- OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, MASERU, LESOTHO.
BASUTOLAND l t September, 1966.
The R" ht Hon. T Thqnt , S ecret~ry Gener , Un "t ed Nations Org nisation, NEW RK. U.S .A.
Your Excellency ,
It g ·ves m~ much pleas r e a t this e qrly pportun · t y to th~nk Yo r Excellency without reRerva t ion for the 1 e l y coming f l'1r. H.S. c o s en, Indu tr' al Deve l opment Ad ser to the Lesotho Governme nt. In the me gr teful bre ath all l me o ~sk you to co nve y o r e tfel th ks to the Co r e f 24 for the e x elle nt m~ nner in h "ch it executed its task nd meeted out its well considered verdict after considering the plea tabled before it by the Opposition deleg tes. I feel deeply indebted to Your Excellency's Co ittee of 24 for "t s r~tience to 11.sten to the evidenc e given by Mr. Brown, the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations. From Mr. Br wn the Comm ittee of 24 got the tru th and were able to a r rive a t a correct and r easonable decision.
With our independence only five week s awq y let me a s ure Your Excellency that the Basotho Nation is looking forward to the eventful day of October 4th with unity and unanimity. The entire country has ~a ys desired complete n2 tionhood; it desires it a ll the more keenly now, and ~ill g o into independe nce with one accord on tha t great day.
Throughout the Continent of Africa, es in Lesotho itself, political independence is the offspring of n~ t ion a l a war eness, which aw eness cennot be s crificed to party differences or personal gain. It goes without saying tha t deeds spea k louder than words. You will hear shortly whgt devel opments t ak e pla.ce in my count;ry when you will be able to decide our f a te o n t he ~t re ng th of the country' s ner a l progr e and no on wh a t mi s~uided individ u~ ls may say abro d.
]'-1y Governme t has t he m 0.. nd~. te of the people of' Lesotho to lea d them to complete n .tionhood.
~t this stage I ould like to t h ank Your Excellency for accepting my Gover me nt's invitat· on to the Ind pendence Celebrgtions, t h ugh due to pressure of work you will not be qble to Bttend in person. We shRll be very h a ppy to rece ive your personal envoy Rnd to e n joy with h i m the events of the h ist oric d e y. He wi ll s ee for h i ms elf the conditions under which we liv e in Lesotho qnd I s hall g ive him addit i onal me ssages for you.
Let me assure Your Excellency th8t irnmediRtely following the I ndepe ndence of Lesotho I s hall s eek to obta in member s hip t o the Uni ted Nations Orga n isat i on. W~en our applica tion f or memb ership of t his world body is b r ought u p for consider At ion, I ~o ul d be happy if t his would be done aga inst the ba c'kground of t h e re~i t ies of life obt aintng in our part of the world . 1e live in So th Africa a nd un i k e the people
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His Excellency U Thant, Secretary General, United Nations Organisation, NEW YORK. .
Your Excellency,
Thank you very much for your letter of 4th October, 1966. This letter was particularly of interest to me after my recent acquaintance with Your Excellency at the United Nations. I' take this opportunity of asl himself in great diffic~l tie s in a country. like ours which has no funds for dvvelopment. The question of aid to Lesotho is vital. You are no doubt a ware t hat we are an encl a ve within the borders of the Republic of South Africa. Unless we can receive aid our chances of remaining economi cally independent of South Africa will be greatly reduced. I arr, making this direct appeal to you as I am sure you are a ware that the .United Kingdom Government, contrary to promises for a id made in the British Parliament has offered us only £11 million which is just sufficient to close the budgetary deficit leaving hardly anything for • -development.·. By this 'Br,itain has not only gene oa ck· on 1• t~eir promises t o us but they have turned against assurances mad e to the TJni tee Jfations e.nd to ·the World. 1 • ; I. OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, MASERU . . ·LESOTHQ. His Excellency U Thant -2- 28th October, 1966. My financial experts advise me that the £11 million would meet our budgetary and development needs if spread over a two-year period; but phased over a three-year period, according to the British stand point, it i s seriously inadequate. The plight in lflh1ch we are urges me to request that you use your good offices with the United Nations Agencies to channel a greater and more effec~ive flow of aid to our country. In our serious economic plight I earnestly reque'st that whatever aid had been set aside for us should come in a greater measure than was the case before. In addition I would ask Your Excellency that t he funds which were to be raised by the United Nations