Broadening Horizons Constructing an Epistemology of Religious Belief Frederick D

Broadening Horizons Constructing an Epistemology of Religious Belief Frederick D. Aquino*

Abstract. — This essay explores both the context and constructive possibilities of Newman’s emphasis on concrete, holistic reasoning in the Grammar of Assent, pay- ing special attention to the influence of patristic thought on his own engagement with reductionistic accounts of rationality (e.g., evidentialism). An epistemology of religious belief thus construed focuses on the actual conditions of belief-formation and opens up new possibilities for connecting multiple dimensions of intellectual and spiritual life. In this sense, broadening epistemic horizons relocates epistemology from a thinly conceived self of paper logic to a thickly populated self in the concrete moments of human existence.

Newman includes a quotation from Ambrose’s De Fide ad Gra- tianum Augustum on the title page of the Grammar of Assent (“Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum:” it is not by logic that it has pleased God to bring about salvation of his people). Though the Grammar develops a rich epistemology of Christian belief, it is not an exegesis of De Fide ad Gratianum Augustum. The reference to Ambrose symbolizes a shift from “paper logic” (reason reduced to formal logical reasoning) to a dynamic, personal, and concrete conception of faith and reason, an embrace of Christian faith that reflects the insight of practical wisdom, and not merely a rule-governed process.1

* This article is a revised version of the 148th Anniversary Lecture of the American College presented at the Catholic University of Louvain. I want to thank the community there for the engaging conversation and wonderful display of hospi- tality. 1. As Edward Sillem, The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman, ed. Edward Sillem, vol. 1 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1969-1970) 24, points out, Newman revives “the ancient Greek and Christian traditions of thought which had fallen into partial eclipse as early as the Renaissance, and brought them once more into contact with our own contemporary problems.” For example, Newman’s notion of the illative sense draws from the ancient Greek tradition (e.g., Aristotle) and the patristic conception of CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 199

Newman’s affinity for the concrete and holistic nature of reasoning shapes the overall argument of the Grammar, thereby echoing the spirit of the Ambrosian line. Ancient Greek and patristic traditions shape this move from “paper logic” to personal reasoning. As a result, the epistemic agent, for New- man, seeks to connect discourse and way of life, fusing the cognitive, affective, and moral into a holistic way of being in the world. Broad- ening epistemic horizons entails a thicker construal of humanity. Seen in this way, the moment of rationalistic crisis in Newman’s day may become a source of healing for our own context. His proposal offers a robust understanding of the conditions of Christian belief, relocating epistemology from a thinly conceived “self” in the world of “paper logic” to a thickly populated “self” in the concrete moments of human existence.

From Paper Logic to Personal Reasoning

One backdrop for understanding the reference to Ambrose is the philosophical position of liberalism materialized in the epistemology of evidentialism. The basic claim here is that a person cannot believe something without full understanding and without demonstrative proof.2 This epistemic focus restricts knowledge to the logic of proof or to what New- man describes as “paper logic.” Therefore, theological beliefs that fail to meet these criteria are simply matters of “opinion” and sentiment; they do not qualify as rationally acceptable beliefs. In other words, “no religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be so” (Apologia, 259). If A cannot render sufficient reasons for p, then A is not entitled to p. Such an enterprise presupposes an internalist precondition of epistemology, reducing rationality to a formal logical account of the grounds of a belief. To do otherwise is to commit an intellectual vice. personal reasoning (e.g., Clement of Alexandria, Ambrose). Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 44, aptly describes Aristotle’s understanding of the non-rule governed process of making ethical judgments. “For teaching and learning, here, do not simply involve the learning of rules and principles. A large part of learning, in turn, requires the cultivation of perception and responsiveness: the ability to read a situation, singling out what is relevant for thought and action. This active task is not a technique; one learns it by guidance rather than by a formula.” Newman’s notion of the illative sense, as we will see, comes close to this description. 2. John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, ed. Ian Ker (New York: Penguin, 1994) 259; henceforth cited as Apologia. 200 FREDERICK D. AQUINO

