Employment of Pacific Islanders Aboard Foreign Fishing Vessels

R.D Gillet and M.A McCoy April 1997

FFA Report 97/11

PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY P.O.BOX 629 HONIARA SOLOMON ISLANDS TELEPHONE (677) 21124 FAX (677) 23995 WEB http://www.ffa.int Table of Contents

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND MAJOR FINDINGS...... 3

2.0 INTRODUCTION ...... 8

3.0 THE PRESENT SITUATION...... 9

3.1 EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL ...... 9 3.2 PRESENT NUMBER OF PACIFIC ISLAND CREW ON FOREIGN FISHING VESSELS ...... 12 3.3 PRESENT IMPORTANCE OF EMPLOYMENT ON FOREIGN VESSELS IN PACIFIC ISLAND ECONOMIES...... 14 4.0 OVERVIEW OF THE FISHERIES AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE DISTANT WATER FISHING NATIONS ...... 15

4.1 UNITED STATES OVERVIEW ...... 15 4.1.1 Offshore and Distant Water Fisheries ...... 15 4.1.2 Labour Situation ...... 17 4.1.3 Legal and Institutional Considerations ...... 18 4.1.4 Training Programmes...... 20 4.2 JAPAN OVERVIEW ...... 20 4.2.1 Offshore and Distant Water Fisheries ...... 20 4.2.2 Labour Situation ...... 23 4.2.3 Foreign Crew...... 24 4.2.4 Institutional and Legal Considerations ...... 24 4.2.5 Training Programmes...... 27 4.2.6 Miscellaneous Considerations...... 29 4.3 KOREA OVERVIEW...... 29 4.3.1 Distant Water Fisheries...... 29 4.3.2 Labour Situation ...... 32 4.3.3 Foreign Crew...... 32 4.3.4 Legal and Institutional Considerations ...... 32 4.3.5 Training Programs ...... 34 4.4 TAIWAN OVERVIEW...... 34 4.4.1 Offshore and Distant Water Fisheries ...... 34 4.4.2 Economy and Recent Economic Trends...... 35 4.4.3 Labour Situation ...... 36 4.4.4 Domestic Labor Situation in Fisheries ...... 36 4.4.5 Foreign Crew...... 37 4.4.6 Legal and Institutional Considerations ...... 38 4.4.7 Crew Health and Welfare Issues ...... 39 4.4.8 Training Programs ...... 39 4.5 CHINA OVERVIEW...... 40 4.5.1 Distant Water Fisheries...... 40 4.5.2 Labour Situation ...... 41 4.5.3 Foreign Crew...... 42 4.5.4 Legal and Institutional Considerations ...... 42 4.5.5 Training Programmes...... 43 5.0 OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT ON THE FOREIGN FLEETS ...... 43

5.1 UNITED STATES PURSE SEINE FLEET ...... 43 5.2 JAPANESE PURSE SEINE FLEET...... 46 5.3 KOREAN PURSE SEINE FLEET...... 49 5.4 TAIWAN PURSE SEINE FLEET ...... 51 5.5 JAPANESE LONGLINE FLEET...... 53 5.6 KOREAN LONGLINE FLEET...... 55 5.7 TAIWANESE LONGLINE FLEET...... 58 5.8 CHINESE LONGLINE FLEET...... 62 5.9 JAPANESE POLE/LINE FLEET ...... 63 2

5.10 UNITED STATES TROLL FLEET ...... 65 6.0 PERCEPTIONS OF PACIFIC ISLAND CREW ...... 66

6.1 US VESSEL OPERATORS ...... 66 6.1.1 General Perceptions ...... 66 6.1.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet...... 67 6.2 JAPANESE VESSEL OPERATORS...... 68 6.2.1 General Perceptions ...... 68 6.2.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet...... 69 6.3 KOREAN VESSELS...... 69 6.3.1 General Perceptions ...... 69 6.3.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet...... 69 6.4 TAIWANESE VESSELS ...... 70 6.4.1 General Perceptions ...... 70 6.4.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet...... 71 6.5 CHINESE VESSELS ...... 71 7.0 PERCEPTIONS OF PACIFIC ISLANDERS REGARDING EMPLOYMENT ABOARD FOREIGN FISHING VESSELS...... 72

8.0 SPECIFIC ISSUES...... 72

8.1 TRAINING...... 72 8.1.1 Description of the Training Institutes...... 73 8.1.2 Comments on the Fisheries Training Institutes ...... 74 8.2 REGIONAL STANDARDS ...... 76 8.3 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS...... 76 8.4 THE ASIAN CREWS ...... 80 8.5 MANNING AGENCIES ...... 81 8.6 RELEVANCY OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ...... 84 9.0 FUTURE DEMAND FOR PACIFIC ISLAND CREW ...... 85

9.1 CHANGES IN THE FLEETS ...... 85 9.2 COMPETITION WITH THE ASIAN CREWS ...... 88 9.3 EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS OF ACCESS AGREEMENTS ...... 89 9.4 LIKELY FUTURE DEMAND...... 90 10.0 CONCLUSIONS ON MEASURES FOR INCREASING PACIFIC ISLAND CREW ON FOREIGN FISHING VESSELS...... 90

10.1 US PURSE SEINE FLEET ...... 90 10.2 THE ASIAN FLEETS ...... 92 10.2.1 Employment Requirements Placed on the Asian Fleets...... 92 10.2.3 Facilitation of Employment on the Asian Fleets...... 94 10.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON MEASURES TO INCREASE PACIFIC ISLANDER EMPLOYMENT...... 95 10.4 SUMMARY OF MEASURES FOR INCREASING PACIFIC ISLAND CREW ON FOREIGN FISHING VESSELS...... 95 11.0 REFERENCES ...... 96

APPENDIX 1: NOTES ON STACKING NET ...... 99

APPENDIX 2: THE LONGLINE OPERATION AND SKILLS REQUIRED...... 101

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1.0 Executive Summary of Issues and Major Findings

Number of jobs on It is estimated that the total number of people now working on all the foreign fishing vessels foreign fishing vessels in the Pacific Islands area is at least 21,000. in the region Considering the realities of the situation, the number of job opportunities for Pacific Islanders is far less than this figure. Present number of There are about 1200 men from the region working on the 10 major Pacific Island crew on fleets. The major employers are Japan (about 30% of the foreign fishing vessels employment), Korea (24%), United States (15%), and Taiwan (13%). In early 1997 the major Pacific Island providers of crew were Fiji (about 340 men on foreign vessels), Kiribati (226), Solomon Islands (138), Vanuatu (133), and FSM (120). The present importance of such employment is not great, about .3% of all formal employment in the region. On a national basis, crewing on foreign fishing vessels is most important to Kiribati where it represent 2% of all jobs. Conditions in the The major fleets traditionally operating in the Pacific Islands region Distant Water Fishing are both experiencing problems in attracting nationals of the flag Nations which affect states to work on the vessel and attempting to reduce operating Pacific Island costs by recruiting crew from low wage countries. For some of the employment fleets, employment of Pacific Islanders may be a mechanism to facilitate access. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have legal limits to the amount of foreign crew that can be carried on board their fishing vessels, but these regulation are being progressively relaxed. The US has no such limits out their EEZ, but they and the Asian countries prohibit foreigners from becoming officers. Japan has training programmes for Kiribati and FSM crew, as well as for crew from Indonesia. It appears that none of the other fleets have such training programs targeting Pacific Island crew Role of foreign Foreign governments determine the labour and manning laws on governments their flag vessels, which in some cases can affect how commercial operators attract, recruit, and employ foreign fishermen. However flag-state governments generally are not directly involved in any of these processes, preferring to let commercial fishing interests act in ways they perceive to be best for the particular enterprise or industry concerned. Working and living Of the fleets that presently employ Pacific Islanders, the living and conditions on the working conditions are undoubtedly best on the US seiners, followed major fleets by the Japanese and Korean seiners. There is the general consensus among former crew that of all fleets on which Pacific Islanders have worked, Taiwanese longliners have the worst conditions. Indications are that conditions may be worse on the 300 Chinese longliners operating in the region, however Pacific Islanders have not been employed on that fleet. The regular and organised nature of Japanese employment is appreciated by the crew. In general, the work on seiners requires specialised skills and crew 4

pay is related to the jobs performed and experience. Longline work requires less skill and the tasks tend to be repetitive in nature. Characteristically, deck crew earnings on most longline fleets are not closely related to skills/experience. Direct comparison of wages of the different fleets is complicated by the various bonus systems employed. The lowest wage paid for deck crew appears to be on Taiwanese albacore longliners ($214 monthly for all crew regardless of experience), but the bonus from shark fin sales can add substantially to this amount. The upper limit for unspecified deck crew on purse seiners appears to be almost ten times as large. Recruitment The operators of US seiners have a preference for personally meeting and scrutinising prospective deck crew prior to recruitment. Therefore almost all the Pacific Islanders presently in the fleet have obtained their employment while in a seiner port, mainly Pago Pago. The vessel officers are likely to be involved in the recruitment process. Most of the Pacific Islanders on Japanese vessels have obtained their work through more official channels. Some form of formal training is usually a prerequisite and employment of certain nationalities is often linked to other concerns. The Koreans and Taiwanese most often resort to commercial manning agencies to obtain their crew and ships’ officers are not usually involved in the recruitment process. Vessel operators’ Eighty-eight Pacific Islanders are now working in the US purse seine perceptions of Pacific fleet and many are quite highly regarded by their employers. In Island crew general, Pacific Islanders get along well with the other crew and while at sea there is no major difference between their work ethic and that of the other nationalities in the deck crew. US vessel operators perceive that the major deterrents preventing them from hiring more Pacific Islanders are the difficulty of identifying and recruiting suitable crew, their low skill level, a high attrition rate of recruited crew, and the availability of an alternative source of labour with equal or superior qualifications (Filipino crew). The operators of Japanese purse seiners and small longliners interact chiefly with the men from FSM; while Japanese experience with Pacific Islanders on pole/line vessels and large longliners is mainly with Kiribati crew. Purse seine operators initially had a poor opinion of men from FSM, but the perception improved considerably after measures were taken by Japanese and FSM officials. The small Okinawan longline vessels based in Palau, Guam, and FSM carry very few Pacific Islanders. According to Japanese managers in Pohnpei, the men from FSM lack the work ethic that longlining requires. The Japanese operators of pole/line vessels and distant- water longliners appear relatively satisfied with their Kiribati crew. Because of the apparent policy in the Korean fleet of having deck crew from several countries to prevent solidarity, Pacific Islanders are viewed as being beneficial because they are non-Asian. Another positive perception is that a large body size enables them 5