Development Committee for use in the former High Commission Territor i es b~ brough t in to augment the aid to my country. In the event of there being nothing raised yet under this f und, I would be gr ateful if you could bring to the notice of those who initiated t he good intentions t .o see to their implementation. To the same end I would be most grateful to you if you could bring pressure to bear on the United Kingdom to honour their obligations; this being a matter of great i mportance for our independence and for the stability of our economy. No other former British dependency has been this much under-developed at attainment of independence. We want to make our i ndependence r eal but as long as we are at the mercy • of our powerful neighb~ ur · - "the Republic of ~o uth Africa to which we a re economica lly subservient our independence will not benefit us much. Accusations by unfriendly cri.tic s that my governmen ~ is· a. puppet Government of the South Afric&:'1/ . . . ...... , " • • .,1' •• .· .. . :r OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, MASERU. . ' LESOTHO. His Excellency U Thant -3- 28th October, ~ 1966. South African Republic do not assist in any way to surmouni:; our 'geographical difficulties. What we want is encouragement and active assistance. I am, however, grateful to learn from you tha.t the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme is ready to give very sympatheti'c consideration to requests for assistance beyond those in the Programme which my Government has already requested. May I conclu~e by re-iterating my cordial thanks to you and to Mr. Hoffman and with best wishes. to the .United Nations for their future success and well-being. Yours sincere ly, ~ ..., .,_ ·. PRI ME MI N •• • " I' •.. ~ J T H PERMANENT SICN OF TH KI NGDOM OF LESOTHO TO TH E UNITED ATI ·s 497 4th floor, 866 U. N. Pla za N. Y. 16th Novemb er, 1966 . Secretary-General, United l~·.J. t.ions. Sir, I b2ve the honour to acknowledge r e ceipt of your l etter of tho 8th November, 1966 , addressetl to His Excellency, Chi ef Leabua Jonathan , Prime Mi nister of Lesotho and to say that it has been for>•a r ded to the Pri e Mini ster 1 s o f ice in Maseru, Lesotho. Yours sinc "r e l y ) ri. T . li;Ja sholog.;u Cha r ge d ' Af : a ir s , - CVN/c c • • cc : Mr . Narasimhan Permanent i ss ~on Mr . Lemi eux ./ • OFFICE O F THE PRIME MINISTER MASERU LESOTHO : t l c t ober, l 67. Y ~l r u c el_ e .. c :; , ·~7 e e ~ s [.. _; J .:.r:. ti ; · :is~-= t ' :!.' e .s ::_ ~ .; t 0 e - =- e c s · o u ~· C. i. . c u..,s ::.. ::1 =- ::;t ~ . e l _ l i c. i'::>:r-::!3 tio E ~ ·· . ;:, ~-~ l e t o ;> s l u to yo· 2.n ;,: ~1 d e r ~ t a ... L ; · t :.. e v e r ;- o .=' L e sot ~ :: o .' _Le ~.J l::. ":i e s o i ::t bee n ~isu .d e r ta o ~ ::... ul' __ _ r.ic- . L . e o L:er a ti 1 "' :1_' - t a ·: e t __ i s t ~ i t · tor e : ~ ~ m t .e ! Jy :l t y o f t .. e L L 1.:;do ::.·:. •. --::::)1 ' ~ ~ t u t i n t h e U _i t ct ~ ot' OU l e sire t o b e 1. a v e :l. n c. 1· c s _-' n 11 _ r :: t ~ - l _ • i . Y.~ u r _;:-;:ce l l ·· ay I •ery s u c c e s i n yo u r . e ·: t e :!'.. o _ . e . _ ..,s uri n. · ;to r .:: ~( cel le n c y m ~ · .1i :h s t co n si d e r a t io n, His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations Secretariat, NEW YORK, N. Y. / .. cnfcc OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER MASERU LESOTHO 24th November, 1967. 'I enclose, for your information, copy of my letter dated 22nd November, 1967, addressed to Mr. P. G. Hoffman, Administrator, United Nations Development Programme, New York, which speaks for itself. You may recollect that when I had the honour of meeting you in New York we discussed the Oxbow project; and \vhile I am fully aware of the general feeling among the United Nations in regard to the political policies of the Republic of South Africa, I am equally sure that you will at all times bear in mind the particular difficulties experienced by my country due to its geographical situation as a separate enclave within the confines of a more powerful state. While it is within your knowledge also that we are irrevocably and strongly opposed to the present political policies of our immediate neighbour, our situation must make it evident that it would be to our very great detriment to do other than agree to differ, or to attempt to interfere in the domestic policies of South Africa. I would in all good faith make the suggestion that a tactful approach on our part to international relations, particularly those with the Republic of South Africa, could be of great value in influencing that country's outlook. While admittin~ that infinite patience will be required of us, we feel that time is on our side and we are not without hope that the future might see fundamental and progressive changes in the attitude of South