Newman’s earlier experiences in the circle of the Oriel Noetics fur- nish a nice glance into such epistemological commitments. The Noetics subscribe to the logic of evidentialism, seeking to secure logical proofs on paper. Their goal is to offer rationally acceptable formulations of Chris- tian belief in response to the epistemic challenges of the day. A belief is rationally acceptable if and only if formal reasoning can account for the evidence. For example, Richard Whately, a prominent member of the Oriel Noetics, argues that the cultivation of “argumentative powers” is indispensable for defending the Christian faith. A person “desirous of possessing a cultivated mind” must master logic, the science of reasoning.3 All reasoning, for Whately, “on whatever subject, is one and the same process, which may be clearly exhibited in the form of syllogisms” (Elements, 253, see also 258, 262).4 Consequently, the Noetics became, “unwittingly, the pioneers of that Liberal spirit in religion,” mirroring the rationalism of the day and reducing Christian belief “to little more than logical deduction from certain evidences for the divine character of Christianity.”5 There is little room for mystery. In fact, the reduction of theological belief to sentiment or private judgment excludes theological discourse as a serious candidate for knowledge. Newman shares the concern of providing an intellectual account of Christian belief, but views the Noetic commitment as epistemically narrow and phenomenologically problematic. It does not reflect, empirically speaking, the actual process of belief-formation and the domain-specific nature of reasoning. Nevertheless, Newman appreciates the impact of the

3. Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston: James Monroe and Co., 91858) xxxiv. In this regard, logical argument is “the most important intellectual occupation of man” (xix); henceforth cited as Elements. As William R. Fey, Faith and Doubt: The Unfold- ing of Newman’s Thought on Certainty (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos Press, 1976) 1, points out: “While the Enlightenment had driven many continental Christian intellec- tuals into fideism or sentimentalism, it tended to advance the trend in the Church of Eng- land toward a rationalization of Christianity into those doctrines which would survive the strictest logical tests. The Noetics argued that no has a right to believe until he has applied to his claims the same canons used by mathematicians and physicists.” The assumption here is that when logic, as the most appropriate intellectual occupation of humans, “is obtained it compels assent to the articles of Christian belief. But by estab- lishing a proportion between the reasonableness of one’s beliefs and the rigour of objective proof, this school tended to reserve a well-founded faith for the scholarly few who could master technical proofs” (1). 4. Whately, Elements, 171, adds: “The rules already given enable us to develop the principles on which all reasoning is conducted, whatever be the Subject-matter of it, and to ascertain the validity of fallaciousness of any apparent argument, as far as the form of expression is concerned; that being alone the province of Logic.” 5. Terrence Merrigan, “Newman’s Oriel Experience: Its Significance for His Life and Thought,” Bijdragen 47 (1986) 193. CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 201

Noetics, especially Whately’s influence, on his intellectual development. Under the tutelage of Whately, his intellectual formation included the development of epistemic qualities such as careful reflection, rigorous articulation of ideas, and the capacity to decipher true from false ideas. Whately “emphatically, opened my mind, and taught me to think and use my reason … he had not only taught me to think, but to think for myself … when he had taught me to see with my own eyes and to walk with my own feet ” (Apologia, 31).6 Though he remained grateful to his mentor for such training, New- man gradually disagreed with Whately over the nature, function, and scope of logical thinking in the formation and sustenance of religious belief. In the Elements of Logic, Whately acknowledges three operations of the mind: simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning, but focuses primarily on the third category. Logic is “not equally concerned with all: the last Operation being alone its appropriate province; and the rest being treated of only in reference to that” (Elements, 172). Thus, the primary business of logic “is with argumentation, expressed in words, and the operations of the mind implied in that: what others there may be, or whether any are irrelevant questions” (Elements, 60). Newman includes this category in the University Sermons under the category of explicit reason and in the Grammar under the category of formal inference, but sees it as an insufficient means for addressing concrete matters. A phenomenologically grounded account of belief formation requires “an organon more delicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation.”7 Skill in logical thinking, though helpful, does not fully address the intricate and concrete dimensions of life. Antecedent assumptions accompany the course of reasoning and converge into a cumulative case for a given belief. All people reason, but not all on the explicit level. Rationality, in other words, is not reducible to explicit or formal levels of thinking. Some pro- ceed “by a sort of instinctive perception of the legitimate conclusion in

