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Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order Author(s): G. John Ikenberry Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 2009), pp. 71-87 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40407217 Accessed: 22-10-2015 14:30 UTC

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Liberal Internationalism3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order G. JohnIkenberry

- - Liberalinternational order both its ideas and real-worldpolitical formations is not embodied in a fixedset of principlesor practices.Open markets,international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective prob- - lemsolving, the rule of law theseare aspects of the liberal vision that have made appearancesin variouscombinations and changing waysover the last century. I arguethat it is possibleto identifythree versions or modelsof liberal international order - versions1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. The firstis associatedwith the ideas ofWoodrow Wilson, thesecond is the Cold War liberalinternationalism of the post-1945 decades,and the thirdversion is a sortof post-hegemonicliberal internationalism that has onlypartially appeared and whose fullshape and logic is stilluncertain. I developa setof dimensionsthat allow foridentifying different logics of liberal inter- nationalorder and identifyvariables that will shape the movementfrom liberal internationalism 2.0 to 3.0.

the past century,the liberalinternational unfoldingover the last two- centuries has been what might "project"has evolvedand periodicallyreinvented be calledthe "liberalascendency." This has involvedthe itself.The liberalinternational ideas championed extraordinaryrise of the liberaldemocratic states from by WoodrowWilson were extendedand reworkedby weaknessand obscurityin thelate eighteenth century into FranklinRoosevelt and Harry Truman. Todays liberal inter- theworld's most powerful and wealthystates, propelling nationalistagenda is evolvingyet again. The actualorders theWest and the liberalcapitalist system of economics themselves,built after the two world wars and in theafter- and politicsto worldpreeminence. All ofthis occurred in mathof the Cold War,have also differed in theirlogic and fitsand startsin thetwentieth century amidst world war character.Liberal international order - bothits ideas and and economicupheaval. At historicaljunctures along the real-worldpolitical formations - is notembodied in a fixed way,liberal states have pursued various efforts to establish setof principles or practices.Open markets,international rulesand institutionsof internationalgovernance. Adap- institutions,cooperative security, democratic community, tationand innovation,necessity and choice,success and - progressivechange, collective problem solving, shared sov- failure all ofthese are aspects of liberal internationalisms ereignty,the rule of law- theseare aspectsof theliberal movementalong its twentieth century pathway. visionthat have made appearancesin variouscombina- It is possibleto identifythree major versions or models - tionsand changingways over the decades. ofliberal international order callthese versions 1.0, 2.0, In grandhistorical perspective, this makes sense. The and 3.0. The firstis associatedwith the ideas that Wood- mostimportant macro-transformation in world politics rowWilson and Anglo-Americanliberals brought to the post-World War I internationalsettlement; the second is the Cold War liberalinternationalism of the post-1945 G JohnIkenberry is theAlbert G Milbank Professorof decades;and thethird version is a sortof post-hegemonic Politicsand InternationalAffairs at PrincetonUniversity liberalinternationalism that has onlypartially appeared in theWoodrow Wilson School and thePolitics Department and whosefull shape and logic is stilluncertain. In its ([email protected]). He is also a Global Eminence earlytwentieth century form, liberal order was definedin Scholarat KyungHee University,Korea. He is theauthor termsof state independence and thebuilding of an inter- ofAfter Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and nationallegal order that reinforced norms of statesover- theRebuilding of Orderafter Major War (Princeton eigntyand non-intervention.In the earlytwenty-first UniversityPress 2001). He would like to acknowledge century,liberal order is increasinglydefined in termsof commentsand suggestionsby Michael Doyle,Andrew Hur- thereverse. It is an evolvingorder marked by increasingly rell,Miles Kahler,Jeff Legro, Andrew Moravcsik, Daniel far-reachingand complexforms of internationalcooper- Nexon,Alan Alexandroff,and membersof the Princeton ationthat erode state sovereignty and reallocateon a global Universityworkshop on risingstates and globalgovernance. scalethe sites and sourcesof political authority.

doi:10.1 01 7/S15375927090901 12 March 2009 | Voi, 7/No. 1 71

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The UnitedStates was themajor champion and spon- Dimensions of Liberal sor of the liberalinternational project in the twentieth Internationalism century.But at each turn,the role and functionof the The liberalimagination is vast,and theideas and designs UnitedStates in the liberalinternational order has dif- forliberal international order are also extraordinarily wide fered.Indeed, the waysin whichAmericas preeminent ranging.1At itsmost basic, liberal internationalism offers geopoliticalposition has simultaneouslyfacilitated and a visionof an open, rule-basedsystem in whichstates impededthe operation of an open,rule-based liberal order tradeand cooperateto achievemutual gains.2 Liberals is a criticalaspect shaping the characterand logic of assumethat peoples and governmentshave deep common liberalorder itself. In the post-1945 period,the United interestsin theestablishment ofa cooperativeworld order Statesgradually became the hegemonic organizer and man- organizedaround principles of restraint,reciprocity, and ager of Westernliberal order. The Americanpolitical sovereignequality. There is an optimistassumption lurk- system- and its alliances,technology, currency, and ing in liberalinternationalism that states can overcome markets- becamefused to the widerliberal order. The constraintsand cooperate to solvesecurity dilemmas, pur- United Statessupported the rules and institutionsof sue collectiveaction, and createan open,stable system. liberalinternationalism but it was also given special Thereis alsoan optimisticassumption that powerful states privileges.In the shadowof the Cold War,the United will act withrestraint in theexercise of theirpower and Statesbecame the "ownerand operator"of the liberal findways to crediblyconvey commitments to otherstates. capitalistpolitical system. The questiontoday is howwill Acrossthe decades,liberal internationalists have shared the systemevolve - and how will the United States theview that trade and exchangehave a modernizingand respond- to a successorliberal order in whichthe United civilizingeffect on states,undercutting illiberal tendencies Statesplays a lessdominating role? How necessaryis the and strengtheningthe fabric of international community. UnitedStates as a liberalhegemonic leader to thestabil- Liberalinternationalists also share the view that democra- - - ityand functioningof liberalinternationalism? And will ciesare incontrast to autocratic and authoritarian states the UnitedStates remain a supporterof liberalorder in particularlyable and willingto operatewithin a open, an era when it has fewerspecial privileges? For halfa rule-basedinternational system and to cooperate for mutual century,the UnitedStates essentially had liberalorder gain. Likewise,liberal internationalists have sharedthe builtto its specifications.What happenswhen this spe- viewthat institutions and rulesestablished between states cial statusends? facilitateand reinforcecooperation and collectiveprob- This articlehas two goals.One is to map thevarious lem solving.3 models of liberalinternational order - both in ideal- Beyondthese general, shared liberal convictions, there typicalterms and in theirhistorical setting. This entails is a greatdeal ofvariation in theordering ideas of liberal specifyingthe dimensionsalong which liberal inter- internationalism.In particular, liberal internationalist ideas nationalorder can vary and identifyingthe logic and func- and real-worldorders have differed in regardto howsov- tionsof theseideal-typical orders. A second goal is to ereignty,rules, institutions, and authority are to be arrayed probe the alternativeand changingways in whichthe withinthe international system. How liberalorder is to be UnitedStates has interactedwith international order. In governed- thatis, the location of rules and authority- is particular,I delineate the alternative liberal pathways that thegreat unresolved, contested, and evolvingissue of lib- mightexist as theylead awayfrom the post- 1945 U.S.- eralinternationalism. centeredorder - thatis, the movement from liberal inter- Lookingback at thevarious visions of liberalorder in nationalism2.0 to 3.0. the twentiethcentury, it is possibleto identifyfive key I beginby lookingat the majordimensions around dimensionsof variation:participatory scope, sovereign which liberalorder can vary.After this, I surveythe independence,sovereign equality, rule of law,and policy majorhistorical eras of liberal international order, includ- breadthand depth.These dimensionsare summarized in ing the transitionalcontemporary era. I arguethat the figure1. "thirdera" of liberal international order hinges in impor- Scope refersto thesize of liberalorder; whether it is a tant ways on whetherand how the United States selectivegrouping or globalin scope.This is a distinction can accommodateitself to diminishedauthority and betweenorder that is builtaround an exclusivegrouping sovereignty.The questionfor American policy makers of states(defined by regionalor othershared characteris- iswhether bargains and other arrangements can be made- tics)or open in access and membership to allstates (defined particularlyin securitycooperation - that provide byuniversal principles). Liberal order can be constructed waysfor the UnitedStates to remainat the centerof betweenWestern democracies or withinthe wider global liberalinternational order. New formsof governance- system.In one caseit is situatedwithin an exclusivegroup- networksand informalsteering groups - willbecome more ingof like-minded states - theWest, the "free world," the importantin a post-American-centeredliberal inter- Atlanticcommunity - and in theother it is open to the nationalorder. entireworld.