Africa. Already we have experienced concrete and increasing evidence of the Republic's goodwill towards neighbouring countries, despite ideological variationf At this juncture may I be permitted to stress the fact that while the Republic of South Africa would, in the event of the coming to fruition of the Oxbow project, benefit to a very large extent in increased supplies of water and electricity, our own would be the greater gain, not only in the pure economic sense of receiving payment for our inexhaustible supplies of water and electricity, but also in the presentation to us of golden opportunities to increase our avenues of employment for our own nationals in our own country, and benefit greatly our own agricultural and industrial resources - not to mention the almost incalculable benefits that would flow to us from the opening up of our beautiful mountainous countcy to world tourism. In addition, and by no means least important, we who live in Southern Africa are constantly reminded by successive and devastating His Excellency U thant, Secretacy-General, United Nations Organization, NEW YORK, N. Y., United States of America. .. • OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER MASERU LESOTHO His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations Organization, 24th November, 1967. 2. droughts that the ultimate survival of this sub-continent is dependent on the conservation of its water resources. Paradoxical as it may sound, water is the very life-blood of Southern Africa. Our people call it "white gold". I know that I do not need to belabour the point; and that you will need no reminder that the future of our country and the prosperity or otherwise of its people depend largely on the success of the Oxbovl project. Any influence you may feel free to bring to bear in support of our .request to the United Nations Development Programme would earn the very deepest gratitude and appreciation of myself, my Government and my people. Please accept, Your Excellency, the renewed assurances of my deepest respect and highest consideration. \ ~ (' s Prime ~Minister and ':Pte'-'1--t~· n ster of -- External Affair ... ~ - - ~ - · ~--- ... ~ ,__, ... '---.-~---- ... OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER MASERU LESOTHO 22nd ~ovemb e r, 1967. I t 1;-1as a g r e a t pleasure for me t o me t wi t ~1 you durin0 my v isit to New York at t h e end of Sept em e r . As you know, and .:~s 1 expres s ed to you at that time , 'tve i n Lesotho are pr. r t icu l a r ly a pp reciative of t he help 'Hhich Lesotho is r ceiving f rom t Lle United a tions Deve l opment Prog ramm e . Ue re: a l ise that thi s is alrea dy on a generous s c ale but we hope t ~at , with y our h l p, it ay be i ncreased i n the f uture. Ou r needs are truly g r ea t and we welc ome espec i a l ly dev e opme t a s sistan c e from the United Nations be c ause this make s e ven s t ronger the inks '~hich ind us b rough the org nisati on lth the r t of the world . It wa s wit t he e con sider6t i o ns in mi d that, as y ou may r c ~ l l , we dis c ussed the ques t ion of Sp e c ia l und a ssistance wit1 t e !~ b o , p roj e ct. Under t:J i p r oject one or m re dams wil l be built h i gh up in ou r mounta i ns t o pr ide water and some e l ect r icit for s ale to the Re public f South f ric a . From Lhe l~st round of l ·s 1hich we re held betwee n my officials an t he Sout ric ans i n ~1aser u at t e e n d of la s t mon th, i t n ow s eems v irtual l y certain t h ~t the epub l ic o ~ t e ir si e a re Hilli n t o p r oc eed wit n tbis pr o j e ct. As y ou will kn ow, my Government has already ma a e a r equest to t he Unite d Nations Developme nt Frog ramme for .a p re _a r tory assistance mission \vh ich would mak e rec ommend t i ons t o you r Governing Council a ~ o ut t he undertaki ng oi a f easib ilit y study. T e s t udy I understanc nay cos t bet we en h~ l- a milli o and one mi llion d ll~rs . We a r e s ti 1 waiting a i i na~ decision f rom ~be UllD as to 'tvhether it J u c. be {)OS s i l e for .JO Ur o-... 1. c.e L.O provide s u ch ass i stance. 1 ~m sure y ou ~ i ll a ppreciate that a l t e rnative s ources of this type of aid will be extreme l y dif ficul t f or my Gove r nment t o o btain, and it seems t h a t t h e mo s t l i kely other p ss i bility at t h e present time is from t 1e South r icans t h emselve s. It is f or this reason tha t I -m wr itin g t h is letter t o you. 1 would still prefer t hat t he UND should p rovid e this assistance - you remain my f i rst hope .. fo vJeve r, I appreciate the d i f ficulties which f ace y ou in u n e rtaking a project of this nature, whic~1 v70uld b e n efit not only Lesotho but t h e Re pu b lic of South Af rica, and I reali se that as a part of the Unit d Hr . • G. Iloff ma n , Ad ministr a tor, United Na t ions Dev e lopment Pro0 ramne, 42nd St r eet and i rst Av e n ue, NEW YORE' , • Y. 10017, UniLed t at.e of America. - OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER MASERU LESOTHO r . P. G. f oftman, dministrat..:>r, 1 , N w Y rk, 2~nd November, 19 6 7. 