AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY rf#Y REVIEW Air OnW« JÜ« » A**1Ai*
AIR reviewUNIVERSITY THE PüOFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Air Force Technical Intelligence . Col. Robert B. Kalisch, USAF
Air c r a f t Wake Turbulence...... Andrew S. Carten, Jr.
Sonic Boom and the Supersonic Transport . Maj. Richard M. Roberds, USAF
T he Uniqueness of the Earth 34 Dr. William G. Pollard
T errorism as a Political Wea pon...... 45 Jay Mallin Military Affairs Abroad T he Ussur i Riv e r Incident as a Factor in Chinese Foreign Policy ... 53 Col. Donald M. Marks, USAF Air Force Review M anagement Uses of Cost Information...... 64 Maj. Frederick T. Walker, USAF Equipment Rea diness...... 71 Jerome G. Peppers, Jr. Books and Ideas T he Civ il l a n Analysts, in Their Pride and T heir Fall...... 75 Brig. Gen. Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret) T he Amer ica n Mil it a r y Novel...... 86 Col. Jesse C. Gatlin, Jr., USAF F iv e Pathfinders: T he Origins of A ir Na v ig a t io n ...... 89 Col. Ray L. Bowers, USAF
T he Contributors...... 94
the cover Addreas manu Scripts to Editor, Air University Planet earth has been here several billions of Review Oivision, Bldg 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL years, Dr. William Pollard reminds us, but man's 36112. Printed by Government Printing Office. accurate knowledge of it and its evolution is Addreas subscriptions to Superintendent of largely a produet of the past century or ao. Documenta, GPO, Washington DC 20402: yearly Whilc the tools and skills of scientifíc investiga- $4.50 domestic, $5.75 foreign; single copy 75C. tion grow increasingly sophisticated, so, too, the For back issues, rnail check or money order to complex produets of technological advanccment Book Department, DMSB, Bldg 1450. Maxwell Bometimes pose threats to man and his environ- AFB, AL 36112: domestic 75 COLONEL ROBERT B. Ka LISCH /A \ DMI RAL THOMAS H. MOORER prior to becoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, “I believe that the greatest military danger facing our country lies in the possibility of a major technical surprise." 1 As this nation reduces its investment in military technology and development, the need to prevent technological surprise becomes even more important." When U.S. technology is foremost, the chance of an unbalancing breakthrough from a nation of lesser technological strength is not so great. Now with the steadily burgeoning Soviet investment in Science and technology, the chance of a new development that could break the nuclear stalemate is increasing/ This article traces the earlv Air Corps commitment to the prevention of technological surprise down to the present problems of technical intelligence. The period up to 1945 differed greatly from the later developments, 1945 to the present. Organizational unity within the Air Force during much of this latter period had a major influence on the AIR FORCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 3 attitudes of the current technical intelligence A high priority was given to their destruction. community. Technical intelligence growth Yet, during much of this period the Allies has been a direct response to the technological were not sure of the purpose or the opera- military threat. The increasing complexity of tional characteristics of the V-l sites.6 This modern weapon systems has created new was a “knee-jerk” response to new technology: aspects of technical intelligence. In this article if the enemy valued certain facilities, destroy I shall outline and discuss such aspects as them. The enemy’s enthusiasm in repairing technical intelligence priorities, the signifi- facilities served as a guide for the bombing cance of warfare systems, the growing impor- priority. tance of Science to technical intelligence, and Few of the technical intelligence oppor- the complexities of net assessments. tunities of World War II were elegantly exploited. Those that were exploited at all usually followed the pattern of capturing early air technical intelligence enemy equipment (airplanes, guns, torpedoes, Militan requirements for technical intelli- or mines) and analyzing it.7 While this tech- gence were minimal prior to World War II. nique led to the birth of practical technical A few farsighted Air Corps leaders such as intelligence, it was ill suited to counter certain Major YVilliam (Billy) Mitchell, Chief of types of the new World War II military European Intelligence Section of the War hardware, such as radar or atomic weapons. Department (1912), and Major Raynal C. These problems required a more sophisticated Bolling (1917) foresaw the need for air approach. technical intelligence.4 Despite their efforts, One hint of the potential of technical only a modest capability existed in 1941. intelligence analysis was given by the V-2 Realization of the importance of air technical incident. Some months before the Germans intelligence was slow because of the attitude launched the V-2 missiles against London, the that technological surprise would not be a Soviets observed a number of large blast decisive factor in a major war. In earlier wars craters on the Polish front. An Army Air between industrial nations, technical advances Corps team went to Poland, retrieved some were not crucial. fragments, and returned to England. By World War II changed these attitudes. New assembling these fragments, a joint British- technologv dominated events. Radar, anti- American team was able to identify the new submarine warfare, sonar, fighter aircraft weapon as a ballistic missile. Once the weapon design, ballistic missiles, aerodynamic missiles, had been identified, efTorts were made to and atomic weapons created major techno- establish suitable countermeasures.8 logical imbalances. These technological asym- metries gave rise to the first real opportunities the cold war for technical intelligence. During World War II one approach to In the twenty-five years following World War the introduction of a significant new tech- II, the need for subtle technical intelligence nologv was to counter with simple, unsophisti- methodology steadily increased. Nonhostile cated direct action. One such example was techniques for obtaining technical data on the Gcrman V-l launcher deployment. V-l major enemy weapon systems had to be launch sites had been identified as “ski sites” developed. Each weapon system had to be by the British from aerial photography.1 assessed from the viewpoint of its possible “Operation Crossbow" was designed to de- cffect in altering the cold war balance of stroy these sites by aerial bombardment. power. 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Radar, aircraft, missiles, space vehicles, and major areas of technical intelligence nuclear weapons dominated the intelligence efforts of this period. Each new radar posed Four major areas characterize technical a challenge from the viewpoint of the Strategic intelligence activity to date: Air Command penetration capability and the 1. Preventing technological surprise. possibility of effective electronic counter- 2. Advancing U.S. technology by use of measures. New Soviet interceptor aircraft foreign technology. raised questions of air defense doctrine, air- 3. Identifying weaknesses in foreign weapon craft intercept capability, air-to-air armament, systems. and effective counter actions. Soviet missiles 4. Using certain design traits of foreign and satellites established a new increased weapon systems as indicators of strategic dependence on the technical intelligence intent. analyst. Technical intelligence required not Each area has a “success story” to tell, but only new collection techniques but also identi- much of it cannot be told now for securitv fication of the parameters to define the threat. reasons. Characteristic unclassified achieve- Public statements by national leaders are evi- ments can be cited to give the reader an dence of the apparent success of this aspect indication of the progress that has been of technical intelligence.9 achieved. Major Raynal Cavvthorne Bolling (1877-1918) Seeing the approaching involvement of the U.S. in World War I , and sensing the potential of aviation, Bolling learned to fly. He was a colonel and Assistant Chief of Air Service when killed in action. AIR FORCE TECH NIC AL INT ELLIGENCE 5 Technological surprise. Two interesting competition and determination . . . may examples of prevention of technological sur- produce.12 prise are the forewarning of the Soviet ic bm This hazard may be reduced by the transfer threat and the warning of the Soviet fractional of advanced foreign technology to domestic orbital bombardment system ( fobs). Dr. use, a post-World War II example being Harold Brown has described the importance Project Paperclip. Paperclip was designed to of intelligence evaluations in the former case: allow Axis scientists and engineers to continue their work in the United States after the war.13 A good example of the two-edged nature The net result of this effort was that the highly of lead time and intelligence estimates is the intercontinental ballistic missile, which the sophisticated missile and jet aircraft tech- Soviets were working on in the early 1950s. nology of the Germans was effectively trans- Knowledge that they were developing an ferred to this nation. I.C.B.M. was a major factor in the initiation Such opportunities rarely occur. A more of our own program in 1954—55. But the common situation is that a nation, having Soviets did not have a substantial I.C.B.M. developed a militarily important technology, capability until 1962, an elapsed time of jealously guards it. The Soviet technology in about ten years. Starting two or three years Chemical and biological warfare is probably later, we managed to finish about two years quite advanced compared to the U.S. State earlier than they.10 of the art.14 However, no simple transfer of Another possibility of technological surprise this technology is possible. Such a transfer was nullified during the Soviet development could only result from intensive intelligence of the fractional orbital bombardment system. efforts by analysts well schooled in the issues The advantage of this class of system is that of Chemical and biological warfare as well as it permits an attack on an unusual trajectory, the techniques of intelligence collection and presumably one which would minimize the analvsis. Despite the difficulties, it is the job probability of detection.11 Technical intelli- of technical intelligence to transfer the foreign gence can assess what trajectories can be used, technology as well as assess the threat posed which trajectories would be most effective, by it. possible countermeasures, and mass launch Identification of weapon system weaknesses. capability evaluations. This input coupled The technical intelligence effort to identifv with U.S. strategic force deployment and the weaknesses of potential adversaries’ weapon strike plans can provide the all-important net systems is operationally important and highly assessment of the significance of the fobs. This visible. Of major significance to the Air Force is another way in which technical intelligence are the capabilities of the Communist bloc can prevent technological surprise. interceptors. Theoretical estimates and engi- Transfer of technology. The national re- neering evaluations are usually adequate for search and development “slowdown” has performance data or aircraft vulnerability caused some writers to speculate on the nature studies. In some cases, however, only fiight- of the technological threat. George Fielding test experience will suffice. Such a situation Eliot has said: arose during the Korean conflict. Parts from . . . danger to the U.S. of technical surprise damaged MIG-15 aircraft were available for probably does not lie in the sudden appear- analysis, but General Benjamin W. Chidlaw ance of a decisive Soviet weapon system and Colonel H. E. Watson wanted a MIG-15 against which we would be helpless. It lies intact for flight test.15 As a result of their rather in the steady year-to-year cumulative efforts, a defector flew a fully operational gains which Soviet devotion to technological MIG-15 in to Kimpo Air Base at Seoul in The only whole, flyable MIG-15 beyond the Iron Curtain was flown to Kimpo Air Base near Seoul, Korea, by a North Korean officer in a daring escape to freedom. . . . The prized Russian-built jet fighter gets its first test flight with a USAF pilot at the Controls, followed by an F-86 Sabrejet, which, among other tests, engaged the MIG in simulated combat. AIR FORCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 1 1953. This windfall established the credibility Such an analysis has profound implications. of technical intelligence. Actual flight tests If one accepts Dr. Foster’s conclusions, the confirmed the aircraft characteristics pre- Soviets appear committed to a greater empha- viously estimated by engineering analysis of sis on a counterforce strategy.18 This in turn damaged aircraft. creates an increased sense of urgency for pro- As brilliant as the MIG-15 exploit was, it grams intended to decrease the vulnerability could not serve as a model for future technical of the U.S. strategic force. intelligence problems. Captured hardware has rarely been available during the cold war. current technical intelligence Instead, remote sensing techniques, extensive engineering analysis, and logical deductions Several fundamentally new factors affect the based on Soviet systems concepts have pro- role of technical intelligence. These factors vided the basis for hardware evaluations. are likely to accelerate and alter the evolution Determination of strategic intent. Modern of technical intelligence. Some of these prob- weapon systems are exceedingly complex. lems are clearly in the domain of the technical A system may be so complex or may require intelligence analyst. Some fali in the large compatibility with several other systems so grey area between technical and classical that there can be no overall optimization. intelligence. Such a situation is resolved by subsystem The changing relative technological strength optimization. The nature of the subsystem of the United States will cause important optimization may be indicative of the intent changes in the technical intelligence program. of the system. In fact one might deduce the Totally different technical intelligence strate- overall system intent more readily in this way gies are appropriate to a nation that is the than by study of the entire system. technological leader and to one that is a Examples of disclosure of system strategic follower. Consider the defense against ballistic intent from a subsystem are not uncommon. missiles. No one would suggest that this tech- Analysis of the Soviet SS-9 ic bm illustrates the nical intelligence area should be treated identi- point. The underlying question was the Soviet cally the same as intelligence pertinent to intent in their large SS-9 deployment.16 Dr. digital Computer design. In the latter field, John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research the United States is the international leader, and Engineering, Department of Defense, the primary innovator, the standard for refer- described the situation as follows: ence. In the other, the United States does not Although we are not positive that the have an operationally deployed antiballistic multiple warheads being tested on the Soviet missile (abm) system, and our national atti- SS-9 ic bm are designed foi multiple hard- tude is much less committed to achievement target destruction, we do know that the in this field than the Soviet Union is.19 guidance and control system employed in the A second factor in the role of technical SS-9 tests has capabilities much greater than intelligence is that some types of technological that required to implement a simple mr v. advancement may not be particularly signifi- The things we do know about this mechani- cant in view of the world situation. In this zation are completely compatible with mir v even though they do not prove a mir v category one might contemplate a twenty per- capability. . . . My own judgment in this cent change in the range of a Soviet sub- matter is that the Soviet triplet probably marine-launched ballistic missile, which would is a mir v and that it has little other function not alter the threat significantly. However, a than the attack of large numbers of hard similar change in the range capability of targets.11 g u id e l in e , the Soviets’ surface-to-air missile, //• /M< /í/n . JC /í*»> ^yArvZ ^ // ZÍm s AtA -^ « i « » . A . ^drt. A\t+. ♦ r' /Z x + A m £ s 1 A . />*• A*- ^ T»»T.áw>^ » //^h jL í,. ^k. A- ^ l . . »Á Ar*M ^ 2»)- A/w*- < /•*7 A». £*••**. vr- J L _. ;%/ í-»**^- ~ z /Uz^+Vés-*<-*+~-*u! y,- ,r*~~ * r * <* " ■ S^tr.«■»•*» • d z Jt*^? / /*« - //^ w ^ "y ^ * * *"***^ A/A .SH Z /*y d d ,* u £ ^ d2Zr A *rt- * e. %v~- AZ ^A * ‘ZdtdZmZr yjd^Z o^ - 'Ã*,- A ^ s*/£àá <=/ A^,fi>t**Zt^, 4Z.et+~-*i+->~- yfo ft • M z*-As jü * y j fiz^+4 ^ .<1/ . ZrrOt^-TZt^ /*V Y — í>Tí^ XÁ»» / A»"" Z^A&ir-rtV y~*— hsuzt-á. ^ (" r-J \5 a . . Jk/7*+r AIR FORCE TECHN1CAL INTELI.IGENCE 9 would represent a major threat change in their air defense system. The point to be made is that not all technological advances are of equal importance. technical intelligence priorities Deterrence of nuclear war is our prime strate- gic objective.20 Assured destruction is an integral part of the strategy to deter war. Lieutenant General Glen W. Martin, Vice Commander, Strategic Air Command, has defined “assured destruction” as a reliable ability to “destroy a significant percentage of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our strategic forces.” 21 Any intelligence that affects assured Air technical intelligence was slow to materialize destruction capability is high on the priority for until World War II significant techno- list. Intelligence priority can be judged on logical surprise was hardly a possibility, much less a threat. One of the earliest U.S. items the basis of the likelihood that the information of air intelligence is the diagram and will alter our understanding of the military report of a Union Army reconnaissance ascent over the Hampton-Norfolk region of Virgínia, on balance of power or the comparative military AugustlO, 1861. This document is in the collec- capabilities. In general, intelligence, especially tion of the Old Records Section of The Adjutant General’s Office, U.S. Army. technical intelligence, is evaluated on the basis of relevance to U.S. decision-making. As the relevance of the intelligence varies, so should its priority. Such an approach allows alloca- tion of resources on more criticai issues at the expense of less important areas. warfare systems The use of Soviet military equipment by other nations brought to light the problem of the operation of Soviet warfare systems. The United Arab Republic has had difficulties with a mix of Soviet radars, interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles that must be analyzed from the viewpoint of an overall warfare Sys- tem. One suspects that the command and control, maintenance, and communication are fundamental problems which tend to degrade the quality of that equipment. As modem weapons are deployed through- out the world, part of the technical intelli- gence job is to assess the overall war-making capability. Each weapon system contributes 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to the overall total, but without an integrated posed to very low temperature. Not surpris- assessment, any view of a national capability ingly, this phenomenon has been important is grossly distorted. in Soviet agriculture, but other nations have not given it high priority. Hence, no techni- sensitivity to science cally strong research is being conducted on a large scale outside the Soviet Union. Prior to World War II the impact of tech- Judgments in such areas are extremely difficult nology during a war had not been great. and questionable. Similarly, the impact of science has not yet been fully felt in war. To be sure, science has net assessments changed the nature of war, but it has not An intelligence estimate, technical or other- yet been a dynamic factor during a war. wise, is not an end in itself. Intelligence has Nonetheless, the lead time from scientific dis- meaning only insofar as it enhances under- covery to application is being steadily short- standing of future interactions. Specifically, ened. In criticai areas in the future this time how military weapon Systems will interact in interval could be deceptively brief—on the combat is of prime concern. Isolated system order of five years. This telescoping of time capabilities and characteristics are not key from science to application is an issue of data. For example, a capability for tracking importance to the technical intelligence ana- a surface-to-air missile system is dependent lyst. Formerly it was sufficient to remain upon the vehicle to be tracked. Without defini- abreast of technological developments and tion of what is to be tracked, the tracking implications. Today and in the next decade capability really has no meaning. The Blue the scientific base and its military potential Ribbon Defense Panei described its concept of are essential elements of any comprehensive net assessments: evaluation. This problem is particularly difficult be- A Net Assessment Group should be created cause often the only people capable of assess- for the purpose of conducting and reporting ing the scientific advances in other countries net assessments of the United States and are the U.S. scientists in similar fields. This foreign military capabilities and potentials. factor tends to bias estimates. U.S. scientists This group should consist of individuais from naturally believe that the approaches used in appropriate units in the Department of their own research are the most promising. Defense, consultants and contract personnel appointed from time to time by the Secre- They often believe that other approaches are tary of Defense, and should report directly less attractive. This situation is inevitable, but to him.22 it forces the technical intelligence analyst into an untenable position. Either he assesses the This description does not treat the problems threat as greater than the most knowledgeable of net assessments. Problems arise because of scientists in the field do, or he accepts their the uncertainties of intelligence data and the somewhat biased views. fact that these net assessments will constitute Further difficulties arise in the assessment fundamental constraints on dod actions. of research for which no U.S. counterpart Intelligence uncertainties are often hidden in exists. On an unclassified levei, one example is the estimating process. Furthermore, not all the problem posed in attempting to judge the technical system estimates enjoy the same levei significance of vernalization experiments, that of confidence. Therefore, the art of net assess- is, enhancing the growth of certain plants if ments is to translate intelligence studies and the seeds are planted and subsequently ex- military systems data into realistic relative AIR FORCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 11 parameters. The vagaries of inteiligence may gence provides a basis for forecasting the frequently require that the comparison param- behavior of some of the elements. Technical eters be generated specificaUy for net assess- inteiligence has steadily grown and increased ments and not be a generaUy reported index. in sophistication. In World War II technical A net assessment, as described here, refers inteiligence was in its infancy. Cold war pres- to the comparison of military capabilities. It sures caused a maturation and major increase should not weigh weapon Systems, because in sophistication. During the sixties the ulti- individual weapon systems do not necessarily mate technical inteiligence product was an play identical roles in the warfare system. One individual weapon system analysis. Now these example would be a weapon system for which analyses are but building blocks to a broadcr the other side has no counterpart. The Soviet assessment—the warfare system. The warfare intermediate-range ballistic missiles would be systems and their component system analyses a case in point. There is no corresponding are the basis for the even broader problem weapon in the U.S. inventory. Clearly, of net assessments. weapon systems could not be compared in this Not only has the problem grown in the situation. sense that many weapon systems must be Consider the problem of comparing inter- assessed as an integrated military unit, but continental ballistic missiles. One aspect of also the development cycle has become criticai. the comparison would certainlv be the system Science can be brought to bear on military capability to destroy the adversary’s hard issues quickly and dramaticallv. targets. Yield, accuracy, and reliability are Hence, there have been changes in the involved as well as target hardness and target- nature of the technical threat as well as a ing considerations. Net assessments would changing requirement concerning the form of evaluate capabilities against enemv target the evaluations. These factors will have a pro- systems, not yield, accuracy, reliability, etc. found influence on the growth of technical Modem war is an incredibly complex inter- inteiligence in the seventies. action of men and machines. Technical intelli- Air War College Not e* 11. Brookc Nihart, "The Soviet Strategic Threat and U.S. 1. Thoroa» H. Moorer. "Inquiry into US5 Pueblo and EC—121 Decisions," Armed Forces Journal, 20 June 1970. p. 8. PUne IncidcnU," Heariog before the House of Repre»entative9 Spccial 12. Gcorge F. Eliot, "Tcchnological Surprise," Ordnance, Vol. 54, Subcommitlee on the USS Pueblo of the Committee on Arnied July-August 1969, p. 55. Service», HASC No. 91-10, Washington, CPO, 1969. p. 635. 13. FTD 1917-1967, p. 18. 2. Otto J. GUsser, "Shaping the Future,*’ Air Uniocrsity Review, 14. The Soviet Military Technological Challenge, p. 76. XXII. 1 (Norember-Decembcr 1970), 3. 15. FTD 1917-1967, p. 24. 3. The Soviet Military Technological Challenge, Cenlcr for 16. Crnig Powell, "Strategic Forces," Armed Forces Management, Strategic Studie», Ceorgetown Univeriity, Septcmbcr 1967. p. 8. Vol. 16. No. 7 (April 1970), p. 27. 4. FTD 1917—1967, Foreign Technology Diviaion, AFSC, Wright- 17. John S. Fostcr, "Soviet Multiple Worhends Duc Ncxt Year," Patter»on Air Force Ba*e, Ohio, 1968, p. 8. Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 106, August 16, 1969, p. 14. 5. We»ley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces 18. Air Force Manual 2-11, paragraph 2-3, 1 December 1965. in World War II, Vol. III (Chicago: Uoiversity of Chicago Press, 19. Williani T. Lee, "Soviet Military Industrial Complex, Pari II," 1951). p. W. Armed Forces Management, Vol. 16, No. 9 (June 1970), p. 41. 6. Íbid., p. 525. 20. Melvin R. Laird, "Countering the Strategic Threat," Supple- 7. FTD 19/7-/967, p. 12. ment to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 6—1970, p. 14. 8. íbid. 21. Glon W. Martin, "The Strategic Dctcrrcnl," Supplement to 9. John C. Mcyer, Supplemenc to Air Force Policy Letter for the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, No. 6—1970, p. 21. Commanders, 8-1970. p. 10. 22. Report to the Presidcnt and the Secretary of Defense on lhe 10. Harold Brown, “ Planning Our Military Force»," Foreign Affairt, Department of Defense by the llluc Ribbon Defense Panei, 1 July Vol. 45, January 1967. p. 280. 1970, Washington, GPO, p. 59. Andrew S. Carten, J k - N SEPTEMBER 1970 the Office of the way, it is a rerun of the clear air turbulence Air Force Deputy Inspector General for ( cat) crisis of the early 1960s except that Inspection and Safety circulated the follow- aviation is in a better position to cope with ingI message: the newer problem than it was when the cat THE INVESTIGATION OF A RECENT T-38 crisis developed. FATAL ACCIDENT INDICATES THAT EX- The Air Force Office of Scientific Research TREME TURBULENCE FROM TRAILING and the Boeing Company conducted a sym- VÓRTICES OF A LARGE AIRCRAFT, 747 OR posium on aircraft wake turbulence during 707 TYPE, MAY HAVE BEEN A MAJOR FAC- TOR IN THE ACCIDENT. THE T-38 WAS summer 1970 in Seattle, which attracted MAKING A LANDING APPROACH AND many aircraft designers, aeronautical re- APPARENTLY FLEW INTO THE TRAILING searchers, pilots, meteorologists, and operations VÓRTICES OF A LARGE AIRCRAFT THAT personnel as well as representatives of various HAD JUST COMPLETED A LOW APPROACH regulatory agencies. Several puzzling aspects ON A 30° BISECTING RUNWAY. ALTHOUGH THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION IS STILL of the wake turbulence picture were brought IN PROGRESS, IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE into focus at the symposium, and areas in T-38 PILOT LOST CONTROL OF HIS AIR- need of investigation were identified. This CRAFT DUE TO WAKE TURBULENCE. article will stress some of the key points made That message called attention to a safety there and will draw on other sources to explain problem that is becoming a crisis of serious the genesis of the problem, its operational proportions—the increasing incompatibility of impact, and possible alleviation techniques.1 the various types of aircraft constituting the Both as phenomena and as technical and traffic mix at busy airfields and in flight over operational challenges, clear air turbulence heavily traveled air routes. The crisis results and aircraft wake turbulence exhibit striking from the excessive wake turbulence generated similarities. In the belief that the wake turbu- by the new large swept-wing aircraft. In a lence problem will gain perspective if discussed 12 A1RCRAFT WAKE TURBULENCE 13 in the light of cat knowledge, I will review encountering turbulence. Although the num- briefly the cat situation and other related ber of severe encounters is decreasing, cat references. still deserves great respect, as the passengers on a PanAm 747 caught in turbulence attrib- uted to cat over Nantucket on 4 November the CAT crisis 1970 will agree.2 Moreover, the routine cir- In the initial stages of commercial jet trans- cumnavigation of suspected cat areas imposes port operations in the United States ( 1959— a large economic and time penalty on civilian 1961), aviation had to face up to a serious and military operations. Consequently re- problem for which it was not adequately pre- search by the Air Force and other federal pared—the presence of random patches of agencies continues, much of it at Air Force very turbulent air at cruise altitudes, 25,000- Cambridge Research Laboratories (afcrl), 40,000 feet. Since these patches are usually under the purview of the Interagency Clear found in the absence of clouds, they provide Air Turbulence Steering Group. An effective no advance warning to pilots. This type of airborne cat early-warning system is one of turbulence is called clear air turbulence to the major goals. distinguish it from the well-known turbulence With the battle against cat only partially associated with convective clouds, which is won, it is ironic that the era of the second- generally avoidable through use of airborne generation jet transports—the so-called jumbo radar. Several spectacular CAT-related inci- jets, 747, C-5, etc.—has been marred from dents, involving both military and civilian air- the start by the presence of a second craft, occurred during the early sixties and turbulence-oriented hazard, aircraft wake caused numerous personnel injuries and struc- turbulence. tural damage. A fatal B-52 accident during this period was blamed on cat. CAT versus aircraft wake turbulence One probable reason for aviation’s unpre- paredness was that earlier warnings from Both cat and aircraft wake turbulence can mountain wave and jet stream research pro- cause loss of control of encountering aircraft. grams had not reached enough people or Both frequently occur in clear air, without were not properly heeded. Those warnings, warning. incidentallv, had been supplemented during Many reported brief cat incidents may the fifties by Strategic Air Command reports actually have been penetrations of wake turbu- of clear air turbulence encountered by high- lence, and airborne instrumentation concepts flying B-36, B-47, and B-52 aircraft. Ánother for detecting cat remotely are also being reason was the magnitude of the problem. applied to wake turbulence detection. The conversion to jets was proceeding rapidly Major dissimilarities also exist between the while scientists and operations personnel two phenomena. cat occurs naturally, and struggled to obtain a working knowledge of usually in preferred locations (i.e., over moun- cat and cat countermeasures. tainous country and near the jet stream), and Today, the causes of cat are generally at preferred heights (i.e., near the tropopause established, and reasonably effective methods and in regions of high-altitude wind shear). have been developed for identifving areas in Aircraft wake turbulence is a man-made which cat is likely to be present. In addition, atmospheric disturbance found behind all air- pilots now employ special turbulence penetra- craft in flight, wherever they may be. Severe tion techniques to reduce the hazard and avoid cat can toss very large aircraft around quite earlier problems caused by overreaction on handily (witness the 747 incident over Nan- Figure 1. H azar d potentials of trailing vórtices (source: NASA) tucket) while wake turbulence in its most jumbo jets.