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Figure1 Dimensions of liberal internationalorder

universal4* scope w^ regionalor exclusive sovereign- w autonomous *^ * shared independence - equal ^ sovereign equality 4> hierarchical legal-binding^ ruleof law 4> ad hoc narrow^ policydomain ^ expansive

Sovereignindependence refers to the degreeto which advantagesof states shape interaction. Hierarchical order - liberalorder entails legal-political restrictions on statesov- whichconfers unequal privileges and authority to themost ereignty.Sovereignty in this sense refers to thestate s exclu- powerfulstate or states- can also be moreor less rule siveclaims to authoritywithin its territory, manifest in the based. internationallyrecognized domestic formal-legal right to Finally,liberal order can varyin termsof thebreadth issuecommands and enforceobligations. States can pos- and depthof itspolicy domains. The internationalorder sessfull Westphalian legal sovereignty and interaction with canbe organizedto deal with only a narrowpolicy domain. otherstates on thisbasis, or agreementsand institutions It could be essentiallyfocused only on traditionalinter- can be constructedthat involve the sharing and abridge- statesecurity challenges. Or it can be organizedto deal mentof statesovereignty. On the one hand,states can witha moreexpansive set of social, economic, and human cede sovereignauthority to supranationalinstitutions or rightschallenges. The moreexpansive the policy domains reducethe autonomy of their decision making by making of liberalorder, the more that the international commu- agreedupon commitmentsto otherstates. On theother nityis expectedto be organizedto intervene,control, reg- hand,states can retain their legal and political rights within ulate,and protectaspects of politicsand societywithin widerframeworks of inter-statecooperation.4 and acrossstates. Sovereignequality refers to the degree of hierarchy within These dimensionsof liberal order help us identifyand theliberal order. Hierarchy refers to thedegree of differ- contrastthe various historical manifestations ofliberal inter- entiationof rightsand authoritywithin the international nationalorder. Refer to figure2 fora summaryof these system.Liberal order can be organizedaround the sover- differences. eignequality of states- a veryhorizontal ordering based As thefollowing sections demonstrate, the logics of lib- on principlesof equal access, rights, and participation. Or eralinternational order have evolved - and at specifichis- liberalorder can be morehierarchical in whichone or toricalmoments they have been transformed.I do not severalstates possess special rights and authority.In an offera causaltheory of why liberal order has evolved over ordermarked by sovereign equality there is verylittle dif- the last century.Such explanatoryefforts have been ferentiationof rolesand responsibilities.States enter into attemptedelsewhere.7 The effortshere are typological- agreementsand cooperateas moreor less equal parties. In thatis, to identifythe changingways that liberal inter- a hierarchicalorder, the roles and responsibilitieswill be nationalorder has beenenvisaged and constructed. moredifferentiated - and statesare organized, formally or informally,around superordinate and subordinate author- ityrelationships.5 Liberal InternationalOrder 1.0 Rule of law refersto thedegree to whichagreed-upon The firstefforts to constructa liberalinternational order rulesinfuse the operation of theorder. The "ruliness"of camein theaftermath ofWorld War I withideas famously liberalorder can vary.The interactionof statesmay be advancedby Woodrow Wilson. The Wilsonianvision was informedby highlyarticulated sets of rulesand institu- of an internationalorder organized around a globalcol- tionsthat prescribe and proscribeactions. Or the inter- lectivesecurity body in whichsovereign states would act actionof statescan be informedby moread hoc and togetherto uphold a systemof territorialpeace. Open bargainedrelations.6 Even ad hoc and bargainedrelations trade,national self-determination, and a beliefin progres- areinformed by some minimal sense of rules- ifonly by siveglobal change also undergirdedthe Wilsonian world thenotion of reciprocity.Nonetheless, variations exist in view.It was a "one world"vision of nation-statesthat the degreeto whichgeneralized rules and principlesof tradeand interactin a multilateralsystem of laws creating orderprevail or whetherspecific powers and bargaining an orderlyinternational community. "What we seek,"

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Figure 2 mentsto act in concertto protectterritorial borders and Three Versions of Liberal Internationalism deteraggression (when there is unanimousconsensus that is The itself Liberal Internationalism1.0 aggression takingplace). League provided mechanismsfor dispute resolution. There is sometension Universal membership,not tied to regime location or character. in theWilsonian notion of a universalliberal order. On theone hand,Wilson did holdthe view that a stableand Westphalian sovereignty,defined in terms of an international legal order affirmingstate independence and non-intervention peacefulinternational order would need to be builtaround liberaldemocratic states. Accountable governments that Flat politicalhierarchy respectthe rule of law wereessential building blocks of a Rules and norms operate as internationallaw, enforced through peacefuland just world order. As Wilson argued in hiswar moral suasion and global public opinion address,"a steadfastconcert of peace can neverbe main- Narrowpolicy domain, restrictedto open trade and collective tainedexcept by a partnershipof democraticnations."8 securitysystem But,on theother hand, Wilson also understoodthat the architectureof a liberalorder would need to be universal Liberal Internationalism2.0 and open in scopeand membership.All statescould join theLeague regardless of their regime type. Western-orientedsecurity and economy system The Wilsonianvision reconciled this apparent contra- ModifiedWestphalian sovereignty,where states compromise dictionwith the understandingthat all aggressivestates so as state legal independence gain greater capacity could be broughtto heelwithin a collectivesecurity sys- Hierarchicalorder, with American hegemonic provisioningof temand that, in the long run, non-democratic states would public goods, rule-based and patron-clientrelations, and voice make democratictransitions and eventuallycome to opportunities embraceliberal international rules and norms.Wilson did Dense inter-governmentalrelations, enforcement of rules and believethat a world-widedemocratic revolution was under- institutions and throughreciprocity bargaining way.Beyond this, Wilson tended to emphasizethe dem- ocraticbases of peace in hiswar speeches but less so later Expanded policydomains, includingeconomic regulation,human on in his effortsto securethe Covenant.Wilson never rights,etc. thoughtthat all the membersof the League had to be democraciesin orderfor the organization to succeed.In Liberal Internationalism3.0 neitherWilsons original proposal for the Covenant pre- in nor in the final Universal scope, expanding membership in core governing sented Parison February14, 1919 institutionsto risingnon-Western states versionadopted on April28 does the worddemocracy The s missionwas theavoidance of Post-Westphaiian sovereign, withincreasingly intrusive and appear. League mainly interdependenteconomic and securityregimes waressentially by means of arbitration and a reductionof armaments,and thenthe threatof collectivesanctions. Post-hegemonic hierarchyin which various groupings of leading states occupy governinginstitutions The spreadof democracy was seen more as a consequence of an effectiveLeague than an essentialsource of that Expanded rule-based system, coupled withnew realms of effectiveness.Hence theuniversalist architecture.9 network-based cooperation Wilsonian-eraliberal internationalism was also predi- Furtherexpansion of policydomains catedon Westphalianstate sovereignty. The nation-state was championed.Ideas ofa progressiveliberal order dur- ingthis period were closely associated with anti-imperial movementsand strugglesfor national self-determination. Wilsondeclared at MountVernon on July4,1918, "is the Wilson did not see the liberalproject involving a deep reignof law,based on the consentof the governedand transformationof statesthemselves - as sovereignlegal sustainedby the organized opinion of mankind." Despite units.Nationalism was a dominantforce in worldpoli- its greatambition, the Wilsonian plan forliberal inter- tics, and Wilson'ssupport for rightsof nationalself- nationalorder entailed very little in theway of institu- governmentgave voice to it. In May 1916, Wilson tionalmachinery or formalgreat power management of proclaimedthat "every people has a rightto choosethe the system.It was to be an institutionally"thin" liberal sovereigntyunder which they shall live." He arguedthat orderin whichstates would primarilyact cooperatively "smallstates" as wellas "greatand powerful nations" should throughthe shared embrace of liberal ideas and principles. enjoysovereignty and territorialintegrity free from aggres- At thecenter of the Wilsonian vision was theLeague of sion.10To be sure,at theParis peace conference,Wilson Nationswhich was to providethe forumfor collective was hesitantto recognizenew nations,particularly out- security.This was to be a universalmembership organiza- sideof Europe. As thehistorian Lloyd Ambrosius observes,: tion.Nation-states that joined it made diffusecommit- "As in the Philippinesearlier, he [Wilson]applied the