2. at i on s o~g an: s atio n you are i 1fl uenced y L ~e Reso l t i ou~ o e eneral As emb ly. Nevert h eless , W• in Maseru r e laced in the position ~1 e re e ,.;ould l i ke o h ave as e~rly a decision as pos i b e from you on this d i f f icult s bjec t. Shoul ~ you be un a b l e to provide t - assistance wh ic we s eek , we shoul t h e n no~ where we stund, and could turn cls ewnere. I repect t hat 1 sti ll prefer that the Un i~.:ed Na t ·.ons D ve: l opment Prosr::tmme should c.:1rry out the f e asibility study for us, but I ~m placed in e position w e re I n e e d to know whether such assista nce will be _orthc omin from your organisati on or no · . Accordingly , I would appreciate be ing advised of an e r ly d cision on this matter . I hope tha t t his i l l be po ~ itiv bec ause e s you knm·J LE'sot h o is not only one of t e poorest c oun tri s in the world , e ntirely s r roun de by one of the r 1che st, but has a s y et n o Spec ial F d p roj0ct at all. Pr ime Minister a er f External Af . .. CVN/cc cc: Mr. Narasimhan Mr. Hof:fman / Mr. Lemieux/ CVN/nt 5 1 y , cc - Perm. Rep. Dr. Bunche Mr. Narasimha~ Mrs. Mira V" Foreign - • . . MINISTRY OF ~ AFFAIRS P .O . BOX 527 FRGN/SEC/2 MASERU LESOTHO 20th February , 1 970 Your Excellency , I am writing to you in connection with the current political situation in Lesotho. First, I wish to thank you for your obvious under standing of the domestic nature of the problem and to reassure you on the following points :- (a) That it is the wish and intention of my Government to return to constitutional rule as soon as possible. Appropriate steps have already been taken to draft a new Constitution which will be placed before the Nation for approval. (b) That all political detainees are and will continue to be treated humanely. It is not in our nature to be cruel and vindictive. (c) That we shall continue to respect our international obligations. Secondly, I am sending herewith an aide-memoire on the situation in my country in the hope that the document will assist you in understanding not only what has already happened but also in interpreting newspaper and radio reports which are often sketchy and out of context. FinaUy, I am taking this opportunity to inform you that I am making arrangements to attend the Twenty-fifth Session of the United Nations Assembly and look forward to meeting you again. With highest consideration. ~,. Lea5ua J r His Excellency U. Thant, Director-General, United Nations, NEW YORK • THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO TO THE UNITED NATIONS REF, 866 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA SUITE SSO CABLE ADDRESS NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 LESOTHOUN TELEPHONE 421-71543·4·8 AIDE-MEMO IRE ON THE LESOTHO CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS This Aide-Memoire, which is not exhaustive, is intended to assist an objective assessment of the current constitutional crisis in Lesotho. Background to the Crisis: Recent developments in Lesotho are not an isolated incident but the culmination of events which started as far back as 1965, that is, before and after the first general election, which the opposition parties had hoped to win. Prior to the 1965 General Election, which was won by the Basotho National Party (BNP), there was complete agreement and unanimity among the Basotho about self-government and independence. This was recognised by His Highness the Paramount Chief of Basutoland, as he was then designated when, on 11th September, 1961, he addressed the National Council as follows:- 11 It is evident from public statements that there is general desire for the introduction of responsible Government - and also other developments which are the pillars of any poli tical advance. I desire to make it very clear - perhaps publicly here for the first · time - that if responsible Government and all that it involves - but at the same time preserving our good old traditions true and characteristic of ~1sotho nation - is the wish of my people, I will not only welcome it, but will use my position as Paramount Chief of Basutoland to see that 11 people's desires are accomplished • It will be noted later in this document how His Highness' attitude changed. The Report of the Constitutional Co~~ission (1963) which embodied proposals for a new Constitution for an independent Lesotho and clearly defined the responsibilities of the King, Parliament and Cabinet, was unanimously supported by Chiefs and all political parties existing at that time. In 1964, a delegation