* When multiple, regularly spaced severe form is a threat principally to medium- vórtices emanate from a source, the rings sized (DC-9, 737) and small aircraft. This combine to form a spiral or helix (e.g., curl- does not mean that larger aircraft are un- ing cigarette smoke) .3 This is essentially what affected by wake turbulence. The threat is happens at or near the wingtips of an aircraft simply less obvious. in flight. Aircraft vortex wakes are, in effect, A typical aircraft wake occupies a much two parallel, rapidly rotating, spiral “tubes” smaller volume of the sky than that occupied of air, up to 35 feet in diameter, trailing down- by a typical “patch” of cat, which can extend stream. (Figure 1) Although less severe than for hundreds of miles and be 2000 to 3000 natural tornadoes, they exhibit a tornado-like feet thick. The wake also tends to dissipate drop of pressure in their cores. They are called more rapidly than the cat. However, more “streamwise,” “trailing,” or “wingtip” vórtices extensive and more persistent volumes of wake or, more simply, aircraft wake turbulence. turbulence may be expected under busy air At cruise altitudes, they extend 10 to 40 lanes. Also, wake turbulence can hover over miles behind the generating aircraft. They are runways, where aircraft are most vulnerable frequently visible against a blue sky when, to unexpected loss of altitude or control. The under proper conditions of air saturation, the combination of poor visibility and a wake familiar condensation trails produced by encounter during landing operations is espe- engine exhaust persist and are entrained in cially dangerous. the vortex tubes—another example of flow visualization. (The reader is invited to verify the trailing vortex this phenomenon by skywatching.) Aircraft wake turbulence is not only a mark Are aircraft wakes really turbulent? of the jumbo jet era, it is to some degree a One might question the use of the word produet of it since the most dangerous atmos- * A vortex is a parccl of air in circular motion. A common pheric disturbances of this type are those example is the cigarette smoke ring; the smoke enables one to see the air in motion. It also typifies the kind of flow visualization associated with the trailing vortex wakes of the on which research in fluid dynamics depends heavily. AIRCRAFT WAKE TURBULENCE 15 “turbulence” when discussing vortex wakes. Establishment (Squire, Dee, Fose, Kerr), By definition, turbulence is an irregular veloc- among others, published explicit, experi- ity fluctuation imposed on the mean airflow. mentally supported warnings on vortex haz- It is made up of extremely variable eddies of ards in the 1955-1964 time period; but these a wide range of sizes and directions (e.g., the warnings, like the early cat warnings, appear wide and violent fluctuations of surface winds to have been largely unheeded. observable on a gusty day). cat is believed to have this random distribution of eddy sizes and directions despite its origin in organized the mounting evidence natural wave and vortex motions of the Inevitably, vortex wakes were recognized as atmosphere. more than just interesting and sometimes use- Aircraft vortex wakes, on the other hand, ful phenomena, particularly after reports of have a highlv organized circular flow, a upsets to light planes operating near the larger relatively stable geometry, and tangential first-generation jets (e.g., Boeing 707, B-52). velocities which remain constant for long A multiple-fatality takeoff accident to a com- periods of time. They are most dangerous muter aircraft at New York’s Kennedy Air- during their organized stage. When they port in 1969 is typical. The loss of control degenerate into random turbulence, they lack was blamed on the residual wake of a 707. the power to cause serious upsets to following The National Transportation Safety Board aircraft. The use of the word “turbulence” has records of at least 98 wake-caused acci- is justifiable, nonetheless, in that an aircraft dents in the past five years, with numerous Crossing the vórtices experiences buffeting fatalities. characteristic of turbulence encounters. action at last early investigations of trailing vórtices There is a strong correlation between the .Aircraft vortex wakes were known long before weight of an aircraft and the strength of its the advent of jet aircraft and the discovery of vórtices. With growing concern over haz- cat. Early (1900-1930) aeronautical experi- ardous wakes from the 300,000-pound first- menters Lanchester, Prandtl, Von Kármán) generation jet transports, aviation was finally postulated or demonstrated the presence of forced—in 1969—to examine the implications wingtip vórtices—findings that have been up- of wakes from the 700,000-pound C-5 and dated in subsequent studies. As aerodynamic 747 aircraft. shapes have become more sophisticated, vór- Preliminary calculations showed the 747 tices have been used not only to explain the and C-5, as well as the heavier versions of the dissipation of lift and drag energy but also as earlier DC-8 and 707 (and their Russian and actual sources of lift and control. In the T-tail British equivalents), to have powerful wakes aircraft, vortex management prevents deep indeed. Early in 1970 the Federal Aviation stalls. The highlv swept wing of the supersonic Administration ( faa) and the Air Force transport ( sst ) relies on vortex-generated imposed rigid separation distances (10 miles, lift for safe handling qualities at low speed.4 later reduced to 5 for FAA-controlled opera- In general, the effect of the vortex on the tions) between aircraft weighing more than generating aircraft seems to have been stressed 300,000 pounds and following lighter air- rather than the hazards to other aircraft. craft, distances which many felt to be too Investigators from nasa (Kraft, McGowan, conservative. (Previous separation distance Wetmore) and from the Royal Aircraft had been 3 miles.) By reducing the number 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of aircraft movements per hour, this regulation such as that around a cylinder. Our smoke has added to airfield congestion. VVith more ring is an example of this circular air motion; jumbo jets entering Service, theorists and a spinning golf bali has circulation. When experimenters have been working overtime to airflow past a body is added to the circular establish the true characteristics of the wakes airflow about the body, lift at right angles to of these planes, with emphasis on measurecl the airflow past the body is the result. In the vortex diameters, tangential velocities, decay case of the golf bali, it could mean a long times, and horizontal and vertical transport. drive, a hook, or a slice, depending upon the To appreciate their findings, one must delve direction of the propulsive force. a little into existing wake turbulence theory. Aircraft wings have circulation about them. VVhen the flow past the wing (produced by aircraft wake turbulence as a product of lift the forward motion of the aircraft) is added to the circulation about the wing, lift is Many people think of aircraft wakes in terms produced. As the lift increases, there must be of “prop wash'’ or jet engine exhaust. The in- a corresponding increase in circulation. This flight turbulence associated with the power has an important bearing on the strength of plants is actually short-lived. The principal the spinning vortex tubes trailing from the cause of the trailing vórtices which coastitute wingtips. Their circulations are essentially the the wakes is the lift generated by wing sur- circulations “spilled” from the wing, and their faces. As proof of this, wake turbulence is tangential velocities (i.e., peripheral speeds) present behind unpowered aircraft and even are directly proportional to those circulations. birds in flight. Geese are believed to adjust In other words, the larger its circulation, the their positions in formation flight instinc- greater the force a trailing vortex can impose tively to achieve maximum lift from the on an encountering object, such as the wing vortex wakes generated by their mates, the of a following aircraft. If the ability of the energy saved permitting longer-range flight. following aircraft to overcome the suddenly (Presumably, the birds take turns in the lead imposed load is exceeded, loss of control (often position.) Helicopter pilots in Southeast Asia fatal at low altitudes) will occur. ( sea ) refueling operations are reported to be The magnitude of the circulation depends using the wakes of tanker aircraft to decrease on a number of variables. It increases or rotor workloads during hookup, an obvious decreases depending on which of the variables range-extending maneuver. (Helicopters them- is changed or held constant. Thus, in discuss- selves generate powerful [and dangerous] ing vortex strength, one must know how heavy vortex wakes which have been useful in fog- the aircraft is, at what altitude and speed it clearing operations in sea, a technique tested is flying, and what its wingspan is. (In this at the Army’s Cold Region Research and paragraph and the next, let us assume a Engineering Laboratory and developed at constant wingspan.) Since lift can be equated AFCRL.) 5 with aircraft weight, increased weight requires increased circulation. One can expect very vortex theory strong updrafts, downdrafts, and lateral wind components, therefore, in the wake of a heavy As aircraft vortex generation involves aero- aircraft. dynamic theories not generally familiar, a For a given aircraft weight, circulation will brief discussion may be of interest. vary with changes in air densitv and in air- The key word in this discussion is “circula- craft velocities. The low, slow “dirty con- tion,” the concentric airflow about a body, figuration” (i.e., fiaps down) period of flight is usually considered the time of maximum Figure 2. Vortex sheet roll-up process (after Spreiter and Sacks) vortex production. At cruise altitudes and high cruise speeds, the increase in aircraft velocity (reduced circulation) more than cancels out the effect of reduced air density (increased circulation). There are reduced cruise speed conditions, however, when the vórtices at altitude can be as severe as those near the ground—conditions common to military mis- sions (e.g., refueling and formation flights) where maximum cruise efficiency is not realiz- able. (The high-velocity filament described later is a further complication.) the importance of attitude and of aspect ratio Aircraft tuming motions and changes in atti- tude (e.g., increased climb rate) will also cause variations in vortex strength (discussed further under vortex alleviation methods). In addition, circulation will increase if the A photograph taken during an early afcrl wingspan is decreased. This means that heavy cloud-seeding operation graphically illustrates aircraft of low aspect ratio, i.e., with very the trailing vortex formation with cloud tops short wingspans such as the highlv swept sst , serving as the flow visualization agent. will have very large circulations and high Photographv can show engine exhaust vortex tangential velocities. With high aspect smoke being caught up in the vortex wrap-up ratio long span) wings, added lift is possible process of a landing C-5. Here the exhaust without increased circulation. serves not onlv as a flow visualization agent but also as a vortex locator. There is evidence the vortex sheet and roll-up that the exhaust of T-tail aircraft with aft- Aerodynamicists have developed a vortex mounted engines (unlike the C-5’s wing- model that features a thin vortex “sheet” mounted engines) is not caught up in the flowing from the trailing edges of the wing. vórtices, in which event the smoke would The sheet undergoes a rolling-up process at not help to locate the vórtices. (The 747’s some distance behind the wing. (Figure 2) exhaust is “clean” and oílers no clue at all.) The roll-up is aided by the pressure differential between the bottom and upper surfaces of the the vortex radius wing, which imparts a characteristic rotational In 1950 Spreiter and Sacks of Ames Aero- movcment to the airflow at each wingtip nautical Laboratory of the National Aero- (clockwlse at the left wingtip, viewed from nautics and Space Administration ( nasa) the rear of the aircraft, and counterclockwise helped to bridge the gap between the pioneer- at the right wingtip). The resultant mutual ing work of the Prandtl school in Germany interaction between the two rolled-up vórtices (bascd for the most part on straight, high ca ases them to sink below the aircraft—a very aspect ratio wings) and the necd for data important consideration in wake turbulence on the new swept, low aspect ratio wings. avoidance and dissipation determinations. 1 hey showed that wing geometry greatly in- Wingtxp vorticts formed aft of a B-17 flying abovt ciou d deck (lejt) . . . Tht «ngine txhaust of a C-5 when land- mg u entrained in tht vortex (below). AIRCRAFT WAKE TURBULENCE 19 fluences vortex roll-up time.6 With delta wings, succession, with possible structural damage. for example, the roll-up is extremely rapid (Figure 1) Flight between the vórtices would (within a chord length or less of the trailing place the following aircraft in the downwash edge and well within the tail region). Using region and seriously degrade its rate-of-climb certain energy cutoff assumptions, they also performance. The table shows that wakes from postulated that the core radius of each rolled- other large aircraft are dangerous too, depend- up vortex (i.e., the distance from the center ing on the size and performance of the of the core to the region of maximum tan- encountering aircraft. gential velocity) is approximately one-tenth the distance between the two vórtices. This another look at the crisis relationship allows us to estimate how corn- pletely a specific following aircraft will be At this point the reader may ask: “Why the enveloped by a particular trailing vortex. The crisis, if trailing vórtices have been known Approximate Parameters and Wake Values for Selected Aircraft Max Max Vertical Gross Vortex Vortex Vortex Velocity Weight Span Airspeed Spacing Sink Rate Radius (less w) (w) (b) (V) (b') (w) (r) Convair (C-131) 46,000 92 237 72 162 7 1800 Boeing 727 169,000 108 272 86 372 9 4100 Boeing 707 328,000 145 300 115 366 12 4000 Boeing 747 710,000 196 300 155 432 16 4700 C-5 750,000 222 290 175 354 18 3900 Concorde 385,000 84 338 67 1120 7 12900 Boeing 2707 750,000 143 338 112 760 11 8500 Spreiter and Sacks theories were used exten- almost since the beginning of flight and if sively in vortex strength calculations released established theories explain their relationship in the past year or two. to other flight parameters?” The crisis derives Typical is the accompanying Air VVeather from the unavoidable commingling of air- Service table.7 It shows that an aircraft with craft of all sizes in the same airspace. To date, a 32-foot wingspan would be completely cap- segregation by size at airfields and in the air- tured by the vortex of a 747 if it were to fly lanes has been very difficult to implement, and into the vortex endwise. It would experience conditions have become increasingly intoler- induced roll rates far beyond its capacity to able for smaller aircraft. The first sweptwing control them. Larger aircraft would be jet transports and bombers accelerated the affected in proportion to their size. (In Boeing trend; the jumbo jets have sharply increased tests, a 737 was rolled 30° in a hair-raising the peril. encounter with a 747’s wake 100 feet above To appreciate the aircraft wake problem, the ground.) Transverse crossings of the 747 one has only to compare it with the corre- wake by other aircraft would subject them to sponding problem in boating, which also has severe updrafts and downdrafts in rapid greatly increased in volume and variety of 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW traffic. Small, unpowered or lightly powered ditions. A longer-range goal is to develop watercraft must frequently share the same instrumentation that will actually detect and river, lake, or harbor with high-powered track the vórtices. A third goal is the allevia- cruisers and outboards. With boats, safe co- tion of the problem by vortex destruction or existence can be assured through simple speed dissipation techniques. control. With aircraft, the problem is more l he problem is somewhat easier at jet cruise difficult, on several counts. Not only are air- altitudes. Most planes that fly at these leveis craft wakes usually invisible; their effects can are not endangered by wake encounters, be so catastrophic that little margin for error although all are affected to some degree. is possible. Reducing a boat’s speed auto- Small, short-span fighters and executive jet matically minimizes its wake generation, since transports pose a special problem. They are the momentum imparted to the water thrust upset easilv by a strong wake, as was graphi- behind by the boat is proportional to the cally demonstrated when a small nasa trans- square of the boat’s speed. With aircraft, the port was probing the wake of a C-5 and opposite is true. Circulation and wake turbu- rolled through 180° against the pilot’s input. lence increase when aircraft velocity is de- (Complete capture is relatively infrequent creased; the hazard to other aircraft landing in such tests, as the wake tends to cast aside or taking ofT is actuallv greatest when it should the would-be penetrator.) be least. The flight-no-flight transition zone At cruise altitudes, small jet aircraft should is too sensitive to be subjected to such large stay above the long-lived vórtices of larger unexpected upsetting forces. This is especially ones. In the event of an unexpected encounter, true of st oi. and vtol aircraft where forward altitude is a saving factor and should allow velocity is at a minimum and criticai depend- recovery. Unfortunatelv, this was not the encc is placed on high lift devices. case in the 1966 B-70 accident at Edwards afb in which a closelv following chase aircraft the needs identified was suspected to have been rolled over by the B-70 vortex wake, and both aircraft were To those responsible for the safe coexistence destroyed. of various sizes of aircraft in the terminal area, the minute-to-minute location of destructive vortex decay vórtices is of vital concern. Unless they are positive that vórtices from a previous large When aircraft weight is transferred from aircraft movement have drifted out of the wheels to wings during takeoff, lift is gener- path of a following lighter aircraft, they must ated, and the concomitant circulation initiates impose large time and distance separations. trailing vortex formation, a process that ceases An alternate possibility is to have lighter air- only on landing. What happens to the vórtices craft take ofT “short," so that their flight path is of concern now. is consistently above the trajectory of the Cruise altitude vórtices usually levei off at sinking vórtices from a preceding heavy air- about 1000 feet below the altitude of the craft, or to land “long,'’ which achieves the aircraft as their density comes into equilibrium same result.s This method does not cover all with that of the surrounding air. Decay situations, however. processes then take over. Two commonly With respect to terminal area operations, mentioned decay mechanisms are the mixing a primary goal is to develop methods of pre- action of eddy viscosity and the intcraction dicting vorfex presence, movement, and decay of the vórtices with each other. The eddy under various traffic and environmental con- viscosity mechanism is relatively slow and is A1RCRAF1' WAKE TURBULENCE 21 marked by many unknowns, particularly the usually make for the most dangerous condi- value of the eddy viscosity coefficient. The tions, since wake-destroying turbulence is at interaction mechanism is based on instability a minimum and the calm instills a sense of modes in the vórtices, which propagate sinus- complacency. oidal waves through the wake, bringing the two vórtices in contact with each other vortex detection, high-intensity cores periodically and causing them to break into vortex rings. (This occurrence can be seen in nasa has been particularly active in investigat- the sky when condensation trails are present.) ing instrumentation for detecting the presence Crow of Boeing believes that these rings and movement of vórtices near runways. This quickly disintegrate into chaotic and harmless work involves the use of a CO* Doppler laser turbulence.9 Others see the rings as stiil quite velocity-measuring system adapted from a cat dangerous. Crow also suggests that the vórtices detection system. A high-intensity, small-radius of the 747 (about 1.8 times as powerful as vortex jet or filament (accompanying photos), those of the 707) should break up faster than which is noted in nasa field experiments with 707 vórtices. He reasons that the instability the CO.- laser and a collocated smoke genera- propagates much more rapidly in vórtices of tor, suggests a more complicated vortex pic- higher intensity. ture than covered by the Spreiter and Sacks Neither the triggering mechanism nor the theories. These filaments (also noted by the ideal instability wavelength for vortex breakup faa and the Australian Department of Civil is known. A wavelength of 5 to 10 wingspans Aviation) were generated by low-flying test has been suggested. MacCready has proposed aircraft in the “clean” (i.e., wheels up, flaps mechanical excitation of the proper wave- up) configuration. (In actual operations, this length.1" Atmospheric turbulence and stability configuration is partially achieved in a “go- also play an important but not completelv around” situation when a landing is aborted.) understood part in the decay of the vortex The filament seems common, even at high flap wakes. settings, to T-tail aircraft with aft-mounted Vórtices generated below about 1500 feet engines (DC-9, 727), the clean wings appar- usually sink to just above the ground, 50 to ently permitting tighter \’ortex wrap-ups. The 100 feet. Their speed of descent varies with faa has recorded on film both the persistence the type of aircraft and with the local atmos- of the filament and its propensity towards pheric conditions. A figure of 450 feet per sudden destruction. It can be seen to whip minute is typical of large sweptwing jet trans- around in the sky and then suddenly burst ports. As the vórtices approach the ground, when it touches the smoke tower. It frequently thev spread apart and move sideways, at right displays a very strong axial component, prob- angles to the runway, at the same 450 feet ablv the result of smoke being entrained in per minute, roughlv 5 miles per hour. An the core’s intense vacuum. Acoustic verifica- opposing surface wind of 5 miles per hour tion of the filaments has also been reported will block horizontal movement of one vortex by faa personncl, who talked of “walking” while doubling the movement of the other, the filament across the test zone by listening transporting it perhaps to a runway inter- for the disturbed air sound. section or to a parallel runway. (Figures 3 This evidence of filament vórtices was one and 4) The time to disappearance of the of the highlights of the Seattle symposium. vórtices depends on the degree of low-level It helped to explain fiight tests reported by turbulence present, on mutual interaction, and the faa, by nrc (Canada), nasa, and affdl, on a number of other factors. No-wind davs/ in which tangential velocities higher than Figure 3 (left) illustrates vortex movement near the ground with no wind, and Figure 4 (right) shows vortex movement near the ground with a crosswind (after W. A. McGowan). predicted by theory were encountered. The Both photographs (courtesy of NASA) evidence also made it clear that much remains illustrate C-47 vortex visualization. to be learned about the trailing vortex, espe- cially in connection with modern aircraft. The Spreiter and Sacks theory, which places the highest tangential velocities at a core radius equal to one-tenth the vortex span, apparently correlates best with wakes gener- ated by aircraft in the “dirty” configuration, such as at landing. Where the filament is present, tangential velocities at least twice as high as predicted have been encountered, and the vortex filament radius is only about one-third the expected value for the core radius. There is evidence also that even when the filament is present there is an induced vortex (externai to the filament) whose radius and tangential velocities are in accord with the older theory. Experiments by McCormick, et a/.,11 who use a different energy cutoff value than Spreiter and Sacks, correlate better with the filament phenomenon. vortex alleviation Several vortex “alleviation” (breakup) mech- anisms or techniques were discussed at Seattle. One suggestion was a porpoising of the air- craft during landing and taking off. Changes in angle of attack would presumably alter circulation, introducing periodic instabilities 22 r in the vórtices. Passenger discomfort ruled out nation of vórtices near a runway via a gigantic this idea. Another suggestion, which would suction system was felt to be impractical. use somewhat the same technique, involved an adaptation of the Load Alleviation and Simil a r it ie s between the current aircraft Mode Stabilization (lams) system, in which wake turbulence crisis and the earlier clear automatically induced symmetrical oscillatory air turbulence have been pointed out. It has movements of the aircraft wing control sur- also been shown that the problem of aircraft faces would introduce perturbations in the wake turbulence has been growing over the vórtices without disturbing the passengers. years as a result of the tremendous quantitative (The usefulness of lams in alleviating struc- increases in vortex strengths that have come tural loading and possible upset tendencies in with low aspect ratio heavy aircraft. The need vortex encounters was also discussed, although to operate various sizes and kinds of aircraft the application seems practical only for large at the same airfield at the same time is shown aircraft.) A third proposal featured vortex to be the crux of the problem. alleviators on the wings of the generating air- Flight tests have demonstrated that vortex craft—essentially flat plates lifted into the cores and tangential velocities are frequently airstream. NASA-Ames Ls currently working on different from those predicted from theory. this technique, but results to date have been This is espccially true of aircraft in the “clean” inconclusive. A suggested “brute force” elimi- configuration and of T-tail aircraft with aft- 23 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW mounted engines. The need for additional tary flights. The use of smoke trails to mark knowledge and the search for methods of the presence of wake vórtices has some merit assuring peaceful coexistence were summed up for daytime use but probably would not be at the 1970 Symposium on Aircraft Wake allowed in today’s world of antipollution Turbulence. pressures. A vortex-detection system, capable Conservative separations, in time and in of identifying minute-to-minute conditions in distance, between the large aircraft and the the vicinity of an airfield, will be developed aircraft small enough to be affected by wake turbulence will be in order for some time. and should become standard equipment at The peculiar requirements of military opera- major airfields within the next decade. Vortex tions, which tend to maximize vortex produc- alleviation methods may eventually bring tion at times, will dictate against use of the about quick dissipation of wakes, but this same separation criteria for civilian and mili- cannot be predicted with certainty. Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories Notes 1. The proceedings of the 1970 Aircraft Wake Turbulence Sym- 6. J. R. Spreiter and A. H. Sacks, “ The Rolling Up of the posium are being published and will be available later this year. Trailing Vortex Shect and Its Effect on the Downwash Behind Wings," I must defer to that publication for a proper listing of papers Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences, January 1951, pp. 21-32. given and their authors as well as for a more definitive treatm ent 7. D. N. Jones, “ Introduction to Jet-Engine Exhaust and Trailing of the subject matter. In this article, it is impossible to give proper credit to individuais. Vortex Wakes,” Technical Report 226, Air Weather Service, April Another symposium on turbulence and CAT was held in Washington 1970. on 22—24 March 1971. with over a thousand pcople in attendance. 8. W. A. McGowan, “ Avoidance of Aircraft Trailing Vortex Its findings did not differ significantly from those of the earlier Hazards,” NASA Report, October 1970. one in Seattle. 2. References to the 707, 727, 737, and 747 are to Boeing commer- 9. S. C. Crow and J. H. Olsen, “ The Duration of Trailing cial transporta; DC-8 and DC-9 references are to McDonnell-Douglas Vórtices: 747 and 707,” Boeing Company Flight Sciences Laboratory commercial transporta. Air Force equivalents, C—135 and C -9, may Technical Communication 008, October 1969. be substituted for 707 and DC-9 references. 10. P. B. MacCready. Jr., “ An Assessment of Dominant Mecha- 3. B. Quinn, “ Cigarettes, Vortice9, and V /Stol,” Air Force nisms in Vortex-Wake Decay,” Aircraft Wake Turbulence Sym* Research Review. July—August 1970. posium, Seattle, Washington, 1—3 Septem ber 1970. 4. P. M. Sforra. “ Aircraft Vórtices: Benign or Baleful?” Space/ Aeronautics, A pril 1970, pp. 41 ff. 11. B. W. McCormick, J. L. Tangler, and H. E. Sherrieb, 5. V. Plank, “ Fog Modification by Ü9e of Hclicopters,” AFCRL “ Structurc of Trailing Vórtices,” Journal of Aircraft, Vol. 5, No. 3 Report 70-0593, 23 October 1970. (May—June 1968). pp. 260-67. HE PLANNED production of a United 1964. The principal objective was to ascertain States supersonic transport ( sst ) was the public reaction to sonic booms of inten- Tintended as the next logical step in the sities on the order of 1.5 to 2.0 pounds per evolution of space-age transportation. While square foot (psf) peak overpressure. This was there has not yet appeared to be a distinct the predicted intensity of overpressure to be military requirement for an sst , the Air Force expected from an sst . Air Force B-58, F-101, nonetheless followed its progress with keen F-104, and F-106 aircraft were used to interest and anticipation. It was believed that, generate the booms. at minimum, spin-off from it would find A second phase of the Oklahoma City area valuable military application. Indeed, Dr. test was conducted to study specifically the John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense effects on structures of varying sonic-boom Research and Engineering, seemed eminently intensities. This test series was performed at right when he described the potential con- White Sands Missile Range in New México tribution of the supersonic transport to de- from 18 November 1964 through 15 February fense as “indirect but not insignificant” by 1965. B-58 and F-104 aircraft were employed, “reinforcing the technological base upon and sonic booms were gcnerated of intensities which defense vvill be drawing for the develop- up to 38 psf peak overpressure. ment of military systems.” 1 A third test series was carried out at As the sst operates supersonically over Edwards afb, Califórnia, from 3 June to 23 populated areas of the globe, a sonic boom June 1966 and from 31 October 1966 to 17 mav be created that is capable of destroying January 1967. In this program the Air Force property and provoking substantial public was designated the implementation agency opposition. This fact is especially criticai in and program manager, with technical assist- light of the current emphasis on environmental ance from the Stanford Research Institute. pollution. The sonic boom from the sst looms Again, the determination of human reaction as a possibly serious intruder into the nation’s and structural response to the sonic boom was justifiablv deserved peace and quiet. The per- a prime objective. Peak overpressures up to sistent lay question is simply whether the sst 3.0 psf were generated by F-104, SR-71, and is worth the price of enduring its sonic boom. XB-70 aircraft. Sonic-boom ground over- Recent research has begun to shed some pressure measurements for flights at altitudes light on the problem. Notably, the Air Force in excess of 70,000 feet and at speeds up to has played a significant role in the experi- Mach 3.0 were provided by the SR-71. mental research toward an operational super- In addition to these flight research pro- sonic transport that will not be objectionable grams, data have been made available from to society. To answer some of the questions public complaints and damage claims from concerning the impact on society of the sonic operational flights of military aircraft where boom from the sst , the Federal Aviation sonic booms have been generated of routine Administration, in conjunction with the necessity. The SR-71 Category III testing United States Air Force and several contract- from 1 July to 30 September 1967 is an ing firms, embarked on a series of sonic-boom example of such operational stimulation of measurement tests. These tests were the first public reaction. major effort anvwhere in the world to measure Another research effort is presently being quantitatively the effects of the sonic boom on conducted in which operational flights of the populated areas. SR-71 are being used to generate sonic booms The test. program was conducted at Okla- for study. This program is being conducted homa City from 3 February through 30 July by the Environmental Science Services Admin- 26 SONIC BOOM AND THE SUPERSONIC T RANS FORT 27 istration of the U.S. Department of Commerce flight conditiom in the Pendleton, Oregon, and Goldburg, An airplane that is creating a sonic boom will Idaho, areas. be flying at a particular altitude and Mach Other ongoing research programs continue number and may or may not be maneuver- to study the various aspects of sonic booms. ing. These three flight conditions determine Experimental and theoretical research at the magnitude of the sonic boom that is felt nasa's Langley and Ames research centers on the ground. is being conducted on the feasibility of reduc- It is probably intuitive to the reader that ing or eliminating the sonic boom bv modify- as the altitude of the airplane increases, the ing the shape of the airplane. This work may sonic-boom intensity on the ground decreases. hold the eventual solution to the sonic-boom This is indeed the case; in fact, the altitude is problem. the one single variable that has the greatest A consequence of these research efforts has effect on sonic-boom reduetion. The reason been a substantial enhancement of understand- is twofold: the magnitude of the shock wave ing in three principal areas: diminishes with the distance traveled, and • Generation and propagation of the the intensity of the shock wave as it is gener- sonic boom ated decreases with the decreasing air density. • Human behavioral response to the The variation of boom intensity with flight sonic boom Mach number is not as intuitive. The peak • Effects of the sonic boom on struc- overpressure of the sonic boom increases slowly tures and structural material. with aircraft speed up to about Mach 1.4. As velocity increases above this point, the It is not coincidental that these areas are the accompanying decrease in aircraft angle of ones that were outlined in 1964 by the attack becomes the predominant factor, and National Academy of Sciences’ Committee the boom intensity begins to decrease slightly. on ssT-Sonic Boom as needing special study. For practical purposes, this decrease is insig- While the gains made in each area ha ve been nificant, and the boom intensity above Mach extensive and certainly bevond the scope of 1.4 may be regarded as remaining constant. a single article, it is interesting to review, if If an airplane traveling at supersonic veloc- only in part. some of the fruits of the efforts. ity maneuvers by turning, porpoising, or accelerating, the effect is to focus the sonic Sonic-Boom Generation boom at points on the ground. The sonic booms so focused are known appropriately An airplane traveling at supersonic speed as superbooms. Recent French studies have is creating shock waves that will manifest indicated that magnification may be as thcmselves as a sonic boom if they reach the high as five times under focusing conditions. ground. The generation of the shock waves Fortunately, such points cncompass only 100 and their subsequent propagation through the to 200 fcet. atmosphere are well understood and substan- tiated by measurement. In fact, all the factors atmospheric conditiom entering into the formation and final intensity of the boom can conveniently be placed in Sonic-boom measurement tests have revealed three categories: how the airplane is ílown variation in recorded peak overpressures from 'flight conditions), atmospheric conditions, a single aircraft flying at constant speed and and airplane design. The fundamentais of altitude. These variations are attributed to each category are relativcly simple. nonuniformities in the atmosphere. Glouds, to the boom in the lateral direction (per- pendicular to the airplane flight path). The term “lateral cutoff point” is used to describe the lateral distance from the flight path where the shock front has been refracted to move parallel with the ground. This, of course, ií the border of the sonic-boom path. The boom Ihrethold Moch numbei throhold Moch numbor path, or “bang zone,” will grow wider aí aircraft altitude and Mach number increase. Figure I. Threshold Mach number. Even when flying For an sst flying at 65,000 feet, the boom at supersonic speeds, an aircraft will not boorn the path will be 65 miles wide. ground if its speed is below the threshold Mach number. airplane design turbulence, wind, and sharp temperature in- The third general area under which the versions are inhomogeneities in the atmosphere variables that affect the intensity of the sonic that alter the intensity of the sonic boom. boom can be grouped is that of airplane Such atmospheric perturbations rarely cause design. Within this category fali such variableí a variation of more than 0.3 psf, however, as aircraft weight, length, and what are knowr and can be neglected in analyses of boom as design parameters. “Design parameters’ effects on communities. means the details of the shape of an airplane. An important phenomenon in the atmos- The weight of the airplane has a very simplc phere that cannot be neglected is the refractive relationship to the intensity of the sonic boorr effect of the normal atmospheric temperature generated. The sonic-boom peak overpressure change on the shock-wave front. Since the varies directly with weight. The maximurr speed of sound increases with increases in air takeoff weight of the American sst waí temperature, as the shock-wave front nears expected to be around 750,000 pounds, more the earth and enters warmer air, it bends than twice the original design objective ol forward. If the airplane is not moving at too 350,000 pounds prescribed in 1963. At thi; high a supersonic speed (the shock front is heavy weight, difficulty would certainly b< not swept back too far), this refraction may expected from the overpressures generated