6. John Henry Newman, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Henry Tristam (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1957) 67-68, says, “Much as I owe to Oriel in the way of mental improvement, to none, as I think, do I owe so much as to you. I know who it was that first gave me heart to look about me after my election and taught me to think correctly, and (strange office for an instructor) to rely upon myself.” Newman helped Whately write the Elements of Logic in the summer of 1822. This opportunity gave Newman a first- hand glance into the history of logic and its contemporary significance for belief-formation. Whately, in fact, gives Newman credit in the preface: “But I cannot avoid partic- ularizing the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, who actually composed a considerable portion of the work as it now stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who is the original author of several pages” (Elements of Logic, xv). 7. John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) 217; henceforth cited as GA. 202 FREDERICK D. AQUINO and through the premises, not by a formal juxtaposition of proposition” (GA, 239). A cursory reading of the Apologia shows both an initial attraction to and an eventual rejection of the epistemic commitments of the Noet- ics. Newman gradually saw the corrosive effects of restricting the operation of the mind to formal logic. “The truth is, I was beginning to pre- fer intellectual excellence to moral; I was drifting in the direction of the liberalism of the day. I was rudely awakened from my dream at the end of 1827 by two great blows – illness and bereavement” (Apologia, 33). In November 1827 Newman collapsed from nervous exhaustion while examining at Oxford and on 5 January 1828 his youngest sister Mary died suddenly. “In proportion as I moved out of the shadow of that Lib- eralism which had hung over my course, my early devotion towards the Fathers returned; and in the Long Vacation of 1828 I set about to read them chronologically, beginning with St. Ignatius and St. Justin” (Apolo- gia, 42f.). The patristic focus constitutes a shift from “paper logic” to personal reasoning, and is an outgrowth of Newman’s claim “that a person embodies in his life and personal habits of thinking the truth he holds an inward personal vision of concrete things in a way no argument, process of reasoning or abstract system can possibly do” (PN, vol. 1, 95). Moreover, the shift indicates a desire to connect moral and intellectual excellence in the concrete “self.”8 The Noetic abstractions of human selfhood thin out the real, debilitate the confidence of most ordi- nary believers, and contribute to a growing yet unrealistic chasm between faith and reason. Thus, two options emerge from this philosophical anthropology: belief according to the preponderance of evidence (evidentialism) or a faith insulated from public scrutiny (fideism). This transformation in thinking reflects a desire to move beyond such extreme views of faith and reason. As a result, the quotation from Ambrose on the title page of the Grammar reveals the deep impression of the patristic notion of personal reasoning on Newman’s cognitive development and his understanding of the process of belief-formation. The Apologia offers a brief commentary on the relevance of the quotation. And then I felt altogether the force of the maxim of St. Ambrose, “Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum;”

8. The relation of the moral and the intellectual is a complex issue in Newman. For example, he restricts the focus in the Idea to intellectual formation, but in the Uni- versity Sermons and the Grammar he envisions moral, affective, and intellectual compo- nents as fundamental to a holistic understanding of belief-formation. For further reflection, see Frederick D. Aquino, “Newman and Virtue Epistemology,” in Newman and Truth and “Newman’s Idea of Practical Wisdom.” CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 203

– I had a great dislike of paper logic. For my self, it was not logic that carried me on; as well one might say that the quicksilver in the barometer changes the weather. It is the concrete being that reasons; pass a number of years, and I find my mind in a new place; how? The whole man moves; paper logic is but the record of it. All the logic in the world would not have made me move faster towards Rome than I did; as well might you say that I have arrived at the end of my journey, because I see the village church before me, as venture to assert that the miles, over which my soul had to pass before it got to Rome (Apologia, 136). This observation does not imply a complete rejection of logic, but clarifies the difference between “a conclusion in the abstract and a conclusion in the concrete” (Apologia, 136). The problem is not necessarily with liberalism’s political and social dimensions, but rather with its manifestation in religion. Liberalism “ignores the fact that thinking is a personal activity; capacities for, as well as ways of, thinking in any science are as different as the persons who think” (PN, vol. 1, 50). However, the reference to Ambrose functions more as a deeply symbolic impression than as an exegetical insight, conveying Newman’s preference for a holistic epistemology of Christian belief.9 Personal reasoning undergirds the move from provisional starting points to the accumulation of probabilities into a synthetic account of Christian belief. It’s clear that Newman read and drank from the world of the Fathers. Yet, the claim that he engages in straightforward historical exegesis “is more difficult to prove according to the canons of historical method.”10 This shared perspective lies in the affirmation of the “whole person, mind, heart, and will.”11 The key here is concrete and holistic thinking. For example, in both the University Sermons (1843) and the Grammar (1870) Newman grounds the conditions of Christian belief in the concrete and the broader