headed by His Highness, held discussions with the British Government on the Constitutional proposals which had been passed by the National Council. - 2 - The agreement which was reached at the talks provided for responsible self-government to culminate in independence after a period of one year. It included basic agreements on what was to beco~e the Independence Constitution. It is to be noted that all the parties to the talks agreed to these constitutional proposals and that His Highness signed the do~ument to signify his approval. This same document became the basis for the 1965 Pre-Independence General Election which at the time the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and the Marematlou F~eedom Party (MFP) thought they would win. As it turned out, however, the BNP won the 1965 General Election. The election victory of the BNP was followed almost immediately by a complete change in the attitudes of the MFP and the BCP and His Highness to the Constitution which they had accepted without reservation before the election. The most ·aramatic event of the post 1965 election period was the new strategy proposed by the Co~nunist Party to form a United Front, consisting of the King, the MFP and the BCP in opposition to the granting of independence under a BNP regime. In a key document outlining this policy, the Communist Party wrote as follows:- ""Under these conditions it is essential for the BCP and especially Ntsu Mokhehle to welcome help and assistance from all forces working for freedom. We communists are Republicans and do not believe in monarchs or Chiefs. Yet in the present conditions, the BCP must modify its attitude even to the Chieftainship for the sake of maximum national unity". In the context of the letter, and as will be seen later, national unity is unity against the Governm·9nt. In the same document, the communist Party specifically expresses that "we must co-operate whenever possible with the BCP, MFP and other groups that are opposed to the National Pat'ty Government". It should be noted that within the framework of the United Front the Communists still insisted on retaining for themselves what they termed their "independence and separate command". These aspirations were embodied in a letter addressed to the MFP by Joe Matthews on 12th May, 1965. This letter is important because it outlines practical measures to be adopted by the proposed United Front 1L~der communist sponsorship to gain control of the political leadership of Lesotho. The measures included action to be taken locally in Lesotho and internationally to overthrow the BNP. Among the proposals for local action contained in the letter was that there should be a secret election pact whereby either the BCP or MFP candidate would be jointly supported by members of the respective parties depending on the specific constituency. Coneerning international action, the letter proposed that "as an immediate step a joint delegation possibly consis ting of Presidents and Secretaries of the MFP and BCP together - 3 - should visit certain countries to explain the position in the country and to obtain assistance". In the event, assistance was also received from the Liberation Committee Q~til stopped upon protest of the Lesotho Government. It is especially to be noted that the communists were also anxious to exploit to the fullest the links which Ntsu Mokhehle, leader of the BCP, had established with the Pan African Movement based in Accra as long ago as 1958 because the letter goes on to say "Unless so!D.e agreement is arrived at with Ntsu Mokhehle (that he should be Chairman of the United Front and Premier in an eventual government), the African States and other well-wishers will probably just turn their backs on Lesotho until things change". The strategy proposed by the Commnnist Party and adopted by the Opposition Parties (MFP and BCP) was applied ~~reservedly in the debate on the Independence Motion. In a desperate attempt to stall independence, the Opposition Parties introduced a series of amendments to the proposed Independ.en~e Constitution which were clearly contrary to the 1964 Lond.on Agreement. The King lent his support to the obstructionist efforts by expelling five nominated Senators who supported the BNP Goverrrnent and the motion of independence, with the purpose of weakening Government support in the Senate and preventing the fulfilment of the condition that the Independence Motion should be passed by a majority in both Houses of Parliament. Wnen the Independence Motion had been carried and when it became clear at the London Ind.ependence Talks that Lesotho would be granted independence, the King and the Opposition Parties, in accordance with the strategy proposed by the Comm1xnists addressed petitions opposing independence to the OAU and the UN which were