion to either institute enforcement mechanisms or not (Howard, 2016). Zimbabwe also became a member of the KPCS in 2003 but the country has not been complying with the KPCS rules and continued to trade diamonds on the international market amidst allegations of gross human rights violations in its mining sector. The government did not curtail diamond smuggling and widespread human rights abuses committed by the armed forces since 2006 in the

Marange diamond fields, in Manicaland Province (PWYP Zimbabwe, 2015). The

KPCS did not establish a monitoring process in the country and thus implementation has not been progressive (ZELA, 2016).

2.6.8 Publish What You Pay (PWYP) PWYP is a global initiative (led by the civil society) that was formed in 2002 and it aims to increase government accountability by conducting mandatory and independent auditing and publications of mining company payments as well as government revenues. The PWYP has an affiliation of more than 800 CSOs and 41 countries worldwide (PWYP, 2016:3). PWYP Zimbabwe, launched in 2010 by a group of 10

CSOs has successfully campaigned for the amendments of the country’s constitution to curb mineral revenue leakages. Elitism and the non-recognition of CSOs by the

ZANU PF government have been bedevilling efforts on transparency and accountability by PWYP Zimbabwe (PWYP Zimbabwe, 2015). Just like the EITI,

PWYP has a weakness that it is short of compliance and enforcement mechanisms, which has left corrupt and rogue governments at freelance.

2.6.9 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) The ACHPR is the main regional tool that seeks to protect and promote human rights on the continent. The adjudication of the African Commission on ACHPR on the violation of Endorois people’s rights by the Kenyan government in 2010 is the

Commission’s most radical and substantive decision to date, with significant implications for natural resources governance, inter-communal relations and socio- economic realities (Lynch, 2011). This case shows how regional instruments can deal with state injustices in the extractive sector. Open Society Initiative for Southern

(2019:8) noted that the Charter has no standardised and consistent approach “in the provision of relevant information. The African Commission on ACHPR has not dealt with on-going human rights violations in Zimbabwe’s diamond and gold sector, despite the country’s membership since 2003 (Murombo, 2016).

2.6.9 African Mining Vision (AMV) 2009 The policy framework compels thrust towards ‘transparent, accountable, equitable, optimal and sustainable exploitation of mineral resources’ to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development (Ushie, 2017). It establishes a comprehensive fiscal regime to curtail the hemorrhaging of the mineral resources of the continent. Andrews and Nwapi (2018) noted implementation of the AMVs Country

Mining Visions has been slow with only 24/54 countries committed, therefore not in accord with the feverish anticipations surrounding its establishment. Zimbabwe’s CMV processes are currently underway but implementation has been slow (Ushie, 2017).

Only one AU member state (Ethiopia), has adopted the AMV fully through the development of its CMV. Some CSOs and CBOs critique the AMV on the basis that it follows a top-down and extractivist developmental paradigm, which benefits the capitalists and governing elites in the mining sector at the expense of poor mining communities (Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future, 2012). The latest AU policy thrust, Agenda 2063 does not articulate how transparency, accountability and inclusivity can be achieved in Africa’s natural resource sectors.

2.6.10 Applicable Sub-Regional Protocols: The 1997 ‘SADC Protocol on Mining This is in line with the SADC Common Agenda articulated in the SADC Treaty Article

8 of the protocol states that, “Member States shall promote economic empowerment of the historically disadvantaged in the mining sector” (SADC Protocol on Mining

1997). Since 2000, most of the member states have been engaged on harmonization of their mining legislation and policies to augment information flows and investment climate in the mining sector, and to establish a viable ASM subsector with greater women participation (Zongwe, 2014). The SADC treaty and Protocol do not specifically refer to aspects of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion of which,

36 these are key to the achievement of sustainable development of the region’s mining sector and poverty eradication.

2.7 The evolution of the concept of socio-economic development

The concept of development is not a new one. Rostow (1975: 1-30) maintained that the concept emerged in the eighteenth century in Western Europe after the societal transition from a primitive to a modem one (Ewetan and Ese, 2014). The understanding of the development concept was derived from biology, which defines development as a maturation process. History started to be viewed as a ceaseless improvement process whereas industrialisation became a modernity indicator, which resulted in the industrial revolution. The understanding of the concept of development has evolved for more than half a century: from economic growth, to economic development and most recently socio-economic development. In order to have an in- depth understanding of the evolution of the concept of socio-economic development, it is fundamental to reflect on the socio-cultural context, which shaped this phenomenon. The conceptualisation of the term development has undergone a transformation and metamorphosis since the World War II ended in the year 1945.

The ideological contradictions between the Capitalist West and the Socialist East largely influenced the conceptualisation and meaning of the term development

(Ewetan and Ese, 2014). Growth theorists maintained that development is a result of economic growth, for instance, Rostow (1952) and Domar (1957) and Harold (1959) postulated that economic growth and development results from savings as well as investments and structural changes in the economy.

2.7.1 Development as Economic Growth Until the mid-20th century, development was not viewed as an outcome of the deliberate action of man. It was rather viewed as a spontaneous process than a target-

37 oriented one. It was only until the 2nd half of the twentieth century when development

“became a subject of deliberate action” (Litwiński, 2017:452). Peet and Hartwick

(2009) have classified development thinking into three historical epochs namely the convectional approaches, critical approaches and the post-modernism theories. A classical and neo-classical thinking informed by classical economic thinkers like Adam

Smith, David Ricardo, and John Mills marks the convectional approaches. Such an approach also includes the neo-liberal and modernisation theories of development.

The dominant idea of development in the conventional theories is seeing development as an economic growth-based capitalist transformation driven by market fundamentalism. Classical and neo-classical theories see state intervention in economic development as retrogressive. The role of the state is seen as mainly to provide a secure and conducive environment that allows the market to operate freely through a demand and supply mechanism where development takes place through the trickle-down effect.

As indicated by Arndt (1987:35) the expression of the conventional approaches was an endeavour of national accounts compilation (from various countries) by Clark

(1940). His paper titled ‘Conditions of Economic Progress’ was an incentive to the evolvement of several models and theories of growth. It is important to note that roughly two decades or so after the World War II, the rise of the differences in terms of need satisfaction between the rich and poor countries as well as the evolving humanitarianism meaning made these differences unacceptable (Litwiński, 2017:452).

The economic growth models’ failure, in the 1970’s, to deliver social goods and also address poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, hunger and other socio-economic problems in the majority of developing countries as well as developed countries in

Latin America and Africa, necessitated a new thinking in the development discourse.

The idea of synchronising ‘development with economic growth’ is sternly challenged on the basis that it paid inadequate attention to the conditions of the poor. All the structural theories including the modernisation, Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses development at a macro-level and disregard the micro-level analysis of development challenges that vary across regions and countries. Such development that put emphasis on an economic growth model is defective as it overlooks other forms of development. These weaknesses have led to the development of a new post-modern and post-structuralist approach to development. Post-modernism has brought a flourishing of both macro and micro theories of development that emphasise participatory and emancipatory models of development pioneered by Amartyar Sen and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This led to the “redefinition of development from economic growth centred perspective to human centred approach” (Nwanegbo, 2013:32). Therefore, economic development became a buzzword in the mainstream economics and other disciplines where it became synonymous with upliftment of the living standards of people. In his contribution to the development thinking and policy in the 1950’s, Arthur Lewis argued that economic development entailed the rise of the real national income for every individual. Although the national income per individual was not an ideal measure of the standards of living, it was considered as the main element in the evaluation of the development process. However, there also appeared a more comprehensive conceptualisation of economic development, which overlapped economic growth. For instance, Gunnar Myrdal in the late 1960’s proposed a quite wider definition of economic development, indicating that it entailed the enhancement of the vital conditions in the social system, which underlies underdevelopment (Kanbur, 2018).

Therefore, the social development concept gathered traction mainly due to works of the UN on the promotion of social welfare (Stewart, 2013). Social development sought to correspond economic growth with the welfare of families and children. The significance of the social dimension to the concept of economic development became the centre of debates. Singer (1965) underscored aspects like health, education and nutrition, highlighting that the problem of most underdeveloped countries was not only growth stimulation but also development quoted in Petrov (2010). John Rawls in the beginning of the 1970’s made significant contributions to this discourse with his justice theory. He argued that the natural resources distribution consequences should be assuaged by the managed distribution of resources in ways, which ensure equality.

More recently, the concept of development is categorised with distributional justice.

This is based on the realisation that a country can have a robust economic growth but still perform poorly in terms of health, literacy, nutrition and life expectancy (Sen,

1999). Theorists who pursue the Marxist philosophy believe that the questions of social justice and distribution cannot be resolved independently of the governing mechanisms of production as well distribution.

2.7.2 Socio-economic development

The growth fetishism criticism resulted in the emergence of the so-called ‘social indicators’: education levels, literacy, life expectancy, health care, household living conditions, infant mortality and so on. Some authors went even further to ‘posit an opposition between growth and development’ (Litwiński, 2017:6). The Kerala state and

Sri Lanka where economic growth was not too impressive but where the welfare facilities as well as education levels were significantly improving were contrasted with countries such as Brazil where vigorous growth had barely influenced poverty levels

(Szirmai,2012). Most theorists concluded that growth is a precondition for

40 development, whereas development transcends growth. There is need to also focus on changes in demographic developments, the family, mentalities, cultural changes, political changes, transformation of the rural societies and urbanisation processes

(Szirmai, 2005 & 2012). The goal of the concept of socio-economic development is to put people at the core of the process of development in terms of policy, debate and advocacy.

The linkage of economic activities with social interventions is traceable back to the

1800s, where Charity Organisation’s volunteers in England assisted impoverished people to find employment or begin small business (Fritz, 2010). There are also examples of governing the economy towards enhancement of living standards during this period. This is epitomised by the massive recovery program in the United States under the administration of President, Franklin Roosevelt. This program adopted the idea of John Maynard Keynes for government intervention for the promotion of economic growth as well employment (Fritz, 2010). Nowadays the process of social as well economic development is termed socio-economic development. The international institutions such as FAO, UNDP, IMF and WB and countries’ declarations on cooperation to attain development goals has greatly influenced conceptualization and understanding of the factors of socio-economic development. For example, the

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), proposed by the UNDP (2000), incorporated poverty reduction, health, food security, education, sustainable utilization of natural resources as well as good governance. According to Chojnicki (2010:1), “Socio- economic development embraces changes taking place in the social sphere, mostly of an economic nature”.

Socio-economic development is viewed as a development product and is commonly defined as a social as well as economic transformation in the society (Szirmai, 2015)

Therefore, socio-economic development is spawned by various endogenous and exogenous factors, which determine the direction and course of development. It is worth noting that processes of socio-economic development do not happen in seclusion from other processes and they are usually preceded by or are an outcome of other processes. Chojnicki (2010:6) socio-economic development factors “cannot be described closer in general terms” due to the fact that because they differ contingent on the conditions produced by geographical and historical backgrounds in which the socio-economic changes transpire. Socio-economic development means the improvement of the lifestyles of people through improved incomes, employment, education and skills development (Saurah (2016: xv). It is a process of social and economic transformation premised on environmental and cultural factors. Socio- economic development in the mining industry context is understood, as the creation of economic value for the community as well as the wider society which, will endure after ceasing of the mining operations.

Traditionally socio-economic development is measured by objective or social indicators such as educational and health outcomes or household income. Some measures of socio-economic development only include objective indicators, some only subjective indicators and some use both objective and subjective indicators (Howe,

2010). Social or objective indicators reflect how a country utilises its wealth to enhance quality of life of its citizens. Socio-economic development, which is conceptualised as upliftment of the quality of life and measured in terms of three socio-economic indicators in this study (health care, household income and education), needs sound governance of mineral resources to take place. The impact of the mining sector to socio-economic development is determined by the composition and size of the sector, the nature and quality of employment opportunities generated, social and

42 environmental costs generated, corporate social investments, by fiscal revenue amounts generated and how it is utilised, and how it contributes to the country’s socio- economic indicators (McMahon and Moreira, 2014).

2.8 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework’s role is to present the theory that explains the problem under study and why it exists. In that light, it is vital to consider relevant theory’s knowledge base of the phenomenon (Ravitch and Riggan, 2016). The three theoretical frameworks that underpin this study, the Governance, the Rent-Seeking and Natural resource curse, were used to understand how institutional structures and factors influence socio-economic development at the micro-level. The strengths, weaknesses and implications of these theories on mineral resources governance and socio-economic development are discussed. Zimbabwe continues to experience robust growth of its mining sector against the backdrop of dire socio-economic development outcomes. Therefore, an analysis of these theories helps to understand the research problem.

2.8.1 Governance Theory

The governance theory emerged in the years towards the late 1990’s and it was coined by the World Bank. According to Diallo (2015:16), “Governance is defined as the quality of public and private institutions, which govern how decisions get made and in whose interest”. The theory propounds that decentralisation reforms are supposed to enhance equity, enable greater participation, poverty alleviation and empowerment of the locals, and foster the responsiveness of the government to the citizens. In some cases, decentralisation resulted in the transfer of power to customary authorities, private bodies, NGOs, which effectively reveals the issues of accountability, legitimacy and inclusiveness (Ribot, 2007 and Lockwood et al., 2010). Governance theorists

43 developed a list of principles for good governance, which are key for effective governance of mineral resources. Lockwood (2015) catalogues eight dimensions as

“guidance” for the good governance of natural resources: Legitimacy, Accountability,

Transparency, Fairness, Inclusiveness, Integration, Adaptability and Capability. Critics argue that although these proposed dimensions can be the means to attain successful natural resource governance, it is arguable that they are not the principal determinants of its realisation per se. Aorora and Sharma (2016: i) argued, “Good governance is an ideal which is difficult to achieve in its totality,” citing that very few societies and countries have drifted closer to attaining good governance in its entirety.

2.8.1.1 Transparency

Transparency seeks clarity on the decision makers, the means and ways by which the decision has been reached as well as its justification. According to Barwick (2014) transparency entails; (i) the visibility of the processes of decision making (ii) clarity in communicating the reasoning behind decisions, and the availability of pertinent information about resource governance as well as performance. According to (Chêne,

2017) oversight mechanisms in most resource-rich African countries (such as Nigeria,

Zambia, Zimbabwe and DRC) like civil society, parliamentary oversights, audits and media monitoring are incapacitated to play the oversight role as a result of rent seeking, corruption and unbridled elitisms. Bieske (2018) noted that no resource-rich

African country has ever been ranked in the top 20 of least corrupt countries in the world. Despite launching the ZMRTI, Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Zimbabwe

Chapter in 2011 and membership to the Kimberly Process since 2006, the mining sector has remained an arena of contestation and secrecy concerning mining claims issuance, the contracting process as well as revenue use (ZELA, 2016). Dhliwayo

(2016) argued that efforts to foster transparency and accountability are incessantly

44 undermined by the non-recognition of key stakeholders like CBOs and CSOs and the violation of economic, environmental, social and cultural rights of communities.

Nonetheless, transparency alone is not likely to attain sustainable socio-economic development outcome from the mineral sector. Weak institutions and regulatory frameworks as well as the lack of flexible, adoptive and collaborative management practises and sound fiscal regimes has hampered transparency efforts in Africa’s mining industry (DFID, 2017). The EITI, ‘Publish What You Pay’ and the ‘Kimberley

Process Certification Scheme’ (KPCS) were established in the beginning of 2002 to foster transparency around the governance of natural resources. Transparency is still a challenge in the mining sector of African countries despite the espousing of EITIs as evidenced by UN Conference on Trade and Development (Unctad) 2016 report alleged widespread mis-invoicing in Africa’s mining industry, including Zimbabwe

(Frykberg, 2018). Southern Africa Liaison Office (SALO) (2015) posited that initiatives for mineral revenue transparency are implemented in the context of information asymmetry, power asymmetry and cynicism between regulators (government), investors, and workers as well as affected communities. Transparency International

Corruptions Perception Index has cited Côte d’Ivoire as highly corrupt resource-rich country, “with a score of 34 out of 100 in 2016, relegating the state to a rank of 108 out of 176.95 in Transparency” (Anderson, 2016:793). Furthermore, the perception of corruption control is negative, with a -0.42, which demonstrates the common perception that public power is mainly exercised for the gain of the elite. This is despite the fact that Côte d’Ivoire has been an EITI member state since 2008 and a Kimberly

Process (KP) signatory since 2003. Resource fuelled rebellions and rebel control of diamond-rich areas epitomizes the nature and scale of the resource curse phenomenon on the African continent.

While initiatives for mineral revenue transparency aim to lessen these asymmetries and forge trust, their execution is undermined by the following factors. Firstly, there is no mutual understanding between the government, workers, mining communities and the mining industry on the contribution that the extractive industry should make to socio-economic development at the local and national levels, what the ‘good economy’ or the ‘good society’ vision should be. Secondly, Initiatives for transparency in the mining sector conventionally focus on a narrow scope of indicators, namely the reconciling of mining industry payments and the government receipts from the sector.

This information is insufficient to allow an informed analysis of the contribution of the sector to socio-economic development. Opponents of the initiatives for mineral revenue transparency, particularly the EITI have expressed concerns about their empirical basis and their pseudo-reformism, particularly when tallied with other obligatory national-level global initiatives. One of the prime questions in mining regulation is the transparent and accountable management of revenues created by mining (eg rental payments, income tax and royalties). This is because taxation is more challenging in the mining sector compared to other sectors owing to the

“complexity of multinational business negotiations” and the lapse of time before accrual of profits (Manley, 2013:13). Transparency is also often fraught: depending on the ways of revenue collection, depositing and reporting, management and oversight of mineral revenue can be a daunting task.

2.8.1.2 Accountability

Accountability has been described as an innovation in the sphere of action of the

World Bank. Accountability entails the allocation as well as acceptance of responsibility for actions and decisions taken in the mineral value chain, and “how

46 these responsibilities have been met” (Nunan, 2018:18). In contexts of mineral resources governance in resource-dependent nations, evidence denotes that

“accountability tends to be a one-way affair”, from the local levels upwards to the national, states as well as territory governments with lesser accountability downwards to the regional and local communities or laterally to the partners. (Moore, 2006:2;

Lockwood et al., 2010:15). Where accountability is not realizable through direct democratic means and is mostly informal, the needs of the citizens for proper information access; meaningful consultation, and for improved opportunities to participate actively become more important. Compliance with and strict observation of relevant legislation, codes and standards forms the basis of accountability. Lockwood et al. (2010:16) noted, “Reporting requirements should be the minimum necessary to provide financial, governance and performance accountability”. Accountability looks at whether the stakeholders have adequate, timely, accurate and understandable information ‘on which to act’. In that light, accountability is difficult to enforce where there is no transparency. Rathinam (2019) argued that substantial revenue from mineral wealth and less dependence on public taxation undermine public scrutiny of the policies and actions of government. In Zimbabwe when mining companies disburses taxes directly to the government, citizens have less oversight on revenue and expenditure flows (Sibanda, 2019).

According to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (2011) the efficacy of mechanisms of both horizontal and vertical accountability has proved to be limited in the African mineral sector. Danso (2017), noted that the operational Mineral Act of

2007 (703) of Ghana has a lacuna when it comes to accountability and transparency in that it is silent on these two principles of good governance and also it does not

47 clearly indicate how the mineral rents should be used to engender development.

Fortmeyer (2018:2) noted, “The current state of public information regarding natural resource extraction” in both the DRC and Zambia raises questions about the motives of the state and the investor incentives’ dire outcomes of underdevelopment, inequality and human rights abuses. In DRC, information asymmetries have masked fraudulent, regressive taxation and smuggling activities, which has financially benefited the political elites, whereas 71 percent of the ordinary Congolese live in abject poverty and, whilst Zambia has not been “as politically turbulent it maintains years worth of gaps in mining statistics” (EITI, 2016:12). Liberia’s public sector has been ranked on the Transparency International index as corrupt with a 37 out 100 score but its rank is more favourable than the neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire which have a 76 out of 96 score.

Liberia has been a signatory of KP since 2007 and EITI since 2009. Anderson (2016) noted that Liberia has made “meaningful progress” with the KP and EITI standards, and in 2015, the country reported US$ 32.5 million from the diamond sector.

Most countries (Zimbabwe included) are failing to align the laws with global EITI standards in order to promote transparency and accountability. Weak reporting schemes, lack of enforcement as well as corruption along the mineral value chain detract from the efficacy that international initiatives like EITI, KPCS and Publish What

You Pay (PWYP) could reach. Transparency and Accountability Initiatives (TAs) in the mining industry are premised on the presumption that making revenue flows information more transparent enables the citizens, civil society and private companies to utilise the information to foster government accountability. Consequently, the impact of these TAs is measured in accordance with compliance with the set standards or procedural changes at the institutional or organisation level, rather than the broader governance or development outcomes. Yet, where there is evidence that, the TAs in

48 the mining sector (EITI, in particular) contributes to more transparency, whether they lead to greater accountability, or to wider governance, development or social outcomes remain an unanswered question. Calls for accountability and transparency in the mineral value chain of Zimbabwe by different stakeholders suggests that decision making in mineral resources governance is not sufficiently subject to the public scrutiny.

2.8.1.3 Inclusiveness

Inclusiveness refers to the opportunities that are available for all stakeholders to take part and have an influence in the actions and processes of decision-making (Kagwa,

2014). As with the accountability and transparency principles, inclusiveness denotes that governing bodies at the lower level have opportunities for input into the higher- level of decision-making. According to governance theorists, governance is viewed as inclusive when all the stakeholders can engage in the governance processes on equal basis. Lockhood et al, (2015:17) noted that the processes of reform seeking to enhance governance decentralization should avoid a ‘top-down’ imposition of the institutional structure but instead adopt an approach that is collaborative involving mutual engagement of all potential and extant governing actors. The effectiveness of the engagement processes is demonstrated by the maintained uptake of practices of governance outside the projects, improved participation in the projects or “the number of formalized partnerships with significant key stakeholders” (Lockwood, 2010:18).

Reflections on inclusive natural resource governance practise led to criticism on the nature of the platforms (co-management, user groups and so on). Inclusive governance platforms in the context of the African mining industry have not always been welcoming spaces for the marginalised and weak, and women, nor free from co- option or manipulation by the more powerful insider and/or outsider groups. With

49 privatisation of the mining sector in most African countries, the regulatory role of the state becomes convoluted, granting the mining corporations more power in the sector.

Proponents of Emmanuel Wallenstein’s World Systems theoretical constituents of core-based exploitation have dismissed the plausibility of stakeholder inclusion as the

International Economic System gives more power to the MNS and TNCs to facilitate the exploitation of the peripheries’ resources by the core. However, the opposing camp argue that by establishing the initiatives for mineral revenue transparency, external actors aim to benefit host countries, the industry, workers and other members of mining communities. Despite the institution of transparency accountability and stakeholder inclusion initiatives in the mining industries of most resource-rich developing countries, the core-periphery exploitation system pervades. Large MNCs and TNCs control mining securities and power structures, thereby reinforcing exploitative extractive systems. Most disempowerment forms in Zimbabwe’s mineral resource governance system reflects the risks of decentralisation that is supply-led in, in which the state has a free reign in conceptualising governance systems and the extent as well as nature of entrustments that can be devolved to CBOs, NGOs, traditional authorities, local governance and mining communities (Wushe, 2014). Few partnerships and initiatives are geared towards reinforcing Civil Society Organisations in the country’s mining sector and thus their role has been mostly focused on environmental issues (Murombo, 2016). In countries like Zimbabwe, DRC, Nigeria and

Angola, processes for decision-making, consultation and communication tend to favour favor bi-polar (private sector - government) initiatives and outcomes without due stakeholder representation and participation (ZELA, 2016). Investigations conducted by the UN Panel of Experts in 2013 highlighted how DRC’s neighbors,

50 powerful individuals and private companies profited from unregulated exploitation and trade of the nation’s mineral wealth (Chandler, 2013).

Literature has cited that stakeholder engagement is not innately difficult; -the challenges are imposed externally, by the manner in which engagement rules are set.

(Hickey et al, 2015). Countries that have adopted Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) as EITIs, PWYP and the Global Reporting Initiative struggle to work effectively and consistently with the civil society. Revenue Watch/Publish What You Pay Institute reported that in Mauritania and Cameroon, vital documents were not circulated ahead of meetings, leaving the civil society representatives of the multi-stakeholder groups, off-guard for participation and decision-making (Aaronson, 2011). Mistrust between the government and civil society has spawned an unease and acrimonious relationship between the two stakeholders and has undermined EITI multi-stakeholder initiatives.

For instance, the Congolese government has frequently harassed the mineral resources governance civil society activists, which has stalled EITI work and in

Mongolia government officials has frequently usurped the powers of appointing the stakeholder groups instead of NGOs and the citizens to elect their representatives

(The World Bank Group’s-Africa’s Pulse Magazine, 2015). The underlying problem is that governments perceive NGOs and CBOs as mineral resources governance collaborators rather than “watch dogs” enabling free information flows as well as its timeliness and accuracy. Human rights abuses and state sanctioned violence in ASM sectors of DRC, Zimbabwe and Ghana speaks volumes of the stakeholder exclusionary tactics (Afful-Koomson et al., 2015). Big multinational corporations such as Anglo Gold Ashanti, de Beers and British Petroleum wield colossal power in the extractive sector in countries like DRC, Botswana, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria, which has the limited participation of the members of public and the civic society

51 groups. In Sierra Leone as well as some parts of DRC, nonetheless ASM miners control mineral resources extraction (Afful-Koomson et al., 2015). In countries like

Botswana, South Africa and Makulele devolution policies to some extent addressed equity issues and, enhanced the involvement of women, and marginalised groups in the decision-making processes in natural resources governance (Chandler, 2013).

The decentralisation processes affect the mining industry because in some cases the priorities and goals of local governments may clash with the central governments. The dual system of governance has resulted in conflicts and rivalry for power and resources between traditional authorities and other structures and departments of the state in Zimbabwe’s mineral resources sector (Chigwata, 2016). Verbrugge (2015) posited that devolution of substantial powers to local governments in Philippines has happened albeit with conflict with local governments and civil society groups. For instance, local governments in collaboration with the civil society groups and traditional authorities in the Davao Oriental province passed moratoriums banning mining activities on the grounds of environmental protection and disagreements over revenue share in direct contradiction of the central government’s goals. According Verbrugge

(2015:449) “efforts to decentralize mineral resource governance in Philippines; have given rise to a highly ambiguous institutional arena, marked by pervasive uncertainty regarding rule interpretation and enforcement”. The author further noted that institutional struggles have crystallised in the form of intra-governmental conflicts over authority for fiscal regulation in the sector, small versus large scale mining companies over mineral-rich land and inter-tribal conflicts over ancestral land domain rights and the mining royalties associated, in terms of the Indigenous People’s Rights Act. The dominant thinking in literature is that well-intentioned initiatives for decentralisation are fettered by political-economic factors with central government “recentralizing while

52 decentralizing” and the local elites apprehending the freshly decentralized powers as well as resources (Poteete & Ribot, 2011, Pattenden, 2011 Verbrugge, 2015). Despite

Namibia and Botswana having progressive decentralisation policies that transferred more power to communities, the state has continually asserted its authority and more often than not, sought recentralization of natural resources governance. However, in

Botswana and Ghana traditional authorities have continued to play a key role in natural resources governance by exercising authority over decisions on land use (including approval of licences and concessions) and in controlling revenue expenditures

(Chandler, 2013).

According to FAO and UN (2017:1) FAO managed to address natural resource fuelled social conflict, poverty and land degradation through working with the government of

Philippines and the local communities towards the implementation of “inclusive natural resource governance through the gender-sensitive Participatory Planning (PAP) and the rights-based approach”. PAP is a holistic as well as participatory planning approach that uses the local institutional capacity development to foster stakeholder empowerment to reach consensus on the governance of natural resources. Enhanced natural resource governance, empowered participation and increased access to natural resources by local community members are some of the positive results of this approach in Philippines. According to Wushe (2014) in Nigeria, the government and mining companies dominate the process of making decisions in oil exploration and revenue utilisation and other stakeholders like members of the public, civil society and traditional leaders do not have much voice. Whereas the contemporary efforts to enhance accountability and transparency in natural resources governance emphasises the responsibilities and roles of stakeholders, relatively lesser attention is

53 being paid to the elected legislators’ contribution. Yet, the legislative board’s core functions- constituent interests’ representation, making public policy, and executive agencies’ policy implementation oversight are critical to aspects of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion. For instance, following the discovery of

Norway’s oil deposits, elected legislators’ contributions helped in the designing of sound mechanisms for transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion for the nation’s new wealth (Noreng, 2016). Evidence of investigative journalism’s impact on the governance of mineral resources is particularly thin. Nonetheless, media impact on making sense of the ever-burgeoning data volumes being produced in the mining industries is key in fostering transparency and accountability.

Literature cites that private companies, civil societies and the public in general oppose the involvement of the state in mining operations as it has bowed to red tape and bureaucracy, corruption, rent seeking and elite capture, which undermines transparency, accountability, stakeholder inclusion mechanisms (Chandler, 2013).

Zimbabwe has been cited as one of several African countries where the government has been overstepping international law in its endeavour to wrest control and ownership of the mining sector from the private operators.

2.8.1.4 Legitimacy

Legitimacy entails ‘‘the justification and acceptance of shared rule by the community .

. . the legitimacy question concerns who has legal entitlement to make rules and how authority is generated’’ (Bernstein 2005:142–143). Legitimacy speaks about devolvement of power to the lowest ranks where it can be exercised effectively and it also focuses on the integrity “with which this authority is exercised” (Lockhood, et al.,

2015). Lockwood (2015:13) has argued that powers for rights allocation over ‘common property resources’ or for application of sanctions for the violation of the operational

54 rules “should not be assumed by or conferred on bodies that rely exclusively on earned legitimacy”- they should be limited to the institutions with democratically and/or legally derived authorities. Transparency and accountability in the natural resources sector requires democratic as well as mutually supportive local and central governance institutions (European Union, 2017; Kaggwa, 2014). Power exercise should be legitimate. This argument transcends the normative assertion and lies on the pragmatic grounds that for power holders to be effective in the long run, they must be perceived to be legitimate. A legitimate shortfall undermines the public support as well as commitment to development programmes and eventually undermines the power holders’ capability to foster accountability, transparency and inclusivity in resource mobilisation and allocation. While legitimacy is evidently critical for the effective governance of mineral resources, little is known about factors that contribute to stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy or how the perceptions are differentiated socially. It is widely presumed that stakeholder participation has considerable potential to augment the perceived legitimacy of mineral resources governance. The pillaging, illicit deals and human rights abuses in the mining sector highlight the depth of problems of the country’s political economy. Research conducted in Uganda,

Tanzania, Kenya and Mozambique highlighted that a fundamental challenge for decentralised natural resources management was that donors and central agencies chose to operate with multiple partners (private sector and CBOs) spawning rivalry for legitimacy with the elected leaders (Kijazi, 2015; Mbenche, 2015; Madondo and

Jusrut, 2015). Multiplicity of players in the sphere of local government tends to undermine and fragment authority and thus creating accountability and legitimacy challenges. Sibanda (2019) noted that the multiplicity of tax collecting boards (ZIMRA,

Ministry of Mines, and Rural District Councils) is hurting the mineral sector.

2.8.1.5 Fairness The governance theorists purport that given the crosscutting nature of such problems, it is fundamentally essential to ensure that roles and responsibilities do not fall on particular actors unfairly, such as the private interests being anticipated to bear the costs burden for the public good outcomes or burdening the future generations with the present generations’ costs (Carothers and Brechenmacher, 2014). According to the governance theorists respecting and supporting the dignity of stakeholders is a moral obligation and it fosters receipt of outcomes. According to Lockwood et al,

(2010:19), “fair procedures should guarantee that like cases are treated alike, and that where they are irrelevant, the race, gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status of a person do not determine decision-making processes or outcomes”. The theory propounds a governance framework that is informed by fairness ensures that resource allocations and decisions are not biased systematically in favor of any specific sector or individual, unless the bias was needed to deliver on a strategic plan or agreed upon or priorities were articulated clearly for benefit of stakeholders who were not eligible.

Little attention is paid to the concepts of fairness and justice in natural resources governance and whereas natural resource governance aims for equity and fairness, practical guidance on ways to achieve this is scanty.

2.8.1.6 Integration

Integration refers to the coordination across and connection between different levels of governance and policy for efficient deployment of public resources and avoidance of duplication. Integration also entails the alignment of plans, activities and priorities across the governing organisations. According to Lockwood (2015), strategic connectivity has demonstrated to be significant for sustainability in a multi-level governance environment as well as for regional inclusive and sustainable development. Policy design as well as implementation and crafting of management

56 instruments should take into account and be suitable to local conditions particularities.

Nonetheless, this has been elusive in Africa’s mining sector given the dominant bipolar state-mining company relationship. In Zimbabwe lack of integration amongst government agencies like inter alia, Ministries of Mines and Mining Development,

Finance, Environment, ZIMRA, RBZ and RDCs as well unalignment of policy and national laws to the constitution engenders duplication and inefficient allocation of public resources (Murombo, 2016). According to the governance theorists, policy instruments integration could include, for instance, ensuring consistency of the overall policy frameworks that rely on the market-based instruments (Buur, 2013). Prior developing countries case analysis shows that reforms for decentralisation rather than augmenting equity, enabling greater participation of the locals, fostering government responsiveness to the citizens and promoting conservation, often result in power transfers to the private bodies, NGOs and customary authorities, revealing accountability, stakeholder inclusion and legitimacy issues. This experience justifies the necessity for the normative guidance in the establishment of decentralised governance systems.

2.8.1.7 Capability

Capability entails the systems, skills, plans, knowledge, resources, experience and leadership, which enable the institutions and the individuals who direct and manage them to deliver effectively their duties (Maldonado, 2010 and Lockhood et al., 2015).

Solution to the problems of that nature in mineral resource governance should be informed by various knowledge sources, including but not limited to on-ground experience, scientific research and indigenous knowledge systems. The governance theorist purports that free flowing information coupled with effective communication stimulates flexibility and creativity necessary to be proactive to situations (Kagwa,

2014 and Lockwood, 2015). However, safeguards to avoid abuse of knowledge as a means of domination and control have been elusive in mineral resources governance.

Furthermore, in a devolved natural resource governance system, there is a risk, duties and responsibilities will be allocated to the lower tiers without the commensurate resources. In that case, governing bodies’ capacity to deliver outcomes effectively is compromised by inadequate knowledge, flexibility and autonomy.

2.8.1.8 Adaptability

Adaptability refers to the incorporation of new knowledge and learning into decision- making and implementation. It demands a natural resource governing body to be capable of rearranging its internal procedures and processes in response to the alternating external or internal conditions. According to Maldonado (2010) organisations that are anticipatory, strategic, innovative and forwad-looking in its approach is better positioned to reduce unexpectedness, to be responsive to change, read external environment and adapt to the changing needs of the community. A governing body that is adaptable should have procedures for the identification, assessment and management of risk; for short-term and long-term stategic planning and for uncertainities. According to Kagwa (2014) actors should consider the importance of self reflection on their processes, procedures and perfomance through means like reviews and monitoring and evaluation. In the context of complexties and uncertainities, meta-learning or self-reflectivitiy provides crucial information for management, policy planning and adoptive governance (Lockwood et al., 2010).

2.8.1.9 An evaluation of the governance theory The eight principles serve as a basis for developing monitoring as well as evaluation systems for transparency, accountability and inclusiveness in natural resources sectors. They provide structure and motivation from which indicators and outcomes of transparency, accountability and inclusiveness can be constructed. Lockwood et al,

(2010:24) noted that the principles “provide normative guidance for the establishment of good-practice multi-level NRM governance”. Normative standards are fundamental to the establishment of efficient governance institutions since they reflect ideal types of motive, character, action as well as consequences to be anticipated of them.

Following the benchmarking processes, such indicators enable natural resource governance authorities to identify governance deficiencies, track their governance performance and areas that needs improvement. In addition to organisational leaning, such performance monitoring and evaluation can promote transparency, accountability and inclusiveness particularly where it is operationalized in an independent audit form. However, the governance theory was not used as the main theory because the governance perspective’s contribution to theory is not at the causal analysis level. Neither does it provide a new normative theoretical framework to be used as basis for analysing resource governance and socio-economic development.

Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014:8) noted, “Many practitioners remain sceptical of treating accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion as intrinsic to their conception of development”. Broadening the agenda of development on the normative grounds will essentially dilute the central focus on growth and reduction of poverty.

Although the principles proposed by the governance theorists evoke essentially transformative citizen empowerment notions, in practice they risk being abridged to limited citizen consultation forms or technocratic reforms that are reliant on simplistic developmental change theories. According to Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014),

“Uncertainty about the principles’’ instrumental value is aggravated by the unsolved broader debate over the natural resource governance and socio-economic development relationship.

Shifting from the conceptual debates and discussions, practitioners and researchers have found it critical to disaggregate and deconstruct governance into its operational constituents (Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012). In the natural resources context, this attracts attention to the joint ensemble of institutions and rules, which determine the manner of decision making, the decisions taken, the role of stakeholders and actors as well as the flow of power and knowledge in order to enhance transparent, accountable and inclusive governance in the extractive sectors. Informal and formal institutions in mineral resources governance do not only synchronise but they also interact in a dynamic and complex manner. The governance theory fails to bring in the social context that is adequately provided for by the institutional theory. Corporate social responsibility in the mining industry is considered to be operating from the institutional perspective by many scholars. However, until now governance theorists have not provided adequate findings of research on the conjunction between formal and informal institutions in mineral resources governance. In the subsisting literature, loss of traditional resource management methods and lack of apt institutional arrangements have had “adverse effects on people’s control over and their dependability on natural resources” (Shahidullah et al., 2015:94). Collaborative governance models often overlook institutional complexities, particularly those caused by the state’s dominant role in initiating the collaborative processes and inclusion of multiple actors with varying interests. In spite of recognition at the abstract level of the criticality of power for natural resource governance practice, there has been little empirical or theoretical attention paid to explore the power operations in the field. Most studies have indicated that endeavours to implement participatory approaches to natural resources governance can aggravate or reproduce, pre-subsisting social hierarchies within the communities, between the local people as well external actors

(Cooke and Kothari 2001; Raik et al., 2008; Ghatea and Chaturvedi, 2016). For many scholars, strong formal and informal institutional complementarity and good natural resource governance practises have been proffered as fundamental explanatory factors for the remarkable socio-economic performance of resource-rich countries such as Norway and Botswana (Holden, 2013 and Kumah-Abiwu, 2017).

2.8.1.10 The discourse of the governance theory and development Sceptical scholars acknowledge that larger historical as well as statistical relationships between governance principles do not deftly translate into definite policy recommendations. Therefore, they caution against endeavours to impose some generic institutional templates on extremely differing contexts. Yu and Robinson

(2011) noted that sceptics has argued further against the “inclusive governance orthodoxy” underlining that several governments have made momentous developmental progress without espousing the governance principles propounded by the governance theorists. Some scholars downplay the significance of governance in general, instead emphasising the criticality of structural factors such as natural resources, geopolitics, and technological development and geography in the determination of developmental success and failure of a nation. The opposing camp argue that evidence that the good governance aspects are a provision for development is weak citing that the governance structures of East Asian resource rich nations did not tally with the specifics of the model propounded by the governance theorists.

A more prominent school of thought on the sceptical camp recognises the criticality of governance, but disapproves that inclusive or democratic institutions are fundamental to prosperity. Scholars espousing this view advocate instead for an effective and capable developmental state, a model that rose to prominence after the Asian Tigers’ economic rise in the 1990’s. In fact, scholars have maintained that success of these endeavours depended specifically on restricting citizen participation in political

61 processes as well as isolating the state institutions from accountability and transparent mechanisms as well as popular pressure (Yu and Robinson, 2011). Booth (2012:78) argued that the “fragmented, clientilistic governance systems” habitually pose larger obstacles to growth and development than the diverse forms of “developmental patrimonialism” that effectually centralise decision-making. He therefore stresses the significance of state cohesion and capacity, while rebuffing the normative insistence on accountability, transparency and inclusiveness as well as bottom-up pressure as a means to magnify government performance. Following the same line of thought,

Khana (2006) as cited in Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014) criticised the ‘good governance agenda’ for its prioritisation of ‘market-enhancing measures’ like accountability, rule of law, transparency and anticorruption in restricted governance capabilities contexts. Instead, he advocates for more focus on ‘growth- enhancing governance aspects, like the capacity to strategically lure new investment in the extractive sector. Linking the line of thinking of these scholars is a predominant concern that a mere implementation of governance principles can aggravate subsisting collective action glitches, and a caution of good governance approaches which assume political will and state capacity for reform wherein both are deficient.

The governance theory’s value lies in its capacity to offer a framework to comprehend the changing governing processes, standards and principles. The governance framework does not only recognise the complexity in government systems, it also draws attention to the shift in responsibilities and duties onto the private sector, civil society and generally, the citizens. A citizenry that demands rights as well as responsibilities is part of the emerging consensus, which is critical in fostering transparent, accountable and inclusive mineral resources governance.

2.8.2 Rent seeking Theory

Rent seeking as a concept is the notion that transfers are changed into social costs when people expend efforts and real resources in order to capture them. Prior the concept’s invention by Tullock (1967:2) the transfers were considered “as costless redistributions from losers to winners in activities such as regulation and monopolization”. Although initially developed to explicate social welfare losses that are incurred in the establishment of subsidies, tariffs and monopolies, rent-seeking models have been on the forefront of contemporary efforts to explain the phenomenon of resource curse. A mutual theme of the models of rent-seeking behaviour is that political institutions favourable to rent seeking trigger the societies’ failures to optimise benefits from subsoil wealth. When the nation’s wealth is concentrated in the mineral sector and the mineral rents are channeled to the State coffers, the government’s locus of authority and its decision-making framework can shift. Mineral rents control becomes political power basis and institutions attune to maintain the subsisting control patterns in order to capture rents. Deacon and Rode (2015:3) noted that wealth from natural resources is a ‘curse’ instead of blessing to the society when there is no clear definition or respect for property rights and “the wealth become a rent-seeking prize”.

The fact that natural resources are deeply embedded in a specific locality and cannot be reproduced elsewhere forms the basis of the concept of ‘rent’ (Yadav, 2015). Since the majority of governments in less developed countries have monopoly over control and distribution of natural resources, there are elements of misuse and abuse of funds by top government officials.

Generally, natural resources are state owned and therefore if the institutions are moribund and weak, the ruling elite can appropriate them easily. Thus, the state provides the ruling elite with incentives to invest in political power accumulation as well

63 extracting rents accruing from exploitation of natural resources (Wadho, 2014).

However, although natural resources create rents that invite rent seeking activities, given the political participation cost; it is not always lucrative to be corrupt. Matti (2010) argued that when state revenue is derived from the citizen incomes, there is always an incentive to establish an honest and effective bureaucracy to encourage compliance. Contrastingly, generally resource rents do not require similar transparency and accountability levels, due to their external nature. Therefore, resource-rich countries in the developing world spend less time defending and explaining policy decisions.

In a rent-seeking economy, a small elite class capture and monopolises the surplus from the non-renewable resources without the need for reinvestment. Profit needs investment and rent does not. As a result, rent-seeking strategies do not create new wealth and hence constitutes an obstacle for socio-economic development (Cloke et al., 2006). The monopolistic or oligopolistic structure of ownership in a rent seeking economy diminishes the need to diversify the local economy hence the lack of socio- economic development. According to the proponents of the theory, a rent-seeking economy is habitually associated with a culture, which considers change as a threat to its own entire value system, and hence changes, which are necessary for socio- economic development, are thus opposed. One consequence is that the rent seeking economy does not lure foreign investments from outside which are critical for local socio-economic development.

Furman and Orszag (2015) rents can take several forms like higher than the competitive return rates in monopolies, extra income that is earned from an exclusive scarce resource ownership or extra income that is earned from transfers that are politically organised like subsidies. The conventional rent-seeking theory distinguishes

64 lobbying and corruption as rent-seeking forms. One difference between these two activities is related to the question of how the ones making the decisions are influenced. Whether bribes constitute a social waste, has been subject to debate by various rent-seeking theorists. John (2011:171) argued that bribes actually generate rents for state officials and thus a wasteful competition for jobs in the public sector develops. In other words, rent is viewed as the ultimate source for corruption and a platform for abuse of power and control in natural resource sectors. Posner (1975:812) quoted in Lambsdorff (2007) does not support this position arguing, “initially bribes represent pure transfers”. For several economists, resource rents are not supposed to subsist in the long-term, as there will be reallocation of resources, so that factor incomes from various activities will be equal. Therefore, rents are assumed to subsist in the long term because they are maintained by market interventions.

Rent seeking in an economy impose some avoidable costs through the involvement of resource transfers, or alternatively resource use on activities that are unproductive or socially unnecessary and wasteful (Jomo, 2003; Shlapentokh and Woods, 2017).

In the preceding case, resources are just transferred, but they are not diverted from the economy; in the last case, resources are debauched. Economically, rent seeking is considered wasteful because of high costs of the rent seekers’ attempts to alter the structure of claims or rights regimes, through the establishment of new rights or claims.

The conventional theory of rent-seeking makes an assumption that rent-seeking activities only result in monopoly rents creation or protection, and its supposition about the determination of rent-seeking cost is limited. Nonetheless, the contribution of this conventional theoretical framework was principally clarifying the rent-seeking cost as an additional monopoly protection and maintenance cost. There is need for an

65 extension of this theoretical framework if it is going to be applicable to the real world situations.

2.8.2.1 Outcomes of Rent Seeking and their implications on development Rent seeking affect allocation of resources in an economy, in terms of resource deployment and availability. Irrespective of their derivation, resources may either be allocated to productive investments or to rent seeking activities (Jomo, 2003).

Particularly following the distinction by Oslo between ‘growth and distribution coalitions’, redistributive and developmental rents are distinguishable, how they impact the economy and the relationship between them. While the rent seekers are wholly interested in rents, which they can be able to capture for themselves, the social value associated with the rents can widely vary. Therefore, the costs of rent seeking can be relatively low or high, depending on the way in which ‘access to the right’ is structured. Rent-seeking outcomes have varied significantly across countries. The structure of the industrial policy, which was instituted in the early 1960’s in South

Korea, has been documented by Amsden, 1989; Kim and Ma (1997) among others quoted in (Challier, 2018). Torvick’s (2002) rent-seeking model illustrated that natural resource abundance scales up the numbers of entrepreneurs who are engaged in the rent seeking activities and decreases the numbers of entrepreneurs running firms that are productive which fosters the resource curse phenomenon.

Learning rents were created through the use of state subsidies but effective monitoring of performance ensured that “subsidy-recipients” moved up in terms of technology and learning rents were considerably value-enhancing. Contrastingly, in India, the 1960’s industrial policy also targeted to promote the strategic sectors of the economy but the outcomes were not impressive. Production licensing sought to utilise entry barriers to generate rents for the infant industries and to promote new technologies adoption

(Jomo, 2003). Nonetheless, monitoring of performance was weaker, in fact practically

66 not existent, and the rights, which generated the rents, were not reallocated when the performance lagged. An important part of rent-creation in India was of the value- decreasing rents for the competing factions premised on party, community, caste and language. The Malaysian case in the 1970’s and 1980’s is quite different from the

Indian and South Korean ones. The distinguishing features here was redistributive rents creation for the ethnic Malays principally based on transfers dispensed to

Malaysian-Chinese businesses.

Kolstad and Søreide (2009) noted that resource rents induce patronage as national governments pay off loyalists to remain in power, which results in un-accountability and misallocation of the public funds. Pendergast et al., (2011) conducted a study, which focused on evaluating the resource curse by the consideration of the potential for the natural resource rents to trigger rent seeking and corruption that in turn, affect wellbeing or living standard of the ordinary people using case studies of 101 countries across the globe. A regression analysis was done on data compiled from various sources, although most of the indicators came from World Bank. Pendergast et al,.

(2011) came to the conclusion that metals, ores and fuel resources are associated with more rent seeking and corruption, implying that that this category of natural resources may be deemed a curse. On the other hand, forest resources were found to be associated with less corruption and rent seeking, suggesting that the forests resources are more likely to be a blessing. While abundance of natural resources has no direct impact on socio-economic development, Pendergast et al. (2011) found that metals, ores and fuel resources are concomitant with rent seeking activities that has a negative effect to wellbeing, with results to diverse sensitivity analyses and model specifications. Therefore, resource rents’ capacity to augment rather than imped development is largely dependent on the nature of the resources creating the rents

67 and the role played by government institutions and other stakeholders to foster transparency and accountability.

2.8.2.2 Rent-seeking in the post-colonial African State

A look at numerous resource-rich countries on African continent shows widespread evidence of the effects of the rentier state and/or rent-seeking economies with many characterised by lack of democratic governance, relative reliance on the natural resources for creation of wealth, and heightening rent-seeking and corruption levels.

Many nations Africa such as Angola, Democratic republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea among others seems to vividly illustrate the rentier and rent- seeking effects (Obati and Owuor, 2010). Rent-seeking elites as well as public officials in the developing resource-rich nations are seen as the prime corruption source within the extractive sector. Rent seeking theorists believe that corruption in these nations is spawned by the domestic conditions and the solutions to the poverty ‘amidst-plenty phenomenon’ lies at that level.

2.8.2.3 Angola

The Angolan case show the expansion of rent can sustain the interests of the elite at the public’s expense. Angola has been ranked the second in terms of oil exports and the third in terms of diamond exports and yet it remains with one of the highest poverty levels globally. Sources indicate that the rent-seeking scales intensified after 1993 when unanticipated rebel victories abridged the time horizons on both the rebels and government sides and hence the leaders turned to looting (Auty, 2008).

The oil revenues of the government of Angola leaped to US$10billion in 2005 and the oil revenue has constantly taken an upward trend since then but it continues to be ranked as one of the most unequal nations in the whole world (Amundsen, 2014:6).

The country’s gini- coefficient is oddly high, at 0.62 as compared with that of Nigeria which is at 0, 51 and Zambia; 0.45, Indonesia; 0.33 and South Korea (resource- poor)

(World Bank, 2007a:16). Elite plunder, rent seeking activities and corruption seemingly gives a part of the explanation to this disparity (Obati and Owuor, 2010). Auty

(2008:86) argued that the government of Angola “deployed a form of rent cycling that maximises” the rent-seeking scope through the combination of efficient extraction of rent by multinational oil corporations with slack controls on the deployment of rent. The

IMF (2007:46) dryly noted that 1/3 of oil rent in the 1997-2000 period remained unaccounted for, though this does not directly imply that it was dissipated by rent- seeking activities. When the government of Angola resorted to privatisation of state activity in the beginning of the 1990’s as a condition for International Financial

Institutions’ assistance, the elite captured several firms at prices that were undervalued in order to extract rent. Rent is also indirectly extracted “by skimming second round rent expenditure” through monopolies on imports and domestic production as the elite did in Mozambique, Zambia and elsewhere. (Barros, 2012:12).

2.8.2.4 Zambian Statism, Policy Capture and Rent seeking

The espousal of statist policies in Zambia after independence in 1964 to raise welfare and handle political pressures backfired on all accounts by suppressing the market incentives for the efficient allocation of resources and ensconcing rent-seeking activities. The copper boom in the early years after independence (1964-1974) brought economic optimism in Zambia. Auty (2008) noted that the optimism was watered down as the country’s trade terms fell by 2/3 in the end of the 1970’s. Rent-seeking, use of copper rents to maintain a patronage system in government and under-investment in the copper mines saw the collapse of copper production by 438000 tonnes between

2000 and 2008 (Auty, 2008:37). Ethnic competition triggered state overexpansion as

69 regional leaders utilised the public resources to maintain patronage. The bloated public sector facilitated the cycling of rent to the powerful elite through corruption and bribes for mining permits, over-padded public works contracts and biased decisions to serve the interests of the cronies. The then ruling party (United National Independence

Party) retained political support through rent extraction at the competitiveness expense and blaming the subsequent growth decline on adverse external events such as market access deterioration (as the adjacent economies capitulated to civil strife and mismanagement) and declining of copper prices (Moribame,2011).

2.8.2.5 Nigeria Elite Capture, Ethnic Rivalry and Rent Dissipation

Although the policy of Nigeria was less statist than that of Zambia, there was more intense ethnic rivalry and it spawned rent-seeking through the oil boom that subsequently saw markets repression and collapse in economic performance. The rent-seeking recipients’ resistance to economic reform (Ogbonna and Ebimobowei,

2013) elongated this. Transfers of oil rents from the North to the South during the colonial rule were facilitated by the marginalisation policy (Iyoha &and Oriakhi, 2008 and Ncala, 2016). These transfers intensified in the post-independent Nigeria, nonetheless, because the Northerners dominated the presidency more often and eroded the decentralized ownership of revenue principle in order to facilitate more oil rent transfer from the North to the South (Ogbonna and Ebimobowei, 2013).