i) cause the direction of travei of the shock it were the only design consideration. front to become parallel with the ground. A factor that tends to affect the peak over Under this condition, the sonic boom will not pressure is the length of the aircraft: the reach the ground and will not be heard. This longer the airplane, the less intense is the phenomenon gives rise to the threshold Mach sonic boom. The length of the projectec number effect. (Figure 1) The threshold Boeing 2707 sst was 298 feet, a length which Mach number is a speed above which an would have offset, somewhat, the intensity o airplane must be flying for its boom to be the sonic boom generated. However, tht felt on the ground. Under standard atmos- longer aircraft are also the heavier aircraft pheric conditions, the threshold Mach number so that, in general, larger airplanes generatc for an airplane above 35,000 feet is around larger booms. Mach 1.2. A problem on which a significant amourr The effect of temperature refraction acts of effort is currently being expended is tha1 on the sonic boom in another important way. of determining how airplane design param It limitá the area of ground that is exposed eters affect the size of the boom. It has turned SONIC BOOM AND THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT 29 out to be one of the most difficult aspects of mination for the supersonic transport under the sonic-boom problem, almost on a scale varying flight conditions and weight. For with determining how people will react to the illustrative purposes, a determination has been boom. Yet it is a tremendously significant presented for an sst weighing 750,000 pounds area in which a breakthrough may mean a and flying at 60,000 feet at Mach 2.7. The solution to the entire boom problem. length of the sst was taken as 300 feet. As can be seen, the nominal peak overpressure Eaeh of the variables that is known to affect under these conditions is 1.9 psf. the creation of a sonic boom can be mathe- matically represented and combined into an The other two areas where understanding equation. This allows for the calculation of has increased as a product of sonic-boom the peak overpressure of a sonic boom pro- research are (1) human behavioral reaction duced by an aircraft of varving size, shape, to the sonic boom as it interrupts ordinary and weight under different flight conditions. living activities and (2) damage to propertv Such theoretical determination of sonic-boom from the sonic boom. Investigation within intensity has been developed to a high degree these two areas has been pointed toward of dependability. answering one question: What levei of sonic- From a nomograph presented by John H. boom intensity will be acceptable to society, YViggins, Jr., in his book Effects of Sonic considering both noise annoyance and boom Boom,- I have constructed a nomograph damage? depicting determination of overpressure. On the basis of the data gained from the (Figures 2a and 2b) This nomograph is a sonic-boom measurement tests, the permissible product of present-day theorv on the genera- levei of sonic-boom intensity may now be tion and propagation of the sonic boom. It can known. However, the maximum intensity levei be used for reliable peak overpressure deter- short of propertv damage is not necessarily Figure 2a. Determination of nominal peak overpressure Figure 2b. Continued measurement of peak overpressure 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the levei that is acceptable to the public. Each on the “perceived noise decibel” (PNdB) of area must be considered independently. a sonic boom. The PNdB is a rating applied to aircraft noise that describes its annoyance or unacceptability. It is necessarily a subjec- Human Behavioral Response tive rating, for what may be extremely irritat- The most difficult part of the sonic-boom ing to one person may not be so disturbing problem associated with the supersonic trans- to another. An increase of ten PNdB is port is determining how people will react to normally equivalent to doubling the “noisi- the boom. The variables in the problem are ness” of a sound. practically infinite in number and particularly Kryter established his PNdB leveis from the elusive to measurement. The problem was subjective ratings by individuais of the noise stated in 1963 by Headquarters usaf: from subsonic jet aircraft (KC-135) flying overhead at varying altitudes and engine . . . the effect that sonic booms will have on power settings. This provided a good base to the general public remains an open question . . . Early work has served mainly to point which sonic booms could be compared, since out the extreme complexity of the problem. public reaction to subsonic aircraft noise is Not only must the magnitude of the sonic fairly well known. At Edwards, test subjects boom be considered, but also the complaint rated the acceptability of the noise from sonic potential of the community being studied. booms of varying intensity against subsonic It has been found that community tolerance engine noise of known PNdB levei. Kryter depends on such factors as an awareness of was thus able to correlate the noise from what causes the booms, people’s feelings sonic booms with specific PNdB values. The toward the Air Force and aircraft industry results from this correlation are shown in in general, neighborhood pride, and the Figure 3.4 presence or absence of other community problems.3 The lower boundary of the affected zone in Figure 3 represents the noise rating assigned The Oklahoma City area tests revealed that to sonic-boom overpressures by a community other factors should be added to those cited that had been acclimated to sonic booms. The above. The daily number of booms to which upper boundary represents the reaction of a a community is subjected is an important con- community that had had infrequent previous sideration in determining how people will exposure to sonic booms. react to the sonic boom. Another factor to An accurate prediction of the public reac- weigh is that a community with a history of tion to sonic booms must not only consider exposure to sonic booms will tend to gain a the overpressure of the booms but should also degree of acclimation to their occurrence. take into account their frequency of occur- As a result of the work performed during rence. This is done by use of a rating called the Edwards afb test series, a method now the “composite noise rating” ( cnr). The exists whereby the public reaction to sonic cnr value for a noise is obtained from a booms of a particular intensity, occurring at mathematical relationship which includes the a certain frequency per day, can be predicted. PNdB levei and the number of noise occur- The method was devised by Karl D. Kryter rences (N ). It is expressed by the relationship: and associates at the Stanford Research Insti- tute. Dr. Kryter was the director for the CNR = PNdB -12 + / psychological portion of the Edwards afb where / is a number that increases as the experiments. number of occurrences per day increases Kryter and his associates based their work (/ = 10 log.oW).5 SONIC BOOM AND THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT 31 cnr value can be converted to a range of public reactions; to determine which reaction within that range should be chosen, such factors as community motivation toward avia- tion and people’s feelings toward the activity creating the sonic booms should be weighed. The center line of the figure represents an average community. Damage to Property Recorded incidents of damage attributed to sonic forces are not new to history. In fact, Figure 3. Perceived noise leveis of the first recorded occurrence took place thou- sonic boom nominal peak overpressure sands of years ago at the ancient Palestinian Several studies have been made of the citv of Jericho. The event was the Battle of acceptability of subsonic jet noise, and the Jericho, where, purportedly, Joshua, with a public reaction has been fairly well deter- mighty blast of trumpets and shout of voices, mined. The results of these studies are pre- tumbled the Jericho walls. However, a more sented in Figure 4,® which depicts the pubhc recent investigation of the event by Major reaction for a particular cnr value. The range Tollack, chief engineer of the Allenby in- of reactions depicted is to be expected, since vasion of Palestine in World War I, suggested each community’s reaction depends upon its that the wall was not felled by the blast of particular complaint potential. horns and shouting. Major Tollack proposed Since PNdB values have been assigned to that the wall fell because of the undermining sonic-boom overpressures by Kryter, et al., of the foundation stones by tunneling opera- from the Edwards afb experiments, a method tions while the defenders of Jericho were dis- is complete wherebv public reaction to sonic- tracted by Joshua’s horn blowing.7 Such an boom exposure can be predicted. From Figure explanation might seem more plausible than 3 the PNdB can be obtained that corresponds that originally claiined. to the average peak overpressure of a series It is interesting that this event is strangely of sonic booms. A cnr value can be calculated analogous to the present-day sonic-force prob- from the PNdB value and number of sonic lem—the boom from a supersonic airplane. booms occurring per day. From Figure 4 the For while there are many damage claims, Figure 4. Relation between noise and corresponding community re- sponse. Dashed lines represenl range of possible reaction; the solid line is estimated average. 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW purportedly due to sonic-boom forces, further variation in sonic-boom intensity investigation often reveals that other causes of As the sst flies supersonically at a particular the damage were more probable. Additionally, altitude and speed, it will generate a sonic it is often military investigators who arrive at boom whose peak overpressure can be theoreti- the correct explanation. cally determined by, for example, a nomo- A major question posed by the advent of graph (as in Figure 2). This value of peak the supersonic transport concerns structural overpressure is called the nominal peak over- respoase to sonic booms: At what levei of pressure. In practice, however, because of the sonic-boom intensity can damage be expected? many unpredictable variables such as non- The answer to this question will not only aid uniform atmospheric conditions, the peak in assessing legitimate sonic-boom damage overpressure actually experienced rarely cor- claims; it will also serve to predict damage responds exactly to the nominal peak over- from the sonic boom of the anticipated sst . pressure predicted by theory. The precise determination of the response A meaningful analysis of the damage to be of a structural element to a sonic boom is a expected from a supersonic transport must good deal more complicated than just measur- include the higher leveis of overpressure that ing the peak overpressure of the boom. The often occur. The highest peak overpressure myriad of variables affecting the sonic boom likely to occur when a nominal peak over- as it is generated and propagated, plus the pressure has been calculated is expressed by complexity of the response by a structure, the equation: make it difficult, if not impossible, to predict exactly the damage that will be caused by a P max P nom ( 1 "f" N Cv) particular supersonic overflight. To answer where Pmax is the highest likely peak over- the question of damage expectancy, two fur- pressure, Pnom is the nominal peak overpres- ther questions must be posed: Can the varia- sure, Cv is the coefficient of variation (Cv = tion in boom intensity be predicted from what .20 on a normal day), and N is the signifi- is known about the generation of the sonic cance factor. (For N — 2.3, 99% of the time boom? And is there some simple quantity, the peak overpressure will be at or below such as peak overpressure, to which a corre- the Pmax.) sponding structural response can be predicted It should be clear that use of the P max in to an acceptable degree? damage prediction will provide a conservative The book by Wiggins outlines a statistical result, since this high value of peak over- method that circumvents the complexities of pressure will occur only rarely. However, the problem and offers answers to these since there is a reasonable probability of a questions.8 The many variables involved in peak overpressure occurring at or near the determining both the maximum value of over- P max value, the use of P max is warranted. pressure and the structural response cause them to behave like random variables. In fact damage probability it is reasonable to assume that the sonic-boom phenomena have a normal bell-shaped dis- The damage that will be inflicted by a sonic tribution, which renders the problem amen- boom of particular peak overpressure cannot able to a statistical approach. The use of be precisely stated. Instead, a statistical analy- statistics provides a means to predict the sis must be employed that will predict the variation in the sonic-boom intensity. It also probability of damage. The highest likely peak allows the use of peak overpressure as an overpressure determined by the above method index for a corresponding damage probability. should be used as the intensity of the boom. Since glass is the material most susceptible to damage from sonic booms, it can serve as a convenient threshold index for predicting the sonic-boom intensity levei that will begin to cause damage. Fortunately, glass damage data are of sufficient quality and quantity that a model for predicting glass damage can be constructed. Just such a representation is shown in Figure 5, which presents the prob- ability of damage to a glass pane from a single boom of particular peak overpressure.9 A probability of 1 means the pane is certain to break; a probability of 10-1 (or 1/10) means one pane out of ten will break, and Figure 5. Probability of window pane breakage so on. At first sight, the curve in Figure 5 appears to be overly conservative. For instance, at 10 psf, which represents an unusually loud boom, there is only one chance in a thousand toward the amelioration of an unfortunate that a particular pane will break. Yet the prob- problem: that an sst , with its many benefits, ability of glass damage to one pane does not would also bring a formidable sonic boom, have to be very large to have one pane break with its unpredictable social and economic when literally millions of panes are exposed consequences. The sonic-boom measurement to a certain overfiight. programs have provided quantitative informa- The sonic-boom intensity levei at which tion for a better knowledge of the effect of damage begins to occur is not a fine, precise the sonic boom on society. Indeed, because of point. It can be taken as that boom intensity light shed on the probable public reaction to where glass breaks. But this intensity is a the boom, the first-generation sst will most hazy range of values that depends upon the likely be restricted from supersonic flight chosen probability of glass breakage. There is except over the oceans. no problem here, however, since at the lower The current acceptable levei of sonic-boom sonic-boom leveis where community reaction magnitude has been reasonably well estab- is acceptable the probability of glass breakage lished. Advancing technology shows promise is entirely negligible, even when millions of that the sonic boom can be reduced below the panes are considered. criticai levei and that a second-generation supersonic transport, unlimited in its opera- We have seen that recent sonic-boom re- tion, may lie in the future. search programs have provided real strides Air Command and Staff College Xotes on Sonic Booms Conducted at Edwnrds Air Force Base. Final Report i 1. Edgar E. UUamer. "The SST It V iul «o the National Intereat," (Mento Parle, Califórnia: Stanford Research Instilute, August 1968), Air Force and Space Difest. Vol. 53. No. 2 (February 1970), p. 52. p. 16. 2. John H. Wiggin», Jr.. Egects o/ Sonic Boom (Paios Verde». 5. Karl D. Kryler, "Sonic Boom» and Supersonic Transport," Califórnia: J. H. Wiggin» Company, 1969), pp. 14. 15. Science. Vol. 163. No. 3865 (24 January 1969) , p. 365. 3. The Sonic Boom Problem. Ofhce of the Director of Developmenl 6. Ibid. (Reproduced courtesy K. D. Kryler.) Planning, Hq USAF, March 1963. p. 26. 7. Wiggin», p. 96. 4. Figure 3 ha» been conslructed from data preaented in K. D. 8. Ibid., pp. 133-36. Kryter. P. J. Johnaon. and J. R. Young, Piycholoficnt Experimente 9. Ibid.. p. 87. (Reproduced courtesy J. H. Wiggin».) THE UNIQUENESS OF THE EARTH NE of the most significant general results of the space program of the O United States has been the new per- spective on our earth achieved for all mankind with the magnificent color pictures of the planet brought back from the Apollo missioas. The dazzling beauty of the earth, with its swirling white cloud cover and the sparkling azure of her oceans, is breathtaking. From out in space where the earth can be seen as one among many astronomical bodies, no others have anything to compare with her beauty. The earth has an incredibly long history, and her present adornment of atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere, and noosphere is the achievement of that history. It was made possible by a remarkable and delicate com- bination of circumstances which, when fully appreciated, suggests a largely unrecognized uniqueness for the earth. This can be best appreciated by considering the history of the earth in parallel with the contrasting histories of the other planets in the solar system and of the sun itself. For this purpose a number of other less well-known missions of the U.S. and Soviet space programs have provided much new and relevant information. With this information combined with knowledge derived from other sources, a fairly reliable general account of the history of the solar system can now be given. The Thomas D. White Lectures continued at Air University on 2 March 1971 when the speaker was Dr. William G. Pollard, Executive Director of the Oak Ridge Associated Universities. The Review is pleased to present an adaptation of that lecture. T he Editor 35 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW The Earth among the Planets of ice and some entrapped ammonia and methane in them. These in turn fell together The sun and planets were formed 4.6 in growing bodies that became the lesser billion years ago in the collapse of a great planets: Mercury, Venus, Mars, earth, moon, cloud of gas and dust falling in on itself under and the asteroids (which were prevented its own gravity. The gases were mainly hydro- from consolidating into a planet by the power- gen and helium, with the less abundant car- ful gravity of nearby Júpiter). Farther out bon, nitrogen, and oxygen present as methane the very cold hydrogen and helium were (CFL), ammonia (NH3), and water (FLO). gathered under their gravity and condensed Floating in this gas was a relatively small into the major planets Júpiter and Saturn, amount of dust of silicates and metais, mostly which are low-density bodies very different iron. The heavy elements in this cloud, from from the inner planets. They may have central iron through uranium, had been freshly cores of solid helium surrounded by thick synthesized one or two hundred million years mandes of metallic hydrogen with outer earlier in a vast explosion of a previous star, atmospheres of hydrogen, ammonia, and which became a supernova. methane. Most of this cloud condensed into a large At first all the inner planets, including the central body, which became the sun. A few earth, must have been much alike: bare, tenths of a percent of it, however, was thrown rocky bodies pockmarked with craters result- out by centrifugai force in the rotating, ing from their growth by the falling together collapsing mass into a great platter in the of great chunks of rock. The heat of these plane of the sun’s equator, like the rings of collisions released gases trapped in the rock Saturn. In the meantime the center of the so that they all acquired a growing atmosphere condensing mass became hotter and hotter of ammonia, methane, and water. In all of as the gas was more and more compressed. them, radioactive materiais-—mainly uranium, The temperature at the center of the sun thorium, and potassium generated in the reached the hydrogen-bomb ignition tempera- ancestral supernova—steadily generated heat ture of several million degrees centigrade, and deep in their interiors. Possibly the earth and the hydrogen in the central core ignited ex- Venus collected more iron, uranium, and plosivelv. This explosion has been going on in other metais than the others and so experi- the sun’s central core for the last four and a enced greater internai heating than the moon half billion years. Elsewhere in the universe, and Mars. In time this internai heat also before and since, other interstellar gas clouds melted the rock, and the rising pressure re- have been undergoing gravitational collapse leased it in volcanoes with great lava flows in the same way and producing stars. Our own and quantities of steam, additional carbon galaxy contains over a hundred billion of dioxide or methane, and nitrogen. them, and new ones are being formed all the Only the earth was at just the right distance time. from the sun for the released steam to con- The young sun was quite active, producing dense as rain and collect over the surface in great solar fiares and an intense solar wind. rivers, lakes, and eventually oceans. On Venus In the first hundred million years, this wind and Mercury the temperature was always too swept much of the hydrogen and helium out high for this, and the steam remained in their of the space near the sun well beyond the atmospheres as water vapor. On Mars it carne present orbit of Mars. The heavier materiais down as snow and collected as ice. Only in the meantime condensed into growing occasionally in brief warm periods would chunks of stone and iron, with a good deal there have been liquid water such as one sees THE UNIQUENESS OF THE EARTH 37 here on the Greenland ice cap. For the first there was converted to solid carbonates, such several billion years the moon may well have as limestone, of which the earth’s crust has been a separate planet in an orbit around the great quantities. On Venus, in the absence of sun near the earth s orbit. liquid water, the carbon dioxide remained in There are two important and somewhat the atmosphere. At present Venus has about related points to be made about the hydrogen- the same amount of nitrogen as the earth containing compounds methane, ammonia, but has an enormous mass of carbon dioxide, and water in the early history of all these so that the atmospheric pressure at the surface planets. At the top of their atmospheres the of Venus is over a hundred times that on the intense ultraviolet light from the sun con- earth, nearly a ton per square inch. Under tinually knocked hydrogen atoms out of all this crushing atmospheric canopy, the tem- these molecules. The very fast-moving hydro- perature at the surface is 800°F, hot enough gen atoms, when moving directly away from to melt lead. There may be mountain-forming the planet, would occasionally have enough volcanoes and earthquakes on Venus as there velocity to escape from it completely. This are on the earth, but there has never been was very much the case with the moon, for any water erosion with resulting sedimentary which the escape velocity is only 1.5 miles beds and ore bodies. But there is probably per second. For Mercury and Mars it is a terrifically powerful wind erosion with high little over 3 miles per second, but the much winds blowing over dreadfully hot and totally higher temperature of Mercury would pro- arid deserts, producing sandblasts of an in- duce a much more rapid escape of hydrogen tensity unimagined here. For all the romanti- from it. For Venus and the earth the escape cism of which Venus has been the object in velocity is about 7 miles per second, so the human literature, she is as near hell as one hydrogen would escape much more slowly. can imagine! Ultimately, when all the hydrogen is gone, the oxygen left behind from the water com- The Conditions for bines with the carbon left behind from the Life on Earth methane to form carbon dioxide, with some remaining as oxygen gas. It also combines We now turn to the second important point with metais to form oxides. The nitrogen left about the hydrogen-containing molecules in behind from the ammonia remains as nitrogen the early atmospheres of the planets. As hydro- gas (N2). Thus on any planet no heavier than gen atoms were knocked out of them by the earth the atmosphere after four billion ultraviolet light, free radicais of carbon, years will consist of nitrogen and carbon nitrogen, and oxygen were left behind. These dioxide. are highly active chemically, and they generate By now, four billion years later, even the in such an atmosphere a great variety of residual nitrogen and carbon dioxide have organic compounds basic to life. This process escaped from the moon and Mercury. They can easily be reproduced in a hydrogen, have no atmosphere left at all. Mars has lost ammonia, and methane mixture in the labora- practically all its nitrogen but does have some tory, where extended ultraviolet irradiation residual carbon dioxide, much of it in the produces a variety of amino acids, simple form of drv ice around the polar caps. Venus sugars, and bases, like adenine, essential to and the earth, however, have retained all or the formation of nucleic acids. On the earth, nearly all of both. The earth, with its liquid and perhaps for a short time on the moon water, was able to dispose of its carbon dioxide and Mars as well, these compounds were because it went into solution in the water and washed out of the atmosphere by rain from 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW the condensing volcanic steam. As the earth’s 2.5 and 1.5 billion years ago is left in the oceans grew, they became well stocked in great iron ore beds of Lake Superior and in this way with all the basic building blocks of the Mesabi Range that used to stand in life. The amino acids could join to form pro- Minnesota. teins; and the sugars and bases, combined For three and a half billion years of its with phosphoric acid dissolved in the water, history, the earth consisted of oceans and could form nucleic acids such as ribonucleic bare sterile land areas subject to rapid erosion (rna) and deoxyribonucleic (dna). On Mars by flowing water. Ultraviolet radiation from and the moon, as the water escaped, these the sun was intense over the whole land and compounds were broken up again and ended sea surface of the earth. When the living simply as nitrogen and carbon dioxide. On organisms in the oceans carne within several Venus, without liquid water and with high feet of the surface, they were soon destroyed temperature, they met the same fate almost by the ultraviolet radiation. Nothing living as rapidly as they formed. existed anywhere on the land. No multi- During the first one and a half billion years cellular organisms or creatures moved through of earth’s existence, these organic materiais in the deep waters throughout that immense the growing oceans of the young earth had period of time. No suspicion of what would somehow become incorporated into simple later be achieved through the further elabora- cellular organisms. This we know from rem- tion of dna codes, developed by then in the nants resembling present rodlike bactéria single-celled organisms in the oceans, could embedded in a black chert 3.2 billion years have been gained from an examination of the old in the Fig Tree series of the eastern earth at that time. Transvaal region of África. In another billion Almost two billion years ago, free oxygen years a great variety of single-celled filamen- released in photosynthesis began to escape tous organisms like modern blue-green algae from the oceans and join the nitrogen and had developed, as we know from their fóssil other oxygen resulting from the ultraviolet remains in the 1.9-billion-year-old Gunflint release of hydrogen from water high up in iron formation on the northern shores of Lake the earth’s atmosphere. When some ten per- Superior. These organisms were capable of cent of the present amount had accumulated photosynthesls and so continuallv converted around a billion years ago, a layer of ozone carbon dioxide into oxygen in the ocean. For was formed high in the atmosphere, which these early organisms the oxygen was highly absorbs all of the far ultraviolet in the solar poisonous, and its presence constituted a major radiation. From then on, living systems could crisis in the history of life. At first their only rise to the surface of the oceans and later protection from it was its removal from the find habitats on the land. At the same time, oceans by conversion of soluble ferrous iron in response to the dissolved oxygen in the to precipitated ferric iron. Oxygen gas began oceans in equilibrium with that in the atmos- to accumulate in the atmosphere about two phere, dna codes were elaborated for entirely billion years ago, and by 1.3 billion years ago new biological systems for which oxygen was a new kind of living cell, capable of utilizing no longer a poison but a benefit. These were the oxidation of sugars as an energy source, the mitochondria, which, by burning sugar had developed. The serious oxygen crisis had with oxygen, could produce the same essential been successfully passed, and the stage was organic compounds as that produced by the set for a new phase of life of tremendous ancient and long-standing chloroplasts from potential. An impressive record of this first carbon dioxide and water using the energy of major ecological crisis that occurred between visible light from the sun. A new and potent THE UNIQUENESS OF THE EARTH 39 energy source was now available for incor- longed to the mammals, which developed in poration into living organisnis. The stage was increasing profusion and variety. Plant life set for an astounding new epoch in the history had become much as we know it now. The of the earth. land was graced with a blanket of verdure, Bv 650 million years ago, soft-bodied multi- great hardwood forests, and high windswept cellular organisms, jellyfish and flatworms, steppes. There were birds and insects in the and novel animal forms had developed in air, fish in lakes and rivers, and in the sea. the oceans. Their impressions are found in Through forest and prairie myriads of animais abundance in ancient sandstones in the ranged. By the end of the Tertiary, just two Ediacara Hills in South Australia. By 600 million years ago, these were much the same million years ago some of these animais devel- as we know them today: antelopes, zebras, oped the capacity to make calcium carbonate and horses; a variety of proboscidians in and could cover themselves with hard protec- herds; deer, tigers, wolves, foxes, and badgers. tive shells. From then on, the history of life on Through forest and prairie myriads of animais the earth is recorded in a continuous fóssil of the inner energy and dynamism of the record. This was the beginning of the geo- phenomenon of life, there was by now in logical period known as the Cambrian, which forest and steppe the beauty of flowering began when the earth was just four billion plants, shrubs, and trees embracing the whole years old. range of color in every degree of delicacy and The development of living organisms had brilliance. Only one element was missing from taken place with almost infinite slowness dur- this calm and lovely scene: Man had not yet ing those first four billion years. During the appeared, and nowhere over the whole earth Cambrian the rate of development took a was there so much as a wisp of smoke rising quantum jump to a new order of magnitude. from a camp fire. Sea creatures developed in great variety and profusion. Plant life began spreading over The Question of Life the land, followed by insecLs. After 500 million on Other Planets years of such development, the earth of 180 million years ago had acquired a fully devel- Science fiction conveys the impression that oped biosphere, with many of today’s features. planets throughout the universe are very An Apollo picture of the earth taken then similar to the earth; that life has developed would have looked very much the same as on all of them and has finally produced some those taken now. Closer up, however, the manlike creature which, although possibly scene then would have been quite different. bizarre in appearance, nevertheless thinks, is The dominant creatures were the great reptiles, self-conscious, and can communicate. Bevond mighty dinosaurs, immense and fearful flying Science fiction, popular accounts of Science in reptiles, and numerous reptilian sea monsters. newspapers and magazines instill the same Great conifer forests and other vegetation kind of convictions in readers. A good example clothed the land, but as yet no deciduous hard- is Walter Sullivan’s book We Are Not Alone.