9. David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1991) 86, n. 33, adds: “The classic Ambrosian line ‘Non in dialectica placuit Deo salvum facere populum suum’ determines the ethos and persuasive power of Newman’s The Grammar of Assent … Indeed an analysis of Newman’s project in the Grammar in the light of the present distinctions among dialectics, rhetoric-poetics and ethics-politics would perhaps prove a more enlightening setting forth of the complexities at stake than one more round of the W. C. Clifford-William James debate on ‘the will to believe’.” See also, Gerard Magill, “Newman’s Personal Reasoning: The Inspiration of the Early Church,” Irish Theological Quarterly 58 (1992) 304-313. 10. Vincent F. Blehl, “The Patristic Humanism of John Henry Newman,” Thought 50 (1975) 266. 11. Robert L. Wilken, “Alexandria: A School for Training in Virtue,” Schools of Thought in the Christian Tradition, ed. Patrick Henry (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984) 19. 204 FREDERICK D. AQUINO contours of human experience. Faith involves rational reflection, but it is neither removed from the everyday nor is it displaced from antecedent considerations and background factors. However, such a focus does not imply radical individualism; rather, it merely highlights how experience, tradition, and epistemic dependence shape the concrete nature of reasoning. The illative sense illustrates the point. Its concrete activity “econ- omizes to its subject matter with deliberation moving back and forth dialectically,” adjusting “in relation to the whole person within the community of discourse as the context within which thought develops pro- gressively.12 Newman, like Aristotle, sees “fine-tuned concreteness” as an indispensable ingredient for making epistemic judgments.13 “It is the concrete being that reasons” (Apologia, 136). Such a proposal seeks to bridge the chasm between philosophical discourse and a concrete way of being in the world without blurring this fundamental distinction. The convergence of probabilities occurs in the concrete moments of human existence. In this sense, Newman challenges the posture of skepticism by showing that “we trust our senses” though they occasionally deceive us.14 The connection of discourse and way of life has a contemporary parallel in the work of the French philosopher Pierre Hadot. The pursuit of discourse through particular forms of philosophical ascesis is the integral dimension of the concrete and holistic self. Early in his intellectual training, Hadot credits Newman for this insight. Newman shows in this work [the GA] that it’s not the same thing to give one’s assent to an affirmation which one understands in a purely abstract way, and to give one’s assent while engaging one’s entire being, and realizing – in the English sense of the word – with one’s heart and one’s imagination, just what this affirmation means for us. This distinction between real and notional assent underlies my research on spiritual exercises… Ever since I started doing philosophy, I’ve always believed that philosophy was a concrete act, which changed our perception of the world, and our life: not the con- struction of a system. It is life, not a discourse.15

12. Gerard Magill, “Introduction: The Intellectual Ethos of John Henry Newman,” Discourse and Context: An Interdisciplinary Study of John Henry Newman, ed. Gerard Magill (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993) 4. 13. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 38. 14. John Henry Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford, ed. Mary Katherine Tillman (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 31997) 213; henceforth cited as US. 15. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) 277, 279. CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 205

Hadot’s preference for the concrete here is similar to Newman’s par- ticularist stance. Reductionism is foreign to the nature of reality and the ways in which humans know, experience, and articulate things. Reduc- ing religion to rational demonstration or pious feelings fails to do justice to the complexity of human thought and existence. The complexity of God, self, and the world eludes finality. Newman’s observance reflects his immersion in the apophatic strand of the Alexandrian Fathers. An epistemic project, envisioned in this way, is the work of a concrete “self” grounded in and shaped by experience. In one sense New- man followed the empiricist tradition of his day but in another sense he drank from the patristic well of sacramentalism. This explains his preference for “the concrete working-out of the economy of salvation in history.”16 The Alexandrians especially taught him the economy of spiritual truths. The concrete begins with the world of empirical realities but the economy of faith transcends the world of matter, thereby inviting the sagacious and mature to probe the deeper mysteries of faith. In other words, the concrete points to, but does not contain, the fullness of God’s economy. The illative sense wonderfully connects the concrete and holistic dimension of personal reasoning. In consulting the world of facts, we discover an implicit process of reasoning in which people attain certainty in concrete matters without explicit reflection. We live in “a world of facts, and we use them; for there is nothing else to use. We do not quar- rel with the world of facts, but we take them as they are, and avail ourselves of what they can do for us” (GA, 272). Furthermore, the formation of Christian belief reflects a fundamental continuity between nature and grace. Divine revelation does not violate “our essential nature as historical and social beings. God engages with us on our own terms, so to speak. He addresses us, as we are and where we are. At the same time, He never overwhelms us. Consequently, His presence is always a mediated presence, and for that reason, always a veiled presence.”17 The Grammar materializes the spirit of the Ambrosian line, devel- oping a richer treatment of faith and reason than evidentialism and fideism. Newman refuses to relegate belief to a process that abstains from the rigors of logical reflection but neither does he reduce it to an explicit process. The process of belief-formation is not exclusively a religion of evidences or of pious sentiment. More specifically, the illative sense, hinted at in the University Sermons and developed in the Grammar, fits