“Successive federal governments appeased ethnic interests and lost control of rent seeking” (Auty, 2008:10). The author further noted that the deployment of the 1974-

1978 oil windfall aimed to distribute the rent across the ethnic groups through infrastructural and educational investments absorbed nearly half of the public investments. A similar rent distribution was envisioned for the 1979-1981 oil booms.

However, the dispersed oil rent benefited the regional elites at the expense of the rural

70 majority. The regional elites supported indigenization policies in order to extend the scope of state intervention and increase their rent access.

The state patronage expansion identified the Nigerian political parties with their ethnic regions, and blurred the distinctions between personal, party and public finances and eroded accountability and transparency of government revenues. The federal politicians maximised their rent extraction by cutting the retention of the local revenue by below 30% and terminating the civil societies’ leading role in the formulation of policy (Ogbonna and Ebimobowei, 2013:36). Ethnically dispersed rent deployment in

Nigeria subverted macro policy. Rent deployment aimed to placate the ethnic elites had a dire effect of repressing markets and declining economic performance. Rent seeking activities hindered efforts to apportion rent when the oil prices fluctuated. The regional elites perceived economic restructuring and stabilisation as threats due to the fact that competitive markets restrict opportunities for rent extraction (Auty, 2010). Far from improving the majority poor’s welfare, oil rents in the years preceding independence, further impoverished them, they persistently backed ‘ethnic regional redistribution’, which actually favoured the local elites.

Empirical evidence indicates that Mexico, Venezuela and Nigeria enjoyed enormous resource windfalls, but the revenues were dissipated through value decreasing rent seeking activities reminiscent of the Nigerian case. “The poor performance of countries experiencing windfalls is suggestive that increases in public capital expenditure were not productively deployed and that appropriated resources were consumed, invested in safe but inefficient activities, or transferred overseas” (Di John, 2011:172).

2.8.2.6 Botswana as a Counterfactual Best Practice

Botswana has abundant diamonds just like countries such as the DRC; however,

Botswana has performed better in terms of socio-economic development than most

71 countries on the continent. Moribame (2011:6) states, real per capita, generally rose six fold in the Batswana case from 1970-1974 to 2000-2000. According to Moribame

(2011), the case of Botswana highlights elite that recognised a scope within the society to protect their status by the deployment of rent to enhance sustained wealth creation and dispersion. According to Solomon (2012:124) political acumen, institutional capacity and strong leadership are indubitably significant drivers to the success of the country’s mining industry. The establishment of a two parallel system of modern and traditional governance has functioned effectively for Botswana; ensuring accountability and transparency. One accountability mechanism at the level of the traditional authority is the kgotla, which is an adult males’ assembly that deliberate natural resource governance matters with the chief. The institutional establishment as a British protectorate permitted minimal British rule influence, which enabled the country to reinforce its traditional private property right laws whilst embracing the democratic governance style. Another institutional feature, which has promoted good management of resource rents, is the National Development Plans (NDPs). These cannot be revised without the unanimous approval of the legislative and these have constrained rent-seeking and excessive spending by the public officials.

Scholars argues that Just like successful economies like Chile, Malaysia and

Indonesia, Botswana identified four policies to achieve this, (i) appropriate macro adjustment (ii) rent-seeking control (iii) raising the majority poor’s incomes by promoting competitive employment (iv) establishment of a political constituents that are pro-market. The government of Botswana “reacted as if it managed a low rent- economy” and targeted sustained wealth creation and distribution, counting on “a consensual political tradition” and more transparent and accountable management of mineral rent to maintain its authority (Imakando, 2016:140). Though mineral

72 dependence bestowed a central role on the government in the economic sphere, mining taxation raised public spending to 2/3 of GDP (Maipose and Matsheka, 2008:

523), the government instituted a policy for the effective deployment of rent by curtailing rent seeking. The government encouraged private firms by promotion of FDI, through increased public expenditure on services and goods and prudently converting the diamond rent into economic infrastructure and human capital development (health and education). The cautious rent deployment circumvented economic instability as the expanding diamond-mining sector drove rapid economic development of 1970-

1990, similar to the East Asian tigers. The diamond prices stability facilitated effective macroeconomic management and limited the scope for looting of resources and rent- seeking control. This contrasts with dispersed artisanal and small-scale exploitation of alluvial diamonds typical of Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and Angola. Although Botswana is still grappling with socio-economic issues such as poverty and inequality, it has generally performed better in terms of controlling rent seeking and management of its diamond rent stream as compared to other mineral-rich economies on the continent.

2.8.2.7 Limitations and strengths of the Rent Seeking Theory

One of the main weaknesses of the rent seeking economy is that it does not offer explanations beyond the rent seeking narrative. It fails to offer comprehensive explanations of how the costs of rent seeking can be mitigated so as to enhance the public welfare. The theory is narrowly focused on the dynamics of rent seeking in an economy and its outcomes without giving an analysis of the broader underlying macroeconomic factors of rent seeking activities. It does not take into account other social, economic and institutional factors that may cause the resource curse phenomenon. The other shortcoming of the theory is its failure to identify the welfare implications of rent seeking activities and corruption. The theorists fail to account for

73 the implications of rent seeking in the context of globalisation and its long-term socio- economic implications. Critics of the theory also argue that, in practise it is difficult to distinguish between beneficial and detrimental rent seeking and hence theory falls short of providing ways to deal with the repercussions of rent seeking (Pütün, 2015).

The theory does not provide an explanation of how transparent, accountable and inclusive governance can be fostered to curb rent seeking.

However, the resource curse explanations in resource-dependent economies, provided by rent seeking theorists are compelling. The rent seeking theory is befitting to this study since it adequately identifies how natural resource abundance spawn’s competition for resource rents and corruption and how these induces power asymmetries and maldistribution of wealth. The theory proffers a rational explanation of how the government mechanism as the recipient of revenues as well as budget processes are “convenient” for the power groups to appropriate the revenues through government transfers (Akylbekova, 2015:10).

It is arguable that rent seeking in Zimbabwe has been mainly associated with value- decreasing rents and social waste. Hence, the reduced real wealth creation due to poor resource allocation, widening income inequality, poor indicators, loosing of governing revenue as well as national decline. The rise of rent seeking activities in the mining sector of Zimbabwe has proliferated due to lack of transparent and accountable governance, which has spawned maldistribution of wealth and subsequent deterioration of welfare of the ordinary people.

2.8.3 Natural Resource Curse Theory

The natural resource curse theory posits that countries that are rich in resources tend to have slower growth and worse socio-economic development outcomes than

74 countries, which are resource-poor particularly with reference to resources such as oil, minerals and other natural resources (Keenan, 2014). A comparison of the United

Nations Human Development Index (HDI) of resource-dependent countries and non- resource dependent countries since the 1980s shows that resource-rich countries have in general not performed well in key economic and social development areas such as education, health and income compared to non-resource dependent countries. Zimbabwe has experienced receding socio-economic conditions despite a remarkable growth of its mining sector in terms of its contribution to the GDP and therefore the resource curse theory is instrumental in understanding the country’s situation.

Richard Auty, a British Economist in the year 1993, coined the concept of ‘Natural

Resource Curse’. The resource curse has been broadly defined as “the perverse effects of a country’s natural resource wealth on its economic, social, or political wellbeing.” (Ross, 2015:2). The term natural resources have been defined differently in literature. Sachs and Warner (1995) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998) have included not only petroleum and minerals but agricultural commodities as well. However, the latter were precluded in recent literature since they are not extracted but produced, hence fall short of the standard definition of natural resources. Moreover, agricultural commodities are barely correlated with inauspicious outcomes like violent conflicts

(Vahabi, 2017). Scholars still advocate for a broader definition to encapsulate non-fuel minerals. Auty (2001a:90) established that “the per capita incomes of resource-poor countries grew at rates two to three times higher than resource abundant countries between 1960 and 1990”. Ross (2004) also found out non-fuel minerals as well as oil wealth were concomitant with undesirable outcomes for poor people in terms of human development levels and poverty.

There are two schools of thought that have emerged on the natural resource curse narrative; those who advocate for it and those who opposes it. Those who oppose the resource curse theory argue that natural resource abundance should work in the favour of a country by providing it with a revenue source and investment opportunities, which is crucial for socio-economic development. In her two articles, (Brunnshweiler,

2008:42) reacted to the resource curse hypothesis. Firstly, she lodged a strong criticism on the chosen indicators of the resource curse thesis, arguing that with the different methods as well as indicators of measuring natural resource abundance,

“there would be more positive than negative outcomes in a cross-country study”.

Secondly, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) criticised that the hypothesis presented by the resource theorists arguing that institutional capability and quality play a central role in resource rich nation’s economic performance and they believe that research that has been conducted on this subject is inadequate. Ross (2015) agree with the literature on the quality of institutions and the resource curse hypothesis alluding that institutions’ quality is the pivotal factor when making a determination whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing. He listed institutional quality as dependent on variables mentioned as follows; government bureaucracy, rule of law, corruption incidences and the capacity of the state to bolster socio-economic development.

Institutional quality as a resource curse transmission channel, has gained momentum in recent literature but this has not yet been corroborated by quantitative research.

When examining the critiques on the natural resource curse hypothesis measurement, it appears majority of resource curse studies focus on resource abundance effects.

The indicator that is used in the resource curse empirical analysis is derived through dividing the primary exports by the national income measure. By utilising this derived indicator, resource intensity, most studies confirm the negative development trajectory

76 dominant in resource rich nations. This approach is unsatisfactory if resource abundance should be quantified. Two primary reasons are put forward by the opposing camp; firstly, the conclusion of the curse of resource abundance is supposed to be grounded on closest probable estimate of such abundance in the real terms for instance Gross Income Per Capita (GNP). Presuming that a sturdy affirmative correlation between resource abundance and natural resource exports is by no means a definite correlation. This can be disapproved by empirical evidence of resource rich nations with a low natural resource exports percentage. This then is a sign that a negative correlation as primarily of economic policy as opposed to the direct resource curse. Secondly, in the measurement of natural resource export variables, it needs to be taken into account that such variables are volatile. The variations of utilising resource exports as the indicators for the measurement of resource abundance, alters the outcome of the specific indicators in the hypothesis. Brunnschweiler (2008) identified these diverse outcomes from studies who used dissimilar set-ups of resource exports as the indicators. Therefore, the rival camp argues that the first step in the re-examination of the resource curse hypothesis should be to look at it from the dimension of being a natural resource abundance curse rather than as a natural resource export dependence curse, as established by much of literature.

On the other hand, the natural resource curse theorists purport that, natural resources and growth vary inversely (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Gylfason and Zoega,

2001a). Extremely resource rich countries like the Oil States of Mexico, Nigeria,

Venezuela and those in the Gulf region have not had sustained socio-economic development. Smaller and resource deficient nations like Taiwan and Korea had indicated better in terms of economic performance than resource-rich nations like

Mexico, Brazil, China and India (Polterovich and Tonis,2010). The author claimed that

77 all these six countries had begun based on analogous econometric models, called import substitution industrialization or autarkic industrial policy. Taiwan and Korea, due to the mineral endowment differences had to quickly adopt policies, which were more export oriented due to the negative trade terms concomitant with commodity export reliance. Due to the fact that Taiwan and South Africa switched to a model, which was more competitive, fewer imbalances were incurred in their economies as compared to their resource rich- counterparts where the models proved to be very costly (Snyder,

2013).

Some explanations proffered by the resource curse theorists are based on the argument that mineral-rich countries end up overspending mineral rents. Deller and

Schreiber (2012) argued that the argument could only stand when an empirical a study is conducted on the saving behaviour of resource ‘blessed’ nations and do a comparison with those of resource ‘curse’ nations. The opposing camp of the resource curse hypothesis argue that this approach has a challenge that income from natural resources in most countries’ national accounts is not clearly distinctive. Income from various revenue streams is just categorised as general income and not classified according to its origins. Such loopholes render resource curse studies inconclusive, as the causal factors might be copious and complicated to detect.

The argument presented by the resource curse theorists is that a natural resources increase results in economic decline. This pattern is counter-intuitive, because the economic theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, natural resources augment the production possibilities of an economy thus enhancing socio-economic development potential. However, it is important to understand that natural resources abundance is not the direct cause for economic redundancy but rather it induces some distortions in an economy, which then function as transmission mechanisms, which in turn affect

78 socio-economic development. Some of the transmission mechanisms include government mismanagement, corruption, the Dutch disease and low human capital levels.

2.8.3.1 Political institution based explanations

 Rentier States, Resource-Driven Conflict and Weak Institutions According to Matti (2010:402) the ‘rentier state’ approach to the resource curse examines “the effect of resources on the institutional capacity of resource-rich developing countries”. ‘Rentier states’ are those where rent seeking- usage of revenue of the government without the benefit of society is the main government function.

Kumah-Abiwu (2017) noted that rentier activities often occur when a resource-rich country earns enormous revenues to a point where lesser taxes are imposed on the citizens. As Rosser (2007) argued, rentier activities have a potential to diminish the ability of the stakeholders to effectively demand government accountability and transparency due to the established low taxation regime. Incessant calls for transparency, accountability and inclusiveness in the mining sector of Zimbabwe and the ebbing socio-economic conditions points to rentierism and elitism

The state and domestic institutions should play a critical role in the management of natural resource wealthy in order to curb rentier activities and reckless spending of resource rents. Institutions in the resource economies are perceived to suffer from an atypical malady- a caricature of efficient and ‘rational’ decision-making processes

(Ushie, 2017). Rent-seeking models formally advanced by Krueger (1974) and

Bhagwati (1982) provide credence to the devastating impact of state interventionism, rentier economies and rent seeking. The availability of large resource rents is perceived to cause “extreme policy myopia” in the resource-rich nations (Heinrich,

2011). Zimbabwe has no substantive mineral policy and has relies on unremitting

79 amendments of the Mines and Minerals Act of 1960, which does not address issues of transparency, accountability and inclusiveness in the mining sector.

Abundance of natural resources strengthens the well-connected elite groups, in turn piling pressure on the governments to pursue policies that serve these powerful and influential groups’ interests rather than the poor people’s interests. The availability of huge rents earned from natural resource exports increases the citizens’ demand for efficient redistributive policies, and the state capitulates by distributing the revenue among various interests in the short-run, when the revenue could be saved for future usage (Ushie, 2010, 2018).

If government is not dependent on the revenue from the populace for its spending and expenditures, politicians often utilise the resource rents irresponsibly because less pressure may be exerted by the populace for the delivery of adequate and efficient public services. This is opposed to the situation where more of the government revenue is derived from the taxpayers due to citizen demands for transparency and accountability (Renner, 2002; Diallo, 2015). Government revenues in Zimbabwe are derived from various sources such as mining, agricultural, tourism industries and public taxes and lack of transparency and accountability on these have spawned widespread protests and ‘national shutdowns’ which intensified beginning in 2015 umpteenth.

One of the fundamental reasons for the stagnation of resource-rich countries, when paying attention to the significance of governance in the facilitation of mineral-led development, is that mineral resource wealth motivates conflict and discord amongst the domestic stakeholders, like politicians, local tribes, developers and citizens (Bodea et al., 2016). Zimbabwe has been on record when it comes to conflicts in the political spectrum and in artisanal and small scale mining activities, repressions and human

80 rights violations (for instance state-sanctioned violence in Chiadzwa diamond fields in

Marange) and government illegitimacy which has allegedly attracted Western sanctions on the country as highlighted by (Mawowa, 2013 &and Spiegel, 2015). This makes Zimbabwe emblematic of a resource cursed country.

A political analysis conducted by Paul Collier an Oxford University-based scholar found that for any given 5-year period, the probability of a civil war in a non-resource rich African country ranges from below 1% to almost 25% in natural resource-rich countries on the continent (Ross, 2015). In the DRC, mining activities have traditionally provided funding for the rebel groups. Political and economic elite as well as rebel groups smuggle minerals for their own benefit whilst the ordinary Congolese do not benefit from the generated profits. This increases the inequality gap between the rich and poor in the DRC (Sells, 2013). Empirical evidence highlights a connection between mineral riches and conflict. Minerals have spawned the Angolan Civil wars,

South Sudan rebellions and Western Sahara disputes in Morocco (De Waal, 2014).

The Mariakana massacre in 2012 was fuelled by mining disputes as the Lonmin platinum mine workers struck for higher wages as they perceived the income gap between themselves and the senior management as extremely unfair (Alexander,

2013). Social injustice due to rent seeking activities was phenomenal in Colombia.

Therefore, large rents from mineral wealth have a high probability of motivating rent- seeking activities and intensification of domestic conflict.

According to Ngwu and Ugwu (2015) regardless of the wide acceptance of rentierism as a general approach to the resource curse theory, it has been criticised on several grounds. Firstly, it is applied to the states’ identification as rentier, leaving slight variation on dependent or independent variable. Secondly, to attain their desired generality level, proponents of the rentier state approach to the resource curse theory

81 often present their variables slackly defined resulting in the typical case of Sartori’s

‘conceptual over-stretch’. That is a theoretical framework with an impressive generality level but an unsatisfactory validity level (Ross, 2007: 10-11, Ngwu and Ugwu,

2015:423). Therefore, it is imperative to understand mineral governance and socio- economic development using the resource curse theory as a basis of analysis.

2.8.3.2 Market Based explanations of the resource curse  Commodity Price Volatility and Resource Dependence Economists have argued that the volatile nature of the global market prices of mineral resources is one of the various channels through which the phenomenon of resource course operates. The Guardian (2015) cited that crude oil revenue provides 75% of

Nigeria’s annual budget but since the oil price dive in 2014, Nigeria’s currency, the

Naira has depreciated by 1/5 of its value (Waidi, 2016). In 2015, economic growth in the Sub-Saharan region dropped to 4 percent owing to the region’s “vulnerability to falling commodity prices since it is a net exporter of oil and mineral commodities” (The

World Bank Group’s-Africa’s Pulse Magazine, 2015). Volatility of global market prices diminishes economic growth and development, quite apart from commodity prices trends. Instability and fluctuation of the resource commodity prices on the global market affects the stability and reliability of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues, theatrically spawning huge government deficits.

 The Dutch disease and Natural Resource Booms. The ‘crowding out’ approach assists in giving an explanation why countries that are resource-rich lack often export diversification. It puts a proposition that during the price booms the ‘resource sector’ attracts human and capital resources from the other

‘growth-driving sectors’ in the economy such as education, agriculture and manufacturing. As a result, the prices of such inputs rise in the local market and production costs of other export sectors like agriculture and manufacturing increase, thereby contracting these vital sectors thereby affecting local economic development

(Ushie, 2017). This is reflected by the Dutch disease models developed by Corden and Neary (1982), van Wijnbergen (1984), Neary and Wijnbergen (1986) which have shown two significant effects of the ‘commodity price windfalls’, namely ‘a resource movement effect and a spending effect’

2.8.3.3 Limitations of the Resource Curse theory As an analytical framework in resource-based economies, the resource curse has limitations as to how these same countries could use their resource-revenue to move beyond the resource curse and promote socio-economic development. One of the shortcomings of the theory arises primarily from the reductionists’ pursuit for a ‘one big explanation’ for natural resources’ role in development. The resource-curse theorists’ generalisation that resource wealth production hurts the economy tends to overlook the convolution of socio-economic development in diverse countries under different contexts.

According to Amin (2014:22) the theory “does not stand the test of time” in which economic integration and globalisation are reshaping international trade and development, wrought by TNCs and MNCs that are inherently becoming powerful both economically and politically. The theory overlooks other significant factors that induces fiscal instability like trade sanctions, unsustainable foreign debts (high interest’s payments), and “short-term capital flows” (Raik et al., 2008). Furthermore, the resource curse theory does not address the question of how state institutions can be manipulated to foster transparency, accountability and inclusiveness towards a resource-led development.

2.8.3.4 The Applicability of the Resource Curse Theory However, the resource curse theory is that it provides an in-depth analysis of the internal and external underlying factors that induce the resource curse phenomenon in resource-rich countries. (Di John, 2011). The theory clearly accounts for the political

83 and economic transmission channels of the resource curse phenomenon, which undermines stakeholder inclusion, accountability and transparency in the mineral sector. Literature review has demonstrated the resource curse as an analytical framework for resource-rich countries as it measures well in accounting for the structural as well as development challenges confronting many resource-rich countries. Empirical evidence has proved that there can be an inverse relationship between natural resources and socio-economic indicators such as literacy, income and life expectancy (resource curse) (Kwaramba et al., 2015). Therefore, the resource curse was used as the main theory underpinning this study because it provides comprehensive insights on how mineral resources policy swaying and capture for the interests of the elite in the mining industry, institutional subversion corruption and rent seeking activities by the influential interest groups which engender lack of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion. The resource curse theory also clearly accounts for how mineral wealth actuates conflict and discord among stakeholders like citizens, local tribes, politicians, the government, civil society and private mining corporations which undermine accountability, transparency and inclusivity in the sector. Furthermore, the theory gives an explanation of how global market upsurges makes it difficult to measure mineral revenues which provides challenges to transparency and accountability mechanisms in mineral-rich countries.

These insights have provided a basis for understanding the resource curse phenomenon and designing of a model for resource governance and socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe.

2.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, the ideal constituents of good mineral resources governance are still debated. Whether the concept is an ideal for socio-economic development remains

84 subject to criticism by various scholars. The fact that mineral resources are location- specific and infinite induces policy myopia; thus spawning conflict, rent seeking and corruption, undermining of state institutions and maldistribution of mineral wealth. The literature is aligned to the belief that socio-economic, as well as political well-being of natural-resource-rich countries is highly dependent on the actors who are involved.

Nonetheless, the literature has fallen short of illuminating the kinds of governance traits as well as the international interventions requisite to overcome resource curse.

While it is not disputable that governance is not the automatic panacea for fostering mineral-led development, it is likewise true that it is the basis for more inclusive and equitable framework for mineral wealth distribution. Although the initial wave of literature put an emphasis on the negative effects of natural resource abundance

(resource curse), recent work underscores how local institutions can condition the relationship, to induce positive outcomes. Zimbabwe’s mining legal framework lacks provisions for public participation, information access and protection of local communities. In the absence of comprehensive and stronger policies, mining sector development have had limited downstream effects on the country’s socio-economic front. Some countries have interpreted international laws or protocols differently, which has affected their implementation in different contexts. The political and regulatory context of Zimbabwe puts hurdles on the international and non-state actor championed transparency as well as accountability initiatives and thus they have been difficult to enforce against state actors, the state itself and corporates. The resource curse and rent seeking economy has been used as theoretical frameworks to primarily understand the transmission channels for the resource curse and how these can be plugged. The governance theory has been used to explain how good governance of mineral resources can plug the resource curse. However, the governance theory tends

85 to overlook governance capabilities that are critical for productive capacities’ transformation and broad-based socio-economic development. The resource curse has been used as the main theory to understand mineral resource governance and socio-economic development and as basis for modeling pathways for mineral-led development in Zimbabwe. This is because the theory provides insights and compelling explanations of how the resource curse abounds which is instrumental in chatting the way forward. Although the governance and rent seeking economy theories are good and pertinent it is the resource curse theory that speaks to the core issues of the study. The succeeding chapter discusses the research methodology adopted for this study.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

3.1 Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to unpack the research methodology that was used in order to gather data on mineral resources governance (focusing on three indicators of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion) and socio-economic development (focusing on three indicators of health, education and household incomes). Research methodology is a framework of procedures, practices and rules that are employed by researchers in order to solve research problems (Creswell,

2009). It is a theoretical and systematic analysis of the body of ideologies and approaches linked with a knowledge division. Typically, it embraces concepts like theoretical models, paradigm, phases and qualitative or quantitative techniques. Every research methodology depends on the study’s underlying philosophical assumptions

(Haq, 2015). As such, the methodology of this study was aligned to the topic under study in informing how the data could be drawn. Furthermore, the methodology was informed by the four objectives that this study sought to address, outlined in Chapter

1. Several approaches utilises different analytical and philosophical repertoires to explain, investigate or theorise the diversity of group or individual experiences as they happen within broader discourses, structures as well as power relations.

3.2 The study methodology There are numerous methodology types (qualitative, quantitative, historical and mixed methods approaches) that are utilised in the quest to get an in-depth understanding of research problems. According to Babbie (2007) and Azam (2012) quantitative research is an inquiry into an identified problem, based on testing a theory composed of numbers, measured with numbers and analysing using statistical techniques and the goal is to determine whether the predictive generalisations of a theory hold true.

On the other hand, qualitative research methodologies are a scientific approach that attempts to give meaning to certain experiences by describing human behaviour, belief systems and cultural phenomena. “It is less structured in description, because it formulates and build new theories” (Mohajan, 2018:2). Historical research can be defined “as the systematic collection and objective evaluation of data related to past occurrences in order to test hypothesis concerning causes and effects” (Mcdowell,

2013:4). The study utilised mixed methods or the triangulation approach as the foundation for the collection and analysis of data. The mixed methods approach has been widely described “as the third methodological movement or the third research paradigm” (Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010:22). This was after the dominance of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. While several philosophical frameworks support mixed methods approaches, some authors believe that they work more plausibly in practise rather than in theory. Newman and Benz were amongst the first proponents of the Quali-Quanti continuum in 1998. Instead of dichotomising qualitative and quantitative methods, “mixed methods rejects the dichotomy and relies on a continuum in which research maybe predominantly qualitative or predominantly quantitative” (Newman and Ridenour 2008:27). The interactive continuum is viewed as a research holistic approach, which incorporates theory building and theory testing as the mutual purposes of quantitative and qualitative researches.

Mixed methods’ uniqueness is that it utilises both quantitative and qualitative approaches to get an understanding and in depth meaning of a certain phenomenon utilising statistics and epistemological analysis. The mixed methods approach was used in this study to gain an in-depth understanding of how issues of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion affects socio-economic development in terms of household incomes, health and education in the Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi,

Kwekwe and Shurugwi rural districts. The approach befitted this study which sought to investigate whether there is a resource curse in Zimbabwe or not, with a view to model pathways for mineral resource governance for socio-economic transformation.

A single pronged methodological approach could not provide deeper insights. The integration of methodological approaches reinforces the research design, “as the strengths of one approach offsets the weaknesses of the other” and can proffer a more substantial and comprehensive evidence than the mono-method studies (Creswell and Creswell, 2017:7). The mixed methods are used to address theoretical perspectives at various levels, address the research questions at various levels, outdo single design weaknesses and compliment single design strengths (Biddix, 2009:1).

Complementarity of the two methods was fundamental in understanding the nature and extent resource curse in Zimbabwe and in modelling pathways for the way forward. This study used various types of triangulation, which included methodological triangulation, investigation triangulation, theoretical triangulation, and data triangulation in order to understand the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development.

According to Creswell and Clark (2017) mixed methods offers better particularity as well as generality, dimensionality and magnitude, verification and deeper understanding. The mixed methods approach therefore intensifies and strengthens

89 the effect and augments the adaptability and flexibility of the research design

(Creswell, 2014). The use of mixed methods was instrumental in ensuring that bias that could have been in-built in a single approach could cancel or diffuse bias of other approaches. Another practical benefit was that mixed methods encouraged interdisciplinary collaboration as well as multiple paradigm use. Use of mixed methods was useful in conducting the research, as the strength of each of them were complimentary.

Mixed methods approach was chosen for this study as a means of maintaining some quantification aspects and at the same time integrating interpretive concerns on meaning and subjectivity. Both text as well as numeric information was utilised as the ultimate information denotes both qualitative and quantitative information. To gain a deeper understanding subject under study in Mhondoro Ngezi, Chegutu, Kwewke and

Shurugwi, a concurrent procedure was operationalized to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. This was helpful in corroborating, cross validating and confirming the research findings from the different designs while scrutinising the same phenomenon.

It is widely acknowledged that an in-depth understanding of research problems is enhanced by qualitative rather than quantitative methodology, whereas, greater objectivity and generalisation is obtained through quantitative methodology.

Therefore, qualitative and quantitative methods “should be seen as complimentary rather than incompatibles” (Rimondini, 2010:260). Quantitative methods can be comprehended as satellites around the qualitative research central axis, proposing and filling out ideas and theoretical frameworks as they are developed from the research. In that respect, quantitative method served as a complementarity in

90 situations where the qualitative approach was inadequate. To that end, use of the multiple methodological approaches aimed to provide a holistic perspective of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development using qualitative and quantitative analysis.

3.3 Research Paradigm According to Kivunja and Kuyini (2017) a paradigm describes the worldview that is informed by philosophical assumptions about the nature of social reality. Research paradigms are classified into three philosophically distinctive categories and these are interpretivism, positivism and critical postmodernism. The mixed methods approach is rooted in the post-positivism paradigm. Post-positivism is driven by the critical realism philosophy. According to Haverkamp et al, (2005) and Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) the post-positivism paradigm can be differentiated from positivism based on whether the research focus is on theory distortion (post positivism) or theory confirmation

(positivism). Just like the positivists, post-positivists subscribe to the idea that authentic independent human thinking that can be measured through scientific methods. Critical realism, nonetheless pinpoints that observations are liable to errors and those theories are modifiable. Objectivity can however be attained by utilizing multiple measures as well as observations and triangulation of the data to get a clear understanding of reality (Chilisa and Kawulich, 2012). Post-positivists (logical empiricists) subscribe to the idea that natural scientists and social scientists share the same research goals and employ similar investigation methods. This study was rooted in post-positivism paradigm since it sought to establish the strength of the correlations between mineral resources governance indicators (transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion) and socio-economic development indicators (household income, education and health) in the four districts.

Post-positivism mixes the benefits of positivism and interpretivism ideas, hence it was deemed suitable to guide this study. Quantitative method is informed by the positivism paradigm, which is aligned to the notion that social reality exists in the same way as physical reality and that this reality can be captured and measured (Devos et al, 2011).

The quantitative paradigm ensured that quantified perceptions of the larger sample, which was constituted by households from the four districts was attained.

The qualitative method relies on interpretivism and thus it investigates phenomena through understanding the views, opinions, beliefs, culture and way of life of the people. Polit and Beck (2010) who posited that qualitative paradigm uses a constructivist/naturalistic approach, which suggests that reality can be constructed, qualified the use of qualitative paradigm in this study. As a result, the researcher paid attention to the participant’s views and experiences and interpretation of the subject of mineral resource governance and socio-economic development in the four districts.

To that end the interpretivist paradigm, was very instrumental in unearthing underlying beliefs, thoughts, perceptions and attitudes of small samples pertaining the subject under study.

3.4 Research Design Research designs are about organising research activities, including data collection, in order to achieve the predefined research aims (Wong, 2017). It involves all aspects that play a major role in developing and implementing a research project, from project formulation through reporting and dissemination of the research findings. Common research design in social sciences includes case studies, phenomenology, ethnography, biography and grounded theory (Creswell, 2013). This study followed a case study design (which are popular in the field of social science) focusing on four

92 rural district of Chegutu and Mhondoro-Ngezi (Mashonaland West Province) and

Shurugwi and Kwekwe (Midlands province).

There are three kinds of case studies and these includes exploratory (which play the preliminary research role), explanatory (which seeks to explain causal links between variables under study and descriptive (which provides a full description of a phenomenon within its context) (Crowe et al, 2011). This study adopted the descriptive case study approach since it sought to understand and describe the relationship between mineral resources governance and socio-economic development. Nueman

(2011) noted that descriptive strategy aims at describing the phenomenon under study. Under this case study design, a researcher can examine the data within a real life context and this can be through the selection of a small geographical area or a limited number of individuals as the subjects of study (Zainal, 2007). Case studies speak to “questions of why and how” and, in that light they provide context and offers a complete picture of the phenomenon under study (Baskarada, 2014:15).

The case method in this study involved in depth and longitudinal examination of the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development. Case studies are adaptable and flexible to a wider array of contexts. To that end, the case study approach was used to interrogate the efficacy of government policies as well practises, policy formulation and implementation, transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion mechanisms in the four districts’ mineral sector. Furthermore, it was used to understand the development outcomes of mineral resources governance.

3.5 Qualitative Research Methodology Qualitative research is widely accepted as a legitimate inquiry form in social sciences, and researchers of various methodological persuasions acknowledge its value in eliciting in-depth and contextualised information. Additionally, since social

93 phenomenon is complex, different methods and approaches were needed to comprehend social problems (Cacciattolo, 2015). According to Merriam (2009: 13),

“qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, which is how people make sense of their world and experiences”.

Qualitative research was employed in order to gain an in-depth understanding of various issues, which ranged from mineral resources governance, transparency, accountability, stakeholder inclusion, socio-economic conditions, local participation, and revenue sharing and so on. Qualitative research enabled the participants to share their perceptions, opinions, experiences, beliefs and views on the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development. The qualitative approach examines the how and why certain decisions are made, not only the where, what and when. The subjective experiences of individuals are significant and should be seriously considered. The researcher managed to get an understanding of the experiences of people by listening to them and networking with them.

Creswell (2009:25) posited that in qualitative research the researcher builds a complex holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducted the study in a natural setting. Qualitative methodology is inductive rather than deductive, which means that qualitative scientists develop their understanding in the study’s progression process. This means that researchers will not derive their findings based on preconceived assumptions, but should let the respondents directly provide data. Therefore, the researcher interacted with participants, through which the general direction of gathered information was pursued and analysed. Although qualitative method has some disadvantages (time consuming and lacks generalisability), some social realities were best revealed through this research method.

3.6 Quantitative Research Methodology Quantitative research methodology, which is rooted in the positivist paradigm, has been historically a pillar of research in the field of social sciences. Purists call for the researchers to, “eliminate their biases, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of study and test or empirically justify their stated hypotheses” (Terrell,

2012:6). Quantitative research uses statistical analysis to proffer a significant link between “pragmatic observation and statistical expression of numerical data relationships” (Kyeyune, 2010. 45). The approach espouses a scientific approach and positivist orientation based on the understanding that facts, which are observable and measurable objectively, makes up the world. Besides its objectivity, the approach allows a researcher to duplicate in numerous areas or over a period with the construction of some comparable outcomes. The quantitative approach, with proper sampling allows for the measurement of many subjects’ reactions to a set of questions.

Since each question has a limited set of answers, the results can be compared and analysed statistically. In addition, they can also be generalised to the larger population within the known limits of error (Warwick and Lininger, 1975; Fraenkel et al., 2011).

The form of quantitative research that was used was the survey in which households in the rural districts of Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi, Kwekwe and Shurugwi were asked a series of questions and it was ideal for studying large numbers of people. Since the quantitative methodology is rooted in the positivist paradigm, the researcher carried a survey and numerically measured mineral resources governance indicators of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion as well as socio-economic development indicators of health care, education and household income. Most questions on the questionnaire had a limited set of answers and thus the results analysed statistically. Only a few questions were open ended in order to allow the

95 participants to share their views. According to Creswell (2007), quantitative research enables the researcher to validate relationships while in qualitative research the information obtained from participants is expressed in descriptive form.

3.7 Units of Analysis The unit of analysis may be an individual, group of people, artefacts (books, newspapers or photos) or even a corporation. Units of analysis entail the major entity that the researcher analyses in his/her study (Milford et al., 2013). The units of analysis are often intricately connected to economic, social, political, personal and historical issues therefore providing platforms for research questions. In order to understand mineral resource governance and to examine whether there is a natural resource curse in Zimbabwe, the units of analysis in this study included;

i) the four rural districts’ households (because they are the ones that are

directly affected by the study subject),

ii) relevant government ministries, rural district councils traditional institutions,

mining companies (Pickstone Peerless Mine,Zimplats Platinum Mine, Jena

Mine and Unkie Mine)

iii) CSOT/s (Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba-operating in Mhondoro-Ngezi,

Chegutu and Zvimba districts and Tongogara-operating in Shurugwi and

iv) Civil Societies (ZIMCODD which is an advocacy coalition for social as well

as economic justice in the country’s diverse sectors including the natural

resource sectors and ZELA which is a public interest civil society that seeks

to promote equitable and sustainable utilisation of natural resources,

environmental justice and good natural resources governance). These two

civil societies were included because the views of each civil society are

subject to their relationship with the state and their involvement in the mining

sector, and whether they have competing interests or not. These units of

analysis were chosen because they are the ones that are directly involved

in the governance of mineral resources and planning for socio-economic

development at the local and national levels. v) The ministry of Finance and Economic Development was chosen because

it is the oversight ministry; managing revenue flows from the mining sector

and other sectors as well as mobilizing funds for public resources. The

ministry of Mines and Mining Development was selected because it has the

key mandate of governing the country’s mining sector and to leverage it for

sustainable socio-economic development. vi) The ministries of health and education also constitute the units of analysis

because these are the ministries respectively responsible for health and

education; two of the indicators used to measure socio-economic

development in the four rural districts. vii) The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing also

constitute the unit of analysis because it has the obligation to stimulate

sound local governance, to coordinate and undertake urban and rural

development. viii) Rural district councils, traditional institutions, CSOT/s who were also units

of analysis in the study, constitutes the local government structures and falls

under the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National

Housing. These local government structures are key stakeholders to the

governance of mineral resources and local development in line with the

provisions of devolution in the country’s new constitution

(‘Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act, 2013’).

3.8 A profile of the Mining Districts The hierarchy of the District administrator governs the district through the RDC Act, shouldering the mandate of supervising the conservation and exploitation of natural resources, and infrastructure as well as service provision. Reporting to the DA are the

Rural District Counsellors. The RDC is the only rural local governance body that is democratically elected at district level as provided by section 275.2.b of the 2013

Constution.This study targeted the rural parts of Chegutu (run by Chegutu RDC),

Mhondoro-Ngezi (Mhondoro-Ngezi RDC), Kwekwe (Zibagwe RDC), and Shurugwi

(Tongogara RDC). The chiefs are on top of all the district wards, Headmen oversee the wards, village heads oversee the villages and the Village Development

Committees (VIDCOs) form part of the hierarchy of traditional leadership. The chiefs and their traditional hierarchies are responsible for allocation of water use and land rights and petty crimes arbitration at the local level. This dual governance system has been muddled and chaotic due to supremacy battles between traditional leaders and

RDCs (Chitotombe, 2012).

3.8.1 Background and Profile of Mhondoro-Ngezi district Mhondoro-Ngezi Disctrict is located along the great dyke. The district is constituted by

16 wards namely Resettlement Schemes, communal as well as commercial farms and peri-urban areas (Mkodzongi and Spiegel, 2019). The district is endowed with platinum group minerals as well as other base metals. A wide assortment of mining activities takes place in the district ranging from ASM Mawowa (2013) to large-scale mining activities undertaken by the “South African owned ZIMPLATS and the Chinese owned ferrochrome mines” (Makore & Zane, 2012). Muruviwa et al., (2018:5) noted, “In an environment that is characterised by scarce job opportunities, Zimplats is the biggest employer employing approximately 25% of the total population” and the second biggest employer is the government (Pindula, 2017:2).

3.8. 1.1 Population and Socio-economic Profile According to World Population Review (2019:1), currently Mhondoro-Ngezi has a population of 104,342 people. The District’s population is relatively young with 41 percent below 15years and about 4 percent are aged 65 years and above. The district is home to people of diverse cultural and tribal backgrounds and these includes the

Ndebele, Chewa, and Shona. The education of Mhondoro-Ngezi district has also endured the worst of the country’s economic collapse and educational infrastructure is in a dire state. Mhondoro-Ngezi constituency has more than 36 primary schools enrolling more than 16 032 pupils per year and the teacher to patient ratio has recently rose to 46:1 (Pindula, 2017). There are approximately 10 secondary schools in the district enrolling about 8190 pupils per year and the teacher to student ratio is also high (Pindula, 2017). Fourteen health institutions service the district and these include

2 rural hospitals and 7 rural health centres as well as four clinics. According to

Mkodzongi (2016), most of these health institutions are experiencing severe power outages, acute drug shortages, shortage of health personnel and medical equipment.

Mkodzongi and Spiegel (2019) further noted that the public health system is ineffective and there is lack of accountability in the province’s health sector. “The district has a high rate of unemployment; which economists has pegged at more than 66%” (Ndlovu,

&and Tigere, 2018).

3.8.2 Background and Profile of Chegutu district Chegutu was established in 1891 by gold prospectors as a mining settlement and mining of minerals like gold, platinum and chrome remains vital. The mining district is located 100 kilometres South-West of Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. Simba et al,

(2015:14) noted, “Chegutu District is primarily a mining district”. Traditionally, Chegutu district has accounted for approximately 30% of Zimbabwe’s gold output annually (A-

Z Environmental Consultancy, 2008:15 and Parliamentary Research Document,

2011). Currently the dominating economic activities in the area are artisanal and small- scale gold mining and large-scale platinum mining.

The leading sectors in the Chegutu local economy are mining and farming (Simba et al., 2015:4). According to Parliamentary Research Document (2011) David Whitehead

Textiles and other dominant employers like Cargill in the area closed in 2009 spawning high unemployment levels. Large scale mines such as RioTinto’s Cam, Gadzema

Mine and Motor Mine (arguably the largest producer of gold in Zimbabwe’s history),

Pickstone Peerless and Jena Mines (50% state owned) are operating in the district.

(Ministry of Mines and Mining Development 2017: i). Commercial farms like Stockdale

Estate and Hippovalle Farm are no longer productive and the farming equipment have either been sold or destroyed by the new black farmers (Simba et al., 2015).

3.8.2.1 Population and Socio-economic Profile Chegutu mining district has a population of 50,590 people and 53% of the population are females (World Population Review, 2019:1). The collapse of white commercial agriculture and big companies such as David Whitehead Textiles, Cargill and the state owned Elvington mine amongst others spawned high unemployment and poverty rates in the Chegutu district. According to Budzi (2016) the populations’ formal unemployment rate is 64, 6% that means that most members of the population are unemployed and they mainly depend on the informal sector jobs like ASM, vending and so on (Masekesa and Chibaya: 2014:8

The major causes of morbidity as well as Malaria in the district are HIV/AIDS, malaria,

Tuberculosis and malnutrition. Just like the rest of the country’s districts, the exodus of professionals to neighbouring South Africa and Botswana as well as western countries (Budzi, 2016) gravely affected Chegutu’s health and education sectors. This has compromised the quality of services in the district’s health and education facilities.

100

3.8.3 Background and Profile of Kwekwe district Kwekwe district is located in central Zimbabwe, about 68 kilometres north of the

Midlands province’s capital; Gweru and equidistant from the country’s second largest city of Bulawayo and capital city of Harare (Mumanyi, 2014). Kwekwe is endowed with about 20 mineral deposits and these includes iron, nickel, gold amongst others and large scale mines currently operating in the district include Jena Mine, Global and

Phoenix mine, Pipermoss mine and ZIMASCO (Ministry of Mines and Mining

Development, 2018). Kwekwe district is also agriculturally opulent, endowed with rich soils for cash crops and livestock production. The lack of formal employment opportunities and the lack of irrigation equipment and capitalisation in resettlement farms have railroaded most people, including farmers into gold panning. The district is comprised of hoary resettlement areas, small scale and commercial farming area as well as newly FLTRP resettled A1 (about 30 hectares) and A2 (ranging from 30 to 300 hectares) farmers (Mumanyi, 2014).

3.8.3.1 Demographics and socio-economic profile The district has a diverse population, with a higher proportion of females and a larger number of people residing in urban areas. According to Chibwana, 2016:74) the national census of 2012 reflected that the district had a “population of 174 727 people

(86 698 males and 88 029 females)”. The Zimbabwe Poverty Atlas (2015:164) conducted a poverty mapping exercise of Kwekwe and other districts in Zimbabwe and indicated that Kwekwe had a poverty prevalence of 61, 8%. Chazireni and Tembo

(2018) conducted a research that focused on examining the provision of health, using multicomponent index method for data analysis in the Midlands province. Chazireni and Tembo (2018) noted that health inequalities were grounded on economic, social, political and political factors in Kwekwe.

101

3.8.4 Background and Profile of Shurugwi district Shurugwi district is located about 350 kilometres south of the country’s capital, Harare.

Two local authorities namely, Shurugwi Town Council (which administers urban wards) and Tongogara Rural district council (which run rural wards) run the district.

Shurugwi remains a vital mining centre for chrome, nickel, gold and most recently platinum (Chiunya et al., 2017). Huge platinum reserves were discovered on the turn of the new millennium in Shurigwi district, leading to massive mining investments by

Todal and Unki mining corporations (Britannica, 2017).

The district’s major land uses include mining, agricultural, forest, industrial and residential (settlement) areas (Mhembwe and Dube, 2017). A sizable number of people (about 1500) have turned to artisanal mining/gold panning (largely done nearby

Mutirikwe River and around Boterekwa Mountains for survival against the backdrop of a deepening economic crisis and rising as well as unemployment rates (The Chronicle,

2019). This has sparked conflicts between miners and agriculturalists. Large-scale mines that are currently operating in the district include Zimasco Mine (ferrochrome producer), Camperden Mine (gold) and Unkie Mine (platinum) (Ministry of Mines and

Mining Development, 2018).

3.8.4.1 Demographics and Socio-economic Profile According to World Population Review (2019), Shurugwi has a total population of

17075 people. The district has experienced a population decrease “from 86 820 in

2002 to 77 460 in 2012” (Matsa and Masimbiti, 2014). This is attributable to FTLRP, which induced significant movements of families to other districts to settle in new farming plots. Other possible reasons are outmigrations to big towns and the Diaspora during the 200-2009 hyperinflationary decade. The Karanga ethnic people, who reside in most of the district’s urban and rural areas, predominantly constitute the district’s population but there are also minorities like Zezuru and Ndebele speaking people.

102

(Mhembwe and Dube, 2017). The district has several primary schools and these include Bokai, Vungwi, Chitako, and Matamba among others. Secondary schools include Rusununguko, Bokai and Mupangai among others (Matsa and Masimbati,

2014). Health centres in Shurugwi district include Zvamawande rural hospital,

Shurugwi Hospital and Tongogara cinics among others. However, most of the aforementioned areas are hardly accessible due to poor untarred roads networks, majority of which are damaged.

3.9 Population and Sampling According to DeVos et al (2011:14), “a population is a set of entities where all the measurements of interest to the researcher are represented”. Population is the total number of objects or people that possess the characteristics that are questioned by the study (Kuada, 2012). Individuals or objects in a certain population often have a common, binding characteristic or trait. It entails the specification of the survey group, which is under investigation, and the specifications define the elements that belong to the target group and those that are not to be included. This study targeted relevant government ministries (ministries of Finance, Mines, Local government, Health and

Education) and ZASMC, relevant Civil Societies and, households, RDCs, traditional chiefs, mining companies, CSOT/s in the rural districts of Chegutu and Mhondoro-

Ngezi (Mashonaland West province) and Shurugwi and Kwekwe (Midlands province) in Zimbabwe.

The study targeted these four rural districts because they are some of the mineral richest districts in Zimbabwe and it is where large scale and ASM mining activities are concentrated. Therefore, information related to the phenomenon under study could be found in the four districts. The principal aim of the researcher in collecting data from different groups was to get in-depth and rich information pertaining to the subject under

103 study. The population of the four districts have been cited above and since it is not feasible to study the whole population when conducting a research; therefore, the researcher made use of a sample to collect data.

A sample is a “representative part of the object to be analyzed” (Kateman and Buydens

1993:18). According to Creswell (2013) the term sample refers to a set of objects, occurrences or individuals selected from the whole population for a research study.

Furthermore, De Vos et al., (2011) explained a sample in terms of elements or a subset of the population considered for actual inclusion in the study. It can be viewed as a subset of measurements drawn from a population in which the study is focused on.

The primary idea of sampling is that by selecting some elements of a population, the researcher can draw conclusions about the entire and defined group of elements

(target population) (Hair et al., 2008).

The characteristics and objectives of the study determined how many and which people to select. The sample size for the study was 179 participants (160 households of which 40 were sampled from Chegutu, 40 from Mhondoro-Ngezi, 40 from Kwekwe and 40 from Shurugwi rural districts), 4 officials from government ministries (1 from each of the following ministries; Mines and Mining Development, Finance and

Economic Development, Health and Child Care and Primary and Secondary

Education). Another 4 officials from large-scale mines in the four districts (1 official from each of the following large-scale mines; Pickston Peerless Mine (Chegutu),

Zimplats (Mhondoro-Ngezi), Jena (Kwekwe) Unkie Mine (Shurugwi). In addition to these, 2 officials from each of the following Civil Society Groups; ZIMCODD and ZELA and, 4 councilors from each of the 4 rural district councils, and 2 traditional chiefs; from

Masholand West province and Midlands province and 2 officials from CSOT/s (1 from

Mhondoro Ngezi and 1 from Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trusts) and 1

104 official from ZASMC. In this study, the sample of 160 household survey respondents involved people from age groups of 18 years and above and, all races, educational status, socio-economic status and residential areas in the four rural districts. The inclusion criteria also required people who had resided in the 4 districts for at least 1 year and above because they were presumed to have knowledge of the subject under study.

3.9.1 Sampling techniques and sampling procedures Sampling techniques are broadly divided into two categories; non probability sampling in which non-randomized methods are utilized to select a sample based on the researcher’s judgment and; probability sampling in which each population’s element has a known ‘non-zero’ selection probability (Showkat and Parveen, 2017). Probability sampling techniques includes cluster, systematic, stratified and simple random sampling. Non-probability sampling techniques include purposive, snowball, quota and convenience sampling. The study used non-probability sampling methods, which are the snowball and purposive sampling techniques. These two sampling techniques were used because the researcher sought to include participants who had knowledge about the subject under study.

The non-probability sampling methods that were used for this study aided the researcher in selecting participants from the populations of the four districts that the researcher was interested in studying. Non-probability sample was utilized to study the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development in the two districts through the lenses of subsisting theoretical insights with a view to develop a new model (Showkat &and Parveen, 2017). Even though non-probability sampling techniques lack generalizability of the established findings, there are convenient and appropriate for case studies. The researcher used snowball-sampling technique in

105 selecting the 160 households in the four rural districts for the survey and these were selected because the governance of mineral resources in the respective mining districts impacts their socio-economic wellbeing.

Snowball sampling was used in locating people who are involved mining activities or those who reside in the thresholds of mining projects in four mining districts because there are sparsely and remotely located in districts’ rural locations. Martinez-Mesa et al. (2016:13) defined snowball sampling as a “sampling technique, in which existing subjects provide referrals to recruit samples required for a research study”.

The researcher asked the participants to refer the researcher to other individuals (who could have knowledge of the subject under study) that they knew through their social networks, collaborations and contacts. The researcher targeted participants with knowledge of large scale, medium scale and ASM mining operations in the four rural districts. To that end mineworkers, migrant workers, artisanal and small-scale miners and farmers, constituted the households that were visited in districts. Snowball sampling technique helped the researcher to identify the prospective participants through chain referral. It enabled wider-coverage of participants with potential to answer questions related to the subject.

The local counselors, village heads and ordinary residents in the rural locations also helped the researcher in identifying the whereabouts of the potential participants, heads of households, rural district counselors, traditional leaders, CSOT/s officials and mining companies’ officials. This snowballing process went on until the study sample was reached. This sampling technique is cheap, simple and cost-efficient because it is easier to reach prospective participants. However, there is no guarantee for sample representativeness as the researcher has limited control over the sampling technique because participants are found based on the previous subjects. The initial participants

106 may direct the researcher to people they know despite of their relevance to the study.

For instance, one participant may direct the researcher to his/her entire family. As a result, there is a high probability that the participants share the same characteristics and traits. The researcher may end up with a small subgroup of the whole population, which leads to research bias. Irrespective of the aforementioned criticism, snowball- sampling technique was indispensable in identifying members of the mining districts, who provided sufficient information.

Purposive sampling was used to reach officials for in-depth interviews. Officials in government ministries and departments, CSOS and ASM associations are specialised in different areas in each unit and it was critical to purposively sample officials who whose office designations were directly related to the subject under study. This was important in order to get fully packaged answers to the interview questions. Therefore, the researcher purposefully selected elements that contained the most characteristic, representative, or typical attributes of the population that served the best interest of the study. Purposive sampling is entirely based on the researcher’s judgement to choose samples that comprise the most relevant attributes or characteristics of the target population (Sharma, 2017). As such, a purposive or judgemental sampling technique was selected based entirely on the fact that it allowed the researcher a degree of flexibility in selecting suitable participants had knowledge of how mineral resources are governed and how it has affected education, healthcare and household incomes in the four districts. The institutional letter, preliminary abstract and the research instruments that were attached with official application letter for research authorisation enabled officials in government ministries and departments, CSOs and

ASM Association to help the research in pinpointing officials who could participate in the interviews.