* wood or flowering plants and shrubs. Also at Even some very distinguished and otherwise that time there was no Atlantic Ocean, and highly reliable scientists speak this way. Europe and África formed a continuous land Within the scientific community itself the mass with North and South America. ideas of the commonness of the earth and the Just 70 million years ago the earth entered prevalence of life are widely held. As a result a new period of her history called the Tertiary. there is as yet in the public at large little Most reptiles were extinct, and the age be- appreciation of the cxtraordinary wonder of 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the earth or of what a rare and precious gem larger and more massive than it is, it would our planet is. have retained until now the reducing atmos- But now, against the background of what phere of ammonia and methane plus possibly we know so far of the history of our solar free hydrogen, which seems to have been system, let us examine critically the conditions necessary during its first few billion years for which must be met for anything comparable the development of life as we know it. In that to the earth to be achieved elsewhere in the case there would be now no free oxygen in universe. First and most essential is liquid the atmosphere and so no ozone layer. There water. This, of course, requires a rather would still be no life on the land. How far narrow temperature range which must persist life would have developed in the deep oceans, for at least half the planet’s orbit around its we have no way of knowing. But the earth star. If the earth were just 10 percent closer would obviously be now a very different object to the sun than it is, it would receive 23 with a radically different history. percent more solar radiation than it does now. Those who like to think of the earth as There might then be some liquid water in quite common and unexceptional should con- arctic regions and occasional hot pools else- template quite deeply the significance of what where over the surface which would boil and we know now of the moon, Mars, and Venus, dry up every summer. There would be some to say nothing of Júpiter and Saturn. Even in limestone, but the atmosphere would still be our own solar system, planets come in a great like that of Venus, with a great amount of variety of Chemical composition and physical carbon dioxide. If the earth had been 10 States. Except for the earth, their several percent farther out from the sun, it would histories have led after four and a half billion receive onlv 83 percent of the solar energy years to the achievement of nothing like the it does now. In that case most of the water complexity of organization of matter that we would be in vast ice caps, with some melting have come to know and take for granted. on the surface of the ice in summer and But it is not only the planet which is perhaps some lakes and rivers in the tropics. important. The central star is also most impor- Again if the earth were in a highly elliptical tant. All main sequence stars like the sun orbit around the sun, instead of the near- are burning hydrogen into helium in natural circular one it has, the oceans would boil hydrogen bombs in their cores. When the vigorously for two or three months of the hydrogen in the core is used up, they go into year and then freeze solid for six to eight a gravitational collapse, which leads to the months. burning of helium in the core and a tremen- If the earth had been much smaller and less dous expansion of the outer envelope. The massive than it is but otherwise in the same star becomes a red giant. If it previously had orbit, hydrogen would have escaped much a system of planets around it, they are all more rapidly from its gravitational hold. In evaporated and become a part of its outer that event it would not have been able to envelope. This brings all planetary histories, hold sizable quantities of liquid water for of whatever character, to an abrupt termina- more than two or three billion years. Bv now tion. The more massive the star, the more all the water would have escaped, along with rapid is the burning and the sooner is the some of the nitrogen and carbon dioxide. red-giant stage reached. A star only fifty per- Life could have developed up to the stage cent heavier than the sun would reach the of the Gunflint algae perhaps but then would red-giant stage in 2.3 billion years. If it had have been snuffed out as the last water left. a planet the size of the earth in the right On the other hand, had the earth been much place, life could have developed to the stage THE UNIQUENESS OF THE EARTH 41 of the Gunflint algae before being destroyed. within several hundred light years of us. If In order to allow a development of at least that is the case, then the earth for all practical 4.6 billion years, the star must be no more purposes is unique. There is no other Creative massive than 1.25 times the sun’s mass. The achievement of such a high organization of sun itself has several billion years more to matter within any conceivable reach of us. go before reaching the red-giant stage. About half the stars are double stars or The Advent of Man members of systems of three or more stars. In such multistar systems there are no stable The preceding account of the earth’s history near-circular planetarv orbits. The other half goes through the Tertiary to the beginning of the stars that are single probablv all have of the present geological epoch, the Pleisto- systems of several planets. Moreover, stars less cene, which began just two million years ago. massive than the sun greatly outnumber those This sequence was followed to point up the that are larger. For example, in our region major character of the turning point in this of space there are three times as many stars long history which the appearance of man on with half the mass of the sun as there are the planet represents. Only three or four stars of the same mass as the sun. These other turning points of comparable magni- smaller stars are much cooler than the sun, tude can be identified. One was certainly the and their radiation is much weaker in ultra- point over three billion years ago at which violet. Without ultraviolet, both the loss of nucleic acid and protein first became orga- hydrogen from the original atmosphere would nized in living cells. The second was the be much slowed and the production of organic achievement of photosynthesLs around 2.5 materiais from that atmosphere would be billion years ago, with its attendant oxvgen altered. A planet the size of the earth at the crisis. The third was the transformation 600 right distance from the star might well develop million years ago from the pre-Cambrian to life, but its evolution over four billion years the Cambrian, when multicellular organisms would probablv show a verv different history. appeared and the earth began to acquire a The mechanism of planetarv formation biosphere. A fourth could have been the around such a star could well favor hydrogen- earth’s capture of the moon sometime between helium planets like Júpiter and Saturn close these two turning points, followed by the to the star. Such bodies do not offer an moon’s subsequent close approach to the environment favorable to any very elaborate earth and causing immense scouring tidal evolution of complex organisms. waves. The fifth is the very recent appearance There are so many stars now on the main of man, as a result of which the earth has sequence in our galaxy that the probability acquired what Teilhard de Chardin aptly is great that somewhere another earth-like calls the “noosphere”—i.e., a blanket of mind planet has held liquid water for billions of and spirit covering the earth. The planetary years and has enjoved a history that could impact and crisis proportions of this trans- have clothed it wãth verdure and produced formation of the biosphere into the noosphere another gem of rare beauty like the earth in are just beginning to be felt in this centurv. Early in the Pleistocene one stem of the the vast reaches of space. But the conditions evolving and diversifying branch of primates required for such an outcome, as we have took a fateful step. As at so many other points considcred thcm, suggest that such objects in the history of life, a door opened briefly are quite rare—probablv none at the stage and this primate stepped through it. Had he of development presently reached by the earth passed by instead to go through some other 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW door, the opportunity for man could well have and Mesopotamia, leading to cities, nations, been gone forever. The result was the first and empires, with a division of labor from of the species Homo. He left the trees and slave to king, and attendant professions. Just began to learn to walk on two feet. He 200 years ago, the industrial revolution originated in south central África and is called ushered in a new era of mechanical power and Homo habilis. After a long period of con- invention, leading in the last 50 years to an tinuous development and diversification, a efflorescence in Science and technology, con- quite new version called Homo erectus ap- sumption and pollution, and, above aü, popu- peared on the scene 300,000 years ago, after lation explosion. By now there is widespread which all forms of Homo habilis became ex- recognition of the fact that the noosphere is tinct. In time he showed the very human interacting in a major and decisive way with trait of wanderlust, and he migrated to the the biosphere and that this interaction is Middle East, Europe, England, China, and bound to reach a crisis levei before the end Southeast Asia. In Europe he is Heidelberg of the century. man, in China Sinanthropus, and in Java Several aspects of this crisis call for con- Pithecanthropus. By 100,000 years ago a still sideration against the background of the total more human version, Homo neanderthalensis, history of the earth. Perhaps the first of these emerged, and soon Homo erectus became which stands out is the extraordinary accelera- extinct. Neanderthal man was the first crea- tion which the phenomenon of life has mani- ture in the whole history of life on earth to fested in its history. Some sense of this burv his dead. From this fact alone we know acceleration is evident in the accompanying we are dealing with a self-conscious being table; what stands out is the extraordinary who anticipates in anxiety or hope. Yet if we compression in the time scale that has marked could see a Neanderthal man today, with his each new stage in this history of life. Measured massive jaw and absence of forehead, we first in biliion-year periods, it moves to 100 would not consider him human at all. million, to 10 million, to million-year spans. Some 40,000 years ago one of the diversify- Thereafter for man it goes from 100,000-year ing lines of development in Neanderthal man to 10,000-vear spans, and then from millennia made another leap, and our species, Homo to centuries, to mere decades. The acceleration sapiens, first appeared on the scene. After his of life has become breathtaking if not intoler- arrival Homo neanderthalensis became ex- able. We do indeed live in a time of change tinct. Homo sapiens not only buried his dead more rapid by orders of magnitude than any but was an artist as well, and we still marvel which the phenomenon of life on this planet at the remarkable, dynamic paintings of has experienced before. mammoth and reindeer that he left in the Another feature that stands out is the caves of Southern France. But for the next immense potentiality of matter as organized 30.000 years he remained a hunter and on the earth to rise to ever more complex gatherer of food, like other animais, and did modes of organization, culminating in the not appreciably alter the pre-existing balance phosphorescence of thought and spirit which of nature into which he was bom. Then some now envelops the earth in her noosphere. 10.000 years ago a drastic change began to What stands out here is the extreme rarity of materialize in his way of life. Settled villages conditions throughout the universe in which were formed, based on the first agriculture and this inherent, almost unlimited potentiality domestication of animais. In another 5000 of matter can be realized. One need only years, another major step was taken in the think of the moon, Mars, and Mercury to emergence of the first civilizations in Egypt find matter severely limited in possibility. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE EARTH 43 HISTORY OF LIFE ON EARTH Measured in Stages in the Years before A.D. 2000 From Historical Epoch To 4,600,000,000 Chemical evolution of protein and 3,200,000,000 nudeic acid. 3,200,000,000 Development of living cells in reducing 2,500,000,000 conditions, dependent on fermentation and feeding on each other. 2,500,000,000 Blue-green algae develop photosynthesis 1,500,000,000 and nitrogen fixation. Crisis of oxygen. 1,500,000,000 Development of respiratory cells using 650,000,000 oxygen for energy. Oxygen in atmosphere. Ozone layer shields ultraviolet. Life comes to surface of sea. 650,000,000 Multicellular organisms and macroscopic 230,000,000 animais develop in seas. Plant and then animal life covers the land. Coal, oil, and natural gas produced. 230,000,000 Dinosaurs and other reptiles. Hardwoods 70,000,000 and shrubs. 70,000,000 Mammals, grasses, flowers, fruits, and 2,000,000 vegetables. Production of the modern world other than man. 2,000,000 Appearance of man from most primitive 40,000 through Neanderthal man. 40,000 Homo sapiens as hunter and gatherer. 10,000 10,000 Rural farm viilages. 5,000 5,000 Cifies, nations, empires. Written 200 languoge and literature. (1800) 200 Industrial revolution, mechanical power, 80 and machinery. (1920) 80 Age of affluence, Science, and technology. 30 (1970) 30 Population explosion and ecological crisis in 0 the biosphere. Beginning of postcivilization. (2000) 44 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW Júpiter and Saturn may consist almost entirely ducing it, including as an integral component of hydrogen and helium; and although for man himself—an appreciation of all this is them such possibilities as solid helium and essential to man’s continued occupation of metallic hydrogen, unknown to us, are actual- this planet. With such an appreciation, man ized, additional possibilities for new develop- will know how to love the earth as she ments of matter are almost nonexistent. deserves, to woo her into ever greater and Matter in stars can occasionally be assembled more wonderful Creative achievements, to into the rare and unusual forms of atoms celebrate the wonder of the achievement al- above iron all the way to uranium and ready realized, and to have a holy fear of californium when the star becomes a super- desecrating her. To accomplish this, it is first nova. But for the most part it is severely necessary for man to recover widely and gen- limited in the variety of possibilities open to it, erally his lost sense of transcendent reality. regardless of the length of time available. The process of this recovery is now well under It is awesome to contemplate the immense way and will be much accelerated during the Creative investment that has gone into bring- time of judgment that is now upon us, with ing the earth to her present stage of beauty its destruction of secular hopes and con- and fulfillment. The slow but ever accelerat- fidences and its acute raising of the issues of ing elaboration of information coded on dna meaning and purpose. over an unimaginably vast reach of time has As men regain this essentially theological by now produced, suspended in the alien perspective on nature and their proper place reaches of space, a magical garden and placed within it, they will be enabled to respond within it that strangest achievement of any more and more fully to the Creative energies of the manifold dna codes, man. This was now at work in the wrorld and to play their possible onlv because of a most delicate bal- part in bringing into being the new creation ance of gravity, heat, and light realized on that is now in preparation. For those meek the earth but only very rarely on the other enough to be guided in judgment, the pros- planets. This uniqueness and the wonder of pect of what is coming in the world during the Creative achievement which it has made the remainder of this century does not lead possible mean that the earth is a rare gem to despair. Rather their hope is deeplv of fantastic beauty and that its desecration grounded in and sustained by the knowledge or destruction by any being is an act of awful that the Creative energy which has been able sacrilege against which the heart of all mean- to accomplish such amazing results through ing and purpose in the entire universe must four and a half billion vears is not exhausted. cry out in anguish. Rather, in concert with man, that same energy If, as I believe, the human species stands is even now at work preparing the next great on the threshold of the next great step in its step in this long process. evolution, then this view of the earth may well prove to be a decisive element in the Oak Ridge, Tennessee possibility of that step. A full appreciation Note of the beauty of the earth and of the immense 1. VSalter Sullivan, We Are Not Alone (New York: McCraw-Hill. Creative investment that has gone into pro- 1964). * * “•"«ti- TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL WEAPON Jay Mallin HEN the first caveman hit another with a rock, violence among humans was born. VVhen the first W caveman hit another man with a rock and then swung the rock menacingly against other persons in order to cow them, then terror as a weapon was born. Human violence today occupies a wide spectrum of real and potential activities. A barroom brawl is violence; so is nuclear warfare. Terror tactics make up a portion of the overall spectrum. Obviously the threat of a nuclear war—or the threat of a physical beating to an individual—can be viewed as forms of terror, but these lie within the broad, semantic meaning of the word. In a political context, terror tactics are acts of violence committed by a clandestine group, the psychological effects of which are expected to bolster the group’s cause and move it toward its objectives. 45 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW The basis of terror tactics is the threat— cations bind the various countries and peoples threat to a government that it must abandon closely together. When Archduke Francis power or face continued trouble and danger Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated in for its officials; threat to a population that Sarajevo, the news reached Germany’s Kaiser they face constant disruption unless they help Wilhelm via an admirai on a launch who overthrow the government. A village chief is placed a piece of paper in a cigarette case and assassinated, and the threat of death dis- tossed it aboard Wilhelm’s yacht. President courages capable men from assuming the Nixon was flying aboard the presidential plane local leadership. A diplomat or an airliner is in the United States in September 1970 when seized, and as a result political prisoners are a radio message crackled in to inform him that released because of the threat to the lives of an American airliner had been blown up the hostages. The caveman is still swinging in far-off Cairo, Egypt, after having been his rock. hijacked. Terrorism is a form of guerrilla warfare. Over today’s Communications systems the The basic tactic for guerrilla warfare is to hit reverberations of a terrorist act can travei far and run and hide, hit, run, hide. Guerrillas and fast. A diplomat is kidnapped in one conceal themselves in mountainous or rural country, and within minutes the foreign minis- areas. Terror tactics are employed in urban try of his own country receives the news and as well as rural areas, and when carried out brings pressures to bear to secure his release. in cities and towns, they are often aptly re- In 1904 a Moroccan bandit named Raisuli ferred to as “urban guerrilla warfare.” Like kidnapped an American named Perdicaris, guerrilla warfare, terrorism is a hit, run, and but it was a month before President Theodore hide form of conflict—combat by attrition, Roosevelt issued his famous ultimatum, destruction of the prevailing authority being “Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.” the hoped-for end result. Often, although not Delicately balanced international relation- always, guerrilla warfare and urban clandes- ships are susceptible to acts of terror. Two tine activities are conducted simultaneously bullets at Sarajevo shattered the peace of the and are complementary to each other, as in world for four years. Airplane hijackings by Cuba in 1957 58, in Venezuela in the early Palestinian terrorists in September 1970 sixties, and in Vietnam for over two decades. endangered a Middle East cease-fire that had Terror tactics are not a new weapon. One been carefully worked out to prevent an of the most famous acts of terrorism of this eventual confrontation between the tw-o super- centurv was committed in the Austro- powers, the United States and the Soviet Hungarian town of Sarajevo on 28 June Union. 1914: a double assassinaiion of rovaltv which Delicately constructed equipment is also precipitated World War I. Abraham Lincoln highly vulnerable to acts of terror. A hamrner was the victim of a terror plot hatched by a can destroy a Computer. A match can levei small group of Southern sympathizers who an industrial plant. Within the space of a hoped to destroy the Union government. Fidel few weeks in 1970 the huge airliner in Cairo Castro was still a child when Cuba was and a highly sophisticated research center in immersed in a bloody clandestine struggle Madison, Wisconsin, were blown up by ex- aimed at overthrowing the dictator of that plosives placed by terrorists. One or two men period. can pulverize the accumulated work and The modern complex, crowded, interrelated knowledge of many researchers or scicntists. world appears to be exceptionally vulnerable It is easier to destroy than to build, and— to political terror tactics. Electronic Communi- tragically—as man builds ever more complex TERROR1SM AS A POUTICAL WEAPON 47 equipment, the ability to destroy remains cultivated a Robin Hood image by such deeds relatively easy; and it is into this widening as robbing a casino. This image, evoking gap that terrorists have moved with devastat- laughter more than concern in the populace, ing results. Once largely limited to killing enabled the Tupamaros to establish themselvcs people, the terrorist today has the whole wide as an operational and well-known organiza- field of technological development as his tion. They then turned to more deadly potential target. In order to further his scheme, activities, including the murder of a kid- the terrorist no longer needs an army or a napped American official. guerrilla group; a fuse or a hammer will • Terror in Vietnam in the late fifties suffice. A harmless soft-drink bottle, with was largely selective (e.g., the killing of village gasoline and a wick, becomes a Molotov cock- chiefs). Later it was expandcd to includc tail that can wreck a home, destroy a factory, general targets (e.g., a mine placed in a road disrupt a Communications network. Acts of to catch any passing vehicle). The wider sabotage can add to the intensity of a terror scope was given to terrorism as the Viet Cong campaign, but in destroying material objec- increased their efforts to bring down the South tives their primary purpose is to inflict damage Vietnamese government. to the economy. In considering types of action, one must • The Cuban revolution of the late not overlook the fact that sometimes more fifties was a classic instance of a clandestine than one factor—not onlv the terror purpose struggle linked with guerrilla combat. Fidel —is involved in these deeds. The murder of Castro led the rebel guerrillas and became the village leaders may be the policy of a clandes- popular Symbol of the revolution. In the tine group; the person carrying out an actual cities and towns, however, the underground killing may be acting out of personal revenge. also waged its battlc against the government. The hijacking of airliners may be the policy Significantlv, more rebels died in the cities of another group; an individual hijacker may than in the hills. The underground engaged be acting as much in search of “glory” as in in numerous terrorist activities, with varying compliance with orders. Furthermore, an act degrees of success. There were some assassina- of violence may serve more than one purpose: tion attempts (few succeeded) and a good when a village official is murdered, not only many acts of sabotage. Bombs were their most is authority destroyed but a terror effect is potent weapon; they exploded in Stores, felt throughout the population, particularly theaters, night clubs, and on the streets. The among other officials and governmental bombs served several purposes: loud blasts adherents. dcmonstratcd to one and all, friend and foe, Variations in patterns of terror appear that the rebel underground existed and was in different countries, depending on local highly active. The bombs encouraged the circumstances: population, which was largely antigovernment, * In Guatemala in 1968, with both and helped to demoralize the government rightist and leftist elements engaged in terror forces, aware that the enemy was present and activities, revenge killings were a characteristic dangcrous. In May of 1957 a mighty explo- of the violence. Kidnappings for ransom sion destroyed a section of a vital electrical became almost commonplace as terrorists conduit in Havana, blacking out part of the favored this method for obtaining funds. city for more than two days. In November of the same year residents of Havana thought * In Uruguay in the late sixtics, the they had come under bombardment when Tupamaros, an extremist organization, first some forty bombs exploded in different places 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW within a fifteen-minute period. As these and within a city that was thought of as a govern- other terrorist acts were carried out, com- ment stronghold. merce slowed, investment capital dried up, Four months later the rebels staged an even tourism came to a halt, and the decline in more spectacular kidnapping. Guerrillas led the economy became a major factor in even- by Raúl Castro had occupied a portion of tually bringing down the government. easternmost Cuba, but there they were being Terrorists everywhere have confronted the harassed by the government’s aircraft. In an question: Does terrorism in the long run do effort to obtain a breathing spell, the rebels more harm than good, turning a population seized 48 Americans and 2 Canadians. The against the cause espoused by the terrorists? rebels knew the government was unlikely to The Cuban underground, operating within bomb guerrilla-held areas as long as Ameri- a population that was basically sympathetic, can citizens might be endangered. By means sought to solve this problem by not using any of this mass kidnapping the rebels achieved metal in at least some of its bombs. This a number of objectives: they demonstrated minimized casualties because flying metal their effective control of a portion of the fragments do the most harm to humans, not national territory, forced a letup in the gov- the explosion itself if it is limited in potency. ernment’s air activity, and won de facto The bombs were exploded primarily for their recognition of sorts from the United States psychological effects, not to kill or maim. when two American consuls came to nego- There were some casualties, but these were tiate the release of the prisoners. relatively few compared to the large numbers The hijackings and kidnappings by the of civilians killed or wounded by Viet Cong Cuban rebels were an ominous portent of explosions, the primarv purpose of which is the future use of these techniques by terrorist preciselv to kill and wound. individuais or groups in other parts of the The Cuban revolution was the incubator world. The hijacking of airliners reached a for two terror methods that have now come climax in September 1970 when Palestinian into international use: hijacking of aircraft terrorists seized four airliners with some 599 and kidnapping of people for political pur- passengers and crew within a period of four poses. The rebel 26 of July Movement was days (a fifth hijacking attempt was thwarted). probablv the first organization to carry out All four of the seized planes were subsequently hijackings for political reasons. A number of blown up. domestic flights and one international flight Nowhere in the world in modern times has were seized by hijackers, who thus sought to terror as a political weapon been used so disrupt the country’s Communications system extensively as the Communists have used it and demonstrate the ability of the rebels to in South Vietnam. The terror tactic has strike appreciable blows. ranked with the military tactic as a full- In February 1958 Juan Manuel Fangio, fledged component of the Communist drive then world auto-racing Champion, was in to conquer that country. The Communist Havana to participate in a race. Members of military commander, General Vo Nguyen the rebel underground seized Fangio in the Giap, stated bluntly: lobby of a downtown hotel, spirited him off, At the price of their hard-won experiences, and held him for several days, finally releasing our compatriots in the South realized that him unharmed. No demands were madc; the the fundamental trend of imperialism and its kidnapping in itself served the rebels’ purpose lackeys is violence and war; that is why the by bringing them worldwide publicity and most correct path to be followed by the demonstrating their capability for action peoples to liberate themselves is revolutionary TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL WEAPON 49 violence and revolutionary war. [Italics are sees itself in a crisis, it will almost inevitably Giap’s.] This path confomis strictly to the use extra-ordinary repressive rneasures.3 ethics and the fundamentais of Marxism- As previously noted, the Communists have Leninism on class struggle, on the State and utilized both selective and general methods the revolution. Only by revolutionary violence of terror in Vietnam. A selective target may can the masses defeat aggressive imperialism and its lackeys and overthrow the reactionary be a village chief, a policeman, or an Ameri- administration to take power.1 can official. A general target may be an audience in a theater or people crowding into So pervasive has terrorism become that a marketplace. In hitting a specific target, one writer asserted that it “has long passed the terrorist strikes at the fabric of govern- the stage of excess and become a vice, an mental control. In hitting a general target, intoxication with violence, one that may well he aims at the overall social fabric. Create be a release from the terrible and inhumanly chãos, the terrorist believes, and you open the prolonged hardships and repressions of per- way to seizing power. sonal interests which its adherents must The widespread Communist use of terror undergo.” 2 in Vietnam since 1957 has been fully docu- Terrorism may well be an emotional outlet mented in a considerable number of publica- for persons engaging in it. It has also served tions. Statistics related to events in Vietnam very real political purposes for the Commu- are often suspect, but thev can serve as nists in Vietnam. A study of Viet Cong terror indicators. According to reports issued by tactics by the United States Mission in Viet- the United States Mission to that country, nam enumerated five aims the Communists assassinations in 1966 totalled 1732, rose to hope to accomplish by employing these 3706 in 1967, and then to 6518 in 1968.4 methods: The 1968 figure is totally inadequate, how- ever, because it does not include deaths dur- 1. Mor ale building within the Viet Cong ranks. A successful terrorist act does much ing the bloodv Tet offensive. By 1969, with to create an aura of invulnerability within United States and South Vietnamese forces a guerrilla band and helps bolster spirits in greater control, assassinations dropped to throughout the insurgent organization. . . . 6075. (See accompanying table.) 2. Advertising the Viet Cong movement. .. . The Communists’ attack in 1968 enabled 3. Disorientation and psychological isola- them to occupy most of Hue, the country’s tion of the individual. This is done by destroy- second citv. Later, once the citv had been ing the structure of authority which previously recaptured by government and American was a source of security. The particular target forces, it was discovered that the Communists is the Vietnamese villager. . . . Terror removes had massacred a large number of people. The the underpinnings of the orderly System in mass graves of victims were found around which the villager lives out his life. . . . the citv. The first discovery was made in the 4. Elimination of opposing forces. . . . By vard of a high school, where 170 bodies were means of terror the Viet Cong have sought recovered. In the months that followed more to eliminate the entire leader class of Viet- namese villagers. . . . graves were found, and eventuallv some 2800 5. Provocation of the GVN [Government bodies in all were recovered. About 2000 of South Vietnam].. . . Any govemment faced more persons were missing, perhaps buried with terrorism must attempt to suppress the in graves that were not found.’' terrorists. Ideally, that suppression is by an Douglas Pike, an expert on Vietnamese orthodox use of law enforcement. But if the afTairs, has categorized by phases the Com- terrorist is effective and if the government munist rationale behind the killings: When 50 AIR UN1VERSITY REVI EH' they thought thev would be able to hold the social conditions.” 7 Karl Marx wrote in Das city for a short while, they killed in order to Kapitai, “Force is the midwife of every old eliminate enemies and to weaken the struc- societv pregnant with a new one,” 8 and ture of the establishment. When they thought almost a century later Ernesto Guevara they might be able to maintain their hold on echoed Marx with the statement, “. . . We the city, they killed in order to purge the old should not fear violence, the midwife of new social order. And then when it became societies.” 9 China’s Mao Tse-tung clearly set apparent they would lose the city, they sought forth the Communist viewpoint on violence to liquidate anyone who might later be able when he said, “Every communist must grasp to identify Party members.® the truth, ‘Political power grows out of the General Giap’s statement that “violence barrei of a gun.’ ” 10 and revolutionary war” conform “to the ethics Terrorist campaigns follow a pattern. At and the fundamentais of Marxism-Leninism” first there are sporadic activities, without much means that Communists openlv favor the use design. Usually these consist of occasional of violence and terror as a means to obtain and scattered bombings and perhaps one or political control. Rarely do they attempt to two assassination attempts. These actions are conceal their adherence to—often preference similar to the first tentative attacks that are for—the use of force. The Communist Mani- carried out by a guerrilla group beginning festo States bluntly: “They [the Communists] operations in a rural area. If the army is openly declare that their ends can be attained unable to snufT out the guerrilla movement, only by the forcible overthrow of all existing it expands and becomes more active and U.S. Mission reports of assassinations anel abductions, 1966—1969, from Stephen T. Hosmer, Vict Cong Repression and Its Implications for the Future (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1970) 1966 1967 1968* 1969 1966-1969* *These figures do not include ony assassinations or abductions that may have occurred during February 1968. Official data for that month are nol available. . **lncludes titled officials at national, corps, region, province, district, village, and hamlet leveis. ***lncludes civil servants (teachers, health workers, etc.), Rural Developmenl workers, and members of the National Police when not on military operations. TERRORISM AS A POLITICAL WEAPON 51 dangerous. In urban areas, if a clandestine There are, howevcr, techniques that have tcrrorist apparatus is not eliminated com- been applied, sometimes quite successfully, to pletely, it, too, may grow and become more particular aspects of terrorism. Cuba, during sophisticated. the aforementioned period, eliminated the One indication of sophistication is the problem of hijacking by requiring body abilitv of a terror group to select and carry searches of all passengers and by placing out attacks on selected targets. This frequently armed uniformed guards aboard planes. The takes the form of attacks on police. Lenin guards were seated with the crew so that they once wrote, “The first objective [of armed could keep watchful eyes on the passengers struggle] is to kill individuais such as high through peepholes set in the doors separating officials and lovver-ranking members of the the crew and passenger compartments. police and army.” 11 In South Vietnam the Modern electronic equipment is today an police have been a primary target of Viet additional aid in detecting weapons and fore- Cong terrorists. Not only have individual stalling hijackings. policemen been shot, but even police head- Good police techniques are the best method quarters have been attacked. In the Domini- of beating terrorism, which is, after all, can Republic, at the time of the 1965 up- a form— a political variation—of crime. rising, so manv police were attacked and Infiltration of terrorist groups, money pay- killed by terrorists in Santo Domingo that ments to informers—the same methods used the police disappeared from the streets of the against criminal gangs—are feasible against citv. Police are a symbol of the existing order; terror groups. A detailed file, kept up to date they are also a major support of that order. —computerized if possible-—of all persons To strike at the police is to deal psychological suspected of being engaged in clandestine as well as real blows agaiast the existing activities can be most helpful, just as files on establishment. criminais aid police in crime detection. In one In the United States, today troubled by case in a Latin American city, files on possible terrorism for the first time in its history, terror terrorists were combed, and over thirtv sus- tactics have reached the levei of sophistication pects were brought in for interrogation. Of the in which terrorists are leveling their guns at persons questioned, only one was found to be policemen with deadly effect. As of mid- engaged in terrorist activities, but when he September 1970, sixteen police officers have told the authorities what he knew, they were been killed in the year as the result of un- able to break up a significant portion of an provoked attacks, more than double the total underground network. for the previous year and nearly four times Terrorist groups must obtain weapons and the annual average for the past ten years.12 explosives in order to carry out their work. There are no simple, ready Solutions to Strict Controls over the sale and distribution tcrrorist activities; there is no panacea for of these can make the tasks of terrorists more terrorism. Counterterror is not the answer; difficult and sometimes can enable police to it is, in fact, counterproductive. Although trace the purchasers of weapons used in acts limited gains may temporarily be achieved— of terror. such as deterring fainthearted individuais While police officers are often the targets from joining a rebel group— in the long run of terrorists, by being cautious in situations counterterror will cause repugnance in a that are potentiallv dangerous, they can reduce population, turning many persons against the their risk. Policemen working in pairs are authorities. Such was the case in Cuba in more difficult targets to attack: terrorists 1957 and 1958. must either kill both policemen or chance 52 AIR UNI VERSITY REVIEW being killed themselves. If two policemen keep • Censuses are conducted frequently a suitable distance between them when they in order to keep track of inhabitants. An un- approach or are approached by a question- explained “cousin” who has come from the able individual, that individual will find ít interior might be a Viet Cong agent. almost impossible to kill them both at the • Still another tactic is to cordon off same moment. an area within a city suddenly and have the Security at public buildings, including police carefully sweep through that zone. theaters, can be enhanced if all packages, They round up persons who cannot ade- including women’s purses, are subjected to quately identify themselves or explain their scrutiny at entrances. A stick of dynamite can, presence. of course, be smuggled in under a persons clothing, and it may not be feasible to search * Secure areas are maintained around every individual fully. Searches of packages or adjoining government buildings. Vehicles and purses, however, will at least decrease the entering these areas are subject to search, possibility of bombs being smuggled into a including search by means of a mirrored building, and certainly will eliminate the device that is passed underneath the vehicle possibility of any sizable explosive artifact to detect any explosives concealed there. being smuggled in. * The military have learned the value The cities of South Vietnam have long been of civic action programs aimed at winning troubled by terror campaigns. In order to over the inhabitants of a troubled area so lessen the casualties and damage inflicted by that they will support the government and its terrorists, a number of steps have been taken forces, not the rebel guerrillas. The same by the authorities: tactic is valid for urban police. If the police do not make an effort at maintaining friendlv * Government agents infiltrate the relations with the inhabitants of a troubled Viet Cong clandestine apparatus. This is one portion of a city, such as a ghetto area, those of the most effective methods of keeping track people are more likely to help terrorists who of terrorist activities, sometimes forestalling them. Agents who have pcnetratcd an under- are striking at the police and the established order. Guerrillas in rural areas need the sup- ground svstem can not only identify individual port of the peasantry. Similarly, urban guer- terrorists but often provide enough informa- rillas must be assisted by local people if they tion to enable the authorities to destroy an are to operate efTectively and evade the police. entire clandestine cell or series of cells. * At roads leading into a city, authori- Urban terror is a cross between crime and ties search vehicles to make sure none is insurgency. By adapting the techniques of carrying weapons or explosives. VVithin the crime-fighting and counter-insurgency, the city itself, police spot-check passing cars best methods can probably be found for (perhaps every fifth or tenth vehicle). combating the terrorists. Coral Gables, Florida Notes 1. Vo Nguven Giap. The South Vietnam People Will Win (Hanoi, 7. “ The Communist Manifesto,'* iti Essential U orks of Marxism, 1965). cd. Arthur P. Mendcl (New York, 1965). 