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions principleof nationalself-determination with great cau- ism. Wilsonianinternationalism did not call upon the tion.He did notundermine British rule in Ireland,Egypt, internationalcommunity to organizeto promoteexpan- and India, or Frenchrule in Indochina.Wilson recog- sivenotions of humanrights, social protections, or eco- nizedonly new nations that emerged from the collapse of nomicdevelopment. To be sure,there was an underlying the Russian,German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman assumptionthat the international system was moderniz- empires."11Wilsons notion of national self-determination ing in a liberaldirection. But liberal internationalism dur- - was decidedlydevelopmental and patronizing.Sover- ing this period did not containan explicitagenda of eignself-rule required the emergence of an "organic"nation buildinginternational capacities to defend or advance ambi- in whichthe people werepolitically mature enough to tious social ends. Indeed,the Versaillestreaty has been independentlygovern themselves. Hence the mandate widelydepicted as a flawedblueprint for postwar order system- a Leagueof Nationsinnovation to replacefor- withlitde understanding ofthe economic and social under- mal colonialrule - thatwould operate to maintainorder pinningsof stable order and progressivechange.14 in backwardareas until national self-rule was possible. Takentogether, the Wilsonian vision of liberal interna- The Wilsonianconception of liberalinternationalism tionalismwas bothbreathtakingly ambitious and surpris- similarlyembraced the notionof sovereignequality of inglylimited. It soughtto transformthe old globalsystem states.Among the established nation-states - most of whom basedon thebalance of power,spheres of influence,mil- wereWestern - therewas littleformal institutional hier- itaryrivalry, and alliancesinto a unifiedliberal inter- archyin thepostwar order. The Leagueof Nations was to nationalorder based on nation-statesand therule of law. be an organizationof states that came together as equals. Powerand securitycompetition would be decomposed The Leaguedid nothave the institutional framework for and replacedby a communityof nations.The Wilsonian specialgreat power authority and rights of the later United visionwas universalin scopeand celebratedthe sovereign Nations.It did havean ExecutiveCouncil but, adhering equalityof nation-states.The resultingorder would be closelyto theprinciple of the equality of states, its powers boundtogether by the international rule of law. But Wil- weresimply to initiateinvestigations and make recom- sonianliberal internationalism did not involvethe con- mendationsto thebody of thewhole. The hierarchiesof structionof deeply transformative legally-binding political Wilsonianliberal internationalism were more implicit and institutions.Liberal international order was to be con- informal,manifest in notionsof racialand civilizational structedaround the "soft law" of public opinion and moral superiority.Wilson himselfwas notoriouslyunenlight- suasion.The Leagueof Nations was, according to Wilson, ened in these respects.Hierarchical arrangements of to "operateas theorganizing moral force of men through- Wilsonian-styleinternational order were also manifestin out theworld" that will turn the "searching light of con- theways in whichthe major powers of the League would scious"on wrongdoing around the world. "Just a little remainresponsible for supervision of post-colonialterri- exposurewill settlemost questions," Wilson optimisti- tories.Again, Wilsons progressive developmental vision callyasserted.15 providedthe intellectual coherence. The liberalinternationalism envisaged by Wilson was Regardingthe ruleof law,Wilson of coursechampi- an historicalfailure. This was notsimply because the Sen- oneda worldordered by international law. As Wilsonput ateof the United States failed to ratifythe Versailles Treaty. it, "thesame law thatapplies to individualsapplies to It was reallya failureof theemergence of theunderlying nations."12Yet he had a verynineteenth-century view of conditionsneeded for a collectivesecurity system to func- internationallaw. That is, Wilson did not see inter- tion.As noted earlier,the Wilsonianversion of liberal nationallaw primarily as formal,legally-binding commit- internationalismwas builtaround a "thin"set of institu- mentsthat transferred sovereignty upward to international tionalcommitments. But it was also builton theassump- - or supranationalauthorities. International law had more tion thata "thick"set of normsand pressures public - ofa socializingdynamic, creating norms and expectations opinionand the moral rectitude of statesmen would acti- thatstates would slowly come to embraceas theirown. As vate sanctionsand enforcethe territorialpeace. Wilson Thomas Knock notes,"Wilson emphasized that inter- got aroundthe problem of sovereignautonomy - which nationallaw actuallywas 'not made/as such. Ratherit theUnited States Senate would not give up - byempha- wasthe result of organic development - 'a bodyof abstract sizingthe informal norms that would take hold and bring " 13 principlesfounded upon long established custom/ Inter- countriestogether to maintaina stablepeace. The sover- nationallaw and the system of collective security anchored eigntyof states- sovereigntyas it relatedto both legal - in theLeague of Nations would provide a socializingrole, independenceand equality wouldnot be compromised graduallybringing states into a "communityof power." or transformed.States would just be expectedto act - Finally,liberal internationalism 1.0 had a relativelynar- better whichfor Wilson meant that they would be social- rowview about the domain of international cooperation. ized intoa "communityof power." It was essentiallya systemof collectivesecurity and free Lookingback, it is clear that the securitycommit- tradebound together by rules and normsof multilateral- mentswere too thinand the normsof complianceand

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Articles | Americaand the Dilemmas of LiberalWorld Order collectiveaction were not thickenough. As a result,the The Rooseveltvision did anticipatemore compromises in - inter-warera did not see thefull implementation of lib- sovereignequality than Wilson thatis, the system would eral internationalorder 1.0. Instead,the UnitedStates be morehierarchical. There was also a substantiallymore pulledback fromactive involvement in peace and secu- developednotion of how international institutions might rity.The internationalismof the 1920s and 1930s was a be deployedto manage economic and political interdepen- sortof internationalism0.5. That is, it was essentiallya dence.Roosevelt's wartime proclamation of the Four Free- privateinternationalism of banks and commercialfirms domsand the Atlantic Charter advocacy of a postwarorder thatstruggled during these decades to cooperateto man- thatwould support full employment and economic growth age the impactsof a contractingworld economy. There gaveliberal internationalism a more expansive agenda. The was also a revivalof legal internationalismmanifest in greatpowers and governance institutions would have more the Kellogg-BriandPact, which sought to returnto the authoritythan Wilson proposed, but it would remaina earlynineteenth-century uses of arbitrationtreaties to unifiedsystem in which Roosevelt's "family circle" of states settleinternational disputes.16 This multilateraltreaty, wouldmanage openness and stability. whichgave governments an opportunityto renouncewar But theorder that actually took shape in thedecades againstother treaty members - exceptin self-defenseor afterthe war came to havea morefar-reaching and com- othercircumstances - was evenless of a formalsecurity plex logic. It was moreWestern-centered, multilayered, - pact than the League of Nations.And it sharedwith and deeplyinstitutionalized than originally anticipated Wilsonsliberal internationalism 1.0 the convictionthat and it broughtthe United States into direct political and publicopinion and moralsuasion were the mechanisms economicmanagement of the system.The weaknessof thatwould activate cooperation and collectivesecurity. Europe,the looming Soviet threat, and the practical require- mentsof establishing institutions and makingthem work drovethe process forward - and in newdirections. In the Liberal InternationalOrder 2.0 decadesthat followed. The UnitedStates found itself not When the United Statesfound itself in a positionto just thesponsor and leadingparticipant in a newliberal - relaunchthe liberal international project in the 1940s,it internationalorder itwas also ownerand operatorof it. initiallydid not seekto transformits basic logic. Roose- The visionof liberal order turned into liberal hegemonic veltwanted to injecta bitmore realism into its operation order. bybuilding a moreformal role for the great powers. Like In bothsecurity and economic realms, the United States Wilsonsversion, it would be a "one world"system in founditself steadily taking on newcommitments and func- whichthe major powers would cooperateto enforcethe tionalroles. Its own economic and political system became, peace.The UnitedStates would take the lead in creating in effect,a centralcomponent of the largerliberal heg- theorder, but the order would be collectivelyrun. In this emonicorder. America's domestic market, the U.S. dollar, sense,FDR's wartimevision of postwarorder was liberal and the Cold War alliancesemerged as crucialmecha- internationalism1.5. But the unexpectedand evolving nismsand institutionsthrough which postwar order was challengesof forginga viablepostwar order - rebuilding foundedand managed.America and theWestern liberal Europe,integrating Germany and Japan, making commit- orderbecame fused into one system.The UnitedStates ments,opening markets, providing security, containing had moredirect power in runningthe postwar order but it Sovietcommunism - forcedthe United States along a path- also founditself more tightly bound to the otherstates way thatled to a transformationin the foundationsof withinthat order. The UnitedStates became a providerof liberalinternational order. In theshadow of the Cold War public(or at leastclub) goods- upholdinga setof rules a newlogic of liberalinternationalism emerged. It was a and institutionsthat circumscribed how American power logicof American-ledliberal hegemonic order - thatis, was exercisedand providingmechanisms for reciprocal liberalinternationalism 2.0. politicalinfluence. In thelate- 1940s, security cooperation Fromthe moment it beganto planfor peace, the Roo- movedfrom the UN SecurityCouncil to NATO andother seveltadministration wanted to builda postwarsystem of U.S. -led alliances.The global systemof great-power- open tradeand greatpower cooperation. "The United managedcollective security became a Western-oriented Statesdid not enterthe war to reshapethe world,"the securitycommunity organized around cooperative secu- historianWarren Kimball argues, "but once in thewar, rity.Likewise, the managementof the worldeconomy thatconception of world reform was theassumption that movedfrom the BrettonWoods visionto an American 17 guidedRoosevelt's actions." Itwould be a reformed"one dollarand marketsystem. In effect,the world "contracted world"global order. In thebackground, the great powers out" to theUnited States to provideglobal governance. wouldoperate together to provide collective security within A criticalcharacteristic ofliberal internationalism 2.0 is a newglobal organization. The AtlanticCharter provided itsWestern foundation. The UnitedStates found it possi- thevision. Wartime conferences at Bretton Woods, Dumb- ble to makebinding security commitments as it shifted artonOaks, and elsewhere provided the architectural plans. fromWilsonian collective security to alliancesecurity built