107

Four government officials; 1 from each of the following Ministries of; Finance and

Economic Development, Mines and Mining Development, Education and Health, 2 officials from Civil Society Organizations (ZIMCODD and ZELA), and 4 Rural District

Council officials, 2 traditional chiefs from each of the rural districts, 4 officials from the

4 mining companies mentioned in the foregoing, 2 officials from CSOT/s were purposefully sampled AND I official from ZASMC. The four districts were purposefully sampled on the basis that they are some of the richest mining districts in the country.

The districts were on the basis to understand mineral resources governance and its effect on socio-economic development not for comparative purposes. Purposive sampling technique proved to be feasible and logical in terms of time as well as access to the officialdom. Purposive sampling has the advantage that it increases the probability of variability that is common in any phenomena to be presented in the collected data (Creswell, 2009:12). This helped in maintaining consistency in collected data and a reduction in bias. This method is flexible and it meets multiple needs and interests.

However, purposive sampling has a limitation that, it gives the researcher the entire responsibility to select participants and as such, there is a probability that a researcher can choose inappropriate or wrong participants. Other scholars argue that the notion that purposive sampling technique is operationalized based on the researcher’s judgement spawns possible biases in research. However, the researcher purposefully selected officials with professional designations and/or ranks of authority that directly dealt with the subject under study. The help afforded to the researcher by officials in pinpointing suitable officials allayed these inadequacies of the purposive sampling technique. Since the mining sector of Zimbabwe is a highly contested and politicised

108 arena and, the researcher was not at liberty to layout the professional designation of the officials in consistency with the research ethics of privacy and confidentiality.

3.10 Data Collection Procedures and Methods Data collection is the precise and methodical collection of data related to explicit objectives and questions of the research study (Burns and Grove; 2005 and Zozus,

2017). Data collection procedures and methods and enabled the researcher to answer research questions and to get a complete picture of the subject under study.

To interview personnel and access reports in the different ministries, the government of Zimbabwe requires the researcher to write an official application letter attached with the copies of the institutional letters, personal identification, preliminary abstract and research instruments as mentioned in the foregoing. The application has to detail the relevance of the study to the ministries and why authorisation is sought from each of the targeted ministries. The letter should also outline the role of each Ministry’s personnel and show a commitment to uphold the government of Zimbabwe’s Official

Secrets Act, where the researcher undertakes to use the data that would have been gathered for academic purposes only and not divulge it for any other purposes.

The researcher wrote application letters to the ministries of Mines and Mining

Development, Finance, Health and Child Care and Education and Ministry of Local government, Public Works and National housing. The application letters were submitted to the respective Ministries’ records departments where copies of the letter were made and archived and the original copy is sent through the ministries bureaucratic processes for authorisation or disapproval. The records department personnel sign the application letter and write a memo that accompanies the application letter to the human resources director who does the same and sends it to the Chief Director up until it reaches the permanent secretary’s office for signing and

109 official authorisation of the study. The bureaucratic processes for the authorisation of the study took an average timeframe of a month in all the ministries that were sampled in this study.

Gaining entry into the mining communities is a challenge, since there are simmering political tensions in Zimbabwe and there always high suspicions and discomfort from local authorities and residents when strangers make entry into their localities.

Furthermore, in rural districts like Kwekwe and Shurugwi, marauding and terrorising groups of artisanal miners’ mobs called by the local nomenclatures “makorokoza” in

Kwekwe and “Mashurugwi” in Shurugwi has instilled widespread fear and distrust of strangers. Therefore, authorisation and entrance into these research areas was negotiated with the provincial administrators, district administrators, rural district councillors and traditional chiefs for each of the aforementioned districts. The researcher sought research entry through written letters from the Head offices of the government ministries in question, University letters (ethical clearance letter and departmental letter and informed consent letter) to access participants in the four mining districts, civil societies, traditional authorities as well as RDC, mining company, and CSOTs officials. Permission was granted within 2 weeks for the fieldwork to be conducted. Kawulich (2011:28) noted, “Access and entry to the study site are important and sensitive issues that need to be addressed”.

3.11 Data collection techniques Primary sources of data (in-depth interviews and questionnaires) were used to collect information officials and households in the districts respectively. In-depth interviews were used to collect data from civil societies, Government ministries, Rural District

Councils and traditional chiefs as well as mining company and CSOT officials.

Questionnaires were used to collect data from households. Archival documents were

110 also used to gather secondary data on the subject under study. These data collection techniques and the units of analysis provided the basis for the researcher to understand how minerals are governed; the mineral policy frameworks and the resource curse on the people of Zimbabwe.

To build rapport with communities in the chosen mining districts, Shona was mostly used, since it is the dominant language in Mashonaland West and Midlands provinces.

In some instances, where the dominant languages where Ndebele, Chewa and

Tswana, the researcher sought the assistance of local translators to bridge the gap in communication since the researcher is not conversant with these languages.

Furthermore, the researcher explained about the purpose, nature and importance of the study to the members of the mining communities.

To ensure the questionnaires’ validity, a sample of 16 questionnaires was utilized to pre-test the questionnaires (4 in each of the four districts). It emerged in the pilot study that some of questions in the questionnaire were too technical and therefore the questions in the final questionnaire were simplified and adjusted accordingly.

According to Robson and Yekhon (2011), a research instrument’s validity assesses the capability of an instrument to measure the aspects, which it intends to measure.

Two research assistants were trained two days before the fieldwork and these were helpful in both pilot and actual fieldwork. The researcher made sure that the research assistants understood the research questions and objectives of the study, the research problem and their assigned responsibilities before administration of questionnaires.

Both the research assistants were enrolled at tertiary institutions and therefore induction and training took a short time. The research assistants and the researcher mutually agreed and undersigned on a remuneration schedule in order to avoid

111 conflicts of interests between the research assistants and the study. Creswell (2009) noted that conflict of interests has the potent to affect the study’s reliability and validity.

In some instances, the challenge of utilizing questionnaires in the rural areas was illiteracy. Six participants (2 in Chegutu and 4 in Kwekwe) were given Shona version of the questionnaire since they could not answer the English version of the questionnaires. This was primarily done to avoid misinterpretations or misunderstandings of the questions in the questionnaire. These data collection apparatuses had different features that had a significant bearing on accuracy and objectivity of the study. Triangulation of the different data collection techniques increased the legitimacy, validity and reliability of research findings.

Table 1: A summary of the methods of data collection used and the issues encapsulated

Data Respondents and the Issues Encapsulated Collection size of the sample Technique Questionnaires 160 Households in the Assessment of the state of health care, mining Districts education and household living  Community conditions. Assessing whether mining members activities contribute to local socio-  Mine Workers economic development or not.  ASM operators Evaluating whether the revenuesharingmechanisms in place are effective in promoting local socio- economic development. Assessment of the respondents’ perceptions pertaining to mineral resource governance and socio-economic development. Evaluation of transparency and accountability in the mining sector. Assessment of stakeholder inclusion as well as local participation and access to mineral resources.

112

In-depth Officials from; Assessment of the efficacy of the Interviews  Government current mines and minerals policy. An (Ministries of Mines evaluation of the extent to which (1), Finance and growth in the mining sector has Economic Planning contributed to socio-economic (1), Health and development. Exploring other Child Care (1) and strategies put in place by the Education (1) government to ensure mineral wealth  Mining company promote socio-economic officials 4 development. Assessing how the  Rural District government engages other Councils (4) stakeholders. Investigating whether  Traditional Chiefs there is transparency and (2) accountability in relevant government  Civil Societies (2) ministries and departments.  CSOTs 2 Understanding the current policy  ZASMC 1 thrust in the mining sector. Analyzing the governance of the ASM sector.  The role of traditional leaders in the

mining industry. Assessing the efficacy of COSTs. The role of Rural District Councils and Civil Societies in the mining industry. Archival Data Government reports, UN Understanding policy myopia and the Collection Agencies' reports, NGO resource curse thesis in the mineral reports, IMF and World resource sector with a view to Bank reports. Previous construct an ideal model. Comparing researches and the findings of the study with those of publications similar prior studies.

3.11.1 Questionnaires The main purpose of using a questionnaire is to obtain facts and opinions about a phenomenon from people who are informed about a particular issue. A questionnaire is defined as “an instrument of gathering, containing of a standardised series of questions relating to the study topic to be responded in writing by participants” (Bless and Higson-Smith, 2000:156). The questionnaire was designed in such a way that some sections were closed ended to extract quantitative data and some sections were open ended to extract qualitative data. The former are structured and they have an

113 advantage that they enhance objectivity. They easily usable and are less time consuming when it comes to data analysis. Some of the closed ended questions provided Likert Scales with measures like ‘Excellent’, ‘good’, ‘Better’, ‘Bad’ ‘Worse’;

‘YES’ or ‘NO’ among other varieties with tick boxes. Closed-ended questions are easy and less time consuming, because participants are not required to expresses their responses in their own words since response options are provided. Closed-ended questions makes data easier to interpret codify and analyse. However, it is worthy to note that in certain instances, closed-ended questions are not appropriate to elicit deeper perceptions and feelings of the participants pertaining to the matter under investigation. Open-ended questions were used in exploratory cases as (Babbie and

Mouton 2007) recommended. Open-ended questions were unstructured and provided space for the participants to express their opinions, perceptions, views or recommendations on the subject under study. Open-ended questions allowed the participants to liberally state their case and also to give their explanations. The need to control participants’ responses was achieved through standardisation of the questions. The researcher kept the number of the open-ended questions low in order to encourage respondents’ compliance. Generally, use of the questionnaire in this study facilitated a wider coverage of the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development. One of the limitations of utilising a questionnaire in this study was the fact that it provided a limited room for the participants to exhaust all the information they had. The researcher was assisted by the research assistant to ensure that effective response was provided in all areas where participants needed clarification and to cross check if all the questions had been answered. There was only one person who did not answer the questions correctly in Chegutu and the researcher decided to remove that unit from the analysis.

114

3.11.2 In-depth Interviews The researcher utilized in-depth face-to-face interviews to extract information from government ministries, Rural District Councils, civil societies, mining companies,

CSOTs officials as well as traditional chiefs because they were busy and it was more convenient to contact short but all the same exhaustive personal interviews. It is worthy to note that the researcher wanted to avoid disturbing the officials hence it was found to be suitable to visit them at their offices at their appropriate time. The research wanted to elicit a vivid picture of the views, lived experiences, perceptions and attitudes of the officials to the subject of mineral resources governance and socio- economic development. According to Greene et al, (2008) in-depth interviews are instrumental for inferring individual perspectives as opposed, for instance to community group norms for which the most appropriate data collection method would be focus groups. The researcher booked appointments with the officials to conduct the interviews at the times and venues they were comfortable. The processes of booking and conducting of interviews were completed in 6 weeks (from mid-August to end of

September 2019).All the interviews were conducted between October and November

2019. Each of the interviews lasted 14 to 35 minutes. A semi-structured interview schedule was used to conduct the in-depth interviews with the government officials.

The guidelines for authorisation to conduct research in government ministries and departments were also instrumental in streamlining and sharpening interview questions. The interview schedule helped the researcher to ascertain the fundamental areas that were supposed to be covered in the interviews. There was flexibility on the interview schedule to change questions and shift the interview discussion depending on the context and content of the discussion. In-depth interviews with the officials were extremely interactive and hence it allowed the researcher to capture large volumes of data and to come up with thick descriptions.

115

The researcher posed the questions in an impartial manner and listened to the participants’ responses attentively. Probes and follow up questions based on the participants’ responses were also useful in the clarification of grey areas. In-depth interviews permitted the researcher to shift the analysis line, follow interesting responses and examining the underlying reasons thereof in a way that a survey questionnaire cannot. In-depth interviews gave the researcher an opportunity to gain insights into how the officials ordered and interpreted the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development. Babbie and Moton (2007) state, in- depth interviews are highly accurate and sensitive for collecting valid and reliable data because most people are more willing to verbally express themselves rather than respond to a question in writing. In-depth interviews offered the researcher an opportunity for deep investigation in order to unearth new evidences and problem dimensions as well as elements. In-depth interviews were also instrumental in enabling the researcher to pick up and make sense of the participants’ non-verbal responses. Body language particularly facial expressions and gestures showed the dissatisfaction of some officials on the issue of mineral resources governance in the respective districts and the rest of the country. However, although in-depth-interviews are used commonly in social sciences as a method of collecting data, they have their disadvantages. In-depth interviews may be time consuming as each session may be lengthy therefore effectively reducing the number potential respondents due to time constraints. To circumvent the aforementioned shortcoming of in-depth interviews, the researcher made sure that the interview sessions were timed, short, precise and exhaustive. Furthermore, in-depth interviews are usually less standardised and thus they tend to rely on the questioning style of the researcher and the nature of the subject

116 matter. Respondents may also forget, lie or lack important information on the subject matter under investigation. To deal with that the researcher streamlined the research questions, ensured neutrality in asking questions and asked the officials to be objective and sincere in their responses.

3.11.3 Archival Data Collection Archival data collection method was used in order to have an in-depth understanding of how good mineral governance can promote socio-economic transformation. The method was also used to gather data from various sources on the study subject.

According to Bowen (2009:3) archival data is defined as a systematic procedure or technique evaluating or reviewing documents—both electronic and printed (Internet- transmitted and computer-based) material. Generally archival data falls under three categories which are (i) private records which entail data was collected without an intention to conduct research but exists for purposes of information collection on individuals, government agencies or any organisation for example credit histories, medical records or student records. Some government agencies records are by law permissible to public access and therefore fall under the category of public data sets.

Private data sets, which entail data previously collected by another researcher or agency for research or evaluative purposes, were also used. Permission was sought to access private data sets and records as per the intellectual property rights laws and research ethics. (iii) Public data sets, which denote data, collected by a range of academic institutions and government agencies and publicised for purposes of research. As with other analytical methods used in qualitative research, this method requires the examination and interpretation of data to elicit meaning get an understanding and build empirical knowledge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The most significant use of archival data is that they are instrumental in the augmentation and

117 corroboration of evidence from other sources (Yin, 2009:103). The researcher acquired archival data used in this study from different secondary sources and databases. These mainly included Government reports, United Nations agencies

(WHO, UNICEF, UNDP reports), NGO and donor reports IMF and World Bank reports.

The data was also complimented by data gathered from publications, books, government records, reports, previous researches, newspapers and other secondary sources. Archival data was critical in reviewing previously conducted research and evaluating the research findings on the subject in question. The information also provided the basis for the review of literature and provided an opportunity for inferring from others. Data from archival sources was detailed, specific, and free from the researcher’s bias. It is crucial to point out that archival data has its own disadvantages and the researcher used various strategies to mitigate them. The researcher firstly scrutinized the data for validity and reliability since it was collected by third parties.

The researcher also selected sources pertinent to the subject of mineral resources and socio-economic development and took into account the timeline of the study by avoiding taking old and obsolete sources.

3.12 Data Analysis Framework and Procedure Data Analysis entails classifying, organization, summarization and manipulation of data to answer research questions (Murugan 2013: 136). Two broad logical reasoning methods exist in scientific research and these are inductive and deductive reasoning.

Deductive reasoning starts with a theory and go on to narrow it down to a specific hypothesis that is testable in order to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis at specified freedom degrees and significance levels. Arguments based on rules, laws or other principles that are widely accepted are best deductively expressed (Soiferman, 2010).

This study pursued inductive reasoning by moving from the specific observation to the

118 broader generalisations as well as theories. The researcher identified some regularities or patterns and then formulated some themes that could be explored.

Arguments based on observation or experiences are best expressed inductively.

Inductive reasoning is deemed a grounded theory because it constructs theories from specific cases (Mitchell, 2014). The justification for pursuing an inductive reasoning procedure was to develop an instrumental model for the underlying structure for mineral resources governance and socio-economic development processes or experiences. The researcher also sought to establish comprehensible links between study objectives and the collected data.

The primary data analysis mode is the construction of categories from the raw data into a framework or model that captures the key themes as well as processes that are significant to the study. The researcher generated themes by coding in which gathered data was grouped into broad and specific categories. Broad categories were formulated based on research objectives. Specific categories were formulated from a comprehensive evaluation of data and by identifying common themes. Quasi statistics were used to precisely analyze the data. Prominent researchers of the qualitative methodology like Martyn Hammersley and Howard Becker have advocated for the inclusion of ‘quasi-statistics’: “simple counts of things to make statements such as

‘some,’ ‘usually,’ and ‘most’ more precise (Maxwell 2016:1).

Qualitative data was analysed in line with Miles and Huberman’s framework for qualitative data analysis. Mile and Huberman (1994) and Athoillah (2013) posited that there are three procedures for qualitative data analysis which are data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction involves a process whereby the qualitative data mass obtained from field notes, interview transcripts,

119 observations are selected, reduced organised, simplified, abstracted and transformed to make it more understandable and manageable. Since this was a mixed methods project, some of the data was condensed through selecting, summarizing or paraphrasing. All the irrelevant information was separated and only information relevant to the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development was taken. Data display was the next stage followed and this involved the reorganization and display of information using charts, graphs and figures. This was instrumental in enabling the researcher to identify information linkages and craft empirical explanations, which were corroborated with the resource curse, rent seeking and governance theories. Conclusion drawing/ Verification was the last stage of qualitative data analysis. This stage involved assessing what the data themes as well as patterns suggest about the subject under study. The conclusions of the study were verified by reference to the field notes, prior similar researches and theoretical frameworks to ensure that they are valid, supportable and realistic.

Quantitative data analysis involved use of Statistical Package for Social Sciences

(SPSS), which is a program that is windows based and can be utilized to perform data entry as well as analysis (Howell, 2011: 1). It is a comprehensive system for analysing data and SPSS can take data from almost any type of file and use them to generate tabulated reports, charts and plots of distributions and trends, descriptive statistics, and complex statistical analysis. SPSS relies on the application of standardised statistical procedures (Grey and Kinnear, 2012:6). Data was analysed through descriptive statistics, which described the features of a study using graphical analysis such as charts and graphs. This Statistical Package was used because it expresses deeper and more complex data relationships that inform statistical analysis techniques.

120

3.13 Ethical Considerations Ethical considerations were strictly observed throughout the research process. There are many ethical issues the researcher should consider when conducting research study. Miller et al. (2012:2) defined research ethics as a set of rules, codes and norms, which govern what is acceptable or unacceptable when conducting a research.

Professional bodies advocate that ethics must cover issues such as; collaborative relationships among researchers, mentoring relationships, intellectual property, fabrication of data and plagiarism among others (Nueman, 2000:45). The research ethics governs the interaction between researchers and participants. During the study, the researcher eliminated all possibilities of engaging in certain unethical practices, which would have affected the validity and reliability of this study. All the research participants of the study were informed about the general nature of the research so that they could have informed consent about the research. The respondents’ right to privacy was also observed by ensuring that all the obtained responses were strictly confidential. This was achieved by avoiding to present information in a way in which others could easily discover how some respondents might have responded to certain questions or statements. Anonymity was also assured by separating the identity from the information participants gave by using an alias name or pseudo-name of respondents. The researcher also strictly observed the other fundamental principles of research ethics; participants were given the liberty to withdraw at any stage of the research process. The researcher made sure that the participants first filled a form seeking their consent, informing them about the project, the criteria for selection of participants and the identity of the researcher (Creswell, 2009:27). The research was conducted as per the University of Fort Hare Research Protocol. Permission was sought from the University of Fort Hare Ethics Committee and the researcher acquired an ethical clearance letter to do field work and to have access to confidential

121 information in government ministries and departments, civil societies, and mining communities. The researcher cited sources where information used was not his own.

3.14 Conclusion This chapter provided an in-depth discussion of the methodical comprising; research design, sampling techniques, data collection methods as well as data analysis methods. Its central objective was to critically explain how the research methodology, research instruments, sampling techniques and data collection that were used in the study. The methodology of this study was informed by the objectives of the study and resource curse, governance and rent seeking economy theories. The methods of data collection that were used were in-depth interviews, survey questionnaire and archival data. Complementarity of qualitative and quantitative methods was fundamental in understanding the nature and extent resource curse in Zimbabwe.

122

CHAPTER FOUR: MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE COMMUNITIES AND AUTHORITIES

4.1 Introduction The previous chapter focused on discussing how data was collected, transcribed and analysed using the mixed methods approach. Data analysis followed the sequential steps of data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification Data collection techniques (questionnaires, in-depth interviews and archival data collection) and data analysis techniques (thematic analysis and descriptive statistics) that were used in the study were underpinned by the objectives of the study. As outlined in

Chapter 1, the objectives of the study were to; a) To investigate the governance of mineral resources (transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion and its effect on socio-economic development (healthcare, education and household income) b) To evaluate the regulatory framework governing the mining sector for socio- economic development in the country c) To investigate the extent to which growth in the mining sector has contributed to development of the three socio-economic indicators of health, household income and education

d) To examine the extent to which stakeholders are included in the governance of the mining sector

123 e) To propose a framework for good mineral resources governance and socio- economic development in Zimbabwe.

This chapter presents data under the following themes, Demographic Characteristics of the Household Sample, Contribution of Mining Revenue to Socio-economic

Development, Limited Transparency in The Mining Sector, Heavy Dependency on the

Mining Sector, Public Access Laws and information Asymmetries and so on.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Household Sample Demographic characteristics of the sample are very crucial for understanding the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development.

Furthermore, demographic information is very significant in the sense that it influences the responses of the participants. The demographic characteristics of the sample participants in the four districts is presented in terms of the Gender, Age Group, Marital

Status, Educational Status and Household Size in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Demographic Characteristics of the Household Sample

Variable Respondents in all Chegutu Mhondoro Kwekwe Shurugwi location district Ngezi Freq Percentage Fre Per Fre Per Fre Per Fre Per Gender Male 69 43.40 14 35.90 21 52.50 15 37.50 19 47.50 Female 90 56.60 25 64.10 19 47.50 25 62.50 21 52.50 Total 159 100 39 100.00 Age group ≤20 27 16.98 7 17.95 5 12.50 7 17.50 8 20.00 21-30 29 18.24 7 17.95 4 10.00 11 27.50 7 17.50 31-40 28 17.61 7 12.82 13 32.50 3 7.50 7 17.50 41-50 34 21.38 11 28.21 10 25.00 6 15.00 7 17.00 51-60 24 15.09 6 15.38 3 7.50 9 22.50 6 15.00 ≥61 17 10.69 3 12.50 5 12.50 4 10.00 5 12.50 Marital status Single 31 19.50 6 15.00 10 25.00 6 15.00 9 22.50 Married 70 44.03 16 41.03 15 37.50 23 57.50 16 40.00 Divorced 27 16.98 10 25.64 3 7.50 6 15.00 8 20.00 Widower 31 19.50 7 1795 12 30.00 5 12.50 7 17.50 Educational status 36 22.64 6 15.38 9 22.50 11 27.50 10 25.00 No qualification 12 7.55 4 10.26 1 2.50 4 10.00 3 7.50 Primary 32 20.13 8 20.51 9 22.50 6 15.00 9 22.50

124

Secondary 28 17.61 8 20.51 6 15.00 7 17.50 7 17.50 Certificate 23 14.47 5 12.82 8 20.00 6 15.00 4 10.00 Diploma 28 17.61 8 20.51 7 17.50 6 15.00 7 17.50 Degree Household size 1-3 (1) 46 28.93 11 27.50 11 27.50 13 32.50 11 27.50 4-6 (2) 80 50.31 19 50.00 20 50.00 22 55.00 19 47.50 7+ (3) 33 20.75 9 22.50 9 22.50 5 12.50 10 25.00 Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

4.2.1 Gender As depicted on the table above, the large proportion of the total respondents in all locations were females who constituted 57% as compared to males 43%. In Chegutu district, there were more females constituting 64% as compared to men 35%. In

Mhondoro-Ngezi, females (53%) were more as compared to males (48%), in Kwekwe females (63%) were more than men who constituted 38% and in Shurugwi, females

(53%) were more again than males (48%). The study established that women constituted the larger sample as compared to their counterparts in three of the four sampled districts due to the migration of males to urban and peri-urban areas as well as neighbouring countries like Botswana, South Africa and even overseas in search of greener pastures. Such migrations are important as they facilitate the disbursement of remittances from abroad for household support. The economic stagnation that is triggered by among others things corruption, collapse of key sectors like agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors which has resulted in overdependence on the mining sector induces labour migration. Poverty and lack of employment opportunities has forced most people to migrate from the rural areas to peri-urban and urban areas to seek for wage employment (Rocchi and Sette, 2016). Since this study targeted heads of households, the gender composition of the sample indicate that women head most households in these rural districts. Female-headed households increase

125 pressure on women to take extra roles including male roles to support the households’ socio-economic wellbeing (Rahman, 2019).

4.2.2 Age Groups Table depicts that for the total respondents in all locations, the age group ≤20 constituted 17%, 21-30 (18%), 31-40 (18%), the age group with the highest number of respondents 41-50 (21%), 51-60 (15%) and the age group with the lowest number of respondents ≥60 (11%). There was not much different in terms of the total numbers of respondents in each age group. As per each district; in Chegutu the age group ≤20 constituted 18%, 21-30 (18%), 31-40 (13%) and ≥60 (13%) constituted the lowest number of respondents, 41-50 (28%) constituted the highest respondents, and 51-60

(15%). In Mhondoro-Ngezi the age group ≤20 constituted 13%, 21-30 (10%), 31-40

(33%), constituted the highest number of respondents 41-50 (25%), 51-60 (8%) constituted the lowest number of respondents and ≥60 (13%). In Kwekwe, the age group ≤20 constituted 18%, 21-30 (28%) constituted the highest number of respondents, 31-40 (8%) constituted the lowest number of respondents, 41-50 (15%),

51-60 (23%) and ≥60 (10%). In Shurugwi, the age group ≤20 constituted 20%, 21-30

(18%), 31-40 (18%), 41-50 (17%), 51-60 (15%) constituted the lowest number of respondents and ≥60 (17%) constituted the highest number of respondents. Age is a very fundamental aspect when analysing economic sectors and their contribution to socio-economic development. The less differences in terms of the proportions in each age groups means each age group was represented which guaranteed objectivity and diverse views on the subject under study.

4.2.3 Marital Status Marital status is a significant rural development aspect, it is widely believed that marriage brings various sorts of benefits in socio-economic terms since the marriage institution brings a potential earner to a household (Anyanwu, 2014). As depicted in

126

Table 1.2 the highest number of the total respondents in all locations were married constituting 44%, the lowest were divorced (17%), preceded by singles and widowers who respectively constituted 20%. Those who were divorced had a significant percentage and this could be attributed to migration of partners in search of employment opportunities thereby upsetting the family fabric. The high number of widowers could be due to the death of husbands owing to the defective health system.

This trend was common across all the four sampled districts and it signifies that the marriage institution is respected and is still playing a key role in household welfare.

4.2.4 Educational status Since labour is one of the most important assets of the poor, increasing the education of the poor will tend to reduce poverty and increase livelihoods. The poor are unable to afford their education due to their socio-economic status. According to Anyawo

(2014) most of the times the poor cannot attend school because they will be working for their survival. As depicted in table 1.2, the highest number of the total respondents had no qualification constituting 23%, followed by those with secondary education

(20%), followed by those with a certificate and a degree constituting (17%) respectively, followed by those with a diploma (15%), and those with primary education

(7%). Kwekwe and Shurugwi are the ones with the highest number with ‘No

Qualification’ respondents; 28% and 25% respectively and this question the educational investments being made in these districts given their mineral opulence.

Majority (86%) of the participants in Chegutu 10%+21%+21%+13%+21%, Majority in

Mhondoro-Ngezi (79%) 3%+23%+15%+20%+18%, Majority in Kwekwe (73%)

10%+15%+18%+15%+15% and Majority in Shurugwi (77%)

8%+23%+18%+10%+18% had a basic qualification of primary education and above.

This means that majority of the respondents could read and write and they understood

127 the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development in the communities. The high number of degrees and diplomas; 18% and 15% respectively, amongst the respondents in all the locations may denote the youth who are domiciled in the rural districts due to scarcity of employment opportunities.

4.2.5 Household sizes A household’s size is a critical aspect in resource sharing and allocation to education, health care, food and clothing in a family. The household size was crucial in finding out whether the household was managing to sustain the socio-economic wellbeing in their households with their monthly incomes. As depicted on the table, the bigger proportion (50%) of the household sizes in all locations were between 4-6 people, followed by 29% which were between 1-3 people and 33% which were 7+. 1-3 household size is considered a small family in the African contexts where most households are made up of extended family members. Such small families may be due to high mortality rates against the backdrop of a defective health system and increased incidences of communicable diseases such as typhoid, malaria and

HIV/AIDS. Small household sizes are also attributed to migration of family members to urban areas and/or overseas for employment opportunities.

Usually, 4-6 people is the average household size of a Zimbabwean family (ZimStat

2019).7+ households are usually constituted by extended families and these households usually face challenges to sustain the socio-economic wellbeing of rural families due to limited survival options, economic stagnation and the effects of overreliance on the mining sector in these rural districts. The trends of household sizes are on average almost similar for all the four districts (as highlighted in Table 1.2 ) except for the 7+ household size, which on average is almost equal in Chegutu (21%),

128

Mhondoro-Ngezi (23%), Kwekwe (13%) and Shurugwi (25%) which shows marked differences.

Fig 4.2.6: Source of Income Strategies for enhancing income distribution and poverty reduction in the developing world rural communities require an understanding of the sources of income and income inequality. The analysis of this variable also allows an understanding of the relationship between the various economic activities that are undertaken in the rural communities and their implication to socio-economic development.

Fig:1 Sources of Income

Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

Although all the sampled households are rural,- non-farm income remains as the major source of income- in Chegutu, ASM is 6.92% , remittances are 5.03%, Mining

Company Salary is 3.14%, and government salary is 1.26%. Other sources like pensions and informal jobs like part time manual jobs vendoring constitute insignificant

129 percentages. In Mhondoro-Ngezi, Mining Company Salary (5.66), Artisanal and Small

Scale Mining (4.40) and Vendoring (6.92) are the major sources of income. In

KweKwe, Mining Company Salary (3.77%), ASM (6.92%), Vendoring and part-time jobs (3.14%) respectively are the major sources of income. In Shurugwi, the major sources of income are Mining Company salary (5.66%), ASM (3.14%), farming and part-time manual jobs (2.52%) respectively, Vendoring (6.29%). The high percentages in informal jobs like part-time manual jobs, vendoring and ASM shows that the informal sector is now one of the largest employers and the formal sector has regressed due to economic stagnation, corruption and poor planning by the government. A recent study by Medina (2017) has shown that Zimbabwe is the second biggest informal economy after Bolivia, characterized by a ‘shadow economy’ where most of economic activities are concealed from official authorities for institutional, monetary and regulatory reasons. The study listed high tax rates (ZIMRA) and contribution to social security (NASSA) burdens as some of the biggest causes. This partly explains the high opacity levels and leakages in informal sectors like the ASM. High percentages of Mining Salary on the bar chart depict a reliance on mining income for survival and socio-economic wellbeing in the rural communities. Significant percentages of remittances as a source of income shows high levels of out-migration, nonetheless these are indispensable in supporting local household economies. Shizha and Kariwo

(2011:5) argued that to a greater extent, “the near collapse of the Zimbabwean economy has been averted” by remittances from families working abroad. The UNDP

(2016:2) indicated that poverty incidences in Zimbabwe are higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas and the inequality levels varied across wards and districts.

130

4.3 Contribution of the mining sector to Socio-economic Transformation While the mining sector has been consistently the major revenue and foreign currency generation source, through huge export volumes, its contribution to socio-economic development in rural districts has been poor from 1980 umpteenth. The study established that in most rural parts of Kwekwe, Shurugwi Mhondoro-Ngezi and

Chegutu have blatant dire socio-economic conditions. This speaks to Malinga’s (2017) findings, which established that although the mining industry has been hyped as a pillar for the revival of Zimbabwe’s economy, it has, nonetheless, not done much to stimulate socio-economic development in most parts of the country, notably in rural areas.

An official from ZIMCODD said,

“Zimbabwe is the best case of the natural resource curse. We talk about mineral resource abundance but then this has not translated to the welfare and people’s living standards. People’s living standards have worsened; their livelihoods have been lost due to forced relocations” (1 October 2019, Harare)

Communities in the four districts benefit less but suffer more in terms of environmental degradation, prices hikes, and social erosion. Household surveys (75% of the participants in all locations) and interviews with Rural district councillors, traditional leaders and CSOs alluded that there is a disconnect in the districts’ mineral value chain and the concomitant health care, education, household living conditions and infrastructural developments. The country’s legal framework is not clear in terms what happens in terms of local benefit sharing, local content development and so on. That lack of preparedness in terms of legal institutional frameworks is contributing to the losses that communities are experiencing. The country has not adopted a system (like that in Botswana) that allows earmarking of significant portions for mineral revenue to invest in human development programs and as such the main beneficiaries of mineral

131 wealth remains the mining companies, government bureaucrats and the economic elite as noted by researchers; (Mawowa, 2013; Mahonye and Mandishara, 2015; Doro and Kufakurinani, 2018). The study established that tax revenues that are being remitted to the government by mining companies are prone to rent seeking and corruption due to centralization and exclusion of other stakeholders. The bulk of the remaining revenues are being consumed by the civil servant’s wage bill leaving very little to invest in education, health, capital expenditures and household living conditions and this resonates with the findings outlined with the (Auditor General’s Report, 2019).

Poverty and unemployment rates in the four districts are hiking recording an average of 55% and 65% respectively. Household conditions are dire as reflected in Table 1.3,

Fig 1 and Fig 3. Table 1.3, below depicts the Education and Health Conditions in the four districts.

4.3.1 Education and Household Conditions in Households

Education and health plays a key role in enhancing the socio-economic conditions of communities and individuals (Monyai, 2018). This study endeavoured to provide an overview of education and health conditions in the rural poverty context in each location in order to assess the contribution of mining to socio-economic development.

Table 1.3: Education and Head Conditions in Households

Variable Respondents in Chegutu Mhondoro- Kwekwe Shurugwi all location district Ngezi Freq Percentage Fre Per Fre Per Fre Per Fre Per Education conditions Excellent 10 1.89 1 2.56 4 10.00 2 5.00 3 7.50 Good 15 6.29 2 5.13 7 17.50 5 12.50 1 2.50 Better 34 9.43 7 17.95 14 35.00 5 12.50 8 20.00 Bad 55 21.38 13 33.33 13 32.50 14 35.00 15 37.50 Worse 42 34.59 13 33.33 2 5.00 14 35.00 13 32.50 Miss 3 26.42 3 7.69 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 Total 159 100.00 39 100.00 40 100.00 40 100.00 40 100.00

132

Health conditions Excellent 8 5.03 0 0.00 3 7.50 2 5.00 3 7.50 Good 23 14.47 2 5.13 15 37.50 5 12.50 1 2.50 Better 25 15.72 8 20.51 4 10.00 5 12.50 8 20.00 Bad 67 42.14 21 53.85 16 40.00 14 35.00 16 40.00 Worse 36 22.64 8 20.51 2 5.00 14 35.00 12 30.00 Total 159 100.00 39 100.00 40 100.00 40 100.00 40 100.00 Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

7.3.1.1 Education conditions Education conditions in most rural communities in countries on the continent are poor and this propels a vicious cycle of poverty. Reflecting on the total respondents in all locations, Majority 97 (55 indicated Bad +42 that indicated Worse) reflected that education conditions were in a dire state as compared to 54 (8 Excellent + 23 Good and) some differing levels of satisfaction with the education conditions, 25 indicated

Bettter and 3 did not provide meaningful answer. In Chegutu district, the majority, 26 participants (13 indicated Bad +13 who indicated Worse) as compared to the minority

10(1 Excellent+ 2 Good+ 7 Better) and 3 missed the question. In Mhondoro-Ngezi, a slight minority of 11 participants (4 Excellent +7 Good) indicated differing levels of satisfaction with the education conditions on the Likert Scale as compared to the majority 15 participants (13 Bad+ 2 Worse) indicated differing levels of dissatisfaction with the health conditions and 14 indicated Better. In Kwekwe, the majority, 28 participants (14 Bad+ 14 Worse) indicated differing levels of dissatisfaction as compared to the minority, 7 participants (2 Excellent +5 Good) who indicated differing levels of satisfaction and 5 indicated Better. In Shurugwi, minority 4 participants (3

Excellent +1 Good) indicated differing levels of satisfaction as compared to the majority 28 participants (15 Bad +13 Worse) and 8 indicated Better. This data reflects that generally education conditions are not good in the 4 districts. Mineral wealth has not fared well in uplifting education conditions in the mining districts. The deepening economic crises have left the burden of paying education costs to the household.

133

Budget deficits in education and health care sector likewise, have seen the increment of user fees, which exerts more burdens to households that are already living under the Poverty Datum Line (UNICEF, 2018). Although the total budget size is somewhat growing, the education sector overall allocation is not growing at the same rate.

According to UNESCO (2017:6) in 2017, US$810.43 million was allocated to Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MoPSE) by the state. This was about 20.3% of the total budget of US$4 billion. Lack of proper economic management and accountability has led to the acute decline of government revenue and resulted in restricted inflows of resources to the social service sectors. Consequently, the funding requirements of social service sectors, “other than the non-salary component, have remained largely unmet” (Annual Country Report, 2017:16).

7.3.1.2 Health Conditions in Households Health makes a significant contribution to socio-economic development as health populations are more productive and live longer. Reflecting on Table 1.3 above, on the total responses for the respondents in all locations, majority of the participants 93

(67 Bad +26Worse) indicated dissatisfaction with the health conditions as compared to a minority 31 participants (8 Excellent +23 Good) and 25 who indicated Bettter. In

Chegutu majority, 29 participants (21 Bad +8 Worse), as compared to the minority, 20 participants (4 Bad +16 Worse), in Mhodoro-Ngezi a slight majority, 18 (16 Bad +2

Worse), in Kwekwe majority, 28 participants (14 Bad+14 Worse) and in Shurugwi the majority, 28 (16Bad +12Worse) indicated that health conditions were in a bad state.

This reflects that mineral wealth has not contributed largely to healthcare development in the districts. African Health Observatory and World Health Organization (2015) noted that Zimbabwe’s health system financing mechanism is not pro-poor” and as a result poor households in rural areas are not receiving proper health care. The current framework that is adopted in the health sector is based on the implementation of PPPs.

134

Privatisations of health services where people paying high fees for health services and yet they are paying taxes, which should cover for their health expenses. According to the World Health Organisation (2015) although the government’s user fee policy provides for free health services for pregnant as well as lactating mothers, below five years children, and the elderly (60years and above), implementation has been extremely difficult.

The country has suffered massive “brain drain” due to the unremitting economic crisis and state attrition, with most health professionals migrating to the neighbouring South

Africa and further afield in the United States of America and Europe. Patient-doctor ratio in most hospitals is 1:12,000, which is way above the UN recommendation of

1:200 (Voice of America, 2016:1). Household survey participants (85%) in all the districts targeted in this study indicated medical supplies and drugs are incessantly in short supply in the health sector. According to Ministry of Health and Child Care

(2016:34) health inequities are marked by an acute rural-urban divide with malnutrition, infant mortality and below-5 mortality being higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas. The budget allocation for health and childcare has remained below the sub-Saharan Africa average of 11.3 percent (Ministry of Health, 2016). As a GDP share, the budget for health and childcare in 2016 was 0.7 % lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa of 3%. Per capita health allocation in the country was

US$24.34, which was much lower than the average for the SADC region of US$146.29

(Ministry of Health, 2016). A significant commitment to health investment by the state would be to maintain the Abuja Recommendation that 15 percent of national budget should be allocated to the health sector. The centralised budgeting system followed by Zimbabwe, makes it difficult to analyse the education and health budget allocations by province or per individual district.

135

4.3.2 Unemployment Poverty and economic stagnation has adversely affected wage employment in the country. Heavy dependence on the mining sector is constricting the revival of other key sectors of the economy, which escalates unemployment rates in the districts as also noted in Zimbabwe and Angola by Doro and Kufakurinani (2018). Rural areas are the most vulnerable due to their lack of education, skills and training and illiteracy.

Fig 2: Employment Status

Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

Significant percentages (40.25%) of the respondents were unemployed. Therefore, most people fail to get incomes to fund heath, education and other household necessities. According to van Leur (2017) several factors drive rural poverty and these include weak institutions and policies, absence of business enabling environments, unfledged production systems; underdeveloped infrastructure as well as limited access to healthcare, education and finance. A significant number of respondents were employed in the mining sector; 18.24% were Mineworkers and 19.50% were

136

ASM miners. This due to the nature of the economy in the respective districts where local residents rely upon mining as a source of income to sustain their socio-economic wellbeing. The results indicated that 7.55% were civil servants, 6.29% were farmworkers, which reflects that agriculture is no longer the main employer, and pillar of the economy as was the case before the aftermath of the 2000’s. On the other hand,

4.4% indicated self-employment and this is due to the collapse of other key sectors of the economy and drying up of formal employment opportunities. While 3.77% were employed in Non-Mining companies, it shows that they are non-mining companies that are still operating in the harsh business environment. Due to the absence of a robust social security system, more workers have been railroaded into vulnerable employment to survive.

The analysis reflects that rural structural transformation that should promote synergies between non-farm and farm activities has not yet taken place hence the high rates of unemployment. According to Ledriz (2016) the positive GDP growth rate that was recorded in the 2009-2014 period, (averaging 7.8%), was not trailed by employment growth, but rather a drop in employment numbers. Therefore, the mineral-led economic resurgence was not job-rich. A number of factors account for this juxtaposition and these includes overdependence on the capital-intensive mineral sector, persistent informalisation and de-industrialisation of the economy and inadequate infrastructure supply. The government has failed over the years to address the employment creation barriers and to promote inclusive growth. The link to reduction of poverty and socio-economic development through economic growth is the creation of employment and social security.

137

4.3.3 Monthly Income The level of income earned by the rural households is dependent on the performance of the economy and availability of wage employment. It determines whether households are able to sustain their socio-economic wellbeing. Zimbabwe has seen the escalation of scrawny economic fundamentals associated with colossal imports against low exports, passive production capacity as well as high unemployment and low incomes (C-GIDD, 2018). The country has witnessed a hike in multitier pricing systems, which helped in the currency premiums as well as the fiscal position thus mirroring unhealthy spending by government. Fig 3 shows the monthly incomes of households per location.

Fig 3: Monthly Income

Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

138

The bar chart above indicates the Monthly income in frequency form per location, as it was important to understand the differences of the monthly incomes levels on the different locations. As depicted on Fig 2 above, majority of the participants in all the districts earn incomes less than 300USD monthly; in Chegutu 24 earn less than 300,

7 earn 301-600USd, 5 earn 6001-900USD, 2 earn USD901-1200and 1 did not disclose. In Mhondoro-Ngezi 24 earn less than 300; 9 earn between USD 301 and

600, 2 earn between USD601 and 900; 4 earn between USD901 and 1200 and 1 earn between USD1201-1500. In Kwekwe, 24 earn less than USD300; 10 earn between

USD301 and 600; 3 earn between USD601-900, earn between USD901-1200, I earn between USD 1201-1500 and 1 earn USD1501+. In Shurugwi 23 earn less than

USD300; 11 earn between USD301 and 600; 2 earn between USD601 and 900; 2 earn between USD901 and 1200 and 2 earn between USD1201 and 1500. Few participants were not comfortable to disclose their monthly incomes for privacy reasons. Given that the Total Consumption Line (TCL) for an average household size of five persons stood at ZW $873 (then equivalent to USD$350) in 2019 (ZimStat,

2019:1), these figures reflect high poverty conditions in the mining districts. Food

Poverty Atlas (2016:12) conducted a study based on US$30.86/person/month food poverty line, which was compared with “per capita consumption expenditure at the household level” and confirmed that food poverty was also a rural phenomenon across

Zimbabwe. This reflects widespread poverty conditions.

Lack of sufficient income in the households has led respondents to over-depend on the mining sector for survival. According to UNDP (2016:2) report the (GNI) per capita between the years 1990 and 2015 decreased by about 34.9 % and it continued on a decreasing trend in the year 2016. The paradox in Zimbabwe where poverty levels continues to rise amidst a rich mineral resource sector that has performed remarkably

139 for the good part of the preceding years cannot be overemphasised. The high levels of unemployment and low monthly salaries clearly shows that mining activities in the four districts are not contributing significantly to socio-economic development. Malinga

(2017) noted that corruption, greed and rent seeking has spawned opacity and lack of transparency in the country’s mining sector. He further noted that this has deprived the wider society from benefitting from mineral wealth and local communities continue to languish in unemployment and poverty.

4.4 Heavy dependence on the mining sector and Economic Stagnation The analysis seeks to pinpoint the contribution of the mining sector to the development of socio-economic indexes of health, education and household income. Household survey has revealed that although there are some investments in education, health and various projects to augment household incomes, these indexes have not significantly improved in the four districts. This is corroborated with qualitative data from officials. The study established that the mining sector has not been contributing much to socio-economic development because for years it has been the only viable sector following the collapse of agriculture, manufacturing and other key sectors of the economy. The exportation of unprocessed minerals is not giving the country maximum benefits. One official from the MPSE noted

“The effects of Overreliance on the mining sector coupled with other factors like

Western-imposed sanctions and corruption are affecting tax disbursements, inducing economic stagnation and dire socio-economic development outcomes” (7 October

2019, Harare)

All the officials concurred that Zimbabwe had in the recent years, become a typical case of resource curse due to overreliance on the sector for the country’s socio- economic transformation, not discounting the unmitigating effects of tax evasions, illicit

140 financial flows, corruption and rent seeking behaviours that largely bleeding the country’s mineral wealth. These findings resonate with the findings of researchers;

(Mahonye and Mandishara, 2015; Doro and Kufakurinani, 2018 among others), in

Zimbabwe. The four districts just like the rest of the country has been blighted by incessant currency and economic crises for decades, which been affecting tax disbursements and national budget allocations for financing development.

An official from the Ministry of Health and Child Care said, “Growth and economic dominance of the mining sector is not a good indication; it shows the economy is not functioning well. The country is exporting ores and there is no support from the local industry to promote value addition and beneficiation” (15 October 2019, Harare)

The country’s growth and socio-economic transformation has been hinged on mining and the poorly performing agricultural sector, following the collapse of virtually all economic sectors in the aftermath of the post-2000 land reform program and Western- imposed sanctions. According to Samaita (2018), the mining sector accounts for over two thirds of the country’s export earnings despite the closure of some mining companies due to viability challenges. Only Zimplats Platinum Mine in Mhondoro

Ngezi and Unkie Mine in Shurugwi have recently committed to value addition and beneficiation, and the rest of the mining companies in the four districts maintained the traditional ways of mining and exportation of raw ores without meaning full linkages or synergies with the local industries. This has suppressed the potential multiplier effects of the four districts’ mining sectors and rebuffed local enterprise development.

The national budget statement presented by the current minister of Finance on 19

November 2019 projected that, “Key growth restoration drivers in 2020 will be agriculture (5%) and mining (4.7%)”. All the officials in the government ministries that

141 were units of analysis in this study concurred that mining growth has become the mainstay of the economy. One official in the ministry of Finance and Economic

Development said,

“Mining has overtaken agriculture as the anchor of the country’s economy but the fluctuation of international commodity prices induces its fluctuating contributions to the fiscus” (18 November 2019, Harare)

Zimbabwe’s heavy dependence on the mining industry is a bad signal for development as the country, as is the case in most African countries, does not have an influence on the international market mineral prices. ZEPARU (2016:x) noted that the country’s mining sector has indicated “the present fiscal regime is not conducive especially given the depressed commodity prices”. Growth and performance of the country’s mining sector is critically influenced by fluctuations in commodity prices at the international market. International commodity price volatility does do not only obfuscates government spending as well as tax policies for domestic resource mobilisation but it also complicates the decisions of businesses and households on savings and investments. Mutingwende (2017) noted that the impact of commodity price volatility has been aggravated by the “lack of a developed financial sector” and restricted access to global financial markets, both of which should provide better management of the various risks induced by the price volatility. According to African Development

Group (2019:1) platinum and gold prices, which constitute the country’s two primary mineral export products declined by 18.5 % and 3,0% in 2019 due to a slump in global commodity prices and this induced negative pressures on the government’s foreign currency earnings and revenues from mineral royalties. AFRODAD (2017) commissioned a study on “Impacts of Fluctuating Commodity Prices on Government

Revenue in the SADC Region” which focused on four countries in the SADC region;

142

Zimbabwe (Platinum) Zambia (Copper), Angola (Oil) and DRC (Copper). The report cited that these countries have great potential for social service delivery improvement given their mineral wealth but their overdependence on mineral resources makes their economies vulnerable to global commodity price fluctuations, which short-changes their prospects of socio-economic transformation. An extrapolation of Interview excerpts with Chiefs and Rural District Councillors of Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi,

Shurugwi and Kwekwe shows that mining is the dominant economic activity in these four districts (this was also highlighted in the profiling of the four districts in Chapter

3). A chief from Midlands province said:

“Salaries from government and most sectors of the economy are paid in Bond notes and they do not have much value due to inflation. Therefore, majority of the people are forced to join ASM where they get powerful foreign currencies when they sale their minerals” (21 November, Midlands Province).

Overreliance on the mining sector that has been induced by Zimbabwe’s socio- economic crisis have railroaded majority of people in the four districts into artisanal mining where foreign currency (principally US dollars) is still the medium of exchange for minerals. Mkodzongi and Spiegel (2019) cited that on average each of these districts has 1500 or more people who are involved into ASM. According to Casey

(2019), more than 50 000 are estimated to work in ASM operations countrywide and the proliferation of the ASM has been phenomenal in the region. Overdependence on the mining sector to spur growth and socio-economic development is inimical to development given its susceptibility to global price volatilities and sustainability issues.

It is difficult to ascertain how international commodity price volatilities have affected revenue intakes and socio-economic development at the local levels given that most mineral revenues (95%) are remitted to the central government, which disburses them

143 to the local authorities in the form of budget allocations. Production figures and revenue flows at the local levels are not disclosed, the local authorities refer people to the central government for the information, which underscores shadiness and opacity in the country’s mining sector.

4.5 Limited Transparency in the mining sector Transparency throughout the mineral value chain is a key ingredient to the stimulation of a mineral-led socio-economic transformation. There is very low-to-no visibility in the processes of decision-making and very restricted availability of pertinent information about mineral resources governance as well as performance in Zimbabwe. There is lack of transparency in each level of the value chain of minerals from mineral exploration, processes of allocation of mineral rights, mining contracts awarding, government utilisation of mining revenue; including revenue distribution per geographical area (proximal-mining localities, regions) and sector (for instance social services and mining beneficiation). Section 315 (2) of the country’s Constitution requires the Parliament to gazette an Act that guides the negotiation as well as performance of the mining agreements. Six years down the line there is no such Act of Parliament has been enacted. Several mega mining deals amounting to 8 billion were disclosed by the Minister of Finance’s 2019 budget presentation but none of the deals went through parliament and very little is known about them (Sibanda, 2019).

One official from ZMCODD said,

“Mineral resource governance in Zimbabwe is an area which still maintains opacity, its in secrecy, there is no total disclosure of information across the value chain, be it at the point of companies expressing interest, be it at exploration. The opacity is something that was created within our minerals framework to ensure that the

144 interaction between the mines and the communities is not there” (1 October 2019,

Harare)

There are ingrained information asymmetries in the mining regime of the country such that most of the vital information is kept in secrecy between mining corporates and the government. Even when the mines start operating, there is a lot of information that they do not share. The analysis underlines that aggregate data is there but the government cannot disclose it all neither can it be fully disclosed at company level on the basis that the mining sector is a commercially sensitive area. Officials in the government ministries targeted in the study alluded that mining information was readily available at Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and citizens could make use of this information to hold the government to account. ZIMRA is the government department that has the sole mandate of collecting taxes as well as all revenues for the government. The constitution of Zimbabwe mandates ZIMRA to provide information about the country’s revenue’s to the public. One official from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development said, “Consistently the department publicly release reports on aggregate tax per head quarterly and annually. From ZIMRA’s reports, it is easy to glean the tax revenue performance of each tax head”. (18 October

2019, Harare)

145

Fig 4 Revenue contribution by head: 2018 Fiscal year

Source: Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) (2018)

As indicated on the fig 3 above ZIMRA reports are for tracking the residual taxes in the form of Value Added Tax (Tax), Pay as You Earn Income tax (CIT), Royalties

Custom Duty, Exercise Duty as well as withholding tax from ZIMRA’s reports. These reflect aggregate tax figures (serve for royalties) and they do not show mineral revenue on its own. According to Sibanda (2019), only royalties can be tracked to the mining sector in the revenue performance reports of ZIMRA. The study established that country’s fiscal and taxation system is not aligned to the new constitution, ‘The

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013’. The current taxation and fiscal system in Zimbabwe has not been aligned to section 298 of the constitution, which states that management of public finance must be based on transparency as well as accountability and that the taxation burden must be fairly shared. Given that,

146 the constitution is the supreme law of the land it is only actualised through the Acts of

Parliament in terms of the nitty-gritties. In spite of the promotion of taxation transparency by the Constitution, it thus, appears transparency is not prioritized in the current mining regime and any new regime for mining taxation will have to address this gap. The MMAs section 243 make reference to the royalties’ payments by mining companies, therefore should also be read in line with section 298 of the constitution.