2. George Modclski. “ Viet Minh" in Communism and Revolution, B. K a r l M n rx , Capital (New York: International Publishers Co. ed. C. E. Black and T. P. Tlmrnton (Princelon. 1961). edition. 1967). 3. A Study— Viet Cong Use of Terror (Saigon: United States 9. Jay Mallin. ed.. “ C/je" Guevara on Revolution (Miami. 1969). Mission in Vietnam, 1967). 10. Selecled Military H ritings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking. 1963). I I. Stephen T. Hosmcr, Viet Cong Repression and Its Implications 11. V. 1. Lenin. “Partisan Warfare" in Modem Guernlla K arfare, for the Future (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1970). ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York, 1%2). 5. Douglas Pike. The Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror (Saigon. 1970). 12. “ Snipers in Anibuah: Police under the Gun. Time, 1-1 6. Ibid. Septem ber 1970. THE USSURI RIVER INCIDENT AS A FACTOR IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY COLONEL DONALD M. M a RKS HE PROBLEM of povver is the funda- who shall lead the Communist forces in mental problem of our time and probably world politics; and the differing appraisals will remain so in the future. Quarrels amongof the present balance of strategic povver in TCommunist nations are normally ideological the world.1 Such an arrav of irritants and disputes, jarringly embroiled vvith the unavoid- issues naturally tends to revive disputes that able issues of power and policy. In thLs context, were dormant, moribund, or just forgotten. the Sino-Soviet rift is no exception, notwith- Not the least of these problems has been the standing the fact that many analysLs arc not one associated with territorial diíTerences, in agreement as to what constitutcd the actual largely stemming from old treaty settlements causes of the dispute. accomplished when China was in no position While China and the Soviet Union arc to qucstion them simply because she had not sovcreign Communist natioas, they embrace the power to question them. different cultures, histories, goaLs, and tradi- Border problems havc plagued Sino-Russian ons. Other crucial elements relative to the and Sino-Soviet relations for several hundred ft concern the choice of the correct policy years. In the mid-nineteenth century Rússia, >ward movements of “national liberation” ; taking advantage of a powerless China (as Síe risks and consequences of nuclear war; did several European powers), annexed the 53 54 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW provocative behavior in connection with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Border guards reported incidents on 23 December 1967 and in late January 1968, along both the Ussuri and the Amur. The Chinese complaints of Soviet border violations do not have such depth as the Soviet charges. The Chinese claimed that from 23 January 1967 until 2 March 1969 Soviet troops intruded into Damansky sixteen times, using “helicopters, armored cars and vehicles.” The Chinese further assert that the Soviets were guilty of “ramming Chinese fishing boats, robbing Chinese fishermen, turning high- pressure hoses on fishermen, assaulting and wounding Chinese frontier guards, seizing arms and ammunition, and even violating Chinese air space by overfiights.” 3 Finally, the Chinese charged that the Soviets provoked a total of 4189 border incidents from the breakdown of border negotiations on 15 October 1964 to the March 1969 incident. Thus, there was an increasing degree of border An aerial view of the Ussuri River south of Iman, U.S.S.R., about 200 miles north of tension and dispute beginning with the Janu- Vladivostok and close to the Damansky Island ary phase of the Cultural Revolution and setting of the Sino-Soviet encounter of early 1969 extending to the end of that period of Chinese history, 1966-68. In reality, the problem of the Sino-Soviet border has been raised on a sustained basis territory north of the Anuir River and east of throughout the period of Communist rule its tributary, the Ussuri, founded Vladivostok, in China, even to the inclusion of a mutual and cut off China from the Sea of Japan. declaration on territorial integritv in the 1950 The loss of this huge area was accepted by Sino-Soviet treaty. Along with this treaty China in the Treaties of Aigun ( 1858) and declaration, the two powers coevally signed Peking (1860).2 It is reasonable to surmise agreements concerning commercial inter- that with such a background, the momentum actions and use by the Soviet navy of bases of history has thrust these compelling dis- in Port Arthur and Dairen. These instruments turbances into the forefront of contemporary were modified in 1952, however, to permit Sino-Soviet relations. Both sides admit that proprietary Chinese interests, and the naval border incidents have occurred with increas- bases were returned in 1954 at the time of ing frequency, at least since 1960. In fact, Khrushchev's visit to China. During that visit Russian-Chinese contacts along that border Mao himself brought up the question of began to constitute a significant problem by Outer Mongolia with Khrushchev. Although 1967. In January of that year, there were the Russians refused to discuss the matter, this reports of a clash along the Ussuri in which represents the earliest known Chinese initiative the Soviets accused the Chinese of wildly directlvJ connected with a border revision. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 55 Specifically, the territorial aspect of the ingful border treaty. Second, both tacitly Sino-Soviet dispute was inaugurated at the agreed that the actual amount of adjustment end of 1962 by Khrushchev, who, in respond- necessary to realign the border to mutual ing to Chinese strictures about the Cuban satisfaction was slight. Conversely, there were gambit, derided the Chinese for permitting two disagreements. First, and by far the most such “fragments of colonialism as Hong Kong compelling, were the vital differences in pro- and Macao” to survive on their soil. This ^edures advocated. The Chinese had a patho- attack afforded the Chinese an undeniable logical fixation which demanded Soviet ad- opportunity, and they promptly termed the mission of the old treaties’ unequal aspects border treaties signed between tsarist Rússia prior to signing any new treaty. But the Soviets and Ch’ing dynasty China as “unequal” and refused to submit to such a request; thus, an therefore subject to revision. The Chinese impasse ensued. statement, published 8 March 1963, con- In retrospect, it appears that those points cluded with the well-known interrogation: of agreement appreciably exceeded those of “In raising questions of this kind, do you disagreement; but the treaty negotiations intend to raise all the questions of unequal probably failed through lack of procedural treaties and have a general settlement? Has it agreement or real desire on the part of the ever entered vour heads what the consequences participants. It is also quite within the realm will be?” It was after this date that public of possibility that China, smarting from a reports and charges of border violations were sustained disparity of power vis-a-vis the Soviet made and secret border negotiations initiated.4 Union and attempting ideologically to project Events could have resulted in outright a power advantage since 1964, did not, in military action had the polemics continued; truth, want a settlement at that point in time, however, history intervened with the removal for a settlement would have terminated a of Khrushchev in October 1964. There fol- useful gambit. As long as China could aggres- lowed a quiescent period of some two years, sively act with some degree of military im- which, in large measure, lasted until the punity, and assessing that she had time on Cultural Revolution. her side, it is reasonable to surmise that the The border negotiations began on 25 Febru- Chinese broke off the talks w'hen it appeared ary 1964. The Soviet side was represented by that the Soviets would not relinquish on all P. I. Zyryanov, and the Chinese delegate was points or that the talks were about to enter Tseng Yung-chuan, both Deputy Ministers of a stage of definitive settlement. Foreign Affairs. Some progress was achieved, Some note should be taken of the relative but in late October the Soviets recommended military dispositions along the border at this that the talks be moved to Moscow, at which time; however, as can be expected, precise point the Chinese apparently balked. No re- information is questionable. For some time sponse was ever given to the Soviet suggestion, the Chinese had stationed around fourteen and nothing eventuatcd until the two dis- infantry divisions in the northeast, five divi- putants met again on 18 June 1969 at sions in Inner Mongolia, and five more in Khabarovsk. Sinkiang.5 They supplemented these troops Even though this initial attempt failed, it with “construction” personnel, so that in areas is interesting to speculate what were the contiguous to the border there were approxi- probable causes as there appear to be at least mately 35 to 40 divisions, or some 450,000 two points on which the two sides concurred. men. First, both parties were substantiallv in agree- On the other hand, the Soviets were aware ment on the absolute necessity of a new, mean- that the Far East is by no stretch of the ' 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Soviet border guards attacking on Damansky Island, as claimed by Communist Chinese source of photo imagination “next door" to the Russian superiority, i.e., aircraft, armor, and artillery, heartland, and this fact, plus overwhelming and their tactical mobility demonstrably ex- strategic superiority, disposed them to main- ceeded that of the Chinese.® tain onlv eight Red Army divisions between As previouslv pointed out, border disputes the Urais and Lake Baikal. (Another 26 divi- began as far back as 1959 and inexorably sions vvere available in Southern U.S.S.R.) increased to the extent that some sort of overt Thus, it would appear that the Chinese had rnilitary buildup was justified by both powers; an edge in manpower; however, the Soviet but this is not precisely the case. In 1966 both logistical and transportation postures were far sides did initiate modernization programs, and superior. The Soviets also had been building of the two the Soviets had the more active. airfields close to the border; consequently, The Vietnam vvar and the massive American they harbored an edge in terms of equipment intervention undoubtedly drevv Chinese atten- M1L1TARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 57 tion, at least momentarily, to their Southern pact with Mongolia and the stationing of exposure; therefore, they could not hope to Soviet troops on Mongolian soil. By 1968 the keep pace with the Soviet program. Soviets actually accomplished fairly large-scale For the Soviets, 1967 ushered in some maneuvers in the Mongolian area, and several changes in policy and tactics, for it was in bases were constructed. that vear, apparently, that the border incidents Six assessments emerge from the foregoing assumed a more menacing aspect. The Soviets data. First, a general balance of military forces began a program of indoctrinating their existed in the border regions for a long time. citizens which included reports from inspec- Second, the balance assumed a more aggres- tion trips made in the border zones of con- sive stance in 1966 with the introduction of tention. A major feature of the preparedness modernization programs. Third, the Chinese campaign was the signing of a 20-year defense appeared to actively engage in an ideological Tico Soviet armored vehicles and two cars carrying armed frontier troops crossed the frozen Ussuri River on 7 February 1969 and landed on Damansky Island. territory disputed by U.S.SJl. and Communist China. This and other incidents angered citizens of both countries. 58 AIR UNI VERSITY REVIEW power struggle with the Soviets, the border Lieutenant Strelnikov’s outpost noticed some disputes serving as a prime vehicle. Fourth, 20 to 30 armed Chinese moving towards the the general military balance was disturbed Soviet side, shouting Mao slogans as they after 1966 by the movement of Soviet troops approached. Strelnikov and some of his men onto Mongolian soil. Fifth, increased military set off to meet the Chinese. Arriving on the activity by both factions, plus the attendant island, they went forward to confront the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, served as approaching Chinese. a fillip to border tensions. Sixth, the Soviets The Soviets strapped their automatic rifles undertook a domestic indoctrination program to their chests and linked arms to prevent the anent the border problem and entered into a Chinese from passing. The Chinese positioned defense pact with Mongolia. The amalgama- themselves in rows and gave the appearance tion of these incidents and the disruptive and of being unarmed. When they had approached highly volatile excesses of the Cultural Revolu- within about twenty feet of the Soviet soldiers, tion, in conjunction with the Soviet activities the first row stepped aside and a second row along the border, certainly must have induced pulled out submachine guns from under their in the Chinese marked anxiety as to future coats and opened fire on the Soviets. Strelnikov Soviet projections of power. and six of his men were killed outright. At the same time, from an ambush on the Soviet flank, the Chinese let loose an enfilade which obviously caught the Soviet unit by surprise. D AMANSKY ISLAND ÍS located Mortar and machine-gun fire joined in, and in the Ussuri River, which forms the boundary then the Chinese apparently charged with between the Soviet Union and China for hand-to-hand fighting resulting. Under such approximately 180 miles southward from an onslaught, the Soviet unit was overrun, Khabarovsk. The nearest Soviet settlement is and according to Soviet figures the Chinese Nizhne Mikhailovskiy, about five miles to the killed nineteen men on the spot. south, whereas the closest point of Chinese Lieutenant Bubenin had witnessed the battle population is Kung-szu at the Southern ex- from his outpost, and with his men he raced tremitv of the island. Apparently the Soviets to the scene. He forced the Chinese to divide supported two border outposts within the their fire, but in the process he was also general area, one south of the island, com- wounded. A wild melee ensued, and when the manded by Sênior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich confusion had died down the Soviets even- Strelnikov, and the other, to the north, tually forced the last group of 50 to 60 by Sênior Lieutenant Vitaliy Dmitrivevich Chinese to retreat to their side of the river. Bubenin. The solitary Chinese outpost was The battle lasted some two hours, and both situated directly across the island at about its sides claimed victory. mid point. With this in mind, the following There appear to be sufficient facts which, appears to be a reasonable account of what when collatcd and considered with other data, took place on the Ussuri River on 2 March tend to concentrate the causes into three finite 1969. spheres: the incidents attendant to the border Under cover of the wintrv night of 1-2 confrontations; the basic national postures March, approximately 300 Chinese soldiers, endemic to both countries; and the possi- camouflaged in white uniforms, crossed the bilities emerging from the foreign policies of Ussuri River to Damansky Island and estab- the two nations. lished a bivouac area for the night. Early the Perhaps two situational contingencies sur- next morning, the Soviet guard on duty at face. The first lies in a simplistic assessment MIUTARY AFFAIRS AtíROAD 59 that both sides had been invested vvith an There is a possibility that Maoist leadership inordinate amount of unit authority in dealing elements manipulated the 2 March incident with border disputes. It would appear prudent as a diversionary ploy to creatc anxiety, in the that Soviet border commanders of the remote hope that grcater cohesiveness would rcdound. outpost, which was continually confronted Immediatelv after the Twelfth Plenum, do- with a highly volatile situation, did have a mestic programs were initiated which cor- good deal of authority over local events. The porately could have clevated tension and strife. Chinese situation is obscured by less precise These actions probably had something to do knowledge concerning the delegation of also with the continued postponement of the authority and by the presence of border con- Ninth Congress, which was to impart the struction troops. Certainly, in view of the stamp of approval and stecr the nation through history of border incidents, some rather definite its rough political and economic seas. procedures and limits had been previously There are perhaps four Chinese foreign established. policy extrapolations that have a bearing on The second contingency lies in the possi- the 2 March incident. First, it is possible that bility that spontaneity or simple chance Chinese leaders were aware of a Soviet mili- sparked the fire fight; however, this appears tary buildup along the border and feared that to belabor the point. Careful preparations this preparedness presaged a more ominous were made for the confrontation, the Chinese move; thus, the gauntlet had to be ílung heavilv outnumbered the Soviets, and the down. It can only be assumed that the Chinese apparently resorted to deceit prior to Chinese took a calculated gamble, or they triggering the incident. possessed information which assured them that To explain the incident in light of Chinese the Soviets would not retaliate to the extreme. national politics, four possibilities present Second, it is conceivable that the Chinese themselves: a prime issue to heal the wounds actually resorted to a pre-emptive attack and incurred by the Cultural Revolution; dissi- rationalized it by virtue of the Soviet buildup dence; diversion; and the Ninth Chinese and the fact that the attack would be Communist Congress. at the extreme end of the Soviet lines of As a possible mollifier to the Cultural communication. Revolution, the incident appears far too Perhaps a third explanation lies in a re- ephemeral to justify the risks associated with visionist theory: that the Chinese were actually its preparation. under the undeniable control of Mao Tse-tung Dissidence in Communist China during the during the Cultural Revolution and the Ussuri latter stages of the Cultural Revolution might incident was but a manifestation of his hatred be a possible explanation, as that aberration towards the more despised “revisionist enemy." was grounded in disparate groups competing FinaUy, the Ussuri incident was a specific for power. By the end of that cultural con- manifestation of Chinese power politics de- vulsion, the majority of these groups had been signed to embarrass the Soviets. The year eliminated, and the military emerged as the 1968 had witnessed marked deterioration in most dominant and cohesive group. But a Sino-Soviet relations, and the Chinese were note is interjected here: whenever China adamant about opposing Soviet hegemonv. considered herself in danger of externai threat, Examplcs range from support of the Czech perceptible signs of debate appeared in open people against Soviet aggression to bottlenecks publications. Regarding the Sino-Soviet border in Soviet supplies for North Vietnam and difTiculties, however. no such manifestations renunciation of most direct and indirect par- appeared.7 ticipation in that war.8 60 AIR UNI VERS1TY REVIEW The question of timing is important, for the the election suddenly ceased, and the news Chinese obtained a victorv not only on the media no longer refiected a threatening atti- Ussuri but in Berlin as well. There, the West tude.‘J Only a serious externai threat could Germans were to hold an election, which the have compelled the Soviets to abandon such Soviets and East Germans had denounced as a carefully prepared campaign, and they cer- illegal. Resultant propaganda and other dis- tainly construed the Ussuri incident to be far ruptive measures clearly indicated that both more than just a border incident. At anv rate, Communist regimes had committed their the major extension of Soviet foreign policy prestige and resources to exert pressure on at that point in time ceased—militarily, eco- West Berlin and West Germany to force move- nomically, politically, and propagandistically ment of the election to another site. But on in order to confront the nevv crisis. 2 March 1969, the date of the Ussuri inci- The general tenor of Soviet national politics dent, all the threats, military shovvs of force, during this time span was relativelv stable and border blockades, and other actions against rational—quite dissimilar from that in China. MIUTARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 61 It is possible (and probable) that a spectrum In fact, they had their hands full with the oi opinions existed bctween the military aftermath of the Czechoslovakian crisis, they leaders and their political peers in the Gom- were deeply involved with client States in the munist Party as to what should be the proper Middle East, they were preparing for the sa l t policy towards the border problem. Other than talks, and they were deeply interested in the utterances normallv associated vvith strategy, impending election of the West German weaponry, and preparedness, however, there president. were no specifxc promulgations in Soviet litera- There is another consideration in the ture which could be connected with the Ussuri assumption that it was the Soviets who actuallv incident. initiated the incident on the Ussuri on a more In the area of Soviet foreign policy, a num- or less pre-emptive basis. But this possibility ber of factors come into plav. The Soviets has small credence. undoubtedly did not wish a major confronta- Finally, there is the possibility that the tion with the Chinese on the Ussuri River. Soviets, like the Chinese, decided that events Response to the Ussuri River incident at Damansky Island was instantaneous in China and in the U.S.S.R. In Sinkiang the Chinese (left) rail against the Russians, while in Moscow (right) the Soviets reciprocate. 62 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW had gone far enough but for purposes of movement. This is an ideological claim, a world opinion the Chinese were permitted the power claim; but it is the Soviets who have first move. While such an explanation would the power and who are, in essence, leading the be in accord with Soviet preparedness moves, movement. Consequently, Communists the it does not jibe with all aspects of national world over were at the bidding of Soviet politics and foreign policy. However, the “renegades,” and the Chinese Communists Soviet Union is quite capable of masking or were compelled to redress that imbalance as distorting foreign policy. best they could. Although it is arguable that the information presented is circumstantial in portraying the Ussuri incident as a means of forcing a Soviet S ever al conclusions can be retreat from a projected position in Europe, drawn concerning the Ussuri River border it is more reasonable and credible in depicting dispute. First, the SovieLs and the Chinese that incident as a device to undermine Soviet are in agreement that the conflict, which first leadership of the Communist bloc as well as erupted some ten years ago, did not stem the international movement. The attack from their having a common frontier; how- oflered substantial gain at minimal risk, as ever, just three years later, the border issue Soviet worldwide commitments would not became a major factor in the developing permit anything but a modest and face-saving schism. Second, although there is, in actuality, reaction. little to be resolved over the border treaties, The indisputable fact remains that the Sino- the Chinese have refused to yield, both in 1964 Soviet argument is not a simple rift involving and at the present negotiations. Third, the two sovereign States. The struggle is grounded deadlock is not a pristine ideological dispute in the situation of an inferior nation dealing (as is often asserted), nor is it a simple case with a “superpower” and in fierce competi- of rival interests clashing; it is a grinding tion for the support and allegiance of the fusion of both. It is a classic example of power multifaceted components that comprise the politics between two leading world powers, international Communist movement. In such with the primary prize residing in control of a struggle, the motives of power, prestige, and the international Communist movement. ideologv merge and tend to blend with the Communists believe in causes, whereas theories charisma associated with Mao, who, in turn, are simply factors to advance them: where is the leading exponent of Communism as the the cause compels, the theories must change. “wave of the future.” Such a momentous In reality, the 2 March event assumes a force must be controlled by pristine Chinese greater role than just a border incident. Both Communists; thus, power and ideology disputants originally endeavored to hold nego- coalesce to result in the pinnacle of Commu- tiations to resolve it.10 Neither faction had any nist commands and goals: he who Controls concrete advantages to be extracted, as evi- the movement also Controls history. denced by the fact that both sides began the As for the Soviets, they are on the horns talks by disagreeing as to what they were of a real dilemma. Gone are the days when meant to be talking about. a Communist Party could survive or thrive But the motives of the Chinese Communists only if it were a satellite subservient to seem reasonably clear when one remembers Moscow. The crushing paradox is that the their predominant and overriding charge: more effective a Communist Party becomes that the Soviets have betraved the revolution as a political force, the less dependent it be- and are not qualified to lead the international comes upon Moscow—and the less useful and MILITARY AFFAJRS ABRO A D 63 malleable it becomes as an instrument of power. The option they choose will be dictated Soviet policy. The Soviets can impose their by power—Soviet or Chinese. In that light, control and thereby vveaken the political or we should recall how the article began: The electoral chances of the party in their own problem of power is the fundamental prob- countrv, or they can give free rein and thereby lem of our time and will remain the basic lose an instrument of Soviet policy outside problem of all future history. Soviet borders. In short, they can accede to the Chinese demands or resort to military Annandale, Virgínia Notes 1. “The Chinese-Communist Rift: Origins and Portcnts,” Foreign 5. The M ilitary Balance, lnstitute for Strategic Studies, London, Affairs, Yol. 42, No. 1 (October 1963), pp. 15-17. 1965-1970. 2. W. A. Douglas Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands (Prince- 6. Ibid. Soviet modernuation programa for their border garrisons ton: Yan Nostrand, 1962), p. 113. exceeded in quality those implemented by the Chinese—undoubtedly 3. “Note of lhe University of Foreign Affairs of the People's due to the latter’s inferior logistical base and earlier withdrawal of Republic of China,” New China News Agency, 3 March 1969, Soviet aid. Jen-min Jih-pao. 4 March 1969, p. 1. (T ranslation, Survey of 7. A search of appropriate CDSP (Current Digest Soviet Press) China Mainland Press, No. 4372, 10 March 1969, pp. 19—20.) journals could identify no debate on the subject. 4. Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict 8. China Quarterly, No. 25. January-M arch 1966, pp. 48-58. (Stanford: Hoover Institution. 