to do work that the Asians are incapable of doing. On the other hand, there is the belief that men from the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji will quit the vessel at the end of each trip. There have been numerous problems with heavy drinking and alcohol- related violence. On the smaller Taiwanese sashimi longliners that predominate north of the equator the operators feel that the available Pacific Island labour is not willing or able to withstand the rigours of longliner employment. For the operators of larger Taiwanese longliners, there appears to be a tendency (as with the Koreans) to hire deck crews of several nationalities and hence Pacific Islanders would be desirable because they are different. Many operators admire their work ethic aboard. Perceived disadvantages of Pacific Islanders are alcohol-related fighting in port, expense in hiring them for some fisheries outside the region, and difficulty in communicating with the ship’s officers. Perceptions of Pacific Insight into the perceptions of Pacific Island crew can be obtained Islanders of by considering indicators of job satisfaction. From existing employment on employment levels, contract renewals, and the relation between the foreign fleets supply of crew and demand, certain features at the national level become apparent. In general, crew from the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, and Kiribati are willing to work in all the fleets that are presently hiring Pacific Islanders and there are more men who want to work than jobs available. Men from former US affiliated countries and Western Samoa appear unwilling to accept longliner employment on vessels of any nationality but do work on US and (if the option is available) Japanese purse seine vessels where the salary is greater and working/living conditions are better. Training and fisheries The opinion of deck crew training by the various foreign fleets in the training institutes region varies greatly. At one end of the spectrum, the managers of the Japanese distant water fleets believe that formal training (including Japanese language) is essential. At the other end, many operators of Taiwanese longliners feel that, because all the work aboard is simple, training institutes and the skills they teach are worthless. In examining the expressed views of industry and the performance of the various training institutes in the region, certain desirable features emerge. Ideally, the managers of fisheries training institutes charged with training men for work on foreign fishing vessels will know of the available employment opportunities, target specific fleets, seek industry input in curriculum design/teaching, carefully select only those trainees who strongly desire employment on foreign vessels and are aware/willing to make the required sacrifices, set high standards for graduation, be involved in post graduate activities such as job placement and follow up surveys. Regional standard If the objective of the proposed regional qualification is to promote qualifications additional employment, careful attention must be given to the negative views expressed by individuals in the various fleets responsible for recruitment who are supposed to be favourably impressed by such a credential. In addition, the question of the cost 6

of implementing such a regional standard much be considered.

Crew contracts Judging from the information acquired during the present study, it appears as though there is substantial need and justification for contract standardisation work. While such efforts are likely to result in considerable benefits for Pacific Island crew, the complexity of such a task should not be underestimated. As with regional standard qualifications, consideration should be given to commercial realities, employers’ needs, as well as the potential for any contract demands to result in a reduced number of Pacific Islanders employed. It is suggested that the drafting of any standard contract be a tripartite effort, with input from a legal adviser with extensive experienced in commercial practices and labour issues, a fisheries specialist with a thorough knowledge of the foreign fleets, and a labour officer familiar with Pacific Island crew affairs. It also would be essential to have comprehensive information from each flag state on the laws governing labour aboard their vessels. Competition with the It is estimated that on the foreign fleets operating in the waters of Asian crews the Pacific Islands region there are at least ten times more deck crew from China, Indonesia, and the Philippines than Pacific Islanders. It appears that for the foreseeable future, the main factor constraining the level of Pacific Island employment on the foreign fleets of the region will be competition in varying degrees with these nationalities. It can be generalised that Asian crew, including the Chinese, are probably not preferred over crew from the South Pacific on the basis of nominal cost. It seems that preference for deck crew from Asia is related to behaviour and other non-financial factors. Agents and operators often indicate a preference for Chinese, Filipinos, and Indonesians because of lower attrition within and between contracts, less difficulties in port, especially alcohol-related problems, and in some cases a common language. Manning agencies Much of the Asian crew used on the various foreign fleets is recruited through manning agencies in their country of origin. The Asian agencies are efficient; vessels operators based in the Pacific Islands have stated that it is easier to hire a crew from a distant Asian country than a Pacific Island crew. Although agencies exist in some Pacific Island countries, their main problems seem to be lack of contact with industry, their part-time nature, and in some cases political interference in the selection process. Relevancy of the Most of international agreements on employment on fishing vessels international take the form of conventions promoted by United Nations agencies. conventions to Pacific The voluntary and/or advisory nature of many of these international Island crew on foreign conventions results in the situation that they only have a very limited fleets effect on the Pacific Island deck crew of foreign fishing vessels.

Future demand for The total number of jobs for all nationalities of crew will depend on 7

Pacific Island deck the future size of the fleets and changes within the industry. The crew on foreign partitioning of the total jobs between Pacific Islanders and others will fishing vessels depend mainly on commercial competition. Although there is considerable uncertainty, the most likely scenario is that, in the absence of pro-active measures taken on behalf of Pacific Island crew, there will be a slight to moderate decrease in the demand for Pacific Island crew in the medium-term future. Measures for Measures that might be taken to increase employment fall into two Increasing Pacific categories: (a) those that make it easier or more attractive to employ Islands crew Pacific Islanders and (b) requirements placed on the fleets to make it obligatory to hire such crew. The character of the US multi-lateral treaty suggests that efforts to increase employment should concentrate on facilitation, rectifying problems, and addressing operators’ concerns. Several steps are identified.

From the evidence gathered during the present study, it is not clear that employment as a prerequisite for access would be a positive step for Pacific Island countries to take. Some alternatives are offered.

The suggested measures are likely to lead to incremental rather than remarkable increases in crew levels.

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2.0 Introduction

For many Forum Fishery Agency member countries, the main benefit received from the region’s tuna resources has been the access fees paid by foreign vessels. In recent years, Pacific Island countries have been examining various options for diversifying and increasing the economic benefits that they receive from the tuna fisheries in the region. A number of different opportunities have been identified and implemented to varying degrees in different FFA member countries. These include the increased provision of goods and services to fishing vessels, the offering of incentives to encourage shore-based investment, and direct investment in fishing vessels and shore-based facilities. The aim in the present project is to review the issues and opportunities associated with another potential economic benefit to member countries, that of increased employment of Pacific Islanders on foreign fishing vessels.

The large number of foreign fishing vessels in the region, the apparent difficulty of obtaining crew from the country of origin of some of the vessels, and the rising number of unemployed people in the Pacific Islands all suggest that increased employment aboard the vessels may result in substantial benefits to Pacific Island countries. Although initiatives have been carried out at the national level, most notably in Vanuatu and Kiribati, action on the regional level to promote additional employment aboard foreign fishing vessels has been quite limited. There has been some mention in some FFA documents (e.g. FFA 1994, FFA 1995) of the foreign crewing opportunity and the United States multi-lateral tuna treaty specifically states that the US government shall promote the employment of Pacific Islanders on licensed US vessels. It should be noted, however, that these are exceptions. A series of conferences in Hawaii on deriving greater benefits from Pacific Island tuna, including a workshop specifically on creating jobs, made almost no reference to the opportunity of employment on foreign fishing vessels.

To study the issues and opportunities associated with employment of Pacific Islanders on foreign fishing vessels FFA contracted a consulting firm. Between mid- January and the beginning of March, nine Pacific Island countries in which crew employment is important were visited. In those countries 14 government officials, 34 vessel/crew agencies and fishing companies, 21 vessel operators/managers, 34 present and former Pacific Island crewmen, 13 Asian crewmembers, 4 observers for regional fisheries organizations, 9 fisheries trainers and 24 other relevant individuals were interviewed. A trip was also made to Taiwan and Japan where 4 government officials, 13 industry representatives, and 5 other relevant individuals were contacted. Individuals familiar with the crew situation in four Pacific Island countries and two Asia countries which were not visited were also interviewed.

Information on employment can be sensitive in nature. Employers may be suspicious of the motives for such a study and be hesitant to discuss details or supply information. In some cases false information may have been provided. During the study attempts were made to verify and crosscheck with as many sources as possible, but it is acknowledged that inaccuracies may exist. In addition, the detail of coverage of the 10 major fleets investigated during the short period of fieldwork was 9

less than ideal. The results of the study should therefore be considered as indicative rather than conclusive.

Because many of the terms used in conjunction with employment on fishing vessels are imprecise, some clarification is necessary. In this report the term “crew” is used to denote all persons working aboard a fishing vessel and is comprised of officers and deck crew. “Crewmember” and “crewman” are used interchangeably. To simplify accounting for crew/vessels, a foreign fishing vessel is defined as a vessel not registered in a Pacific Island country. The “Pacific Islands region” is defined as in a recent FFA paper: “the region covered by the Pacific Island countries that are members of the FFA plus the Pacific territories that are members of the South Pacific Commission”. A “Pacific Islander” is used in this report to be a national of a country in the Pacific Islands region. For simplicity, the Peoples’ Republic of China is referred to as “China” while the Republic of China is referred to as “Taiwan”.

3.0 The Present Situation

3.1 Employment Potential

To obtain a crude estimate of the amount of employment available on foreign fishing vessels in the Pacific Islands, the FFA Regional Register was consulted. The number of vessels in each fleet was obtained, as well as average crew sizes. The results are given in Table 1.