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions arounddemocratic solidarity within the Atlantic region. sovereignindependence but gain new governmental This shiftwas twofold.One was the movementtoward capacities.20 morespecific and explicitsecurity commitments. Alliance Similarly,the norms of sovereign equality embodied in partnershipsentailed obligations but theywere also lim- Wilsonianinternationalism gave way to a muchmore hier- itedliability agreements. Commitments were not univer- archicalform of liberalorder. The UnitedStates took on sal and openedended; they were tied to specificsecurity specialfunctional-operational roles. It positioneditself at challengeswith treaty-based understandings about roles thecenter of the liberal international order. It provided pub- and responsibilities.18Second, they were commitments lic goods of securityprotection, market openness, and thatwere backed by a politicalvision of a Westernsecurity sponsorshipof rules and institutions. The Americandollar community.The sense thatAmerica and Europe were becamean internationalcurrency and the American domes- imperiledby a commonthreat strengthened the feeling of ticmarket became an engineof globaleconomic growth. Westernsolidarity. But the notionof a Westerncore to The Americanalliance system and theforward-deployed liberalinternational order also suggestedthat unusual militaryforces in Europe and East Asia gave the United States - opportunitiesexisted becauseof commonculture and a directand ongoingsuperordinate role in thecapitalist- democraticinstitutions - to cooperateand buildpostwar democraticworld. Other states established clientalistic and institutions. "specialrelationships" with Washington. In NATO, the Liberalinternationalism 2.0 also movedbeyond the UnitedStates was firstamong equals. It led and directed Wilsonianvision with its more complex notions of sover- securitycooperation across the regions of theworld. The eigntyand interdependence.Westphalian sovereignty UnitedStates exported security and importedgoods. The remainedat thecore of Truman-era liberal international- resultingorder was hierarchical- the UnitedStates was ism.But there were new understandings about the dangers themost powerful state in theorder. It occupieda super- and opportunitiesof economicand securityinterdepen- ordinateposition manifest in roles, responsibilities, author- dence.The economiccalamities of the 1930s and thesuc- ity,and privilegeswithin the liberal international order. cessesofNew Deal regulationand governance informed these Butthe hierarchical character of the order was to be more newviews. Advanced societies were seen to be deeplyand liberalthan imperial. The UnitedStates did engage in pub- mutuallyvulnerable to international economic downturns licgoods provision, supported and operated within agreed-' and thebad policiespursued by other states. States would uponrules and institutions,and openeditself up to "voice needto get more involved in moreintense and institution- opportunities"from subordinate states. To be sure,these alizedforms of joint management ofthe global system. Jacob liberalfeatures of hierarchy differed across regions and over Viner,a leadinginternational economist and postwar plan- time.The UnitedStates was morewilling to makemulti- nercaptured this view. "There is wide agreement today that lateralcommitments to WesternEuropean partners than majordepressions, mass unemployment, aresocial evils, and to others.In EastAsia, the United States built a "huband thatit is the obligation of governments. . . to prevent them." spoke"set of securitypacts that made theregional order Moreover,there is "wideagreement also thatit is extraor- moreclient-based than rule-based.21 Generally speaking, dinarilydifficult, ifnot outright impossible, for any coun- Americasdominant global position made de factohierar- tryto copealone with the problems of cyclical booms and chyan inevitablefeature of the postwar order. But Americas - depressions.. . whilethere is good prospect that with inter- dominantglobal position togetherwith Cold War bipolar - nationalcooperation. ... theproblem of the business cycle competition alsogave Washington strategic incentives to 19 and ofmass unemployment can be largelysolved." New buildcooperative relations with allies, integrate Japan and institutionswould be neededin whichstates worked side Germany,share the "spoils" of capitalism and moderniza- byside on a continuousbase to regulate and reduce the dan- tion,and, generally, operate the system in mutually accept- gersinherent in increasinglyinterdependent societies. ableways.22 Therewere several aspects to thisemerging view that it The rule-basedcharacter of liberal order also evolved in wasnecessary to reducestate sovereign independence. One the 1940s beyondthe Wilsonian vision. As notedearlier, is thatit was essentially an intergovernmental- rather than in theaftermath of thewar and depressionòf the 1930s, supranational- vision. At least in theadvanced world, gov- Americanliberal internationalists had a newappreciation ernmentswould remain the primary sources of authority of theways in whichcapitalist modernization and inter- and decision.But governmentswould bargain,consult, dependencehad created growing functional needs for coop- andcoordinate their policies with other governments, facil- eration.So toodid theyhave new views about the role and itatedthrough international institutions. The otheraspect importanceof rulesand institutions.23Wilsonian inter- was thatthe new internationalinstitutional machinery . nationalistshad strongconvictions about the moral and wouldbe createdin large part to bolsterrather than dimin- politicalvirtues of internationallaw and its socializing ish the abilityof governmentsto deliveron theireco- impactson states.Truman-era internationalists had con- nomicand politicalobligations to theirsocieties. States victionsabout the utilityand functionsof institutions withinliberal internationalism 2.0 would giveup some and rule-basedorder. More so than in earlierdecades,

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Americanofficials saw thatits interests- national eco- notreally exist. The termmost frequently used was national nomic,political, and security- could onlybe advanced "defense,"and thishad a morerestricted meaning to pro- withthe building of a stable,articulated, and institution- tectionof the homeland against traditional military attacks. alizedinternational environment. That is, theAmerican Sometimeduring World War II thenew term emerged and commitmentto rule-basedorder was not simply a conces- it capturedthe new vision of an activistand permanently sionto otherstates, driven by Cold Waralliance impera- mobilizedstate seeking security across economic, political, tives.It was an incentivethat the UnitedStates would andmilitary realms. National security required the United havehad evenwithout the Sovietthreat. As the 1950s, Statesto be activelyattempting to shape its external - NSC-68 strategicplanning document that launched con- environmentcoordinating agencies, generating resources, tainmentargued, the United States had a need"to build a buildingalliances, and layingthe ground work. healthyinternational community," which "we would prob- What the New Deal and nationalsecurity liberalism ablydo evenif therewere no internationalthreat." The broughtto postwar American internationalism was a wider feltneed was to builda "worldenvironment in whichthe constituencyfor liberal order building than in earliereras. Americansystem can surviveand flourish."24 The desirableinternational order had morefeatures and Thereare several distinctive features to 1940s-erarule- movingparts. It was moreelaborate and complexlyorga- based order.One involvedan innovationin the uses of nized.In severalsenses, the stakeshad grownsince the - institutions.Not onlywould intergovernmentalinstitu- endof World War I morehad to be accomplished,more tions providefunctional tools to manage interdepen- was at riskif the right sort of postwar order was notcon- dence,they would also be createdto bindstates together. structed,and moreof American society had a stakein a Thiswas most important in thereintegration ofGermany successfulAmerican liberal internationalist project. intothe West, in which European and Atlantic-wide insti- Throughoutthe Cold Warera, this American-led lib- tutionsprovided frameworks to bind,commit, and reas- eralinternational order was the dominant reality in world - sure.25Beyond this, the American approach to multilateral, politics.Along the way, the United States itself itsecon- - rule-basedorder was to insiston flexibilityand privileges. omy,military, political institutions became tightly tied The UnitedStates would champion a rule-basedapproach to thewider order. Some aspectsof American-led liberal to internationalorder, but there would need to be accom- orderdid changeand evolve. In the1970s, the dollar-gold modations,exceptions, weighted voting, and opt-out standardcollapsed and monetaryand financialrelations clauses.26These werethe compromisesthat allowed lib- becameless tightly tied to Washington.The expansionof eralinternationalism 2.0 to bothreflect commitment to the worldeconomy in the decadesbefore and afterthe therule of law and accommodatethe realitiesof hierar- end ofthe Cold Waralso reducedthe centrality of Atlan- chy.Finally, rule-based order was also supplementedby ticrelations within the wider global liberal order. During bilateralties and agreements.States were not primarily or theCold War, the liberal international order existed "inside" simplyasked to abide by treaty-basedrules and norms. theglobal bipolar system. With the end ofthe Cold War, Crucially,states agreed to operatein a rule-basedsystem thisinside order became the "outside"order. The global whichprimarily created ongoing political processes. That systemwas now largely tied together through the markets, is,rule-based order did not,strictly speaking, create "laws" relations,and institutionsof the postwarAmerican-led thatstates were to obey,rather it createdmechanisms and system.At thesame time, amidst these sweeping changes, processesin whichstates would bargain,communicate, theunderling logic of liberal internationalism 2.0 seemed - and adjust all withinagreed-upon normative and insti- to be increasinglyproblematic. So whyis thisorder in tutionalparameters. trouble- andwhat would liberal internationalism 3.0 look As theforegoing suggests, 1940s-era liberal internation- like? alismexpanded the policy domain of liberal order. A denser and morecomplex sort of international environment was necessaryto allow governments tofulfill their roles and obli- The Crisis of Liberal gationsdomestically. The domesticliberal agenda had Internationalism2.0 expandedas well- and itrequired liberal states to be more Liberalinternationalism 1.0 ended in a crisisof failure. internationallyactive and committed. Indeed, the shift from Liberalinternationalism 2.0 is in crisistoday, but it is a liberalinternationalism 1.0 to 2.0 involveda shiftin what crisisof success. The Wilsonianvision of liberal order was constituted"national security." The depressionand New coherent- it simplydid notfit the realities of the time. It Deal broughtinto existence the notion of "social security" - was builton assumptionsthat did not hold. In contrast, butthe violence and destruction of world war brought into theliberal internationalism of the post- 1945 periodwas existencethe notion of "national security." Itwas more than highlyadapted to existingrealities. Ironically, its coher- justa newterm of art - it was a newand moreexpansive ence was less obvious,at leastat first.Indeed, unlike its internationalistnotion of security.27 In earlier decades, and Wilsonianpredecessor, liberal internationalism 2.0 was duringWorld War I, thenotion of "national security" did neverreally articulated in a singlestatement. Itwas cobbled