16. Terrence Merrigan, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions in the Light of the Theology of John Henry Newman,” Irish Theological Quarterly 68 (2003) 347. 17. Ibid., 345. 206 FREDERICK D. AQUINO the description of the personal nature of reasoning on the title page. Newman combines the empirical focus on human experience and the patristic focus on personal reasoning. He merges Aristotelian and patristic trajectories in the illative sense, refusing to privilege one school of thought. Consequently, the Grammar is not an exclusive midrash on Ambrose’s thought; rather it symbolizes a fundamental shift in orienta- tion – from the conception world of “paper logic” to the concrete moments of human existence. The move to personal reasoning recognizes the historical and devel- opmental aspects of thought and the extent to which people come to evidence from different intellectual standpoints (e.g., first principles). The illative sense reflects the personal dimension in judging the validity of claims. Such recognition, however, does not suggest that Newman is a radical subjectivist. He still believes that we are wired for truth, but he also acknowledges that the route is complicate, enmeshed in the realities of everyday.18

Epistemological Implications

The contemporary relevance of Newman for constructing an epistemology of religious belief is both rich and complex. Instead of con- struing knowledge as merely synonymous with explicit awareness of the grounds of belief, he nuances the discussion. Belief-formation is a falli- ble process, though reality is not. The avenues for pursuing truth are var- ied. As a result, recognizing the distinction between ontological realities and epistemological processes is important for understanding Newman’s epistemology of Christian belief. The realism lurking here can be traced to his reliance on the Alexandrian focus on the sacramental nature of things. The broad philosophy of Clement and Origin carried me away; the philosophy, not the theological doctrine … Some portions of their teaching, magnificent in themselves, came like music to my inward ear, as if response to ideas, which with little external to encourage them, I had cherished so long. These were based on the mystical or sacramental principle. I understood these passages to mean that the exterior world, physical and historical, was but the manifestation to our senses of realities greater than itself (Apologia, 34).

18. Vincent F. Blehl, “The Intellectual and Spiritual Influence of J. H. Newman,” Downside Review 111 (1993) 251-257, shows the impact of Newman’s thought on the works of Walgrave, Lonergan, Dulles, and Vatican II. CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 207

One can know something without explicit awareness of how one knows. Contemporary parallels can be found in reliabilism and recent work in cognitive science.19 Yet, Newman also stresses the importance of mature probing (internalist component) into faith, honing the unculti- vated illative sense into an informed level of judgment. In other words, he does not hibernate in the world of the tacit and implicit. Part of nuancing the discussion is his focus on the different levels of cognition. An epistemology of Christian belief, understood in this way, also reconnects spirituality and epistemology, refusing to divorce the two. Constructing an epistemology of Christian belief redirects the focus from reduction to fuller and richer aspects of Christian belief. For example, the sacramental dimension of Christian teaching suggests that we become what we think, experience, and desire. Properly focused desire has a trans- formative dimension. The epistemic enterprise is expressed not merely in satisfying objective conditions of knowledge, but in connecting the knower to the known. In this sense, knowledge entails participating in the reality that one seeks to understand. The objective and subjective dimensions of knowledge are integral to the process of spiritual formation. This move resembles ancient philosophical traditions and the early Christian focus on contemplative participation. Theological reflection engages in an “intellectual ascesis” in which “self-centered beings gradually learn” to live out “a discipline of God-centered contemplation.”20