Table 1 Numbers of Fishing Vessels on the Regional Register (Licensing period: 1/9/95 to 31/8/96) Flag Small Large Purse Pole/Line Total Longliner Longliner Seiner (<100 grt)1 (>100 grt) Japan 179 298 35 58 570 Korea 0 105 29 0 134 Taiwan 91 36 43 0 170 China 159 149 0 0 308 United 1 5 48 0 54 States Pacific 1 3 11 0 15 Island Philippines 0 0 13 0 13 Other 19 46 3 0 68 Total number 450 642 182 58 1332 of vessels Av. number of 9 18 21.5 29 ----- crew per vessel

1 In this report, the gross registered tonnes (grt) listed is that of the flag state. It should be noted that there are differences in measurement systems between countries. 10

Total number 4,050 11,556 3,913 1682 21,201 of crew

The number of vessels above must be qualified. The Regional Register lists vessels which are able to apply for fishing licenses and therefore the number of vessels on the register would tend to be somewhat larger than those vessels actually fishing2. This must be balanced with other factors; it is likely that some vessels not on the register are actually fishing in the region. In addition, there are a substantial number vessels in the Pacific Islands region fishing in areas outside those areas covered by the regional register. For example, presently much of the Korean longline fleet operates in French Polynesia: SPC has catch 1995 data for 154 Korean longliners while there were only 105 on the Regional Register for the same period. In considering the above, it appears as though the number of vessels on the Regional Register would be a conservative estimate of the vessels operating in the region.

When considering opportunities for employment, vessels operating outside the Pacific Islands area must also be considered. A substantial amount of Islanders are employed outside the region: most Vanuatu fishing crew presently employed on foreign fishing vessels are actually working in the Indian Ocean, trollers in the southern albacore fishery employ crew from Kiribati, Western Samoa, and the Cook Islands, and the domestic longline fleet in Hawaii employs men from the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Marshall Islands.

The jobs available to Pacific Islanders on regionally registered vessels would be considerably less than the total number of crew listed in Table 1. Most, if not all, of the distant water fishing nations have domestic legislation requiring officers to be citizens of the flag state. Many countries specify that a certain minimum percentage of crew must come from that country. Many of the crew positions are highly technical in nature and require skills not presently available in the Pacific Islands (e.g. helicopter pilot/mechanic). Other positions, although potentially suitable for Pacific Islanders, require long training or apprentice periods. Finally, the living/working conditions on some vessels (e.g. some longliners from China) are so poor that they do not represent a viable employment opportunity for Pacific Islanders.

In considering the various factors above which tend both to increase and to reduce the amount of jobs available from that suggested by the Regional Register, it is concluded that the present number of potential jobs opportunities for Pacific Islanders on foreign fishing vessels in the Pacific Islands region would be considerably less than the 21,000 listed in Table 1.

The total number of jobs available on vessels outside the region could be very large: Taiwan authorities report that more than 20,000 foreigners work on their vessels worldwide and in 1996 there were 5,700 foreign crew on Japanese flag vessels. Employment possibilities for Pacific Islanders internationally, however, would be tempered substantially by competition with crew of other nationalities (Section 8.4).

It should also be recognised there is a considerable amount of variability in regional foreign fishing vessel jobs between years. Using the number of vessels on the

2 The difference between number of vessels on the Regional Register and those actually fishing is likely to be less in recent years due to the introduction of a charge to vessel owners for registering. 11

Regional Register as an indicator of the variability, the total crew numbers for four different years are shown in Figure 1.

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Figure 1 Variability in the Total Number of Crew on Vessels on the Regional Register

30000

25000

20000 Pole/Line Pur s e Seine 15000 Large Longline

Total Jobs 10000 Small Longline

5000

0 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96

It can be seen that both small and large longliners account for most of the variability in crew numbers, with purse seine and pole/line employment relatively stable.

3.2 Present Number of Pacific Island Crew on Foreign Fishing Vessels

The present number of Pacific Island crew on foreign fishing vessels was estimated by discussions with the 175 individuals/groups contacted during the study, inspection of official immigration documents, examination of crewing agent correspondence, and (in the case of US purse seine vessel) use of the results of two FFA employment surveys. The results are given in Table 2.

It is assumed (but not confirmed by investigation) that Niue, Nauru, Tokelau, Guam, Northern Marianas, French Polynesia3, and Wallis/Futuna have no men working on foreign fishing vessels.

The Table reveals that, on the basis of information available during the survey, about 1053 Pacific Islanders appear to be employed on foreign fishing vessels during early 1997. The above should be considered an unrefined estimate. The numbers on US purse seine vessels are likely to be the most accurate, with the most uncertain being those on Korean longliners, especially Fijians on Korean longliners4. In refining the estimate for total employment, allowances must be made for groups overlooked during the short survey period, perhaps 15% of the total. The best estimate for actual employment of Pacific Islanders on foreign fishing vessels is therefore about 1200 people.

3 In former years there was a scheme in which the US troll fleet would be subsidised by a government agency in French Polynesia for taking on board local trainees. The number of such crew remaining in the fleet, if any, is unknown. 4 Estimates for Fijian working on Korean longliners ranged from 50 to 200 men. 13

Table 2 Pacific Island Crew Employed on Foreign Fishing Vessels (February 1997) Crew Nationality Type of Vessel Number of Crew Employed Vanuatu Taiwanese longline 98 Korean longline (thru SPFC) 16 Korean longline (outside SPFC) 10 US purse seine 4 NZ longline 5 Solomon Islands Korean longline 85 Korean purse seine 25 Taiwanese longline 4 Taiwanese purse seine 20 Japanese longline 3 US purse seine 1 Kiribati Japanese pole/line 200 Japanese longline (all Japanese vessels)

Japanese purse seine Korean longline 19 US troll 7 Marshall Islands US (Hawaii) longline 12 US purse seine 2 FSM Japanese purse seine 45 US purse seine 13 Panama purse seine 19 Japanese (Okinawa) longline 3 US (Hawaii) longline 40 Western Samoa US purse seine 41 US troll 12 Fiji Japanese pole/line 60 Foreign locally-based longline 160 (other than Taiwan/Korea) Taiwanese longline 20 Korean longline 100 Palau US purse seine 1 Tonga US purse seine 3 Cook Islands US troll 2 NZ longline 4 American Samoa US purse seine 16 Tuvalu US purse seine 7 PNG ------0 New Caledonia ------0 TOTAL 1053

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Figure 2 shows the breakdown of this employment by nationality of vessel.

Figure 2 Present Pacific Islander Employment by Vessel Nationality

Other/non- specified Taiw an 18% 13%

US Korea 15% 24%

Japan 30%

3.3 Present Importance of Employment on Foreign Vessels in Pacific Island Economies

Limited data is available to gauge the present importance of crewing to Pacific Island economies. On the regional level it was estimated that there were 370,000 wage earning job opportunities in the region in 1991 (UNDP 1994). Employment on foreign fishing vessels therefore would represent about .3% of all formal employment. Papua New Guinea may, however, distort the regional situation as there appear to be no PNG nationals on foreign fishing vessels and that country offers most of the region’s jobs.

Some country-specific employment data is available. This information is combined with the number of foreign crew jobs in each country (from Table 2) and the results are shown in Table 3. Table 3 Relative Importance of Employment on Foreign Fishing Vessels Country No. People Formally Employment on Foreign Source of Employment Employed (year) Fishing Vessels as % of Data All Employment Vanuatu 18,500 (1995) .7 UNDP (1996) Solomon Is. 38, 500 (1992) .3 World Bank (1995) Kiribati 11,142 (1990) 2 Miles et al. (1992) Marshall Is. 13,200 (1992) .1 UNDP (1997a) FSM 19,016 (1994) .6 UNDP (1997b) W.Samoa 18,682 (1991) .3 UNDP (1997c) Fiji 93,400 (1992) .4 Bartsch (1992) 15

Cook Is. 7,113 (1991) .1 UNDP (1997d) A.Samoa 14,400 (1990) .1 Douglas (1994)

Caution should be used when interpreting the information in Table 3. The total employment information is in some cases several years older than the crew employment data. In some countries (e.g. Kiribati) the offshore employment is not considered in the total employment figure while in others the status is uncertain. Methodology for calculation of the total employment may vary between countries (e.g Kiribati on provident fund contribution, FSM on census data). Nevertheless, some features are apparent. In general, the present level of foreign vessel employment is not great compared to all employment (about .7% of all jobs for countries listed in Table 3). In relative terms it is much more important in Kiribati than in other Pacific Island countries. In American Samoa, which is the most important tuna base in the Pacific Islands, foreign vessel crewing is insignificant: about 1 out of every 1000 jobs.

It should be noted that jobs on fishing vessels may have an economic importance to some countries greater than that suggested by the relative number of jobs provided. Shipboard wages are usually higher than the average wages for domestic employment and in some case much higher.

The direct value of jobs to Pacific Island economies is very difficult to establish, given the current information available. From Table 2 and information contained later in this report dealing with remuneration of crews (Section 5), some idea of the overall earnings of Pacific Islanders working on board foreign vessels can be inferred. It appears that approximately six million dollars is earned annually by the 1200 Pacific Islanders working on fishing vessels worldwide.

4.0 Overview of the Fisheries and Institutional Arrangements of the Distant Water Fishing Nations

4.1 United States Overview

4.1.1 Offshore and Distant Water Fisheries

As with many distant water fleets of the world’s most industrialised nations, the US fleet in recent years has been shrinking in number. Two factors make the US situation somewhat unique as compared with some of the other participants in the region’s tuna fisheries. First, US flag vessels have traditionally concentrated on the canning market. They have in the past benefited from a close relationship with the US canning industry, which traditionally served the world’s largest market for canned tuna: the United States. Second, the US purse seine fleet has no home fishery or fishing grounds in which to operate, and has typically been an overseas, distant water operation.

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The two major fleets which operate under United States flag in the west, central and southern Pacific are the albacore trollers and tuna purse seiners5. Together, these two fleets have for some time represented the vast majority of distant water and high seas fishing undertaken by US flag vessels. Historically, both fleets operated off the west coasts of North and South America, with albacore trollers fishing in the north and purse seiners operating as far south as the Galapagos Islands.