followed by joint delegations. The period immediately preceding ~dependence was also characterised by violence and many deliberate acts of lawlessness by members of the Opposition Parties, calculated to undermine the condition set at the 1964 London Conference that Independ.ence would be granted provided there was stability, law and order. In the period following indepen:ience, the King, in open violation of the Constitution and against the advice of his Ministers, participated in political rallies jointly sponsored by the Opposition Parties with the specific objective of mobilising support to overthrow the Government by force. This unfortunate course followed by the King and the Opposition Parties led to the Thaba Bosiu incident where eleven Ba.sotho lost their lives when a violent mob attacked the police in the presence of the King and the leaders of the Opposition. It is to be noted that in ~ontinuing to protest against the granting of independence and the constitutional authority of the Basotho National Party Government, the supporters of•the Opposition Parties persistently indulged in acts of intimidation, robbery, sabotage and even violence and murder. It is difficult to believe that the leaders of the Opposition Parties were ignorant or U:'laware of these u.r1.lawful activities of their followers. - 4 - In conclusion, we aver that the acts of lawlessness that led to the nullification of the general election of 27th January, 1970, were a continuation of the lawlessness which was deliberately engineered by the Opp~sition Parties immediately after the 1965 elections in order to thwart and cripple the Government. This is clearly confirmed in a letter from Mr. Joe Matthews addressed to the Secretary - General of the Marematlou Freedom Party which, in stressing .the need for urgent action, said "if there is too much delay 'then Leabua will be able to consolidate his position". Joint action by all ~~position Parties, including the communists, was therefore seen as the only way of over throwing the legally elected Government and the objective was to be achieved by all available means. The Basutoland Congress Party, which was openly against Chiefs, was requested to "modify its attitude even to the Chieftainship for the sake of maximum national unity", that is, lh~ity against the Govern~ent. These are the stark realities with which the Basotho National Party Government had to contend for five years and which eventually led to the declaration of a State of Emergency and the suspension of the Constitution. The Present Position: Since the State of Emergency was declared on January 30, 1970, appropriate action has been taken to provide for the peace, order ani good government of the country. According to the Lesotho Order, 1970, executive authority is vested in and exercised by a Council of Ministers, consisting of Tona-Kholo (Prime Minister) and "those persons who held office as Ministers under the Lesotho Iniependence Order immediately before the coming into operation of this Order and such other persons as may be appointed to hold office as Minister". Including Tona-Kholo, the CoQncil of Ministers (Matona) now has eight members. Since the emergency was declared three weeks ago, there have been only minor incidents which in no way, threatened law and order. The Government 1s1 strongly conscious of the need to maintain stability by preventing outbreaks of violence. Appropriate measures have been adopted to protect the lives and property of citizens and foreigners. Regarding non-citizens, the Government has taken an unequivocal stand against interference in all matters of a domestic nature by any individual, group or organization. The penalty for meddling in Lesotho's internal affairs is su.1r.nary detention and deportation, but whenever possible and practicable, detainees or deportees will be given time to sort out their personal affairs. The Government has ~~dertaken to respect the international obligations, agreements, conventions and treaties to which Lesotho was party before the State of Emergency was declared. - 5 - The Future: Because the suspended Constitution which was essentially British in character was neither suitable nor acceptable, a new Co~stitution, compatible with the traditions and. aspirations of the Basotho people, is being drafted. Any attempt to describe the nature and essentials of the proposed Constitution would be premature at this stage. 