Regardless hereof, “there is no publicity in the determination by the Minister of royalties’ payable by mining companies” (Mudimu, 2017:1).

4.5.1 Provision of information Fig 5: Provision of information

Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

The total scores of the respondents are depicted in percentages and frequencies. The pie chart above does not depict the results per location because it was established that the results from the different location reflected similar trends. Reflecting the results

147 as per the location will not make much difference. As reflected on the Pie Chart above, majority (76.1%: 44.65%+31%.45%) disagreed, although in different levels of

Disagreement, 10.69% were undecided, 6.92% Agreed and 6.92% Strongly Agreed.

Therefore, citizens have lingered in darkness on mining tax revenue performance. Tax constitutes an indispensible revenue source and resource mobilization tool for the government and it is critical for social services financing needed for broad-based socio-economic transformation. Majority of the participants (80%) in the household surveys in the four districts inscribed on the questionnaires that that mining companies refer community members to the District Administrator (DA) for information they do not share it directly with the community members. Yet the mines are operating in their localities and the members should be the first pot of information sharing. According to

Saunders (2017), limited transparency in Zimbabwe’s mining sector disempowers the citizens from holding the corporates and government accountable. This analysis underscores that citizens in the four surveyed districts are not capacitated (due to unavailability of information) to scrutinise the government decisions in the mineral value chain and to crank pressure on them to accountably utilise mineral revenue to deliver social services and uplift living standards. This is aggravated by the fact that the civil societies in Zimbabwe’s mining sector are not empowered to perform their oversight role of ensuring that the government and mining companies are transparent as well as accountable (Sachs and Mugova, 2019).

4.6 Mandatory Disclosures and Tax Havens Generally, the transparency landscape is quite fragmented. For mandatory disclosure rules, it is easier to get annual reports, including various payments that are made to government institutions for companies listed or registered in EU, CANADA and USA but unfortunately, there are very few companies that are listed or registered in these

148 countries. For instance, Unkie mine owned by Anglo American (operating in Shurugwi district) courtesy of its parent companies listed at the ‘London Stock Exchange’ (LST) are some of the companies where data can be accessed. However, the study established that such data is not simplified for ordinary community members to easily understand. The state has also a footprint in the mining sector; state owned enterprises ZMDC, Zimbabwe Consolidate Diamond Company and MMCZ, their reports are not up to date. Samaita (2018) noted that state-owned enterprises have been operating on the backdrop of unupdated reports for decades. So transparency and accountability is elusive when the data is not timely available.

According to ZELA official said “a number of countries are taking advantage of their tax havens domiciles to facilitate nefarious activities like corruption and tax evasion which erodes the finance muscle of Zimbabwe to build better schools and clinics”. (9

October 2019, Harare)

Several mining companies are registered in tax havens; low tax or secretive tax-free jurisdictions infamously known for aiding companies to evade fair tax shares in their investment destination countries. Zimplats (operating in Mhondoro Ngezi district) is domiciled in a tax haven, Guerney. However, “courtesy of its parent company Zimplats holdings limited, listed at the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), information disclosure is still mandatory” (Sibanda 2017:1). The study established that currently there is no public for all mining companies operating in the country but registered in tax havens, which can be used by the country’s tax collectors to silhouette the risk of illicit financial flows in the country. The MMA and the constitution are silent about salient issues of mandatory disclosures but Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill has provisions for compulsory registration of all mining companies at the ‘Zimbabwe Stock Exchange

149 which may transform the transparency landscape in the mineral sector if by any chance the bill is gazetted.

4.7 Public Access Laws and information Asymmetries The government continues to hide behind the out-dated and draconian AIPPA to continue restricting mineral information from members of the public.

One official from the Ministry of Mines and Mining development said,

“The government is, in terms of the constitution practising transparency in the mining sector but that openness is limited by other pieces of legislation like the Access to

Information Act where security and confidentiality interests are the key national priorities. The mining sector is a commercially sensitive area” (4 November 2019,

Harare)

Constitutionally being transparent or to provide information should be the government’s default position. The country’s 2013 constitution Amendment (No.20)

Section 65 provides that an unequivocal legislation be gazetted to give effect to the information access right guaranteed but that is given weight to limit this right with respect to information on professional confidentiality, public security and defence interests. The repressive AIPPA of 2002 has remained principal law governing information access in the country despite repeated calls by the government of their intentions to replace it with a new framework up to the modern modus operandi.

Nonetheless, notwithstanding the right to information access guaranteed by AIPPA,

Part iii of AIPPA categorises certain information as classified, which public bodies may refuse to share with members of the public. Specimens of such protected information are inclusive of information that is related to economic and financial interests of public bodies and/or the State. Such claw-back provisions restrict right of access to

150 information like processes of mining contracts awarding, production figures as well as mineral resources revenues from disclosure to citizens.

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development despite carrying the mandate to transparently and accountably mobilise and allocate national resources clearly indicated that information about revenue flows in the country is classified. Zimbabwe is ranked 6 of 100 points in the Open data ranking, it is ranked 23th in the region in taxation and 29 of 100 points in mining licencing rankings below the regional average of 43 (The Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2017). The institute attribute these poor rankings to the failure by the government to adopt best practises for disclosures of contract awards, production figures and mining company payments.

One official from ZAMASC alluded that;

“……. Let alone gross implementation shortfalls, MMA itself does not capture current international standards which underscores the level of opaqueness in our mineral sector” (21 November 2019, Harare)

In respect of the MMA, its provisions for accountability as well as transparency are scrawny particularly in regard to information access-given the restricted access the mining contracts, production figures and mineral revenues (PWYP Zimbabwe, 2015).

Furthermore, the IEEA that facilitated the establishment of CSOTs was vague and it accorded the Minister too much discretionary powers over mining companies’ compliance negotiations thereby generating opportunities for corruption and rent seeking. This is attributed to the reasons why some mining companies failed to deliver their CSOT pledges.

151

4.8 Lack of accountability Accountability is difficult to enforce where the country’s legal framework shields the government from sharing information with the citizens. Where information is not readily available, it is difficult to hold the government to account on its actions. According to

Chene (2017) transparent reporting and information disclosure practices by the government agencies are a cornerstone upon which to build accountable systems for the collection, management, investment and spending of revenues. In spite of the constitution’s provisions (Section 62) for information access by interested and affected stakeholders; as long as the information is prerequisite in the public interest for accountability, there are no legal instruments to facilitate implementation of such provisions. Section 9 makes provisions of good governance; “the State must adopt and implement policies and legislation to develop accountability, transparency and financial probity”. This applies to the governance of natural resources including the mineral sector. Umpteenth no Act of Parliament has been gazetted for implementation of these provisions. An official from ZASMC said;

“Accountability is not there. We cannot talk of accountability where transparency is not there; there is glaring opacity in the granting of licences, contract negotiations, production data, contract allocation, expenditure and accounting of mineral revenue”.

(21 November 2019, Harare)

Transparency and accountability are mutually reinforcing concepts and without any of them citizens cannot have a voice over issues that affect them; no chance to influence decisions and to hold decision makers to account. Household survey data presented in the sections above indicated that the citizens of the four districts are not supplied with vital data and information on mineral resources, which effectively means they are not capacitated to hold the government to account. The study established that there

152 are wider information asymmetries and dearth of accountability both by the district authorities to the village-level constituencies and and by the central government to the district authorities as perceived by (Sibanda, 2016). Zimbabwe’s mining sector has been marked by high levels of rent seeking and corruption as evinced by diverse literatures in the country (Martin and Taylor, 2012; Transparency International and

CMI, 2015 and Malinga, 2017) and the need for transparency as well as accountability has been underscored by various publications like (Transparency International and

CMI, 2015; Muyambwa, 2016). According to Malinga (2017: 90), the government has failed to account close to US$1 billion of potential mineral revenue in the last four decades due to shaddy and doggy dealings in the mining sector by political and economic elites as well as mining companies. The 2020 budget statement highlighted that “Mineral exports remain the major source of foreign currency, especially gold.

However, leakages have been on the rise, depriving the country of foreign currency earnings”

One of the challenges that was indicated by participants in the household survey questionnaires was that mineral revenues are not being used for socio-economic development, which underlines corruption and lack of accountability, by the government. Participants were asked to indicate whether the government was using mineral revenues for socio-economic development or not and their responses are reflected in Fig 6 below.

153

Fig 6: Revenue Use and Socio-economic Development

Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

As reflected on the bar chart above, majority of the participants in all districts under study indicated that the government was not using the mineral revenues for socio- economic development. In Chegutu, the majority (30) indicated ‘No’ and 9 indicated

‘Yes’, in Mhondoro-Ngezi, the majority (29) indicated ‘No’, and 11 indicated ‘Yes’. In

Kwekwe, majority (33) indicated ‘No’ and 11 indicated ‘Yes’ and in Shurugwi, majority

(30) indicated ‘No’ and 10 indicated ‘Yes’. This most probably indicate that mineral revenues are being squandered through corruption, rent-seeking, poor planning as well as inefficient resource mobilisation strategies.

This is corroborated by secondary sources, for instance, The Starndard (2018:2) reported that Tongogara RDC (in charge of Shurugwi rural) “faces numerous long- standing allegations of corruption and bad governance, but none of them have been

154 dealt with”. An external audit of Zibagwe RDC (in charge of Kwekwe rural) in 2018 revealed gross fund embezzlement to the tune of US$90 000 (Magoronga, 2018).

Similar reports of corruption and rent seeking in Chegutu has been published online.

The Auditor General’s report (2019) highlighted ZMDC, the state’s investment vehicle was ‘not complying with International Accounting Standards 28 (IAS 28)’ which affected the viability of the corporation. This has seen the mining sector failing to materialise its abundant potential to contribute towards socio-economic transformation and enhanced social service delivery in the four districts under study and other mineral- rich districts across the country. Dhliwayo and Sibanda (2017:1) posited that the lack of transparency and accountability has seen the country’s mineral glory turning into the “proverbial natural resources curse”. Hence, the window of opportunity presented by the country’s opulent mineral wealth is wasted in most of the instances.

4.9 Inadequate mechanisms for transparency and accountability The study established that mechanisms or platforms for the government to account to the citizens about its decisions in the mineral value chain, such as the parliament, mining indabas and the Mining Board Affairs (MAB) are not adequate, as they are not empowered to amplify the voices of the citizens. Oversight bodies like the parliament

(Portfolio Committee of Mines and Energy) and the judiciary are not empowered.

Although section 299 of the country’s constitution provides for the parliamentary oversight on revenues as well as expenditures of the state to foster transparency and accountability, the parliament does not have access to disaggregated data on mining tax revenue performance. “The challenge is that Parliament has no power to enforce its recommendations to the executive” (Sibanda, 2019:1). This is line with the findings of Doro and Kufakurinani (2018) who investigated the parliamentary role in

Zimbabwe’s diamonds and Angola’s oil and established that the two countries’

155 parliaments are not capacitated to enforce transparency and accountability of the executive and other agents of government in the mining sector. The capabilities of parliaments in resource rich countries like Zimbabwe and Uganda are truncated by limits imposed upon these bodies by the abiding constitutional mandates. These relegate them to mere watchdogs rather than enforcers. To that end an opaque terrain, pervasively obtain; where gross underhand transactions and corrupt deals are processed without regulation.

4.10 Lack of stakeholder inclusion Inclusive governance requires the natural resources governing bodies to effectively and actively engage their stakeholders through participatory processes and ongoing dialogue. Multi-stakeholder approaches-involving representatives from government, the private sector- are progressively being viewed by resource governance scholars as a vehicle to reinforce accountability and curb corruption-associated challenges in extractive sectors (Marie, 2017). Nonetheless, the establishment of multi-stakeholder approaches do not necessarily imply that corruption and rent seeking is directly addressed and cannot be the only means towards enforcing transparency and accountability. The opacity landscape and lack of accountability in Zimbabwe underscores the lack of stakeholder inclusion in the mineral value chain. One official from the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development said,

“It’s not easy to involve communities and civil societies in issuing licences because they also have vested interests”. (4 November 2019, Harare)

The study established that conflicts of interests and power balances amongst various stakeholders such as mining companies, communities, traditional authorities, RDC authorities, civil societies and the central government is antithetical to the establishment of multi-stakeholder processes in the mineral value chain. The

156 household survey in the four districts highlighted that communities were not included in the decision-making processes across the mineral value chain. One official from

Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba CSOT said,

“There are a lot of personal interest be it at the cabinet, be it at the highest office or at the local government level. There a lot of vested interests which motivate them to keep information to themselves”. (22 November 2019, Mhondoro-Ngezi District,

Mashonaland West Province)

Incongruent stakeholder interests have given rise to power and information asymmetries in the mining sector. There is no broader framework to promote the participation of key stakeholders like communities, ASM operators, CSTOs, CSOs, traditional leaders and RDCs. In his hegemony theory, Gramsci postulates that ruling elites dominate society through an amalgamation of force established by the political society as well as philosophies established through the civil society (Ndakaripa, 2017).

Indeed, the state-civil society relations in the country’s mining sector in the post- colonial state echoes with Gramsci’s hegemony theory. The study established that the ruling elite are using the political-economic superstructure to propagate their interests in the country’s mineral sector. In most of the cases, the government fails to foist its ideologies through CSOs, and it recourses to the political society; the police, the army, the courts to suppress and silence alternative voices in the mineral sector. A statist regime bent on protecting rent-seeking interests for the political and economic elite’s pervades in the mining sector largely excluding other stakeholders. This resonates with Ndakaripa’s (2017) study, which analyzed “State, civil society and the politics of economic indigenisation in Zimbabwe, 1980 to 2016”, and revealed that on several occasions the Zimbabwean state espoused a statist approach and excluded other interest groups. The state marginalises CSOs and aligns itself to business

157 associations that represent foreign capital in the mining sector for instance, the

Chamber of Mines and this hampers resource redistributive policies.

Despite the requirements of the 2013 constitution that the state should ensure involvement of citizens in governance and policy formulation in all spheres, citizens’ voices often go unheard (Chitiyo, 2019). Section 13 (4) of the constitution calls for the broad representation of communities in their diversity in Zimbabwe and provides for the participation of citizens in policy decision-making processes. In spite of the recognition of traditional leaders, by the Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 29:17) and the country’s 2013 constitution; as the custodian of natural resources and facilitators of development within their communities, they are not wholly included in mineral resources governance in the four districts. The study established that although the legislative Instrument 21 of 2010 gave the traditional chiefs the authority to chair

CSOTs, admiration of these institutions is usurped by politically connected elites and the chiefs are sidelined. Shumba (2019) conducted a study, which focused on assessing the problems associated with CSOTs in rural development in Zimbabwe and South Africa. He identified politicization, elitism and stakeholder exclusion as the fundamental challenges of CSOTs in these countries. Furthermore, intermittent conflicts between the traditional leaders and other government structures have pervaded in the dual system of governance. In most of the cases, traditional authorities are overwhelmed by government structures that are reinforced by the state machinery.

AN official from ZIMCODD said, “The traditional leaders are not empowered; their power should originate from the people but then the people are also not empowered because they are intimidated, they do not freely speak their minds” (1 0ctober 2019,

Harare).

158

At the local levels, there are no platforms or mechanisms for engagement of the government with stakeholders in the mining sector. At the national level, there are platforms for stakeholder engagement and, these include the Zimbabwe Alternative

Mining Indaba and the Mining Affairs Board, but the effectiveness of these is questioned. The World Bank, United National Development Programs and other international organizations, which endorse collaboration between the state and civil society in economic affairs, underscores the fundamentality of civil society and other stakeholders for development. CSOs, traditional leaders, RDCs, ZAMSC and other stakeholders are not capacitated power centres and cannot whip the central government into line on mining affairs in the country. Ndakaripa (2017) noted that traditionally the views of various interest groups have been occasionally considered; the post-colonial state has formulated and executed policies in ways that protected elite interests. In that light, the contribution of CSOs and other stakeholders to mineral- led development in the country needs to be understood.

4.11 Zimbabwe Alternative Mining Indaba (ZAMI) Civil society organisations (ZELA and ZIMCODD) that constituted the units of analysis in this study highlighted that there were no platforms for stakeholder engagement at the district levels. Stakeholder inclusion is still very limited even when the civil society

(such as ZIMCODD, ZELA, PWYP Zimbabwe among others) try to create informal platforms like the Zimbabwe Alternative Mining Indaba (ZAMI) which strive to ensure representation of all stakeholders to make their contributions and make recommendations which are taken to the ministry (PWYP Zimbabwe, 2015). ZAMI brings key governments departments, CSOs, CBOs, chiefs, academics, Labour

Unions, mining companies, and community members to discuss the governance of mineral resources in the country. Nevertheless, with the shrinking of civics spaces,

159 sometimes, civil societies are living under threat because of their involvement in issues of mineral resources governance because the mining sector is viewed as a preserve of the central government and it is the president who has the prerogative to speak up about such issues. Recommendations from ZAMI are rarely incorporated into the policy documents and this reflects the power asymmetries in the mineral sector

(Wushe, 2014; Dhliwayo and Sibanda, 2017). There is heavy involvement of the central government and mining companies. Mining companies have powerful structures like the Chamber of Mines to promote their interests and communities are organised around CBOs, CSOs and traditional institutions and these do not have much bargaining power. An official from ZIMCODD said;

“Issues of mining companies are easily incorporated into the policy documents because they have leverage. Where civil societies and CBOs are involved there are limitations because there is high politicisation and securitization of the sector”. (1

October 2019, Harare)

Decisions in the mineral value chain have been primarily a government mining companies’ affair to the exclusion of mining communities, civil societies, and traditional authorities. This classic bilateral model has blurred opacity and lack of accountability in the mining sector. This is in accord with literature, which established that multi- stakeholder groups in natural resources governance seldom have authority to influence legislation (Søreide and Truex, 2011; Chene, 2017). Interviews with chiefs, traditional authorities and CSOT officials in the districts clearly revealed that the central government and mining companies are the main decision makers in the mineral value chain and other stakeholders are nothing short of watchdogs. Officials in government highlighted that stakeholders were involved in the country’s mining affairs by the

160 government through engagement in the Mining Affairs Board but this platform has gross inadequacies as discussed in the section below.

4.12 The Mining Affairs Board (MAB)

The MAB is a statutory board founded under Section 6 of the second part of MMA and to have its configuration changed by the Mines and Minerals amendment Bill (clause

3) when it takes effect. The duties and functions of MAB are to give counsel to the

Minister of Mines and Mining Development. Presently the Ministry’s Permanent

Secretary and four other officials as well as six members who are handpicked by the

Minister to represent miners and farmers (PWYP, 2017) constitute the board. A reflection at the Board’s composition shows that it is exceedingly technical and has very inadequate representation of communal people, which means the opinions, and views of this segment of the population are not fully encapsulated at this level and this stokes fears of elitisms. MAB’s composition falls short of multi-stakeholder initiatives’ best practises or standards. Several stakeholders are affected by the mining sector and these include communities, CSOs, communities, labour, business and government. This diversity is not reflected in the MAB governance structures

(Dhliwayo, 2016). A reflection on MAB governance structure shows that communities,

CSOs, labour traditional leaders and relevant government department/ministries like

Environment, Water and Climate Change, Local government and Finance and

Economic Development are some of the marginalised stakeholders (Dhliwayo, 2016).

Household survey participants in the four districts indicated the lack of community consultation by government in the mining processes as indicated in Fig 7 in the sections below.

4.13 Lack of Corporate Community Engagement

161

In the recent decades, corporate community engagements concern in the mining sector have increased in Zimbabwe and other resource-rich countries in the developing world (Wushe, 2014). This is primarily due to the widely publicised environmental disasters, together with the development of social as well as environmental legislation and public pressures for responsible corporate behaviour in mining communities. The current model in Zimbabwe allows the ministry to issue licences then the mining company will liaise with local communities. In that light, mining companies are anticipated to engage stakeholders on mining issues but hitherto this has not been the case in most of the mining districts under study. Cook et al, (2015) suggests that irrespective of the magnitude of a mining project or the actual community needs to be dealt with, the success stories’ trait of all mining projects necessitates that there should be a strong community engagement commitment.

Genuine corporate community engagement has been a gloomy, given that there has not been open and regular communication by mining companies for understanding of the local needs as well as challenges. Development as well as implementation of solutions to mining communities’ challenges has not been community-driven.

A chief from Mashonaland West alluded that,

“Mining companies are not engaging community members on important mining issues like environmental and social concerns, their production and revenue and because of that we feel excluded from the mining activities taking place in our communities” (30

October 2019, Mashonaland West Province)

There is lack of transparency as well as accountability in the operations of mining companies in the local mining communities and this resonates with Mugova and

Sachs’ (2019:26) findings in Marange diamonds fields in Manicaland province. The taproot for the lack of corporate community engagement is due to the legal void in

162 appropriation laws. This situation tends to empower mining companies at the expense of the locals, who nonetheless are bonafide mineral resources owners. Based on this defective framework, local citizens are in the dark pertaining most mining deals and activities in their respective communities. The MMA does not provide protection of the mining communities’ rights. Section 188(7) of MMA states that RDCs are supposed to act as landowners “if the mining arena is in a communal land” and payment will be disbursed to the District Development Fund (DDF). Whilst the MMA emphasises the miners’ rights, the Communal Lands Act (Chapter 20:04) underscores the “supremacy of mining over surface land rights”. Section 10 (2) of the Act undermines the rights of mining communities and exposes them to undignified eviction should the state resolve to utilize the land for any other purposes. It is noteworthy that no provision or clause in the Communal Lands Act for the consultation of affected communities or their traditional leaders, although they are authorised by RDCs to settle people on the local communal lands. The MMA (Chapter 21:5) bestows legal power to mining companies to obtain mineral rights over farming land and even in areas that are environmentally sensitive. What raises more alarm is that in events of communal lands acquisition for mining purposes, it is the RDCs not the real victims, who should be compensated

(PWYP Zimbabwe, 2015).

Side-lining of affected communities in mineral resources governance in the four districts has resulted in unprecedented tensions between the government and the Civil

Society and mining communities across Zimbabwe (IUCN, 2016). Household survey participants and traditional chiefs cited lack of corporate community engagement and mining companies like Pickstone Peerless, Rio Tinto’s Cam and Jena Mines

(Chegutu), Unkie Zimasco Mine and Golden Quarry Mine (Shurugwi) and Jena Mine and Global and Phoenix mine (Kwekwe) were mentioned. The companies are not

163 engaging communities on environmental and social concerns, production and revenue flows. The priorities of mining communities are not understood; neither are they taken into account due to their exclusion at virtually all stages in the mineral value chain.

Zimpalats in Mhondoro-Ngezi was the only mining company that was pinpointed to be practising good corporate community engagement. The study established that

Zimplats Platinum Mine’s strategy for community engagement is underpinned by research findings principally from perception as well as baseline studies and the quarterly stakeholder meetings that involve local chiefs and community leaders.

Literature shows that violent conflicts are likely to erupt in countries where the local communities are systematically excluded from the processes of making decision in mineral rich nations (Brown and Keating Michael, 2015).

4.14 Consultation of community members by the government Consultation of community members is key to the enhancement of development results (Robinson, 2015). Consultation of community members is instrumental in enhancing quality and effective delivery of social services, enhances the governance of public finances, and fosters accountability, transparency as well as social inclusion.

Hence, respondents were asked to indicate if there was consultation on mining issues by the government.

Fig 7: Consultation of community members by the government

164

Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

The pie chart above does not depict the results per location because it was established that the results from the different location reflected similar trends.The pie chart depict both frequencies and percentages. As reflectd on the Pie Chart above, majority

(70.44%) of the respondents indicated ‘Not at all’, 17.61% indicated ‘Limited consultation’, 2.52% indicated ‘Full participation’ and 9.43% indicated ‘No idea’. The figures reflect that there is lack of consultation of community by the government on issues pertaining mining in the four districts. Interviews with chiefs, traditional authorities and CSOT officials in the districts clearly revealed that the central government and mining companies are the main decision makers in the mineral value chain. This suggests the problem of community disenfranchisement in Zimbabwe’s mining sector and it dispels assumptions by elites and mining companies that communities are reaping larger benefits than imagined. Harvey (2018) noted that in the South African mining sector too many forums for community engagement do not produce reliable or accurate information. The author further postulated, “Mining

165 communities are fragmented and subject to the problem of self-appointed gatekeepers” (Harvey, 2018:1). Chiunya (2017) noted that in Malaysia, although the

New Economic Policy promoted the consultation and development of local communities, it also faced some challenges especially where the elite politicians in

Malaysia acted unilaterally and manipulated the public funds for their own personal comfort.

4.15 Inadequate citizen engagement during budget formulation Citizen engagements during formulation of the national and district budgets is fundamental to socio-economic development. Citizen participation in the processes determine how resources of the public are mobilised, apportioned, disbursed, expended and accounted for to promote socio-economic rights realization. Citizens in the rural districts under study alluded that they are not afforded the opportunity to influence the generation and allocation of public resources due to inadequate citizen engagement during the budget formulation processes. One official from Tongogara

Community Share Ownership Trust said,

“Citizens always complain about feedback issues. When government is developing budget they do consultation normally in major cities but then what happens in Harare does not reflect what happens in remote areas” (30 November 2019, Shurugwi District)

According to Sibanda (2019), citizen engagements in the budget cycles at the national and at the district levels is there but it is limited in terms of the coverage. UNICEF

(2016) noted that the budget processes in Zimbabwe does not include actors, since it is highly centralised. Zimbabwe is hinged on the domineering role of the mining sector and it is critical for the citizens to give their input on how the national and local budget can plug more on the potential of mining on critical domestic resource mobilisation.

ZIMCODD and ZELA officials also highlighted that sometimes budget compilations are

166 done without incorporating the views of the citizens. After the budget compilations, citizens have to wait for another cycle of consultations without feedback in between.

In that regard, budget allocations in key social service sectors like health and education do not reflect social and economic justice. UNESCO (2016:7) noted that allocative efficiency in the public expenditure system of Zimbabwe is low, especially in the health and education sectors. Given that, the budget of the education and health sectors is largely consumed by the employment costs, actual spending is always equal or higher than the budget allocations. The report of the auditor general is always having glaring issues with respect to how resources are used in the various ministries.

The government launched a strategy for the realisation of a mining economy worth

US$12 billion by the year 2023 and with the traditional exclusionary budget formulation processes; it means fair revenue shares will not be captured in this anticipated extraordinary mineral-led growth. According to 온드라 (2015:85), when the wealth of a nation “is concentrated in the mineral sector and the mineral rents are channeled to the State coffers”, the locus of authority as well as decision making framework of the government can shift.

4.16 Zimbabwe’s mining fiscal regime Mining companies that are extracting minerals in Zimbabwe are subject to several taxes as well as levies. These taxes compose the mining fiscal regime of the country.

According to Freebairn and Quiggin (2010), the goal of any government’s taxation system in mining is to ensure the highest possible public benefit while simultaneously promoting investment. Although withholding tax is considered an effective tax head, nonetheless when applied to external technical services payments, would make sense only if it goes along with local capacity development. PAYE official tax table functions on the basis of escalating scale (the higher the employees’ earnings the higher the tax

167 percentage levied on each earnings bracket). Royalties in the mining sector are not deductible for the income tax determinations and the lack of formalisation of the ASM diminishes royalties that can be collected from this sector (ZEPARU, 2016). The study established that all the capital expenditures that are incurred exclusively for the various mining operations is 100% deductible which compromises the government’s take from mineral revenues. The tax regime of Zimbabwe is not aligned to the regional trends to guarantee the contributions of mining tax to socio-economic development. The fiscal regime has not been performing well with regards to meeting of the objectives of government of generating revenue, re-pricing, redistribution and ease of doing business (ZEPARU, 2016).

The study established that the bulky of mining revenues taxes as well as royalties

(95%) are remitted to the central government. The local authorities only get 5% of the mining taxes and royalties. The bigger impact of mineral revenues is felt at the central government level. Aragon and Rudd’s (2012) findings in Ghana mining communities, highlighted that despite huge royalties and income tax from mining corporations, poverty levels in mining communities, continued to increase. This was because majority of the revenues as well as taxes were remitted to the central government and only 9 percent of the royalties were going to the local as well as traditional authorities to finance community development. While skirting the resource curse discussion,

Hilson (2018:9) demonstrated that more than ¾ of mineral revenues are remitted to the central government in sub-Saharan Africa in the form of royalties, taxes, corporate profits, dividends and savings and most of those governments are not able to effectively make use of those revenues “which leads to underwhelming socio- economic development”. He further noted that this is aggravated by the fact that large- scale mining has weaker local economic linkages. The MMA even states that mining

168 revenue should be remitted to local authorities with the Ministers consent. An official from Zimplats said,

“Giving the responsible Minister the discretion to decide the royalties mining companies should pay to local authorities makes the Act susceptible to corruption” (11

November 2019, Zimplats Mine, Mhondoro-Ngezi District)

This arrangement does not provide assurance for community direct benefits accrual.

Moreover with the lack of citizen engagement in budget formulations; social and economic justice is far-fetched in Zimbabwe. The international mineral revenue landscape is changing with the establishment of legislation that provides for benefits to be remitted locally in countries like Canada, Bolivia, the Philippines, South Africa and Colombia (Masiya et al.,2015). The current mining fiscal regime of Zimbabwe is not effective as the government has forgone much revenue in its bid to attract foreign investment. An official from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development said;

“The current regime is not effective, in a bid to attract investment in the sector the government ends up forgoing too much in the form of incentives. Therefore, the ministry of finance is trying to come up with a consolidated fiscal regime for the mining sector” (18 October 2019, Harare).

In respect of revenue management, Zimbabwe has a highly competitive fiscal policy in the region. Nonetheless, currently there are minimal systems put in place for full harnessing and monitoring of financial flows in mining principally because there is inexact data on the capacity, size as well as output of mines “neither is there a requirement to furnish these in the Act” (PWYP Zimbabwe, 2017). The royalty rates and taxes are too low in comparison with international standards. It is an insignificant percentage for a community to benefit for community transformation. The Income Tax

Act merely provides for taxing of companies’ “income” and it does not enhance the

169 country’s capability to project its resources’ value, it does not have capacity to get a fair wealth share through a progressive and coherent fiscal policy model, and its ability to effectively use the mineral revenues for long term and sustainable socio-economic development. The Act also outline the country’s taxing regime for corporate tax and surface tax which are also relatively low in comparison to global standards, and “these standards are imputed by implication into the Act” (Chamber of Mines, 2017).

According to Sibanda (2019) although there is no disclosure on revenues forgone through mining incentives, a notable exception relates to the disclosure of tax revenues (amounting to US$14 million visa-vis US$43.9million worth of imports as at

April 2019) forgone as a result of the ‘Clothing Manufactures Rebate’. The national budget statement presented by the minister of Finance and Economic Development on 19 November 2019 noted that “….in the case of imports, the mining sector largely benefits from a rebate of duty regime that suppresses both customs duty and Value

Added Tax (VAT).” The rebate duty of Zimbabwe covers all capital goods that are imported for exploration and development of the mining sector but this has a dire consequence of suppressing the country’s fiscal mining regime (ICLG, 2019). It is against this backdrop, that analysts raise concerns on the effects of mining incentives to the tax performance of the mining sector and its contribution to socio-economic transformation. Civil societies (ZIMCODD and ZELA), ZASMC as well Rural District

Councilors and traditional leaders from Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Kwekwe and

Shurugwi alluded that the rebate of the duty regime contributes to the potential revenue loss to the government and the situation have been aggravated by failure by most companies to undertake their social responsibilities in the four districts. The government’s failure to disclose the tax revenues forgone through the Mining Rebate facility to attract foreign investment also allude to the opacity in the mining sector.

170

Disclosure of mining tax incentives is key to enabling the public to make an assessment whether the government is negotiating fair deals for the harnessing of finite resources for financing development.

The current system of taxation is regressive hence unfair and inequitable because it exempts big mining companies from paying taxes (through the rebate of duty regime and other mining incentives) and exerts the taxation brunt on the poor. The poor as well as the vulnerable groups are contributing the bigger chunks of their hard-earned incomes to the treasury through PAYE and VAT.ZEPARU (2016:7) noted that one of the biggest contributors in revenue heads terms is PAYE. The contribution of

Corporate Tax to the national treasury is about 15%, which is lesser than that of PAYE

(taxed from most wages that are below the Poverty Datumn Line). VAT is fair and flat but its regressive effects stems from the fact low salary earners have a higher proportion of their incomes taken by VAT as compared to high salary earners. The outcome “is a subsidized state where the poor people sustain the few rich” (ZIMCODD,

2014: vii and KPMG, 2019:1). A critical analysis of PAYE and Corporate tax contribution reflects that tax on labour is premised on gross earnings whereas corporate tax is premised on net earnings. Although the government opened up for stakeholder participation in efforts to reform the fiscal mining regime after the lapse of the GNU in 2013, few changes were incorporated which reflected wider exclusion of non-state actors in mineral resources governance (Saunders, 2017:43).

4.16.1 Double taxation Agreements and Amortization The study further established that mining tax incentives and concessions that are given to mining companies; double taxation agreements, amortization and transfer mispricing allow companies to inflate their costs and carry over losses indefinitely. One official from ZIMCODD said,

171

“Yes, tax framework is there but we have tax incentives that are offered, double taxation agreements and transfer mispricing where companies inflate their costs and carry over losses” (1 October 2019, Harare).

The taxes that is mostly benefiting benefitting the country from is PAYE and VAT that is imposed on an individual but other taxes are not bulkily remitted to the national fiscus because of the losses ostensibly companies make. ICLG (2019:1) stressed that

“mining companies enjoy an indefinite carry forward of their losses”. This condenses to the fact that mining companies can advertantly ‘declare losses’ in order to exempt themselves from the country’s taxes. Considering that, taxes are based on profit it simply means that mining companies can operate indefinitely without paying any tax to the government. This is because the government did not put a cap to the number of years that companies can carry over losses whereas in other sectors like manufacturing they carry over losses to a maximum of six years (Saunders, 2017 and

ZEPARU, 2016). Resource bargaining in the mining sector is not optimal, targeted and refined. Policy prescriptions that are rented from generic models of mining industry development yield limited constructive results.

The mining fiscal regime does not have a flexible calibration for optimization and correspondence of fiscal, developmental as well as political priorities. Interventions have primarily focused on making an investment-competitive fiscal regime, while overlooking the need to develop clear strategies for transparent and systematic revenue flows from the sector.

4.16.2 Limited Capacity of Revenue Collectors at all tiers of government Revenue collection, both at the district level and at the national level is very poor and this is attributed to poor institutional quality, lack of capacity and lack of a consolidated mining fiscal regime. A councilor from Zibagwe RDC said;

172

“Revenue collectors, both at the district level and national levels are not capacitated to institute an effective mining taxation system”. (16 October 2019, Kwekwe District)

ZIMCODD (2014), Saunders (2017) and Sibanda (2019) concurred that revenue collection in the country is generally poor and it is attributed to a range of interlinked factors. The authors further noted that these include but not limited to lack of capacity as well as skills of the public institutions that are constitutionally mandated to collect mineral revenues like RDCs, Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, MCZ/Fidelity,

ZMDC and ZIMRA. Sibanda (2019) further noted that ZIMRA has over the years failed to monitor mining operations as well as transactions and to curb corruption amongst its officials and other elites, mining companies and government departments. The lack of capacity by RDCs to monitor mining operations and revenues is widely documented

(Masiya et al., 2018). Household surveys in (75% of the participants) Mhondoro-Ngezi,

Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi rural districts also provide credence to the fact mentioned in the foregoing.

7.16.3 Multiplicity of tax collecting agents hurting the mining sector

The study established that transparency as well as accountability are affected by the involvement of multiple revenue collecting agents as well as failure of the agents to remit revenues into one purse.

One official from ZASMIC said,

“The multiplicity of tax collecting agents is not health for transparency and accountability in the country’s mining sector. Too many revenue collection institutions make it difficult to trace revenue leakages in the sector”. (2 November 2019, Harare)

Several agencies of the government that are involved in the collection of revenue in the mining sector include the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development (MMMD),

ZIMRA, Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MCZ)/ fidelity and ZMDC. The

173 multiplicity of revenue collecting agents opens up opportunities for leakages and rent seeking as it is difficult to trace all the revenues being handled by these agencies

(ZIMCODD, 2014 and AFRODAD, 2017). The study established that there has been a lot of suspicion on the revenues that are being contributed by the mining sector to the treasury. The government have been failing to predict its mineral revenues while mining companies have neither been transparent nor accountable and the various revenue collecting agents are blamed for that. ZEPARU (2016) posited that the various mineral revenue-collecting agents in Zimbabwe’s mining sector not only compromise the sector’s viability but also present challenges of transparency as well accountability over mineral revenues that are accruing to the nation.

4.17 Subnational revenue sharing The country’s constitution and the 3rd schedule of the RDC Act empowers local government to utilize tax as tool for financing of local economic development as well as delivery of social services. Under Section 276 (2) (b) of the Constitution local authorities are authorized “to levy rates and taxes and generally to raise sufficient revenue for them to carry out their objectives and responsibilities.” If mining companies remit their fair tax shares to the RDCs, ideally mineral revenues should essentially finance service delivery at the local level.

One councilor from Zibagwe RDC said,

“Local authorities are rule takers and revenue takers as a result RDCs are failing to effectively mobilize resources for socio-economic development. The government continues to use an unfair revenue sharing formulae where labor continue to be used as a basis for calculating mining taxes due to any local authority in an environment where we have witnessed massive technological advancements in the mining sector and other sectors of the economy” (17 October 2019, Kwekwe District).

174

Despite the constitutional power afforded to local authorities administering resource rich communities, they have commonly struggled to capitalize on economic activities in their respective jurisdictions, to finance local socio-economic development. Largely the challenge originates from the fact that RDCs are “rule takers and revenue takers

(Bauer, 2013; and Sibanda, 2019). The regressive local tax system in the mining sector impede development finance flow since labor is used as a basis for the calculation of mining taxes due to RDCs. Moreover, the unit is subject to negotiations annually between local authorities and mining companies. The negotiation process is yearly because it is knotted to the local government annual budgeting processes.

Depending on the local government’s bargaining power, a good or bad deal can be made. The use of labor as a basis for calculation of mining taxes due to any local authority is untenable; labor is replaced by machines as a production driver in the mining industry and this position is set to worsen as the fourth industrial revolution wave is not avoidable.

Syama Fact Sheet (2019) noted that Syama mine in Mali became the first completely automated underground mine worldwide. The local taxation system in the mining sector has resulted in revenue losses to local authorities by pursuing the manual labour-based approach instead of the value-based approach. The study established that the constitutional revenue sharing formulae between the local government and national government is not being adhered to.

One councillor from Chegutu RDC said,

“The constitution provides that not less than 5% of national revenue generated in that financial year should be allocated to the provincial and local government but that constitutional formulae is not being followed, the central government always get more

175 and the provincial and local governments gets less since the establishment of the new constitution in 2013”. (10 October 2019, Chegutu District)

The parliament has been gazetting budgets that evidently violate the country’s

Constitution on the allocation of revenues to the three government tiers. Consequently,

RDCs have not been getting enough revenues to finance local development and service delivery. The fiscal capabilities of RDCs to deliver quality social services like hospitals, clinics, schools and roads is limited by the failure by the central government to adhere to the constitutional revenue sharing formulae. Subsection 3 of the constitution directs that “not less 5% of national generated revenue in that financial year must be allocated to provincial and local governments as their share in that year.”

The civil society constituencies have not cranked enough pressure to the Parliament as well as the executive to honor the constitutional revenue sharing formulae.

4.18 Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) The institution of CSOTs is widely viewed as a noble notion that sought to provide communities with an opportunity to participate in shareholding of diverse business entities especially those involved in commercial extraction of natural resources. This is so due to the fact that local communities naturally have a right to benefit from natural endowments in their localities. Community members, Rural District Councillors, traditional chiefs, CSOT officials and CSO officials cast some uncertainty around the future of CSOTS in the country. One official from Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba

Community Share Ownership Trust said,

“The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act that was giving effect to

Community Share Ownership Trusts was repealed and now there is uncertainty around the sustainability and legality of these institutions”. (22 November 2019,

Mhondoro- Ngezi District)

176

The IEA was repealed and the 2020 budget statement announced the framework would be substituted by an Economic Empowerment Act, which will be informed by the present thrust, “Zimbabwe is Open for Business”. The Empowerment Act is yet to be gazetted to clear the mist on the indigenisation agenda in Zimbabwe. It is logical that the government must make the country a mining investment destination because mining business is capital intensive. The current mining regime allows foreign investors to own 100 percent shareholding in all mining operations (MMD, 2019).

However, local community shareholding should not be sacrificed on the expediency of mining investment attraction. The complete scrapping of the entire indigenisation requirements leaves CSOTs without any legal backing (Bhoroma, 2019). This is a wanton violation of the country’s constitution; Section 13 (4) obliges the state to establish mechanisms to guarantee community benefit from their natural resources.

This also constitute a big dent on the political will to implement devolution principles provided for in the constitution as communities are disconnected from control and ownership of natural resources without any ostensible alternative. This is despite the fact that notable progress was being made in the districts where CSOTs were operating in terms of investments in infrastructure, clinics and schools notwithstanding the persistent aberrant infrastructure gaps in the rural districts under study. Accoording to Chiunya et al., (2017:5) CSOTs played a key role in promoting socio-economic development in most mining communities across the country. The authors further noted that these institutions have fostered the realization of human rights through the establishment as well as maintenance of health and educational facilities.

Indigenization policies were not a novelty in Zimbabwe as these have been and are still being applied in countries like France, China, Italy, South Korea and South Africa among others. Bhoroma, (2019) noted that local communities in these countries are

177 benefiting from the indigenization requirements. The South African Black Economic

Empowerment (BEE) Act of 2003 has over the years effected the increased participation of blacks in economic development, thus reducing levels of poverty. The study took a snapshot of the contribution of Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba CSOT

(covering two districts under this study; Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu) and Tongogara

CSOT (covering Shurugwi district).

4.18.1 Mondoro Ngezi Chegutu Zvimba Community Shareownership Trust

Zimplats a subsidiary of the South African based mining consortium exclusively fund

Tongogara CSOT. The study established that the trust now controls 10 percent of

Zimplats Platinum Mines as part of the obligations of the firm to fulfil the requirements of indigenisation. According to Muruviwa (2018) Zimplats funded the trust US$10 million for its operationalization and the mining corporation further disbursed $US 95 million to the trust and completed the 10 percent stake transfer process (Makumana,

2016). Household surveys and interviews with the rural district councillors, traditional chief, a Zimplats official and Mondoro Ngezi Chegutu Zvimba Community Share ownership Trust officials revealed that although there were tangible socio-economic benefits form the trust in Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu, there were still dire socio- economic conditions in the districts. One chief from Mashonaland West who was interviewed said,

“Yes, the trust is helping but socio-economic conditions in Mhondoro-Ngezi and

Chegutu districts are still deplorable; our health and educational facilities are still very poor. Most of our people are living in poverty; most are unemployed and the few that are employed are getting very low wages”. (29 October 2019, Mhondoro-Ngezi

District)

178

The socio-economic benefits from the trust are not benefiting all the residents in

Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu districts. Although there are substantial funds that are being released by Zimplats to fund local socio-economic development; socio- economic indicators are still dire. Prioritisation of the use of the CSOT funds is one of the factors that was indicated by the respondents for the juxtaposition. The former

Industry and Commerce Minister, Welshman Ncube noted that the use of CSOT funds in most resource-rich districts in the country are not addressing the real needs and aspirations of the local people as these are deprioritised (Newsday, 2012).

The study established that use of CSOT to buy luxury cars and construction of offices was being put ahead of local socio-economic development objectives. The same was reported in Shurugwi district. Civil society (ZIMCODD and ZELA) officials interviewed in this study highlighted that increased mechanisation in the mining sector has resulted in diminishing numbers of mine employees in the districts. The study also sought to highlight on the few socio-economic investments that were made by Tongogara CSOT in Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu districts.

7.18.1.1 Investments in education The trust has played an important role in augmenting the educational development of

Mhondoro-Ngezi. The trust built Waungana School in the Wungana communal area in

Mhondoro-Ngezi. This school has improved school access to local pupils who used to travel long distances to neighbouring communal lands. Modern houses for school employees were constructed and electrification of the area was also effected by the trust. The installation of infrastructure as well as amenities like electricity facilitates modern technologies like computers and internet connectivity in schools.

The trust provided infrastructure for Waungana community through the construction of an information centre, which is helping many community members to have access to vital information. The study further established that the trust assisted local authorities

179 in water reticulation rehabilitation in Waungana communal area. The study also established that the trust in partnership with the Mhondoro-Ngezi RDC and Zimplats reconstructed Mtukwa secondary school in Mhondoro-Mubaira. The scope included school administration blocks reconstruction, a new staff room, and new toilets with running water. The project has created safe and conducive working environments for teachers. The study established that the school has a total enrolment of about 365 learners as well as 14 teachers. Mtukwa secondary school also received 10 computers through the CSOTs commitment to complement the government’s efforts for enhancing utilisation of ICTs in schools. Investments in education in these districts are helping in reducing educational inequality and poverty in rural communities and it establishes the foundation for long term and sustained economic growth and socio- economic development (Incheon Declaration and SDG4, 2016). Similar studies in

Zimbabwe have highlighted the critical role that is played by CSOTs in promoting educational development in mineral rich communities. For instance, Dube (2015) conducted a study, which focused on assessing the effectiveness of CSOTs as a rural development strategy in Gwanda district in Matebeleland South province. The study revealed that before the advent of CSOTs in the district, its educational system lagged behind and pass rates were critically low. The operationisation of CSOTs saw the transformation of the district’s education system, through construction of educational facilities and revitalizing the services.

7.18.1.2 Sponsoring of Development Projects Household survey and interviews with officials from Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba

CSOT, Zimplats Platinum Mines, Pickstone Peerless Mine, Councillors and a traditional chief revealed that the Trust was also sponsoring local development projects. The participants underscored that the sponsoring of local projects by the trust was somewhat contributing to socio-economic development in Chegutu and

180

Mhondoro-Ngezi districts. Makumana (2016) noted that CSTOs were playing a critical role in local socio-economic development in mineral rich communities; including

Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu. ZIMPLATS in partnership with the Trust managed to sponsor the Turf Molding Cooperative Company that focuses on supplying bricks in the local communities in Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu. Women who are inclusive of single mothers and widows constitute the cooperative membership. The cooperative is generating incomes for the women and other members of the society thereby enhancing their wellbeing, material basis and uplifting their living standards. The trust also gives donations to enhance the wellbeing of vulnerable groups for example the

Shearly Cripps Children Home in Mhondoro-Ngezi district. The trust has engaged in various projects that are benefiting people residing in Chegutu rural. The trust has been sponsoring local poultry (300 families partaking as poultry out-growers) and honey production (30 honey producer groups being supported) among other projects and these have been key in improving household incomes and standards for some local people in Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu districts (Chegutu RDC, 2019). The study established further that the Trust in partnership with ZIMPLATS Platinum Mine has been Micro-financing services (small loans to villagers, microcredit and micro- insurance) to individuals as well as small businesses that do not have access to orthodox banking as well as related services. The trust further constructed a ZW $3 million chicken processing abattoir in Norton, which created more than 500 jobs for people for the three districts covered by the Trust (Chegutu RDC, 2019). The abattoir project is an offshoot of the US$10 million disbursed by Zimplats Platinum Mine to the

Trust at the behest of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Program. The study established that the Trust has invested US$10 million of its equity shares on the money market, which has generated US$2 million in profits. The returns are being

181 used to construct clinics, schools and refurbishing old ones. The Trust partners

Sables; a chicken processing company based in Chegutu, to supply chickens to the abattoir. According to Zimplats Annual Report (2018:12), the CSOT executed 162 projects in 179 wards in Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi and Zvimba districts.

Chiunya et al., (2017) conducted a study in Shurugwi district, which focused on the prospects as well as challenges of CSOTs in Zimbabwe, and concluded that CSOTs are instrumental in the promotion of income generating projects and recommended that these CSOTs should focus on entrepreneurial projects implementation as a pillar for broad-based empowerment and enhancing household incomes in rural households.

4.19.2 Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trust

Tongogara CSOT is exclusively funded by Unkie Mine, an Anglo-American Company subsidiary. The study established that Unkie mine is one of the largest producers of platinum in Zimbabwe, generating enormous revenues to the government and generating employment for the local people. To date, Unkie Mine funded the trust with

US$10 million, of which US$600 0000 was distributed to 24 wards in Shurugwi for various projects (Ndlovu, 2018). The Anglo American Platinum-owned Unki Mine in the Shurugwi area of the Midlands Province also funded the Tongogara CSOT to the tune of US$10 million, of which US$600 000 was shared by 24 wards in the community for various projects

A significant number (24/40) of participants in the household survey indicated the visibility of the Tongogara CSOT in Shurugwi rural. Household survey participants, a rural district councillor, a Tongogara CSOT official, an Unkie Mine official and a local chief has seen a great potential of aiding poverty alleviation and promoting socio-

182 economic development in Shurugwi rural through investments in education, health system water supply and rehabilitation of roads and community infrastructure.

7.19.2.1 Improvements in education Household survey participants, the Rural District Councillor, traditional chief and

Tongogara CSOT official in Shurugwi rural identified education as one of the sectors that Tongogara CSOT was making some social investments. A traditional from

Midlands province chief said,

“The trust is engaging in infrastructural developments in education through building and rehabilitating schools and vocational centres”. (21 November 2019, Shurugwi

District)

All the people under the Tongogara RDC who participated in this study revealed that investments in the local education system by the CSOT were benefiting the local communities. The study established that it played a focal role in financing the building of a vocational centre adjacent to Musasa Shopping (ward 18). The centre accommodates many high school leavers in Shurugwi and equips them with technical skills that help the youth to get employment in the district’s formal or informal sector.

Through the acquisition of the requisite skills from the centre, the youths were better positioned to generate employment opportunities for the community thereby aiding in the reduction of unemployment and poverty that is wreaking havoc in Shurugwi and the nation as a whole. Marope (2015) noted that one of the cornerstones of social and economic development for a nation is vocational education as it is instrumental in addressing unemployment and poverty. Dzenga and Mushava (2016) noted that research done by the Zimbabwe Youth Council and UNICEF highlighted that vocational training is one of the fulcrums for socio-economic development as it guarantees higher educational investment returns. Information gathered also reflected that Tongogara CSOT constructed a primary school (an Administration block and four

183 classroom blocks) in Musasa area (ward 18). The participants revealed that construction of the primary school benefited many children in Musasa area and surrounding areas, as they no longer walk long distances to remote schools in

Shurugwi rural areas. An interview conducted with a local traditional chief revealed that before the construction of the primary school, pupils were learning in combined classes of distinct grades in a derelict shopping building. Furthermore, information elicited from an interview with a Tongogara CSOT official revealed that the Trust was constructing Musasa secondary school. It is anticipated that Musasa secondary school will accommodate many secondary school pupils as large numbers of them in Musasa area and surrounding areas are learning in “make shift structures” that are not suitable for learning. Apart from the educational investments analyzed in the foregoing, the study established that Tongogara CSOT constructed 2 classroom blocks at each of the following schools; Berengwa Secondary (ward 19), Chisungo Primary (ward 23) and Chikato Primary (ward7). These educational investments are a pathway to the benefits and opportunities of mineral-led socio-economic development. Chiunya et al.,

(2017) noted that CSOTs are a fundamental vehicle in the distribution of socio- economic benefits of mineral wealth citing that in South Africa, local Zimele communities benefited through the institution of Zimele Trust whereby infrastructural developments were undertaken for road networks and educational facilities and this elevated the standards of living. Rueben (2015) conducted a study, which focused on assessing the contribution of Gwanda CSOT to the development of education in

Gwanda district, in the Matebeleland South Province in Zimbabwe. The study showed that the CSOT contributed to the development of education in the rural indigenous communities of Gwanda district in a short space of time. The study endorsed that

CSOTs be implemented as a model for promotion of educational development in

184 resource-rich communities in Zimbabwe (Rueben, 2014:27). However, notwithstanding these investments in education, the study; through household survey data and archival data, established that the education system of Shurugwi still have glaring huge infrastructural gaps. Many pupils still travel long distances to access schools, shortage of qualified staff, lack of teaching materials and many rural poor households still struggle to pay the ever-hiking fees in both private and public schools.