There has been a seasonal troll fishery for albacore in the temperate waters of the North Pacific since the early 1900’s. Vessels as small as 14 meters in length fish during the summer off the west coasts of the US and Canada during years when the fish appear within several hundred miles of shore. Exploratory fishing in the South Pacific in the mid-1980’s was quite successful and by the late 1980’s over 50 US vessels were involved, but presently only about 25 vessels participate.

The US purse seine fleet historically operated off the west coasts of North and South America. During the late 1970’s the US government sponsored exploratory fishing in the western Pacific. In the early 1980’s much of the US purse seine fleet moved to the western Pacific mainly because of restricted fishing in the east and environmental pressure to reduce dolphin mortality there.

The fishing vessel industry’s close relationship with the US canning sector has had both positive and negative aspects. In times of expanding fisheries they could find ready markets for their production as well as the capital or financial encouragement to expand. However in contracting markets, they are often squeezed to the point of collapse and sometimes do not survive. Overall, this market has continued to stagnate for US vessels since the early 1990’s. While cost cutting and production increases have helped to make up the difference, the last two years in particular have seen an increased number of departures from the fishery.

The number of vessels active in the region’s purse seine fishery started slowly with less than 14 vessels throughout the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, then peaked at 62 during 1983-84, when estimated total production was from 160,000 to 180,000 tonnes. However the greatest production experienced, that of about 215,000 tonnes, was reported by about 43 vessels in 1991. Catches were maintained at just below this level for three or four years, then dropped as further changes in the fishery occurred (Table 4) . Table 4: Number of US Vessels and Total Catch in Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery, 1980-1996 Year Active Total Catch Vessels (mt) 1980 14 11,000 1981 14 37,781 1982 24 72,695 1983 62 179,735 1984 61 159,567 1985 40 107,954

5A few US flag longliners originally from Hawaii are based in Fiji and participate in Fiji’s domestic fresh sashimi fishery under various commercial arrangements. As of February, 1997 8 such vessels were licensed to fish in either offshore waters or Fiji’s EEZ. 17

1986 36 121,151 1987 35 141,203 1988 32 114,240 1989 35 139,799 1990 43 162,375 1991 43 215,855 1992 44 202,357 1993 42 197,345 1994 49 207.269 1995 44 166,890 1996 40 146,300 Source: SPC Tuna Fishery Yearbook, NMFS Tuna Newsletter, Feb 1997

The fluctuations in vessel numbers above reflect the rather quick development of the fishery, followed by a maturing period where vessel numbers leveled off and then saw a subsequent decline as adverse business conditions took their toll6.

4.1.2 Labour Situation

The purse seine fishery represents the greatest opportunity for employment among US flag vessels operating in the region. Vessels initially came to the western Pacific with crews intact after fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific during the 1980’s. However the cost of maintaining such crews, including high salaries, travel home and other “customary” perks, coupled with long periods of depressed tuna prices eventually forced owners to look elsewhere for less expensive crew. While fishing in the eastern Pacific and based in southern California, crewmen on some vessels were represented by the Fishermen’s Union of America7. In 1989, one of the last years when this union had any substantial numbers of members working on US flag seiners, it reported that the average annual wage for fishermen on 3 seiners represented by the union was $39,3618.

Switching to foreign crew in the western Pacific was not easy for many owners or operators, since many crew brought to the western Pacific had been with the fleet for long periods of time, and were often of the same ethnic background or even relatives. However, saving money on crew costs was and continues to be imperative for the US purse seine fleet. Depending on fish price, crew costs can represent up to 20% or more of gross revenue, an amount exceeded only by a purse seiner’s fuel bill. Once vessels had made the change to base in the western Pacific they rarely, if ever, returned to their former home ports in southern California. Often vessels would travel to Asia for drydock, and It became easier for them to begin taking on replacement crew from such places as the Philippines which offered experienced crew who would work at substantially lower wages than those whom they replaced.

6 Although many factors went into these variations in both numbers of vessels and production, an unhealthy resource was not one of them. 7This union was reportedly affiliated with the Seafarers Union of North America. 8It is interesting that a report made to the United States Senate in 1992, from which this figure was taken, states that “precise data are not available on employment in the U.S. tuna harvesting sector”. 18

4.1.3 Legal and Institutional Considerations

There are several aspects of US law and its judicial system which are unique to that country and of particular relevance to foreign fishermen employed onboard US flag fishing vessels. Three areas are discussed below: (1) US government laws and policies regarding the manning of US flag vessels, (2) policies governing entry of foreign crewmen into the United States, and (3) access to US courts to settle grievances against a ship owner or operator.

Laws and policies regarding the manning of US flag vessels

All United States registered fishing vessels over 5 net tons must be documented with the United States Coast Guard. Any documented vessels (not just fishing vessels) must have a US licensed master, and to be licensed an individual must be US citizen9. In addition to this, the law specifically states that fishing vessels over 200 gross tons must have a USCG licensed master and a USCG licensed chief engineer. For these vessels over 200 gross tons, anyone who stands a navigation watch must also be licensed, and anyone who stands an engine room watch must also be licensed10.

In practical terms what sometimes happens aboard US purse seiners is that the man in charge of fishing operations, the “fishing master”, may not hold a US license or be a US citizen. In those cases the vessel always employs a “navigator” or “paper master” who is legally operating the vessel. These men are almost always people who have had experience in the fishery and are well-versed in the operation of tuna seiners11. Exceptions can also be made in circumstances where a US-licensed citizen is not available, as in the case of illness or death. Operators may continue their voyage and operation as long as they have notified the appropriate authorities of the situation and take steps to place a properly licensed person on board at the first opportunity12.

In addition to the manning requirements on board US flag fishing vessels operating anywhere in the world, there are also labor requirements relating to crew on vessels which fish in the US EEZ. In these cases, 75% of the unlicensed seamen on board must be US citizens or legal aliens (i.e. green card holders). The remaining 25% can be any other foreigner legally employable under US laws.

Because of the stringent labor laws of the United States which tend to favour the employee in labor disputes, to further protect themselves some prudent US operators are careful that all labor contracts are signed outside the jurisdiction of federal labor laws. It is thus common that employees are considered employed when

9This and other manning requirements are found in 46 USC 8304 (US Code) 10From observation and actual practice however, it is fairly well known (but perhaps not by the Coast Guard) that the latter two requirements are rarely followed. 11The Coast Guard is mainly concerned with relinquished control of the vessel, and have prosecuted cases in other fisheries where foreign citizens operated and controlled the vessel while employing a US citizen on board who, while he might have held an appropriate license, was not involved in either the operation or navigation of the vessel. 12In practice the notification is done as much for insurance purposes as for any concern that the Coast Guard might issue a citation. 19

they board the vessel in a regional port rather than when they depart from their usual residence to accept such employment.

Policies governing entry to the US and its territories

Entry into the United States is controlled by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Guam and American Samoa can have different policies relating to entry and immigration because of their separate political status. Practice and policies in these areas can change, and as such INS officials in Hawaii or the mainland US are not eager to comment on policies or regulations in those two island territories. Even within the US mainland, certain rules and regulations can apply to specific geographic areas and not be equally applied everywhere. For example, the Nicholson Act prohibits non-US citizen fishermen from joining US-flag tuna fishing vessels in ports on the US west coast. Reportedly, this was instituted to protect the jobs of US citizens from potential Mexican competition. In general, on the US mainland and Hawaii foreign citizens arriving to join foreign fishing vessels as crew can do so if they possess a “C/D” visa prior to arrival. A “C” visa is a transit visa, and a “D” visa is the type issued to foreign citizen crews of fishing vessels departing from US ports. These visas must be obtained outside the United States before entry. Crews possessing such visas can also board US-flag vessels in Hawaii if the vessel is not based in Hawaii and if it is departing to fish outside the US EEZ. An important issue recently affecting Guam is the visa situation for non-US citizen on fishing vessels. In the past Guam had an exemption to the Nicholson Act which in effect allowed non-US citizens to enter Guam ports on fishing vessels without US visas. A new policy requiring visas was put into place January 1996 and since that time some Taiwanese and Korean crew have been detained. Although there is great confusion in the fishing industry, it appears as though the requirements for obtaining a visa have also become more stringent, especially for those foreign crew flying into Guam to join fishing vessels. According to US Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations (TL:Visa-25;7-21-89), for visa purposes Guam is part of the United States while American Samoa is not.

The US legal system and the settlement of disputes

Because the United States is a highly litigious society where threatening to file a lawsuit is almost the first reaction of an aggrieved party, the settlement of disputes concerning employment on US vessels is a highly technical and sometimes confusing area of law. It is far beyond the scope of this project to detail here all the legal responsibilities of fishing vessel owners and operators and remedies available to fishermen. However a short summary in the context of this report is warranted: • For non-payment of wages or compensation due, a crewman on a US flag vessel may lodge a lien against that vessel in a US port and have the vessel “arrested”. In practical terms this means going to the relevant court in a US port and presenting documentation which shows the crewman is owed compensation. This action can be brought in a foreign port as well, however the costs involved and compensation involved where Pacific Island crew are concerned might not justify pursuing such action. • All responsible US flag vessels operating in the fisheries of the region should carry protection and indemnity (“P&I”) insurance. This insurance indemnifies (pays back) the owner for liabilities which aren’t covered in other insurance, such as the 20

hull and machinery policy. This kind of insurance coverage includes oil pollution, crew injury coverage, and other situations where the owner might be liable to pay for damages. When a fisherman is injured, under US law he is guaranteed “maintenance and cure” from the owner, which is defined as the legal obligation of the vessel owner to provide for the basic living expenses of the crewman actually incurred until he is cured.