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions togetherin a protractedpolitical process. Its logic and Third,a moregradual shift in theglobal system is the operationemerged gradually from the shiftingimpera- unfoldinghuman rights and "responsibilityto protect" tives,negotiations, and adaptationsduring the early post- revolution.The resultis an erosionover the postwar war decades.Eventually, in the contextof a weakened decadesin normsof Westphalian sovereignty. The inter- Europeand threateningSoviet Union, the United States nationalcommunity is seenas havinga legitimateinter- founditself taking responsibility for organizing and oper- estin whatgoes on withincountries. This growing interest atingthe system - and theliberal hegemonic order took on thepart of the international community in thedomes- shape. tic governancepractices of statesis drivenby bothcon- But Americanliberal hegemony no longerappears to siderationsof humanrights and security.32The resultis be an adequate frameworkto supporta liberalinter- thatnorms of sovereigntyare seen as morecontingent. nationalorder. Shifts in theunderlying circumstances of This gradualerosion in normsof state sovereignty means worldpolitics are againforcing change in theorganizing thatthe international system has createda new "license" ideasand institutionsof the liberal project. The authority forpowerful states to intervenein thedomestic affairs of of the UnitedStates, its hegemonicbargains with other weak and troubledstates. Westphalian sovereignty has states,and therules and institutionsof liberalinternation- been in manyways over the past severalcenturies the alism2.0 areincreasingly contested.28 What has changed? singlemost universaland agreed-uponnorm of inter- First,most obviously, the end of theCold Waraltered nationalpolitics.33 It underliesinternational law, the thehegemonic logic. During the decades of bipolar com- UnitedNations, and the greathistorical movements of petition,the United States provided "system-function" ser- anti-colonialismand nationalself-determination. So when vicesas itbalanced against Soviet power. Under conditions thenorm weakens, it is not surprisingthat it has conse- of bipolaritythe United States was a globalsecurity pro- quences.But theerosion of statesovereignty norms have vider.American power was functionalfor system stability not been matchedby the riseof new normsand agree- and security,and it disciplinedand restrainedthe way mentsabout who the internationalcommunity should Washingtonexercised power. It made the UnitedStates make good on humanrights and the responsibilityto morewilling to undertakeglobal responsibilities, provide protect.Unresolved disagreements mount regarding the publicgoods, and supportand operatewithin a systemof standardsof legalityand legitimacythat attach to the rulesand institutions.Other countries received services actionsof powerfulstates acting on behalfof the inter- and benefitsfrom Americas bipolar global powerposi- nationalcommunity. tion.America needed allies and alliesneeded America. As a result,the erosionof normsof sovereigntyhas Thisprovided the basis for bargains - andit created incen- usheredin a newglobal struggle over the sources of author- tivesfor cooperation in areasoutside of national security. ityin theinternational community. This problemis made The endof the Cold Wardid noteliminate these security- worseby the rise of American unipolarity. Only the United drivenincentives for cooperation - -but it altered and weak- Statesreally has the military power to systematicallyengage enedthese incentives.29 in large-scaleuses of force around the world. The United Second, the rise of unipolarityhas made American Nationshas no troopsor militarycapacity of its own. powermore controversial and raisedthe levelof uncer- Whatprecisely is the"community ofstates" and who speaks taintyaround the world about thebargains and institu- forthem? The problemof establishinglegitimate inter- tionsof liberalorder. With the end of the Cold War, nationalauthority grows. Americasprimacy in theglobal distribution of capabili- Fourth,the sources of insecurity in worldpolitics have tiesbecame one of themost salient features of theinter- also evolvedsince the early decades of liberal internation- nationalsystem. No othermajor state has enjoyedsuch alism2.0. The threatto peaceis no longerprimarily from advantagesin materialcapabilities - military,economic, greatpowers engaged in security competition. Nuclear deter- technological,geographical. This unipolardistribution of rence,democratic peace, and the declinein gainsfrom - poweris historicallyunique, and it has usheredin a new conquest theseare key explanations for the persistence of set of dynamicsthat are stillworking their way through stablepeace amongthe majorstates over the past half - theorganization of worldpolitics.30 But the riseof uni- century thelongest era of great power peace in themod- polaritybrings with it a shiftin the underlyinglogic of ernera.34 The resulthas beena shiftin theways in which orderand rule in worldpolitics. In a bipolaror multi- violenceis manifest.In thepast only powerful states were polarsystem, powerful states "rule" in theprocess of lead- ableto gain access to violence capabilities that could threaten inga coalitionof statesin balancingagainst other states. othersocieties. Today it is possibleto see technologyand When the systemshifts to unipolarity,this logic of rule theglobalization of the world system creating opportuni- - disappears.Power is no longerbased on balancingor ties for non^-stateactors or transnationalgangs of - equilibrium,but on thepredominance of one state.This individuals to acquireweapons of massdestruction.35 is new and different- and potentiallythreatening to As a result,it is nowthe weakness of states and their inabil- weakerand secondarystate.31 ityto enforcelaws and orderwithin their own societies

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Articles | Americaand the Dilemmas of LiberalWorld Order thatprovide the mostworrisome dangers to the inter- liberalinternational order. Liberal internationalism 2.0 is nationalsystem. experiencinga crisisof authority- a crisisof rule and Fifth,the growth of the world economy and theincor- governanceas it has been provisionedover the postwar porationof newcountries into it has creatednew "stake- decadeswithin a liberalhegemonic framework. holders"and raisedquestions about participationand decisionmaking in global governance. In theearly decades, theAmerican liberal hegemonic order existed "inside" the Liberal InternationalOrder 3.0 largerbipolar global system. When theCold Warended, Liberalinternationalism 2.0 is in crisis,which means that the"inside" order became the "outside" order, that is, its thereare growing pressures and incentivesfor reform and logicwas extendedto thelarger global system. This is a reorganization.As in the past,the liberalinternational greattransformation in which globalization of theworld projectis evolving.The old American-ledliberal heg- economyand therise of developingstates have dramati- emonicorder is givingway to somethingnew. But what callyexpanded the geography and reach of the liberal inter- sortof new order?What will be the characterof liberal nationalorder. For the firsttime in the modernera, internationalism3.0? It is easierto identifythe pressures economicgrowth is bringingnon-Western countries such and incentivesfor change than to specifythe organiza- as Chinaand Indiainto the top ranks of the world system. tionallogic of a post-hegemonicliberal international order. Thesefast-growing developing countries are already becom- Butthree sets of issues are particularly important in shap- ing an internationaleconomic force. According to The ingwhat comes next. Economist,developing countries now produce half of the One set of issues concernsscope and hierarchy.A globalGNP. They hold most of the world s financialreserves reformedliberal international order will need to become and are placinghuge new demandson energyand raw moreuniversal and lesshierarchical - that is, theUnited materials.As FareedZakaria notes, "for the first time ever, Stateswill need to cede authorityand controlto a wider we arewitnessing genuinely global growth. This is creat- setof states and giveup someof its hegemonic rights and ingan internationalsystem in whichcountries in all parts privileges.But a "flatter"international order will also be ofthe world are no longerobjects or observersbut players one in whichthe United States plays a lesscentral role in - in theirown right."36 These are remarkable developments providingfunctional services generatingpublic goods, withpotentially far-reaching implications for power and stabilizingmarkets, and promotingcooperation. So the governancein worldpolitics.37 questionsare several. What is thelogic of a post-hegemonic The foundationupon whichliberal internationalism liberalorder - and is it viable?Can thesefunctional ser- 2.0 was builthas shifted.It is no longera systembuilt on vicesbe providedcollectively? Will the United States agree equilibriumor balanceamong the great powers. The uni- to relinquishthe specialrights and privilegesbuilt into polardistribution of powerand the riseof new powers liberalinternationalism 2.0. Of course,it is possiblefor and participantsin theglobal system have made theold moreincremental shifts away from liberal hegemony. The bargainsand institutionsless tenable.The buildingof a UnitedStates could continueto providefunctional ser- liberalinternational order was moresuccessful - and dur- vicesfor liberal order but do so in widerconcert with - ingthe Cold Warlargely unnoticed thananyone in the othermajor states?Liberal order can be endangeredif - 1940s reallyimaged was possible.But theerosion of the thereis too much hierarchy indeed hierarchyin its old normsof sovereignty, the spread of international norms extremeform is empire.But it might also be endangeredif of humanrights, and the riseof new sortsof threatsof thereis too littlehierarchy, as theWilsonian-era experi- collectiveviolence have generated problems with the func- mentin liberalorder revealed. tioningof thatliberal international order. A secondissue concerns legitimate authority and post- In a fundamentalsense there is an authoritycrisis in Westphaliansovereignty. A reformed liberal international todaysliberal order. The internationalcommunity is the orderwill need to findways to reconcilemore intrusive repositoryfor new humanrights and nationalsecurity rulesand institutions with legitimate international author- norms- butwho can legitimately act on itsbehalf? Amer- ity.The humanrights revolution makes the international icanleadership of the liberal international order was made communityincreasingly concerned with the internal work- acceptableto otherstates during the Cold Warbecause it ingsof states.So too does the new international-threat - was providingsecurity protection - and, overthe hori- environmenta situationwhere growing "security inter- zon,there were threats from Soviet communism. Ameri- dependence"is makingeach country'ssecurity increas- can authorityis now less securelyestablished - and the inglydependent on what goes on elsewhere,including American-centered,hierarchical character of thepostwar elsewhereinside of states. The internationalcommunity is internationalorder is moreproblematic. How to estab- goingto needcapacities and legitimateauthority to inter- lishlegitimate authority for concerted international action vene in weak and troubledstates.38 It is goingto need on behalfof the global community - and do so whenthe monitoring,surveillance, and inspection capacities to ensure old normsof order are eroding - is thegreat challenge to thatincreasingly lethal technologies of violence do notget