1965), p. 31 ff. Mao Tse-tung also is 66-76, 106-14. on record as having xnade a famous statement concerning these treaties and the resultant irredenta: “ About a hundred years ago, 9. Press eoverage from 28 February to 8 March included 22 articles the area to the east of Baikal became Russian territory, and since in Pravda and 20 in Izvestia. then Yladivostok. Khabarovsk, Karnchatka. and other areas have 10. Major G eneral A leks A n ikushin, “ U SSR B orders Are Invio* been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for lable,” Sovetskaja Rossia, 19 M arch 1969, p. 3 ; and CDSP, XXI, this list." 12 (9 April 1969), 3. Air Force Review MANAGEMENT USES OF COST INFORMATION Major Frederick T. Walker HE IDEA of “cost,” expressed in mone- military plan. To be more specific, the Joint tary terms, has been an integral part of Strategic Operations Plan (jso p) is a pro- Tevery individuars mental frame of reference posed course of action to be undertaken in for so long that it is often used as a sort of the event of war at some future date. The universal code word equally meaningful to fydp is an approved course of action to be just about everyone. Perhaps this is why many undertaken now in order to develop the force fledgling managers seem to be interested in structure that would be required to implement “cost” for its own sake. In these days of the jso p if such implementation should be austere funding and constant demands to re- called for at some future time. duce costs, virtually every Air Force manager The programming process necessarily in- needs and demands cost information. Yet volves trade-offs, since there are never enough often the cost information provided is useless resources to satisfy every desire. Such trade- for the intended purpose, and the manager offs, however, can only be made if both the concerned does not even recognize its in- operational desirability/effectiveness and the adequacy. For despite the fact that “cost” is cost of any given program are known. Here, bandied about as if it were the most explicit then, is the way that cost information will be of words, the truth is that the word “cost,” used by management in the programming when taken out of context, has no identifiable activity: to ensure that a given program can meaning for a manager. be accomplished with available resources and Management uses cost information in three to permit rational, objective trade-off deci- distinct management activities: programming, sions between program elements. The cost budgeting, and operating.1 An examination of information required for this purpose is the the management uses of cost information total actual cost of each of the elements in- within each of these activities may help to cluded in the program. Moreover, since the identifv the various types of cost information programming structure is such that only and serve to demonstrate that statements such measurable costs (no allocations) are to be as “The cost of X is $100” have absolutely considered for any given program element, no meaning unless the type of cost is clearly this type of cost information is similar to that understood.2 It should then become apparent which has been termed “Activity Cost.” 4 that in most cases management must first The concept of activity costs aggregating decide how cost information is to be used upwards to depict total actual program ele- before that information can be collected.3 ment costs for use in the programming activity has little direct impact on wing/base-level Air Programming and Budgeting Force managers, since the programming ac- tivity is performed at higher organizational Within the defense establishment, program- leveis. For this reason no detailed treatment ming may be thought of in terms of the of this subject will be presented here. For annually approved Five Year Defense Pro- present purposes, this concept is germane gram ( fydp). In essence, the programming only to the extent that activity costs must be process is that activity which itemizes those initially collected at wing/base levei. Suffice time-phased changes in mission and force it to say, then, that cost information collected structure which will be undertaken in order at wing/base levei must be identifiable to to attain a specified military posture at some program elements even though this activity future date. The programming objective is cost aspect of cost information will be used that military’ posture which must be attained only at higher echelons. in order to be able to implement a proposed The second management activity that will 65 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW use cost information is the budgeting activity. cost information to be of use to management In this context, “budgeting” is used in its in the budgeting activity, it must parallel the generic sense and includes all aspects of the budget format. That is, it must reflect the budgeting process—budget estimates, financial total costs incurred by each organizational unit plans, operating budgets, etc. When viewed in and must categorize such costs by function— this perspective, budgeting may be considered Officer Pay, Facility Maintenance, Family as a composite of three activities—requesting Housing, Transportation of Things, tdy funds, justifying requests for funds, and plan- Travei, etc. These types of costs may be ning the expenditure of funds that have been referred to as “organizational cost” and “func- made available. These activities necessarily tional cost,” respectively. involve the prediction of future costs and In order to relate these concepts to the substantiation of the predictions. The accuracy introductory argument that “cost” has no of these predictions determines the effective- meaning unless the type of cost has been ness of any budgeting activity. identified, let us note that the statement “It In this regard, management uses historical costs one million dollars to operate Noname cost information as a basis for predicting Air Force Base for one year” has several future costs. This is done through equating possible meanings. If the statement referred costs, extrapolating costs, developing cost esti- to activity costs, then it would entail only mating relationships, and similar techniques. those costs attributable to the base operating For example, if historical data show that it support program element for Noname afb. cost $100 to do something last year, and if It would not include those costs chargeable the controlling cost parameters (such as pay to any mission program elements stationed at scales, freight charges, cost of raw materiais, the base, such as B-52 or F-106 squadrons. etc.) have not changed, then management can If the statement had been made in reference predict, with a high degree of confidence, to organizational costs, however, then it would that it will cost very nearly $100 to do the involve those costs initially incurred by the same thing this year. If, on the other hand, combat support group and its subordinate no historical cost data of any kind had been units, whether or not they were chargeable to available, then management could only guess tenant units. Finally, if the statement referred what the costs might be this year. Such guesses, to aggregated functional costs, then it would of course, would not deserve nor would they encompass all the costs incurred at Noname receive much confidence. Cost data, then, regardless of the unit or element incurring serve two purposes in the budgeting activity: the cost. they provide a basis for predicting future costs, We have just demonstrated three alterna- and they lend credence to such predictions. tive meanings that could be intended by the Such credence is of the utmost importance same statement concerning cost, depending in budgeting. In the preceding example, for on the type of cost being discussed, and the instance, when the $100 cost prediction was possibilities are far from being exhausted. based on historical cost data, there is no room We have yet to consider those costs which for hedging—if management wants the job managers use in their operating activities. to be done, they must provide $100 for that purpose. Operating—Management Control Within the defense establishment, budgets are developed for organizational units by The operating activity encompasses all the functional categories, corresponding to the management functions involved in the day- twelve military appropriations. In order for to-day performance of organizational tasks and AIR FORCE REVIEW 67 missions. As such, it is primarily a lower- introductory premise—cost has no meaning echelon function and is, therefore, of unless the type of cost is specified. From this considerable importance to wing/base-level discussion it follows that no special category managers. In fact, it can be said that the of cost data is required in performing the preponderant portion of a wing/base-level communicating function. What is required manager’s efforts are expended in the operat- is that the correct type of cost data be ing activity. In this regard, many if not most used, depending on the purpose of the management actions are concerned primarily communication. with operational effectiveness, mission accom- plishment, and the like—considerations which motivation do not necessarily require cost data. Neverthe- Cost information can be used as an important less, there are two areas of operating activity tool for motivating subordinates. If nothing in which managers use cost information: else, the mere collection of cost data indicates management control and decision-making.6 that management is concerned about costs, In essence, management control is the func- and this fact alone will serve to motivate sub- tion of ensuring that management plans and ordinates to comply with management plans policies are implemented as intended.6 In per- and policies that can be measured in terms forming this function, cost information can of cost. help in three important ways: it can serve At this point it would be appropriate to as a means of communication; it can be used digress for a moment and consider the impor- to motivate; and it can be used as a yardstick tance of motivation. Motivation, really, is the of appraisal/ onlv way that management can ever accom- plish anything. Mr. Robert Anthony expressed comm u n ication this idea most succinctly: The communicating role of cost data is in- An obvious and fundamental fact about herent in the data themselves. Their very organizations is that they are made up of existence constitutes a record of some activity, human beings. The management control process in part consists of inducing the people and the simple act of transmittal constitutes in an organization to do certain things and a report, be it formal or informal. Perhaps it to refrain from doing others. Although for is this characteristic of cost information that some purposes an accumulation of the costs is responsible for the interest in cost informa- of manufacturing a product is useful, manage- tion for its own sake. A cursory consideration ment literally cannot “control” a product or of the communicating role of cost data could the costs of making a product. What manage- lead to the erroneous argument that, since ment does—or at least attempts to do—is any and all cost information by its very nature control the actions of the people who are coastitutes a record and/or report, any and all responsible for incurring these costs.R cost information is of use to management. Regardless of how it is attained, cost control This argument, however, ignores one of the is certainly one of the most important manage- basic precepts of communication: to be effec- ment objectives.” But, to repeat, this objective tive, any communication must convey the can only be realized by motivating people. intended thought. In order to be an effective However, “. . . costs can be controlled only means of communication, then, cost data on the basis of accurate, comprehensive, well- must be collected and presented in a fashion coordinated knowledge of their nature, suitable for conveying the intended thought. amount, and reason for existence. . . .” 10 This is simply another way of stating the The logical consequence of these arguments 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW is that, for management control purposes, A further application of the appraisal func- costs must be collected and people must be tion concerns the evaluation of decisions. motivated. This twofold requirement can be Decisions are often based at least in part on satisfied by measuring costs incurred and cate- cost considerations. In order to evaluate such gorizing them in terms of the person or per- decisions it is necessary to measure results in sons responsible for incurring the costs. This terms of the cost parameters used in the deci- process will fix responsibility for costs with sion process.13 It is evident, then, that the those individuais who have control over the same cost considerations and categories will costs.11 This concept of measuring and cate- be used in evaluating decisions as were used gorizing costs as either controllable or uncon- in making them, and these will be considered trollable serves a dual purpose: to collect the in succeeding paragraphs. required cost data and to motivate responsible Suffice it to say in summary that cost in- individuais toward cost control and other formation is used in the management control management objectives, thereby satisfying the function of the operating activity in order to need of cost data for management control. communicate, to motivate, and to evaluate, and that these uses of cost information require appraisal that costs be categorized as controllable or uncontrollable. Closely associated with the function of motiva- tion is the appraisal or evaluation function. Operating—Decision-Making As far as people are concerned, the two func- tions are practically inseparable—a man will “There’s more than one way to skin a cat” be motivated to perform to the extent that is a homespun adage which expresses one of he will be evaluated on his performance. the most basic and most generally accepted Evaluation, per se, must be based on much truisms of human activity—that there is more more than just cost performance. Nevertheless, than one way to do anything. One of manage- since cost performance, or efficiency, is a ment’s most basic and most frequently per- management objective, it must enter into formed tasks is selecting the best way to evaluation to some extent. The other half of do something. This, of course, is the essence the evaluation coin is effectiveness—how well of management decision-making—choosing the job was done. In the military, effectiveness among alternatives. Moreover, the decision- is rightfully considered to be more important making process is one of comparing the rela- than efficiency, and it should therefore be tive effects of the various possible alternatives. given primary consideration in evaluation. Any course of action may be thought of or The problem, then, is to motivate toward measured in terms of change, based on the efficiency and evaluate efficiency without situation existing before and after the imple- jeopardizing effectiveness. This may be accom- mentation of that course of action. The more plished by evaluating efficiency in terms of a given course of action improves a given extremes—the very good and the very bad situation (or the less it degrades the situation), being identified and evaluated accordingly, the better is that alternative. Or, in the words and all those in between being evaluated of Haynes and Massie, “. . . decisions are entirely on effectivenss.12 At any rate, the same based on measuring the benefits to be derived cost concepts are applicable to the appraisal . . . against the sacrifices (costs) incurred.” 14 of people as were developed in the preceding One of the most important aspects of cost discussion on motivation—controllable costs information in the decision-making process and uncontrollable costs. is futurity. Decisions are concerned with the AIR FORCE REVIEW 69 impact of alternatives on future events, not wants to know the full cost of driving the with past history. It follows, then, that “only family car on a vacation trip. those costs not yet incurred are important to a . . . [management] decision,” and unavoid- costs for decision-making able costs should never even be considered in the decision-making process.15 The effective communication of cost informa- This concept of future costs applicable to tion for decision-making depends, in large decision-making is clearly illustrated by W. J. part, on categorization of costs to reflect those Vatter’s classic example of the cost of operat- aspects illustrated in the automobile example. inç an automobile. The data in Table 1 depict The first requirement is to separate the costs the costs incurred relative to the operation incurred as a direct result of performing a of a familv car for a one-year period. given task from those only indirectly related to the task. These aspects may be identified as direct and indirect costs respectively.16 Table 1 Annual Cost of Operating an Automobile All the costs listed in Table 1 are direct costs associated with owning and operating an Item Annual Cost automobile. Indirect costs would be incurred Depreciation______$ 500.00 for such things as upkeep of garage and drive- Gasoline and lubricants------245.00 way, Utilities for the garage, etc. Tires ______62.50 A further distinction must be made between Garage r e n t______60.00 Driver’s license______3.00costs that vary in direct proportion to output Registration______10.00 and those that do not, termed “variable” and Insurance______139.00 “fixed” costs respectively.17 In the illustration, Preventive maintenance_____ 48.00 gasoline and lubricants and tire replacements Other repairs______45.00 are examples of variable costs, and their Miscellaneous (antifreeze, wash, magnitude is determined solely by the number wax, etc.) ______27.50 of miles driven. Costs such as depreciation, Total annual cost______$1140.00 registration, garage rent, insurance, etc., are Miles driven per year_ 12,000 fixed and they remain essentially the same Total annual cost per mile 9*/20 regardless of how much the car is driven. Of even more interest in decision-making If this family is considering taking a vaca- is the distinction between costs that will be tion trip, their decision may well hinge on affected by a particular decision and those transportation costs. They may aLso want to that will not, termed “incrementai” and consider the possibility of traveling by some “sunk” costs respectively.18 Returning to our means other than the family car. In either case example once more, if the family lives in a they should certainly not compute the cost house that has a garage and driveway, the of driving the family car on the vacation trip costs of these facilities are sunk costs. They at 9J/20 per mile. Instead, they may consider have been incurred and cannot be reduced only those costs that vary directly with the by any decision concerning the use of the number of miles driven, such as gasoline and family car. lubricants, tires, and preventive maintenance, Finally, a manager must consider oppor- which would total only 3*/á ^ per mile. This, tunity costs (or opportunity losses). He must too, would be far from an accurate represen- consider that any gain which might have tation of the true costs involved, for many resulted from employing his resources in a other factors must be considered if one really manner other than the one being considered 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW must be foregone if the alternative is selected Since Air Force managers are continually and is thercfore part of the cost (sacrifice) faced with new and unanticipated problems, incurred by choosing the first course of action. situations, and tasks, it is virtually impossible This aspect of cost data has been termed to begin collecting specific cost information “implicit” cost, as opposed to “explicit” costs, required for the various circumstances after which represent the resources actually con- the requirement is known and still have the sumed by the alternative selected.19 All the information available for timely action. The costs listed in Table 1, for example, are the only practical solution to the opportune explicit costs of owning and operating the acquisition of cost data for management’s use family automobile for one year. However, is the collection of data on a continuous basis if the total amount expended could have been and Identification of each item of cost in- invested so as to earn $50 during the course formation in such a way that it can be selected of that year, then $50 is an implicit cost. and aggregated to portray any desired aspect of cost. This can be done if each element of expense is identified so as to depict —the program element with which it is V^ost information is of value associated to management only to the extent that it is —the organizational unit incurring the collected and presented in a manner com- expense patible with management’s expressed purpose. —the functional nature of the expense The various management uses of cost data —the product or Service with which it is are itemized and the type or category of cost associated (directlv and/or indirectly) appropriate for each is identified in Table 2. —the individual (s) and/or managerial position(s) that can significantly infiuence the Table 2 amount expended and the extent of that Costs Appropriate Management Use infiuence —the nature of the expense in terms of Management Appropriate Activity Cost(s) output (fixed or variable) -the extent to which the amount of the Programming_____ Activity cost expense can be influenced by operating Budgeting______Organizational cost decisions. Functional cost Operating If each element of expense is identified in —Management these ways, then costs can be aggregated and control presented to show any aspect that may be Communication_ As required to convey required by wing/base-level Air Force man- intendcd thought agers. However, if elements of expense are Motivation/ not identified to this depth, then the possible appraisal uses of cost information are correspondingly Of people____ Controllable cost limited. Since cost data rarely are so clearlv Of decisions__ Same as used in the defined in the Air Force, it is imperative that decision concerned Air Force managers be able to analyze the —Decision-making _ Variabie/fixed cost cost data available, determine what kinds of Direct/indirect cost costs are represented by the data, and then Incrementai/sunk be able to determine if the data are reallv cost worthwhile for their specific purpose. Implicit/explicit cost Vandenberg AFB, Califórnia AIR FORCE REV1EW 71 Notei 1. Robert N. Anthony, "Management U»es ol Expenie Informa- 9. Cirl Thomaa Devine. Cost Accounting and Analysis (New York: tion,” »n addreaa delivered by lhe Aaai.tant Secreliry ol Delenae The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 9. (Comptroller) before lhe Tbirleeolh Nationsi Award» Banquet. 10. Stanley B. Hcnrici. Standard Costs lor Manufacturing, 2d ed. Arme d Forcea Management Auocialion. on 13 October 1966, p. 3. (New York: McCraw-HilI Book Company. Inc., 1953), p. 3. 2. Robert N. Anthony. Management Accounting: Text and Cates, 11. Cadmua and Child, p. 5. 3d ed. (Homewood, lllinoia: Richard D. Irwin. Inc., 1964). p. 6. 12. Ibid. 3. Micbael Schiff and Lawrence J. Benninger, Cost Accounting, 13. Ibid. 2d ed. (New York: The Ronald Preaa Company, 1963), p. 1. 14. Warren W. Haynea and Juaeph L. Maacir. Munagemenl: Analy 4. Boward W. Wright, Accounting for Dejense Contracts (Englc sis, Concepts and Cases (Englewood Cliffa, New Jeney: Prentice-Hall, wood Clifft. New Jeraey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962). p. 51. Inc.. 1961). p. 274. 5. Anthony, Management Accounting, pp. 3-6. 15. Ibid. 6. Bradford Cadmua and Arthur J. E. Child, Internai Control 16. Ibid., p. 283. Against Fraud and Waste (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953). 17. Ibid. p. 5. 7. Anthony, Management Accounting, pp. 3-5. 18. Ibid. 8. Ibid., pp. 361-62. 19. Ibid. EQUIPMENT READINESS J er ome G. Pepper s, J r . HROUGHOUT his existence on this mission-essential equipment is maintained in planet, man has found it necessary to a mission-ready state. For this reason, equip- develop weapons of many kinds to protect ment maintenance capability is provided for himself from animais and other men. Warfare in the organizational strueture of every mili- has been a major concern to him in all his tary unit designed for combat or combat leveis of development as it is today to us. support. Maintenance capability consists of Not all men have required offensive forces; trained people and adequate tools, equipment, some armed themselves only for protection. facilities, technical data, supply support, and Even so, mankind has found some form of materiais. Maintenance managers are pro- armed might essential, and this has caused vided to insure the effective use of mainte- the maintenance of weaponry to be of serious nance capability in attaining and retaining the concern for society’s leaders. Man’s weapons required mission equipment readiness. of defense and offense, through technological Until recently the man himself was relied advancements, have become more powerful upon for military effectiveness. He was and more complex. As this has occurred, so, equipped and, with reasonable care, could be too, has an increased concern about their relied upon to use his equipment to accom- readiness for use. plish the mission. This is not true today. Maintenance of military weapons and Today we man equipment and recognize that equipment is an integral part of defense the condition of the equipment is at least as capability. In today’s world, the ability of important as the condition of the man for military forces to react instantaneously is military needs. In fact, the assigned mission essential to national survival. This ability can- of most units could not be accomplished not exist unless an optimum quantity of without a certain quantity of mission equip- 72 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW ment ready and capable. The man, though lished. The 1940 conscription act is one ex- still essential, cannot perform unaided. A pilot ample; the Berlin crisis and Korea are two is of little mission value if his aircraft is others of recent history. In each of these unable to fly. A tank commander is crippled instances we were able to meet the challenge if his tank is unable to move, or fire, or because, fortunately, time to get ready was communicate. Equipment readiness seems to available. There is no assurance that the same be an absolute military essential. fortunate circumstances will again exist. It is impossible to predict when, where, or Historical reviews and analyses following in what manner our military strength might the Cuban missile crisis of 1963 revealed that be needed. The requirement may come dur- some military units reported as combat-ready ing a cold-war tension period or in a limited- were, in fact, not ready because of the in- war commitment. The threat of sudden attack ability of equipment to perform as required. and the possibility of general war add other Some units were “combat-ready” only in the uncertainties to the situation. Because of this sense that command personnel felt they were. uncertainty we must be prepared to meet the The dangers of this delusion were well ex- worst conceivable situation that would require pressed by General David M. Shoup, usmc: instantaneous response ability. This places a In determining operational effectiveness, do great burden on the tactical commander and not delude yourself or higher command. Do emphasizes the urgent requirement for effec- not, as has been alleged, confuse willingness tive equipment maintenance. The burden of with readiness. Willingness is a State of mind, the readiness mission is borne by maintenance, readiness is a matter of fact—report the facts. and it is essential that each maintenance man- General Shoup’s astute observation suc- ager and technician understand his responsi- cinctly places the problem in perspective. We bilities to his unit and his country. must have ready equipment to have unit Maintenance capability is developed to readiness. While other factors also enter into acquire and retain a specified State of equip- consideration, this one is primary. No report- ment readiness for the tactical unit. The ing official (commander or manager) should measure of maintenance success is the ever report anything other than the facts of achieved State of equipment readiness. condition that actually exists. None should Therefore, maintenance receives its reason confuse the issue by reporting what he wishes for being and its measure of success from the existed rather than what actually does. same source: equipment readiness. There is The Department of Defense has in-being no more valid reason for maintenance in the today an equipment-readiness reporting Sys- tactical organization, and maintenance effec- tem. The specific details may be found in tiveness thus becomes a primary factor in dod publications and the implementing direc- determining unit capability. This places the tives of the military departments. Air Force maintenance manager in a position of great Manual 65-110 serves this purpose for the importance and largely explains the growing Air Force, but since it is subject to change, command interest in maintenance operations. this article will not attempt to relate to it. We have not always had the present empha- Rather, it describes the philosophy and con- sis on readiness. Never before was the need cepts less likely to change. so pressing. Many times in our history we Maintenance organizations are designed to have hastily scrambled to marshal resources provide the degree of equipment readiness to meet a developing need. Our ocean barriers required to accomplish the assigned unit permitted the luxury of rising to the occasion missions. To do this, maintenance is expected after the need for military strength was estab- to perform three basic functions: AIR FORCE REVIEW 73 preventive maintenance - routine scheduled it is needed for supply support, procurement, attention to the equipment, to keep it and other functions in logistics support and safely and effectively operable; budgetary activities. Thus, the first knowledge corrective maintenance - repairing or re- element for equipment readiness involves building to rectify failure, malfunction, identification and inventory distribution of or damage; mission-essential equipment. qualitative maintenance - approved modi- For readiness purposes, equipment is either fication, alteration, or retrofit, to improve ready or not ready. But the real world does safety, correct defects, or improve or not permit such simplicity; readiness report- change performance characteristics to ing, while based on those two possible condi- meet mission requirements. tions, has complications and definition The management of this maintenance effort requirements. is extremely important. Management must To begin with, the total item of equipment determine the priorities necessary for the must be thought of as a collection of systems, correct application of maintenance resources. subsystems, and components. It is not suffi- To do this, management must clearly identify cient to think of an aircraft, for example, and understand the unit mission-essential merely as a highly mobile piece of firepower equipment. Further, management must com- equipment. There is more to it than that. municate the mission and mission needs in- There is, for example, a propulsion System telligibly to all personnel involved directly within the airframe System. There is also a or in a support role. fire-control system, a communication system, Not all equipment used in the Department and more. Even the knowledge of system of Defense is mission-essential. Some items structure is not adequate in itself because not are simply convenient. Others are time-savers. all systems are essential to mission ability. But many items are of such nature that mis- Some systems are for redundancy or backup sion success is doubtful if they are not avail- capability. Some are efficiency systems rather able or if they are available but not fully than effectiveness systems. In view of this, the operable. Infantry weapons, tactical aircraft, second essential knowledge element for equip- and ships are rather obvious examples of ment readiness is the identification of those mission-essential equipment. The specific equipment systems and/or subsystems (and identification of mission-essential equipment sometimes individual components) that are must be known by command and maintenance absolutely required to perform the assigned personnel to insure intelligent application of mission or missions. resources in proper priority to attain and re- Normally, the identification of mission- tain the required readiness posture. However, essential systems, subsystems, or components mere identification of the mission-essential is determined by a higher element of authority. equipment is not enough. Command and man- The identification listing of these essentials, agement people must also know how many with full realization of the assigned and possi- of each type of equipment the unit needs for ble mission requirements, will be found in the mission and how many are on hand. military department or major command Such “inventory” information is imperative directives. The listing must (absolutely must) at unit levei and equally important at each be known, with familiarity and understanding, succeeding echelon of the military structure. by the maintenance manager in order to It is needed for planning operational pro- establish logically mission-oriented priority- grams, establishing mission assignments, and action direction to his people. Any direction selecting units for target assignments. Further, for maintenance action without this con- 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sideration could only be coincidentally effec- Specific definitions for the terms “opera- tive for readiness requirements. tionally ready” and “not operationally ready” After the manager knows what equipment are contained in the afm 65-110 readiness is involved and knows its mission-essential reporting directive. Command and manage- elements, the third essential readiness knowl- ment personnel are encouraged to leam these edge element he must have is the current up- definitions and exercise their management to-the-minute status and condition of the skills with full appreciation of the readiness equipment and its mission-essential elements. requirements and directions. Without this information the manager works Periodic reporting of the distribution and in the dark and is unable to do his job intelli- condition of mission-essential equipment is gently. Therefore, an efhcient information required. The reports are submitted by the flow must exist to accurately provide status operational unit to inform those who need and condition data. Maintenance control, this intelligence at each hierarchical levei up whether it be the maintenance manager him- to and including the Office of the Secretary of self or an organizational entity specifically Defense and, often, the President and the manned for that purpose, must receive this Congress. The data are essential for many information on a timely basis, digest it, deter- operational and command requirements as mine its impact on readiness, and direct appli- well as for logistic, budget, and other pur- cation of maintenance resources wherever poses. The data are used and must be accu- action or work is required, in proper priority. rate, factual, and in no way colored by It is at this point that equipment readiness desires or wishes of what might be or might is attained or lost. Certainly, at this point have been. management must be most effective. No matter Readiness reports inform people who make how well the three maintenance functions are decisions. Decisions are based upon judgment. performed, they will not be readiness-effective Judgment can be no better than the available if the described data flow and maintenance information about and the knowledge of the control are not timely and pertinent to the situation. The quality of readiness information readiness objective. affects the decision judgment of an untold Status information will determine current number of people in every element of national readiness condition. This may be either opera- defense. We can afford only realistic judg- tionally ready or not operationally ready, as ment and resource allocation in this vital area. dictated by the status and condition of the Therefore, maintenance managers, and their mission-essential systems, subsystems, and com- commanders, must insure absolute honesty ponents. Those equipments classed opera- and accuracy in reporting equipment readi- tionally ready (or) will be safe to use and ness. Further, they must insure an intelligent able to perform the mission or missions of application of maintenance capability to im- the unit. Those not operationally ready ( nor ) prove the unit readiness condition and correct will be either unsafe or unable to perform, the causes of nonready equipment. This is or both. Logically, most management atten- their job. The nation depends upon that job tion will be applied to those items not opera- being done efficiently and effectively. The tionally ready, so they may be expeditiously end result is a major role in determining our returned to a ready condition. nation’s future. Air Force Institute of Technology THE CIVILIAN ANALYSTS, IN THEIR PRIDE AND THEIR FALL Brigadier Gener al Noel F. Parrish, USAI-’ (Ret) Books and Ideas WELVE years ago the Institute for surrounded by a bland atmosphere in which Strategic Studies was founded in London, all military concerns tend to dissolve into the T and just two years ago the annual conferencebackground.” (p. 104) What has brought of its members heard some remarkable papers things to such a pass? In two words: over- on the progress of strategic studies during the confidence and failure. life of the Institute. Now a small volume has Quoting Bernard Brodie, . . if pride appeared containing nine of these commen- goeth before a fali, members of the American taries on what has happened to strategy dur- strategic fraternity have had both their pride ing a decade that began with misplaced and their fali.” (p. 174) Raymond Aron, in enthusiasm and has ended with exaggerated the first essay of the book, begins the story disillusionment.f of how it carne about: “In 1961 the analysts The star contributors to the volume are arrived at the White House with President Raymond Aron, the most respected French Kennedy; there and then they worked out observer of world political and military afTairs; the various deterrent schemes and discussed Michael Howard, who follows the late Liddell with great passion the strategic or diplomatic Hart as the leading military commentator in doctrines that one can arrive at as a result Britain; Robert Osgood, the eminent pro- of theoretical elaboration. . . . The analysts fessor of American foreign policy at Johns are living their ‘finest hour,’ and most of them Hopkins, who has specialized in limited war; approve, in essence, of the McNamara doc- and finally Bernard Brodie, the acknowledged trine.” (p. 16) Aron speaks further of “the dean of all nuclear analysts (nonstatistical). rise and decline of nuclear strategy, or rather Five other contributors, all eminent in their of the civilian analysts. If they lived their more specialized fields, will be cited later. ‘finest hour’ with Kennedy, the Vietnam war The essays vary in style, content, and value, —for which they are not responsible—repre- but there is surprising agreement on two sents their epitaph.” (p. 20) points: First, that the analytical techniques The term “epitaph” is much too final. The used in developing a nuclear strategy or pos- civilian analysts have become indispensable, ture in the 1950s were successful in creating though in the future they may be “on tap a delicate balance of terror, but these statisti- but not on top” as military leaders once cal techniques failed disastrously in the follow- described the position of specialists. But Aron’s ing decade when they were used to justify charitable absolution of the analysts from limited conventional wars. Second, because responsibility for the Vietnam war is not in this misapplication of method violated political accord with his more detailed judgment or and social principies that are dominant in all with that of his colleagues. grand strategy, we have reached a dead end Aron maintains that all the useful thinking in military policy as well as in diplomatic was done before the analysts wrere installed policy. in positions of power: “. . . towards the end In international politics and international of the 1950s all the main ideas had been affairs, an era has ended with few clues as worked out, all the theories -constructed, all to what the next will be like. In Robert the doctrines put forward.” (p. 17) Osgood’s words: . . strategic imagination Michael Howard agrees that with the seems to have reached a rather flat plateau advent of Kennedy and McNamara “not t Problems of Modern Strategy, Foreword by Alastair Buchan, The Institute for Strategic Studies, Studies in International Security: 14 (N ew York: Praeger, 1970, $7.50), 219 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 77 entirely coincidentaUy, the great period of positively enthusiastic about limited