4.1.4 Training Programmes

There are no known US-based training programs operating applicable to Pacific Islander employment on US flag vessels. The Micronesian Maritime and Fisheries Academy (MMFA, Section 8.1.1) in Yap is attempting to orient at least some of its training to US purse seiners. In Majuro, the Fisheries and Nautical Training Center (FNTC) has stated that it is in the process of recruiting an instructor with experience in the US seine fleet.

4.2 Japan Overview

4.2.1 Offshore and Distant Water Fisheries

The overall number of Japanese fishing vessels has been declining steadily during the last two decades. Tuna vessels are usually categorised in Japanese statistical summaries by size class, with those operating in distant water fisheries being over 120 grt, those in offshore fisheries ranging from 20 to 120 grt, and those in coastal fisheries under 20 grt. The latter category includes not only coastal vessels which fish within Japan’s EEZ, but also some vessels which measure just under 20 grt who fish in the EEZs of Palau and FSM and are based in those countries as well as in Guam.

Compared to other Japanese fisheries, the tuna industry continues to be largest of all in several categories, with about 1,000 coastal, offshore and distant water vessels producing an estimated US$4 billion and employing 20,000 people (Taya 1995). In spite of these impressive figures, the numbers of Japanese tuna vessels worldwide have been declining for some time. Profitability is said to be declining as well, with labor cited as the largest single cost item, representing over 1/3 of fishing costs across all size classes.

In the tuna industry the greatest drop in vessel numbers has been in those fleets which require the largest number of crew: the skipjack distant water pole vessels. This fleet had less than sixty vessels in 1994, about one quarter of the 240 vessels which existed in 1980. During the same period the number of smaller longline and pole/line vessels which fish in “offshore” (kinkai) fisheries dropped over 60% from 637 to 272 and 332 to 144 vessels, respectively (Figure 3).

Contrasting with this are the larger distant-water (enyo) longline vessels, whose numbers seem to be decreasing at a much slower rate, with 87% of 1980 fleet size existing in 199313. However in order to remain viable, this latter fleet has undergone great changes with increased employment of foreigners and extended trips now

13but by 1996 the number had dropped an additional 13%. 21

routinely lasting up to 18 months. These vessels utilise mainly overseas ports as well as the high seas for re-supplying and refuelling. Full-time commercial agents are employed with Japanese staff at ports such as Callao and Las Palmas to assist in vessel management and administration.

As of August, 1996, there were 216 offshore longliners14 and 674 active distant water longliners. Many of the former are from the southern parts of Japan, returning to regional markets to offload every 60-75 days or so. The larger distant water vessels are home ported in various regions of Japan but are mainly from Misaki, Yaizu and Shimizu. They spend long periods overseas, obtaining supplies and exchanging crews in foreign ports as well as the high seas.

14there are an additional 33 permits issued by the government of Japan for this size class which are currently not active 22

Figure 3 Recent Changes in the Japanese Longline and Pole/Line Fleets

900

800

700

600 Distant Water Pole/Line s 500 Offshore Pole/Line Distant Water Longline Vessel

. 400

o Offshore Longline N 300 Coastal Longline

200

100

0 1980 1985 1990 1993

source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 1994

The tuna purse seine sector is a special case which does not reflect conditions elsewhere in the industry. When the tuna purse seine fishery first emerged during the beginnings of the EEZ era in 1978-79, there were 12 vessels in the fleet and production was mainly for the canning market. The number was expanded throughout the 1980s as government-sponsored structural adjustment in the industry reduced the number of distant water pole and line licenses and increased purse seiners at a ration of 5:1. The number of tuna purse seine vessels in the distant water fishery has stayed fairly static since reaching the then maximum allowable number of vessels (32) in the mid 1980s. In addition to those permitted vessels the government also allowed 7 group seiners, which included relatively small net boats along with 2 or 3 carrier vessels, to operate in the western Pacific skipjack fishery during the months of February to May. However by 1995 these vessels were phased out and additional licenses granted for the larger single seine fleet, which now numbers 35.

Adjustments to evolving market and economic conditions have enabled the distant water skipjack purse seine fleet to survive and maintain its numbers while other fleets have been reduced. First, design changes in the mid and late 1980s eliminated the well deck in favour of increased dry freezer storage of the catch. This enabled higher quality fish to be landed and markets to expand into areas formerly dominated by pole and line fisheries. The purse seiners also benefited from a boom in the domestic canning market which uses almost exclusively yellowfin, and prefers the higher quality production from Japanese purse seiners to that available on the world market. This is not to say that all purse seine vessels are financially successful. One major fishing/trading company which owned and operated 5 vessels as late as 1995 has sold all but one and is moving out of the fishery.

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4.2.2 Labour Situation

The changes that have taken place in the Japanese economy and the fishing industry in particular over the last 17 years have drastically affected the labor situation. Total numbers of people actually engaged in fisheries has dropped 38% since 1978. While this is no surprise, given the level of industrialisation and world trade that made Japan a world leader in both during the period, the aging of the workforce has been a critical factor in the need for outside labor. As fewer and fewer in the 15-39 year age category become fishermen, there is a greater need for replacement labor at the entry-level or manual labor-type jobs that would dominate this age group.

Table 5 Number of Persons Engaged in Fisheries in Japan by Sex and Age Year Total Male Male Male Male 60 Female Total 15 - 39 40-59 years old years years and over 1978 478.1 298.1 134.5 199.6 63.9 80.1

1983 446.5 368.3 111.5 192.5 64.3 78.2

1988 392.4 324.3 87.8 160.9 75.6 68.1

1993 324.9 267.9 54.5 122.6 90.8 57.0

1994 312.9 257.4 49.2 114.4 93.8 55.5

1995 301.2 247.0 44.8 107.5 94.8 54.0

Note: Figures in thousand of people Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries, 1996

One reason among many for the shift away from fisheries (and agriculture as well) has been the relatively high wages that could be earned in industry. By 1994, the average industrial wage for all regular workers in all industries was about 400,000 yen/month. Regular construction workers averaged about 450,000 yen/month. By contrast, a temporary worker in the agricultural sector (which includes fisheries) earned an average of about 235,000 yen/month.15

In 1996 there were about 5,700 foreign crew employed on board Japanese flag vessels in all fisheries worldwide. The greatest percentage of these (80%) were employed on distant water (enyo) deep freezer tuna longliners. Other much smaller numbers were employed on skipjack pole/line vessels, distant water tuna purse seiners, squid jigging vessels, and some trawlers.

Of the total 5,700 about 75% were Indonesian, 12% Philippine, 4% Peruvian, and 3.5% from Kiribati, with the remainder from other countries of South America and

15Source: Ministry of Labor Comprehensive Report of Labor Statistics Survey, and MAFF Survey of Wages in Rural Areas. 24

Africa. The relatively few Chinese employed are all on trawlers, while less than 1% are FSM crewmen who work aboard distant water tuna purse seiners.

4.2.3 Foreign Crew

The first foreign fishermen hired to work on Japanese flag vessels were those placed aboard Japanese pole/line vessels in the 1980's in an attempt to try to stem financial losses and maintain a healthy fleet. These and other efforts were not successful, as the fleet shrunk from almost 300 boats in 1980 to about 60 today. Once the first foreigners were allowed on board Japanese flag vessels in this manner, it became easier for distant-water longline and then subsequently overseas squid vessels and some trawlers to employ foreign crew.

It is clear that, while foreign crewmen are currently employed on many vessels in the tuna industry, not all vessels operating today employ foreign crew. For example, of the 216 offshore longliners in the roughly 40-120 gross ton size (all of which must land their catch back to Japan) approximately 17% or 36 vessels have no foreign crew.

Generally it is the larger boats of 400-800 grt that remain away for longer periods that employ the most foreign crew. Around 4,000 of the total 5,700 are employed on distant water longline vessels which only return to Japan about once every 12 to 18 months.

4.2.4 Institutional and Legal Considerations

The two most important points to note about foreign employment on Japanese fishing vessels are: • The interest in employing Pacific Islanders by industry is driven by political needs as well as economic necessity. This is particularly true for the pole- and-line and purse seine fleets; less so for longliners. • The unions and government both play an important role in deciding just how far the industry can go in employment of foreign nationals.

The use of foreign crew for prudent political ends is somewhat offset in Japan by the strength of the seaman’s union and the complicated nature by which the government, union and industry continually wrangle in a search for equilibrium in this and other aspects of business. As with almost every aspect of established Japanese commercial life, there exist detailed and sometimes complex rules and procedures, some for guidance and some hard and fast regulations, which attempt to govern the overall business environment and the activities of those involved. The objective in each case is to maintain as near as possible a state of equilibrium within the affected industry, to avoid cataclysmic change and to smooth out as much as possible the potential conflicts within sectors of an industry. Although eventual change is acknowledged, the approach to its implementation can be a tortuous process by which all sides must compromise in reaching a solution acceptable to all parties.

In the fishing industry, this method of attempting to satisfy everyone while recognising the realities of the business world results in innumerable meetings and 25

discussions between the various factions, with the government acting as mediator and eventual peace maker and implementor through various regulations, guidelines and sometimes programmes. There is give and take on each side, with the objective of maintaining commercial viability firmly in view. The government’s role adds a time factor to such changes, as they do not move quickly through the established framework. Thus, any decision taken usually includes a time period which allows all segments of the industry to adjust and prepare for whatever changes are to come about.

In the case of foreign employment aboard Japanese ships, including fishing vessels, the main protagonists are the vessel owners and operators represented by their respective fishing associations, and the labor union(s) concerned. The government plays a mediating role with the final outcome being promulgation, amendment, relaxation, stiffening or otherwise changing of the government labor regulations under which the industry functions.

The fishing vessel owners are represented in such discussions by their associations in Tokyo. Because the outcome is usually on a fishery by fishery basis, these are usually carried out with one association at a time. There are three relevant associations in the tuna fishing industry. Purse seiners (37 vessels) are represented by Kaimaki, a Japanese acronym for the Japan Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing Association. The smaller longliners of from 20 to 120 gross tons are represented by Kinkatskyo, an acronym for the National Offshore Tuna Fisheries Association. Larger longliners and pole/line vessels are represented by Nikkatsu (also called Nikkatsuren), the acronym for the Federation of Japan Tuna Fishery Cooperative Associations, or more simply Japan Tuna. However formal negotiations which encompass major fisheries are carried out on behalf of the associations by the Institute of Japan Associations, Dai-Nippon Suisan-Kai.