7.19.2.2 Improvements in Water Supply Water is at the center of equitable and efficient socio-economic development since it is critical to maintain health, grow food, manage the environment and create jobs.

Goswami and Bisht (2016:1669) noted, “Lack of water is a barrier to sustainable socio- economic development, lack of development is a barrier to solving water problems”.

Household surveys (27/40) and interviews with the Rural District Councillor, traditional chief and Tongogara CSOT official in Shurugwi revealed that although there were still critical shortages of water supply and abhorrent sanitation conditions, there were tangible water supply and sanitation benefits from Tongogara CSOT. The study established that more than 8 boreholes were drilled in Mutsiba and Pandehuni villages in ward 7 by the Trust to address chronic water shortage challenges. The respondents also highlighted that the Trust rehabilitated the water reticulation projects at Donga

Business Centre (Ward 10) and Svika Rural Clinic (Ward 14). Participants in Shurugwi also revealed that Tongogara CSOT renovated Chirume dame in Svika community and this opened many opportunities for the local communities. Reconstruction of

Chirume dam enhanced the livelihoods of local communities, as various income generating projects like horticultural projects (for instance Mushandirapamwe garden) and poultry projects. These local projects were being hampered by chronic critical water shortages before the construction of the dam. The study further established that

185

Tongogara CSOT installed drip irrigation at Chief Ndanga’s (ward 10) and Chief

Banga’s (ward 8) homesteads under the programme Zunderamambo.

Communities surrounding these centres can now access clean as well as safe water for use of domestic purposes. Access to clean as well safe water is vital as a health and development matter at the local, regional and national levels. According to UN

Water (2014) investments in water supply as well as sanitation yields net socio- economic benefits, since reductions in hazardous health effects as well as health care costs, far outweigh cost of interventions. Kurebwa et al. (2014) conducted a study, which focused on the contribution of Bindura CSOT to rural development in Bindura district. The study established that enormous investments in water supply were key in propelling rural development in the district.

17.19.2.3 Improvements in the health system The participants indicated that Tongogara CSOT played a focal role in enhancing the health system in Shurugwi rural. The participants revealed that the CSOT constructed a mother’s waiting shelter and a mortuary at Zvamavande hospital located adjacent to

Donga business centre (ward 10). A Tongogara rural district councillor said,

“Construction of Zvamavande Hospital brought relief to surrounding communities because before its construction many people travelled long distances to access the mortuary services at Shurugwi general Hospital for their deceased relatives and many could not afford the transport costs”. (26 November 2019, Tongogara Rural District)

The councillor further revealed that construction of a mother’s shelter bought relief to the expecting mothers from surrounding communities who can now easily access pre- natal and post natal care. The participants also indicated that the Trust managed to renovate Mbiri Clinic (ward 13) Jobolingo clinic (ward 13). The study also established that through the antiretroviral drugs provided by the Trust, HIV and AIDS patients were finding it easier to access medications and treatment. In addition, as a means of

186 enhancing the community’s health delivery system, Tongogara CSOT constructed a main clinic at Pompy mine (ward 8). Chiunya et al., (2017) noted that CSOTs are key drivers of socio-economic development in rural communities citing that the Impala

Bafokeng Trust (funded by the ‘Anglo American and Implats mining companies’) played a pivotal in the development of local mining communities in South Africa through the promotion of health and educational systems and facilitation of capacity building. However, the study established that although the Tongora RDC (with the assistance of Tongogara CSOT, Unkie Mine and the Chinese embassy) had managed to construct five clinics; Totonga, Batanai, Ruchanyu and Jobolinko, health facilities were still in critical shortage in Shurugwi rural. Ndlovu (2018) noted that health facilities; clinics, hospital and medical drugs and equipment were still in critical shortage in Shurugwi rural; hence the increased incidences of communicable diseases and related deaths.

4.19.3 Improper use of CSOT funds Improper use of funds was reported in both Mhondoro- Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba and

Tongogara CSOTs. Household surveys participants; 32/40 in Mhondoro-Ngezi, 28/39 in Chegutu and 33/40 in Shurugwi and company officials from ZIMPLATS Platinum

Mine, Unkie Mine and Pickstone Peerless Mine and Councillors from Mhondoro-Ngezi,

Chegutu and Tongogara felt that there was improper use of CSOT funds and this was affecting socio-economic development in these districts.

One official form Unkie Mine said;

“Funds that are disbursed by mining companies to CSOTs are not fully committed to socio-economic development projects and there is need for investigations for fund misappropriations and embezzlements” (26 November 2019, Unkie Mine, Tongogara

Rural District)

187

A ZELA official alluded that “CSOTs not operating in a transparent and accountable manner. Nobody knows what is happening” (3 October 2019, Harare)

Although the Mhondoro-Ngezi-Zvimba-Chegutu and Tongogara CSOTs have managed to kick start some projects in their communities, gross fund mismanagement hampers the potential of these institutions to stimulate socio-economic development in the districts. The participants revealed that the trustees of these CSOTs (composed of RDC CEOs, DA, Company Representatives and special interest groups) have not been furnishing communities with progress reports; both narrative and financial on programmes implementation. The tender system procedures in CSOTs are very opaque and communities allude that they are not benefitting much from those.

Trustees of CSOTs must be able to furnish communities with progress reports both financial and narrative on the implementation of programmes to establish transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion. Civil Society Organisations

(CSOs) have not been fared well their oversight role in mineral resources governance as they have failed to simplify the reports by removing jargon than can create barriers to effective consumption of the reports by the intended consumers (community members). The study found that although external auditors to ensure transparency as well as accountability annually audit the CSOTs, the recommendations of audit reports are not implemented. This is in line with the findings of Chiunya et al. (2017) who established that the officials in Shurugwi Trustee body of Shurugwi CSOT was involved in misappropriation and manipulation of the Trust funds, which affect socio- economic development in the district. Mabhena and Moyo (2014) established that chiefs in Zvishavane CSOT were awarding themselves hefty annual sitting allowances of $5000 each, which was not sustainable for the Trust.

188

4.19.4 Participation in CSTOs Participation of the mining communities in mineral resources governance is key in ensuring transparency and accountability in the sector. Evidence from household surveys points to poor participation of community members in the planning as well as implementation stages of the various programs run by the Trusts. There is lack of consultation and/or involvement of local community members. This is depicted in the bar chart below.

Fig 8: Participation of local people in CSOTs

Source: Household Survey Data from Field Work

The bar chart indicates the tallies of the participants’ responses in both frequencies and percentages. As depicted by the Fig 7 above, in Kwekwe majority (20.75%) of participants indicated ‘Not at all’ and the minority (4, 40%) indicated Not Sure. In

189

Shurugwi, the majority (15.75%) indicated ‘Limited participation’, 5.03% indicated Not at all, 3.77% indicated ‘Full participation’ and 0.63% did not respond. In Mhondoro-

Ngezi, majority (15.75%) of the participants indicated ‘Limited participation’, 5.66% indicated ‘Full participation’ and 1.89% indicated ‘Not at all’. In Chegutu, majority

(11.32%) of the participation indicated ‘Limited participation’, 8.18% indicated ‘Full participation’, 1.89 indicated ‘Not at all’ and 0.63 did not respond. These figures show a lack of participation of most community members in the four mining districts.

Lack of empowerment and consultation was cited by respondents as part of the problems that did not enable them to fully partake in mineral resource governance.

Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu Zvimba CSOT was reported to be consulting and involving community members but majority of household survey participants indicated high levels of exclusion of local communities, as was the case in Tongogara CSOT. No substantive legislation provides clear guidelines and procedures for the involvement of local communities and assessment of their needs. This resonates with Shumba’s

(2019) findings who established that information and power asymmetries in CSOTs in the mining sectors of Zimbabwe and South Africa were hindering the involvement of local communities. Lack of consultation and involvement of local communities is affecting the sustainability of the projects implemented by the Trusts. Corruption and elitism was documented in Bumiputera Trust, which was established in terms of the

New Economic Policy on the turn of the millennium in Malaysia for local benefit in the extractive sector (Chiunya et al., 2017). The lack of community involvement in the

CSOTs under study was attributed to elitism, information asymmetries, the lack of awareness of citizens’ rights, roles as well as responsibilities in CSOT programs. Poor citizen involvement in the planning and implementation of CSOT development projects was attributed to poor leadership bent on pursuing personal interests, discordance

190 and miscommunication amongst leaders of the Trusts. The glaring disregard for the constitutional provision on community involvement in mineral resources governance gleaned in this study spawns a lack of sense of ownership in development projects.

Furthermore, it incapacitates local communities to crank pressure to the CSOT

Trustees to follow transparency as well as accountability procedures in the Trusts.

4.20 Employee Share ownership trust/employee equity

The operationalization of ESOPs in the country’s mining sector has been a quandary due to capital viability challenges for the indigenous Zimbabwean to acquire stakes in foreign owned mining companies. An official at Jena Mine in Kwekwe said, “The

Company has been facing capitalisation challenges for acquisition of indigenous stakes and we have opted to undertake Corporate Social Responsibility to empower locals and stimulate socio-economic development” (28 November 2019, Jena Mine,

Kwekwe District)

The indigenisation policy did not make provisions on how and where indigenous

Zimbabweans were going to get capital in order to acquire stakes in the mining companies. Therefore, endeavours to utilise ESOPs as a tool to indigenise the mining industry in mining companies like Jena Mine in Kwekwe and Pickstone Peerless Gold

Mine in Chegutu among others, has not yielded results (Makumana, 2016).

The study also established that Zimplats Platinum Mine in Mhondoro-Ngezi managed to sell 10% equity in 2017 to its ESOP, which is composed of more than 2000 permanent employees excluding company secretary and executive directors. An official from ZIMPLATS said, “The 10% equity stake is being vendor financed through a loan advanced by Zimplats and it is being repaid from dividends declared by the company”. (11 November 2019, Zimplats Mine, Mhondoro-Ngezi District,

Mashonaland West province)

191

Unkie Mine also vendor financed a 1 million stake through a loan in 2016 and this is being repaid through loans. Although, employees do not directly hold the shares, they enjoy some financial benefits from ESOP schemes in Unkie Mine and Zimplats

Platinum Mine.

However, the equity stake is not available to all indigenous employees in Unkie Mine due to capitalisation challenges. Equity shares are helping some employees to get better salaries from the mining company and this is enhancing their household wellbeing. The challenge with ESOPs was that they were supposed to be divided according to positions but because of the technical nature of the mining sector, there are more expatriates in higher positions requiring expertise, than the locals. The study established that undervaluing of company profits in some financial years is also affecting the dividends that employees get. ‘Broad- Based Black Economic

Empowerment Charter for the Mining and Minerals Industry’ (the Mining Charter) has underpinned ESOPs in South Africa’s mining industry and they have registered some successes in the sector. For instance, employees from mining entities like Exxaro and

Kumba Iron Ore “obtain real economic benefit from ESOPs and it t has paid out approximately R 2.7 billion to the 6 209 employee beneficiaries” (Howard, 2017:1).

However, the author further noted that due to international commodity prices downturn, coupled with the capitalisation structure of ESOPs shares (the vendor financing structure), beneficiaries in South Africa’s mining sector have not seen substantial benefits in many instances in the recent years.

However, the 2019 Mid-Year Budget Review and Supplementary Budget cast the future of ESOPS in Zimbabwe’s mining sector into uncertainty after the repeal of the indigenisation law in the mining industry. An official from ZIMCODD said,

192

“We are not sure whether the new empowerment bill is going to incorporate Employee share ownership schemes. We are not even clear what will happen to Employee

Schemes that have already been entered into”. (1 October 2019, Harare)

Evidence from the ground indicates that it is not clear whether companies that had adapted ESOPs are going to continue with the schemes based on the signed contracts or whether they will be suspended.

4.21 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) CSR is fundamental in the mining sector since minerals are finite and it is a modern accountability mechanism in the corporate world. The study established that to a certain extent, corporate social investments are helping to stimulate socio-economic development but the problem CSIs are not legislated and there are on-going amendments to that effect. There are different views around CSR, some thinking that the responsibility of mining companies is just to pay taxes to government and then the government builds roads, schools, health centres and so on. Government officials had the conviction that if CSR is made legally obligatory in Zimbabwe, CSOTs will be rendered irrelevant in the present situation. The concept of CRC and CSTOs are congruent hence mining companies might view the legal mandatory of the two as double taxation on their side which will frustrate foreign direct investment in the mining sector (ZELA, 2016). Regulations SI 21 of 2010 makes a provision that revenues realised from CSOTs will be utilised for community projects like construction of schools, hospitals, and irrigation facilities among others. The legal provisions crystallised CSR into law, although it did not specify the phrase CSR. Legislations in various countries are placed differently with respect to business role in societal development. For instance, India has taken a unique initiative of making CSR obligatory for certain companies (including those in the extractive sector) to commit

193

2% of the profit towards CSR projects on basic health care delivery, poverty eradication, water and sanitation and social inclusion among others (Government of

India, 2019). The market capitalization of mining companies listed with the ‘Bombay

Stock exchange’ (BSE) is around 3,45 percent and the companies rank at 8/19 top companies listed with the BSE (Poddar et al., 2019). The companies are committed to the legally mandatory 2% for CSR per annum.

There are scepticisms from the communities to say the government has not been committed to socio-economic development goals with the resources that they have been getting from the other taxes. An official form ZELA said, “It’s something that is not mandatory in the case of Zimbabwe but it’s something that is tax deductible and most companies actually engage in such so they do not pay taxes because its deductible in terms of their tax payments”. (3 October 2019, Harare)

Some of the CSI are not benefitting the communities because it is something that is done at the mess of the mining company who decide what kind of CSR they want to deliver to communities. Some mining companies sponsor football teams, which are domiciled elsewhere, and those investments do not benefit the local communities. In most cases, the investments are overpriced to evade tax. Mugova and Sachs

(2019:31) in their book titled ‘Opportunities and Pitfalls of Corporate Social

Responsibility in Zimbabwe’, noted that wider accountability deficits in terms of financial benefits reporting and adherence to agreements on CSR implementation codes are some of the principal limitations to developing world resource-rich countries and Zimbabwe is one such case.

Corporate Social Responsibility in mining communities depends with the company for instance Zimplats says 2% of its profits before tax goes to CSR. According to last year’s report about 50 % of CSR was disbursed to Ngezi Platinum FC (Muruviwa et al

194

2018:7). Communities in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi do not have the authority for the enforcement of CSR agreements as a result companies, may or may not implement CSR. There are no penalties or legal consequences for defaulting on CSR. Household surveys (76% of the participants) in the four districts indicated that although there is a presence of civil societies, they have not done enough to sensitize communities of their power and rights about the implementation of CSR agreements. Thus, local communities capitulate their power to mining corporations and take a passive role, which affects them. One traditional chief interviewed in Mashonaland West said, “Since it is mining companies who decide what to give communities, in most instances it does not reflect the needs of local communities”. (30 October 2019, Chegutu district, Mashonaland West province)

Inclusiveness as a principle of the Governance theory provides that CSR priorities should reflect the needs of stakeholders. The real socio-economic benefits of CSR have proved to be elusive in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America

(Mugova and Sachs, 2019). The failure by the Zimbabwe government to provide adequate land and amenities for relocated people in Shurugwi and Kwekwe (as was the case in Marange, Shurugwi, Chegutu among other districts) is widely viewed as one of the main failures of CSR in the country. Socially responsible actions are supposed to be government driven because there are given the mandate by citizens to implement programs that enhance their social wellbeing. Therefore, linkages between CSR activities and investments in health, education and household incomes amongst other indicators of socio-economic development is quite weak in Chegutu,

Kwekwe and Shurugwi.Some of the CSR implemented by mining companies in the 3 districts are depicted in the table below.

Table 1.4 CSR implemented in Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi

195

Chegutu Kwekwe Shurugwi Pickstone Peerless Gold Jena Mine Unkie Mine Mine  Infrastructure  Injected more than US$12000  Supporting local Development in Silobela: for the building of Runyaru Clinic farmers to ascertain  Road Clearing at a in Tongogara. The construction signed way leave forms cost of US$ 1,830 of the clinic brought relief to for the re-routing of  Road Grading at a thousands of locals who used to power lines cost of US$6,65 travel long distances to access  Help with cement for  Bins for Clean health care services at Mafuti clinic toilets Campaign at a cost Marishongwe rural health centre  Boreholes for the of US$ 3,76 or Mapanzure health centre in community around the  100 bags of cement Zvishavane. mine (4 sites at a cost of US$750  Committed funds towards mentioned) towards Construction of Rugare  Construction of a block construction of Secondary School 1x2 at Tiverton school houses damaged classroom block & Equipping-  Wheelchairs for the by hailstorm. Expenditure as at 31 March 2019 disabled in the was US$1,460 community  Drilling and equipping borehole  Snolime and Chairs at Rugare Secondary School donation to Pickstone  Renovations and equipping School Chrome Secondary School  Planning to install Laboratatory at a cost of US$ electricity and 35,933 computers at Pickstone  Implementation of Reifontein Primary school Household Irrigation Gardens  Roofing Sheets for and support infrastructure at a Shingirirai Primary cost of US$ 6, 201 School  Developing and equiping Impali Expenditure on Corporate Sewing Club US$ 6,721 Social Responsibility  Funding of Shungudzevhu and  2018 Total Expenditure: Gutsaruzhinji irrigation $US18,575 horticulture projects at a cost of  2019 first Quarter US$ 262,535 Expenditure: $US 670  Construction of Pamumvuri  2019 second Quarter ablution at a cost of US$ 8,381 Expenditure $500  Construction of Shurugwi District Karo Platinum Mine Holdings hospital incinerator at a cost of The early stage CSR projects US$2,294 from project ground breaking in  Drilling and equipping a borehole the first quarter of 2018 to to the at Shurugwi District Hospital at a last quarter of 2019, cost of 3346  the value of the  Construction of Ruchanyu clinic- donations was injected US$12000 approximatelyUS$10  Village 4 Rehabilitation of a 000. borrow pit at a cost of US$38,174

196

The following donations have  Chironde access road grading at been made to the Chirundazi a cost of US$24,480  Primary School (has  General Manager’s discretionary approximately 730 donations amounting to US$ pupils), located in the 16,205 vicinity of the project  In total Unkie Mine committed a area: total of US$205,901 towards  Equipping of borehole CSR. and water storage to supply clean water to pupils and teachers  Installation of solar panel  to supply electricity

Source: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development 2018 Annual Report

CSR is to some extent contributing to socio-economic development in Mhondoro-

Ngezi as noted by Muruviwa’s (2018) study, which focused on assessing the role of

CRS in community development as well as poverty reduction in the district. According

to Zimplats Annual Report (2018) over the last 16 years, Zimplats Platinum Mine spent

$US 200 million on various community development projects such as road

construction, clinics schools, income generating projects and so on.

4.21.1 CSR in Mhondoro-Ngezi 7.21.1.1 Educational Investments Some of the major projects for educational development in Mhondoro-Ngezi depicted

on the table below

Fig 1.5: Educational Investments in Mhondoro-Ngezi

Name of school Developments by Zimplats David Gazuzu Construction of a new library, staff center and offices Marshall Hartley New class blocks, refurbished dining hall, furniture for 200 students and boarding holster at a cost of $500 000 NyangwenePrimary New classroom blocks, offices and provision of furniture for about 700 students at a total cost of $370 000 St Michael’s High Construction of a laboratory at a total cost of $12000 Turf Primary and Refurbishment of the whole school and construction of Secondary houses for teachers

197

Wanganui Turf High Refurbishment of the whole school, construction of School Expansion classroom block with four classrooms, construction of a crèche block, drilling a borehole for supply of clean water to the school at a total cost of $1 513 000. About 450 students benefited Source: Ministry of Mines and Mining Development 2018 Annual Report

As depicted on table 1.5 above, Zimplat’s activities in the refurbishment and upgrading of schools around various wards in Mhondoro-Ngezi are an indication of the mining giant’s commitment to educational development in the district. Secondary data reflects that Zimplats invested a hefty $5million for the construction and refurbishment of schools around Mhondoro-Ngezi (Muruviwa et al., 2018). Prior to Zimplats’s intervention, most of the schools were in a decrepit state and the corporation’s CSR have improved the state of education in the district. Results from the household survey correspond with the qualitative findings Zimplats’s contribution to educational development in Mhondoro-Ngezi community. CSR proponents argue that CSR plays a critical role in those areas where the government fails.

17.21.2 Investments in the health facilities in Mhondoro-Ngezi

There are some notable investments in the health facilities of Mhndoro-Ngezi by

Zimplats Platinum Mine. According to Zimplats Annual report (2018) since 2013, the mining company invested US$1.6 million on the refurbishment of medical facilities as well as purchasing of equipment for local clinics. One of the outstanding projects that was implemented by the company is the rehabilitation of Kadoma General Hospital at a cost of $US 2.5 million. The hospital is one of the main referral hospitals in Zimbabwe and the second biggest in Mashonaland West province mainly delivering healthcare to patients from Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi, Kadoma urban and Sanyati districts. The hospital was built in the pre-independence period and no major rehabilitation was done to the health centre since then owing to economic challenges. People in the

198 neighbouring rural districts such as Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi, Sanyati among others are now able to access quality health services from Kadoma General Hospital after the installation of modern equipment and systems at the centre. Health care delivery in most rural districts in Zimbabwe is in a dire state having been pervasively affected by the country’s chronic political and economic crisis (Kevany et al., 2012:46). One project that was implemented by the company to promote health care development in the district includes the purchase of an ambulance at St Michael’s hospital. This development came at a critical time when most patients’ health was deteriorating further or were even losing their lives before they access health care due to transport challenges. Unlike hospitals in urban areas with better equipment and facilities, rural hospitals fail to attend to some health matters due to lack of advanced equipment and facilities. Consequently, several patients are referred to metropolitan hospitals where they pay higher fees for transport and health care. To address the challenges, Zimplats donates health equipment to local clinics and hospitals.

4.22 Disequilibrium in Development Household survey (29/40 in Mhondoro- Ngezi, 32/40 in Chegutu and 35/40 in

Shurugwi) participants indicated that there is disequilibrium in the development approach by CSOTs and mining companies CSR programs. One household survey participant in Shurugwi wrote,

“Most wards in Shurugwi North are not covered by the Tongogara CSOT or mining companies’ corporate social responsibilities and yet these wards are in even worse socio-economic conditions”. (26 November 2019, Shurugwi District)

Most CSOT projects and corporate social responsibility programs are implemented mostly in areas in and around business centres for instance Donga and Musasa areas

199 in Shurugwi where several developments like construction of schools, clinics, vocational centres, rehabilitation of hospitals and roads. These infrastructural and socio-economic developments are not being implemented in remote wards that are immersed in poverty and dire development challenges. Several household survey participants in the Chegutu district noted that most Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba and mining company CSR programs were mostly done to rural wards closer to towns.

For instance, the construction of a US$ 3 million abattoir in Norton was creating jobs for Chegutu rural wards located closer to Norton and the Chegutu as well as Norton urban dwellers. The rehabilitation of Kadoma hospital was improving the health services of Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu rural wards that are located closer to

Kadoma. Microcredit and micro financing services given by Mhondoro-Ngezi-

Chegutu-Zvimba CSOT are not availed to most of Chegutu’s rural remote wards like those in Mashayamobe, Nyamweda, Gora and Nherera. Most rural wards in Kwekwe are not receiving meaningful benefits from CSR and the proliferating ASM activities in the district.

Kwekwe and Shurugwi has been defined as outstanding cases of the resource curse phenomenon given the opulent mineral resources, the histrionic proliferation of the socially irresponsible ASM, the chaotic gold rush, mineral resource fuelled anarchy and violence instigated by “makorokoza” and “mashurugwi” mobs in Kwekwe and

Shurugwi respectively. The study established that the rulers as well as economic elite have turned the state into a vehicle for private accumulation of capital against the backdrop of blatant grim socio-economic conditions in most remote rural wards in the four districts as also indicated by Spiegel (2015) in his study of ASM governance in

Zimbabwe. A commendable number of household survey participants (21/40) in

Mhondoro-Ngezi indicated that Zimplats Platinum mine’s CSR makes a wide coverage

200 of the district’s rural wards to ensure that even remote rural wards benefit from its investments in education, health, water and sanitation, income generating projects and other developmental projects. This resonates with Muruviawa et al., (2018) findings in their study that focused on assessing the role of CSR in alleviating poverty in

Mhondoro-Ngezi district.

4.23 Poor Governance of the ASM Sector The study established that there is no law or broad based measures that specifically deal with the subsector. An official from MMD said,

“ASM framework is there in the MMA part 4 section 20. Its only issues of capacitation to implement the framework” (4 November 2019, Harare)

The purported ASM framework in MMA (part four section 20) is inadequate. In spite of the growing significance of artisanal mining as a source of livelihood and employment for low-income groups, the government has failed to take broad-based measures to support artisanal mining and this has cast the future of low-income artisanal gold miners into a quandary. This is in spite of the scrapping of Presumptive Tax by the government to incentivise the sector. Rural district councillors in the four districts indicated that they have been incapacitated to regulate the ASM sector since the recentralisation of ASM governance in the post-2006 period when the central government abrogated legal instrument 275 of 1991 that allowed RDCs to issue ASM licences. Although the RDC officials want to support ASM as livelihoods capable of sustaining local economic development, national ASM policy debates are disconnected from concerns about local livelihoods (Spiegel, 2015).

The government policy towards artisanal miners has been in reactive mode where state sponsored violence, arbitrary arrests are the order of the day, notably in Kwekwe,

201 and Shurugwi.This is despite the fact that ASM is providing incomes to an average of

1500 households in each of the four districts under study (Spiegel, 2015). The lack of regulation of ASM has spawned looting, smuggling as well as human rights violations in the country’s mining sector. The government has not put in place measures for tracking all mineral movements in the ASM sector and thus there are high levels of opacity and unaccounted millions of US dollars of potential revenues are lost every year (Dzimunya et al., 2018). One ASM miner from Kwekwe District wrote, Illicit financial flows in ASM are allowed by poor payment modalities where ASM miners get

US 55 % and 45% Zim dollars then they opt to sell on the black market where the precious stones fetch higher foreign currency prices” (22 November 2019, Kwekwe

District)

The unstable regulatory status of ASM present the state with challenges in governing and fiscally benefiting from the sectors’ productivity. Unsound policies and lack of proper coordination between the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, MMD, ZIMRA, the EMA,

MMCZ, local authorities and the security establishment has spawned poor governance as well as opacity and too many leakages in the ASM sector. Social responsibility in the ASM sectors of the four districts under study has been difficult to enforce owing to the absence of proper regulation. Thus, ASM operate without any mandatory agreements with stakeholders spawning a horrendous cost of environmental degradation to the local communities. Most ASM operators lack the knowhow, organisation, equipment and capital to manage the environmental hazards their activities pose. Phiri (2011: 34) noted that, “the tragedy of the management and use of the natural environments is usually rooted in the non-consultation and non- involvement of local communities in decision making processes by central and even local governance structures”. For most ASM operators there are usually low incomes

202 from the sector due to inefficient mining and processing methods therefore the costs end up outweighing the benefits in most of the cases. Although the incomes are low for a considerable number of operators, there is a proliferation of ASM miners, most notably in Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi due to the decline of other key sectors owing to the country’s unprecedented economic meltdown. This results in increased deforestation, land degradation and water pollution in the aforementioned districts.

This exerts a negative impact on agricultural land practises and is aggravated by the fact that the country’s legal framework gives precedence to subsoil assets rights over agricultural land rights. Such a scenario reinforces a vicious cycle of poverty in most parts of the districts understudy. According to Debrah et al, (2014:914) in most rural communities, it is the respective mining regimes and the gazetted regulations that are not premised on the diverse needs of artisanal and small scale miners that aggravate the cycles of poverty.

All the gold that is produced in Zimbabwe is supposed to be sold through Fidelity

Printers, which is a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), however, most of the minerals produced by artisanal miners is sold on the black market locally and in South Africa and other neighbouring countries where the mineral fetches higher prizes. The contribution of artisanal mining in alleviation of poverty and rural development nationally is widely appreciated and less disputed.

An official from ZASMC alluded that, “There are piecemeal measures for the ASM sector. ASM is not a reserved sector. No special licences in the sector as is the case with medium and large-scale mining. Small scale, medium and large scale mining are entitled to same claims” (2 November 2019, Harare)

203

The structure, form as well as organisation of the sector are opaque. Medium and large scale are able to hold mining claims through special licences like the Special

Mining Lease and Special Grant licences and the government has not provided such special provisions for the ASM sector. Household surveys (70% of the participants) and interviews with traditional chiefs and civil societies revealed that the ruling and economic elite are heavily involved in the ASM sectors of Chegutu, Kwekwe and

Shurugwi in their bid to accumulate private capital and seemingly there is no political will to institute regulations in the ASM sector. Far from being the poor people’s survival strategy only, the sector reflects shady networks of the elites’ mineral wealth accumulation. The analysis underscores how state power is being used in a myriad of idiosyncratic and complex ways for private accumulation. Traditional chiefs, ZASMC,

ZELA and ZIMCODD officials alluded that there is heavy involvement of military, police and Central Intelligence Organisation in the allocation of mining ASM claims, notably in the gold sector, in Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi districts as was highlighted by

Mawowa’s (2013) and Spiegel’s (2015) analyses. A reflection on the structure, form as well as organization of ASM show the intersection between politics, patronage, economic crisis, elite accumulation and survivalism.

The study established that the government has not committed to the geological mapping of ASM zones and consequently in some instances, ASM miners encroach into claims owned by large-scale mining operators and this reverberates with

Dzimunya et al.’s (2018) study, which focused on establishing pathways for the maximization of ASM contribution in Zimbabwe. The author posited that this situation is due to the fact that large-scale mines buy vast tracts of land and “the ASM is usually left with smaller and poorly mapped areas” (Dzimunya et al., 2018). This situation degenerate into pervasive disputes and conflicts for mining claims. One artisanal

204 miner from Kwekwe wrote, “…. It is difficult to get mining licences due to the exorbitant licence fee amounting to more than US$1000 and the strenuous bureaucratic processes”. (22 November 2019, Kwekwe District)

The centralised mining regime that is currently in Zimbabwe is posing challenges to the artisanal miners, particularly in terms of registration and licencing where the miners have to undergo a long strenuous process to get mining licences and permits. The government’s position on artisanal mining is contradictory and inconsistent in the sense that they criminalise artisanal mining activities and at the same time Fidelity

Printers, a gold buying agency for the state buys gold from the same people.

4.24 Mining Title Management System Furthermore, the mining regime is operating with an out-dated mining title management system, which blurs opacity and un-accountability in the management of mining titles. An official from ZELA said “You can’t talk of transparency and accountability in the mining sector when we do not know how mineral rights are being parcelled. Modern mining tittle management system is needed.”

A traditional Chief from Mashonaland West said, “There are people moving from their areas and coming to resource-rich communities grabbing mining claims in the name of ZANUPF, some purporting to be highly connected to senior government officials and this is causing conflicts. Many people who want to access mining claims have been denied”. (30 October 2019, Chegutu District)

Mining tittles are sorely issued in accordance with part 67 of the MMA and not any other Act can do so. The current mining title management system is manual and out- dated and, and it is highly susceptible to wanton corruption. The system is difficult to track mining titles, claims, and progress on work. According to Dhliwayo (2016), the

205 country’s mining title management system is susceptible to corruption and speculation.

The current mining tittle management system allows mining companies to hold claims as well as titles that they are not working on and may not have an intention to work on by merely remitting an insignificant yearly fee to the government. The study established there are several mining companies that have not been working on their claims for many years. This has been depriving the country of significant and timely revenue amounts that can contribute to socio-economic development. Other companies are operating without environmental impact assessment papers causing much damage to the environment. ASM operators are struggling to get mining claims and titles due to corrupt bureaucracy. Medium and large-scale mines have been holding claims and titles for years whereas ASM operators cannot access them. Some mining companies have taken advantage of the out-dated mining title management system and carried out mining operations under the guise of exploration (Dhliwayo,

2016; Dhliwayo, Mutuso and Sibanda, 2017). The study established that the absence of a mining cadastre has resulted in the awarding of licences over mining claims that belong to other people already and this is most notable in Chegutu, Kwekwe and

Shurugwi. The Auditor General’s report (2019) cited that there was evidence of prospecting as well as pegging within the claims of MMCZ but the Auditor General was not furnished with geological maps of MMCS claims in Shurugwi and Kwekwe districts, which MMCZ officials reported to have been misplaced. The report cited the risk and/or potential implication of disputes over claims as the corporation may fail to identify its mining claims in the district. There are incessant mining claims disputes in the aforementioned districts, some dating back to as early as the 1990’s. The Mining

Commissioners who are tasked with issuing out licences in the current mining regime were reported to be corrupt resulting in double awarding of licences on same sites

206 thereby fuelling disputes and conflicts amongst the ASM operators themselves and between ASM and Medium and Large Scale Mines. Furthermore, the current mining management system bares stakeholders from accessing essential mining information since it charges exorbitant and prohibitive fees (US$250) for accessing information and does not have reporting mechanisms. The high information access fees refute the spirit and letter of the Constitution (Section 62) which provides for the right to access to information held by any State agency for transparency and public accountability interests. With all these barriers to key information access, transparency and accountability are questioned. Silence on the progress pertaining the computerisation of mining title management system is a heavy indictment on a government that purport to open the country for business.

4.25 Conclusion Although the country’s mining sector shows a huge potential alongside the subsistence of a progressive constitution, substantial development has remained elusive in the districts under study. Females head the majority of the households in the four districts targeted in this study. The age ranges that were established in the study reflect that majority of the age groups were represented which gave room for diverse views. The findings reflect the high frequency of married participants, which shows the importance of the marriage institution in the rural households in Zimbabwe.

The sources of income that were gleaned in the study generally shows high informalisation (mainly due to the literal collapse of the formal sectors) of the districts economies and heavy dependence on the mining sector. Household survey data also reflects high unemployment levels, which spawn below the Poverty Datum Line household incomes. Majority of the citizens in the four districts remain with poor health and education conditions as well as high unemployment rates and low household

207 incomes, which reflects pervasive poverty conditions. Education and health care gains as well as household incomes levels that were achieved in the pre-2000 period are being drastically undermined by factors like poor governance, institutional incapacity and corruption, and rent seeking, HIV/AIDS and “brain drain” among other factors.

This is in spite of the presence of mineral opulence and increased mining activities in these locations.

Nonetheless, the contributions that are being made by CSR in the districts and by the

Tongogara CSOT in Shurugwi and Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba CSOT in

Mhondoro-Ngezi and Chegutu should not be discounted as these are also assisting in improving health, education and household incomes. However, these institutions engendered disequilibrium development as most wards in the rural districts are left out. The lack of a comprehensive legal framework for ASM has spawned opacity, violence, smuggling of minerals, human rights violations, land degradation and diminishing of agricultural land in most rural parts of the districts. There is high centralisation and monopolisation of the mining sector by the central government, which spawns elite capture, private accumulation, opacity, un-accountability and stakeholder exclusion.

The study gleaned that there is lack of consultation of citizens by the government and mining companies and this reflects the social and economic injustices that abound in the mining sector. The country’s mining legal framework has some remnants like the

MMA and the AIPPA among others that are yet to be annulled and others are yet to be aligned to the new constitution’s provisions and clauses on transparency, accountability, stakeholder inclusion and mineral-led socio-economic transformation.

The current legal framework gives the central government actors too much discretionary powers, which disempowers citizens, CSOs, traditional institutions and

208

RDCs from holding them to account. The country’s mining fiscal regime is not water tight against leakages; it does not promote transparency and accountability. It does not constitute an effective resource mobilisation tool since it exempts mining companies from remitting commensurate corporate taxes and exerts the burden of taxation on the poor. The current mining title management system is out-dated and ineffective in tracking mining claims and titles. This makes the mining claims and titles susceptible to corruption by the government bureaucrats and mining companies, which affects the mineral revenue potential to prop socio-economic development. Part of the explanation for the disconnect between mineral wealth and socio-economic development is poor governance of the mining sector that is marked by lack of transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion, an impious legal and policy environment. The chapter noted that Zimbawe’s mining sector has potential to generate resources for development financing in the mining districts if the government and other stakeholders such as community leaders, citizens and civil society are transparent and accountable and capacitated to perform their roles effectively.

209

CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESOURCE CURSE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE

5.1 Introduction While the preceding chapter focused on presenting, interpreting and discussing the findings of the study, this chapter will provide a comprehensive analysis of the gathered data pertaining the governance of mineral resources and socio-economic development underpinned up by literature review as well as secondary data. Empirical literature is used as the basis of analysis and the theoretical frameworks; Resource

Curse, Rent Seeking and Governance theories are also used to analyse and evaluate the research findings. The Resource Curse theory is the flagship framework that is used to understand the subject of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi rural districts because it speaks to the core issues of the study. Analysis is also done in line with the problem statement, research questions and objectives of the study.

5.2 Political Economy and the Resource Curse Literature on the political economy of Zimbabwe has had an agrarian bias partly due to the historical dominance of agricultural capital in the colonial and post-colonial state development. Yet mining fills an important space in the political economy of the country. In spite of the crisis of the mining sector’s political economy, the mining industry has become a vital economic sector, primarily due to the decline and subdued recovery of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors that hitherto contributed significantly to the GDP of the country. The political economy of mining in Zimbabwe, in the post 2000 period invites reference to the crisis of the post-colonial state on the

African continent, and to debates over capitalist development and primitive accumulation (Saunders, 2017). Zimbabwean scholars have related Karl Marx’s

210 concepts of primitive accumulation to explain state violence and elite accumulation in the country. The ruling elite have seemingly turned the state into a vehicle to accumulate private capital in mining sector and hence governance of mineral resources has remained in crisis, with laws that are not consistent and up to the modus operand. The production, trade and distribution of mineral wealth and their associations with the local customs, laws, and government in Zimbabwe professes the resource curse phenomenon.

The socio-economic –wide impacts of the country’s crisis-beset political economy have been devastating so far. Zimbabwe’s international isolation, inverse growth, rule of law dearth (1999-2008), episodes of economic decline and recovery, state fragility, weakening of institutions, multicurrency use, informalization of the economy, high external debt and the enforcement of the indigenisation policy (2009-2014) provides a unique context to analyse the governance of mineral resources and socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. Despite the presence of mineral endowments and the subsequent growth of the mining sector in the four districts, as is phenomenal in most mineral resource-rich districts, in the country, glaring poor socio-economic outcomes still abides. Majority of the citizens in the four districts remain with poor health and education conditions as well as high unemployment rates and low household incomes, which reflects pervasive poverty conditions.

The three Cs: Competition, Collusion and Corruption characterises the political economy of Zimbabwe’s mining sector and, these underpins institutional weaknesses and deterioration, a fragile and/or void regulatory environment and an enclave economy which spawn poor socio-economic outcomes. An important aspect of the

Zimbabwe’s political economy is the use of the MMA of 1961, which reflects a colonial legacy of segregation, separatism, inequality and social exclusion. Mtandwa (2018: ii)

211 noted that the “absence of a single mineral policy document” affects the government of mineral resources in the country. The absence of stand-alone substantive mineral policy makes it difficult for stakeholders to picture government strategy and vision for mineral exploitation and utilization of mineral revenues for social delivery. A stand- alone policy document lessens ambiguity, which arises in trying to understand the position of the government.

Opacity and un-accountability in the mining sector is also aggravated by the fact that the mining fiscal regime does not adequately capture mineral revenues, some of which are lost due to illegal financial flows as well as corrupt activities. The mining fiscal regime in its current form is not an efficient tool for domestic resource mobilization as it gives mining companies tax holidays as well as incentives leaving the tax burden to the citizens. Nyoni (2016:23) noted, “In the first half of 2016, ZIMRA collected $356 million in individual tax, $145 million company tax and $33 million from mining royalties”. The tax and royalties utilised in Zimbabwe’s mining sector are not premised on profitability, as is the case in Botswana and South Africa. This renders the regime rigid and inefficient as a tool for resource mobilization and socio-economic development. The regime does not provide mechanisms for transparency, accountability and inclusiveness, which provides a fertile ground for tax avoidance and evasion by mining companies thereby professing the resource curse.

This underlies the failure by the state to bring substantial changes; inclusivity, transparency, accountability and equity because it endeavours to use an economic system that was used by colonialists to the detriment of the natives. The looting, smuggling and human rights violations in the country’s mining sector epitomize

Zimbabwe’s political economy crisis and the politics of natural resource control within it. Mining is highly contested and politicized; the politics of extraction as well as trade

212 control euphemizes the patronage system and elite accumulation in the sector.

Situating the mining sector within the evolving political and economic interests, the analysis contributes to the discourse on how patronage networks and power dynamics spawn opacity, un-accountability, exclusion, private accumulation, illegality and leakages.

The Zimbabwean case study shows how weak structures lead to the abuse of resources and the resource curse narrative. Mtondoro et al (2013) and Taruvinga

(2016) observed that countries like Zimbabwe have resource misallocation, because the elite within the society are compelled by the desire for self-enrichment. There is slight political incentive for saving as government spending is consumption focused rather than infrastructural development oriented. Besada (2011) argued that the SAPS of the 1990’s as well as the partisan militarization of state institutions in the post 2000 period, eviscerated the state capacity, and made the formulation and implementation of policy vehemently partisan, elitist, unpredictable, reactive and more ad hoc. The policy discourse of the country does not represent anything less than the resource curse cynicism. Thus analysis reflects on the credibility or otherwise of the poverty amidst plenty analysis. The reflections of the analysis invoke a rethink of the pessimistic interpretations of the performance of the mining sector, its contribution to contribution to socio-economic development, possibilities of accrual from below as well as human welfare. Mineral accrual is not without precincts and should be qualified.

The competition for mineral resource rents by the central and subnational government bureaucracy, mining companies and other elites isolates CSOs, traditional institutions,

RDCs, and local communities from decision-making processes in the mineral value chain. It further predisposes the potential for societal rifts, conflicts, weakening of

213 institutions and mal-distribution of mineral revenues as highlighted by (Pütün, 2015) in his analysis of the political drivers of the resource curse phenomenon in resource-rich developing countries. Mawowa (2013:20) reflected on the “the political economy of conflict” of Zimbabwe’s mining sector. Consequently, these recurrent processes supresses the higher growth potential of the district’s mining sectors, professes lower income per capita, higher unemployment rates, poor education and healthcare outcomes as well as persistent poverty.

The lack of wider public consultation in mineral resources governance and during local and national budget formulation and implementation processes highlights the abiding social and economic injustice issues and the unconstitutional dominance of the elite in the production and use of mineral revenues. Thus, the resources, which supposedly belong to the people, are used by the elite group without the consideration of the needs and aspirations of the citizens, which underscores the resource curse thesis in the four districts. Consequently, the citizens have not realised optimum benefits from mineral exploitation in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi, while the development of parallel and exclusive networks has given rise to incapacitation of stakeholders, opaque mining deals, lack of corporate-community engagements, negative local externalities, constitutional subnational national revenue sharing formulae breaches and disequilibrium development approaches. This is undermining local autonomy and it defeats the purpose of devolution. Bureaucratic corruption by government officials who demand mining bribes and kickbacks is inhibiting productivity in the sector.

The multi-stakeholder groups do not have authority for legal enforcement, which affect their participation in critical decision-making processes. Chêne (2017) noted that interest conflicts and power balance struggles amongst various stakeholders inhibits

214 the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder initiatives in most mineral-rich African countries.

This is in line with Doro and Kufakurinani’s (2018) findings in Zimbabwe’s diamond sector where they established deep-seated power and information asymmetries and the intransigence of the resource curse phenomenon. The issue with the subsidiary bodies together with their partnership arrangements with the central government is a question of whether devolvement of the real powers has happened.

The communities have not realized the full domestic resource mobilization benefits primarily because the country’s policies and laws are not water tight against illicit financial flows. Consequently, poor domestic resource mobilization strategies have been and continues to be implemented which leads to tax injustices where big mining companies continue to pursue a largely ‘Extractive Business Model’ in most of the districts’ rural parts and making huge profits without remitting all the taxes due to the government. The up scaling of mining visa-vis the nonexistence of a robust mining law and institutional framework as well as the absence of the political will to shield communities from the negative externalities of mining such as displacements, state sponsored violence, terror gangs, land degradation and poor socio-economic outcomes allows the poverty amid plenty phenomenon.

The mining laws, as highlighted in Chapter 4, gives mining companies the leeway to carry over losses indefinitely, engage in mining under the pretext of exploration, commit to piecemeal CSR so as to avoid and evade tax, thereby depriving the country of its source of revenue for social and economic development. Furthermore, there are no mechanism to verify mineral exploration, production and marketing. A number of agents do mineral marketing; Fidelity, ZMDC, MMCZ and multiplicity of marketing agencies permits a lot of side marketing and smuggling (PWYP Zimbabwe, 2015).

215

Such deficits of Zimbabwe’s political economy profess and manifests the resource curse through poor infrastructural development, poor expenditure for critical social sectors like health, education and others as well as general economic decline. As a result, tax burden will be borne by ordinary people through Pay As You Earn (PAYE),

Value Added Tax (VAT) among other direct and indirect taxes. This analysis underscores that much of the resource curse in Zimbabwe and most resource-rich countries in the region is linked to these countries’ political economies.

In that light, the obtaining resource curse phenomenon is thus, more of a governance deficit rather than a mineral resource opulence crisis. McFerson’s (2011) delineation of the resource curse is concomitant with a country’s leadership as the incumbent government makes a determination on how mineral revenues are administered and utilised. Literature in Chapters 2 highlighted that in resource-rich countries governments, which have established and evolved effective checks and balances systems, the resource curse impasse can be eased.

The deferment by the state of Zimbabwe to come up with a substantive mineral policy gives impression of the heavy involvement and influence of the political and economic elite interest groups who are benefiting from the slack regulatory environment that provides latitude for opacity, unaccountability and exclusion. Findings of the study mirror that the political patronage networks largely undercut and pervade the sanctity of oversight boards such as the parliament, judiciary, traditional chiefs and CSOs.

When there is lack of representation of the interests of all stakeholders by the government “the transparent and accountable use of resource stocks to provide public good amenities, as opposed to salable products, may be under-emphasized.” (Mamo

2016:24).

216

Today, the growing significance of natural resource extraction in most developing nations underlie the renewed interest in policy around natural resource-led socio- economic development and several such policies have been advocated. Yet for the larger part, practitioners and scholars have fallen short of deciphering broader agreement on “good practice” policies into substantial steps to address and navigate the political and institutional obstacles associated with the extraction and allocation of resource rents for socio-economic development purposes.

The political economy context drives power and information asymmetries, which engender opacity, unaccountability, and stakeholder exclusion as the ZANU PF- connected political and economic elite seeks to protect their mineral rent extraction interests at the expense of the broader society. These factors fragment the mineral resources governance landscape and underlies the disconnect between growth in mining activities and socio-economic development.

The political system of Zimbabwe is directly connected to the way natural capital assets are produced, marketed, distributed and utilized in the form of revenues. The government, as the custodian authority, is not managing natural resources in ways, which optimizes their value to the citizens as evinced by the patent poor healthcare, education, household incomes in the four districts. Mineral resource opulence in

Zimbabwe is associated with the resource curse as the political and economic elites diminishes the capability of stakeholders to effectually demand government accountability and transparency and disempowers CSOs, RDCs, traditional leaders and communities by starving them of key information in the mineral value chain, in terms of mineral production, marketing, revenue remittance and utilization. According to Chitotombe (2012) the inception of the post-colonial government at independence further consolidated the powers of the central government in mineral resources

217 governance as the local institutions were ‘cultured’ into a system only taking instructions from the central government.

Although the traditional leaders and District Councils were empowered through the

1998 traditional leaders Act and the 1988 Rural District Councils Act respectively, this co-option has largely been dysfunctional in the governance of mineral resources.

According to Chigwata (2016) despite this co-option of district councils and traditional leaders, these local institutions have largely remained peripheral in the governance of natural resources. The dual system of governance in the mineral resource sector has had fallacies, as there have been intermittent conflicts between the traditional leaders and other state structures, mostly local governments, which is motivated by rivalry for legitimacy, power and resources. Relating with other African cases, in Lesotho and

Zambia, the chiefs avowed disproportionate power as sub-district natural resource governance chairpersons and diverted some benefits to the mining communities

(Chigwata, 2016). The author further juxtaposed with the Namibian case, where traditional leader’s exclusion from natural resources governance was counterproductive, spawning delays and conflicts until the leaders’ co-option into natural resources governance committees.

Literature cites that reform processes in the African mining industry was mostly government-centered and excluded the civil society and the local communities, albeit important stakeholders. Without transparency, an uneven playing field amongst stakeholders is created; which disempowers them from holding government executives and politicians to account for the mineral production, marketing and revenue utilization.US NGO Revenue Watch (2017) identified the unequal power distribution as a driver of the resource curse when a developing nation is sitting on vast mineral riches

218

Resource curse theorist propounds that since mineral wealth is point specific and finite, their discovery, extraction and utilization poses fundamental challenges to the concomitant political economy. The absence of robust government institutions and the political will to formulate and/or to effectively implement legal provisions for transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion results in lack of property rights, regressive and unjust mineral taxation system, rent seeking and mal- distributions. Ideally mineral revenues should principally fund local service delivery, nonetheless the regressive local mining taxation system obstruct development finance mobilization from the mining activities.

The apparent symptoms of the resource curse theory as noted by Ross (2015: 1) include a reduction in accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, bureaucratic effectiveness, a rise in economic volatility, corruption, and the likelihood of a civil war.

The failure to enact and or align Acts of Parliament on transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion in line with the country’s constitutional provisions six years down the line since its establishment as the country’s supreme law in 2013 is heavy indictment on a government that purports to be ‘Open for Business’ in the public fora.

The rentier approach of the resource curse theory provides propounds that nations that lack strong institutions and the political will to enforce regulations and redistribution mechanisms are more vulnerable to the detrimental effects of rent seeking. The development of strong institutions that should underpin transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion as well as state competence are discouraged as these tend to intransigently suppresses perverse political incentives. This is epitomised by the government’s reluctance to implement the new constitutional reforms on transparency, accountability, inclusion, devolution and so on.

219

Hilson and McQuilken (2014) argued that, just like in most countries in the SADC region, the organization, structure and form of ASM mining in Zimbabwe are opaque.

This analysis reflects on how the lack of a comprehensive ASM regime in the country’s political economy has blurred the lines between illegal, legal and informal activities, although a distinction can be made in practice. The gross inadequacies in Zimbabwe’s political economy has seen the operation of unregistered ASM operators and the elite often engage in illicit/ informal mining activities. To that end, measuring informality, growth as well as development in ASM is problematic. There is need for further research to understand the modalities of interpretation of "formalization" policies in the various regions in Zimbabwe and by the different miners.

The criticality of a country’s political economy association to natural capital assets has led scholars to shift the research agenda from the economic development to the governance perspective, thus questioning the government’s role on development beyond the effects of the production factors on socio-economic development. In the case of Zimbabwe, evidence point to the unbridled exigencies of the country’s political economy that blankets rent seeking tendencies, corruption, tax evasion, illicit financial flows, smuggling of precious stones and mining claims disputes thereby creating inequalities for the citizens as was also observed in sub-Saharan Africa by (Demissie,

2014).

5.3 Weak State structures and Patronage Systems The negative externalities are professed by the state’s weak structure, which are strongly connected to the central government role in the governance of mineral resources in the country. The weak foundations and structures of the postcolonial

Zimbabwean state has spawned opacity, un-accountability and stakeholder exclusion.

There is opacity in the mining deals despite the existence of a clause in the constitution

220 allowing parliament to scrutinise mining contracts. The mineral resources of the four districts produces significant rents but the governance institutions and rule of law are not properly established therefore the system professes elite capture, rent seeking and corruption. Taruvinga (2016:23) noted, “The structure of the Zimbabwean state is set up in a way that looting of resources is the norm for the political elite”. Burgis

(2015:233) who stated that the government of Zimbabwe “operates on an extractive basis” recounts how the government governs mineral resources in the country. The fragile structures, which are described as the Zimbabwean state’s dysfunctionality, are some of the principal ways in which the poverty amidst plenty phenomenon manifests in the country.

The abuse of mineral rents in Zimbabwe is connected to the criminalization of the state. The criminalization of the African state is closely associated with activities that have to do with the economy (Taruvinga, 2016) Criminalization of the Zimbabwean state is connected to authoritarianism, as the regime is not answerable to the country’s laws. Corruption in issuing mining licences and rights are conspicuous indications of the resource curse phenomenon. Although precisely quantifying the corruption levels in the four districts is very problematic, evidence outlined in Chapter 4, suggest a credible correlation between mineral resource reliance and corruption. Nonetheless, at the national level more than US$ 20 million per annum is lost in illict flows as noted by (Sibanda 2019).

Corruption in Zimbabwe is centralised in patronage networks form and this has had negative development outcomes as also noted by (Taruvinga, 2016 and Sibanda,

2019). The levels of smuggling and looting, notably in the ASM sector is indicative of the failed governance in the country and this is resonated by the civil society. The

221 manner of smuggling and looting represents a systematic failure by the country’s internal control mechanisms.

A reflection on the production, trade and utilization of mineral wealth in the four districts shows that natural resource abundance is barely a curse in itself, rather it comes from the subsisting political system that regulates the economy, and the relationships between the state and the society, that propels poor socio-economic development prospects. Private accumulation of wealthy by the economic elite and influential politicians has left ASM in a dire and unorganized state in Zimbabwe as also noted by studies conducted by (Mawowa 2013, Spiegel 2009;2015 and Saunders 2017).

Spiegel (2015:41) noted that,

“In the public media, Zimbabwe’s mining sector governance has thus become increasingly characterized as part of a ‘‘brutal regime’’ of ‘pillage and patronage’, with injustices abounding when it comes to controlling”.

Terror gangs (Mashurugwi and Makorokoza) that unleash violence and murder villagers as well as law enforcement agencies with impunity gives the impression that that this is a very powerful cartel involving influential politicians, economic elites and high profiled security personnel. This reflects a resource cursed nation. The analysis underscores that the coercive control tactics of the state in ASM to enforce compliance and the associated violence by ASM gangs spawn a vicious cycle and exacerbates economic, social and environmental problems in ASM communities. The analysis shows i) the link between coercion, disorder and chaos as well as private wealth accumulation and retention of political power ii) the state’s role in this imbroglio, particularly its centrality and pervasiveness.

222

Since the recentralization drive in 2006, the subnational government has been stripped of their powers and capacity to regulate ASM in their localities. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 2013 constitution does not explicitly list down the functions or powers of the local government. The enumeration of the local functions and powers would have afforded a guarantee that the decentralized powers would not be arbitrarily recentralized. In reality, “it is about those with power and control over resources wanting to maintain the status quo”, whereas those without power and resources seek to have more influence and a share of the resources (Chigwata, 2019:14).

5.4 Centralization and Politicization of the Mining Sector The new constitution retains a unitary government form, which connotes an aggregated power form at the national level. The constitutional acknowledgement of local and provincial governments as administration levels instead of government tiers learns credence to the submission. Under, the current constitutional order, subnational governments are not anything more than national government extensions implementing laws and policies and making expenditure decisions as per the matrix of the central government (Chigwata and de Visser, 2018). Sibanda (2019) noted that

Austria’s devolution policies have been instrumental in speaking to the wellbeing needs, the sustainability and inclusive governance of natural resources at the local levels, in 56 regional bodies. This model disallowed national policy and national institutions to be heavily influential at local level governance.

The constitutional provisions inter alia preclude the capricious abolition of subnational units by the ruling part for political expediency. Lack of resources for implementation of devolution principles were raised and this shows a lack of commitment and political will to a devolved model of natural resources governance. The underlying conviction is that if mining taxes and revenues are managed at the subnational level, it fosters

223 transparency, accountability, inclusion, and effective service delivery; among others, improved access to health, education and roads.

According to Chigwata (2019), the dependence on intergovernmental grants by subnational governments is a significant indicator of their lack of autonomy. The subnational governments’ spending discretion tend be to low when they considerably depend on intergovernmental grants, particularly the ones that are remitted with conditions. Burgis (2015:217) stated that where there is a disproportionate and

“asymmetrical concentration of political and economic power” the African resource economy fall victim to an extractivist and narrow elite whose outlook, in spite of its democratic posturing, is mediaeval, and its behaviour resembles “old tribal chiefs than a modern government”. This submission sums up the inherent features and identity of

African politics in connection to natural resources.

Chigwata and Visser (2018) noted that there has been a rife political contestation over the devolution of powers as well distribution of revenues over the preceding few decades. This contestation has to be reflected in order to understand the centralized impacts of the mineral sector on the political as well as social landscape. According to Saunders (2017), nearly four decades of contestation around social and fiscal arrangements in the mining sector underlined the fundamental role of leading stakeholders in mining. State-civil society contestation in the mining sector has evolved around issues of transparency as well accountability. The Chamber of Mines

(2017) noted that CSOs struggled to win government’s active cooperation in establishing rules as well as monitoring mechanisms for enhancing transparency and accountability in the mining sector; rather, they were met with resistance and hostility.

224

It appears that the devolution of decisions over resources to the local governments as well as local communities from which they are derived, and the involvement of civil societies and other stakeholders expunge the centralized rents appropriation, centralized rent-taking, secrecy and lack of descending accountability over their utilization. This is line with Arellano-Yanguas (2011:3) who established that in most of the interpretations of politics underlying the resource curse phenomenon in resource- rich developing countries, the “core problem is that resource revenues empower the central state apparatus”. Centralisation of the mining sector in Zimbabwe tend to spawn high political costs, stunt bureaucratic capacity, isolate the government from the people, incapacitate local institutions, weaken democratic accountability which makes it difficult to meet the local needs. The most reflective evidence of resource curse is considered to be centralization of control and ownership of resource rents in a state, as well as the enormous power and privilege that arises thereof. Centralization of ownership and control in the state spawns increased agitation for state revenue control by diverse organized interests as well as resource struggles and violent conflict

(Whetho, 2014). State capture by organised interests is nearly inexorable, legitimising rent-seeking activities by other societal members, leading to the establishment of political structures that are predatory. In that way, mineral resources debauch state legitimacy and authority and resulting in the rooting of a rentier state- one which is principally preoccupied with passive distribution of resource rents amongst the citizenry. Scholars focusing on resource abundance have indicated that a negative correlation exists between mineral resource abundance and democracy, positively correlated with violent conflicts in some instances. (Fontaine and Caviedes, 2016) argued that most governments in resource-rich countries in the developing world use resource rents for patronage and political expediency. Parallel power networks are

225 instrumental in overriding the legal, economic and political barriers to rent extraction and dispersion. A social phenomenon is thriving, where private groups or individuals have access to the country’s mineral wealth outside state and/or formal power structures and the economy. It is critical to approach the question of development in the mining districts by probing the intersection of the post-colonial state in a crisis- beset political economy, the growing importance of the mining sector, histrionic proliferation of ASM and increased corporate mining activities. This analysis submits that carefully managing the power networks diffusing political as well as economic rent is key to a mineral-led socio-economic transformation in the mining districts.

There has been a laxity to enforce the rule of law and reign in the marauding gangs in the four districts under study over the last decades. This highlight the obliteration of the credibility and authority of the state and the establishment of a rentier economy in which rents capture by the competing groups and individual interests is the principal pastime of the wider society as observed by (Ushie, 2017). Excessive requirements by the centralized bureaucratic governments and institutional delays in issuing out operating licenses have significantly contributed to illegitimacy of artisanal mining activities throughout the Sub-Suharan Africa; Zimbabwe included (Spiegel, 2009:41).

This sentiment holds true for Zimbabwe where there is no clear policy that deals with

ASM mining activities and too many bureaucratic processes for ASM license acquisition. Barma et al (2012) submits that the significance of country-exact determinants like the political economy behind governance of natural resources cannot be overemphasized.

Despite the growing erudition of the economic crises as well as the livelihood struggles and politicized agricultural reforms as well forced displacements from the state in Zimbabwe (Rutherford 2012), attention that has so far been paid to the subject

226 is little given the functions of local and national institutions of the government, which have the responsibility for mineral resources management. The 2013 constitution somehow also spawns the policy myopia; in as much as it requires provincial as well as metropolitan councils to assume socio-economic development in the regions, including planning as well as implementation of socio-economic development activities. According to Taruvinga (2016), the constitution does not provide a concise definition of the term socio-economic development. It lacks clarity whether this embraces the power for adoption of policies or spending of budgets on matters that are relevant to socio-economic development. Generally, the concept of socio- economic development incorporates virtually everything, from social oriented services like provision of education, health care, water and sanitation, to economic related activities like natural resource extraction, tourism and employment creation.

Legislation or policy that clarifies the limits of the socio-economic development roles of the councils is non-existent which lends credence to the resource curse narrative.

The state has created murky systems and processes that close space for any transparency, accountability and inclusion models. Mawowa (2013) analogized the

Zimbabwean state to Reno’s ‘shadow state’, both enforcing and refraining from enforcing legal provisions to regulate accumulation for the benefit of members of the ruling elite, or those connected to them”. ZANU PF built a shadow state on the foundation of patronage. In order to make sure that the system retains the status quo, the patronage system plays a key role as it permits the governments to utilize state resources to recompense loyalists and this was also noted by (Spiegel 2015,

Taruvinga 2016 and Saunders, 2017). In Reno’s shadow state’s supposition there is deliberate institutional structures weakening and little attention paid to the ordinary citizens and this epitomises the Zimbabwean state. Karl Marx alluded to how the state

227 tends to be the vehicle for private accumulation by those in power. This is also the case with regional countries like Uganda where the state has created a mysterious legal landscape around the diamond value chain, which largely compromise the effectiveness of accountability and transparency models as pinpointed by (Doro and

Kufakurinani, 2018).

Accountability and transparency is a real issue for good governance in the extractive industry contexts where effectiveness of the processes of decision-making is fundamental to sustainable extraction and utilization of resources. The citizens’ lack of information and mineral revenue ownership spawns an accountability and transparency deficit in the country. Where the information is available it is in aggregated form and in forms not accessible to the citizens and Kagwa (2014) suggested that such a scenario reflect the characteristics of a rentier state that has more focus on extracting rents rather than uplifting the welfare of its citizens. Most decisions in the mineral value are not made according to the conferred or delegated authority, according to established procedures and the outcomes do not reflect the interests and aspirations of the broader society.

The political economy of Zimbabwe professes the resource curse narrative in that it is structured in such a way that citizens are made to believe that it is the central government; political and economic elites as well as the security establishment that has entitlement to all mineral resources governance matters. Malinga (2017:90) noted that there tend to be central government monopoly over the control of mines as well as mineral resources in the country through the implementation of the archaic MMA and such a situation is an outcome of the politicization of the mineral resources. To that end citizen’s citizens do not have the appetite to pressure and scrutinize the government decisions in the mineral value chain even when the extraction of the

228 precious stones transpire in their communities. Kumah-Abiwu (2017) linked rent- seeking activities to the resource thesis arguing that rentier activities have a potential to diminish the ability of the stakeholders to effectually demand government accountability and transparency due to the established low taxation regime.

The monopolistic structures of ownership in the mineral sector of Zimbabwe erodes the power of subnational governments in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Kwekwe and

Shurugwi to negotiate fair local tax regimes with the central government and mining companies to enhance local resource mobilisation and development financing.

Furthermore, when communities are not cognisant of the policies and laws around mining tax revenue generation, tariff contracts between the governments and mining companies, mineral revenue allocation as well utilisation for progressive Socio-

Economic Rights realisation; the RDCs lose a key stakeholder to hold the central government as well as mining companies to account.

The argument presented by the Resource Curse theorists that political factors like corruption and rent seeking, are rife in many poor countries whether they are resource- rich or not seems to hold water. However, the dominant view in the ‘rentier state’ approach to the resource curse that resource based economies experience higher levels of such factors than the non-resource rich economies sheds some light on

Zimbabwe’s political economy of mineral resources governance.

Forson et al (2016) gives credence to this predisposition arguing that the institutional structures promote corruption and rent seeking challenges that are bedeviling development in most resource-rich African States. A growing number of research empirically elaborates that institutions can allay or provide an antithesis to the resource curse. Bardia-Miro et al (2016) “…….is that the quality of institutions plays a central

229 role in the curse or the blessing of natural resources, and even when there are abundant natural resources in an economy it can perform well if institutions are good”.

Williams and Le Billon (2017:42) underscores the key role of domestic institutions by observing that the availability of any natural resources “is not a predictive indicator of conflict”: the key pointers are desires that are sparked by the human beings’ needs (or greed) as well as well the political economy shaping practises.

Condensing from these empirical establishments as well as the study findings, the analysis come to the effect that the poor quality of policies, laws, and institutions as well as the lack of political will to implement provisions for transparency, accountability, stakeholder inclusion and realisation of socio-economic rights drives the resource curse in the four districts and the rest of resource-rich districts in Zimbabwe.

The study underscores how Zimbabwe’s deepening political as well as economic crises have been contributing to subnational government disempowerment in mineral resources governance over the decades and this complements to the analysis advanced by Ncube (2011), Murombo (2010) and Spiegel (2015). The scholars mentioned in the foregoing highlights how Zimbabwe’s national politics has been causal factors to the local government crisis; weakening RDCs and traditional institutions as democratic leadership conduits. Therefore, competition for natural resources have affected the social structure of the country by creating a wealthy elite who are less likely to prop political and economic reforms and such rentier effects undermine socio-economic development both at the district and national level.

The political economy of the country is structured in such a way that all key decisions about mineral resources governance priorities as well as investments are not freely accessible to all stakeholders which contravenes the governance principles and spells

230 the resources curse. The plunder of mineral wealth highlighted in the successive yearly Auditor General’s reports, the national budget statements and this study’s findings reflects that the government lacks public trust, public goodwill and public confidence.

With the subsequent fragmentation of the transparency and accountability landscape, relevant ministries and departments like Finance and Economic Development, Mines and Mining Development, Local government, Public Works and National Housing,

Health and Child Care, Education, Industry, Labour and Environment, ZIMRA, RBZ, and MMCZ cannot work in a properly coordinated and integrated mode to deliver sustainable and inclusive positive socio-economic outcomes. Most of the institutions operate in isolation, which provides a fertile ground for opacity, unaccountability, corruption, and unfavourable resource- based FDI. In that case addressing many problems surrounding the use of natural resources is usually complicated by the confusion over the question of responsibility. According to Lockwood (2015) institutional and policy integration is crucial for efficiency in the deployment of the public resources and for the avoidance of duplication.

5.5 Lack of Diversification and Economic Stagnation The monopolistic or oligopolistic structure of ownership in Zimbabwe’s mining sector diminishes the need to diversify the local economy hence the lack of socio-economic development in the four districts. The government has espoused an extractivist development model whereby development is anchored on mineral extraction and exportation. Although the impact of the Western imposed-sanctions and the fast track land reform on the collapse of key sectors like agriculture and manufacturing in the post 2000 era, should not be discounted. It is worthy to note that the government has failed to capitalise on the resurgence of the mining sector to revive the collapsed

231 sectors and diversify the industrial base. Seemingly, the big window of opportunity presented by the country’s mineral opulence and increased mining production has been squandered in the preceding two decades. Sibanda (2019) noted that one prominent indicator of our sick economy is heavy dependence on the mining sector, and this is a key concern because of numerous accounts, among them the mineral resources finiteness and price volatility on the international market. The impact of mineral exports share to the country’s total exports is larger compared to the mining sectors real growth. This scenario reflects that the country relies heavily on mineral exports for foreign currency reserves generation and this opens the resource curse vulnerability.

The contribution of the mining sector to the country is export oriented providing other countries development incentives (Mahonye and Mandishara, 2015). The outward orientation as well as concentration of economic activities in the mining industry compromises its inward contribution towards meaningful socio-economic benefits.

Therefore, there is little impact when reflecting on local beneficiation and value addition, fiscal and socio-economic benefits and employment creation at both local and national levels (Mahonye and Mandishara, 2015)

The resource curse theorists’ crowding approach lends some credence and sheds some light in Zimbabwe’s mining sector as most of the capital; human and financial capital appears to have been shifted wholesomely to the mining sector while leaving other sectors economically unviable. Ushie (2017) noted that this has an effect of constricting other vital sectors of the economy thereby affecting local socio-economic development in the four districts.

232

The dominance and overreliance on the mining sector is evident in Mhondoro-Ngezi,

Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi as agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors among others have literally collapsed. This produces poor socio-economic outcomes in terms of health, education, household incomes as the lone mining sector fails to support the households in terms of job creation and elevating household incomes.

The economies at the district and national levels mirrors a mining sector development that is disconnected from other economic activities which is is reminiscent of the crowding approach in the resource curse thesis. This scenario has left the sector in question as the main source of local revenues, household incomes and employment as majority of people turn to ASM, medium and large scale mining companies for employment. Massive retrenchments in other sectors due to the prolonged economic crises have increased pressure on the mining sector as hordes of people are joining the mining sector.

The better incomes (usually remitted in US$) associated with medium and large scale mining employment and ASM mining activities (in comparison with other sectors where labour is paid in inflation-hard hit local bond note) subsequently result in over dependence on mining activities for food, health, education and construction of infrastructure. This overdependence results in increased deforestation, land degradation and water pollution, which drives the resource curse phenomenon in the four districts (Saunders 2017). However, the potential of ASM to support local private sector development through development financing should not be ignored. The failure to view the ASM sector in Zimbabwe and most resource –rich countries in terms of its development potential shoots from a narrow assumption that the sector is principally survivalist and subsistence-oriented. The study makes a critique to the thinking of the camp that approaches ASM only through linear debates over informal and grass roots

233 survivalist by highlighting how Zimbabwe’s current mining regime has also provided lucrative opportunities for the elites in the sector.

Heavy dependence on the mining sector has seen it failing to prop substantial CSOT and CSR development projects in all the rural wards in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu,

Kwekwe and Shurugwi. Other sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing are incapacitated to support development in rural wards, particularly remote ones, as a result wider development disequilibrium abides. Torvick’s (2002) rent-seeking model illustrated that natural resource abundance scales up the numbers of entrepreneurs who are engaged in the rent seeking activities and decreases the numbers of entrepreneurs running firms that are productive. Therefore, the mining sector tends to crowd out other key sectors through this way and economic stagnation abides which spawn viability and operational challenges to mining companies as well. This is also one of the main reasons why mining companies in the four districts employ a few people, as indicated by the household surveys analysed in Chapter 4. Heavy dependence on the mining sector is aggravated by the absence of comprehensive and robust systems for the full harnessing as well as monitoring of mining financial flows because there are no exact data on the size, capacity and output of mines, which allows for leakages. The closure of large companies and farms has seen a decline in formal economic activities and resultant growth of the informal mining activities in the four districts. Thus, more mineral resources have lower welfare outcomes in most part of the districts under study.

Kaznacheev (2017) submits that sound institutions are key to the diversification of the economy and strengthening of all the pillars of the economy for the enhancement of socio-economic outcomes. This analysis follows the institutional approach of the resource curse theorists who views natural resource copiousness as the underpinning

234 of institutional degradation as well as corruption within the politically connected elite in

Zimbabwe, which subsequently affects mineral-led growth and socio-economic development potential. Fundamentally, the ‘resource curse’ turn out to be an

‘institutional curse’.

The resource curse theory submits that rather than propelling growth as well as development, subsoil wealth can become the driving force for economic stagnation.

The effect of western imposed sanctions and corruption on the country’s runaway inflation on the local currency; the bond note cannot be discounted. Nonetheless, the foreign currency inflows from the mining sector are spawning an increase in local demand for local goods and services as well as real exchange value appreciation and inflation on the local currency and thus diminishing the domestic competitiveness. The

Dutch disease submits that mineral revenues pushes up the local currency value and thus negatively impacting local manufactured products as the imports become cheaper (Burgis, 2015:70). Thus since the early 2000’s the government has been struggling to manage the exchange rate resorting to orthodox and unorthodox money supply growth measures on the money market in endeavours to forestall the tradeable sectors and thus short-circuiting any diversification potential. Malinga (2017:19) noted that the “bond notes have heightened and increased the inflation rates” which curtails any capitalisation efforts. To that end, the country’s financial system remains weak and/or underdeveloped and the whole economy is not monetised or integrated which has produced dire health, education and household incomes conditions. A diversification strategy that targets public investments in social and economic infrastructures in the four districts and the rest of the country has not been the anchor of the government’s recovery plans and hence an enclave economy and suppressed socio-economic development potential.

235

The prospects of a perpetual deindustrialization and hiking of unemployment rates are overwhelming given the weak intersectoral linkages reinforced by heavy dependence on mineral resources and the poor subsidies to promote the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors among other key sectors. This case is relevant to most resource-rich African countries, as they tend to over-depend on minerals at the cost of other key economic sectors. The government foist ‘a redistributive burden on the resource sector’, which essentially induces its drastic contraction. Debates on natural capital assets and development has not only pinpointed the role of natural resources in socio-economic development but the correlation with other economic undertakings in the long term. The resource curse is a growing phenomenon in the country because of overdependence on one sector in which unprocessed minerals are exported at low prices and therefore the end game is depletion of the resources and residual long-term negative externalities in the mining communities. This analysis submits that the government has had few incentives to aid the development of other economic sectors since its revenues from mineral exports are deemed plentiful and this is line with the resource curse and dependency theorists as well as the structuralists.

The private sector is not inspired to invest in other economic sectors since the exporting sector brings biggest profits and foreign currency, nonetheless revenues from mineral exports are highly volatile due to the fluctuating international market prices, which has stagnated the economy and spawned undesirable socio-economic outcomes. The government is trying to rebuff the effects of the volatility of international prices and mineral-resource overdependence through proffering attractive tax breaks as well as exemptions, in the form of the Mining Rebate, in order to induce mining companies to aid in the reinforcement of the export sector, which on the other hand,

236 is suppressing revenue collections. The government has failed over the years to establish strong fiscal, macroeconomic and industrial policies to foster local mineral value addition and beneficiation as well as strong linkages with other economic activities at the local and national levels to circumvent resource overdependence and deindustrialisation in other key sectors.

Resource curse theorists argue that strong and quality institutions re-join better to the exogenous shocks of resource booms and price volatility and can manage natural resource wealth for growth and socio-economic development but this has not been the case in Zimbabwe, as the country has pervasively remained vulnerable to these.

According to Frankel (2010), global market instability upsurges uncertainty, makes it very difficult to measure the revenues from the mining sector, and therefore impedes effectual planning for socio-economic development in resource-rich developing countries. Natural resource rents’ volatility and its effects on the government revenues as well as state performance engender an entirely new literature on the impact of resource rents’ volatility on socio-economic development as well as political stability in the fragile commodity export economies on the African continent

5.6 Mineral Resource Property Rights

Mawowa (2013:17) has maintained that when the state is incapable of maintaining and enforcing a definite property regime, primitive accumulation processes may be prolonged or ‘may stagnate, hence blood continues to flow’. Many ostensibly anti- capitalist characteristics of the country’s crisis –volatile currency and hyperinflation,

‘war vets’ and militia deployment, economic disorder and high informality levels in the mining sector - are concomitant with the broader process of ‘accumulation by dispossess’. The mining title Management system is out-dated and ineffective and it spawns corruption in the allocation of mining rights and mining claims disputes. The

237 incapability of the state to enforce mining rights indirectly lead to the resource curse intransigence in the four disticts. Mawowa (2013) submitted that the absence of a capable state in Zimbabwe to enforce and maintain specific property rights regime, results in protracted primitive accumulation and leakages in the mining sector. The heavy involvement of the security establishment in the issuing out of licences and mining claims in Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi and the wider exclusion of key stakeholders instigates the resource curse and spawns poor socio-economic outcomes. This gives credence to the resource curse theorists’ discourse that an abundance of natural capital assets strengthens the well-connected elite groups, thereby piling pressure on the governments approaches that serve these powerful and influential groups’ interests rather than the poor people’s interests. The awarding of mining rights in Zimbabwe are shrouded in secrecy and mystery and that is fertile ground for corruption because someone is given mining rights that citizens are not aware, of in terms of the scope and extent of the wealth. The one representing the country can be easily bribed and give away the rights. The colonial Rudd concession is typical of a contract that benefitted individuals. There is no system in place to monitor the actual production of minerals visa-vis holding of mining rights and titles and that opens the door for corruption.

Property and political rights are fundamental to growth and socio-economic development (Costello and Grainger, 2018:24). Property rights or as put across by other scholars “tenure”, refers to access and control over resources; the manner in which people (collectively or individually) hold responsibilities and rights to mineral resources. Therefore, the property rights issue raises significant questions of who has claim to which mineral resource, access and whose responsibility to manage the

238 resources. Of much interest is how the property rights generates incentives or disincentives for the sustainable governance of the mineral resources (Garufu, 2016).

The resource curse framework propounds that when the property rights to natural resources are weak or absent, competition to procure them might be wasteful and characterized by violent and rent seeking conflict. The linkage to the political economy comes about due to the fact that claims of ownership are ambiguous or weak in the districts due to the lack of a well-established rule of law and a mineral property rights regime. The political and economic elites as well as the security chiefs are unscrupulously and unconstitutionally involved in the issuance of mining licenses and mining claims grabs particularly in the ASM sector and this is attributed to the absence of a comprehensive property rights regime and the presence of a lax regulatory environment. When the country’s political economy is non-representative or unstable

“individual’s claim to the resource stock’s future return can be rendered insecure”

(Deacon and Mueller, 2016).

Zimbabwe’s political system impels ownership and conflict risk. When government falls short of the power, popular support and stability required for enforcement of legal claims, “enforcement will fail” (Costello and Grainger, 2018:24). The weak property rights in Zimbabwe’s mining sector professes inequalities and poverty at the local levels as the elites gain more access to mineral rights while the locals stand to endure the negative externalities of mining in their communities. The weak property rights shrouds opacity, un-accountability and exclusion in the districts’ mining sector. The communities do not know the mineral wealth potential in the localities, who is mining what, and the proceeds from these mining titles, which question the foundations of the country’s political economy. The resource stocks, which are nominally owned by the government, are subject to unrestricted access and utilization because the

239 government fails to manage and control resource exploitation and the political system fails to provide adequate incentives for the officials of government to enforce and monitor the claims of the state (Zhuwarara, 2017). Even if the government had adequate enforcement powers, claims of individuals to resources are insecure because the legal system of the country is not reliable to provide predictable, easily interpretable and consistent property laws.

According to Deacon and Mueller (2016) in nations ruled by dominant elites and autocrats, rather than by specified institutions and laws, the claim to natural resource assets by individuals can essentially depend on retaining favour with the ones in power. The gross human rights violations, state sponsored violence, terror gangs, lack of compliance with the law and lack of a consultation by the government in Zimbabwe’s mining sector reminisces this supposition. According to Matsika et al (2014) hitherto platforms for community dialogue with mining companies and government on mineral resources governance have always been limited in Zimbabwe. The state is constitutionally mandated to protect and guarantee the rights of the citizens but in this case, it has its own agenda in relation to the country’s mineral opulence. Zimbabwe’s mining sector, particularly gold is degenerating into a resources war between the marauding gangs, apparently sponsored by senior politicians as well as corrupt business… “the political system is not only shambolic; it is impoverishing hundreds of thousands of our people” (Cross, 2020:12). Literature supposes that good property rights are supplied or created by the political practice in the country in question. Mineral resources in the country are scarce relative to the subsisting demand, which makes the right to use them a central issue.

Although a causality relationship between mineral abundance and authoritarianism is still controversial in quantitative research (Dunning, 2012), it cannot possibly be

240 discarded completely. In fact, many authoritarian regimes’ populisms benefit from mineral reserves and increases in mining activities. Therefore, the research agenda has actually shifted from the economic development to the governance perspective, thus questioning the government’s role on development beyond the effects of the production factors on socio-economic development. A common acknowledgement by scholars now is that natural resource abundance is barely a curse in itself, rather it comes from the subsisting political system that regulates the economy, and also the relationships between the state and the society, are what can propel or doom development prospects.

Accordingly, incentives for natural resource stocks conservation are more likely to be weaker in countries “subject to the rule of individuals rather than the rule of law” (López and Toman, 2006). When ownership claim insecurity is actuated by the political system of a country, ownership claims to all natural resource stocks and assets as well ordinary goods, may be rendered indeterminate. This reduces natural assets conservation payoff, leading to rapid depletion of the resource stocks. This can also have the ancillary effect of aggregating the cost of, or lessening the return from natural resources appropriating.

The role played by property rights in the sustainable management of natural resources, good governance and community empowerment is gaining substantial attention in development discourse. Development agencies and practitioners are momentously recognizing the significance of property rights as a key factor in the determination of the use, management and distribution of natural resource wealth

(Wegenast and Schneider, 2017). Tenure insecurity in the country’s economy has an ancillary effect of raising resource extraction cost and spawning side marketing of minerals as epitomized in the districts’ ASM sector. The fundamental questions of

241 property rights become more critical where markets for the mineral resources are concerned. The state, as the property rights guarantor in the mining industry, should controls access to the mineral resources within its geographical boundaries.

The mechanisms for mineral resource access control, according the resource curse theorists, are often undermined (Snyder, 2013). Bureaucracies and corporations in

Zimbabwe just like in most resource rich countries use rents to pay for privileged access to mineral resources. The possession of mineral wealth undermines motivation for the national government to institute a broad-based property rights regime for the entire economy. Considerations of the political economy are critical to understand the actual arrangements, which emerge in any context (Frankel, 2012). Property rights, which emerge in a superlative democracy, where the group in control is the voting population in its entirety, tend to be different from those, which would emerge if an elite minority was in control of the policies.

Even when there are obvious losses under the subsisting arrangement, free-riding and collective action problems appears to be preventive to the accomplishment of the property right changes and this view is also shared by (Costello and Grainger, 2018).

Whereas an established rule of law and stable political conditions are conducive to the establishment of effective ownership institutions, they “by no means guarantee it”

(Wegenast and Schneider, 2017:6). Costello and Grainger (2018) are of the opinion that in the natural resources industry, rights are usually not clearly defined, are often disputed, or are only temporarily granted. These inconsistencies and inadequacies affect the extractive policies in Zimbabwe’s mining industry. Ultimately, the designation of property rights affects socio-economic as well environmental outcomes in the four districts.

242

Casual empiricism and statistical comparisons show that the way a nation utilises its resources and environment systematically varies with its development level. Whereas there is debate over the driver of such relationships, two literature streams, one on natural resource use and property rights and the other on sources of socio-economic growth, offers a seemingly attractive explanation to the case of Zimbabwe. Sikor et al

(2017) pointed out that literature reflect that those nations with weak property rights are more likely to utilise the stocks of resources relatively heavily owing to the problems of free access. Weak ownership and property rights allows for corruption and private accumulation and foils human capital as well physical investments required to promote socio-economic development in the mining districts.

Combining these two imply that excessive natural resource use and low socio- economic development levels might be a manifestation of a solitary phenomenon, partial property rights in the country’s mining sector. Costello and Grainger (2018) indicated that when the resource property rights are strong, the choice of the regulator coincides with the interest of the public. Nonetheless, when the resource property rights are weak, the choice of the regulator might result in unsustainable extraction.

This has wider implications for natural resource policy making and understanding the socio-economic outcomes as wrought by the institutions in Zimbabwe.

5.7 Conclusion

The disconnection between the districts’ mineral opulence and increased mining activities and local socio-economic development is certainly linked to the country’s political economy. The political economy of Zimbabwe professes the resource curse phenomenon in the country since it creates fertile ground for corruption, opacity, un- accountability and stakeholder exclusion. The highly centralized mining regime of

Zimbabwe is prone to elite capture and patronage systems as well the subsequent

243 weakening of local government institutions, communities and other stakeholders. The weak foundations of the post-colonial state spawns opacity, un-accountability and stakeholder exclusion. The lack of diversification of the economies of the district under study results in overreliance on the mining sector and hence the glaring poor socio- economic outcomes. The inability of the state to enforce mining rights indirectly lead to the resource curse intransigence in the four districts. The following chapter will chat the way forward and provides some insights in the mineral resources governance and socio-economic discourse.

CHAPTER SIX: TOWARDS A HOLISTIC MINERAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE

AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

6.1 Introduction This chapter shifts the analysis towards the conceptualization and articulation of a holistic framework for the governance of mineral resources and socio-economic transformation in mining communities. It endeavours to present a framework that can address the heavy centralization of the mining sector, power and information asymmetries in order to engender transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion as well as a mineral-led socio-economic transformation. The framework is build based on the decentralization framework and the integrated natural resources management framework. The framework is informed by Chapter 5 analysis which revealed that the ‘resource curse’ in the four mining districts turn out to be an

‘institutional curse’. Therefore, the framework takes an institutional perspective and establishes the correlation between mineral resources governance and socio- economic development. The underlying conviction is that a mineral-led transformation

244 will foster developments in health care, education, household incomes, infrastructures and generally human living conditions in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Shurugwi and

Kwekwe districts.

Decentralization

It is worthy to note that at the onset the shortfalls of bureaucracy, and increasing clientilism as well as patronage, were the subject of development discourses economically and politically beginning in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the last decades, a paradigm shift in the conservation and management of natural resources has been witnessed from state centred control to approaches where the local communities, subnational governments and CSOs play a more active role. These reforms supposedly aim to boost resource user participation in the governance of natural resources and local benefits accrual by restructuring the power relations between the central government and other stakeholders through governance authority transfer to the local-level organizations (Roka, 2019). The decentralised framework is geared towards all-stakeholder involvement in the governance of natural resources so that the financial benefits as well as gains are copiously used for the benefit of all groups. Decentralization is extensively debated as a tool for the governance of natural resources. Community Based Natural Resources management (CBNRM) is seen as a self-regulated, decentralized and localised system that can address the ills of centralised mineral resources governance (Roka, 2019). According to (Musavengane and Simatele, 2016) centralised resource governance systems are mainly viewed as being detached from rural or local life and dominated by bureaucrats and the elite functioning in a top-down fashion. Most African mining regimes have centralised systems, which are mainly top-down oriented and they tend to spawn opacity, un- accountability and social exclusion by the bureaucrats and the elite (Muzoroza, 2010).

245

While strategies for decentralization are implemented more effectively in forest and wildlife management, they have not had robust outcomes in mineral resources governance given that precious stones create competition, collusion and corruption.

Most decentralization strategies are not a result of democratic decentralization by itself but rather a result of hybrids of deconcentration, partial, highly circumscribed, poor designed decentralization (Ahmed and Mbwambo, 2004, Musavengane and Simatele,

2016). To that end decentralisation has accomplished moderate successes in some nations, moderate fiascos in other and also both in others. This analysis underlines that given the precise impetus with regards to the application of the true subsidiarity, building of social capital and empowerment among the locals, the concept may be effective in fostering the transparent, accountable and inclusive use of mineral wealth.

With centralised control of policy, regulation as well as production comes high political power concentration and discretion over the allocation of mineral rents, which provides fertile ground for clientilism, patronage, corruption, opacity and exclusion.

Disproportionate representation still pervades in most African mining sectors despite the implementation of decentralization reforms. The debate-both empirical and theoretical -on whether decentralization enhances or reduces social welfare as well as efficiency is still unresolved. One of the strengths of decentralization as advanced by the proponents of the framework is that it allays the problem of centralization by asserting that “it brings decision making closer to the people” which result in enhanced decision making as well as sustainable mineral resources governance and socio- economic development (Ahmed and Mbwambo, 2004). Many proponents of the decentralization framework argue that it institutionalizes social participation, which is indispensable for conserving natural resources, enhancement of equal benefit sharing as well as the responsiveness of the central government to the citizens.

246

6.2 A holistic Framework

Fig 7: Flow chart of the Holistic framework for mineral resources governance and socio-economic development

Central government

Capacitation and devolvement of local units

Government Local Private Agencies Government Community Organizations sss

Multi-sectoral Approach Transparency

Multi stakeholder Accountability inclusion 247

Policy Integration

Socio - economic Aspects

Source: Author 2020 Key The flow of disaggregated mineral information Vertical Accountability Horizontal Accountability Direction of the Flow chart The basis of this analysis is on decentralization as devolution by the central

government (i.e national) government of precise functions, with all administrative,

economic and political attributes that these involve, to the local levels (communities,

local government, traditional institutions and so on. The local level units should be

autonomous from the centre with a legally demarcated functional and geographic

domain. This framework allows a focus on discrete as well as well-defined measures

of decentralization that are key in evaluating empirical effects on policy outputs. The

decentralization discussion in this analysis is premised on the understanding that the

contemporary mineral resources governance necessitates the revolution of divergent

interests among actors so that the externalities that are concomitant with the

governance, use and conservation of mineral resources are not excessively born by

any subgroup. In this framework, the central government should devolve power to the

government agencies like ZIMRA, MMCZ and ZMDC, subnational governments,

248 communities and private organization like CSOs and the community as reflected on

Fig 7 above. Capacitation of the local units should precede the devolvement of powers.

This framework emphasizes a bottom-up approach, which takes into consideration the views as well as aspirations of local level actors and allows for the empowered participation and involvement of local communities and other actors so as to promote transparency and accountability. The framework enables vertical (between the central government and local units) and horizontal accountability (amongst the local units). It also enables the flow of disaggregated data from the central government to the local units and this is key in fostering accountable and transparent governance of mineral resources and broad-based socio-economic development. Mineral resource-rich countries in the developing world like Zimbabwe have not realised meaningful socio- economic benefits due to the failure to implement a well-defined and discrete devolution formulae. Centralization, politicization and securitization of the mining sector has watered down any devolution efforts and spawned corruption, elitisms, policy myopia, patronage systems and dire socio-economic outcomes. Central government monopoly and control over mineral resources governance creates opacity, un-accountability and stakeholder exclusion and this can be best addressed by a devolved multi-sectorial approach. Under the holistic framework, all the devolved and capacitated units converge under a multi-sectorial approach to enforce transparency, accountability, stakeholder inclusion and policy integration. Therefore, this process allows for an empowered participation and involvement of all stakeholders, which is key in addressing opacity, un-accountability, patronage systems and leakages in the mining sector. Furthermore, the holistic approach allows for other elements like the development of socio-economic aspects, environmental

249 issues, industrial diversification, sustainability of mineral resources and equitable revenue use.

Thondhlana et al (2015) noted that approaches to natural resource governance have shifted from protectionist to collaborative models. The holistic model jives well with the new collaborative models in emphasizing the significance of incorporating multiple actors as well as establishing and capacitating local institutions, which include local communities and subnational units in decision-making with regards to the access and governance of mineral resources. Capacitated local institutions are integral for collective action and collaborative governance of the natural capital assets. Without capacitation and empowerment of local units, the beliefs and preferences of policy elites shape and colour the policy making process and hence amply manifest in natural resource governance and socio-economic development outcomes. Power relations are very crucial in maintaining equality in natural resource governance participation.

The restricted capabilities of the disadvantaged and powerless actors to participate in decision-making are a formidable challenge, since they are deprived socially and exploited and dependent on the elite groups (Khan, 2012).

Capacitation of institutions, empowerment and efficiency are three significant elements in the facilitation of stakeholder engagements under the holistic framework, especially the vulnerable and marginalised segments of the society. In most developing countries where the interest groups have very limited power; if any, policy elites and those with access to the policy elites play a critical role in determining policy

(Ghatea and Chaturvedi, 2016). Understanding the power-laden and complex processes which underlies policymaking is fundamental in the holistic framework.

Within the natural resources governance framework, power is attributed to individuals, groups or organisations, to their specific strategies, institutional configurations as well

250 to the social structures. Unravelling the power configuration in the mining regime of

Zimbabwe brings clarity to the skewed revenue distribution. That kind of process gives members of the public, a closer access to the state agencies as well as mining companies. The question is whether democratic institutions or simply put capacitated high quality institutions facilitate the effective governance of mineral resources so that they can lead to inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development.

6.3 Conclusion The framework can facilitate effective stakeholder engagement and collaboration as the government comes closer to the people, which is key in fostering transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion. Furthermore, the bureaucratic structures of the state, the communities, and traditional institutions need to be capacitated for a sustainable and all-inclusive mineral-led socio-economic transformation. Capacitation of government agencies, communities, traditional institutions among other stakeholder’s fosters horizontal and vertical accountability in the mining sector. It also enables the flow of disaggregated data throughout the value-chain of the mining sector. The framework is anchored in a multi-sectorial approach where all capacitated units can collaborate through empowered participation.

251

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 concludes the whole study. Three sections encompassed in this chapter include a summary of all the chapters that constitute the whole study, a broader application and contribution of the study as well as the recommendations of the study.

The summary seeks to illuminate and make a stand on the resource curse thesis in

Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa. The broader contextualization of the Zimbabwean case as a microcosm of developing resource-rich countries’ experiences is reflected.

The chapter answers the main research questions and raises questions for future research. It presents the core argument that Zimbabwe’s political economy is key in comprehending the contradictory socio-economic outcomes in spite of growth of the mining sector.

7.2 Conclusion of the Study The importance of natural resources for economic growth and socio-economic transformation is a contentious subject. Some scholars view natural capital assets as a blessing whereas others view them as a curse. Growth in the mineral sector can leverage economic growth and socio-economic development and the resource curse can be rebuffed if there is good governance, which denotes transparency,

252 accountability, stakeholder inclusion, rule of law, autonomous and capacitated institutions and so on. While governance as a concept cannot be dubbed as an all- time panacea for bolstering a mineral-led transformation, it is a foundation for a more inclusive and broad-based framework for the distribution of mineral wealth.

Nonetheless, the literature has fallen short of illuminating the kinds of governance traits as well as the international interventions requisite to overcome resource curse.

Natural resource governance models such as the participatory, co-management and interactive models have not effectively leveraged mineral wealth towards socio- economic development as these operated in the context of highly centralised and monopolised systems that are neo-patrimonial. From resource nationalisms to subsequent privatizations, the African mining industry has not addressed the resource curse since it strives with the colonial templates and economic substructures that do not deliver substantial changes and mineral-led socio-economic development, which led scholars to dub the African Post-Colonial State as the “Re-Colonial State.” and/or the “The Neo-Colonial State”. Weak institutions have exposed the African state to elite capture, ingrained patronage systems, rent seeking and corruption, which has hatched an inverse relationship between the opulent mineral resources and development. This has procreated poor mineral resources governance regimes that do not have mechanisms for transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion and, most transactions and engagements in the mineral value chain are opaque outside the control and oversight of stakeholders. Despite the morphing of the international governance landscape through the establishment of various frameworks, protocols, treaties, agreements and initiatives, issues of transparency, accountability, and mineral-led socio-economic development has remained elusive in Zimbabwe and other resource-rich African countries. The International governance landscape has not

253 fared well in influencing the local context, as these are constituted by soft laws; are deficient of compliance mechanisms and a penalty regime. There is a lack of political will to implement and harmonise policies with the provisions of the international governance principles. The fact that Zimbabwe does not have a stand-alone substantive mining policy have spawned opacity, un-accountability and poor domestic resource mobilization in the mining industry.

The indicators that were used to measure mineral resources governance are transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion and; for measuring socio- economic development are healthcare, education and household incomes. The impetus for this study emanated from the fact that although Zimbabwe has mineral opulence and has reflected a significant growth of its mining sector in terms of its foreign currency earnings and contribution to the national fiscus, it has continued to exhibit poor socio-economic indicators of healthcare, education, household incomes among others. The study used a mixed methods or triangulation approach; through use of primary data (quantitative and qualitative data) and secondary data (archival data) as the basis for the collection as well as analysis of data. Complementarity of the research methods was achieved through use of data from household surveys with

160 households in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu, Kwekwe and Shurugwi and in-depth interviews with officials of government ministries; of Finance and Economic

Development, Health and Childcare, Primary and Secondary Education, Rural District

Councillors, CSOs; ZELA and ZIMCODD, Traditional Chiefs, ASM association;

ZASMC. The Zimbabwean mining sector is highly securitized, politicized and centralized which represses other participants (particularly interview respondents) from airing out their views and opinions.

254

Heavy dependence on the mining sector and lack of diversified linkages with other sectors of the economy like manufacturing, agriculture, service and others, which have literally collapsed, spawn economic stagnation and poor socio-economic outcomes in the four districts. These outcomes are typical of the resource curse, nonetheless not discounting the impact of the FLTP and western-imposed sanctions, which has suppressed agricultural, manufacturing and other key sectors before the resurgence of the mining sector. Some evidence of corruption, rent seeking, opaque mineral deals have been established by prior researchers. The study established that mining growth is contributing somewhat to socio-economic development through employment creation, corporate social responsibility, taxation and royalties, but broad based development has not taken place in the country. One of the primary reasons for the weak linkages between mining growth and socio-economic development in the four districts is weak mineral resources governance that is marked by limited transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion, a grossly impious legal and policy environment with an advanced constitution that subsists alongside several acts that needs to be annulled and aligned. Several factors compromises accountability and transparency in the mining sector and these include the multiplicity and incapacitation of revenue collecting agents and the absence of one mineral revenue purse. Power and information asymmetries in the mining sector deprives other stakeholders, like

CSOs, ASM associations, traditional leaders, RDCs of vital information which disempowers them from holding the executive to account. Lack of capacitation of

CSOs, communities, RDCs, ZIMRA, the parliament, judiciary and other government agencies and, the subsequent centralization of the mining sector gives credence to the resource curse argument in the country. Platforms for representation and consultation of stakeholders are not present at the local levels but they are established

255 at the national level in the form of the MAB, ZASMIC, ZAMI and the parliament.

However, the national platforms are not capacitated to enforce executive transparency and accountability. MABI and ZAMI lack adequate representation of stakeholder interests. Systems as well as institutions governing the mineral value chain have largely remained outside the control as well as oversight of stakeholders, which gives the elite a leeway to extract rents and plunder mineral resources thereby professing the resource curse intransigence in local communities. Poor institutional capacity and a weak regulatory environment spawns mining claims disputes and conflicts, poor resource mobilization, elite policy influence and accumulation which results in poor socio-economic outcomes.

The mining fiscal regime of Zimbabwe is not consolidated; it has gross inadequacies and it is not aligned to the regional trends for effective resource mobilization and mining tax contributions to socio-economic transformation. The regime does not provide for transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion and tax heads are not disaggregated so that citizens can trace mineral revenue to hold the government to account. The tax calculation formulae for mining taxes due to local authorities is intractable as it based on labour in a sector that is at the centre of the fourth industrial revolution and therefore it deprives the RDCs of potential revenue to finance socio- economic development. The violation of the constitutional provisions on the subnational revenue sharing formulae, devolution principles, nonalignment of national laws and non-stakeholder consultations blatantly points to the undermining and the subsequent deterioration of institutions and are concomitant with the resource curse phenomenon.

The mining fiscal regime is geared towards optimization of Foreign Direct Investment in the sector and in the process gives too much to mining companies in the form of

256 low taxes and royalties and the Mining Tax Rebate regime. Double taxation agreements, amortization and transfer mispricing allow companies to inflate their costs and carry over losses indefinitely, which deprives the country of the much-needed revenue to finance development. Information and power asymmetries between the central government and other stakeholders like mining companies CSOs, traditional leaders, RDCs and communities have spawned opacity and unaccountability. Rife conflicts of interests and power imbalances in the country’s mining sector are antithetical to the establishment of effective multi-stakeholder processes in the mineral value chain and are emblematic of the resource curse thesis. The resource curse has been unbridled and its syndrome has manifested through the militarisation, securitization, centralization and politicization of mineral resources, and the generation of an enclave and stagnated economy, which is principally underpinned by opaqueness in the whole mineral value chain, corruption and smuggling.

CSOTs (Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba and Tongogara CSOTs) have proven to be instrumental in local equity and empowerment and the institutions are making significant contributions to healthcare, education, household incomes, income generating projects and infrastructural developments. Nonetheless, CSOTs are not remitting their maximum potential to local development due to fund embezzlement and misappropriation by the Trustees of the institutions and local leaders. The trustee of the CSOTs have not been furnishing community members with simplified and timely information on the CSOTs programs which has undermined transparency accountability and local community’s participation. The study established that Zimplats

Platinum Mine in Mhondoro-Ngezi and Unkie Mine in Shurugwi are the only mining companies that are implementing ESOPs and these are somewhat benefitting the local employees since they are calculated based on annual companies’ dividends.

257

Disequilibrium in the development approach by CSOTs and mining companies CSR spells out the resource curse in most remote wards in these resource rich districts.

The scraping of the entire indigenisation requirements in the mining sector cast a grim future on local empowerment and socio-economic development. CSOTs and ESOPs has not shown any presence in Kwekwe district, which has been turned into a hot bed of all the evils of ASM.

Although CSR is somewhat contributing to socio-economic development, most notably in Mhondoro-Ngezi, Chegutu and Shurugwi, some of the CSR is not really benefiting the local communities because it is done at the discretion of mining companies and in some instances it does not reflect the needs and aspirations of local communities.

Furthermore, CSR is not legally mandatory in Zimbabwe, just like in most resource- rich countries in the developing world, but it is tax deductible and most companies engage in any form of CSR so that they do not pay tax. In spite of the mining sector’s huge contribution to the country’s foreign currency earnings and GDP, real development remains deceptive. Unemployment rates have taken a toll, socio- economic development indicators of health, education and household incomes remains poor as reflected by the household surveys conducted in Chegutu, Mhondoro-

Ngezi, Kwekwe and Shurugwi. The structure, form as well as organization of ASM show the intersection between politics, patronage, economic crises, elite accumulation and survivalism. In that light, mineral resource rents in the ASM sectors of the four districts induces policy myopia and a political economy crisis. The heavy involvement of the political and economic elite as well as the wider security establishment in rent extraction in the ASM suppresses the political will to design a broad based and comprehensive framework for the sector; reminiscent of a rentier state. The lack of a proper legislation, tracking measures and discordination among different government

258 agencies in ASM has spawned disorder, violence, human rights violations, smuggling, environmental degradation and the absence of a taxation system, which is depriving the government of the enormous potential of fiscal revenue. Local authorities have been incapacitated to govern the ASM sector since the recentralization drive that began in 2006 and the central government agencies are not capacitated to regulate the sector. The good news about Zimbabwe’s mining industry is that most subsoil assets are still unharnessed and represents a great potential to leapfrog development and plug the resource curse in the succeeding decades. The study’s contribution in the discourse of mineral resources governance and socio-economic development is summarised below.

7.3 Policy recommendations The study proposes a holistic framework for good mineral resources governance and socio-economic development elaborated in Chapter 6. From a mixed methods viewpoint, the study makes numerous recommendations for an enhanced mineral resources governance and broad-based sustained mineral-led socio-economic transformation. Zimbabwe’s institutions and legal frameworks are compromised in terms of their form and implementation by an entrenched patronage system and rentierism.

7.3.1 Repeal the MMA and gazette a more comprehensive legal framework The MMA as the principal legislation does not capture international standards and is not in alignment with the constitution on transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion. Furthermore, it is oriented towards extraction of mineral resources rather than their sustainable use. The MMA should be annulled and a principal framework that provides for transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion as well as sustainable mineral-led socio-economic transformation should be implemented. The

259 principal Mining law should be aligned to regional as well as international standards for optimization of the developmental outcomes of the exploitation of mineral resources. The legislation should limit discretionary powers in mining frameworks implementation and permit broad involvement and participation of stakeholders.

7.3.2 Deliver on transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion reforms in the mining sector as mandated by the Constitution Six years down the line since the adoption of the new Constitution in 2013, but transparency reforms in the mining sector as still a mirage. The Parliament should enact an Act that guides the negotiation as well as performance of mining agreements in line with the constitution. The Act should establish steps as well as checks that need to be complied with to ensure transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion.

Furthermore, the Act should clearly spell out the enforceable sanctions regime in case of violation. AIPPA needs to be repealed and an Act that promotes transparency and accountability needs to be gazetted and attuned to the new constitution. The performance of the mining sector should be disclosed across all the revenue heads as well as the revenue performance of strategic mineral sectors like diamonds, platinum, gold, coal and chrome among others as per the principles of Public Financial

Management outlined under section 298 of the Constitution. Disclosure should also be per each mining company or even mining project. These provisions should also be operationalized on mining deals and the Mining Rebate regime so that there is accountability, transparency and stakeholder inclusion on the various mining agreements entered into. Bad deals, especially deleterious tax incentives are one of the major impediments distorting tax revenue flows to the treasury.

Disclosure of disaggregated tax heads is critical to the settling of constitutional provisions on transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion as well as the

Sustainable Development Goals and AU Agenda 2063.Minerals are finite resources

260 and therefore the public should have access to vital mining information to assess whether they are benefiting or losing from mineral extraction in their localities.