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions intothe hands of dangerous groups. These developments to risingand non-Westerncountries such as Japan,India, suggestthat the liberalinternational order will increas- Brazil,and SouthAfrica. Other bodies that would grow in inglyfind itself concerned with the internal governance of importancewould includethe G-20, which- unlikethe states.Unless globalization and theadvancement and dif- G-8- includesrepresentatives from both developed and fusionof technologyis reversed,it is almostinevitable emergingstates. The BrettonWoods institutions - the IMF thatthe erosion of Westphalian sovereignty will continue. and World Bank- would also expandand reapportion Nonetheless,finding consensus on thenorms of interven- rightsand membership. Countries such as Chinaand India - tionin a post-Westphalian world is deeplyproblematic wouldgain significant voting shares in thegovernance of yet shortof establishingsuch legitimateauthority, the theseinstitutions while the United States and Europe would internationalorder will continueto be troubledand see theirvoting shares contract. contested. Liberalinternational order 3.0 wouldalso see a further A thirdissue relates to democracyand theinternational erosionof norms of Westphalian sovereignty and thecon- ruleof law. Here the questionis: how do you build up tinuingrise in thenotion of a "responsibilityto protect." authorityand capacity at theinternational level - in inter- The idea thatthe international community had a right- nationalbodies and agreements- without jeopardizing and indeeda responsibility- to interveneinside of states popularrule and accountabilitybuilt into liberal demo- forhuman rights and securityreasons would be increas- craticstates? Can theauthority and capacityof theinter- inglyembraced world wide. But thismovement toward nationalcommunity to act be strengthenedwithout post-Westphaliannorms of sovereignty leaves unanswered sacrificingconstitutional democracy at home?This is a thequestion of which states - and internationalbodies - deep unresolvedproblem in the liberalinternational would acquirethe rightsand authorityto decidewhere project.39Liberals anticipate a growingrole for the "inter- and howto act.Who willspeak for the international com- nationalcommunity" in thefunctioning of the global sys- munityon questionsof theresponsibility to protect? It is tem.The postwarera itselfhas seena radicalincrease in difficultto see a liberalinternationalism 3.0 thathas set- thenorms and cooperativeefforts launched on behalfof tledthis question. The logicalmove would be to turnto theinternational community. The humanrights revolu- theauthority of a reformedUnited Nations Security Coun- tion and the riseof internationalnorms of "deviance" cil. But if the recentpast is a guide,the abilityof the carrywith them expectations that the outside world will SecurityCouncil to actuallyreach agreement and sanc- actwhen governments fail to actproperly.40 The growing tion the use of forceis highlyproblematic.41 Other less interdependenceof statesalso createsrising demands for universalbodies - suchas NATO ora proposedLeague or - governancenorms and institutions. But how do yousquare Concertof democracies mayprovide alternative sources thedomestic and internationalliberal visions? of authorityfor intervention but thelegitimacy of these Out ofthese tensions and dilemmas,the next phase of bodiesis onlypartial and contested.42Liberal internation- theliberal international project will be shaped.There are alism3.0 mightsolve this problem by fosteringgreater at leastthree pathways away from liberal internationalism agreementamong the Security Council permanent mem- 2.0. Each pathwayinvolves a differentmix in the way ber statesover the rightsand obligationsof the inter- sovereignty,rules, institutions, and authorityare arrayed. nationalcommunity to act. More likely,questions about The firstpossibility is liberalinternationalism 3.0. This interventionand the use of forcewill remaincontested. wouldbe a far-reachingreworking of the American liberal Regionalbodies and non-universalgroupings of like- hegemonicorder. This would be an orderin whichthe mindedstates will continue to offeralternative sources of UnitedStates exercised less command and controlof the authorityon thesequestions. rulesand institutions.Americas special rights and privi- Beyondquestions of humanitarianintervention and legeswould contract as otherstates gained more weight "responsibilityto protect," security threats coming from and authorityat thehigh table of global governance. The the potentialdiffusion of violencetechnologies into the "private"governance that the United Statesprovided handsof terrorist groups will continue to generateincen- throughNATO and itsdominance of multilateral institu- tivesfor more intrusive international arms control and tionswould give way to more"public" rules and institu- counter-proliferationcapacities. The InternationalAtomic tionsof governance.At thesame time, the intrusiveness EnergyAgency is theleading organization edge of these and reachof liberal order would also continueto expand, internationalefforts. In thelast two decades, the IAEA hás placingdemands on governanceinstitutions to forgecon- developedscientific and technicalcompetence and legal sensualand legitimateforms of collectiveaction. frameworksfor monitoring and inspections of nuclear pro- In this3.0 liberalorder, authority would move toward gramsaround the world. As nuclear,biological, and chem- universalinstitutions - or at leastto internationalbodies ical weaponstechnologies grow more sophisticated and that includedwider global membership.These would diffuseinto troubled parts of the world, governments will includea reformedUnited Nations- witha reorganized no doubtseek to expandIAEA-type capacities for moni- SecurityCouncil that expanded permanent membership toring,inspection, verification, and safeguarding. Pressures