'Suffice it to say that because of our history and socio-political structure, the concept of a monarchy will be retained and there will be a freely elected, single - chamber Parliament as opposed to the previous bicameral set-up. The new Constitution will be submitted to the Nation for approval either through a Constitutional Commission, which will tour the country or a Constituent Assembly, which will be free to accept the Constitution in toto or in ~odified form. The basic issue here is popular approval by the people without duress. Lesotho's International Relationsh~~ The Government of Lesotho wishes to assure the community of Nations of its intentions to honour its international obligations in the same spirit that it has in the years since Lesotho attained her independence. By the same token Lesotho will expect to continue to be accorded her full rights as a Sovereign Independent State. In particular, the Lesotho Government will expect an unqualified recognition of its authority in all matters relating to the territory of Lesotho as well as a scrupulous observance by all of the principle of non-interference in her domestic affairs, which is enshrined in the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Organization and in the traditions which govern the Commonwealth. Organization of African Unity As an African State, Lesotho shares in the truest sense all the basic objectives to attain for the people of Lesotho and for all Arrican people, the social, economic and political well-being which lies at the heart of the OAU Charter. The Govern~ent of Lesotho will not flinch from its responsibility to exert all efforts within its ability in contributing towards the attainment of those ideals. At the same time the Government of Lesotho will continue to assert its right to follow its analysis of the problems facing Africa and to formulate and state before the Organi zation the methods which it deems best to attain the objectives of the Organization. Commomveal th The bonds which link members of the Co~nonwealth together are as real to the Government of Lesotho as they are to all member Governments. The Government of Lesotho particularly values the concept of unity in diversity, which ... - 6 - is so strongly illustrated in the Commonwealth relationships. Lesotho will continue to lay emphasis on those things which she shares with other member States out of the conviction that the factors on which unity lies, are much stronger than those which tend. to divide member States. It is the continuing belief of the Government of Lesotho that the success or failure of the Commonwealth will rest ultimately on the importance which individual member governments attach to the principle of sovereign equality of other member states and on the respect and sympathy which is extended to governments facing special problems. United Nations The Lesotho Government has never missed an opportunity to reaffirm its belief in the Charter of the United Nations which for all its weaknesses and for the imperfections of member States and of individual men ani women, still remains mankind's best hope for peace and security. Lesotho will continue to maintain her membership and participation in the United Nations Organization strictly in accordance with the Articles of the Charter in so far as it is possible to do so. Like all other member states of the UN, Lesotho looks forward to the observance of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Organization this year. It is the fervent hope of the Govern~ent of Lesotho that all the world's political leaders will seize the opportu.~ity which this important Anniversary presents for rededication to the principles of the Charter and to efforts to build a world in which men can achieve full self-realization in an atmosphere of freedom, peace and justice. 0 • PERMANENT MISSION OF THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO TO THE UNITED NA T/ONS 866 United Nations Plaza - Suite 580 New York, New York 10017 LESOTHO LEADERS i. £'£'T The Prtme Nintster, Chief Leabua Jonathan, and the Leader of the opposition Basutoland Congress Party conferred for more than an hour on 25 February in the office of the Prtme hini.ster. The meeting followed a request by l.fr. Mokhehle recently for an interview with the Prime Minister. After he had given a hearing to Mr. Mokhehle, the Prime Minister said that he would report Mr • . Mokhehle's observations to the Council of Ministers and Mr. Mokhehle would be informed at a later stage of the decision of the Council of Ministers. The two leaders agreed, however, that the continued existence of peace and order in the country would form the major basis for a return to normality. Mr. Mokhehle intimated to the Prime Minister that he conceded that the Prime Minister acted in full exercise of his authority as Prime Minister when he declared the state of emergency. He did not believe that the present state of affairs represented a Coup D'Etat. The two leaders also reiterated the fact that the matter was a domestic affair which could only be resolved by the Basotho people. The Deputy Prime Minister, Chief Sekhonyana Maseribane was also present at the meeting. New York, New York 26 February 1970