war when American intellectual strategic speculation compared with the mood of the nation today. carne to an end, after five astonishingly fruit- ful years. The military intellectuals were either drawn, like Kaufmann and Hilsman, In Aron’s view the sec- into govemment, or returned to more orthodox ond Cuban crisis (certainly studies on university campuses." (p. 67) He not the first) “marks the says “The principies established by the thinkers triumph of the analyst” of the 1950s were to guide Mr McNamara while “the Vietnam war in his work of remoulding American defence points to his decline and policy . . . ‘The McNamara Strategy’ had a compromises his prestige.” logical coherence—almost an elegance— (p. 32) O ver Cuba the threat of escalation which may have commanded rather more that we posed by mobilizing was persuasive, admiration among academics than it did in but over North Vietnam the practice of escala- the world of affairs. . . . European allies flatly tion has been ineffective. Aron does not refused McNamara’s requests that they should examine the reasons why the threat over Cuba increase their conventional forces to provide was unhesitant and apparently unlimited the necessary ‘spectrum of deterrence’. . . . while that over Hanoi was apologetic and Several of Mr McNamara’s emissaries re- vacillating, and this is unfortunate, for the ceived, in consequence, a somewhat gruelling reasons have to do more with the personal introduction to the refractory world of inter- role of the Secretary of Defense than with national affairs.” (pp. 67-69) his analysts. Yet Aron is far less severe in his In turn, Robert Osgood, who once stressed judgment of the analysts than is Osgood in his “the need to provide the appropriate forces chapter, entitled “The Reappraisal of Limited for the fighting of limited wars” (p. 60), now War.” admits that “although the logic of flexible Osgood agrees with Urs Schwarz (the Swiss and controlled response prevailed on paper author of an excellent little book, American and in strategic pronouncements, the means Strategy— A New Perspective), whose brief to withstand anything more than the most chapter, “Great Power Intervention in the limited attack for longer than a week were Modern World,” makes the point historically not forthcoming.” (p. 102) Osgood does not that unilateral intervention such as we essayed mention what veterans of military or diplo- in Vietnam is an out-of-date gamble against matic Service in the North Atlantic Treaty impossible odds, regardless of the techniques Organization (nato) had known throughout employed. Osgood accuses his more pontificai the 1950s: that the pretense of possible con- colleagues in the study of limited war of being ventional parity with Red forces across the entranced with strategies at the expense of European península was just an academic showing proper consideration for feasible exercise all along. objectives and political realities. He says Now, says Osgood, after “the inroads of bluntly that one cause of the neglect for politi- time upon novel plans . . . limited-war think- cal factors was “the propensity of American ing is Ieft somewhere between the initial civilian strategists to propound their ideas, Kennedy-McNamara views and the approach often with brilliant ingenuity, as revelations of the Eisenhower-Dulles administration.” of an esoteric body of learning (which to (p. 104) Unfortunately, after two more years some extent they were) that would rescue of indeclsion in Vietnam, the Eisenhower- military thinking from conventional wisdom Dulles administration may be recalled as and put it on a rational basis. In this respect, 78 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW however, the deference of the uninitiated, “to save American military policies from the overawed by the secrets and rituais of the thralldom of misguided budgetary restrictions strategic priesthood, has been more important . . . they rejected the thesis of the Eisenhower- than the pretensions of the priests.” (p. 97) Dulles Administration that the United States Osgood apparently agrees with Aron that would spend itself into bankruptcy if it pre- conceptual elaborations of strategies are pared to fight local aggression locally at places basically so simple that “unlike economic and with weapons of the enemy’s choosing. models of the same type, they do not even |f With the advent of the Kennedy Adminis- demand a subtlety of intellect in any way out tration the revisionists carne into office. of the ordinary,” and with Aron’s quotation Responding to a dominant theme in from Napoleon: “ ‘Strategy is a simple art, Kennedy’s campaign, they were determined it’s just a matter of execution’.” (p. 21) to fill the military gaps in containment. . . . He is not content with this blast at the The only remaining gap in military contain- “priesthood” but goes on to more serious ment might be closed if the United States accusations. He remembers that “in the could demonstrate in Vietnam that wars of Kennedy Administration limited war became national liberation must fail.” (pp. 98-99) official doctrine and achieved something But why were “gaps” in defense the domi- approaching popularity.” (p. 93) nant theme in Kennedy’s campaign? Michael As an insider of the now quiescent fraternity Howard is most helpful here. He points out of “limited warriors,” Osgood is in a position that “the first western government to adopt to strike below the intellect in reaching the the concept of ‘deterrence’ as the basis of its heart of the problem “Why Vietnam?” : . . military policy was that of the United King- there was no inducement to question the dom in 1952; very largely thanks to the think- premises about the wisdom and efficacy of ing of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir intervention that underlay the prevailing John Slessor, the then Chairman of the Chiefs American approach to limited war. The tend- of Staff.” (p. 53) Howard does not say so, ency was, rather, to complete the confirmation but it is known that the concept was ofHcially of a decade of limited-war thinking by proving rejected in the United States by General the latest and most sophisticated concepts in Ornar Bradley, of the United States Army, action.” (p. 99) This is a rather startling who was then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs admission: that proponents of strategic doc- of Staff. Yet nuclear deterrence was even trines may sometimes seek to have their con- then, at the height of the Korean War, the clusions tested in combat, just as developers de fado policy of the United States, as it of weapons are accused of doing. I am re- had been ever since the bombing of Hiroshima minded of a platform encounter with an and Nagasaki and the whirlwind demobiliza- enthusiastic advocate of passive resistance who tion of United States ground, sea, and air impatiently urged the unilateral disarmament forces at the end of World War II. Other and consequent occupation of his own countrv means of containing massive Red ground and so that the efficacy of nonviolent revolt could air forces on the central Eurasian land mass be demonstrated. Fortunately most men whose simply did not exist. professions deal with disaster—and this in- The cost—in both casualties and resources cludes military men—are not too anxious to —of trying to contain the new Chinese army test their skills in unnecessary action. on one small península most favorable for Why were the “limited warriors” among defense had caused, in Howard s words, the intellectuals so highly motivated in their “American weariness with the Korean War, crusade? Osgood explains that they sought and the dcsire of the Republican Party to BOOKS AND IDEAS 79 return to financial ‘normalcy’ ” through the the Department of Defense and even a few open avowal, at last, of “massive retaliation" in the Department of State who thought rather as policy. Howard continues, “It should per- hard about these matters. Since their thinking haps be judged, not as a coherent strategic became policy, it can scarcely be dismissed as doctrine, but as a political expedient—or even of no consequence, any more than that of as a diplomatic communication, itself a the academic thinkers whose influence carne manoeuvre in a politico-military strategy of —and went—a few years later. The fact that ‘deterrence’. By these criteria the policy must they were too busy to write books and mono- be pronounced not ineffective. But its logical graphs at the moment was in itself consequen- fallacies were too glaring to be overlooked.” tial—just as it was consequential under a new (p. 58) regime, as the authors of this volume generally Logical fallacies, both Howard and Aron agree, that the “thinkers” in power were too are at pains to emphasize, are inherent in busy with doctrine, formulae, graphs, and the concept of “deterrence,” which, as pronouncements to implement an effective Howard says, “takes us out of the familiar policy in Vietnam. Howard himself, in field of military strategy into the unmapped another context, displays a rare insight into if not unfamiliar territory of political bargain- what is often the low-level (military) source ing, where total rationality does not invariably of high-level (academic) elaboration. reign supreme.” (p. 56) Moreover, while the The academic strategist need not, in conventional forces of the West were stalled Howard’s view, remain at the commander’s in Korea and defeated in Vietnam, nuclear elbow, for there his advice may appear “either weapons were not used at all, and the influ- platitudinous or impracticable.” (p. 49) ence of the threat of their use was difficult Strategy is not a Science but is rather, as to measure. Voltaire described it, “murderous and con- Howard continues: “These, and other jectural.” (p. 48 n) Systems analysis may points, were rapidly made with force and simplify problems (or complicate them), but relish by Democrat politicians and sympa- it cannot eliminate them. The academic role thizers out of office, by academic specialists, is to widen the commander’s range of thought, and by members of the armed Services which to educate his guesses. were being cut back to provide greater re- sources for the Strategic Air Command. There has perhaps never been a strategic Yet even where great controversy which has not been fuelled by commanders have followed political passions and Service interests. It is specific principies, it is diffi- entirely understandable, and for our purposes cult to prove that these were quite unimportant, that the US Air Force derived from specific theo- should havc sought every argument to justifv rists. What, then, might be the doctrine of massive retaliation while the their derivation? Howard US Army powerfully supported its opponents. admits a truth too little known: “The most What is significant, however, is that the latter eminent thinkers sometimes do no more than included every strategic thinker of anv con- codify and clarify conclusions which arise so sequence in the United States. . . (p. 59) naturally from the circumstances of the time One may quarrel with Howard’s statement that they occur simultaneously to those ob- for several reasons, especially for his term scurer, but more influential figures who write “strategic thinker of any consequence.” training manuais and teach in Service colleges. Obviously, there were a number of people in And sometimes strategic doctrines may be 80 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW widely held which cannot be attributed to Robert S. McNamara, tended automatically any specific thinkers, but represent simply the to think in such terms. Military history, which consensus of opinion among a large number used to be the main acknowledged source of of professionals who had undergone a forma- strategic insight—Clausewitz and Mahan are tive common experiente.” (p. 49) examples—has been enormously down-graded “The name of Douhet,” for example, “was in favour of the new analytical techniques.” virtually unknown in the Royal Air Force. (p. 160) . . .” (p. 49) To American airmen that name, Neither Brodie nor the other contributors even if they heard it, sounded more like an question the usefulness of analytical tech- admirai at Manila Bay than an untranslated niques, but they deplore the notion that statis- Italian. They did not even bother to read the tics can substitute for understanding the human tirades of their naval colleagues that told elements and value judgments involved in them whose disciple they were. In fact, they every major decision. Brodie suggests that read little of anything, and they wrote even “under the seven criticai years of the regime less, for such was their tradition. The reasons of Mr McNamara” this notion prevailed so for this are too numerous to cite here, other that “what should have been supplementary than to mention that although they listened talent tended in fact to become pre-emptive in classes to scholars with glasses, airmen of the field of strategic study.” (p. 170) never wore them. Disciplined thinking at “the mostly tactical Howard has, after all, a valid point in his leveis at which systems analysis is applicable” observation that the few well-known academic did not prevent “sloppy thinking” in areas strategists who were writing in the late 1950s of inquiry where the best practitioners of the represented what was considered an Army art, such as Charles J. Hitch, agreed that viewpoint and were outside the establishment, systems analysis “has no real applicability.” while in the 1960s they tended to become a Brodie refers to Amrom Katz, a rand expert part of it. As Aron expressed it: “The analysts with a talent for humility, in his comment of nuclear problems [or of global strategy in that charts are a temptation because “one the nuclear age] have become the diplomatic can present only data on them, usually in the counsellors of the Prince, for the evil or the form of numbers” (Amrom H. Katz, “The glory of Princes and analysts.” (p. 16) Short Run and the Long Walk,” Air Force, With the defense of the West in its most June 1967) and that the proliferation of deflated State since 1949 and with American charts leads to listing whatever data are avail- military affairs the most demoralized since able and pretending they are relevant. Woodrow Wilson’s occupation of Vera Cruz, In Vietnam, for example, with no front “princes and analysts” are now more troubled lines whose movement might be an indication by evil than dazzled by glory. Complaints of gain or loss, “our ‘winning’ is demonstrated against the analysts are not merely that they by the use of charts containing data” that may were “too much” but that they were too be neither accurate nor relevant while the much of a kind. Brodie regrets that the recent enemy is probably using a very different “impressive development of Systems analysis method of measurement. (p. 171) Few of the and of related techniques . . . has fostered frustrations encountered in Vietnam, Brodie the notion that selection of future weapons recalls, were “taken into account in the kinds Systems for appropriate development and of war games, scenarios and cost-effectiveness deployment represents most of what there is analyses done at places like rand over the to modern military strategy. I suspect that the past twenty years.” (pp. 171-72) He con- former American Secretary of Defense, Mr cedes that the restraint we have imposed upon BOOKS AND IDEAS 81 ourselves by not invading North Vietnam tively a promise of non-use under alrnost any “was, surely, a correct one; what was in- circumstances? If so, the utility of these correct was our failing to appreciate the inili- systems-in-being will inevitably be much tary burden it entailed." (p. 173) diminished, and that utility is presently high. Osgood agrees that “probably no American They make major war between the super- leader wrould have considered the eventual powers and between their respective alliance scale of war worth the costs if he had known systems certainly much less likely than without the costs in advance” ; and he adds that per- them and perhaps critically so.” (p. 168) haps the strategy which “has come closest (This problem was explored in greater detail to a clear-cut failure is controlled escalation, in an article by this reviewer entitled, “Effec- as apphed by means of selective bombing in tive Aerospace Power- 1. Deterrence: The North Vietnam.” (pp. 108-9) (Unlike Hard Questions,” in Air University Quarterly Brodie, Osgood ignores our failure to invade.) Review, XII, 3 and 4 [Winter-Spring, 1960— Nevertheless, Osgood wams against sweeping 61], 148-52.) conclusions, since the purpose of our bombing was ambiguous. Was it for strategic bargain- ing or for purely tactical military reasons? Here again, as often in Perhaps it is too difficult to bomb an under- past years, Brodie issues a developed country for bargaining purposes, timelv warning against the perhaps our aims and methods in comparlson recurrent notion that nu- to theirs were too limited and hesitant, and, clear warfare is already a most significantly, “Perhaps controlled escala- solved equation. The smug tion exerts the desired political effect only assumption that nuclear when there is a convincing prospect of nuclear weapons “automatically cancelled each other” war at the top of the ladder.” (p. 110) —or that at least competition in nuclear According to Aron, it is the nuclear threat, weapons would become stabilized as soon as rather than any conventional balance, that the Russians became satisfied with happy has inhibited “limited wars between the States parity—was characteristic of the “new^think” which hold the supreme weapons.” (p. 21; of the early 1960s. Such an assumption helped Aron’s italics) In a chapter which reviews to divert attention to new projects in conven- the status of arms control, Hedlev Bull is tional armaments, counterinsurgency, and the sufficientlv undistracted by Vietnam to keep like. Now, against a rising tide of obscuran- watch on “the field of Soviet-American com- tism, Brodie’s informed colleagues again ex- petition in strategic nuclear armaments. It is press views similar to his. Only Hedlev Bull, this field which Ls the most sensitive of all in far-off Australia, seems inclined to postpone areas of military activity at the present time, concern about ballistic missile defense, multi- because on it the whole structure of power in ple re-entry vehicles, and improvement of the world depends.” (p. 155) Brodie is under- submarine detection, because “experts do not standably concerned about the degcneration now expect that trends such as these will of debate on competitive nuclear systems into underminc the situation of mutual deterrence epithet-terms such as “overkill,” “assured within the foreseeable future.” (p. 145) The destruction,” and other “unappetizing word other writers have talked to more anxious figures” which indicatc “much dogmatism experts or remembered the history of visions but little searching inquiry.” There is agree- of stability in the past. Bull himself recognizes ment that nuclear weapons are efTectivelv that “mutual deterrence remains ‘delicate' sealed from use, “but should it mean efTec- or unstable in principie . . . .” (p. 145) 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Albert power. “Technology, however, may change. Wohlstetters famous article in Foreign Affairs . . . The technology of war does not stabilize (January 1959), has driven its thesis and its itself automatically—peace must rest on a inspired but uninspiring title into modern political stabilization.” (pp. 123-26) In the consciousness as perhaps no other magazine same vein, Aron asserts that to prefer death article has done. Howard and Aron both cite to surrender “is by no means irrational, since it as the classic climax of Russo-American wise men have never suggested that one thought and progress in deterrence and should prefer life to the reasons for livine.” counterdeterrence, not only for the fifties but (p. 44) to this day. Aron recognizes there is no cer- Yet, von Weizsaecker says, “the average tainty as to the result “if one of the two man cannot induce himself to think of his own super-powers was to try, by a sudden act of death as a quantity in a probability game, aggression carried out with all the resources and he is right in that. He may be unable at its disposal, to disarm and force the capitula- to express himself consistently, but he feels that tion of the other. And it remains still more what we protect by this sort of deterrence is true that technical research continues to im- not yet peace but a delicate, haphazard truce.” prove both the shell and the armour, the Mathematical estimates of probabilities are bombs and the means of delivery: the equilib- useful as “the most rational way of expressing rium of terror is then never completely stable.” the ideas of our strategy of deterrence,” but ^p. 17) Howard cites the view that the main- they are at “a levei of abstraction which is tenance of stability will require continued not common in mankind” and they display thought and effort plus “a certain reciprocity an ethical weakness. Yet von Weizsaecker sees from the Soviet Union.” (p. 64) our delicate balance of terror as an approxi- The same view, though much broader in mate temporary solution whose inventors its scope, is expressed by a German philoso- “deserve respect on ethical grounds.” He pher-scientist with the formidable name of offers no easy Solutions, for “to think of a Carl-Friedrich Freiherr von Weizsaecker in a better solution of the problem than the World truly remarkable chapter, “The Ethical Prob- State is a challenge to our political inventive- lem of Modern Strategy.” Von Weizsaecker ness.” He understands that “disarmament is is a pacifist in the finest sense of the term, for a consequence of a détente rather than its he seeks to understand and solve rather than start.” (pp. 129-33) to assume and pontificate. Once Professor of Equally sensible comments on developments Phvsics, now Professor of Philosophy at the in disarmament over a criticai decade are University of Hamburg, von Weizsaecker says made by Hedley Bull, formerly director of the his participation in church committees on British Arms Control and Disarmament Re- atomic weapons has proved fruitless except for search Unit (1964-67). During this period studies showing that “effective ethical verdicts arms control has replaced disarmament as a were confined to those weapons whose use method for peace, for it recognizes the “possi- would not turn the scales of war.” He believes bility of reciprocation and co-operation even the atomic weapon will be used when “not between potential enemies . . . (p. 141, using it would no longer mean to refrain quoting Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. from one possible means to an end, but to Halperin’s Strategy and Arms Control, p. 2) renounce the very end, e.g., the freedom of Because of the inescapable logic and the one’s own country.” At present, we have a unique success of arms control measures, the “lucky technological situation” in which the formerly troublesome advocates of general use of the weapon does not seem vital to any and complete disarmament (gcd) are no BOOKS AND IDEAS 83 longer influential. The attention of radical his essay can be overlooked with profit. groups, especially of violently radical groups, is now focused on other matters. There are difficulties, of course, even with It would be wrong to nonexistent disarmament. There is danger of conclude this review with- disillusionment over logic or mathematics as out a few words in explana- a solution for disarmament just as previous tion or defense of the generations hoped in vain for “the moral strategic analysts who have transformation of mankind.” Bull also recog- been rather severely taken nizes the difficulties of “translating the uncer- to task by their colleagues in tain and constantlv changing balance of povver some of the passages I have quoted, as well into the precision and fixity of a treaty.” He as in others not mentioned. Howard concludes wams that “in the accumulation of merely with a fair judgment of these strategic svmbolic or hortatory treaties there is a risk thinkers: “Like Clausewitz and Mahan thev that we shall repeat the errors of the 1920s are children of their time, and their views and become the victims of our own illusion- are formed by historical and technological making.” (pp. 154 and 156) conditions whose transformation may well In the strangest of all the chapters, Kenneth render them out of date.” (p. 67) Well, Boulding, an economics and behavioral Sci- Clausewitz and Mahan are not yet entireiv ence professor and a director of research in out of date, especially Clausewitz. “conflict resolution,” maintains that prac- Howard and Aron, not unlike many others, tically evervthing is an illusion. He quotes are a bit severe with Herman Kahn, who is, British philosopher David Hume to the effect after all, a large target. Howard admits the that reality and mental images are incom- claims of Kahn’s critics do not stand up to parable. But Boulding States that “the whole “dispassionate analysis” but says he made organization of the international system is only two new contributions to the nuclear designed, not only to create false images in debate: first, that substantial survival is the minds of the decision-maker,” etc. (p. 82) possible; second, that nuclear war must be More disturbing are Boulding’s perverse controlled, through an effort to coerce the declarations that all historians are “deter- enemy, rather than to engage him in mutual ministic” and assertions such as “The major destruction. Two more-important contribu- human conflict is seen as between the world tions could hardly be made, and after all, as war industry and the civilian population and Brodie observes, “The opportunities for con- enterprise which supports it, rather than be- cocting fresh generalizations in this area are tween national States.” (p. 88) A more not what they once were.” (p. 159) typical examplc of the kind of language that Howard is not alone in deploring Kahn’s captivates disturbed and bewildered collegians “grim jocularity” of style throughout his “huge at the moment is this sentence: “In these davs and baroque study On Thermonuclear War.” there is not much glorification of war as an Who can decree that the great Kahn, a vast end in itself, though what might be called pleasure dome himself, sometimes called the the martial virtues of courage, fortitude, great smiling Buddha, should be other than gallantry and so on, continue to be somewhat jocular even if it causes people like James R. covertly admired even though the martial Newman to bccome “hysterically vitriolic”? style is somewhat alien to the academic and few give Kahn the credit he deserves for reflective life. (p. 88) That was Boulding’s bringing a lethal problem out of windowless most interesting sentence. The remainder of rooms and into relatively unpolluted air. 84 AIR UNJVERSITY REVIEW Aron takes both Kahn and Schelling to progress chart somehow so as to make that task at considerable length over their con- line slant up instead of down”? When analysts struction of “models” to represent strategic who may be thorough and exact despite dedi- situations. He thinks that this practice, while cation to doctrine are caught in this situation, useful, causes analysts to slight their study of compromise is the only solution, and com- each true situation. Aron does not recognize promises can become cumulative. the ingenuity these men had to exercise to Mr. McNamara was long aware of such pierce the wall of security classification that criticisms as have been quoted here and of enclosed them. It was once this reviewer’s others which have not. He showed himself strange duty to examine all rand writings to especially sensitive to those which accused determine whether any of them had to do him of neglecting human factors and qualities with circumstances such as might cause the such as those revealed in the lessons of history. United States to surrender. The Congress, in Also he was aware of some of the doctrines of the marathon “silly surrender'' debate that classic military theorists, particularly those was a part of the post-Sputnik hysteria, had who would “save humanity from nuclear arms decreed that no government-supported re- by saving war”—even at the expense of searcher should ever coasider the possibility endless war. (p. 28) of surrender. Thomas Schelling’s algebraic It is only fair to note that Mr. McNamara elaborations on what might happen to signaled his intentions in this respect and also “Country A” or “Country B” made tedious to note that even the most outspoken hawks, reading, but they passed inspection. before their wounding, were relatively free Finally, it is unfair to blame the analysts for from attacks by doves. Osgood dulv attributes what Brodie once entitled “The McNamara to Douglas Kiker a now almost incredible Phenomenon." Onlv a few carne to power in public statement by McNamara, one which the famous anterooms of the Secretarv, and was little noted at the time: “If you read such power is well diluted. Further, while Tovnbee, you realize the importance of a Mr. McNamara brought no strategic ideas democracy learning to cope with a limited from his motor companv, he did bring some war. The greatest contribution Vietnam is attitudes which his advisers were powerless making—right or wrong is beside the point— to change. As a former lieutenant colonel of is that it is developing in the United States statisties in the Air Force, he knew how to use an ability to fight a limited war, to go to war statisties to a purpose—often a purpose that without the necessity of arousing the public met the needs or desires of his commander or ire. . . . this is the kind of war we ll most himself and not exclusivelv a purpose logically likely be facing for the next fiftv years.” (pp. derived from the figures themselves. As lawyers 99 n - 100) learn to become their own clients and so get The reference to Tovnbee is interesting, not elected to office, as public relations practi- so much because that overworked historian tioners learn to sell themselves along with their often serves as the busy man’s claim to intellec- sponsor’s assets, so are statisticians often ex- tuality, or because Tovnbee himself was even pected to produce for their employers figures then nonviolently opposed to the war, as to support whatever needs to be supported. because of the Secrctarv’s desire to bring a What military man has not heard com- historian’s perspective into the “esoteric priest- manders, in their occupational blindness, hood’’ advocating a war—a war that could demand legal officers who “can tell me how properly be endless as long as it was otherwise to do what I want to do and not why I can't” limited. Most historians, Tovnbee and a few or statistical officers who can “angle that others excluded, do not wish to cast them- BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 selves in the role of prophets or seers in support others—both in uniform and out, in Vietnam, of specific theories or doctrines. They prefer in Europe, in the Pentagon and other head- to ask questions, such as Aron’s at the end of quarters—whose experiences on active and his essay: “To guarantee that wars remain inactive fronts caused them to take all these limited, is it not to accept permanent war? considerations into account. These men were YVill not limitation in means have as its mostly members of the establishment at the corollary absence of limitation in time?” beginning of the sixties, and they probably (p. 46) could be constrained to ride with feigned enthusiasm on the new wave. Unlike the doctrinaire advocates of uni- Military men, unlike lateral withdrawal, the contributors to this thinkers, must provide not volume display no illusions as to the conse- questions but answers. quences of our failures in Vietnam. Osgood General George C. Mar- thinks the total experience will “preclude, at shall provided a long-for- least for a while, . . . any renewed efifort to gotten answer during the strengthen military deterrence and resistance hearings on MacArthur in in the Third World by actively developing the Korean War. He said, “A democracy can- and projecting the United States’ capacity to not fight a Seven Years War.” The advocacy fight local wars.” (p. 116) The development of endless limited war, or fifty years of it, may of such a resistance and such a capacity was comfort some of us who are older and fear said in the beginning to be the principal a too-violent termination of the war, but it purpose of the Vietnam war. can be infuriating to the young, who see it “A more realistic appraisal of our true as their eternitv. capabilities is always to the good," in Brodie\s Brodie, “as both a parent and a teacher,” opinion, “but we have probably experienced speaks of the young: “It does not depreciate a real constriction of those capabilities rather them to surmise that most of their moral than merely a clarification of them. The politi- indignation over our Vietnamese adventure cal disunity within the United States which has been connected with the draft.” (p. 172) is so largely attributable to the war in Viet- Other moral problems involved in having nam, and the disaster which has overtaken planned a war without the will to finish it are President Johnson as a result of his personal the cumulative effect of the war on the commitment and involvement, will not soon people and the area where it is fought; the be forgotten by his successors.” (p. 171) No fatalism, either passive or desperate, induced one could have predicted, at the time Brodie bv repeated rotation of the military pro- wrote, the determined salvage operation now fessionals; and escalating costs without an being attempted in the face of sabotage efforts advantage gained or a disadvantage avoided. by those who capitalize on political disunity No one, in Brodie’s recollection, “ever and insist that nothing more, save honor, took into account what frustration from denial need be sacrificed. of victory or at least of clearly visible progress A more specific but no more encouraging might mean with respect to the attitudes of prediction is made in the final essay by the American people in supporting such a foreign correspondent Brian Crozier: “If the war, and also the attitudes of other peoples Americans are forced, whether for military . . .” (p. 172) Here Brodie speaks for those or for political reasons, to pull out of Vietnam, who favored such a war regardless of inter- their defeat, however disguised, will be hailed minable restraints; but there were manv by revolutionaries everywhere as the final 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW vindication of the theory . . . that even a eighteenth century are unrealistic, counter- super-power can be defeated by a peasant parts of the total wars of the following cen- army. In that event, the efforts now being turies would be catastrophic. The nuclear made to launch such insurrections, or sustain age has . . . inculcated a novel respect for the them, in África, and Latin America, would deliberate control and limitation of warfare. be redoubled. Even the Russians, who do not That respect is a more significant and endur- appear to share the faith of the Chinese, the ing achievement of limited-war strategists North Vietnamese, and the Cubans in the than any of their strategies.” (p. 120) efficacy of the technique, will feel bound to Fortunately, there remain talented and improve on theii commitment to insurgents.” capable men, sobered if not inspired by recent (P- 218) history, who are now trying to adapt a wide The fact that some gains have been made, choice of military techniques to the political regardless of the Vietnam war, is best ex- and social realities of our time. That is the pressed in Osgood’s conclusion: “If counter- challenge of today. parts of the stylized limited warfare of the San Antonio, Texas THE AMERICAN MILITARY NOVEL COLONEL JESSE C. Ga TLIN, Jr - ROFESSOR WAYNE MILLER’S ex- “military” novels, The Spy and The Pilot, and amination of the fictional face of the ends with Dr. Strangelove. Miller notes that AmericanP military establishment,f written Cooper s two books establish one extreme of originally as a doctoral dissertation, begins at the attitudinal spectrum across which the the beginning with James Fenimore Cooper's military novel is spread. Both the Cooper f W ayne C. Miller, An Artned America: Its Face in Fiction—a History of the American Military Novel (New York: New York University Press, 1970, $7.95), 294 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 87 works tend to glamorize the military and con- relatively short, relatively reluctant, and rela- centrate on officers who accept without tively unprofessional—which is to say, rela- question the hierarchical and authoritarian tively antagonistic to the goals and assump- assumptions that characterize the professional tions of the mihtary profession. mihtary. The image of mihtary life in such novels as At the other end of the spectrum Miller Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms, Mailer’s places Dr. Strangelove, the novelized version The Naked and the Dead, Jones’s From Here of the motion picture scenario by Stanley to Eternity, Heller’s Catch-22, and of course Kubrick and Terry Southern, who in turn Dr. Strangelove has generaüy been one of based their work on the novel Red Alert by oppression by usually inhuman, desensitized, Peter George. Dr. Strangelove, as those who cruel, corrupt power-figures whose inhumanity saw the movie will recall, creates a cast of is not only condoned but often aided and caricatures whose very names epitomize the abetted by an institutionalized monolith of tone and satiric intention of the book— mechanized incomprehension and appahing General Buck Turgidson, Major King Kong, stupidity. Of course, there are differences Colonel Jack D. Ripper, Colonel Bat Guano, among these novels in their images of the and Dr. Strangelove himself. living people and concrete situations within Between those extremes in time and atti- their common mihtary settings. Yet it is fair tude, Professor Miller examines an impressive to note that in nearly every one of them the number of authors and novels dealing with major antagonist of the conflict or the chief the military.