The union involved in the fishing industry is JSU, the All Japan Seamen’s Union, or Zen-Nihon Kai-In Kumiai. Government representation is headed by the Ministry of Transportation. The Japan Fishery Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries also participates, however the major responsibility for crewing falls under the Ministry of Transportation.

It is a governmental policy that no company or individual can employ foreigners for unskilled labor. They can only employ skilled labor which is already approved by category. Generally, fishing vessel positions which are theoretically the easiest to fill with foreigners are categorised as unskilled, and thus foreigners have generally been excluded from direct employment. This policy has had a long and almost sacrosanct history. It is one of the reasons why Japanese unemployment has historically been so low16 but also a reason for the high cost of living in Japan. The main political advocates of what has come to be the Japanese labor policy was the Japan Socialist Party, historically the strongest supporters of trade unionism in the country. Their power has weakened since the demise of Communism, and membership in the Seamen’s union has been declining in recent years.

16Japanese unemployment in February, 1997 was reported at 3.4%, the highest in over 40 years and it this is causing great concern in the country. 26

It is not mandatory that all Japanese fishermen belong to labor unions. Trade unionism has historically been strongest in the company-owned vessels, particularly factory trawlers and other large vessels. Currently, some of the crew on smaller tuna longline operations, particularly those which are family-run businesses, do not belong to the labor unions. However despite the lack of actual union members, the government requires all fishing associations whose members want to employ foreign crew to negotiate with the union. Obviously, the crux of negotiations are the union attempts to gain added benefits and compensation for the remaining crew, at the expense of unskilled crewmen who are to be replaced by the foreigners. It also pushes very hard for greater membership among the remaining Japanese crewmen, thus enhancing their position for future negotiations. Once agreement is reached with the union, then government gives its approval and the employment can proceed.

In practical terms direct employment of foreigners has only existed in the tuna fisheries for less than 8 or 9 years. There are no reported instances where officers have been employed; all employment has been directed to deck or engine room crew. The system that has been hammered out has four main components: • To qualify for foreign crew the vessels must operate in international waters and visit foreign ports as a usual part of their operation17. • The fishing vessel owners, as employers, must establish a means by which the crew are actually employed through a foreign entity and not the vessels directly. This has the effect of limiting the benefits which might be available to employees of Japanese entities. • The vessel cannot bring foreign crew to Japan. (exceptions are made for certain fisheries such as the distant water pole and line and tuna purse seine fisheries). • The ratio of foreign crew to Japanese crew should not be more than 1:4 (maximum 25% foreign crew). In 1996 this was increased to 40%.

Under this type of crewing, the foreign crewmen are required to obtain Japanese seamen’s identity certificates. All crew so employed must become “special members” of the union. That means they pay union dues, however it is not clear which union benefits apply.

There are other possible legal means by which Japanese flag fishing vessels might employ foreign crew. In the shipping industry worldwide it is not uncommon for the vessel owner to bareboat charter the vessel to a foreign company set up by the owner for that purpose. This foreign entity then arranges for crewing, becomes the actual employer of the crew and then charters the vessel back to the owner. This can be done for convenience, or even to circumvent certain regulations of the flag state such as manning. However if it is done to avoid legal liability or to insulate the owners from adverse legal consequences arising from any aspect of the vessel’s operation, the owners can still be found liable. Discussions in Japan appear to be taking place which might result in such a system being allowed, however at the time research for this report was undertaken, no indication of any resolution to the issue was available.

17 This requirement appears to have been relaxed for tuna purse seine and pole/line vessels. 27

4.2.5 Training Programmes

A wide variety of training programmes have been specifically tailored by Japan for foreign participants in the fishing industry. In the past these have generally centred on providing skills to developing countries, and this remains the main emphasis of the training for foreigners. However as the need for foreign crew has increased, within the last four years specific training programs have been established with respect to the employment of foreign fishermen on board Japanese fishing vessels.

Several of the requirements applicable to regular employment also apply to training. No “trainees” are allowed in near-shore fisheries and the ratio of trainees to domestic crews is set. Trainee programmes must also include some training on land which lasts about 3 months and can take the form of language, fishing skills and so forth. The shore-based training is usually carried out by institutions familiar with this type of activity in areas close to the vessel’s home port.

One unique feature about such training programs is that the vessel owners are not the ones to provide direct sponsorship for the trainees. They must be sponsored by the relevant municipal governments in the towns or cities where the owner lives or the operation is based. The sponsor is responsible for 50% of the cost of trainees. In practical terms, the municipal government pays 50% of the training costs while the trainee is ashore during his initial 3 month period, after which the fishing vessel owner bears the remaining costs.

This type of system also exists in the agriculture sector. However while agriculture cooperative associations are allowed to sponsor the trainees directly, fishing associations must go through the municipal governments concerned. In practice, this is done on a collective basis by the local cooperative association. If, for example, 6 vessel owners of a particular cooperative require 24 trainees, the cooperative association must make the request to the local municipal government. The municipal government then approaches the relevant agencies in the national government for approval and implementation. Originally the trainees were limited to a maximum stay of one year in Japan; i.e. as crewmen aboard the vessels. However beginning in 1996, this could be extended for an additional year.

This system was initially begun by the smaller under 200 ton offshore pole/line vessels which fish kinkai (offshore) as opposed to enyo (distant) waters. However it has now spread to tuna longline as well as squid vessels. At any one time there are probably 250 to 260 foreign crewmen employed under this system. About 45% are employed by the kinkai pole/line vessels, with 20% each on tuna longline and squid vessels. The remaining 15% are placed aboard group purse seiners operating from southern prefectures on Kyushu in various fisheries such as mackerel. Trainees must remain with the vessel for which sponsorship has been arranged.

During their first year, trainees are not allowed to accept regular wages. They paid only a stipend or living allowance. The recently-enabled second year does allow a wage to be paid, and such is done under terms of an employment contract. All second-year trainees must become “special members” of the union. This means they also pay union dues, however exactly what union benefits apply to them is not clear. 28

There is ongoing discussion to extend the program to include a third year of wage- earning employment, however this is yet to be finalised.

Originally, a maximum of only two trainees per boat was allowed. However now with the introduction of a second year of “on the job” training, the maximum has been raised to four. Two must be in their first year, and the remaining two can be in their second year of “on the job” training.

In principle, this is considered advanced training for experienced crew from foreign countries. It is not intended to be an entry-level crewing situation. The government of Japan closely checks the occupational personal history of each applicant. At present the only nationalities involved in this type of training program for employment are Indonesian and Filipino fishermen. The Filipino fishermen were the first ones employed, however this is quickly changing over to Indonesian fishermen. The main reason these two nationalities are targeted is because there are large numbers of experienced crew in these countries. There are always many more qualified applicants than training slots, so it is easier to choose the best trainees. It is also said that there is also a very good chance for them to obtain better employment in their own country upon completing the training, as both countries have active fishery sectors.

A separate training program has been set up with the assistance of the Overseas Fishery Cooperation Foundation (OFCF, Zaidan). Although OFCF made it clear that they considered this essentially an industry issue to be addressed specifically by the industry, it appears OFCF sponsors 30 crew per year in a separate training project for countries with which the Japanese fishing industry has close relations. In recent years, ten places have been allocated to each of the three fishing associations per year. The Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing Association has reportedly used its slots for FSM crew, while Japan Tuna is most likely using theirs for Kiribati crew. Kinkatskyo (smaller longliners) has used theirs to support trainees from Indonesia.

29

4.2.6 Miscellaneous Considerations

In Japan, there is a crew insurance law. This is run as a social system through the government for Japanese crew only, but not for foreign crew. Since this is an older system, fishing vessel owners sometimes augment the government system with their own private insurance. Now, with the hiring or placement of foreign crew as employees, separate private insurance has to be obtained. For on the job trainees who are employed under the a training system, government insurance is applicable.

It is inevitable that the Japanese industry will require foreigners as officers in some fisheries. While few will admit publicly to a problem, there does seem to be serious concern over the inability to retain current officers and problems finding replacements for those that retire. The overall aging of the current workforce and paucity of new entrants at a level which could provide experience for future officers are two major factors currently contributing to the problem. Unions are strongly opposed to any employment of foreign officers, and at this stage there is no indication where suitable replacements might be found. However the most likely countries which might be thought of as being able to provide candidates for replacement officers such as Taiwan and South Korea are seeing problems of their own. This issue may be of considerable interest to Kiribati which has men who have the required seatime and have passed the required courses and examinations.

4.3 Korea Overview

4.3.1 Distant Water Fisheries

Total landings of fish from all distant water fisheries have grown steadily in Korea from about 475,000 metric tons in 1980 to almost 900,000 metric tons in 1994, with the Pacific contributing about 80% of the total in that year. In fact, the Pacific is the only ocean where Korea has increased production; from 600,00 mt to about 720,000 mt between 1991 and 1994. During the same period production in the Atlantic Ocean fell from about 275,000 to 175,000 mt, and the Indian Ocean dropped from 50,000 mt to about 25,000 mt (Anon 1996).

As of 1994, tuna and skipjack catches represented about 23% of all distant water catches by volume, and ranked third behind pollack (30%) and squid (26%). The industry has continuously adapted and shifted in focus during this period; and although landings volume has increased, the number of vessels within the fleet has not.

South Korea’s distant water tuna fisheries are said to have begun in the late 1950’s with tuna longlining based out of Samoa. By the 1960’s there was a UN-sponsored training school in operation at Pusan, and tuna longlining targeting albacore was well established in the south and central Pacific by the early-1970’s. By the mid-1970’s this fleet had grown to 589 vessels worldwide. However increased operational costs, particularly the increases in fuel prices after the two “oil shocks” of that period encouraged operators to follow the Japanese into low temperature sashimi 30

operations. By 1995 there were only 31 foreign-based (i.e. albacore) longliners worldwide, with 18 operating in the Pacific. (Table 5).