19. For accounts of reliabilist versions of epistemology, see Alvin Goldman, Epis- temology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), David Arm- strong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), and John Greco, Putting Skeptics in their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and for cognitive science, see Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd, and The ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (eds.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Cam- bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), Robin M. Hogarth, Educating Intuition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discov- ering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer- sity Press, 2002), Giles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way we Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002), David G. Myers, Intuition: Its Powers and Perils (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), Robert S. Wyer, Jr. (ed.), The Automaticity of Everyday Life, Advances in Social Cogni- tion, 10 (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 2005), and The New Unconscious, ed. Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 20. Fergus Kerr, “Tradition and Reason: Two Uses of Reason, Critical and Con- templative,” International Journal of Systematic Theology (2004) 38. 208 FREDERICK D. AQUINO

Such a move probes the epistemological implications of Christian belief while correcting lopsided epistemologies. For example, a religion reducible to sentiment or imagination eclipses its intellectual weight, reducing belief to sentiment and opinion. Ignoring the objective conditions of knowledge only contributes to the projection of wishes. How- ever, the logic of evidentialism drains the interior component out of Christian belief. Both conditions of knowledge are integral to the search for truth. Newman affirms the existence of objective truth while claim- ing that our conception of it is limited and imperfect. The apophatic and cataphatic dimensions of theology are crucial here; linking spirituality and intellectual practices furnishes safeguards against excesses and deficiencies (e.g., evidentialism and fideism). So, an epistemology of Christian belief connects reason and contemplation Seen in this way, an epistemology of Christian belief presupposes that a properly disposed mind sustained by healthy practices and habits enables a person to attain knowledge of God and render skillful judgment about particular situations. The result is the formation of a theologically and philosophically mature mind. Rational insight without proper dis- position clouds the mind. Constructing an epistemology of Christian belief, then, takes place in “a complex whole, a unified system which appeals to the person in their entirety, by taking possession of our intel- lect, our heart, and our will.”21 This holistic endeavor entails the apophatic and cataphatic dimensions of theological reflection. We can do no more than put ourselves on the guard as to our own proceeding, and protest against it, while we do adhere to it. We can only set right one error of expression by another. By this method of antagonism we steady our minds, not so as to reach their object, but to point them in the right direction; as in an algebraic process we might add and subtract in series, approximating little by little, by saying and unsaying, to a positive result … He is ineffably one yet He is exuberantly manifold.22 The dialectic of affirmation and negation enables the epistemic agent to participate in a realty that the mind cannot capture completely by words. Though Newman acknowledges the limitations of human discourse about God, such recognition does not come by “talking nonsense, but by talking carefully, by taking great care what we say.”23 Respect for

21. Merrigan, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” 347. 22. John Henry Newman, The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty, ed. Hugo M. de Achaval and J. Derek Holmes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) 102. 23. Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 58. CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 209 the mystery of faith does not suggest flimsy thinking or retreat from dif- ficulties, but greater appreciation for the expansive nature of Christian reflection. Like the Greek fathers, Newman had a healthy dose of apophaticism in his philosophical diet, nurtured by “a deep sense of rev- erence and of the Divine Transcendence.”24 Newman clearly acknowledges the importance of logic, but not in its reductionistic form. In this regard, his relevance fits the current inter- est in revisiting patristic writers for rethinking the task of theology.25 The common thread between Newman and these contemporary thinkers is dissatisfaction with the reductionistic impulses of rationalism, evidentialism, biblicism, and so on. Theology is a more robust enterprise than these narrow moves, grafting the whole person into the complex and personal quest of the knower to encounter and be changed by the known. It does not exclude the study of logic, history, science, and other fields of knowledge but merely brings them in conversation with a broader and more comprehensive task of understanding, loving, and becoming the very object of contemplation. The spiritual discipline of contemplation is coupled with rigorous reflection. Newman, in fact, sees the need to connect this experiential dimension with theological reflection. As the Grammar shows, the “strength of our mental impressions” does not set- tle the question of whether a proposition yields true beliefs or false beliefs (GA, 80). The experiential dimension of faith requires the guidance of reasoning, since imagination may project illusions. Broadening our epistemological horizons calls for a phenomenologically grounded approach to belief-formation and participation in the ground of our being. Theology, with this in mind, is a contextual enterprise, a vibrant pursuit of a living mind saturated in the concrete moments of human existence. It is not “a fixed and static teaching systematically imposed irrespective of times and circumstances, but it originated in living and fundamentally imaginative response to the mysteries of revealed truth; what had to keep on changing, if it were to live was our understanding of it.”26 Again, I think that Newman would endorse Hadot’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and spirituality.