* Herman Melville’s Billy Budd, object of satire is a character or number of though set in the British rather than the U.S. characters who embody what the author navy, gets a great deal of attention, chiefly as presents as the mihtary ethic. And the the culminating work in what Miller sees as protagonist is usually either a young, involun- Melville’s progressively deepening concern tarily recruited officer or enlisted man fighting with the conflict between individual freedom to assert his individuality in the face of the and institutional—especially military—con- overwhelmingly hostile and insensitive forces striction of conscience. Millers central as- of the professional element of the mihtary sumption is that by its very nature the militar)’ institution. stifles the best ethical, humanitarian, and Professor Miller’s study examines in detail intellectual impulses of those who, reluctantlv many novels which make these kinds of as- or by choice, find themselves involved within sumptions or which portray with realistic it. He supports the assumption by frequent revulsion the profoundly horrible and dis- quotations from antimilitary social and politi- illusioning experiences of war. He correctly cal writers, such as Tristram Coffin, Fred J. points out that this trend became firmly Cook, and C. Wright Mills. established in treatments of the Civil War ThLs argument is hard to contest if one experience in such works as Crane’s The Red chooses his evidence from American militarv/ Badge of Courage and has continued as a novels. Especially is it true in the twentieth sustaining tradition in American mihtary century that nearly everv artistically worth- fiction to the present day. His chapters on while treatment of life within the military the World War I novels and on the diversity profession has been written by an author of the novelistic recordings of World War II whose own experience of that life has been are excellent in their treatment of major •While an officer in the U.S. Air Force, Miller terved in the writers and trends. Department of Engliih at the Air Force Acadcnoy from 1963 until be left the aenríee in 1967. He ia now on the Engliah faculty at the Miller devotes an entire chapter to a very Uoiveraity of Cincinoati. judicious and balanced appraisal of J. P. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW MarquancTs Melville Goodwin, U.S.A. and survival unprecedented in the history of James Gould Cozzens’s Guard of Honor, American culture.” with some attention also to W. W. Haines’s It is altogether appropriate that Professor Command Decision. These works embody, Miller’s book evaluate the American military as Miller points out, balanced analysis and novel in a social and political context. There general acceptance of the military structure. is, of course, no distinctive generic criteria Especially in Guard of Honor the setting, the which identify a work as a “military” novel characters, and the conflicts present with except the obvious requirement that it deal honest realism the day-to-day world of the at least in part with a military setting and military as most of those who have lived in with characters who are involved in some way it have come to know it. And Miller per- with the military Services. However, some of ceptively notes that characters like Cozzens’s the novels Miller examines, such as Melville’s harassed yet rational and persistent Colonel Israel Potter and Faulkner’s Soldierf Pay, Ross can fairly reflect both a full awareness deal chiefly with the problems of the returned of human values and a full sense of responsi- veteran rather than with military life as bility for one’s decisions within the military such. The pertinence of these works to Miller’s scheme of things. study is questionable. Miller follows this generally favorable On the other hand, there are a few notable treatment of the balanced and realistic por- omissions: a few important works by major trayals of military life with a chapter devoted authors do not appear either in the study or entirely to a most sympathetic appraisal of in the extensive bibliographical listing. Two Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. This novel, Miller of these, Carson McCullers’s Reflections in contends, is a brilliant satire not only on the a Golden Eye and William Styron’s The Long military but also, through the military as March, certainly surpass in literary merit and microcosm, on the whole value structure of in the scope of their implications many of U.S. societv. Miller quotes copiouslv and the works that are included. A third novel, approvingly from the book, pointing out con- Anton Myrer’s Once an Eagle (1968), is notations, analogies, and symbolic implications certainly a work of sufficient magnitude to of the characters and events in Heller’s mad deserve a place in Professor Miller’s study military world. Miller’s insights are indu- (incidentally, it received the dubious distinc- bitably an aid to the general reader’s under- tion of being noticed and scorned by Ward standing of Hcller’s novel. The chapter is one Just in his articles on the U.S. Army in The which any reader of Catch-22 will find illumi- Atlantic for October-November 1970 and nating. For those who have not read Heller’s more recently in his Military Men). Perhaps book, it provides an excellent introduction; for Myrer’s work was published after Miller had those who have, it might well incite another. completed the research for his dissertation, Miller’s study ends with a chapter on but the 1970 Copyright date of An Armed “nuclear age” novels, among them Knebel America indicates at least that a supple- and Bailey’s Seven Days in May and Burdick mentary notation of some kind could have and Wheeler’s Fail-Safe, as well as Dr. Strange- been included before the book’s publication. love. None of these are works of real literary And to cavil at a detail, the book reveals merit. As Miller observes, their chief appeal several instances of careless proofreading; lies in the topicality of the issues they treat; for instance, it is mildly annoying to the “coupled with the non-fiction dealing with reader who knows Catch-22 to find Milo the same problems, they contribute to a com- Minderbinder repeatedly identified as Milo posite of concern about national and human Mindenbinder. BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 A more serious objection to the book has for the people. Else we all may indeed perish already been suggested: Professor Miller, from the earth. despite his protestation in the introduction Despite his emphasis on the sociological and that he has “sought resolutely to avoid over- political—as opposed to the artistic and simplification . . . in order to easily condemn literary—aspects of the authors and works or easily praise,” quite obviously shares the he treats, Professor Miller has performed a concern of many of the writers he quotes— Service by raising serious questions about the of both fiction and nonfiction—that the “mili- function and influence of fictional literature in tary-industrial complex” is indeed in the our society. He has charted a pathway that is saddle in our country and that its methods essentially Platonic in its assumption that fic- and motives are riding us in the direction of tion is and should be primarily a utilitarian national disaster. He appears to believe that means of social and political comment. It is our problems would lessen immeasurably if an assumption which many among the Ameri- the military would just go away entirely—or can reading public, including most military at least shrink to the tiniest possible dimen- readers, are likelv to share. His book will prob- sions. He leaves unanswered, as do many of ably in the long view be important chiefly in the authors he cites, the question of how evincing the concern of late twentieth century such a desired end can be accomplished, America with its sociopolitical problems, at given the world as it is and men as thev are. the expense of any real concern that literature One can share his concern, even his wishes; be judged chiefly by literary standards. But but finally one is reduced to the hope that the whatever topicality the book may now em- Colonel Rosses of the world—both the mili- body, it has much to commend it to both the tary and the civilian world—can manage to military and civilian reader as a record prevail. One can hope that our institutions (though sometimes incomplete) of the fic- will learn from such men how better to be- tional face of the military establishment in come agencies of the people, by the people, America. United States Air Force Academy FIVE PATHFINDERS The Origins of Air Navigation Colonel Ray L. Bowers MONG the navigators of the U.S. Army them to what sometimes became one of the A Air Forces during the Second World War, war’s most challenging tasks. The navigators few were military professionals. Most had corne job was seldom an exalted one. Few reached lately from the offices and schools of the nation, high rank; regardless of talent, a navigator with only a fast training program to introduce never commanded the aircraft in which he flew. 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW He often flew as part of a massed formation of for flying training in the wartime Air Service bombers or troop carrier planes, with no respon- and had subsequently returned to mit for sibility for actually directing his own aircraft. studies in aeronautical engineering. After report- On the other hand, those navigators who them- ing to McCook Field (now part of Wright- selves led the formations knew that a mis- Patterson afb, Ohio) in 1919, Second Lieutenant judgment could mean the lives of hundreds of Hegenberger established what subsequently be- paratroops or airmen; few responsibilities could came the Instrument and Navigation Branch. be as awesome. Here Hegenberger and his associates worked The limitations of the navigator’s art became to perfect their ideas in air navigation, or aviga- magnified in the urgency of combat. In troop tion, turning their inventiveness toward new carrier operations, navigating in darkness or developments in compasses, airspeed meters, bad weather proved so uncertain as to call into driftmeters, sextants, and maps. Limited funds question the very efficacy of airborne assault, for procurement yielded chronic delays and while the main American bomber offensives frustrations. In June 1919 Hegenberger pre- hinged on the existence of visual conditions pared a week-long course in air navigation for near the target. Exemplifying the problem were the Engineering School, including ground prac- the navigational mistakes on the Ploesti mission tice in star identification and use of the sextant. of 1 August 1943 and on the Sicily airborne After attending a special course under the Navy assaults the same summer. In less pressing at Pensacola, including dead reckoning and circumstances, however, wartime navigational celestial flights over the Gulf, Hegenberger successes were impressive: thousands of trans- returned to his work at McCook. oceanic flights by the crews of the Air Transport The June 1927 flight of Lieutenants Hegen- Command, for example, foreshadowed the berger and Lester J. Maitland from Califórnia global nature of air power. to Hawaii in a Fokker trimotor reflected the The idea of a specialist, professional air advancements at McCook in long-range naviga- navigator was itself recent in the U.S. air arm. tion. Hegenberger’s successful navigation re- The B-17 and B-18, which entered active Air sulted from accurate dead reckoning using the Corps Service in 1937, were the first types having magnetic compass and driftmeter, supplemented crew positions designed for the navigator, and by celestial observations. The newer earth until 1941 these positions were manned by Air induction compass failed during the flight, Corps pilots certified in celestial navigation and and the radio compasses proved unreliable. dead reckoning after short training courses. Hegenberger had made azimuth and altitude But if the navigators themselves were new to precomputations for the sun and selected stars the Air Corps, the techniques and equipment for several points along the route. His final they employed were not. These elements, along early-morning observations, taken amid rain with a conceptual framework for systematic air and clouds, indicated that the aircraft was well navigation, were wholly in existence by 1940, north of the planned course. After some per- the products of two decades of determination suasion, Maitland accepted the 90-degree left and resourcefulness among a handful of path- turn. The correction proved sound, and the pair finders in the field, men to whom the challenge landed successfully at Wheeler Field. The flight of invention was all-absorbing. If the demands of their Bird of Paradise was the first from the of combat in World War II at times went mainland to Hawaii. Two years earlier two beyond the State of the navigator’s art, least at Navy flying boats had attempted the Crossing fault were the “impatient young men” of the but had made forced landings in the Pacific. years of austerity. The successful flight earned for the two Air During the decade following the First World Corps pilots the Mackay Trophy for 1927. War, developments in navigation within the Air Soon afterwards Hegenberger (who remained Service centered around the career of Albert F. a lieutenant until 1932) and two other instruc- Hegenberger. Bostonian by birth, Hegenberger tors opened a new navigation school for pilots had left Massachusetts Institute of Technology at Wright Field, incorporating in the curriculum BOOKS AND IDEAS 91 missions over the Gulf of México in the Bird of Field, Califórnia, late in 1933, with Gatty Paradise. The school closed shortly, and Hegen- alternating between the two locations as princi- berger’s attention turned to instruments for pal instructor in celestial navigation. In the first blind flying. The Collier Trophy in 1934 recog- class at Rockwell was an officer of unusual nized his achievement in this work, inade talent whose background included the study of possible by his strong background both as pilot astronomy at Stanford. Lieutenant Thomas L. and engineer. Thurlow easily grasped the essence of the The navigator’s position in the Martin B-10 air navigator’s tasks, and he soon became was an afterthought, extemporized by installing one of the schooFs most innovative instructors. a few essentials in the rear cockpit. The position Thurlow’s future influence on Air Corps naviga- was manned most often by pilots who lacked tion and equipment was apparent in his sole the 1000 hours of flying time required by regula- authorship of the first Air Corps text on the tion for eligibility as B-10 pilot. With aircraft subject, Celestial Air Navigation, issued in 1934. of longer range entering Service, the Army Air Thurlow and Gatty jointly devised a table that Corps badly needed to widen its thinking on simplified calculations by use of the double air navigation svstems. Largely on Hegenbergers drift method, whereby drift readings taken on urgings, the Air Corps in 1932 brought to headings 90 degrees apart afForded groundspeed Washington a civilian adviser in navigation, information. Harold Gatty, a Tasmanian of unusual qualifi- Training flights out of Rockwell included both cation. Gatty' had learned marine navigation at dr and celestial work over the Pacific, though the Royal Australian Naval Academy and had no night missions were flown. AU students were had wide experience in air navigation, having rated pilots. Each received 50 hours’ air work navigated for Wiley Post in his round-the-world as navigator during the course, along w'ith venture. At first he had trouble communicating instrument flying training, in the assigned his ideas to the officers in the headquarters, Douglas amphibians. On those occasions when but he soon found his element in working with Thurlow himself assumed the navigation task, an experimental unit established at Bolling Field, his rnastery served as a reminder to his colleagues D.C. Gatty stressed a system built about dead that navigation was more of an art than a reckoning ( dr), which he viewed as the basic Science. Both the Langley and Rockwell schools element of navigation, and the meticulous use closed temporarily during the airmail operations of a log form. Vital was the accurate calibration of 1934. Gatty shortly resigned his position as of compass and airspeed meter, along with sênior navigation engineer at Wright, in order precise in-flight determination and application to work with Pan American Airways in survey- of drift and groundspeed. The group spent long ing their Pacific routes, but his brief association weeks, patiently installing and calibrating new with the Air Corps left a lasting impression. navigational devices in the Douglas amphibian He served during the war with the Royal airplanes. Periscopic drift and groundspeed in- Australian Air Force and afterward died in the struments devised by Gatty were tested, and a crash of a Fiji Airways plane. protected hatch fitted for sextant and pelorus, Gatty’s departure in 1935 left Thurlow, then the latter used to obtain relative bearings. instructing at Rockwell, as the acknowledged A temperature gage for the first time was leader in the celestial navigation field. Thurlow employed for more accurate calculation of true moved to Ohio to join the Instrument and airspeed. Meanwhile, the Naval Observatory Navigation Laboratory, the successor to Hegen- published a simplified version of the Nautical berger’s branch. There his contributions to navi- Almanac for 1933, the first Air Almanac, in- gation continued in countless projects, including corporating information essential to the air- reformulation of the Air Almanac, which had bome celestial navigator in a fonn convenient been abandoned since 1934. Thurlow served as for fast computations in the air. navigator for Howard Hughes on the round- Courses in navigation for Air Corps pilots the-world journey of 1938. Colonel Thurlow’s opened at Langley Field, Virginia, and Rockwell continuing work in navigation was acknowl- 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW edged by an annual award established by the Harbold became a kind of interpreter for Gatty’s Institute of Navigation in 1945, a year after his brilliance. LeMay later recounted how only death in a takeoff at Dallas while testing a Harbold seemed able to grasp Gatty’s ideas and new compass. would in turn instruct LeMay and the others.2 One of Gatty’s students in the 1933 Langley LeMay and Harbold had been classmates in school was energetic Second Lieutenant Curtis flying training at Kelly Field. Harbold remained E. LeMay. Subsequently assigned to Hawaii, in navigation work at Langley and Rockwell LeMay was directed to organize a navigation until 1937, working and flying with Thurlow school in his unit, and soon, with characteristic at the latter field. resourcefulness, this officer was absorbed by the In June 1940 Harbold served on a committee challenge of adapting Gatty’s methods to the assigned to organize the training programs for local aircraft. Late in 1936 LeMay was assigned the influx of navigator, bombardier, and gun- to the 2nd Bombardment Group at Langley nery students soon to commence. Navigation Field, which was being equipped with the new training for cadets began under contract with B-17s. LeMay adroitly evaded the task of Charles Lunn of Pan American, and Harbold setting up the unit navigation training program, spent two strenuous weeks at Coral Gables, but his obvious skill and inclination earned him organizing the opening of the school with 48 the job of lead navigator for the important students but without uniforms, study materiais, exercises soon to come. LeMay was the lead and (briefly) instructors. During the war navigator for the B-17 formation interceptions Harbold directed navigator training establish- of the Utah in the Pacific in 1937 and of the ments at several bases and became operations Italian liner Rex, 600 miles off the Atlantic chief for Air Training Command. By September coast, the next year. LeMay also navigated on 1945 over 50.000 navigators had been trained the mass flight to South America in 1938, pro- to use a navigation system differing little from viding drift readings to the other navigators by that taught by Harold Gatty a decade earlier. using the only gyrostabilized driftmeter in the Thus Harbold’s central contribution was to flight. A self-described “navigator by nature,”1 take the knowledge developed by the others and LeMay’s insight into the profession of navigation transmit it to those destined to use it in war. remained with him through the higher posts There were other individuais who were less he afterwards held. prominent in Harbold’s narrative but whose contributions were large. One was P. V. H. Weems, the retired Naval officer, whose assist- T hese four men—Hegenberger, ance to Air Corps navigational development Gatty, Thurlow, and LeMay—are the central reached over the entire period and whose characters in the recently published chronicle methods were reflected in Gatty’s. Another was of air navigation, researched and written by John Egan, the officer who worked with LeMay Norris B. “Skippy” Harbold, Major General, in Hawaii and in the early B-17s and who later usaf (Retired).f Harbold’s narrative docu- shared with Harbold many of the tasks of war- ments the events herein described, revealing time training. Providing continuity at Wright that the activities of the fcur touched on nearly Field over the decades was Dr. Samuel M. all important developments in air navigation Burka, like Thurlow honored by the Institute prior to 1941. Intertwining with the work of of Navigation with an annual award in his name. each of the four was the career of Harbold The record of the twenty years after 1945 himself. As a second lieutenant four years out was disappointing in comparison, conceming of West Point, Harbold joined Harold Gatty’s navigation developments for tactical air forces. research group at Langley in 1932. There With the passing of the tactical bombers—the t Norris B. Harbold, Major General, USAF (Ret), The Log of Air Navigation (San Antonio, Texas: T he Naylor Company, 1970, $10.00), 117 pp., 36 plates. BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 B-45 and B-66—all-weather navigation and plus the incomparable range of the author’s bombing capabilities for manned aircraft in the personal experience. The brevity of the book— Tactical Air Command (tac) and the overseas 117 pages—is to be regretted, for the expanse commands declined. The C-123s and C-130s of the subject as well as the obvious depth of went to Vietnam with a system for airdropping research would substantiate a fuller account. which depended on stopwatch timing from a Stripped to the essentials, the narrative may visual estimate of aircraft position, and the reflect Harbold's own characteristic directness F-105 pilots coming ofF Thud Ridge sometimes of approach. Some thirty pages of illustrations discovered their targets immune to attack constitute priceless supplements to the text; the because of cloud cover.3 The F-4, its advanced footnotes and indexing are precise. avionics seemingly tailored for a professional Norris Harbold was chosen one of the early career navigator, instead went to war with presidents of the Institute of Navigation, pilots manning its back-seat position—officers founded in 1944. Today he finds that the papers whose career orientation focused on advancing in electronics and space navigation published to first-pilot status. Indeed, the belated shifting in the journal of that institute have outdistanced of navigators into the F-4 was reminiscent of his own technical levei. His humility in making the 1940 decision to train nonpilots as B-17 this confession is unnecessary: it is in the nature navigators. Many of the navigators of the post- of technology to advance upon the achievements war Air Force have become dedicated officers of those who have gone before. As technology of great talent, capable of maintaining the advances, however, the qualities needed for tradition of the earlier pathfinders. Promotion leadership in engineering are unchanging. and command opportunities have improved for Among the pathfinders of today are to be found the navigators, but often only after moving the same deep-seated determination and crea- away from navigation and flying duties. tivity that marked the careers of Harbold, Hopefully, the Southeast Asia experience, Hegenberger, and the others. The exhilaration coupled with the presence of navigators in the of success following upon long periods of en- current tactical fighter squadrons, will bring deavor is classic. Few rewards can compare to new emphasis to the work of this profession.I the emotions felt by Hegenberger and Maitland on reaching Hawaii, by LeMay on intercepting the Rcx, or by the Apollo moon walkers in July 1969. Achievements such as these mirror the highest aspirations of modern man. I he technical strengths and weak- nesses of Harbold’s book may be quickly sum- Alexandria, Virgínia marized. The research is thorough, drawing from materiais located in both the National Archives and Air Force Historical Archives; Notes various collections of private papers, including 1. Curtis E. LeMay with M acKinlay K antor. Mission With LeMay those of Hegenberger and Thurlow; interviews (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965), p. 177. with Hegenberger, Egan, and others; a wide 2. Ibid.. pp. 94—98. 3. Jack Broughton, Coloncl, USAF (Ret) , Thud Ridge (Philadel- assortment of manuais and technical journals; phia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1969). The Contributors Officer, III DASC Task Force, Vietnam. He has been a research physicist, Air Force Weapons Laboratory; a T-38 flight instructor in Uudergraduate Pilot Train- ing, where he taught Applied Aero- dynainics; and an F-102 pilot in Air Defense Command. Major Roberds is a 1970 graduate of Air Command and Staff College. C olonel Donald M. Marks (M.A., Indiana University) is with the Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency, Joint COLONEL ROBEKT B. K á LISCH (USNA; Chiefs of Staff. He served in intelligence M.S.E.E., Stanford University; M.S., with Hq USAFE, Germany; later as a Trinity University), prior to his assign- T-33 flight commander, Webb AFB, ment to Air War Collegc class of 1971, Texas; then as Assistant Air Attaché, was Director, Ionospheric Physics Labora- Yugoslavia. He has also been Chief, tory, Air Force Cambridge Research Standardization/Evaluation Division, Hq Laboratories. Previous assignments have Air Training Command; war plans offi- been as instructor, Air Training Com- cer, Hq Seventh Air Force, Vietnam; m and; Chief, Offensive Missiles Division, DR. WlLLIAM G. POLLARD is Executive and Air Force Research Associate, Stan- and PACAF liaison officer. Foreign Tech- Director, Oak Ridge Associated Univer- ford Research Institute. Colonel Marks nology Division; and Chief, Electronics sities. After graduating Phi Beta Kappa is a graduate of Air War College and Division, Air Force Office of Scientiüc from the University of Tennessee and won the George Washington Honor Research. earning the Ph.D. from Rice University, Medal, Freedom Awards Foundation. he taught physics at the foriner, 1936— 1947. While on leave in 1944—45 he worked on the Manhattan Project. An ordained priest in the Episcopal Church, he has served on the faculty, Graduate School of Theology, University of the South. He holds some dozen honorary doctorates in Science, divinity, law, and letters and has written several books. Dr. Pollard was a member of the Board of Visitors to Air University from 1967 to 1970. Major Frederick T. Walker (USAFA; ANDREW S . Ca RTEN. JR. (M .S.. Tufts M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology) University) is Chief, Equipment Engi- Í9 Director, Communications-Electronics neering and Evaluation Branch, Aero- Plans and Program9, lst Strategic Aero- space Instrumentation Laboratory, Air space Division (SAC), Vandenberg AFB. Force Cambridge Research Laboratories. Califórnia. A graduate of Air Command During World War II he served a9 a and Staff College, he has hcld command staff weather officer. Eighth Air Force. and staff management positions in Com- He joined the Air Force Cambridge Re- munications or elcctronics, including as- search Center in 1954 as Chief, Design signments with 5th Tactical Control Engineering Branch, Atmospheric De- Group (PACAF) and Hcadquarters Com- vices Laboratory, and in 1960 assumed mand. his present position. He is author of numerous publishcd articles and papers presented at meteorological conferences. JAY MALLIN (B.A., Florida Southern College), a journalist, first wrote for Cuba*s Havana Herald. later serving a9 corrcspondent for a numher of U.S. news- papers and Time magazine. Hc covered the 1956—58 Cuban revolution and was there during the Bay of Pig9. He has covercd the October missile crisis, the Dominican uprising, the Vietnam war, “ Chc” Guevara’s gucrrilla movement in Bolívia, and the 1969 Salvador-Honduras M ajor Jer o m e C. Pepper s, J r .. USAF war. His books include Fortress Cuba, (R et), (B.G.E., University of Omaha), Caribbean Crisis, Terror in Viet i\am, is a faculty member. School of System» Major Ric h a r d M. R oberds (M .A., **CheM Guevara on Revolution, and Strat• and Logistics. Air Force Institute of Kansas University) is an Air Liaison egy for Conquest. Technology. Hc served in the Air Force 94 1940-64. from 1951 in m aintenance as- Deputy. NATO Defense College. and while completing his doctorate. Colunei signments irith Strategic Air Command. Deputy Director, Military Assistance Di- Catlin has pubiished military studiet Since his retircment he has Laugfct at vision, Europe: Assistam for Coordina- and articlcs on drama and betion. AFIT. principally in DOD Maintenance tion. DCS/Plans and Programs; and Di- Management Information Systems courses. rector. Aerospace Studies Institute. Pepper* is s graduate of the Industrial 1961-64, when be retired. College of Lhe Arme d Forces and Air Caivexsity courses. COLONEL RAY L. BOWERS (U.S. Naval Academy; M.A., Univcrsity of Wtsconsin) COLONEL JESSE C. CATUN. JR. (U S M A ; is assigned to thc Otfuc of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., working on a Bbicadiee Geneíu l Noel F. Parrish. Ph.D., Univcrsity of Denver) is Perma- USAF (R et). (Pb.D.. Rxce Unxvexsity) nent Professor and Hcad. Departmmt history of tscticsl sirlift in Southeast Asis. He has âown as a B-45 uavigator- is aasistant professor of history at Trinity of English. USAF Academy. After West bombardicr and participaled in thc test- Univcrsity, San Antonio. Commissioned Point (1945) and âigbi training, he ing and esrly use of the b*oó. He was a from âxght training in 1932. from 1938 served as P-47 pilot. as radiological history faculty member, USAF Academy Io 1946 be served as âying instmctor otfccer at Nevada Test Site. and as ex- (1960- 67), and prior to his present and supervisor and as Com mander. chsnge otficer, Royal Canadian Air Force. assigntnent a C-130 uavigator with Tuskegee Army Flying Scbool. Other After earning an M.A. (University of PACAF. Colonel Bowers's articlcs have aaaignments «ere as Spectai Asaiatant tu North Carolina) m 1957. hc went to thc been pubiished in various military lhe Vice Chief of Staf. Hq USAF; Air Academy. where be has remained except joumals. The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Force-Structure Planning" by Lieutrnant Colonel Edward Stellini, USAF. as the outstanding article in the May-June 1971 issue of the Review. Colonel A. E. Goldsmith, Fifth Air Force Director of Information, congratulates Colonel Robert R. Hemphill, winner of the annual Air University Review Outstanding Award. AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AWARDS PROGRAM Colonel Robert F. Ilemphill, usaf (Retired), now engaged in research and writing in Japan, has been selected by the Air University Review Avvards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the Review during fiscal year 1971. His article, ‘ On Behalf of Perspective,” was previously designated the outstanding article in the November-December 1970 issue. The awards program provides payment to eligible authors, a $50 award for the outstanding article in each issue, and a $200 savings bond for the yearly outstanding article. Bimonthly and yearly award winners also receive a plaque. The bimonthly winners for the past year were U. A. Coty, E. J. Daniels, and R. A. Shane, “On Military Force Planning,” July-August 1970; Charles A. Roberts, “Managing the' Civilian Work Force in the Seventies,” September-October 1970; Colonel Robert F. Hemphill, usaf (Ret), “On Behalf of Perspective,” November-December 1970; Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Clark, usaf, “Soviet Strategy for the Seventies,” January-February 1971; Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh, usaf, and Captain Pember W. Rocap, usaf, “The Ghanging Role of the Military Profession,” March-April 1971; Lieutenant Colonel Edward Stellini, usaf, “Force- Structure Planning: Considerations, Problems, and Issues,” May-June 1971. ED ITO R IA L STAFF C olonel Eldon W. D ow ns, USAF Editor J ack H. M ooney Managing Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel John H. S crivner, J r ., USAF Associate Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Laun C. Smith, J r ., USAF Associate Editor E dmund O. Barker Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. W est cot t , J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique G aston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L ia Midosi May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. De P aola Art Editor and Illustrator F ir s t Lie u t e n a n t Clemmer L. S laton, USAF Editorial Project Officer ADVISERS C olonel Jack L. G iannini Hq Military Airlift Command C olonel Elbert T. H ovatter Hq Air Force Logistics Command C olonel John W. K eel er Hq Air Training Command C olonel Boone Rose, J r . Hq Tactical Air Command C olonel John B. Voss Hq Strategic Air Command L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Arthur F. M c C onnell, J r . Hq Aerospace Defense Command L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Arthur S. R agen Hq United States Air Force Academy D r . H arold M. H el fma n Hq Air Force Systems Command F rancis W. J ennings SAF Office of Information ATTENTION Air University Iieview is published to stimulate pro- fessional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents refiect the opinions of its authors or the investiga- tions and conclusions of its editors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW