The Triumph of Neutrality in under Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (1810-1844)

While it has been argued in the last years that was a myth, a post-war invention, and that it served in Patrick Salmon’s words as “collective therapy for a collective conscience” after 1945, which is certainly true inasmuch the long term perspective is taken into account, I would like to show that the election of Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte as regent of Sweden in 1810, then as king of Sweden- in 1818, was much more than a simple change of , but resulted in a redefining of Swedish foreign policy that would leave a strong mark on future national decisions.

To that purpose I will concentrate on three major moments, with first the period around 1810, then the post-war period and finally the later years until 1844.

Once officially adopted by Carl XIII as Prince regent, the first key question Bernadotte was about to consider regarded the position he would occupy in State affairs from the beginning and what his political vision for Sweden would be. Most certainly, he was not very familiar with the tradition and history of his new homeland, but he was a man of inquiring mind, who read a great deal, especially when he had a specific mission to accomplish. He demonstrated, on some occasions, a general if not deep knowledge of Sweden when, for instance, as ambassador in he had “long and intimate visits” from the chargé d’affaires Fredrik Samuel Silfverstolpe and “not only spoke with praise of Gustav II Adolph and Carl XII, but proved to be informed about various features of Swedish life such as the throne speech and the opening ceremony of the Riksdag, the importance of the peasant state in Swedish Constitution, etc.” He probably developed his interest in the Northern countries during his campaign in Germany when he was sent to Copenhagen in March 1808 to assist the Danish king after the bombing of his capital by the English fleet. Carl Johan had the opportunity to show his natural qualities sooner than expected, for he received from XIII, prematurely incapacitated, the general command of the forces by land and sea while he was still in , on the southern coast of Sweden, and a few days later the responsibility for political affairs. On November 5, 1810, Bernadotte made his first official appearance at the Riksdag in front of the States General of the Kingdom and clearly set out the policy he would conduct in the future with regard to foreign matters:

“The only policy which the laws of God authorize must have justice and truth for its foundation: such are the principles of the King and they shall be mine likewise. I have beheld war near at hand, and I know all its evils: for it is not a conquest that can console a country for the blood of her children, spilt on a foreign land. I have seen the mighty Emperor of the French so often crowned with the laurel of victory, surrounded by his invincible armies, sigh after the olive branches of peace. Yes, Gentlemen, peace is the only glorious aim of a sage and enlightened government: it is not the extent of a state, which constitutes its strength and independence; it is its laws, its commerce, its industry, and above all, its national spirit. Sweden, it is true, has suffered great losses, but the honour of the Swedish name is untarnished: let us conform to the decrees of Providence and reflect, Gentlemen, that it has left us a soil which supplies our wants, and iron to wield in our defence.”

This speech is of vital importance for understanding the future orientation of Bernadotte’s foreign policy, since the main elements of his vision are distinctly mentioned: peace, restoration of national prosperity and spirit, reconstruction of defence capacities and armed neutrality. One point, however, remains unclear: Was he sincere when he suggests that the Swedish people should accept the boundaries of the new realm and give up all ideas of reconquest, or did he intentionally decide to silence his deep aspirations so as to favourably impress the Royal family and the Riksdag? The 2

answer might be both, for his desire to work in favour of Sweden and to preserve its independence and sovereignty was not contradictory to the idea of territorial expansion, provided that it would serve the first aim. In this respect, he was perfectly aware that his designation as official candidate had been linked to the project of recovering Finland, sought by many Swedish noblemen like perhaps General Count Mörner, or maybe “to win something for Sweden that would be worthy of his own reputation”; in other words, Norway. Plunket Barton is right to say that “the idea of annexing or uniting Norway to Sweden was not a new one,” although it was “traditionally weak” in Sweden and not as exciting as regaining Finland, and he is also right to insist on the fact that this idea was most certainly inspired in the first place by Bernadotte’s own geostrategic ideas and his affinity with the French concept of frontières naturelles or “natural borders.” This same principle had indeed been a constituent element of Louis XIV’s defensive policy in Northern France and the main reason behind the French expansion during the after the Battle of Jemmapes, when Danton stated at the Convention in 1793 that “the limits of France are marked by nature. We will reach them on their four directions: on the Ocean, on the , on the Alps, on the Pyrenees.” Consequently, it was only natural for him to consider the unification of Norway with Sweden as the logical path to follow according to his own experience, for it was in his opinion the best way to guarantee the security of the whole . On the other hand, Bernadotte was fully aware of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of regaining Finland for several reasons, among which the desperate situation of the Crown’s finances, the apparent firmness of the French-Russian alliance and the lack of readiness of the Finnish people to accept their return to Sweden.

By uniting Sweden and Norway, and renouncing the continental possession of Pomerania, Carl Johan succeeded in creating a “Scandinavian Peninsula”, in official words, and providing security for the united kingdoms, for all that the relations between and the other Northern capitals would remain stable and peaceful. Separated from Europe by the sea on the east, south and west, the only plausible threat for Sweden-Norway was , whose land border stretched from the Arctic to the town of Torneå (Tornio) on the Gulf of Bothnia. Yet, the friendly relationship between Crown Prince Carl Johan and the Russian Czar Alexander was a guarantee, along with the treaty of Hamina, that nothing would change in the near future. Obviously, the decision to maintain harmonious relations with Russia was not supported by the whole nation, for a large part of the military and conservative opinion was not willing to give up Finland; but Carl Johan managed to control the “expansionists”, or the conservative opposition within the Nobility which was directed by Carl Henrik Anckarsvärd, at least during the “Harmless Years” until 1818. The second axiom that would become the central point of the Swedish foreign policy in the 19 th and 20 th centuries was neutrality, even though this principle was not new to Swedish tradition. Already in 1691, the necessity to protect their common interests at sea had forced the three Scandinavian kingdoms - , Norway and Sweden - to sign a union based on armed neutrality, which had led to further treaties in the 18 th century and the official recognition by third powers of their neutral status, provided that none of them would grant assistance to any belligerent in case of war. Though this principle was not always followed, like in 1756 during the French- English war, the rights of the neutral Scandinavian states were eventually restored in 1794, albeit for a short time, as was demonstrated when armed neutrality failed to keep Sweden and Denmark- Norway out of the European conflagration. In this respect, it is not quite accurate to say that Bernadotte “inaugurated a policy, which was the ancestor of the policy of neutrality”, even if the “insular” situation resulting from the treaties significantly pleaded in favour of its reinforcement. Neutrality was both the result of Carl Johan’s will to force the union between Sweden and Norway according to the concept of “natural borders”, and a vital necessity given the disastrous demographic and economic situation of the country resulting from the Northern and Continental wars, as well as the changes occurred in foreign trade. The had been partly responsible for the economic stagnation, and, for example, tar - one of the most important products 3

exported to England - experienced a brutal drop, as well as timber, both of which were being replaced by Canadian imports . However, the main reason for the economic depression was the very poor condition of agriculture despite the slow increase of production and livestock, which sometimes exceeded population growth, as Lars Magnusson has pointed out. The Crown Prince was particularly aware of the situation and had expressed his early concern for agriculture on many occasions, like in December 1810, when he described to the “sad condition” of the Swedish economy, or in January 1813 when he set up the Academy of Agriculture in Stockholm as president of the economy. In the following emphatic speech, Carl Johan considers both the material and social impact of the agricultural revolution, referring to technical progress and the positive prospects that await the whole country:

“All classes of society gain by the improvement of the cultivation of the earth. The merchant barters the productions of the soil against the articles, which he is obliged to procure from abroad; the manufacturers, by the aid of these same productions, make their first materials; and lastly the State sees its defenders multiplied by the augmentation of its resources. The chief riches of Sweden consist in its extent of soil. Uncultivated lands and unwholesome marshes may, in the course of years, be covered with harvests. In some cases, agricultural industry has even contrived to fertilize rocks, and we may see in this, as in all free countries, the agriculturist developing the fecundity of nature in spite of all obstacles.”

The reason for Carl Johan’s interest in the development of agriculture was not accidental, for the prosperity of the United Kingdoms was the main condition for the success of his foreign policy. In the same speech, he reminds the members of the Academy of the scarcity that threatened the country, the importance of the “good understanding with England and Russia” during “the two calamitous years which have just passed,” and above all what remains to be done to ensure “security from want and famine” thanks to economic improvement and demographic growth. As a result, the Swedish withdrawal from European politics was regarded as an absolute condition for economic recovery; but in return, only economic recovery could make the renovation and strengthening of the possible. As it was explained to the States General in March 1815, the union with Norway had to be understood as the essential and final part of Bernadotte’s external ambitions, and a precondition to the security and prosperity of the country. Yet, at the same time, it was clear that armed neutrality would remain the basis of the United Kingdoms’ foreign policy:

“Strong in this union, we no longer desire anything, but to live free and independent in the midst of our forests and our mountains. Surrounded by the seas of the North and the Baltic, we possess in the interior of our country all the elements of a free and happy existence. We have no occasion to presume that any Government, jealous of this happiness, will seek to disturb it; but if such did exist let them know that, if the annals of this country speak of the insults, which others have sometimes dared to throw upon it, they speak also of the vengeance, which it has taken for them.”

The emphatic tone of the Crown Prince, though confident, could hardly persuade the Riksdag that the country had nothing to fear from Russia, although Stockholm was assured of English diplomatic and military support in case of war owing to Castlereagh’s strong opposition to Russia’s supremacy in the Baltic (as well as in the Mediterranean). However, Carl Johan would have to convince the States General of the need to support his program of rearmament. Yet, Bernadotte’s attitude never gave rise to any official dispute, in spite of his initial sympathy for the republican cause and the rumours of conspiracy that prevailed in 1816-1817 . Eventually, the death of Charles XIII on February 5, 1818, and the subsequent election of Bernadotte two days later as the new king of Sweden-Norway under the name of Charles XIV Jean (Karl XIV Johan in Swedish) put an end to political intrigues. 4

During the following years, Sweden’s foreign policy was determined by a deliberate abstention from European affairs, according to the oaths of allegiance taken at the Riksdag on May 19 th , 1818, which emphasized once again the isolated position of the United Kingdoms and their interest not to mix “in any discussion foreign to the two peoples of Scandinavia”. However, Norway would be responsible for a growing crisis between Stockholm and Copenhagen that would last until 1821. The reason for the dispute was the Norwegian debt question that the Crown Prince had promised to settle in Vienna in 1815 and which remained unsolved because of the Norwegian reluctance to accept the as a precondition for entering into negotiations . Over the next three years, several attempts were made by the great powers to force the Swedish resolution without any conclusive result. In these circumstances, the great powers which assembled in Aix-la- Chapelle in October-November 1818 felt compelled to pressure the Swedish government in the name of the European stability and even to unofficially consider military action to restore Danish sovereignty in Norway. The King’s reaction was immediate and biting, considering that the “holy alliance of monarchs” had visibly gone beyond the limits established in Vienna and again in Aix-la- Chapelle, that is, not to interfere in specific matters. Obviously the difference of opinion between the Holy Alliance and Sweden-Norway went far beyond the trivial question of debt settlement and involved political motives, more precisely the liberal and independent orientation of the United Kingdoms - which appeared in the eyes of the absolute monarchs as a bad and dangerous policy since all their common efforts aimed at hunting down and destroying all progressive ideology. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Charles XIV John fell out of favour with the Holy Alliance, Russia included, and simultaneously tried to avoid their grip by securing the support of England, the only liberal great power. In fact, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had clearly shown that the discrepancies between the great European nations had considerably deepened since 1815 and, although “for the moment, the split between Britain and the autocratic Powers was postponed”, there was reason to believe that “fresh seeds of disturbances” would soon disrupt the political status quo on the mainland. Therefore, when Carl Johan contacted Lord Strangford, the envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Stockholm in March 1819, in order to find a peaceful settlement of the dispute with the help of the Foreign Office, the proposal was rapidly accepted. Eventually, a convention was signed between Sweden and Denmark on September 1 st , 1819 that proved to be very beneficial for both parties. Carl Johan could be satisfied with the financial terms of the convention, which were far less costly than expected, and its political success, thanks to Britain’s bons offices . On the other hand, Castlereagh, who was pleased to show the Holy Alliance that Britain stood on the side of the progressive governments, had reinforced his privileged relationship with the Swedish Crown at a time of growing tension with Russia. During the following decade, Swedish foreign policy was once again put to the test because of the liberal turmoil that spread over a large part of Europe, more particularly in the kingdoms of , Portugal and the Two Sicilies. The reason for such turbulence was linked to the growing discontent among the emerging classes and the army and the underground activity of secret societies, which increasingly challenged autocratic power and political repression openly, especially in Spain where Fernando VII became the object of public hatred. From Spain, the upheaval rapidly spread to neighbouring countries, then to Naples, also under Bourbon rule, in the space of few months, between January and July 1820, to reach Turin in March 1821. The evident empathy of the Swedish king for the liberal movements in Europe had visible consequences for diplomatic relations between Stockholm and Saint Petersburg regardless of the Norwegian debt issue, which had caused much discontent and impatience in Alexander. With full knowledge of the facts, Carl XIV Johan did not hesitate to show - though secretly - a deep interest in the newly independent South American states. “During the time of Latin American emancipation, writes Magnus Mörner, diplomatic contacts were made between Sweden and the new republics, which were relatively intense”, for Sweden hoped to find for its iron exports “a profitable market in South America, which had just open her doors to foreign trade.” In fact, two agents were sent to 5

Argentina and Chile in 1818-1819 and again in 1823 in order to open secret negotiations, but the result was negative because “Sweden never took the risk to award them diplomatic recognition which, for obvious reasons, they had put forward as an essential precondition so that any facility or commercial advantage might be granted to Sweden.” When Carl Johan became king in 1818, the security of the United Kingdoms became a national priority, but he was wise enough not to alter the structure of the . The Swedish army was rather small compared to those of the great powers, but as Friedrich Engels underlines, “the Swedes play a part in military history, which is beyond all proportion to the scanty population which furnished their renowned armies”. This was due to its very specific - Daumont says “curious and unique” - organization, the involvement of the population, mainly peasant and burgher, in the financing and recruiting of the land forces, and the complex land tenure which was adopted in order to support the indelta truppar . Consequently, the Swedish army was not only basically a national army, composed of Swedish subjects and not “soldiers of fortune”, but also a very economical army compared to the permanent and professional armies of many European states. Sweden also possessed numerous fortified towns and fortresses, like Vaxholm, which defended maritime access to Stockholm, or Christianstad in Scania, the key access point to Sweden from Denmark and the southern shore, as well as shipyards in Stockholm and Gothenburg, and even if the northern border was not solidly protected at that time, a foreign threat was not to be feared since popular guerrilla resistance “in conjunction with the efforts of Sweden’s small standing army would force the invaders to leave the country” . In fact, for an almost insular territory like Scandinavia, land troops were not the main instrument of national defence, at least not the most deterring weapon with regard to a possible invasion. This essential mission was assigned to the Swedish navy, which benefited from a special and constant attention from the very beginning of Carl Johan’s reign. As Alexandre Daumont observed:

“The Swedish fleet is supported on the most respectable foot, it is maintained with the biggest care every year, sees its force increasing progressively, and its organisation is perfectly combined with the resources of the country and the needs of its maritime position. […] The system of shipbuilding is carried in Sweden to a high degree of perfection. The admiral Chapman was one of the first constructors of Europe; English officers of the Royal Navy often came to consult his nice models.”

A closer look to Swedish navy shows that it was rather impressive and competitive for a “small nation”, if not compared to Britain, with 11 vessels or ships-of-the-line, all built after 1819 and many of them launched since 1830, 8 frigates, mostly recent, 4 corvettes, 6 bricks and finally 250 gunboats specially designed to operate in low waters. In addition, the harbour of Carlscrona, the “Brest of Sweden”, played a key role in the Baltic as shipyard and fortified town with its 13,000-strong population and was considered as one of the most impressive harbours of the time.

Altogether, these military expenditures represented a heavy burden for the Swedish nation of 8 million rixdalers a year, including the budget of the navy, more than 3 million for the land troops and 2,5 million in kind or in cash which were paid directly by the taxpayers to the officers in return for their assignments. According to other figures related to public expenditures in cash, military expenses amounted to 4,450,551 rixdalers out of 8,947,500, or 49,74% of the total. This explains why when the “Harmless Years” were over in 1823, the opposition to such a costly foreign and military policy grew noticeably among the nobility, “who demanded, among other things, extensive reductions of spending within the infantry and the navy.” However, none of the Estates, not even the nobility or the liberal newspaper , were in a position to thwart Carl Johan’s plans, for there were no real political leaders except Carl Henrik Anckarsvärd, the peasant Anders Danielson and the clergyman Christian Stenhammar. A good example is given by the Göta Canal, the enormous project to build a waterway through Sweden from the Baltic to the North Sea, whose 6

construction started in 1810, because its instigator, Baltzar von Platten, never lacked royal and parliamentary support until its completion twenty years later, in 1832. However, in this case, the possibilities offered by “Sweden’s blue ribbon” for internal trade and grain trade in particular extinguished almost all opposition. In any event, the King was always able to win his case because, as the same Platten declared to Anckarsvärd during a debate: “One cannot as easily impress the hero (i.e. Karl Johan) who defeated Europe’s supreme warrior (i.e. Napoleon) at Dennewitz and on the banks of the Saal” . Swedish foreign policy did not undergo any substantial change in the 1820’s. On the contrary, Russian Tsar Alexander’s death in December 1825 and the accession of Nicolas I to throne in difficult circumstances seemingly encouraged reconciliation between Sweden and Russia and the continuation of mutual appeasement in the Baltic, even though the building of limited fortifications on the Åland Islands on one hand and the persisting influence of Sweden in Finland on the other hand never allowed their relations to become openly cordial again. In fact, there was a growing concern among public opinion about national security that was particularly noticeable at the Riksdag sessions in 1828 and 1830 when the Estates, among other things, discussed Swedish military strategy, i.e. the “Central Defence System”. According to this system, a foreign, for example, Russian, invasion of the United Kingdoms from the Åland was hardly possible to contain because of the enemy’s numeric and material superiority, but a clever strategy of withdrawal into the interior of the country behind a natural line of defence based on the Göta Canal and the Vanäs (Karlsborg) fortress, whose construction had begun in 1820, could lure the opponent inside the country and in the end destroy him. This policy was strongly supported by Count Platten, as well as Count Brahe, Baron Nordin and Colonel Lefren, but many other officers and politicians considered conversely that “the moral effect of the abandonment of the capital would be distressing, that nothing would compensate for the loss of state-owned companies and for the treasures that are concentrated there, and that it would be necessary to construct a first-rate fortress between Stockholm and the Åland Islands to protect them”. The Riksdag session ended in March 1830, a few months before the revolution broke out in France, sweeping away within three days the restored Bourbon dynasty embodied by . This event was undoubtedly good news for the French king of Sweden, who had suffered from the clear hostility of Louis XVIII for many years and until this day had complained about “the hostile manoeuvres of an antisocial faction, who from one end of Europe to the other fought fiercely against the freedom of the people and who, in order to destroy it to its source, wanted to ruin any constitutional government…” Yet the growing opposition among the Estates, particularly after the failed reform concerning the freedom of the press during the Diet in 1829 and 1830, and also in Norway, with the monopolizing of political influence by officials and the middle classes, threatened to spread in an unbridled way through Bernadotte’s Scandinavian kingdom because of the revolutionary wave which had flooded into Europe. Carl Johan was concerned about the future of his dynasty indeed, even if his son, the Crown Prince, had recently become father of a boy for the second time and, contrary to Carl Johan, perfectly mastered the . As for the new isolationism, which was the direct result of his neutrality policy, it had also resulted in a “passive foreign policy and a passive security policy”, in spite of the expressions of good will from Nicolas I and the signature of commercial treaties, like that in 1826 with Britain. The mere fact that Oscar, the Duke of Sudermania, travelled all through Germany and Italy in 1822 to find a royal match and finally proposed to Josephine of Leuchtenberg, that is, Joséphine Maximilienne Eugénie , the daughter of Eugène de Beauharnais, the adopted son of Napoleon and former vice-king of Italy, could be regarded as rebuff from the European courts and refusal to contract a misalliance. For those reasons, it is thus not surprising that Carl Johan developed an increasing tendency to conservatism, which in return would be warmly welcomed by the Czar and improve diplomatic relations between Sweden and Russia. The conspiracy in favour of Gustav, the ex-king’s son, that was discovered in 1832, 7

following his acceptance as royal prince of Sweden by several European courts a few years earlier, and the “campaign of comedies” that was organized in Paris under the aegis of Louis-Philippe did not favour a positive rapprochement between the liberal Western powers of France and Britain and Sweden-Norway. However, Carl Johan and Count Wetterstedt, his foreign secretary from 1824 to 1837, were perfectly aware that the security of the United Kingdoms was strictly conditioned on British benevolence, for Sweden was, in Carl Johan’s words, “politically speaking, placed in the English sea” and sought to “repose only under the protection of Britain.” As a matter of fact, his greatest fear was to be dragged unwillingly in a major European conflict, which would oppose England to Russia, and to see Scandinavia caught ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’. The Belgian crisis in 1830 had been an early warning of this possible outcome, but a treaty recognizing Belgian independence and neutrality among the five leading powers in November 1831 prevented a European war which was dangerously close to breaking out . Yet, the worsening of the since 1829 was of a far more critical dimension since Czar Nicolas I was successful in imposing a treaty to Mehmet Ali, the governor of Egypt, and Mahmoud II, the Ottoman sultan, in July 1833. This treaty, above all, planned the closing of the Straits to all war vessels and military support on Russian request, a condition that directly collided with Britain’s strategy in the Mediterranean. The threat of a major European conflict in the Eastern Question between Russia and Britain forced Charles XIV John to take a position and anticipate an official response, which took the form of a declaration of neutrality issued on January 4, 1834. In this document and the memorandum that was communicated to the British and Russian governments, “the émigré Frenchman” did more than simply repeating traditional principles. He established indeed “the intellectual basis for Sweden’s eventual foreign policy of neutrality”, explaining that his country “had abandoned all illusions which might endanger its domestic peace or its existence as a state” and that “his countrymen wanted to stand aside from any conflict between Russia and England, the two powers which were most important to them.” However, the important decision to authorize a limited number of ships in the Swedish harbours could be considered as an implicit advantage given to Britain, since the Royal Navy might only make use of this provision in the Baltic. A second Eastern crisis erupted in April 1839 and on this occasion once again the Swedish Crown declared its commitment to observe strict neutrality in case of war between England and Russia. However, this time the circumstances favoured an understanding of the great powers in July 1840 against Egypt and its French ally and offered a unique opportunity to interfere since England and Russia were on the same side. For the first time, Carl Johan’s foreign policy had the opportunity to take a more active turn and show what Sweden-Norway was capable of. Under the pretext of defending national trade interests, a naval squadron was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Nordenskiöld, who was enjoined “to pronounce against the ambition of the pasha of Egypt and to criticise the behaviour of this prince in relation to his legitimate sovereign [Sultan Abdul Mejid I].” This policy was perfectly in accordance with the great powers, France excepted, and even helped modestly to settle the Eastern Question, as Carl Johan wanted to believe with the signing of the London Treaty in July 1841.

With the exception of the Swedish squadron sent to the Mediterranean in 1840, Carl Johan remained decidedly attached to armed neutrality until his death in March 1844, even if this expression, or the mere word ‘neutrality’, was rarely mentioned. It is questionable to assert, as Mikael Af Malmborg does, that Sweden-Norway were “neutral by default”, for, contrary to many other small states, as he himself observes, “neutrality was never imposed on Sweden.” In addition, Carl Johan was “neither a pacifist nor a bystander in European politics” and always considered it his imperative mission to guarantee the prosperity and security of his Kingdoms, if necessary by military means and above all by maintaining a strict balance between the great powers, that is, Britain and Russia . In this respect, the comparison with a major power like France is not without interest. In 8

1825, Villèle, who was formally Prime Minister from 1821 to 1828, wrote to his ambassador in London:

“We are strong enough neither to resist alone on sea facing England, nor to struggle on the continent with the tremendous alliance which exists there. What is to be done in this situation? Defend our happiness and our safety in spite of everyone, if ever they tried to undermine it; but to abandon the claim to impose on others laws that we are not able to make them carry out… With this behaviour, not very clever but sure, we support as long as possible the general peace, which we so much need.”

There is obviously much in common between French and Swedish foreign policies; yet no one would consider Villele’s statement as a display of weakness, probably because France was recovering from its defeat and diminution in 1815 and therefore trying not to appear as the constant troublemaker of Europe. However, this course of action continued under Louis-Philippe during the July Monarchy and, despite “petty-minded means” and “an often clumsy chattering”, as André Jardin writes, French foreign policy, like the Swedish one, “had a keynote, followed with an audacious obstinacy: the peace of Europe.” There were of course important differences between these two countries, first of all the difference of size and possibilities of which Bernadotte was perfectly aware from the beginning. Sweden, even when extended with Norway to the North Sea, remained a small kingdom, limited in human and economic means to support an ambitious foreign policy even after the prosperous decades of Carl Johan’s reign, which had enabled a significant increase of population and production and a remarkable stabilizing of public expenditure and currency. In addition, the geographic position of Scandinavia, as an “insular Peninsula”, introduced a new path-dependence in the foreign policy kingdoms of Sweden-Norway which were caught between “Russia’s proximity and military superiority” and their reliance on “Britain’s industry and navy”, which meant the need to maintain a balanced attitude in their diplomatic relations. For all that, does it mean that Sweden- Norway did not have any other choice than neutrality and that this neutrality was not “coherent” because Carl Johan’s policy only “fitted to crises and was near to overcome his reserve on several occasions”? This assertion is uncertain, if not doubtful, for there is reason to believe with Kristen Wahlbäck and Edward Killham that Carl Johan did more than simply submit to an inflexible reality and, on the contrary, lay the foundations for a foreign policy whose principles are still in use in modern Sweden. The most striking component of this policy is perhaps the repeated importance of the armed forces and their paramount significance in the assertiveness of neutrality. As we have observed, Bernadotte’s plans and actions since 1810 always considered the Swedish army and navy as the key to Sweden’s security and he tried hard to convince his countrymen to accept the necessary sacrifice, both human and financial, that it required. This was explained in the clearest way in June 1841 at the closing of the Riksdag:

“I see only a happy future for the Northern peninsula if peace can be preserved; but being indifferent to war chances and failing to get ready for it, is to destroy nationality and to dig slowly the tomb of one’s country. Nations are what they want to be, so not powerful, at least considered, by their good faith and their peace. There are instants when a nation must submit to sacrifices, whatever important they might be; it is when honour prescribes him to his prince and to his government. If the leader of the state, by the lassitude of his authority, must get involved personally, he should not hesitate to do it, especially when the interest and consideration of the country make it a rule for him.”

At this point, the question remained unclear as to what would happen after the passing away of the ‘great man’, that is, Bernadotte. For many, the adopted policy was to be continued by Oscar I, 9

in spite of his liberal inclination and noticeable dislike of Russian politics; for others, the orientation of the Swedish foreign policy had been fixed once for all by Bernadotte and could not be changed. It truth, it did not depend so much on the new king to redefine the course of Swedish foreign policy because its principles were bound to powerful geostrategic realities that Oscar I could not ignore. In addition, the national land and sea forces were not prepared for any other mission than a defensive one-if prepared at all, if we rely on the conclusions drawn by young naval officers like Oscar Wallenberg, and polemicists, who were very critical about the state of the navy in the years 1840- 1844. Although the Swedish-Norwegian army was reinforced in the following years and decades thanks to the modernization of the Navy in the early 1850s, its possibilities would not be greatly improved. In the end, Oscar I could neither turn his back on Russia nor display a sudden and flaunting preference for Britain without putting in jeopardy the delicate balance of power in the Baltic, something he would learn during the Revolutions of 1848 and even more so in the years 1853-1855 during the Crimean War when Sweden-Norway, joined by Denmark, were forced to declare neutrality.