24. Charles Dessain, “Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition,” Downside Review 94 (1976) 88. 25. E.g., William J. Abraham, Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology: From the Fathers to Feminism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Ellen T. Charry, By the Renewing of Your Minds: The Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Gender, and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 26. John Coulson, “Newman’s Hour: The Significance of Newman’s Thought, and Its Application Today,” Heythrop Journal 22 (1981) 402. 210 FREDERICK D. AQUINO

The theologian, like the philosopher, develops discourse that intersects with and acts upon the concrete self. The goal is not to convey “some ready-made knowledge but to form” the concrete self through intellectual, moral, and spiritual exercises. The result is the formation of “a habitus, or new capacity to judge and to criticize; and to transform – that is, to change people’s way of living and seeing the world.”27 Newman calls such activity wisdom, the ability to connect things, fuse areas of knowledge, and apply these insights to concrete situations. However, the appeal to ancient Greek and patristic understandings of philosophy is not self-evident in most contemporary circles. The focus on a philosophical way of life is foreign to most current approaches to philosophy; rather, the primary concern is the theoretical undertaking of conceptual issues.28 Newman would recognize this chasm, and most likely would fall within the ancient focus on way of life, though with a profound appreciation for the concrete within the Lockean and Humean lineage. Newman respects the notional aspect of thinking but prefers real assent precisely because of its linkage to the concrete. Yet, he would resonate with the need for holistic integration of thought and way of life. In other words, Newman’s retrieval of the concrete and personal reasoning in the ancient Greek and patristic traditions does not “down- grade” the theoretical component.29 The dialectic of real and notional

27. Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002) 274. 28. As Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 8, points out, “ancient philosophy is not what philosophy is today: a primarily (or even exclusively) theoretical undertaking. The ancient understanding of philosophy still echoes strongly in the popular conception of the subject and often causes embarrassment to professional philosophers when they find themselves in conversation with the laity, who are disappointed to find that professional philosophers are not always outstandingly wise or even full of advice.” Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 20, adds: “Most professional philosophers did not, I found, share the ancient conception of philosophy as discourse addressed to nonexpert readers of many kinds who would bring to the text their urgent concerns, questions, needs, and whose souls might in that interaction be changed. Having lost that conception they had lost, too, the sense of the philosophical text as an expressive creation whose form should be part and parcel of its conception, revealing in the shape of the sen- tences the lineaments of a human personality with a particular sense of life.” See also Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), Robert Solomon, The Joy of Philosophy: Thinking Thin versus the Passionate Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 29. Williams, Problems of Knowledge, 8, says that “a distinguishing feature of the philosophical life” in the ancient tradition “is the importance it accords to knowledge. To know how best to live, we need to know how the nature of things: ourselves and the world we live in. Lacking knowledge of either the world or ourselves, we shall be bound to live in unsatisfactory, even self-defeating ways.” CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 211 in the Grammar illustrates the relevance of both aspects of belief- formation. Thus, the shift from “paper logic” to personal reasoning does not abandon logic. What Newman rejects is the notion that verbal skills of argumentation exhaust the operation of the mind. Yet, reasoning is fundamental to human discourse; without it, assessment of arguments would be meaningless. As the contemporary philosopher John Searle points out, “rationality as such neither requires nor even admits of a justification, because all thought and language, and hence all argument, presupposes rationality.”30 The category of complex assent in the Grammar presupposes the importance of logical reasoning or the activity of explaining how one knows what one knows. The difference here is Newman’s concrete posture. The concrete “self” navigates the complex relationship between subjective and objective conditions of knowledge.31 The ten- dency to reduce Christian belief to either domain is analogous to contemporary attempts to dissolve the gap between first person and third person experiences. Deriving truth claims or general theories exclusively from empirical evidence, though helpful, is tricky business. The same applies to exclusive focus on phenomenal consciousness. For example, observing human behavior (or the function of the brain) does not give us full access to first-person experiences (unless someone has solved the “hard problem”). Yet, we also know that the path of folk psychology is plagued with the problem of credulity. The call to consider various insights will be painful but necessary to our quest for a richer understanding of Christian belief. We have a long journey ahead of us, as we try to foster a conversation between the scientific image and humanist vision of things. Consequently, the dynamic between implicit and explicit processes of belief-formation needs to be taken into consideration when constructing an epistemology of religious belief. Moreover, this enterprise should be understood as a part of spiritual formation. Linking rigorous