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Articles | Americaand the Dilemmas of LiberalWorld Order will growfor norms of Westphaliansovereignty to con- it wouldbe a governancesystem that did a greatdeal of tinueto incrementallygive way to intrusiveinternational work.The policydomains in whichstates would cooper- securityregimes.43 atewould be expansive- indeedeven more so thanliberal The hierarchicalcharacter of liberalinternationalism internationalism2.0. The breadthand depthof therules 3.0 will change.It will,generally speaking, be "flatter" and institutionsof liberalorder would continue to grow. - buthierarchy will remain, it simply will not be American- But as a non-hegemonicorder, the actual functioning of dominatedhierarchy. The hierarchyof a post-hegemonic the systemwould look a lot likeWilsonian-style liberal liberalorder will be foundin the expandedgrouping of internationalism.It would be a universalorder that is less leadingstates that will occupy positions in theUN Secu- tied to the UnitedStates or theWest. But also likethe rityCouncil, the BrettonWoods institutions,and other Wilsonianversion, it would be an orderin whichcooper- lessformal international bodies. It is thisgroup of states ationdepended upon sharednorms that fostered collec- - thatwill collectivelyprovide the variousfunctional ser- tiveaction. It remainsa questionwhether the norms or vicespreviously provided by the United States - providing ideologyof liberalorder - are sufficientlycoherent and security,uphold open markets, and so forth.In someways, widely-enoughembraced to make thispost-hegemonic thecharacter of hierarchy will look similar to theRoosevel- orderfunction effectively over the long haul. tianvision in liberalinternationalism 1.5. A groupingof A secondpathway is alsopossible in which liberal inter- leadingstates will claim authority and institutionalposi- nationalism2.0 is lessfully transformed - this would be tionsto overseethe stability and peace of theglobal sys- liberalinternationalism 2.5. In thisadaptation, the United tem.But in liberalinternationalism 3.0 theirleadership Stateswould renegotiate the bargains and institutionsof responsibilitieswill multiplyto includea widerarray of thepast decades but retain its position as hegemonicleader. security,economic, and politicalgovernance duties. In somesense, this is whatis alreadyhappening today. The characterof the rule of law will also evolve.In In thisreformed liberal hegemonic order, the United States someareas, such as tradeand investment,the rule-based wouldcontinue to provide functional services for the wider characterof the orderwill continue.Indeed, the World system- and in return,other countries would acquiesce TradeOrganization is alreadya liberalinternationalism in thehierarchical rules and institutionspresided over by 3.0 typeof global system of rules. The UnitedStates does Washington.The orderwould remain hierarchical but the not have specialrights or privilegesunder international termsof hierarchy- the bargainsand rules- would be tradelaw. The leadingtrade states do exercisepower in alteredin ways that are mutually acceptable to states within variousways - owingto their market size and overall stand- theorder. ingin theinternational order. But the norms of trade law In this2.5 order,the United States would give up some arefundamentally based on notionsof equalityand reci- ofits hegemonic rights and privilegesbut retain others. In procity.All contractingparties have access to opt out and economicand politicalrealms, it would yieldauthority escapeclause rights. Mechanisms exist for dispute resolu- and accommodaterising states. The UnitedStates would tion.44In areaswhere economic interdependence gener- shareauthority within the reformed Bretton Woods insti- atesincentives for states to coordinateand harmonize their tutions.In securityrealms, however, the UnitedStates policies,rule-based order should increase. But in other wouldretain its hegemonic position. It wouldoffer secu- areaswhere states resist legal-institutional forms of coop- rityto otherstates in a world-widesystem of alliances. eration,less formalnetworks of cooperationwill likely The Americaneconomy would remain a leadingsource of grow.45Such network-stylecooperation allows states to marketsand growth - evenif its relative size declined. The circumventpolitically difficult or costlyformal, treaty- UnitedStates would remainpositioned to supportand basedcommitments. Network cooperation will appear par- upholdthe renegotiated rules and institutionsof thelib- ticularlyattractive to theUnited States as itloses its power eralorder. advantagesand rightsand privilegesunder liberal interna- In some respects,the Bush administrationsought to tionalism2.0. The UnitedStates will find itself forced to save theAmerican hegemonic order by renegotiatingits giveup itshegemonic ability to fostercooperation on its bargains.Its envisionedthe United States as theunipolar ownterms. It was able to dominaterules and institutions providerof global security, upholding an internationalorder and throughweighted voting and opt out agreements,it offree and democraticstates.47 In thisversion, the United was able to reduceits exposureto sovereignty-reducingStates would providefunctional services to theworld - commitments.In a post-hegemonicposition, the United but in returnthe United States would ask fornew rights Stateswill findinformal and network-orientedagree- and privileges.It wouldremain aloof from various realms mentsas a tolerablesubstitute that allows it to gain the of rule-basedorder. It would not join the International benefitsof cooperationwithout offering up formal-legal CriminalCourt and othersovereignty-restraining treaties restrictionson itssovereign independence. and internationalagreements. It was a new hegemonic Liberalinternationalism 3.0 woulddraw on thelogics bargain.The UnitedStates would providesecurity and ofboth its predecessors. Like the post- 1945 liberalorder, stableorder, but it would receivespecial dispensation to

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions remainunattached to themultilateral, rule-based system. nershipswith key allies that remain tied to American secu- In theend, this was a bargainthat the rest of the world did rityprovision. not accept.48The questionis whethera differentset of A secondvariable is thedegree to which Americas secu- bargainsmight be acceptable,bargains where the United ritycapacities can be leveragedinto wider economic and - Statesdoes provide functional services particularlysecu- politicalagreements. The UnitedStates has extraordinary - rityprotection butalso agreesto operatewithin a rene- advantagesin militarypower. Its expenditures on military gotiatedsystem of rules and institutions.The Bush capacityare equal to therest of theworld s expenditures administrationtried to use Americasunrivaled military combined.It operatesa world-widesystem of alliances capabilitiesto reduceits exposure to rule-basedorder. Is it and securitypartnerships. It "commandsthe commons" possiblefor the United States to increaseits exposure to in thatit alone has the power to projectforce in all regions rule-basedorder as a way to retainaspects of authority ofthe world. This situation will not change anytime soon, and privilegewithin a renegotiatedhegemonic order? If evenwith the rapid economic growth of countries such as so, thiswould be liberalorder 2.5. Chinaand India.The questionis, to whatextent do these A finalpossibility is a breakdownof liberalinter- advantagesand disparitiesin militarycapabilities translate nationalorder. This would occur if the orderwere to intobargaining power over the wider array of global rules becomesignificantly less open and rule-based.The system and institutions.If the answeris verylittle, the United of open, multilateraltrade could collapseushering in a Stateswill increasinglyneed to reconcileitself to a 3.0 1930s-styleworld of mercantilism, regional blocs, and bilat- world.But if othercountries do in factvalue security eralpacts. The politicaland securityrules and institutions protection,this gives the United States more opportuni- of liberalinternationalism 2.0 could also fragmentinto tiesto negotiatea modifiedhegemonic system. competinggeopolitical blocs. Such a breakdowndoes not A thirdvariable is thedegree of divergenceamong the necessarilyneed to entaila completecollapse of order - it leadingstates in theirvisions of global governance. Europe simplymeans there is an endto itsopen, rule-based, multi- is clearlymore interested in movingto a worldof liberal lateralcharacter. The Americanhegemonic order could internationalism3.0 than the Chinese- at leastto the simplyyield to an internationalsystem where several lead- extentthat this entails further reductions in Westphalian ing statesor centersof power- forexample, China, the sovereignty.But the question reallyis whethernon- UnitedStates, and theEuropean Union - establishtheir Westerncountries such as China and India will seekto owneconomic and security spheres. The globalorder would use theirrising power to usherin a substantiallydifferent becomea less unifiedand coherentsystem of rulesand sortof international order. One possibilityis thatthey are institutions,while regional orders emerge as relativelydis- not as inclinedto embracethe open, rule-based logic of tinct,divided, and competitivegeopolitical spheres.49 liberalinternationalism - whether it is 1.0, 2.0, or 3.O.50 Thereare several factors - orvariables - thatwill shape But anotherpossibility is thatthey actually see thattheir thepathway away from liberal internationalism 2.0. One interestsare well servedwithin a liberalinternational is theactual willingness of the United States to cede author- order.51If thissecond possibility is thecase, the character ityback to theinternational community and accommo- ofthe negotiations on movementaway from liberal inter- dateitself to a systemof more binding rules and institutions. nationalism2.0 willbe morefocused on participationand Shortof a radicalshift in theinternational distribution of thesharing of authority - and less on shiftsin thesubstan- power,the UnitedStates will remainthe worlds most tivecharacter of liberalorder. powerfulstate for several decades to come. So thereis reasonto thinkthat other countries would be willingto see the UnitedStates play a leadingrole - and provide Conclusion functionalservices - ifthe terms are right.Under almost The liberalinternational project has evolvedover the last anycircumstances, these terms would entaila reduction century- and itappears to be evolvingagain today. In the in Americashegemonic rights and privilegeswhile oper- past, shiftsin the logic and characterof liberalinter- atingwithin agreed-upon rules and institutions. The United nationalorder came in the aftermathof war and eco- Statesmight also come to believethat this renegotiated nomicupheaval. In contrast,the current troubles that beset hegemonicarrangement is better than any of the alterna- American-ledliberal internationalism are not manifesting tives.So thequestion is, could theUnited States in fact in the breakdownof the old order.The crisisof liberal makethe political commitments implicit in thisrenego- internationalism2.0 is a crisisof authority.It is a crisis tiatedliberal international order? If thereis uncertainty overthe way liberal international order is governed.It is whetherthe United States can makecompromises neces- a crisisthat is generatingpressures and incentivesfor a saryto moveto liberalinternationalism 2.5, thereis even reorganizationin theway sovereignty, rules, institutions, moreuncertainty about whether it can reconcileitself to hierarchy,and authorityare arrayedin the international liberalorder 3.0. It might,in. the end, opt fora more system.The Americanhegemonic organization of liberal fragmentedsystem in whichit buildsmore selective part- orderno longerappears to offera solidfoundation for the