In contrast, the number of low temperature sashimi vessels grew gradually and reached a maximum of 276 by 1990. However the following five years saw attrition to where there were just under 200 vessels by 1995. Reasons given for the decline included high operating costs, poor catches and fluctuating fish prices. The future for this fleet was also forecast as bleak, with over 1/3 of the vessels over 15 years old and a government ban in force on the increase in the number of vessels (Choi 1995). Other reasons included increased operational costs from license fees and crew wages; and the difficulty in obtaining experienced crew.

During the mid-1970’s, overseas based pole/line operations were begun using older Okinawan vessels. Two regional operations developed, a shore-based fleet in Palau (with the US firm, Van Camp) and a mothership-based fleet in Papua New Guinea (with Starkist). In both instances the Koreans first supplemented, then replaced mainly Okinawan vessels and crews which were shifting away from overseas-based operations due to financial considerations, one of which was the high cost of crewing Okinawan vessels18.

As both these US companies closed down overseas operations and shifted from pole/line to purse seine, their Korean partners were forced to either shift or get out of the business. One Korean government-backed corporation which had been active in financing several ventures earlier, was one of the first enterprises to begin operations from Guam with a former US seiner in the early 1980’s. However they experienced difficulties from the outset and, despite utilisation of a proven US-built vessel, was forced to withdraw after less than a year. Additionally, several non-tuna fishing companies purchased used purse seiners in Europe and elsewhere for operation from Guam around the same time; however at least one did not succeed and withdrew from the fishery after a short time. During the period of the early to mid 1980’s one of the few successful Korean purse seine operations was the one who had started the trend, a former pole/line operator who, in 1979 obtained a former Spanish seiner and began operations from Guam.

Gradually the obstacles of unfamiliarity with the fishery and under-capitalisation were overcome, and the numbers of purse seiners increased to where there were 39 seiners owned by 12 companies in 1990. The availability of used US seiners from a contracting US fleet was coupled with an emerging Korean market for the catch which had been fostered by government policies and development from a handful of companies. Korean companies began marketing canned tuna and domestic sales increased to a point where domestic processing consumed almost 70% of purse seine catches by 1995. Korean vessels could thus be assured of a guaranteed market for at least some of their catch, and were not as susceptible to the horrific prices and chaotic conditions in the tuna canning market of the early 1990’s. Due to these advances, the early 1990’s proved to be the high point in fleet expansion and 39 seiners were active. Because of difficulties in the purse seine industry worldwide,

18Korean companies were sold older, wooden-hulled pole and line vessels by Van Camp in Palau during the mid 1970’s. Using inexperienced crews who learned from both Okinawan and the few all- Micronesian crewed boats, they were outfishing the latter and keeping up with the former within a year. 31 the fleet began to contract and by 1995 there were 29 seiners operated by 7 companies.

The numbers of vessels in the Korean distant water fleet are given in Table 6.

32

Table 6 Korean Vessels in Distant Water Fisheries, 1995 Fleet Total Pacific Atlantic Indian Foreign-based tuna longliners 31 18 1 12 Korea-based tuna sashimi 196 153 3 40 longliners Purse seiners 30 30 0 0 Squid vessels 125 43 82 0 North Pacific trawlers 25 25 - - Hokkaido area trawlers 11 11 - - Foreign based trawlers 157 79 65 13 Shrimp trawlers 35 0 34 1 Saury driftnet 12 12 0 0 TOTAL 642 387 189 66 source: Korea National Fisheries Administration, quoted by R. Perry-Jones, TRAFFIC, 1996

4.3.2 Labour Situation

The economy in Korea has expanded rapidly in the last 20 years and like Taiwan and Japan, this has meant problems in attracting crew for work on distant water fishing vessels. The relatively well-educated workforce (about 90% have graduated from high school) has opportunities in both light and heavy industries such as electronics manufacture and steel and shipbuilding which, although often wracked by dispute and suffering a long work week of 6-plus days, is still more attractive than work and conditions aboard distant water fishing vessels.

Very little information regarding the overall crewing situation or prospects for employment is made available by either Korean overseas diplomatic missions or the relevant government authorities in the Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries Affairs (Seafarer's Division). Given the likely possibility that government regulations are not being followed (see below), the overall inflammable nature of employment relations within Korea, and the history of clashes between government, unions, and employers, this should not be particularly surprising.

4.3.3 Foreign Crew

According to Korean manning agents based in the Pacific Islands, there is apparently a Korean regulation which mandates that at least 40% of the crew on a Korean flag vessel must be Koreans. As with other Asia countries which have such requirements, this seems to be disregarded. During the study period a Korean seiner in Guam had only 31% Korean crew and a longliner in Pago Pago had only 29%.

4.3.4 Legal and Institutional Considerations

Government oversight of the fishing industry is provided by the Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries Affairs which superseded the National Fisheries Administration in 1996. With respect to fisheries, its main functions include fisheries planning and policy development, promotion and development of both near shore and distant 33 water fisheries, and management of fishery facilities and infrastructure. The Seafarer’s Division within the Ministry is responsible for labor policy and implementation. 34

4.3.5 Training Programs

Apparently, the Koreans have opened a school for longline crew in an area of China close to Korea which would presumably be involved in the training/recruitment of Chinese crew.

4.4 Taiwan Overview

4.4.1 Offshore and Distant Water Fisheries

Taiwan’s overall total fisheries production is declining after steady growth in both volume and value from 1980 to 1990. Total production from distant water fisheries, offshore fisheries, coastal fisheries, marine culture, inland fisheries and inland fish culture decreased almost 12% from 1993 to 1994, the last years for which figures are available. Much of this decline came about from culture operations where both rising land costs and disease caused serious problems in shrimp and eel farming. Distant water fisheries are the largest producers, both in terms of volume (about 684,000 tons from a total of 1,200,000 tons total from all fisheries listed above) and value (about US$1.4 billion out of a total US$3.4 billion total). Of the distant water fisheries, tuna longline at about 210,000 mt and squid jigging at about 158,000 mt are the largest sources of distant-water catch19.

Tuna fishery ports and markets are located in the southern part of the country. Kaohsiung is the main port but Tung Kang, about 20 miles south, is a major secondary landing port for fresh tuna, where from 30 to over 100 tonnes of fresh sashimi-grade tuna and other species are landed daily by both smaller offshore vessels as well as some distant water vessels. Landings of high quality tuna at both Kaohsiung and Tung Kang are air freighted to Japan.

Marine fisheries are divided into three groups for the purposes of government administration: inshore (within 3 miles), offshore (within 200 miles) and far seas or distant water fisheries (including the 200 mile zones of other countries). Some offshore boats, particularly smaller tuna longliners of 30 to 100 tons, are classified as offshore vessels, but fish or are based in what can be considered far seas areas such as Indonesia, Guam, FSM and Palau. Vessels which are considered exclusively far seas vessels are those of the tuna purse seine, albacore longline and deep freezer longline fleets.

The employment of foreign nationals by Taiwanese vessels takes place on all fleets in the far seas fisheries: trawlers and squid jiggers, as well as tuna vessels. There are five categories of vessels in tuna fisheries: 1. Offshore vessels which are less than 100 tons and deliver directly to Taiwan after fishing in nearby seas, high seas or the EEZs of other countries 2. Foreign-based vessels of less than 100 tons which engage in the sashimi tuna fishery and fish in far seas areas, deliver to foreign ports and return

19All figures for 1994 35

only periodically to Taiwan. These vessels can, if of the correct size and with the proper license, fish in Taiwan’s offshore waters and deliver directly to Taiwan. However if this is undertaken, no foreign crew can be employed. 3. Foreign-based albacore longliners. In the South Pacific these are now limited to about 40 to 45 or so which deliver to canneries at Pago Pago and Levuka 4. Deep-freezer sashimi vessels which operate mainly in the Indian Ocean (200 or more) but also in the South Pacific (about 13). 5. Tuna purse seiners which operate in the Pacific Islands region (42 plus some joint venture boats).

Vessels are licensed by the government in various categories denoted by tonnage20. The number of longliners worldwide and the fisheries in which they are eligible to participate are listed in Table 7. Table 7 Taiwanese Tuna Longline Vessels (1994) Tonnage Fisheries Included Total Class number 20-49 coastal, offshore tuna 950 50-99 offshore tuna, foreign based albacore 485 100-199 far seas tuna, foreign based albacore 66 200-499 foreign based albacore, deep freeze 413 sashimi 500-999 deep freeze sashimi 220 source: Fisheries Yearbook, Taiwan Area, 1995

Far seas tuna purse seine vessels were constructed beginning in the mid 1980’s, with both technology and capital from Japan. There are 47 licenses issued for vessels over 500 tons however not all licenses are utilised. There are said to be 42 tuna purse seiners active in the western tropical Pacific fishery, 19 of which measure greater than 1,000 tons. Several of these are engaged in active joint ventures in PNG and the Solomon Islands.

4.4.2 Economy and Recent Economic Trends

Taiwan’s economy in general is rapidly shifting from its former light industrial and agriculture base to more technology-oriented and less labor intensive industries. However even these shifts are not stemming the flow of capital and investment offshore. As Taiwanese products become less and less competitive on the world market, manufacturing first turned to importing labor and then to setting up factories overseas. The advancement of business relations with China over the past ten years has greatly accelerated these trends. Although Chinese labor is generally not allowed in the country, imported labourers from Thailand, Myanmar, and elsewhere

20For smaller longline vessels it is possible to determine the category or tonnage class by its registration number. Each registration consists of the prefix CT (China, Taiwan) followed by a digit denoting size class: 5 for 50-60 tons, 6 for 60-70 and so forth. Taiwanese tonnage measurement results in somewhat higher numbers than for similarly sized Japanese vessels. 36 dominate some fields such as heavy construction. Taiwan is also an important foreign investor in Viet Nam.