7.3.3 ASM legal framework and its regulation The government need to design and promulgate a clear policy that specifically addresses ASM mining activities in the country.ASM should be a reserved sector and

ASM special permits should be unveiled as this sector is mainly constituted by indigenous Zimbabweans who do not have monopoly capital or fourth industrial revolution skills like most Medium and Large scale mining companies. Currently the structure, form and organization of ASM are opaque which has given rise to rife patronage systems, elite accumulation, anarchy and smuggling of precious stones. A principal legislation needs to be enacted that put order, transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion in the governance of ASM. Formulation and implementation of the ASM policy should include the Ministries of Finance and Economic

Development, MMD, Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, ZIMRA,

MMCZ, EMA, RDCs, traditional chiefs, CSOs and local communities. These stakeholders should collectively appoint an Agency that oversees the transparent, accountable and inclusive production, marketing and utilization of mineral wealth. The

Agency should be legally mandated to submit updated monthly reports on the production, marketing and utilization of mineral wealth. This will enable the stakeholders to track the mineral wealth across the value chain and to ensure that

ASM operators remit their due taxes to the responsible authorities. The government should operationalize the geological mapping of the zones that are amenable to the

ASM. This legal approach will address all the structural impediments that are bedevilling ASM. Furthermore, the government should simplify, subsidize the licence fees and reduce the bureaucratic processes for ASM and introduce a one-stop post

261 for easy solemnization of the sector. These measures should be accompanied by the mainstreaming of ASM into the country’s poverty reduction strategies, establishment of partnerships between the government, medium and large-scale companies and the

ASM sector to facilitate technological transfer as well as strengthening of ASM associations such as ZASMIC.

7.3.4 Earmarking and Publicising of Mineral revenue for Development Stakeholders in the country’s mining industry can draw some insights and draw lessons from how mineral revenues are being handled in Botswana. This can be operationalized by earmarking mineral revenue portions, for instance 40% towards various human development as well as infrastructure programs and these should be publicized in various platforms. Billboards and public notices should be erected to show the amount earmarked and subsequent portions allocated towards development of schools, clinics, water sources and other infrastructural improvements. This is significant to show the link between mineral tax and local development and it helps to allay stakeholder fears and conflicts on public revenue abuses. This can set the tone on the harnessing of mineral resources and their subsequent use. RDCs should enhance transparency and accountability through wider local budget consultations to make the revenue information easier to comprehend to the different users. CSOTs trusts should furnish communities with simplified and timely progress reports, both narrative as well as financial on program implementation.

7.3.5 Adoption of online tools RDCs, CSOs, traditional leaders, local communities and ASM associations should push for adoption of free online tools for mineral processes disclosure like the

‘Towards Sustainable Mining’ developed by Canada’s Mining Association and was also adopted by Botswana. This tool assists in solving information asymmetries within the government ministries and departments and permits greater access to information

262 on mineral revenues by citizens. Stakeholders can utilize ‘Social Accountability Tools’ like Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) which enables them to trace funds from their original sources to disbursements destinations. It is fundamental for communities and other stakeholders to use social audits, ‘Citizen Report Cards (CRC)’ and ‘Community Score Cards (CSC)’ to gather evidence on social service delivery effectively and be able to present the evidence to various stakeholders and to use it to crank pressure to the government for delivery of social services.

7.3.6 Implementation of international frameworks, protocols and initiatives The government needs to enact a comprehensive and clear mining policy for easy alignment and contextualization of International provisions (like AMV, PWYP, EITI

AND so on) on mineral resources governance. The government should contextualize the AMV and make progress on implementation of its CMV for an improved framework on transparency, accountability and stakeholder inclusion. Zimbabwe’ EITI version stalled upon its formation in 2011 and there is need for the government to expeditiously implement the initiative to enhance transparency and accountability in the sector. The accolade for an improved framework for transparency and accountability is already playing given that the new constitution’s provisions jives well with EITI Principles on transparency and accountability. PWYP and other international protocols need to be observed by publishing disaggregated data across the entire mineral value chain. The government needs to gazette an Act of parliament to implement the rights of indigenous communities to natural resources and their right to socio-economic development as provided for by the constitution in line with the ILO Indigenous and

Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169).

263

7.3.7 Use information disclosed by companies listed on mandatory disclosure Stock Exchanges Civil Societies, legislators, community data extractors, local communities and the media fraternity should make use of information that is available on companies listed on mandatory disclosure Stock Exchanges like EU, Canada and UK to hold mining companies and the government to account. CSOs should simplify such information and feed it to the citizens. Local communities in Mhondoro-Ngezi and Shurugwi should make use of information available on LSE (Zimplats Platinum Mine) and ASX (Unkie

Mine) respectively to hold the mining companies and the government to account.

While the country is lagging behind on the espousal of international best practice on transparency and accountability on mineral revenues, there is a leeway for communities and CSOs to harness low hanging fruits by engagements with progressive mining companies and local governments. Although payments that are made by mining companies to subnational governments are scanty, comparing to the ones remitted to the national governments, which bounds the effect of transparency at the subnational government level. However, these local level transparency impacts are critical in propelling national level mineral revenue transparency as well accountability reforms.

7.3.8 Modernization of the Mining Title Management System

The current Mining Title Management System professes the resource curse since it is outdated, a mining claim ownership disputes source and a corruption enabler. It is critical that the government adopt a computerized mining cadaster that provides a timely and clear picture of the status of mining titles and their execution so as to do away with the opacity surrounding mining titles in the current mining regime.

264

7.3.9 Adherence to the Constitutional Mineral Revenue Sharing Mechanism The study established the revenue sharing formulae between the national and local governments, which constitutionally, prescribe that ‘not less than five per cent of the national revenues raised in any financial year’ to provincial and metropolitan councils and local authorities’ is not being followed in budget allocations. This deprives the local governments of resource revenues to finance socio-economic development programmes. The country’s national budgets need to embrace the arrangements for sharing of mineral revenues between national and local governments. 20 percent of the mineral royalties should be ploughed back in the zones where the wealth is extracted as provided by the constitution. Local communities and CSOs should petition the legislature or make a case with the constitutional court for enforcement of compliance. This is key in ensuring that subnational governments do not rely on the national government good will for resources as was obtaining under the erstwhile constitutional order. Revenue sharing must be constructed on four principles: i) derivation (communities where mineral wealth is extracted should get a fair share form the production operations), ii) equity, iii) need iv) and population size.

7.3.10 Capacitation and implementation of Devolution The study established that currently stakeholders like RDCs, traditional, CSOs and local communities are not capacitated to meaningfully participate in mineral resources governance and devolution is not being fully implemented which is clear violation of section 264 of the constitution. Chigwata (2019) noted, “The devolution of governmental powers and resources has always been a contested subject in

Zimbabwe, as it has been in many other countries”. Decentralization of powers and capacitation of stakeholders to the provincial as well as local governments is the foundation of devolution and should be fully implemented in line with the constitutional provisions. RDCs, CSOs, traditional leaders and communities should be empowered

265 with real policy making as well as implementation powers together with the requisite resources. Capacitation of local authorities is a feasible option since the constitution makes provision for a pertinent framework that allows local governments to be “real governments”. There is also need to reinforce the capacity of agencies like the

Parliament and the judiciary and establishment of platforms for the empowered participation all stakeholders in the structures and processes of mineral resources governance.

7.3.11 Consolidation of the Mining Fiscal Regime The study established that the current mining fiscal regime of Zimbabwe is not conducive for the transparent, accountable and inclusive mobilization of mineral revenues for financing socio-economic development. The regime allows for opaqueness, leakages, and corruption and it deprives the government of the much- needed revenues for financing of social services. In that light, it is requisite for the government to come up with a consolidated mining fiscal regime that provides for the following;

 Reformation of the Mining fiscal regime and Tax justice: For the communities

to benefit effectively from local resource mobilization strategies, it is critical for legal

and policy reforms that enforce tax justice in the mineral sector. Reforms on the

mining fiscal regime should speak to mineral tax compliance, transparency,

accountability and inclusivity. Tax systems must be progressive, fair and benefitting

the citizens as alluded by Adam Smith in his book, ‘Wealth of Nations’. The mining

fiscal regime reforms should afford the citizens the right to know mineral revenues

from mineral sales, revenues forgone on mining incentives, costs incurred in the

mineral value chain and how the mineral revenues are being used. The cost of

mining revenue forgone to lure foreign mining investments should be presented in

266 parliament in the budget statements and should be incorporated in ZIMRA quarterly and yearly reports so that mining incentives can be publicly monitored and accounted for to get rid of bad and retrogressive mining deals. Tax justice is interconnected to concepts of accountability. The impact of illicit financial flows, tax evasion, bad mining deals and aggressive corporate tax can be easily deduced if the systems of taxation are transparent providing credible, timely and useful information. Furthermore, the reformed mining fiscal regime should specify the amortisation period required for mining companies so that they do not carry over losses indefinitely to evade tax. Royalties should be made deductible for the purposes of income tax to make the sector’s fiscal regime more effective.

 Simplification of the Mining Fiscal Regime: To promote transparency and

accountability as well as reduction of the burden of administration and

compliance, it is requisite to simplify the mining fiscal regime to a small number

of revenue collecting agents, regulations and revenue heads. This is also

fundamental for the formalisation of the ASM sector and it makes royalties to

be deductible from the sector.

 Modernisation of the Mining Title Management System: There is need for

funding of a modern mining title management system for monitoring as well as

tracking of mining tax incentives for the purposes of cost benefit analysis.

 Addressing the Regressive Local Mining Tax System: The local mining

taxation structure should made progressive by embracing a value-based rather

than a manual based method. For instance, to say 5% of income created on

each mining project must make up local tax contribution. Furthermore, the tax

system needs to be reviewed to make sure that local authorities charge mining

267

taxes as they consider fit for facilitation of local resource mobilization and

development.

 The tax and royalty regime must be premised on profitability for it to supple.

7.3.12 Agreements for Community development and Best Practise The study gleaned the lack of corporate community engagements in the targeted districts and consequently communities are at the receiving end of the negative environmental impacts and poor CSR. Many countries are putting requirements for mining companies to enter into Community Development Agreements (CDA) before mining project development. Countries such as Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and

Mongolia have mining law provisions that require mining companies to undertake

CDAs with local communities before commencement of mining projects (PWYP

Zimbabwe, 2015). The CDAs will engender transfer of social as well as economic benefits to the host communities as they bilaterally express the commitment of mining companies to CSR. CDA are critical in defining the relationship between extractive companies, affected communities and the roles of CSOs, subnational and national governments

7.3.13 Social Movements for Good Governance of Mineral Resources and Tax Justice The information and power asymmetries established in the four mining districts spawn opacity, unaccountability and stakeholder exclusion in key decision-making processes in the mining sector. There is need for stakeholders like citizens, CSOs, ASM

Associations and traditional leaders to coalesce and form robust Social Movements in line with the constitutional provisions on the rights to assembly, picket and demonstrate to crank pressure for transparency, accountability, inclusion and social justice in the mining sector. The social movements should also pile pressure for tax justice and progressive taxation policies.

268

7.3.14 Formulation of a clear legislation on local equity and empowerment Provided that CSR is not legislated, neither is it mandatory, and mining companies have shown less appetite for meaningful CSR contributions to their localities, the possibilities of a mineral-led socio-economic transformation may be in limbo. Thus, it is critical for the envisaged New Empowerment Bill to capture local equity and empowerment and to make a more specific and direct legislation on CSOTs and

ESOPs on how these institutions should work and address the local communities’’ needs.

7.3.15 A resettlement policy

Communities in Shurugwi, Chegutu and Mhondoro-Ngezi have cited forced relocations from their communal lands by licensed mining companies. The study established that the current legal framework does not protect local communities, it rather gives primacy to mining companies, and subsequently forced relocations have been experienced. The country requires a resettlement law that explicitly provides for relocation rules and clearly addresses mining-induced relocations.

7.3.16 Beneficiation and diversification The lack of diversification and linkages with other enterprises needs to be addressed through domestic value addition and beneficiation measures like relaxing duty on mineral processing equipment for the current miners, reducing license fees and increasing export incentives for companies that commit to undertake domestic mineral beneficiation. Most case studies make an emphasis on the significance of private and public investment as a means to boost domestic demand, expand domestic supply capacity and direct resources to sectors (agriculture, manufacturing among others) of the economy with growth as well as employment potential.

269

7.4 Areas of further research  Need for further interrogation on the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal

and institutional frameworks with regards to the tax system in Zimbabwe.

 The mining sector is also susceptible to rent seeking and smuggling activities,

where some of the minerals are exported through unscrupulous means. There

is no statistical evidence which quantifies the amount of smuggling of minerals

out and the trends of trade misinvoicing in mineral sector of Zimbabwe and this

is one area which needs to be researched on.

270

REFERENCES

Aaronson, S.A., 2011. Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and

the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public

Administration and Development, 31(1), pp.50-63.

Afful-Koomson, T. and Owusu Asubonteng, K. eds., 2015. Collaborative Governance

in Extractive Industries in Africa. United Nations University Institute for

Natural Resource.

Africa Development, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa

(CODESRIA), Vol.36, No.1, pp. 15-36.African Development Group (2019)

Zimbabwe Economic Brief

https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-

Operations/Monthly_Bulletin_February_2019.pdf

AFRODAD (2017) Impacts of Fluctuating Commodity Prices on Government Revenue

in the Sadc Region. The Case of Platinum for Zimbabwe Policy

Briefimpacts_Of_Fluctuating_Commodity_Prices_Zimbabwe_Policy_Brief.P

271

Akylbekova, D., 2015. Analyzing the Resource Curse theory: A comparative study of

Kazakhstan and Norway.

Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H., 1973. The property right paradigm. The journal of

economic history, 33(1), pp.16-27.

Alexander, N., 2013. Thoughts on the new South Africa. Jacana Media.

Amin, S. (2014). “Understanding the political economy of contemporary Africa”,

Amundsen, I., 2014. Drowning in Oil: Angola's Institutions and the “Resource

Curse”. Comparative Politics, 46(2), pp.169-189

Anderson, C., 2016. Sanctions, Transparency, and Accountability: The Missing Links

in Natural Resource Anti-Corruption Efforts. Geo. J. Int'l L., 48, p.779.

Andrews, N. and Nwapi, C., 2018. Bringing the state back in again? The emerging

developmental state in Africa’s energy sector. Energy Research & Social

Science, 41, pp.48-58.

Aragon, F. and Rud, J.P., 2012. Mining, pollution and agricultural productivity:

evidence from Ghana.

Arellano-Yanguas, J., 2011. Aggravating the resource curse: decentralisation, mining

and conflict in Peru. The Journal of Development Studies, 47(4), pp.617-638.

272

Arifin Afandi and Alizar Aldi Muhammad (2016) Governance Models, Accountability

and Stakeholder Engagement.

Armitage, D.R., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R.I., Charles, A.T., Davidson-Hunt,

Diduck, A.P., Doubleday, N.C., Johnson, D.S., Marschke, M. and McConney,

P., 2009. Adaptive co‐management for social–ecological

complexity. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 7(2), pp.95-102.

Arndt, H.W. (1987). Economic development: The history of an idea. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

Arora, A. and Sharma, C., 2016. Corporate governance and firm performance in

developing countries: evidence from India. Corporate governance.

Assan, J.K. and Muhammed, A.R., 2018. The impact of mining on farming as a

livelihood strategy and its implications for poverty reduction and household

well-being in Ghana. Int. J. Dev. Sustain., 7(1), pp.1-20.

Auty RM. (ed.) (2008) Resource abundance and economic development (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2002) 315-328.

Auty, R.M. ed., 2001. Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford

University Press.

273

Awolusi, O.D., 2016. Mining sector and economic growth in Southern African

economies: A panel data analysis. Postdoctoral Fellow, Graduate School of

Business and Leadership, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

Azam, M., 2012. A distributional analysis of social group inequality in rural

India. Journal of International Development, 24(4), pp.415-432.

Babbie, E. and Mouton, J., 2007. Qualitative methods of data sampling. The practice

of social research, 7, pp.187-193.

Babbie, E., 2007. The practice of social research. 11th. Belmont, CA: Thomson

Wadsworth, 24(511), p.66.

Badia-Miró et al., ‘Introduction: Natural Resources and Economic Development –

What Can We Learn from History?’, in Badia-Miró et al. (eds), Natural

Resources, p.i.

Ballet, J., Koffi, K.J.M. and Komena, K.B., 2009. Co-management of natural resources

in developing countries: The importance of context. Économie internationale,

(4), pp.53-76.

Banerjee, A. and Chaudhury, S., 2010. Statistics without tears: Populations and

samples. Industrial psychiatry journal, 19(1), p.60.

274

Barbier, E.B. and Cox, M., 2003. Does economic development lead to mangrove loss?

A cross‐country analysis. Contemporary economic policy, 21(4), pp.418-

432.

Barros, C.P., 2012. The resource curse and rent-seeking in Angola. Centro de

Estudos sobre Africe e do Desenvolvimento, Working Paper Series, 102.

Barwick, M., Ansell, D., Pritchard, J. and Korodaj, T., 2014. The role of governance in

delivery of natural resource management programmes–a case study

involving the restoration of freshwater fish communities in the Murray‐Darling

Basin. Ecological management & restoration, 15, pp.62-66.

Baskarada, S., 2014. Qualitative case study guidelines. Baškarada, S.(2014).

Qualitative case studies guidelines. The Qualitative Report, 19(40), pp.1-25.

Bauer, A., 2013. Subnational oil, gas and mineral revenue management. Revenue

Watch Institute Briefing. Nueva York, NY: The Revenue Watch Institute.

Disponible

en:http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI_Sub_Oil_Ga

s_Mgmt_ rev1. pdf.

Bernstein, S (2005) ‘Legitimacy in global environmental governance’, J. Int. Law Int.

Relations 1:139–166.

275

Bhoroma Victor (2019) Zimbabwe: Scrapping of Zimbabwe's Toxic Indigenization Law

Good Riddance Zimbabwe Independent

https://allafrica.com/stories/201903290240.html

Biddix, J.P., 2009. Qualitative research design. Research Rundowns.

Bieske Nicole (2018) Transparency in the African mining sector

http://www.africanreview.com/events/event-news/transparency-in-the-

african-mining-sector

Bless, C. and Higson-Smith, C., 2000. Fundamentals of research methods. An African

perspective.

Bodea, C., Higashijima, M. and Singh, R.J., 2016. Oil and civil conflict: Can public

spending have a mitigation effect?. World Development, 78, pp.1-12.

Bodin, O., and Crona, B.I. 2009. The role of social networks in natural resource

governance: What relational patterns make a difference? Global

Environmental Change, 19(3): 366-374.

Boserup, E., 1965. The conditions of economic growth.Thousand Oacks:USA

Bowen, G.A., 2009. Document analysis as a qualitative research method. Qualitative

research journal, 9(2), p.27.

276

Brown Oli and Keating Michael (2015) Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts Working

Towards More Effective Resolution of National and Sub-National Resource

Disputes

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/2015

0619AddressingConflictResourcesBrownKeating.pdf

Brunnschweiler, C.N. and Bulte, E.H., 2008. The resource curse revisited and revised:

A tale of paradoxes and red herrings. Journal of environmental economics

and management, 55(3), pp.248-264.

Brunnschweiler, C.N., 2008. Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance,

institutions, and economic growth. World development, 36(3), pp.399-419.

BTI.,2016.Zimbabwe Country Report https://www.bti-

project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Zimb

abwe.pdf

Budzi, J., 2016. The effects of poverty on health equity in Zimbabwe: the case of

Chegutu Urban District (Doctoral dissertation, University of Fort Hare).

Burns, N. and Grove, S.K., 2005. The practice of nursing research: Conduct. Critique.

Buur, L., Therkildsen, O., Hansen, M.W. and Kjær, M., 2013. Extractive natural

resource development: Governance, linkages and aid (No. 2013: 28). DIIS

Reports, Danish Institute for International Studies

Burgis, T., 2015, The Looting Machine, William Collins, London

277

Cacciattolo, M., 2015. Ethical considerations in research. In The Praxis of

EnglishLanguage Teaching and Learning (PELT) (pp. 55-73). Brill Sense.

Canback Global Income Distribution Database (C-GIDD) 2018 Zimbabwe gdp and

income distribution statistics 2004-2029

https://www.canback.com/cgidd/zimbabwe.htm

Carlsson, L. and Berkes, F., 2005. Co-management: concepts and methodological

implications. Journal of environmental management, 75(1), pp.65-76.

Carothers, T. and Brechenmacher, S., 2014. Accountability, Transparency,

Participation, and Inclusion.

Challier, M.C.T., 2018. Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption: Economic and

Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective. Rev. Eur. Stud., 10, p.96.

Chamber of Mines (2015) Chamber of Mines Calculate Broad Based HDSA

ownership of 38% and meaningful economic value transfer

https://www.moneyweb.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Summary-of-

Chamber-research-report-on-progress-on-ownership-15-05-2015.pdf

Chamber of Mines 2017 Update on the Zimbabwe Mining Policies and Legislation of

Zimbabwe Mining Sector Growth: 2011-2018* Accessed 20 July 2018

o.pdf>

278

Chamber of Mines 2017 Update on the Zimbabwe Mining Policies and Legislation of

Zimbabwe Mining Sector Growth: 2011-2018* Accessed 20 July 2018

o.pdf>

Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (2015) State of The Mining Industry Survey, Report

on Findings http://chamberofminesofzimbabwe.com/wp-

content/uploads/2019/05/2015-State-of-Mining-Industry-Survey-Report.pdf

Chandler John 2013 Mining Regulation and Policy Course. Centre for Mining, Energy

and Natural Resources Law, University of Western

Australiahttp://im4dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Mining-Regulation-

and-Policy-Course1.pdf

Chazireni, E. and Tembo, E (2018) Health Service Provision In The Midlands Province

Of Zimbabwe: A Geographical Perspective.

Chegutu RDC (2019) https://www.cheguturdc.com/

Chêne Marie (2017) Natural resource management transparency and governance.

A literature review focusing on extractive industries Anti-Corruption

Resource Centre https://www.u4.no/publications/natural-resource-

management-transparency-and-governance

279

Chene Marie (2017) Natural resource management transparency and governance.A

literature review focusing on extractive industries. Anti-Corruption Resource

Centre https://www.u4.no/publications/natural-resource-management-

transparency-and-governance

Chêne, M., 2017. Natural resource management transparency and governance. U4

Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

Chibwana, M.W.T., 2016. Social Policy Outcomes of Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land

Reform Program (FTLRP): A Case Study of Kwekwe District (Doctoral

dissertation, University of South Africa).

Chigwata, T., 2016. The role of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe: are they still

relevant?. Law, Democracy & Development, 20(1), pp.69-90.

Chigwata, T.C. and de Visser, J., 2018. Local government in the 2013 constitution of

Zimbabwe: Defining the boundaries of local autonomy. Hague Journal on the

Rule of Law, 10(1), pp.165-185.

Chigwata, T.C., 2019 Devolution demystified: Emerging debates and prospects for

devolution in Zimbabwe A discussion paper.

Chikuhwa, J.W., 2013. Zimbabwe: The end of the first republic. Authorhouse.

Chilisa, B. and Kawulich, B., 2012. Selecting a research approach: Paradigm,

methodology and methods. C Wagner, B Kawulich, & M Garner, Doing social

research: A global context, pp.51-61.

280

Chitiyo Knox, Caleb Dengu, David Mbae and Christopher Vandome Africa Programme

(2019) Forging Inclusive Economic Growth in Zimbabwe Insights from the

Zimbabwe Futures 2030 roundtable series

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/201

9-10-09-ZimbabweFutures.pdf

Chitotombe, J.W., 2012. Politics of inclusion and exclusion in governance of natural

resources: The case of Buhera communal areas, Zimbabwe. International

Journal of Politics and Good Governance, 3(3), pp.1-17.

Chiunya Newman , Mhembwe Smart and Ernest Dube (2017) community share

ownership trusts in Zimbabwe: Prospects and challenges International

Journal of Education and Social Science Research Vol. 1, No. 01; 2017

Chiunya Newman, Mhembwe Smart and Dube Ernest (2017) Community Share

Ownership Trusts in Zimbabwe: Prospects and Challenges International

Journal of Education and Social Science Research Vol. 1, No. 01; 2017

Chojnicki, Z., 2010. Socio-economic development and its axiological

aspects. Quaestiones Geographicae, 29(2), p.7

Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S. and Olson, M., 1997. Institutions and economic

performance: property rights and contract enforcement. Institutions and

281

Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less-Developed and

Post-Socialist Countries, pp.67-90.

Clark, C., 1967. The conditions of economic progress. The conditions of economic

progress.

Cloke, P., Marsden, T. and Mooney, P. eds., 2006. Handbook of rural studies. Sage.

Cloke, P., T. Marsden, and P. Mooney (eds) (2006) Handbook of rural studies.

London: Sage Publications.

Colchester, M. and Ferrari, M., 2007. Making FPIC work: Challenges and prospects

for indigenous peoples. Forest Peoples Programme, http://www.

forestpeoples. org/documents/law_hr/fpic_synthesis_jun07_eng. pdf.

Collier, P. and Goderis, B., 2008. Commodity prices, growth, and the natural resource

curse: reconciling a conundrum.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 1998. On economic causes of civil war. Oxford economic

papers, 50(4), pp.563-573.

Collier, P., 2010. The political economy of natural resources. social research, 77(4),

pp.1105-1132.

Cook, N., Sarver, E. and Krometis, L.A., 2015. Putting corporate social responsibility

to work in mining communities: Exploring community needs for central

Appalachian wastewater treatment. Resources, 4(2), pp.185-202.

282

Cooke, B. and Kothari, U., 2001. The case for participation as tyranny (pp. 1-15). Zed

Books.

Corbin, J. and Strauss, A., 2008. Strategies for qualitative data analysis. Basics of

Qualitative Research. Techniques and procedures for developing grounded

theory, 3.

Corden, W.M. and Neary, J.P., 1982. Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a

small open economy. The economic journal, 92(368), pp.825-848.

Creswell W (2009) Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods

approaches

Creswell, J.W. and Clark, V.L.P., 2017. Designing and conducting mixed methods

research. Sage publications.

Creswell, J.W. and Creswell, J.D., 2017. Research design: Qualitative, quantitative,

and mixed methods approaches. Sage publications.

Creswell, J.W., 2007. Five qualitative approaches to inquiry. Qualitative inquiry and

research design: Choosing among five approaches, 2, pp.53-80.

Creswell, J.W., 2009. Mapping the field of mixed methods research.

Creswell, J.W., 2013. Steps in conducting a scholarly mixed methods study.

283

Creswell, J.W., 2014. A concise introduction to mixed methods research. SAGE

publications.

Cross Eddie 2020 The five pillars of the State. The Zimbabwean; A Voice for the

Voiceless https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2020/01/the-five-pillars-of-the-

state/

Crowe, S., Cresswell, K., Robertson, A., Huby, G., Avery, A. and Sheikh, A., 2011.

The case study approach. BMC medical research methodology, 11(1),

p.100.

Danso, F., 2017 Transparency and accountability in Ghana’s mining sector: Is it real

orfiction?.https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Felix_Danso2/publication/32

1777257_Transparency_and_Accountability_in_Ghana's_Mining_Sector_Is

_it_Real_or_Fiction/links/5a314d97a6fdcc9b2d2bbf21/Transparency-and-

Accountability-in-Ghanas-Mining-Sector-Is-it-Real-or-Fiction.pdf

Davies, A.L. and White, R.M., 2012. Collaboration in natural resource governance:

reconciling stakeholder expectations in deer management in

Scotland. Journal of environmental management, 112, pp.160-169.

De Vos, A.S., Delport, C.S.L., Fouché, C.B. and Strydom, H., 2011. Research at grass

roots: A primer for the social science and human professions. Van Schaik

Publishers.

284

De Vos, A.S., Strydom, H, Schulze, S. & Patel, L. 2011. The sciences and the

profession. In De Vos A.S.

De Waal, A., 2014. When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war

in South Sudan. African Affairs, 113(452), pp.347-369.

Deacon RT, Mueller B. 2006. Political economy and natural resource use. Economic

development and environmental sustainability: new policy options. Jun

29;122.

Deacon, R.T. and Rode, A., 2015. 14. Rent seeking and the resource

curse. Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking, p.227.

Deacon, R.T. and Rode, A., 2015. Rent seeking and the resource curse.

In Companion to the political economy of rent seeking. Edward Elgar

Publishing.

Deller, S.C. and Schreiber, A., 2012. Mining and community economic growth. Review

of Regional Studies, 42(2), pp.121-141.

Demissie, M.Z., 2014. The natural resource curse in Sub-Saharan Africa:

Transparency and international initiatives.

285

Department for International Development (DFID) (2017)Economic Development

Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges

http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/822011487174249256/DFID-Economic-

Development-Strategy-2017.pdf

Dhliwayo Mutuso (2016) The Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill: Its promises and

pitfalls Zimbabwe Environmental Law

Associationhttps://www.accahumanrights.org/images/reports/ZELA/Mines_

and_Minerals_Ammendment_Bill_Paper_edited.pdf

Dhliwayo Mutuso and Sibanda Mukasiri (2017) From Zimbabwe Mining Revenue

Transparency Initiative to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Zimbabwe Law Environmental Association http://www.zela.org/from-

zimbabwe-mining-revenue-transparency-initiative-to-the-extractive-

industries-transparency-initiative/#_ftn1

Dhliwayo, M. (2014). A Review of the Draft Minerals Policy. ZELA.

Di John, J., 2011. Is there really a resource curse? A critical survey of theory and

evidence. Glob. Gov. 17 (2), 167–184.

Diallo, Thierno Amadou (2015) Beyond the resource curse: mineral resources and

development in Guinea-Conakry. PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute

of Technology.

286

Diallo, Thierno Amadou (2015) Beyond the resource curse: mineral resources and

development in Guinea-Conakry. PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute

of Technology.

Domar, E. 1957. Essays in the theory of economic growth. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Doro, E. and Kufakurinani, U., 2018. Resource Curse or Governance Deficit? The Role

of Parliament in Uganda’s Oil and Zimbabwe’s Diamonds. Journal of

Southern African Studies, 44(1), pp.43-57.

Dube, S.T., 2015. An assessment of the effectiveness of community share ownership

schemes as a strategy for rural development: a case of Gwanda south rural

district.

Dzimunya, N., Mapamba, L., Dembetembe, G.G., Dzwiti, K. and Mukono, T., 2018.

Formalization of a roadmap to maximize the contribution of artisanal and

small-scale mining in Zimbabwe.

EITI, 2016. The EITI Standard 2016. EITI International Secretariat, Oslo, (accessed

26.06.16 at 〈https://eiti.org/document/standard.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2017) Shurugwi, Zimbabwe

https://www.britannica.com/place/Shurugwi

287

European Union (2017) Transparent and Accountable Management of Natural

Resources in Developing Countries: The Case of Forests Directorate-

General

forExternalPoliciesPolicyDepartmenthttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegDat

a/etudes/STUD/2017/578045/IPOL_STU(2017)578045_EN.pdf

Ewetan, Olabanji Olukayode, and Urhie Ese. "Insecurity and socio-economic

development in Nigeria." Journal of Sustainable Development Studies 5, no.

1 (2014): 40-63.

Ferreira, P.G., 2012. Breaking the weak governance curse: Global regulation and

governance reform in resource-rich developing countries. University of

Toronto (Canada).

Food and Agricultural Organization and United Nations. 2017. Inclusive natural

resource governance and rural development in the Philippines A case study

on FAO’s Participatory Area Planning activities http://www.fao.org/3/a-

i6401e.pdf

Forson, J.A., Baah-Ennumh, T.Y., Buracom, P., Chen, G. and Peng, Z., 2016. Causes

of corruption: Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. South African Journal of

Economic and Management Sciences, 19(4), pp.562-578.

Fortmeyer, S., 2018. “Why Can’t I Find It?” Mining Transparency in Zambia and the

Democratic Republic of Congo.

288

Fraenkel, J.R., Wallen, N.E. and Hyun, H.H., 2011. How to design and evaluate

research in education. New York: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social

Sciences/Languages.

Freebairn, J. and Quiggin, J., 2010. Special taxation of the mining industry. Economic

Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy, 29(4), pp.384-396.

Fritz, J.M., 2010. Socio-economic developmental social work. Peace Studies, Public

Policy and Global Security–Volume Vii, P.362.

Frykberg Mel (2018) Improving transparency in mining industry Business

https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/improving-transparency-in-

mining-industry-13834778

Furman, J. and Orszag, P., 2015. A firm-level perspective on the role of rents in the

rise in inequality. Presentation at “A Just Society” Centennial Event in Honor

of Joseph Stiglitz Columbia University.

Garufu, P., 2016. Operationalizing international law principles governing state

sovereignty over mineral resources: the case of Zimbabwe and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Doctoral dissertation).

289

Garufu, P., 2016. Operationalizing international law principles governing state

sovereignty over mineral resources: the case of Zimbabwe and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Doctoral dissertation).

Ghate, R. and Chaturvedi, R., 2016. Unpacking the governance conundrum for better

natural resource management. ICIMOD Working Paper, (2016/2).

Goldthau, A. and Witte, J.M. eds., 2010. Global energy governance: The new rules of

the game. Brookings Institution Press.

Goldthau, A. and Witte, J.M., 2010. The role of rules and institutions in global energy:

An introduction. Global energy governance: The new rules of the game,

pp.1-21.

Goswami, K.B. and Bisht, P.S (2016) The Role of Water Resources in Socio-Economic

Development.

Government of India Ministry of Corporate Affairs August (2019) Report of The High

Level Committee On Corporate Social Responsibility – 2018 New Delhi

https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CSRHLC_13092019.pdf

Gray, C.D. and Kinnear, P.R., 2012. IBM SPSS statistics 19 made simple. Psychology

Press.

Green, C.A., Duan, N., Gibbons, R.D., Hoagwood, K.E., Palinkas, L.A. and Wisdom,

J.P., 2015. Approaches to mixed methods dissemination and implementation

290

research: methods, strengths, caveats, and opportunities. Administration

and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research, 42(5),

pp.508-523.

Gylfason,T. and G. Zoega (2001) Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role

of Investment. Copenhagen, Denmark: Economic Policy Research Unit.

Hale, T.N., Hale, T. and Held, D. eds., 2011. Handbook of transnational governance.

Polity.

Haq, M., 2015. A Comparative Analysis of Qualitative and Quantitative Research

Methods and a Justification for Adopting Mixed Methods in Social Research.

Harrod, R.F. 1959. Domar and dynamic economics. Economic Journal 69: 451–464.

Harvey Ross (2018) How to ensure communities living near mining activities get a

better deal Mail and Guardian https://mg.co.za/article/2018-05-08-how-to-

ensure-communities-living-near-mining-activities-get-a-better-deal

Haverkamp, B.E., Morrow, S.L. and Ponterotto, J.G., 2005. A time and place for

qualitative and mixed methods in counseling psychology research. Journal

of Counseling Psychology, 52(2), p.123.

Heinrich, A., 2011. Challenges of a resource boom: review of the literature. Research

Centre for East European Studies Working Paper, (114).

291

Hickey, S., Sen, K. and Bukenya, B. eds., 2015. The politics of inclusive development:

Interrogating the evidence. Oxford University Press, USA.

Hilson, G., 2019. Why is there a large-scale mining ‘bias’ in sub-Saharan Africa?. Land

use policy, 81, pp.852-861.

Holden, Steinar. “Avoiding the resource curse: The case Norway.” Energy Policy 63

(2013): 870–76

Howard Annie (2017) Employee Share Ownership Schemes and The Mining Industry

Mining Feature https://withoutprejudice.co.za/free/article/5255/view

Howard, A., 2016. Blood Diamonds: The Successes and Failures of the Kimberley

Process Certification Scheme in Agnola, Sierra Leone and

Zimbabwe. Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., 15, p.137.

Howe, L.D., Hargreaves, J.R., Ploubidis, G.B., De Stavola, B.L. and Huttly, S.R., 2010.

Subjective measures of socio-economic position and the wealth index: a

comparative analysis. Health policy and planning, 26(3), pp.223-232

Howell, D., C. (2011). Fundamental statistics for the behavioral sciences: SPSS, the

longer manual.

ICLG (2019) Mining 2020 | Laws and Regulations | Zimbabwe | ICLG

https://iclg.com/practice-areas/mining-laws-and-regulations/zimbabwe

292

Imakando, S., 2016. The socio-economic impact of mining: a comparative study of

Botswana and Zambia (Doctoral dissertation).

IMF (2007), ‘Angola: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix’, IMF Country Report

07/355, IMF.

Incheon Declaration and SDG4 (2016) Education 2030 Framework for Action

Towards inclusive and equitable quality education and lifelong learning for

all http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/education-2030-

incheon-framework-for-action-implementation-of-sdg4-2016-en_2.pdf

Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID)

2008. Mineral resources and development in Africa. Strategic guideline

document. CESMART, Paris

International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 2016 Launch of the

“Communities, Companies and Conflict report”-Sharing Natural Resource

Governance issues in Zimbabwe https://www.iucn.org/content/launch-

%E2%80%9Ccommunities-companies-and-conflict-report%E2%80%9D-

sharing-natural-resource-governance

Iyoha, M.A., 2010. Leadership, policy making, and economic growth in African

countries: The case of Nigeria (p. 165). World Bank Publications.

293

Johnson, C., 2013. March. Diverging Models of Participatory Governance: A

Framework for Comparison. In presentation at the 2013 Western Political

Science Association Meeting, Hollywood CA.

Jomo, Kwame Sundaram (2003). ‘Rethinking economic discrimination.’ American

Economic Review: 338-342.

Kadira, G. and Gochero, C.J.P., 2015. Determinants and effect of commercial bank

profitability in Zimbabwe (2009-2013). European Journal of Business and

Management, 7(30), pp.78-83.

Kaggwa Ronald (2014) Natural Resources Governance in A Changing World:

Challenges And Opportunities. Paper presented at a Regional Symposium

on Public Interest Environmental Litigation for lawyers in, Garuga, Uganda.

East Africa

http://greenwatch.or.ug/files/downloads/NATURAL%20RESOURCE%20G

OVERNANCE%20IN%20A%20CHANGING%20WORLD.pdf

Kanbur, Ravi.2018. Asian Drama in Context. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12590.

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102228

Kaseke, K.E., Chaminuka, L. and Musingafi, M.C., 2015. Mining and Minerals

Revenue Distribution in Zimbabwe: Learning from Our Surroundings and

Past Mistakes. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 6(6).

294

Kawulich, B.B., 2011. Gatekeeping: An ongoing adventure in research. Field

Methods, 23(1), pp.57-76.

Kaznacheev Peter 2017 Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in

Resource‐Rich Economies Policy Analysis No. 808

https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/curse-or-blessing-how-

institutions-determine-success-resource-rich

Keenan Patrick. J (2014) International Institutions and the Resource Curse Penn State

Journal of Law & International Affairs 3 (1)

Kennneth Samaita (2018) Mining, not farming, is now Zimbabwe’s economic mainstay

— and it’s thanks to

goldhttps://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-11-20-mining-not-

farming-is-now-zimbabwes-economic-mainstay--and-its-thanks-to-gold/

Keohane, R.O., 1988. International institutions: Two approaches. International studies

quarterly, 32(4), pp.379-396.

Keping Yu 2017 Governance and Good Governance: A New Framework for Political

Analysis Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 11: 1-8

Keping Yu 2017 Governance and Good Governance: A New Framework for Political

Analysis Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 11: 1-8

295

Khan, M. (2001) ‘Rent-seeking as Process’. in M. Khanand K. S. Jomo (eds) (2006)

Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Asian

Kijazi M H (2015), Resources, Rents, Representation and Resistance, The struggle

for just conservation in Mt Kilimanjaro,RFGI working paper 30, CORDESRIA

Kishor, N. and Rosenbaum, K., 2012. Assessing and Monitoring Forest Governance:

A user's guide to a diagnostic tool.

Kivunja, C. and Kuyini, A.B., 2017. Understanding and applying research paradigms

in educational contexts. International Journal of Higher Education, 6(5),

pp.26-41.

Kolstad, I. and Søreide, T., 2009. Corruption in natural resource management:

Implications for policy makers. Resources Policy, 34(4), pp.214-226.

KPMG (2019) Zimbabwe - Income Tax

https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2011/12/zimbabwe-income-tax.html

Krasner, S.D. (ed). (1983). International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press.

Krueger, A.O., 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. The American

economic review, 64(3), pp.291-303.

296

Kuada, J., 2012. Research methodology: A project guide for university students.

Samfundslitteratur.

Kumah-Abiwu, F., 2017. Democratic Institutions, Natural Resource Governance, and

Ghana’s Oil Wealth. Social Sciences, 6(1), p.21.

Kumah-Abiwu, F., 2017. Democratic Institutions, Natural Resource Governance, and

Ghana’s Oil Wealth. Social Sciences, 6(1), p.21.

Kurebwa, J., Ngwerume, E.T. and Massimo, C., 2014. Contribution of the Bindura

community share ownership trust to rural development in Bindura rural

district council of Zimbabwe.

Kwaramba, M., Mahonye, N. and Mandishara, L., 2016. Capital flight and trade

misinvoicing in Zimbabwe. African Development Review, 28(S1), pp.50-64.

Kyeyune, A.P., 2010. The interpretation and use of mixed methods research within

programme evaluation practice (Doctoral dissertation, Stellenbosch:

University of Stellenbosch).

Lambsdorff, J.G., 2002. Corruption and rent-seeking. Public choice, 113(1-2), pp.97-

125.

Liman-tinguiri, Z., 2008. The Resource Curse in Perspective

297

Litwiński, Michał. "The evolution of idea of socio-economic development." Ekonomia i

Prawo. Economics and Law 16.4 (2017): 449-458.

Lockwood, M., Worboys, G.L., Kothari, A., Feary, S. and Pulsford, I. eds.,

2015. Protected area governance and management. ANU Press.

Lockwood, Michael, Julie Davidson, Allan Curtis, Elaine Stratford, and Rod Griffith

(2010) ‘Governance principles for natural resource management’, Society

and natural resources 23 (10): 986-1001.

Lynch, G., 2011. Becoming indigenous in the pursuit of justice: The African

Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Endorois. African

Affairs, 111(442), pp.24-45.

Machinya, J., 2014. The role of the indigenisation policy in community development:

a case of the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust, Zvishavane

District, Zimbabwe (Doctoral dissertation).

Magoronga Michael 2018 Zimbabwe: Minister Escalates Fight Against Corruption The

Herald https://allafrica.com/stories/201802090189.html

Mahonye, N. and Mandishara, L., 2015. Mechanism between mining sector and

economic growth in Zimbabwe, is it a resource curse?. Economic Research

Southern Africa (ERSA).

298

Maipose, G.S., & T.S. Matsheka (2008), ‘The Indigenous Developmental State and

Growth in Botswana’, in B.J. Ndulu et al. (Eds.), The Political Economy of

Economic Growth in Africa.

Makumana, N.T., 2016. The Role of the Mhondoro-Ngezi-zvimba Community Share

Ownership Trust/scheme in improving rural livelihoods in Mhondoro-Ngezi

District: Ward 12 (Doctoral dissertation).

Maldonado Nicole 2010 The World Bank’s evolving concept of good governance and

its impact on human rights Doctoral workshop on development and

international organizations Stockholm, Sweden, May 29-30, 2010.

Malinga, W., 2018, January. ‘From an Agro-Based to a Mineral Resources-Dependent

Economy’: A Critical Review of the Contribution of Mineral Resources to the

Economic Development of Zimbabwe. In Forum for Development

Studies (Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 71-95). Routledge.

Manley, D., 2013. A guide to mining taxation in Zambia.

https://www.africaportal.org/publications/a-guide-to-mining-taxation-in-

zambia/

Martínez-Mesa, J., González-Chica, D.A., Duquia, R.P., Bonamigo, R.R. and Bastos,

J.L., 2016. Sampling: how to select participants in my research study?. Anais

brasileiros de dermatologia, 91(3), pp.326-330.

299

Masiya, T., Davids, Y.D., Ntola, S.Y. and Bohler-Muller, N., 2018. Zimbabwe's

Minerals Amendment Bill (2018): enhancing natural resource governance.

Matsa, M. and Masimbiti, T., 2014. The community share ownership trust initiative as

a rural development solution in Zimbabwe: the Tongogara experience in

Shurugwi district.

Matsika, L., Zano, V., Hove, D. and Murungu, R., 2014. Community Participation in

Natural Resources Governance: An Exposition of the Outcomes of

Alternative Mining Indabas in Zimbabwe. OIDA International Journal of

Sustainable Development, 7(11), pp.89-98.

Matsika, L., Zano, V., Hove, D. and Murungu, R., 2014. Community Participation in

Natural Resources Governance: An Exposition of the Outcomes of

Alternative Mining Indabas in Zimbabwe. OIDA International Journal of

Sustainable Development, 7(11), pp.89-98.

Matti, S., 2010. Resources and rent seeking in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo. Third World Quarterly, 31(3), pp.401-413.

Matti, Stephanie (2010) ‘Resources and rent seeking in the Democratic Republic of

the Congo.’ Third World Quarterly 31 (3): 401-413.

300

Mawowa, S., 2007. Tapping into the Chaos: State, Crisis and Accumulation (Doctoral

dissertation, unpublished MA Thesis (Durban, University of KwaZulu-Natal,

2007).

Maxwell, J.A., 2016. Expanding the history and range of mixed methods

research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 10(1), pp.12-27.

McDowell, L., 2016. Reflections on Research Practice: Writing Difference. Australian

Feminist Studies, 31(89), pp.355-362.

McFerson, H., 2011, ‘Extractive Industries and African Democracy: Can the ‘‘Resource

Curse’’ Be Exorcised?’, International Studies Perspectives, 11(1), 335-353.

McMahon, G. and Moreira, S., 2014. The contribution of the mining sector to socio-

economic and human development.

Medina, Leandro and Schneider, Friedrich G., Shadow Economies Around the World:

What Did We Learn Over the Last 20 Years? (January 2018). IMF Working

Paper No. 18/17. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124402

Merriam, S., B.(2009): Qualitative Research: a guide to design and implementation.

Revisad and explaned from qualitative research and case study applications

in education.

301

Mhembwe, S. and Dube, E., 2017. The role of cooperatives in sustaining the

livelihoods of rural communities: The case of rural cooperatives in Shurugwi

District, Zimbabwe. Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 9(1), pp.1-9.

Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., Huberman, M.A. and Huberman, M., 1994. Qualitative

data analysis: An expanded sourcebook. sage.

Milford, T., Hellaby, L. and Strang, R., 2013. Modeling Action Research for Pre-Service

Teachers as Part of a Primary Maths Method Class. Creative

Education, 4(12), p.747.

Miller, T., Birch, M., Mauthner, M. and Jessop, J. eds., 2012. Ethics in qualitative

research. Sage.

Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 21:05] Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute Number

38 https://zimlii.org/zw/legislation/num-

act/1961/38/MINES_AND_MINERALS_ACT_21_05.pdf

Ministry of Mines and Mining Development (2019) Mining Taxation in Zimbabwe

http://www.mines.gov.zw/?q=mining-taxation-zimbabwe

Ministry of Mines and Mining Development 2018 Profile of Midlands Province’s Mining

Industry http://www.mines.gov.zw/?q=midlands/119

Mitchell, D., 2014. Advancing grounded theory: Using theoretical frameworks within

grounded theory studies. The Qualitative Report, 19(36), pp.1-11.

302

Mkodzongi, G. and Spiegel, S., 2019. Artisanal gold mining and farming: Livelihood

linkages and labour dynamics after land reforms in Zimbabwe. The Journal

of Development Studies, 55(10), pp.2145-2161.

Mkodzongi, G. and Spiegel, S., 2019. Artisanal gold mining and farming: livelihood

linkages and labour dynamics after land reforms in Zimbabwe. The Journal

of Development Studies, 55(10), pp.2145-2161.

Mkodzongi, G. and Spiegel, S., 2019. Artisanal gold mining and farming: livelihood

linkages and labour dynamics after land reforms in Zimbabwe. The Journal

of Development Studies, 55(10), pp.2145-2161.

Mkodzongi, G., 2016. Utilising ‘African potentials’ to resolve conflicts in a changing

agrarian situation in central Zimbabwe. What Colonialism Ignored: “African

Potentials” for Resolving Conflicts in Southern Africa, pp.75-101.

Mohajan, H.K., 2018. Qualitative research methodology in social sciences and related

subjects. Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People, 7(1),

pp.23-48.

Monyai, R.B., 2018. The Significance Attached to Education and Youth Development

in Rural South Africa. In Culture and Identity. IntechOpen.

303

Moore David 2006, ‘Intellectuals Interpreting Zimbabwe’s Primitive Accumulation:

Progress to Market Civilisation?’

Moribame, T.T., 2011. Utilisation of mineral rent and the diversified growth of the

Botswana economy.

Mpofu Bernard 2013 Zim Asset blueprint: Blessing or curse? Newsday

https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/11/zim-asset-blueprint-blessing-curse/

Mtandwa Bright 2018 Leveraging Zimbabwe’s Mineral Endowment For Economic

Transformation And Human Development Master Dissertation University of

the Witwatersrand

Mtondoro, F. S et al., 2013, ‘Research Paper on the Power Dimension to Mineral

Related Corruption Preliminary findings from a study conducted by

Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI-Z) on the State of Corruption in the

Mining Sector- The case of Gold, Diamond

Mudimu Godknows (2017) The missing diamond revenues: A need for transparency

and tax reforms in the Zimbabwean Mining Sector

http://www.mlia.uct.ac.za/news/missing-diamond-revenues-need-

transparency-and-tax-reforms-zimbabwean-mining-sector

Mugova, S. and Sachs, P.R., 2019. Opportunities and Pitfalls of CSR: A Summary.

In Opportunities and Pitfalls of Corporate Social Responsibility (pp. 241-

246). Springer, Cham.

304

Mumanyi, F., 2014. Livelihoods and natural resource management dynamics in fast

track land resettlements, Kwekwe District, Zimbabwe (Doctoral dissertation).

Murombo, T., 2016. The effectiveness of initiatives to promote good governance,

accountability and transparency in the extractives sector in

Zimbabwe. Journal of African Law, 60(2), pp.230-263.

Mukasiri Sibanda 2019 Zimbabwe: Call for transparency, citizen participation &

accountability in management of mineral resources Zimbabwe

Environmental Law association.

Muruviwa, A.T., Nekhwevha, F.H. and Akpan, W., 2018. Corporate social

responsibility as a drive to community development and poverty reduction: A

stakeholder approach to development in Zimbabwe. TD: The Journal for

Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 14(1), pp.1-9.

Mutingwende Byron Adonis 2017 Impact Of Fluctuating Commodity Prices On

Government Revenue Explored https://spiked.co.zw/fluctuations-in-

commodity-failing-to-address-poverty/

Natural Resource Governance Institute (2017) Country Mining Profiles

https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles

Natural Resource Governance Institute 2015 The Resource Curse The Political and

Economic Challenges of Natural Resource Wealth

305

https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_readers_

compilation.pdf

Ncala, T., 2016. The political economy of oil in Nigeria: How oil's impact on rent

distribution has contributed to Nigeria's sub-optimal economic

performance (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town).

Ndakaripa, M., 2017. State, civil society and the politics of economic indigenisation in

Zimbabwe, 1980 to 2016 (Doctoral dissertation, University of the Free State).

Ndlovu Sukoluhle (2018) Tongogara RDC Builds New Hospitals The Herald

Zimbabwehttps://www.pressreader.com/zimbabwe/the-herald-

zimbabwe/20180604/281844349322082

Ndlovu, E. and Tigere, R., 2018. Economic migration and the socio-economic impacts

on the emigrant's family: A case of Ward 8, Gweru Rural district,

Zimbabwe. Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 10(1), pp.1-10.

Neary, J.P. and Van Wijnbergen, S., 1986. Natural resources and the macroeconomy.

Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (2011) Shifts in Governance:

Problems of Legitimacy and Accountability Synthesising study of the NWO

programme “Shifts in Governance”

Neuman, W.L. (2011) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative

Approaches. 7th Edition, Pearson, Boston.

306

Newman, I. and Ridenour, C.S., 2008. Mixed methods research: Exploring the

interactive continuum. SIU Press.

Newsday (2012) Ncube questions share ownership schemes

https://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/03/2012-03-13-ncube-questions-share-

ownership-schemes/

Ngwu, E.C. and Ugwu, A.C., 2015. Rentierism and the Natural Resource Curse: A

Contextual Analysis of Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences and

Humanities, 1(4), pp.422-433.

Noreng, O., 2016. The oil industry and government strategy in the North Sea.

Routledge

Nueman, W., 2000. Research methods: Quantitative and Qualitative

Approaches. New York: Allyne and Bacon Viacon Company.