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Articles | Americaand the Dilemmasof LiberalWorld Order maintenanceof an openand rule-basedliberal order. The nationalinstitutions, see Keohane1984; and liberalproject itself has partly brought us to thisimpasse - Krasner1981. On thefragmented and complex its successhas helpedstrip away the old foundationsof natureof powerand interdependence,see Keohane theorder. and Nye 1977. On domesticpreferences and foreign What comesafter liberal internationalism 2.0? In the policy,see Moravcsik1997. On transgovernmental- absenceof war or economiccalamity, the old liberalorder ismand networks,see Slaughter2004. On themod- is notlikely to completelybreakdown or disappear.As in ernizationtheory underpinnings of theliberal thepast, liberal international order will evolve. The char- tradition,see Morse1976 and Rosenau1991. acterof governancewill shiftwith changes in the way 4 On thedimensions of sovereignty, see Krasner1999. statesshare and exercisepower and authority.Precisely 5 Fordiscussions of hierarchy in internationalrela- becausethe crisisof liberalorder is a crisisof success, tionsas definedin termsof rightsand authority leadingand risingstates in thesystem are not seekingto relationships,see Lake 2003; and Hobson and Shar- overturnthe basic logic of liberalinternationalism as a man2005. systemof open and rule-basedorder. Rather, the pressures 6 See Goldstein,Kahler, Keohane, and Slaughter2001. and incentivesare for change in theway roles and respon- 7 Forarguments about why and howpowerful states sibilitiesare allocated in thesystem. buildinternational order, liberal or otherwise,see The way in whichliberal order evolves will hingein Gilpin,1981; Organski,1958; Ikenberry2001; and importantrespects on theUnited States - and itswilling- Legro2007. nessand abilityto makenew commitmentsto rulesand 8 Wilson,War Message to Congress,April 2, 1917. institutionswhile simultaneously reducing its rights and 9 I thankThomas Knock for discussions that clarified privilegeswithin the order.The UnitedStates is deeply thesepoints. ambivalentabout making institutional commitments and 10 Wilson,Speech to theLeague to EnforcePeace, May bindingitself to otherstates - ambivalenceand hesitation 27, 1916. thathas been exacerbatedby the end of the Cold War, 11 Ambrosius2002,130. Americanunipolarity, and new securitythreats. But the 12 WoodrowWilson, Address to theSenate, January UnitedStates still possesses profound incentives to build 22, 1917. andoperate within a liberalrule-based order. Just as impor- 13 Knock1992, 8. tantly,that order is nownot simply an extensionof Amer- 14 See Keynes1920. icanpower and interests- it has taken on a lifeof its own. 15 Quoted in Ambrosius2002, 52. Americanpower may riseor falland its foreignpolicy 16 See Ninkovich1999, ch. 3. ideologymay wax and wane between multilateral and impe- 17 Kimball1994, 17. See also Divine 1971,and Dallek rialimpulses- - but the wider and deeper liberal global order 1979. is nowa realitythat America itself must accommodate to. 18 This shiftwas froma logicof collective security to a logicof cooperative security. For the classic discus- sionof collectivesecurity, see Claude 1962, ch. 2. Notes 19 Viner1942, 168. 1 Internationalorder refers to thesettled arrangements 20 This is theargument I makeabout the Bretton betweenstates that define the terms of theirinter- Woodsagreements. See Ikenberry,in Goldsteinand action.Liberal international order refers to inter- Keohane1993. A similarlogic holds for the human nationalorder that is open and rule-based.As noted, rightsregimes in postwarEurope, in whichcountries themore specific features of liberal international employedinternational commitments to consolidate - order in particularthe character and locationof democracy- "lockingin" thedomestic political sovereigntyand politicalauthority - can varywidely statusquo againsttheir nondemocratic opponents. withinliberal orders. See Moravcsik2000. 2 Forsurveys of liberal international theory, see Doyle 21 See Press-Barnathan2003. 1997; Russettand Oneal 2001; Deudneyand Iken- 22 See Ikenberry2001. berry1999; and Keohane,in JohnDunn 1990. 23 Foran importantstudy of theseevolving views, see 3 No singlemodern theorist captures the whole of Murphy1994. liberalinternational theory, but a varietyof theorists 24 NSC-68 as publishedin May 1993,40. provideaspects. On thedemocratic peace, see Doyle 25 See Ikenberry2001, ch. 6. 1983. On securitycommunities, see Adlerand 26 JohnRuggie surveys these "exemptionalist" tenden- Barnett1998; and Deutsch,Burrell, and Kann ciesin Americanforeign policy in "AmericanExcep- 1957. On theinterrelationship of domestic and tionalism,Exemptionalism, and Global internationalpolitics, see Rosenau1969. On func- Governance,"in Ruggie2004. Fora sympathetic tionalintegration theory, see Haas 1964. On inter- portrayal,see Kagan2002.

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This content downloaded from 128.112.43.47 on Thu, 22 Oct 2015 14:30:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 27 See Borgwardt2005. 47 The beststatement of thisvision is PresidentGeorge 28 Fordiscussions of thedilemmas and troubledchar- W. Bushsspeech at the2002 WestPoint acterof liberal internationalism, see Hoffmann commencement. 1998, Hurrell2007, Bernsteinand Pauly2007. 48 Forcritiques of theBush doctrine, see Daalderand 29 See Ikenberryin Lefflerand Westadforthcoming, Lindsay2003; and Shapiro2008. vol.3. 49 The fragmentedorder might have characteristics 30 On thecharacter and consequencesof unipolarity, similarto theAmerican airlines industry in which see Ikenberry,Mastanduno, and Wohlforth2009. themajor power centers (airline) have their own 31 Ikenberry2006. distinctand competinghub and spokesystems. See 32 Fora surveyof the shifting norms of state sovereignty, Aaltola2005. seeHaass 2003. The emergingdoctrine of the "respon- 50 See Leonard2008; and Khanna2008. sibilityof protect" is themost systematic notion 511 makethis argument in Ikenberry2008. thatcaptures the changing terms of sovereignty and interventionism.See The Responsibility toProtect, a report ofthe International Commission on Intervention References and StateSovereignty 2001, and Evans2008. Aaltola,Mika. 2005. The internationalairport: The 33 StephenKrasner argues that Westphalian norms hub-and-spokepedagogy of theAmerican empire. havebeen consistently and continuallyviolated by GlobalNetwork 5 (3): 261-78. greatpowers over the centuries, and honoredpri- Adler,Emanuel, and MichaelBarnett, eds. 1998. Secu- marilyin thebreach. See Krasner1999. The argu- rityCommunities. New York:Cambridge University menthere is notthat violations of statesovereignty Press. haveincreased, a propositionthat would be difficult Ambrosius,Lloyd E. 2002. Wilsonianism:Woodrow to measure.But thatthe norms of statesovereignty Wilsonand His Legacyin American Foreign Relations. haveeroded as a definingfeature of theliberal inter- New York:Palgrave. nationalorder. Bernstein,Steven, and LouisW. Pauly,eds. 2007. Global 34 See Jervis2002. Liberalismand PoliticalOrder: Toward a New Grand 35 See Keohanein Calhoun,Price, and A Timmer2002. Compromise.Albany: State University of New York 36 Zakaria2008, 3. Press. 37 Ikenberrvand Wright2007. Borgwardt,Elizabeth. 2005. A NewDeal forthe World: 38 Fordiscussions of post- Westphalian forms of inter- AmericasVision for Human Rights. Cambridge, MA: nationalsupervision and managementof weak or HarvardUniversity Press. collapsedstates, see Krasner2005; Fearonand Cirincione,Joseph, Jon B. Wolfshal,and MiriamRajk- Laitin,2004; and Keohanein Holzgrefeand Keo- mar.2005. DeadlyArsenals: Nuclear, Biologiealand hane2003. See also Ferguson2004. ChemicalThreats. Washington, DC: CarnegieEndow- 39 On accountabilityof internationalinstitutions, see mentfor International Peace. Grantand Keohane2005 and Keohaneand Nye in Claude,Inis L. 1962. Powerand InternationalRelations. Kahlerand Lake 2003. New York:Random House. 40 On theevolving norms of deviance in inter- . 1966. Collectivelegitimation as a politicalfunc- nationalrelations, see Nincic2007. tionof theUnited Nations. International Organiza- 41 Thereis a largeliterature that explores the problems tion20 (3): 367-79. oflegitimacy and theuse offorce. For the classic Daalder,Ivo, and JamesLindsay. 2003. AmericaUn- explorationof theseissues, see Claude 1966. bound:The Bush Revolution in ForeignPolicy. Wash- 42 Severalproposals for a newgrouping of democracies ington,DC: The BrookingsInstitution Press. havebeen advanced. See Ikenberryand Slaughter, . 2007. Democraciesof theworld, unite: The 2006; and Daalderand Lindsay2007. debatecontinues. The American Interest! (4): 43 Fordiscussions of theevolving technical and legal 137-39. frameworksfor arms control monitoring and en- Dallek,Robert. 1979. FranklinRoosevelt and American forcement,see Cirincione,Wolfshal, and Rajkmar, ForeignPolicy, 1932-1945. Oxford:Oxford Univer- 2005, and Kessler1995. sityPress. 44 On therule-based character of theWorld Trade Deudney,Daniel, and G. JohnIkenberry. 1999. The Organization,see Lloyd2001. natureand sourcesof liberal international order. 45 The leadingstudy of network-basedinternational Reviewof International Studies 25: 179-96. cooperationis Slaughter2004. See also Slaughter,in Deutsch,Karl, Sidney A. Burrell,and RobertA. Kann. Byers,ed. 2001. 1957. PoliticalCommunity and theNorth Atlantic 46 See Drezner2007. Area.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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