30. John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) xiv. Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 24, makes a similar point. “For the case of reasoning itself, however, no such alternative is available, since any considerations against the objective validity of a type of reasoning are inevitably attempts to offer reasons against it, and these must be rationally assessed. The use of reason in the response is not a gratuitous importation by the defender: it is demanded by the character of the objections offered by the challenger.” 31. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Impartiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 14, aptly describes the juxtaposition of standpoints (partial and impartial) in terms of “a division of the self.” Quick resolutions of this tension simply exacerbate the problem. 212 FREDERICK D. AQUINO habits, dispositions, processes, and practices is fundamental to the process of spiritual formation. This is not an uncritical return to a pristine epistemic state, condition, or place (e.g., Aristotle, the Fathers, and New- man). Rather, the goal is relocate the enterprise of epistemology to Chris- tian spirituality, understanding, perhaps in fresh ways, epistemic practices such as critical thinking, accounts of justification, desire for truth, humil- ity, and wisdom as concrete expressions of ascesis. In other words, an alternative to the divorce between spirituality and epistemology is a holistic approach, which sees these domains as sacramental mediations of the life of God.

Epistemology: A Thicker Construal of Humanity

To move in this constructive direction, we must be prepared for painful seasons of Christian existence, shedding the old habits of reductionism, hard rationalism, sentimentality, and so on. Appealing to mystery is not begging the question; it merely recognizes the difference between the subject’s quest for “a view from nowhere” and ultimate reality.32 Newman also understands the material world as fundamentally con- nected to but not equivalent to reality. This sacramental principle, under- girding our constructive accounts of epistemology, fosters a more robust notion of what it means to be human. The failure to recognize this point reflects the inability to acknowledge the God in whom we participate is an infinite yet accessible being. Epistemology, viewed in this way, opens up the possibility of becoming fully human. Our sharing with Christ in his life, death, burial, and resurrection is an ongoing expression of our participation in the life of God. Pursuing knowledge and wisdom is an outgrowth of our participation in God. We are learning to become what we are and through our new existence we learn to actualize our identity through Christian practices. Our epistemic practices enable us to live out what God has called us to become. God in Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit enables us to become fully human through our new ecclesial identity. However, the actualization of image into likeness requires a collaboration of the human and divine. Becoming God-like, then, is becoming fully human, not less or more than human.

32. For a helpful discussion of this distinction, see Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). CONSTRUCTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 213

A robust epistemology of Christian belief needs to reflect insights from various fields of knowledge (biology, psychology, history, philosophy, and so on). This task comes with the territory of being a “systematic” theologian, and opens up the possibility of asking whether Chris- tian belief is absolutely counter-intuitive to our existence (theoretically and empirically). Does Christian belief annul human existence or does it cohere with it, as Newman seems to suggest? Is constructing an epistemology of Christian belief a fictive impossibility for us? Or is it a real possibility for us today? If not, then it seems that Christianity is simply a mental reminder of our ineptitude. In this regard, Newman’s epistemology of Christian belief keenly focuses on the historical, personal, and holistic dimensions of reasoning. It rethinks the actual conditions of belief-formation, furnishing some hints for broadening the horizons in our attempts to construct vibrant epistemologies of Christian belief. The epistemic agent is in process, “faced all the time with new and complex situations; how we deal with them reveals what we have become and affects what we are becoming.”33 Forming an expansive mind calls for constructive and imaginative possibilities mediated through epistemic agents, struggling to connect discourse and way of life.

Frederick Aquino is Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology in the Graduate School of Theology at Abilene Christian University. Recent publications include Communities of Informed Judgment: Newman’s Illative Sense and Accounts of Ratio- nality (Catholic University of America Press, 2004) and Unveiling Glory, co- authored with Jeff Childers (ACU Press, 2004). He has published articles in Restoration Quarterly, Downside Review, Christian Higher Education, and Louvain Studies. Address: Abilene Christian University, ACU Box 29406, Abilene, TX, 79699, U.S.A.; [email protected].

33. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 52.