Nunan, F., 2018. Navigating multi‐level natural resource governance: an analytical

guide. In Natural Resources Forum. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Nwanegbo, C.J. and Odigbo, J., 2013. Security and national development in Nigeria:

The threat of Boko Haram. International Journal of Humanities and Social

Science, 3(4), pp.285-291.

307

Nyazema, N.Z., 2010. The Zimbabwe Crisis and the provision of social services:

health and education. Journal of Developing Societies, 26(2), pp.233-261.

Nyoni, M., 2015, ‘Mining Sector Rakes in US$10 billion’, News Day 24 July 2015.

https://www. newsday.co.zw/2015/07/24/mining-sector-rakes-in-10bn/.

(accessed 27 February 2017).

Obati, G. and Owuor, G., 2010. Extractive industries, natural resources management

and sustainable development: A review. ANSA Africa.

Obi, C., 2009. Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the complex drivers of violent oil-

related conflict. Africa Development, 34(2).

OECD (2009). Natural Resources and Pro-Poor Growth the Economics and Politics:

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/63/42341879.pdf.

OECD (2011). ‘The Economic Significance of Natural Resources: Key point for

reformers in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia’. Accessed

8December2017

20significance%20of%20NR%20in%20EECCA_ENG.pdf

Ogbonna G.N and Appah Ebimobowei (2013) Rent Seeking and Group Interest on

Petroleum Revenue in the Nigerian Economy: a Causality Approach Asian

Journal of Business Management 5(2): 213-228

308

Yuana. O.M (2016) Research Methodology http://repo.iain-

tulungagung.ac.id/4269/4/BAB%20III.pdf

On November 14, 2019 By The Hon. Prof. Mthuli Ncube Minister of Finance and

Economic

Developmenthttp://zimtreasury.gov.zw/index.php?option=com_phocadownl

oad&view=category&id=54&Itemid=787

Open Society Initiative for Southern (2019) Best practice guidelines for mining in the

SADC region:Towards an inclusive and sustainable approach by the Centre

for Applied Legal Studies https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-

university/faculties-and-

schools/commercewandmanagement/researchentities/cals/documents/prog

rammes/bhr/resources/CALS%20Best%20Practices%20Guidelines%2015

%20March%202019.pdf

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) (2015) Natural

Resources and Pro-Poor Growth, The Economics and Politics

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/63/42341879.pdf.

Paletto, A., Geitner, C., Grilli, G., Hastik, R., Pastorella, F. and Garcìa, L.R., 2015.

Mapping the value of ecosystem services: A case study from the Austrian

Alps. Annals of Forest Research, 58(1), pp.157-175.

Parliament Report 2015. Indigenization of the mining sector.

https://www.parlzim.gov.zw/

309

Parliament Research Department, (2011). Chegutu East Constituency Profile, the

Clerk of Parliament, the Parliament of Zimbabwe.

Peet, R. and Hartwick, E., 2009. Theories of development: contentions, arguments.

Pendergast, S.M., Clarke, J.A. and Van Kooten, G.C., 2011. Corruption, development

and the curse of natural resources. Canadian Journal of Political

Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 44(2), pp.411-437.

Petrov, A.A., 2010. Models Of Socio-economic Development. Social And Economic

Development–Volume Vii, P.332.

Pindula (2017) Mhondoro-Ngezi Profile https://www.pindula.co.zw/Mhondoro-Ngezi

Pindula 2017 Midlands Profile https://pindula.co.zw/Midlands_Province

Pittel, K., van der Ploeg, F., van der Ploeg, R. and Withagen, C. eds., 2014. Climate

policy and nonrenewable resources: The Green Paradox and beyond. MIT

Press.

Poddar, A., Narula, S.A. and Zutshi, A., 2019. A study of corporate social responsibility

practices of the top Bombay Stock Exchange 500 companies in India and

their alignment with the Sustainable Development Goal s. Corporate Social

Responsibility and Environmental Management.

310

Polit, D.F. and Beck, C.T., 2010. Generalization in quantitative and qualitative

research: Myths and strategies. International journal of nursing

studies, 47(11), pp.1451-1458.

Polterovich, V., Popov, V. and Tonis, A., 2010. Resource abundance: A curse or

blessing?. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1814382

Pring, G. and Siegele, L., 2005. International law and mineral resources

development. International and comparative mineral law and policy: Trends

and prospects, pp.127-148.

Publish What You Pay (2016) Proud past, bright future PWYP activities report 2012-

2015 http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/02/pwyp_ar2016.pdf

Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Zimbabwe (2015) Position Paper on key Mining

Reforms in Zimbabwe https://www.pwyp.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/03/PWYP-Zimbabwe_Position-Paper-on-Key-Mining-

Reforms.pdf

Publish What you Pay Zimbabwe (2015) Position Paper on key Mining Reforms in

Zimbabwehttp://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/January%202016/Zimbabwe%

20PWYP%20Key%20Mining%20Reforms.pdf

311

Pütün, M., 2015 Linking Rent-Seeking Activities to Natural Resource Curse

Phenomenon: The Case of Africa. Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler

Enstitüsü Dergisi, 24(1), pp.351-368.

Rahman, K.F., (2019) A Review of the Socio-Economic Impacts On Female-Headed

Households for Temporary Labour Migration to Middle East from

Bangladesh.

Raik, D.B., Wilson, A.L. and Decker, D.J., 2008. Power in natural resources

management: an application of theory. Society and natural resources, 21(8),

pp.729-739.

Raik, D.B., Wilson, A.L. and Decker, D.J., 2008. Power in natural resources

management: an application of theory. Society and natural resources, 21(8),

pp.729-739.

Rapp, J., 2017. The Challenge of Governing Natural Resources: A Social Network

Analysis of Actors' Collaboration in Ghana's Petroleum Sector. PHD thesis

Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2017

Rathinam Francis, Priyanka Cardoz, Zeba Siddiqui and Marie Gaarder

2019Transparency and accountability in the extractives sector a synthesis of

what works and what does not. Working Paper 33. International Initiative for

Impact Evaluationhttps://www.3ieimpact.org/sites/default/files/2019-

03/WP33-TAI-synthesis-web_0.pdf

312

Ravitch, S.M. and Riggan, M., 2016. Reason & rigor: How conceptual frameworks

guide research. Sage Publications.

Reis, 2012. The state and the market: an institutionalist and relational take. RCCS

Annual Review. A selection from the Portuguese journal Revista Crítica de

Ciências Sociais, (4).

Renner, M., 2002. The anatomy of resource wars. Worldwatch paper, 16, p.2.

Report of the Auditor 2018 Financial Year Ended December 31, 2018 On State

Enterprises and Parastatals Presented to Parliament of Zimbabwe: 2019

http://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/AUDITORGENERAL%20REP

ORT%20for%20the%20FINANCIAL%20YEAR%20ENDED%20DECEMBE

R%2031%2C%202018%20ON%20STATE%20ENTERPRISES%20AND%

20PARASTATALS.pdf

Ribot, J.C. and Peluso, N.L., 2003. A theory of access. Rural sociology, 68(2), pp.153-

181.

Ribot, J.C., 2007. Representation, citizenship and the public domain in democratic

decentralization. Development, 50(1), pp.43-49.

Rimondini, M. ed., 2010. Communication in cognitive behavioral therapy. Springer

Science & Business Media.

313

Robinson, M., 2015. Q&A with Mark Robinson: The Role of Good Governance in

Sustainable Development. Interview by Madaleine Weber February, 18,

p.2015.

Robson, J. and Sekhon, Y., 2011. Addressing the research needs of the insurance

sector. International Journal of Bank Marketing.

Rocchi, A. and Del Sette, P., 2016. Lesotho: rural development and migration. Centro

Salute Globale. Retrieved February, 15, p.2019.

Rodney, W., 1973. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture

Publishers).

Roode, D., Speight, H., Pollock, M., and Webber, R. (2004). It's not the digital divide

− it's the sociotechno divide! In Leino, T., Saarinen, T. and Klein, S. (eds.).

Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Information Systems.

Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Turku, Finland.

Ross, M., Kaiser, K. and Mazaheri, N., 2011. The “Resource Curse” in MENA? Political

Transitions, Resource Wealth, Economic Shocks, and Conflict Risk.

Ross, M.L., 2004. What do we know about natural resources and civil war?. Journal

of peace research, 41(3), pp.337-356.

314

Ross, M.L., 2015. What have we learned about the resource curse?. Annual Review

of Political Science, 18, pp.239-259.

Ross, M.L., 2015. What have we learned about the resource curse?. Annual Review

of Political Science, 18, pp.239-259.

Rosser, Andrew. 2007. “Escaping the resource curse: The case of Indonesia.” Journal

of Contemporary Asia 37.

Rostow, W.W., 1959. The Process of Economic Growth (New York, 1952). For a more

extensive discussion of these alternative patterns of economic growth and

their impact see.

Rustad, S.A., Le Billon, P. and Lujala, P., 2017. Has the Extractive Industries

Transparency Initiative been a success? Identifying and evaluating EITI

goals. Resources Policy, 51, pp.151-162.

Sachs, J.D. and Warner, A.M., 1995. Natural resource abundance and economic

growth (No. w5398). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner (2001) ‘The curse of natural

resources.’ European economic review 45 (4): 827-838.

Sachs, P.R. and Mugova, S., 2019. Opportunities and Pitfalls of Corporate Social

Responsibility: The Marange Diamond Mines Case Study. Springer.

315

SADC Protocol 1997, Protocol on Mining in the Southern African Development

Community (SADC), 1997, p. 1

Sands, P. and Peel, J., 2012. Principles of international environmental law. Cambridge

University Press.

Sanginga, P.C., Abenakyo, A., Kamugisha, R., Martin, A.M. and Muzira, R., 2010.

Tracking outcomes of social capital and institutional innovations in natural

resources management: Methodological issues and empirical evidence from

participatory bylaw reform in Uganda. Society and Natural Resources, 23(8),

pp.711-725.

Saunders, R., 2008. Crisis, capital, compromise: mining and empowerment in

Zimbabwe. African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de

Sociologie, 12(1).

Saunders, R., 2017. Contestation and resource bargaining in Zimbabwe: The minerals

sector (No. 2017-13). UNRISD Working Paper.

Saurabh Sen, Bhattacharya, Anshuman and Sen, Ruchi 2016 International

perspectives on socio-economic development in the era of globalization

Hershey, PA, USA : Business Science Reference

316

Segula, S., 2013, ‘Contribution of the Mining Sector to Sustainable Economic

Development of the Zimbabwean Economy’,

www.iac.co.zw/syllabus/ChamberofMines.pdf (accessed 1 March 2017)

Sells, R. N. (2013). Towards Stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo-The

Dodd-Frank Act's Strengths and Weaknesses. Seattle J. Soc. Just., 12, 603-

651.

Sen, A., 1999. Freedom as development. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Shahidullah, A., Mohiuddin, H. and Haque, C., 2015. Institutional Interplay in Natural

Resources Governance: Toward a Sub-Sectoral Approach for Medicinal

Plants Management in Bangladesh. Resources, 4(1), pp.93-109.

Sharma, G., 2017. Pros and cons of different sampling techniques. International

journal of applied research, 3(7), pp.749-752.

Shlapentokh, V. and Woods, J., 2017. Feudal America: Elements of the Middle Ages

in Contemporary Society. Penn State University Press.

Showkat, N. and Parveen, H., 2017. Non-probability and probability sampling. Media

and Communications Study, pp.1-9.

Shumba Busisiwe Monica 2015 An “Evaluation of Indigenisation Policy in Zimbabwe”

Masters Thesis University of Kwazulu-Natal.

317

Shumba, N., 2019. Problems Associated with Community Share Ownership Trust in

Rural Development: On Corporate Social Responsibility. GRIN Verlag.

Sibanda Mukasiri (2019) Analysis Taxes, Indigenization and transparency: How

Mthuli’s new fiscal regime impacts on Zimbabwe mining

http://goxi.org/profiles/blogs/analysis-taxes-indigenisation-and-

transparency-how-mthuli-s-new

Sibanda (2019) Devolution can lift resource rich communities Goxi

http://goxi.org/profiles/blogs/devolution-can-lift-resource-rich-

communities?overrideMobileRedirect=1

Sibanda 2019 Why Zimbabwe Must Join The Extractive Industry Transparency

Initiative http://goxi.org/profiles/blogs/why-zimbabwe-must-join-the-

extractive-industry-transparency?overrideMobileRedirect=1

Sibanda Mukasiri (2019) Hinge the 2020 National Budget on US$12 billion mining

economy strategy

http://goxi.org/m/blogpost?id=5786733%3ABlogPost%3A128324

Sibanda Mukasiri (2019) How Zimbabwe’s new fiscal regime impacts on mining sector

Newsday https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/08/how-zimbabwes-new-fiscal-

regime-impacts-on-mining-sector/

318

Sibanda Mukasiri 2017 Analysis of Zimplats' 2017 integrated report: 11 things CSOs

can learn http://goxi.org/profiles/blogs/analysis-of-zimplats-2017-integrated-

report-11-things-csos-can

Simba, A., Nyandoro, Z.F., Munyoro, G. and Chimhande, D., 2015. The local

economic development processes in low-income countries: The case of the

metropolis of Chegutu in Zimbabwe. Local Economy, 30(4), pp.405-420.

Singer, H.W. (1965). Social development. Key growth sector. International De-

velopment Review, 7(1).

Snyder, J., 2013. Myths of empire: Domestic politics and international ambition.

Cornell University Press.

Soiferman, L.K., 2010. Compare and Contrast Inductive and Deductive Research

Approaches. Online Submission.

Solomon, M., 2012. The Rise of Resource Nationalism: A Resurgence of State Control

in an Era of Free Markets or the Legitimate Search for a New

Equilibrium. South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy.

Søreide, T. and Truex, R., 2011. Collaboration against corruption? Multistakeholder

groups in natural resource management. U4 Issue, 2011(5).

Southern Africa Liaison Office (SALO) 2015 Extractives Revenue Transparency in

SADC: Challenges and Opportunities. International, Liaison Dialogue and

319

Research http://www.salo.org.za/wp-

content/uploads/2015/03/PolicyBrief1of2015-3.pdf

Spiegel, S.J., 2015. Shifting formalization policies and recentralizing power: The case

of Zimbabwe's artisanal gold mining sector. Society & Natural Resources,

28(5), pp.543-558.

Spiegel, S.J., 2015. Shifting formalization policies and recentralizing power: The case

of Zimbabwe's artisanal gold mining sector. Society & Natural

Resources, 28(5), pp.543-558.

Srivastava, M., 2009. Good governance-concept, meaning and features: A detailed

study.

Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future (2012) Sustainable Development in the

21st century (SD21).Review of implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio

Principles

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/641Synthesis_re

port_Web.pdf

Stewart, F. (2013). Approaches towards inequality and inequity: concepts, measures

and policies. Retrieved 21.03.2017 from https://www.unicef-irc.org.

320

Strydom, H., Fouché C.B. & Delport C.S.L. Research at the grass roots for the social

sciences and human service professions. 4 th ed. Pretoria: JL Van Schaik

Publishers

Syama Fact Sheet (2019) Syama Gold Mine n December 2018, Resolute commenced

sublevel caving at the new Syama Underground Mine on time and on budget

https://www.rml.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Syama-Fact-

Sheet.pdf

Szirmai, A., 2005. The dynamics of socio-economic development: an introduction.

Cambridge University Press.

Szirmai, A., 2012. Industrialisation as an engine of growth in developing countries,

1950–2005. Structural change and economic dynamics, 23(4), pp.406-420.

Szirmai, A., 2015. Socio-economic development. Cambridge University Press.

Taruvinga, G.R., 2016. The governance of natural resources in Zimbabwe: the case

study of the Marange diamonds (Doctoral dissertation).

Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. eds., 2010. Sage handbook of mixed methods in social

& behavioral research. sage.

Tennant, C., 2017. Indigenous peoples, international institutions, and the international

legal literature from 1945–1993. In Indigenous Rights (pp. 63-119).

Routledge.

321

Terrell, S.R., 2012. Mixed-methods research methodologies. Qualitative report, 17(1),

pp.254-280.

The 2019 Mid-Year Budget Review & Supplementary Budget ‘Building a Strong

Foundation for Future Prosperity’

https://www.dpcorp.co.zw/assets/2019_mid-year_budget_review_-

_supplementary_budget-(1)-(1).pdf

The 2020 National Budget Statement. Presented to the Parliament of Zimbabwe

The Chronicle (2019) Command Agriculture turns Shurugwi miner into successful

farmer. Opinion and Analysis https://www.chronicle.co.zw/command-agric-

turns-shurugwi-miner-into-successful-farmer/

The Herald (2015) Sovereign Wealth Fund costing Zimbabwe

https://www.herald.co.zw/sovereign-wealth-fund-costing-zim/

The Herald (2018) Mashonaland West province primed for investment

Mashonanaland West Bureau https://www.pressreader.com/

The World Bank Group’s-Africa’s Pulse Magazine (2015) Open Knowledge Repository

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21736

The Zimbabwe Poverty Atlas (2015)

https://www.unicef.org/zimbabwe/resources_17478.html

322

Tullock, G. (2013). The economics of special privilege and rent seeking, Vol. 5:

Springer Science & Business Media.

UN Water (2014) A Post-2015 Global Goal for Water: Synthesis of key findings and

recommendations from UN-Water

https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/pdf/27_01_2014_un-

water_paper_on_a_post2015_global_goal_for_water.pdf

UNDP (2019) Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century Briefing note for

countries on the 2019 Human Development Report

UNICEF Zimbabwe. (2018). Social Protection 2018 Budget Brief

https://www.unicef.org/esaro/UNICEF-Zimbabwe-2018-Social-Protection-

Budget-Brief.pdf

Ushie, V., 2013. The Management and Use of Natural Resources and their Potential

for Economic and Social Development in the Mediterranean. Istituto affari

internazionali.

Ushie, V., 2017. From Aspiration to Reality: Unpacking the Africa Mining Vision.

Vahabi, M., 2017. A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the

appropriability lens.

323 van Leur Alette (2017) The rural economy: An untapped source of jobs, growth and

development ILO https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-

ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_547135/lang--en/index.htm

Van Wijnbergen, S., 1984. TheDutch Disease': a disease after all?. The Economic

Journal, 94(373), pp.41-55.

Verbrugge, B., 2015. Decentralization, institutional ambiguity, and mineral resource

conflict in Mindanao, Philippines. World Development, 67, pp.449-460.

Vintró, C., Sanmiquel, L. and Freijo, M., 2014. Environmental sustainability in the

mining sector: evidence from Catalan companies. Journal of cleaner

production, 84, pp.155-163

Vogel, D., 2009. Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation in a global

economy. Harvard University Press.

Wa Githinji, M. and Adesida, O., 2011. Industrialization, exports and the

developmental State in Africa: The case for transformation (No. 2011-18).

University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.

Wadho, W.A., 2014. Education, rent seeking and the curse of natural

resources. Economics & Politics, 26(1), pp.128-156.

324

Waidi Adebayo 2016 Governance and Legitimacy Crisis In Africa in the 21st Century

Master Dissertation Witten/Herdecke University

Warwick, D.P. and Lininger, C.A., 1975. The sample survey: Theory and practice.

McGraw-Hill.Washington DC.

Watts, M.J. and Ibaba, I.S., 2011. Turbulent oil: Conflict and insecurity in the Niger

Delta. African Security, 4(1), pp.1-19.

Wegenast, T. and Schneider, G., 2017. Ownership matters: Natural resources

property rights and social conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political

Geography, 61, pp.110-122.

Wise, H. and Shtylla, S., 2007. The role of the extractive sector in expanding economic

opportunity. New York: Harvard University and John F. Kennedy School of

Government.

Wong, P.T., 2017. Meaning-centered approach to research and therapy, second wave

positive psychology, and the future of humanistic psychology. The

Humanistic Psychologist, 45(3), p.207.

World Bank (2007a), World Development Indicators 2007, World Bank, Washington

DC.

325

World Bank (2018) A Guide to Good Governance in Extractive Industries

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/20/a-guide-to-good-

governance-in-extractive-industries

World Population Review (2019) Zimbabwe Population

http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/zimbabwe-population/

Williams, A. and Le Billon, P. eds., 2017. Corruption, natural resources and

development: From resource curse to political ecology. Edward Elgar

Publishing.

Wushe, T., 2014. Corporate community engagement (CCE) in Zimbabwe's mining

industry from the Stakeholder Theory perspective (Doctoral dissertation).

Wushe, T., 2014. Corporate community engagement (CCE) in Zimbabwe's mining

industry from the Stakeholder Theory perspective (Doctoral dissertation).

Wushe, T., 2014. Corporate community engagement (CCE) in Zimbabwe's mining

industry from the Stakeholder Theory perspective (Doctoral dissertation).

Xinhua News (2018) Zimbabwe government officially amends indigenization law

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/19/c_137050661.htm

Yadav, S.K.S., 2015. Anti-Corruption Movements & Measuresin India. REVIEW

JOURNAL, p.5.

326

Yin, R.K., 2009. How to do better case studies. The SAGE handbook of applied social

research methods, 2, pp.254-282.

Yu, H. and Robinson, D.G., 2011. The new ambiguity of open government. UCLA L.

Rev. Discourse, 59, p.178.

Zainal, Z., 2007. Case study as a research method. Jurnal Kemanusiaan, 5(1).

Zhuwarara, S.K., 2017. An assessment of the impact of Zimbabwe's mining policy

legislative and institutional framework on acquisition and oversight on

diamond mining rights (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria).

Zikiti, B., 2016. How can Zimbabwe leverage its mineral resources for economic

recovery and sustainable growth(Doctoral dissertation).

Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (2014) Zimbabwe's Tax System:

Opportunities and Threats for enhancing Development in Zimbabwe

http://www.zimcodd.org/sites/default/files/research/ZIMCODD%20Zimbabw

e%20Tax%20Justice%20May%202014.pdf

Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU) 2016. The

Probable Impact on Zimbabwe Mining Fiscal Revenue and Industry

Competitiveness of Various Price, Production & Fiscal Scenarios:

Incorporating a Quantitative A Case study of the Gold Sector

327

Zimbabwe Enviromental Law Association (ZELA) 2016 Mineral Revenue Disclosure

And The Information Needs Of Various Stakeholders:A Gap Analysis” Using

the law to protect and conserve the environment

ZIMCODD (2014) Zimbabwe's Tax System: Opportunities and Threats for enhancing

Development in Zimbabwe

http://www.zimcodd.org/sites/default/files/research/ZIMCODD%20Zimbabw

e%20Tax%20Justice%20May%202014.pdf

ZIMCODD Annual Report. 2016. National Budget Analysis www.zimcodd.org › 2016-

budget-analysis 2016 Budget Analysis |pdf

Zimplatas Intergrated Annual Report (2018) Mining for a Sustainable future

https://www.zimplats.com/data/2018/09/ar2018.pdf

Zimplats Annual Report (2018) Presentation to the Minister of State for Provincial

Affairs.

ZimStat (2019) Poverty Analysis Poverty Datum Lines – March 2019

http://www.zimstat.co.zw/sites/default/files/img/publications/Prices/PDL_3_

2019.pdf

Zongwe Dunia. P 2014 An Introduction to the Law of the Southern African

DevelopmentCommunityhttp://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Southern_Af

rican_Development_Community1.html

328

Zozus, M., 2017. The data book: collection and management of research data.

Chapman and Hall/CRC.

온드라, 2015. The Paradox of Natural Resource Abundance: The Case

ofMongolia (Doctoral dissertation, 서울대학교 국제대학원).

329

LIST OF ANNEXURES

Annexure 1: Questionnaire for Households in the Mining Communities

My name is Chrispen. T. Chawatama, from the University of Fort Hare in the Department of

Development Studies pursuing a Doctoral Degree. I am conducting a research on mineral resources governance and socioeconomic development in the Midlands Province of

Zimbabwe. You are kindly invited to participate in this study as it will be beneficial to the mining communities, the government and other stakeholders on how the mineral resources can be governed in a way that promotes socioeconomic development. Your participation is key to the success of this study. Your participation in this study will remain confidential and all the information given here will be used for academic purpose only. Completion of this questionnaire is voluntary and anonymous. Your contribution will be greatly appreciated.

Questionnaire Number …………………. Date………………………..2018

330

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (Tick where applicable)

Personal Details

1) Gender of the participants

Gender Male Female

2) Age ranges

21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60+ Under 20

3) Marital Status

Single Married Divorced Widowed

4) Educational Status

Qualification Primary Secondary Certificate Diploma Degree

SECTION B: SOCIO- ECONOMIC INFORMATION OF HOUSEHOLDS

5) Head of Household

Father Mother Sibling Male Relative Female Relative

6) Household sizes

1-3 4-6 6+

331

7) Employment Status

Unemployed 1 Mineworker 2 ASM Miner 3 Self-Employment 4 Farmworker 5 Civil Servant 6 Non-mining private 7 company

7 (i) If other, please specify

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

8) Number of economically active people who are not employed in the household

0-1 2-4 5-8 8+

9) Source of Income

Mining Company Salary 1 Artisanal and Small Scale Mining 2 Government Salary 3 Non-mining private company 4 Pension 5 Remittances 6 Farming 7 +Vendor 8 Part time manual jobs 9

9 (i) If other, please specify

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

10) Average Monthly Household Income in US dollars

332

Below 300 301-600 601-900 901-1200 1201-1500 1501+

11) Contribution of mining revenue to household’s socioeconomic wellbeing

Main Source of income Extra Source of Income 2) All basic needs 3) Food Security 4) Healthcare 5) Education 6) Provision of water and electricity 7) Housing 8) None 9)

11 (i) If other please, specify

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

HOUSEHOLD LIVING CONDITIONS

12)health care and education in the community

1) 2) 3) 4) 5)

Health Care Excellent Good Better Bad Worse Education Excellent Good Better Bad Worse

13) Funder of health insurance and education in the household

Education Health Care 1) Government 2) Mining Company (Name of Mining Co) …...... 3) Non-mining private company 4) Self-Funded If any other funder, please specify

333

SECTION C: REVENUE SHARING AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

14) Revenue sharing mechanisms that benefit local people

Community Share Ownership Trust 1 Employment benefits 2 Community projects 3 Corporate social responsibility 4 Funding of local projects 5 None 6 Other 7

14 (i) If other, please specify;

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

15) Effectiveness of revenue sharing mechanisms in ensuring fair revenue shares

Do you think revenue sharing schemes are effective?

Very Effective Somewhat Very Ineffective No idea effective

15 (i) Explain your answer;

......

16) Involvement of community members in revenue sharing schemes

Not at all Partially Fully Not Sure involved involved about that

17) The contribution of mining companies to socioeconomic development

334

Funding community projects 1 Employment Benefits 2 Funding of ASM activities 3 Building water sources 5 Building sanitation facilities 6 Building schools 7 Building hospitals 8 Building roads and bridges 9 Nothing at all 10

18 (i) If other, Please specify

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

19) Dou you think the government is using mineral revenue to promote socioeconomic development

Use of government revenues

Yes No

SECTION D: GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MINING SECTOR

20) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? (Please tick in the boxes provided where applicable)

The current mining regime is promoting local socioeconomic development (in terms of health, education and household income).

1) Strongly 2) Agree 3) 4) Disagree 5) Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree

21) Respondents perceptions of the authorities in charge of mineral resources governance in their communities

1) Central 2) Rural District 3) Traditional 4) Collaborative Government Councils Leadership Governance

335

22) Government consultation of local community members on matters pertaining local mining operations

Consultation of local community members by the government

1) Yes-full 2) Yes-but 3) Yes-but once 4) No-not at all 5) No idea consultation limited in while consultation

23) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? (Please tick in the boxes provided where applicable)

Provision of information pertaining the use of mineral revenues

The government provides sufficient information pertaining the use of mineral resource revenues (Please tick in the boxes provided where applicable)

1) Strongly 2) Agree 3) 4) 5)Strongly

Agree Undecided Disagree Disagree

SECTION E: LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS TO MINERAL RESOURCES

24) Local benefit from exploitation of mineral resources

4) Only the 2) Yes- government 1) Yes-Fully butlimited 3) No benefit at and mining Benefiting benefits all companies are benefiting

24 (i) If yes, explain how you have been benefiting from exploitation of the mineral resources?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………

336

25) Local participation in ensuring transparency and accountability in use of mineral revenues

1) Full 2) Limited 3) I get the 4) There is no 5) the participation participation opportunity opportunity government once in a for and mining while participation companies participate

26) Government measures to promote full participation of the community members in promoting transparency and accountability

1) 2) Providing 3) Inclusion of 4) Inclusion 5) Inclusion 6) The Consulting vital mining community of ASM of traditional government community information representatives Associations leadership is not doing members in in governing in governing ingoverning anything at decision bodies bodies bodies all making processes

26 (i) If there is anything else that the government is doing to promote the participation of the community members in mineral resources governance, write in the space provided

………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

27) List any measures being taken by the government to support ASM

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………

SECTION F: LOCAL EMPOWERMENT AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

28) Presence of Community Share Ownership Trusts/Schemes CSOT/S in the communities

337

Yes (1) No (2)

28 (i) If yes list the projects that are being implemented by the community Share Ownership Trusts in your community

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

29) Participation in Community Share Ownership Trust projects

Full participation 1 Limited 2 participation Not at all 3 Not Sure 4

30) Satisfaction with mineral resources governance in the communities

1) Very Satisfied 2) Partially satisfied 3) Not satisfied at all 4) I am not sure

30 (i) Briefly explain your answer;

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

31) Capacitation of local institutions to ensure transparency and accountability in the mining industry

2) Yes-But 3) In the 4) Not 1) Yes- Partially process capacit Fully of being

338

Capacit Capacit capacit ated at ated ated ated all

Rural District Councils CommunityShare OwnershipTrusts/Sch emes

Traditional Institutions Artisanal and Small Scale Mining Associations

Civil Society

32) Establishment of the Community Share Trust and improvement in Education, Health and Household Incomes

Service 1) Improved 2) Not improved 3) Improving 4) Worsened

Education

Health

Household income

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION AND TIME

339

Annexure 2: Shona Version of the Questionnaire

Zita rangu ndinonzi Chrispen. T. Chawatama. Ndiri kuita zvidzidzo zvaMuzvinadzidzo zveDevelopment Studies (Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies) neYunivhesiti yeForte Hare (University of Forte Hare).Ndiri kutsvakurudzo umbowo hwekugavhunwa kwezvicherwa nekubudirira kwenzvimbo yenyu. Umbowo hwandiiri kutsvaga hwakanyanyonangana nekujekeswa uye kupinzwa kwenhengo dzakasiyana siyana mukugavhunwa kwezvicherwa, kuti izvi zviri kuita kuti upfumi hwezvicherwa zvishandiswe nemazvo here kuti dunhu reMidlands province ribudirire.Tsvakurudzo yese zvayo inotungamirwa nedonzvo guru rekuedza kupedza hurombo hwevanhu ihwo hupfumi hwezvicherwa huripo uye kurasikirwa kwedunhu nehupfumi uhu. Ndapota pindurai mibvunzo iri mugwaro rino sokugona kwenyu kwose, muchiyeuka zvakare kuti zvose zvamunenge mapa kana kutaura hazvina kana nemunhu mumwe achazviudzwa uyezve kuti hapana anoziva kuti ndimi mapa pfungwa idzodzo kusvika tsvakurudzo yose yapera. Regai zvenyu kunyora zita renyu pagwaro rino, kusatoti kana imi pachenyu muchida kunyora. Ndinoda kugara ndasanokukutendai zvikuru nekutora nguva yenyu yakakosha kwazvo muchizadzisa pamwe nekupindura mivhunzo yakapiwa mugwaro rino. Mivhunzo inotevera ine chinangwa chekunzwa zvinofungwa nemi vagary vemuno mudunhu reMidlands

340

CHIKAMU CHEKUTANGA: MIBVUNZO YAKANAGANA NEMI (Ndapota Taridzai Umbowo

Hunoenderana Nemi Muzvibhokisi Zvakapiwa)

1) Muri murume here kana mukadzi?

Murume Mukadzi

2) Mune makore mangani?

Pasi Pakati Makumi Makumi Makumi Makumi pemakore pegumi matatu mana mashanu matanhatu gumi nerimwe nerimwe ne nerimwe nerimwe zvichikwira nemaviri nemakumi makumi nemakumi nemakumi matatu mana mashanu matanhatu

3) Makamira papi panyaya dzewanano?

Handina Ndakabuda Ndiri shirikadzi kuwanikwa/kuwana Ndakaroora/Kuroorwa muwananano

4) Makasvika papi pazvidzidzo?

Mugrade Mugrwaro Mugwaro Gwaro yechinomwe reOrdinary reAdvanced reDiploma Gwaro Level Level reDegree

CHIKAMU CHECHIPIRI: MIBVUNZO YAKANANGANA NEMAGARIRO ENYU MUMBA

5) Ndiani ari kutungamirira imba yenyu pari zvino?

Baba Mai Mwana Mwana Mwana Mwana mukomana musikana mukomana musikana Hama abva zera abva zera asati abva asati zera abva zera

341

6) Imba yenyu ine vanhu vangani?

Pakati pevaviri Pakati pevashani Vasere Munhu mumwe nevana nevasere zvichikirwa

7) Makamira papi panyaya dzemabasa?

Handishande Ndinoshanda pakombani yezvicherwa Ndinochera ndega zvichera Ndinzvishandira Ndinoshanda mupurazi Ndinoshanda muhurumende Nyorai mubhokisi riri pamberi kana muchishanda rimwewo basa risiri pamusoro

8)Vanhu vangani vanoshanda mumba menyu?

Pakati pezero Pakazi pevaviri Pakati pevana Vasere zvichikirwa nemumwechete nevana nevasere

9) Munowana mari kubva kupi?

Muhoro kubva kukombani yezvicherwa Ndinowana pakuzvicherera zvicherwa Muhoro unobva kuhurumende Kune mamwe mapazi asiri ehurumende Penjeni

342

Ndinotumirwa mari kubva kunze kwenyika Ndinorima Ndinotengesa zviinhu Ndinoita mabasa emaoko Handina kwandiwana mari

9 i) Kana paine kumwe kwamunowana mari kusina kuratidzwa pamusoro nyorai pazasi

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………

10) Upfumi hwunobva kuzvicherwa hunobva kuzvicherwa hunobatsira chii pakubudirira mukugara kwenyu mumba menyu?

Ndiko kunobva mari yose Ndiko kunobva imwe yemari Ndokunoraramisa mhuru yose Ndokunobva zvose zvinodiwa nemhuri Ndokunobva chikafu Ndokunobva mari yezvipatara neutano Ndokunobva mari yefundo Ndokunobva mari yekubhadhara mvura nemagetsi Kuvaka dzimba Kuvaka upfumi Kuvaka mabhizimisi Kutenga dzimotokari

Kuteerera zvakasiyanasiyana

10(i) Kana paine zvimwezvamunobatsirwa neupfumi hunobva kuzvicherwa, ndapota nyora pachinzvimbo chakapiwa pasi

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

11) Mari yamunowana pamwedzi iri mumari yemuno muZimbabwe (Bond Notes

343

Pasi Pakati Pakati Pakati Pakati Pakati Pakati Zviuru zvitatu pezana pezana pemazana pemazana pemazana pemazana pechuru zvichikwira nemazana maviri matatu mana mashanu nezvuru maviri nemazana nemazana nemazana nechuru zviviri matatu mana mashanu

11 (i) Mari yenyu yamunowana pamwedzi nokwana here kubhadhara zveutanp,zvedzidzo nezvimwewo zvinodiwa mumba menyu (Ndapota taridzai pazvibhokisi zvakapiwa pazasi)

Hongu Kwete Zvedzidzo Zveutano Zvekudya Zvekuteerera Kubhadhara magetsi Kubhadhara mvura Zvese zvidiwa mumba

11 (ii) Kana mati kwete pamusoro apo, ndokupi kumwe kwamunowana mari yekubhadhara zvese zvinodiwa mumba? (Ndapota nyorai pacghinzimbo chakapiwa pazasi)

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Magariro amakaita mumba menyu

12) Makamira sei maererano nemagariro enyu, zveutano uye zvedzidzo mudunhu renyu?

Zveutano Zvakanaka Zviri nani Zvakaipa Zvakaipa chaizvo zvakanakawo chaizvo Zvedzidzo Zvakanaka Zviri nani Zvakaipa Zvakaipa chaizvo Zvakanakawo chaizvo

344

13) Ndiani anokubhadharirai zveutano nezvedzidzo mumba menyu (Ndapota ratidzai panoenderana nemi muzvimabhokisi zvakapiwa)

Zvedzidzo Zveutano Government Kambani yezvicherwa (Nyorai zita rayo) …...... Ndinobhadhara nemari yangu Kana paine mamwe kambani kana vanhu vanobhadhara ndapota nyorai mubhokisi riri pamberi perino

14)Taridzai mamiriro amakaita panyaya yedzimba. Ndapota taridzai pamabhokisi akapiwa

Muridzi Ndinogara Kana Pane imwe nyarai Wemba Ndinogara mumba apa…………………….. muimba Ndinogara yekambani ……………………………… yeumwe mutangwena yezvicherwa ndichibhadhara

15) Kwamunochera mvura yekushandisa

Mutapi Muchibhorani Mumugoghi Pasina wakachengetedzwa kuchengetedzwa; murwizi, mumugodhi

16) Marasiro amunoita tsvina

Chimbuzi Chimbozi chemvura chinoshanda chsiri kushanda Toilet yegomba Tinoenda kusango nemvura

17) Kunobva moto wekushandisa mumba

345

Magetsi Parafini Gas Huni

18) Kucherwa kwezvicherwa kunobatsira sei kuvandudza mari yenyu, hutano nedzo mudunhu renyu? (Ndapota ratidzai mumabhokisi akapiwa pazasi)

Mari Muhoro unobva kukambani Zvikwata Zvimwewo yemumba Kuzvicherera yezvicherwa zvezvicherwa zvichera zvedu z Kupiwa mishonga Kupiwa

Utano Kuvakwa nezvmwewo zvekurapwa mvura, kurasa

kwezvipatara services tsvina Zvimwewo nezvimwewo zveutano Kuvakwa Kupiwa

kwezvikoro zvekunyorera,zvekunyoresa Kupiwa mari Dzidzo nezvimwewo nezvimwewo yekubhara Zvimwewo zvakawanda zvefundo

18 (i) Kana pane zvimwewo, nyorai pazasi

Mari yemumba……………………………………………………………………………………..

Utano…………………………………………………………………………………………......

Dzidzo………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Hapana…………………………………………………………………………………………………

CHIKAMU CHECHITATU: Kushandiswa kwehupfumi nekubudirira kweDunhu

19)Munowana mari kubva kuchirongwa chipi kubva kuzvicherwa?

Chikwata chenharaunda chinoona nezvemari dzezvicherwa

346

Ndine dzimwe mari dzandinopiwa nekambani yezvicherwa Mari dzinobatirwa makambani ezvicherwa nehurumende Mabasa emaoko anotsigirwa nemakambani ezvicherwa Zvatinongopiwawo sezvipo nemakambani ezvicherwa Kubhadharirwa kutanga mabasa emaoko nemakambani ezvicherwa Zvimwewo Hapana

19 (i) Ndapota kana paine mamwe mawanire amunoita mari dzezvicherwa, nyorai pasi apo

20) Vagari vemudunhu rino vanosanganisirwawo here pakushandiswa kwehupfumi hwezvicherwa?

Kwete Hongu Hongu Handina zvachose pano nguva humbowo neapo dzose naizvozvo

21) Munofunga nzira dzekupiwa mari dzezvicherwa dziri kuita kuti vanhu vawane mari inofanirana nevanhu uye kuvandudzwa kweutano,dzidzo nemari dzevanhu munharaundaa yenyu? (Ndapota ratidzai muzvibhokisi zvakapiwa)

Hongu chaizvo Kwete zvachose Handina ruzivo nazvo

21 Ndapota tsanangurai mhinduro yenyu 347

......

22 Ndezvipi zvinoita nemakambani ezvicherwa kuvandudza budiriro yemunharaunda menyu?

Kutsigirwa mabasa emaoko Kupa vanhu mabasa Kupa vanozvicherera vega zvicherwa mari yekuti basa ravo riende mberi Kuvaka migwagwa nemabhiriji Kuvaka zvibhorani nedhamhu Kuvaka zvekurasa tsvina Kuvaka zvikoro Kubhadharira vana zvikoro Kuvaka zvipatara Kubhadharira vanhu kuzvipatara Hapana zvinoitwa nemakambani ezvicherwa

22 (i) Ndapota kana paine zvimwe zvinoitwa nemakambani ezvicherwa kuvandudza budiriro yenharaunda yenyu, nyorai pachinzvimbo chakapiwa pazasi;

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

23) Munofunga kut hurumende iri kushandisa zvicherwa nenzira inoita kuti mari, utano nedzidzo zvivandudzwe mudzimba here? (Ndapota ratidzai pazvibhokisi zvakapiwa pazasi)

Hongu Kwete Mari yemumba Utano Dzidzo Dzimba dzekugara Chikafu Mvura nekuraswa kwetsvina Magetsi

348

CHIKAMU CHECHINA: KUGOVHUNWA, KUJEKA NEKUVINMBIKA MUZVICHERWA

24) Munobvumirana zvakadii nesitatimenti iri pazasi (Ndapota ratidzirai muzvibhokisi zviri pasi panoenderana nemi)

Kugavhunwa kuri kuitwa zvicherwa kuri kuvandudza budiriro yezveutano,zvedzidzo nemari mudzimba

Ndinowirirana Ndinowirirana Handiwirirane Handiwirirane nazvo nazvo nazvo nazvo Handizivi zvakanyanya zvakanyanya

25) Humurumende inotsigira vanozvicherera zvicherwa (Artisanal and Small scale Mining) nenziri dzipi (Ndapota ratidzai muzvibhokisi zvakapiwa pasi panoenerana nemhinduro yenyu).

Vanoisa Vanovabatsira Vanovabatsira Vanovabatsira mutemo Vanotsigira neruzivo nezvekucheresa nekutsvaga unovatsigira nemari pane zvicherwa

26) Ndeapi mapazi ane basa rekugavhuna zvicherwa munharaunda menyu? (Ndapota ratidzai pane zvibhokisi zvakapiwa pane mhinduro inoenderana nemi)

Hurumende MaRural District Vakuru Councils venharaunda Vese vanobatana (traditional chiefs) pakugavhuna

27) Hurumende inotanga yavhunza vagari vemunharaunda here maererano nekucherwa kwezvicherwa munharaunda? (Ndapota ratidzai pane zvibhokisi zvakapiwa pane mhinduro inoenderana nemi)

Hongu Hongu asi Hongu asi pano Kwete zvachose Handizive zvakazara zvisina kuzara neapo

28) Munobvumirana zvakadii nesitatimenti iri pazasi

349

Hurumende inotipa humbowo hwakakwana maererano nekushandiswa kwehupfumi (Ndapota ratidzirai muzvibhokisi zviri pasi panoenderana nemi)

Ndinowirirana Ndinowirirana Handiwirirane Handiwirirane nazvo nazvo nazvo nazvo Handizivi zvakanyanya zvakanyanya

29) Hurumende inosanganisira vagari vemunharaunda here pakuronga mashandisirwo ehupfumi hwezvicherwa?

Hongu Kwete

29 (i) Kana muchiti hongu, hurumende inosanganisira vagari vemunharaunda sei pakuronga mashandirwo ehupfumi hwezvicherwa?

If yes, how does the government involve community in deciding the use of mineral revenues?

CHIKAMU CHECHISHANU: KUPINDIRA NEKUSHANDA MUZVICHERA KWEVAGARI VEMUNHARAUNDA

30) Mungati muri kubatsirika zvakadii kubva mukucherwa kwezvicherwa?

Hurumunde Hongu-zvishoma nemakambani Hongu-zvakanyanya Kwete zvachose ekuchera zvichera ndoari kubatsirika zvakanyanya

30 (i) Kana mhinduro yenyu yepamusoro iri hongu, ndapota edzai kutsanangura kuti muri kubatsirika sei

350

31) Ndezvipi zviri uitwa nehurumende kuti vagari vehurumende vabatsirike nehupfumi zvehucherwa (Ndapota ratidzirai muzvibhokisi zviri pasi panoenderana nemi)

Kupa Kuita kuti Kutsigira Kupa vanhu vanhu mari vanhu vanozvicherera Kupa vanhu Hurumende migodhi yekuti vakwanise (Artisanal and ruzivo haina yezvicherwa vakwanise kubatana Small Scale rwekuchera zvainoita kuchera nemakambani Mining zvicherwa zvichera mahombe activities) mubhizimisi rekucherwa

31 (i) Kana paine zvimwe zvinoita nehurumende kuti vanhu vemunharaunda vabatsirike nehupfumi hwezvicherwa, nyorai pachinzvimbo chakapiwa pasi

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

32) Mungatsanangure mapindiro amunoitwa here kuti pave nekujeka nekuvimbika pakushandiswa kwehupfumi hwezvicherwa here?

Ihurumende Ndinopindura Ndinopindira Ndinopindura Pane mukana nemakambani zvakazara zvishoma nguva dziri kure wekupindira ezvicherwa chete vanopindira

33) Hurumende ine zvairi kuita here pane zvakapiwa pazasi kuti pave nekupindira kwakazara kwevagari vemunharaunda kuti pave nekujeka nekuvimbika mukashandiswa kwehupfumi hwezvicherwa?

351

Kubvunza Kupa kusanganisir Kusanganisir Kusangani vanhu humbowo a a sira maererano hwemashandis hutungamiri mibatanidzwa vanamamb Hurumen nekuronga irwo ehuppfumi hwemunhau yevanozviche o de haina kwemashandis hwezvicherwa nda rera mumaupaz zvairi irwo ehupfumi mumapazi mumaupazi i kuita hwezvicherwa ekugovhuna ekugovhuna ekugovhun hupfumi hupfumi a hupfumi hwezvicherw hwezvicherwa hwezvicher a wa

33 (i) Kana paine zvimwe zviri kuitwa nehurumende kuti pave nekupindira kwakazara kwevagari vemunharaunda kuti pave nekujeka nekuvimbika mukashandiswa kwehupfumi hwezvicherwa nyorai muchinzvimbo chakapiwa pasi

………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………

NDOPAPERA MIBVUNZO. NDINOTENDA ZVIKURU

352

Annexure 3: Interview Guide for Zimbabwe Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners Council (Zamsc) official. 1) What do you think about Artisanal and Small Scale Mining in terms of

a) Transparency

b) Accountability

c) Local participation

2) Any mechanisms in place to ensure i) Transparency ii) Accountability and iii)

local participation in the Midlands Province?

3) To what extent is Artisanal and Small Scale Mining contributing to social

economic development in terms of

a) Health

b) Education

c) household income

4) Is there any legislation currently that addresses the needs of artisanal small

scale gold miners?

5) Which programs are being implemented by the following organisations to

support ASM activities in the Midlands Province

a) Central Government

b) Mining Companies

c) Rural District Councils

d) Non- Profit Organisations

6) Do you think the official amendment of the Indigenization and Economic

Empowerment Act will affect ASM activities and socio-economic development

in terms of i)Health ii)Education iii) Household Income

7) Any challenges and successes of Artisanal and small scale mining

353

Annexure 4: Interview guide for Mining Company officials 1. Can you describe the state of mineral resources governance in terms of;

i) Accountability

ii) Transparency

iii) Participation of locals

2. Any compliance mechanisms in place to ensure mining companies maintain

i)transparency ii) accountability and iii)local participation

3. Do you think your mining activities are contributing to local socio-economic

development in terms of a) health b) education c)household income?

4. Which revenue sharing mechanisms amongst the following are you engaged in

inn our organization to ensure members of local communities benefit?

i) Community Share Ownership Trusts/Schemes

ii) Corporate Social Responsibility,

iii) Employee Equity,

iv) Mining Taxes and Royaltie

5. Do you have any other programs aimed at empowering local community

members?

6. Approximately how much do you disburse for the revenue sharing scheme/s

annually?

7. Any other projects/programs that have been rolled out by your organization to

promote health, education and household income in the province?

8. Do you consult members of local communities when engaging in your mining

activities?

9. Do you disclose all your mineral revenues to; i) community members ii)Rural

District Councils iii) CSOT/s officials iv) Non-profit Organisation v) government

354

10. Can you briefly explain the role of each of the following in mineral resources

governance (transparency, accountability and participation)?

i) Rural District Councils

ii) CSOT/s

iii) Traditional Leadership

iv) Non-profit Organizations

11. What do you think are some of the challenges and successes of mineral

resources governance and socio-economic development in the Midlands

Province?

355

Annexure 5: Interview Guide for Officials the Ministries of Mines and Mining Developmnet, Finance, Education and Health 1. To what extent do you think growth in the mining sector has contributed to the

development of health

2. Dou you think the following mineral revenue sharing mechanisms in place, are

effective in promoting health;

a) Community Share Ownership Trusts/Schemes

b) Corporate Social Responsibility,

c) Employee Equity,

d) Mining Taxes and Royalties

3. Which programmes/systems are being implemented by the government in the

country’s mining industry to enhance the following;

Mineral Resources Governance

a) Accountability

b) Transparency

c) Participation

4. Which strategies have been put in place by the government to ensure mineral

wealth retention and development of health, education and household income

in mining communities?

5. Can you describe the participation of the following stakeholders in the pursuit of

transparency and accountability

a) Community Members

b) Civil Society

c) Traditional Leaders

d) government

356

6. Any government programmes aimed at empowering community members to

have access to and manage their mineral resources?

7. How does government participation through Zimbabwe Mining and

Development Corporation and Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe

affect i) Transparency ii) Accountability iii) Local Participation

8. Are there any measures, policies or legal frameworks to promote the ASM sector

in the country?

9. Do you think the FDI governance structures in the mining sector are effective in

promoting wealth retention?

10. Now that the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act has been limited

to diamond and platinum sectors in its application, which measures have been

put in place to ensure mineral wealth retention?

11. What do you think are some of the challenges and successes of mineral

resources governance and socio-economic development in the Midlands

Province?

357

Annexure 6: Interview Guide for RDCs, CSOs, CSOTs and Traditional Chiefs 1) To what extent do you think growth in the mining sector has contributed to

growth of the three socio-economic indicators of;

a) Health

b) Education

c) Household Income

2) How much did the mineral sector contributed to the GDP in 2018?

3) How much has been allocated to the education, health care sector nationally

and provincially in 2018?

4) Do you think there is accountability in the use of budget allocation in the

following ministries;

 The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development

 The Ministry of Health and Child Care

 The Ministry of Education

5) Which strategies have been put in place by the government to promote

development of health, education and household income in mining

communities?

6) Do you think the budget allocation are being used to promote i) healthcare ii)

education household incomes?

7) Any compliance mechanisms put in place to make sure there is (i)

accountability (ii) transparency in the use of allocated budgets ministries?

8) Do you think the compliance mechanisms are effective in promoting i)

accountability ii) transparency in the ministries?

9) Any challenges you have confronted so far with regards to i) accountability ii)

transparency in the aforementioned ministries?

358

10) Any recommendations for the promotion of i) accountability ii) transparency in

these ministries.

359

AnnexureI 7: Interview guide for Mining Company officials

Interview guide for Mining Company officials

1. Can you describe the state of mineral resources governance in terms of; iv) Accountability v) Transparency vi) Participation of locals

2. Any compliance mechanisms in place to ensure mining companies maintain i)transparency ii) accountability and iii)local participation

3. Do you think your mining activities are contributing to local socioeconomic development in terms of a) health b) education c)household income?

4. Which revenue sharing mechanisms amongst the following are you engaged in inn our organization to ensure members of local communities benefit? v) Community Share Ownership Trusts/Schemes vi) Corporate Social Responsibility, vii) Employee Equity, viii) Mining Taxes and Royalties

5. Do you have any other programs aimed at empowering local community members? 6. Approximately how much do you disburse for the revenue sharing scheme/s annually?

7. Any other projects/programs that have been rolled out by your organization to promote health, education and household income in the province?

8. Do you consult members of local communities when engaging in your mining activities?

9. Do you disclose all your mineral revenues to; i) community members ii)Rural District Councils iii) CSOT/s officials iv) Non-profit Organisation v) government

360

10. Can you briefly explain the role of each of the following in mineral resources governance (transparency, accountability and participation)?

v) Rural District Councils vi) CSOT/s vii) Traditional Leadership viii) Non-profit Organizations

11. What do you think are some of the challenges and successes of mineral resources governance and socioeconomic development in the Midlands Province? WE HAVE COME TO THE END OF THE INTERVIEW. THANK YOU FOR

YOUR PARTICIPATION

Annexure 8: Ethical Clearance Letter

361

362

363

Annexure 9: Letter from Language Editor confirming proof-reading of the Thesis

364