Currently there are over 30,000 Taiwanese businesses in China. Although there are no formal diplomatic relations, trade missions and representatives are exchanged and carry on many quasi-diplomatic functions as well as trade relations.

4.4.3 Labour Situation

All commercial fishing is supposed to take place within the umbrella of fisheries associations which roughly follow the Japanese model. There are 38 fishing associations in the country comprising about 260,000 members. Far seas fisheries employ about 30,000 people on vessels world-wide, and 3,000 people ashore. Offshore fisheries have about double the number or 60,000 employed on vessels, with about 12,000 people ashore directly related to the industry.

Employment in the far seas fisheries has stayed fairly constant for the past 5 years, but the current number of those employed in offshore fisheries has dropped during that time period by about 20%. It is illegal to employ any foreigners in the inshore fisheries of Taiwan. Vessels which fish offshore cannot bring foreign crew into Taiwan, so longliners which regularly land their catch fresh at Tung Kang as a rule do not employ foreigners. Vessels which fish in far seas fisheries are those most likely to employ foreigners.

Taiwan has made great strides in the past 15 years with involvement in tuna fisheries. The most notable developments have been in three areas: the emergence of an export-oriented fresh fish sashimi industry which lands catch both at home and in foreign ports; the expansion of far seas deep freezer sashimi longliners, mainly in the Indian Ocean; and the development of tuna purse seiners in the western Pacific to serve cannery markets in other countries. Along with theses advancements, the general tone of the Taiwanese economy has forced the fishing industry to make adjustments, both at home and abroad. One key area has been in the manning aboard offshore and far seas fishing vessels.

4.4.4 Domestic Labor Situation in Fisheries

As with many types of labor in today’s industrialised world, crew expenses are one of the aspects of business management in which cost savings are initially most easily applied. Depending upon the manner in which crew compensation is calculated, it may be possible to reduce crew share of the proceeds or wages paid. In the absence of agreed long-term individual employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements, crew compensation is more susceptible to reduction than other costs such as fuel or insurance which are beyond the ability of the vessel owner or manager to control. At some point, however, the level of compensation offered, coupled with other terms of employment and the general conditions on board the vessel will become unacceptable to the deck crew. This point seems to have been reached during the mid to late 1980’s for most of the Taiwanese fleets under discussion. 37

The Deep Sea Fisheries Training Center in Kaohsiung reports having trouble enticing younger people into fisheries in general. Although they do public relations work such as inviting junior high school students on training cruises in a “boy scout” environment, they report continued lack of interest in high school graduates seeking a career aboard fishing vessels. The major reason they say is that the salary scale for fishing vessels is inadequate to attract new recruits, and of course living and working conditions are much more harsh than those found ashore or even in the merchant marine.

There is also a military-style maritime academy in Kaohsiung which trains officers for ocean going careers. A few years ago there was a push to get graduates from this academy onto fishing vessels, with a subsidy paid by the government to entice employment. However after the subsidy expired, almost all former maritime academy graduates sought jobs in the merchant marine and deserted fisheries occupations.

Many Taiwanese individuals interviewed during the study expressed serious concern with Taiwan’s ability to train and retain new captains, fishing masters and engineers. These problems differ in magnitude among the fisheries concerned. Engineering positions are the most problematic, and there are serious concerns for the ability of Taiwan to produce enough engineers, particularly for far seas fisheries such as tuna purse seine and squid boats. It must be noted that engineers are not only responsible for the main engine, but must attend to hydraulics, electrical systems and refrigeration, all of which require specialised skills and experience. On purse seiners particularly, it is the engineer’s job to see to the refrigeration needs of the catch, maintain fish quality and oversee storage. Further making a Taiwanese engineer’s job on fishing vessels particularly difficult is that some new vessels are equipped with older machinery from other vessels. Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry in Kaohsiung often makes use of available used parts and not all ships are completely “new” when launched.

The replenishment of fishing masters are another concern. One government official interviewed expressed extreme concern that there will not be future fishing masters in the tuna purse seine fleet because there are no Taiwanese at lower or less skilful jobs that can “climb the ladder” to the fishing master’s role. However another person more closely associated with the industry said that wasn’t the case, and most fishing masters come from other fisheries and are taught on the job. While it is true that Taiwan relied initially on Japanese fishing masters in the tuna purse seine fleet, there is now only one such expatriate remaining in the fleet of 42 vessels. It was said that it takes from two to two and a half years to train a competent longline skipper to be a fishing master on a tuna purse seiner.21

4.4.5 Foreign Crew

It has been reported that it is almost impossible to attract any Taiwanese to entry- level jobs on far seas fishing vessels. All such crew must therefore be from foreign

21this may be partly because most fishing is done on log or raft schools; the techniques and abilities to successfully fish on moving school fish could take much longer to acquire. 38

countries. Taiwanese fleets have utilised crew from numerous countries in the recent past, but are more and more turning to China as the major labor source for work on fishing vessels.

Because the actual practice in employing foreign crew in eligible (i.e. non-coastal) tuna fisheries far exceeds government regulations (Section 4.4.6), it is not possible to obtain accurate data on the actual number of foreigners employed. However if one considers the number of vessels employed in those fisheries and the average crew size for each, total employment would be in the neighbourhood of 20,000. Thus realistically there would be somewhere around 14,000 to 16,000 foreigners employed on Taiwan tuna vessels worldwide.22

The population of China will reach 1.4 billion by the year 2000. Even considering the “one family, one child” policies, the population increased 100 million in the last five years. Those Taiwanese within the fishing industry who were interviewed feel that this represents a limitless labor supply of people who are willing to work more cheaply than almost any other nationality, who speak the same language (or can at least understand Mandarin) and with whom current vessel operators are most comfortable. Originally, the Taiwanese obtained Chinese crew from the coastal provinces. Each coastal province has its own training school. However the costs of this labor increased rapidly as coastal provinces experienced economic booms and cheap labour became scarce. The Taiwanese have now found that they can obtain inexpensive labor that is just as dependable from interior provinces such as Hubei or Schezuan. Many have never seen the ocean before. These workers are not as wise to the ways of the world as those from the coast, and hence are more pliable and easier to train.

About three years ago the Philippine government began a general review of living and working conditions for Philippine seamen working overseas. As a result, they singled out the small Taiwanese longliners as vessels which were particularly harsh. This resulted in government pressure on local labor agents and may have had some effect on the interest of Filipino crewmen to work on such vessels. During the study when this subject was raised with Taiwanese industry officials, they were unwilling to comment on this situation. Their perspective seemed to be that the conditions are what they are and if Filipinos do not accept them Taiwanese can obtain crew who will.

4.4.6 Legal and Institutional Considerations

Taiwan fisheries are regulated under the Fisheries Act. This legislation has existed in the Republic of China since 1929, but was revised and put in its current form in 1991. The objectives, as stated in Article 1 are “to conserve and rationally utilise aquatic living resources; to enhance fisheries productivity; to guide the complete development for fisheries; to foster the development of recreational fisheries; to maintain fisheries discipline; and to improve the standard of living of fishermen” (unofficial translation). Article 39 regulates the activities of fishing vessels and crews

22No breakdown by nationality is available, even at the approved government figure of 50%. 39

in foreign fishing bases, and provides for regulating the maximum number of crew allowed to work on Taiwanese vessels.

Currently, the number of non-Taiwanese allowed on far seas fishing vessels cannot exceed 50% of the total crew. It was initially set at 40%, however it has been raised in the last few years. Even with the raise to 50%, it is generally recognised in Taiwan that this limit is exceeded on almost every far seas fishing vessel, and on many approaches 80% or more.

4.4.7 Crew Health and Welfare Issues

Most far seas vessels are reported to be equipped with Inmarsat units to communicate directly with Taiwan, and all communication goes through the home office. In the case of good news from home for foreign crewmen, management usually passes this along. In the case of bad news, management sometimes waits until the crewman is in a position to either respond or do something about it. These are management decisions which differ from company to company.

Insurance for Chinese crew is said to be handled by the Chinese labor agent. This could not be confirmed. The Taiwanese vessel owners say they are not involved and it is a part of the labor agent’s responsibility. Those interviewed said that in the past no Taiwanese insurance company would insure non-Taiwanese. However now they have agreed to insure non-Taiwanese but it is not known how widely this is implemented for nationalities other than Taiwanese. The conclusion one might draw from a lack of volunteered information on existing insurance is that generally it does not appear that there is much insurance or workmen’s compensation coverage for foreign fishermen.

4.4.8 Training Programs

The Deep Sea Fisheries Training Center in Kaohsiung has reportedly trained over 90,000 domestic crewmen since its inception about 20 years ago. Its purpose is to provide advanced training for fishermen and seamen already employed in the fishing industry. As such it provides short-term training classes of one month or less for license certification, survival at sea and fire fighting training, and so forth. It is under the direction of the Council of Agriculture of the Executive Yuan (similar to a MAFF- type organization) and has one 1200 tonne training vessel with a full-time crew of 22 that is equipped to teach trawling, longline and squid jigging.

The Fisheries Training Center is an institution set up for ongoing training of crewmen in existing jobs. However they do special training on request and can devise courses to fit the needs of the industry. Officials at the training center emphasised that it is necessary to include good “character training” in their courses. They made a point of saying that they have classes and instruction in character-building and discipline which better prepares graduates for work on fishing vessels.

There have been several instances of training being offered to foreign students. However in each case these were short-courses in fishing technology or engineering, 40

with one of the prerequisites being political recognition of Taiwan by the trainee’s home country23. A recent fishing access agreement with FSM required the Taiwan Association to “use its best efforts” in getting training and employment for FSM fishermen on board Taiwanese purse seiners. The Training Center drew up a proposal for a training program and sent it to the Overseas Fisheries Development Council for consideration. It was approved in principle, but never funded. The Center says it would provide such training but funds must be provided, and the Taiwanese government could not or would not fund such training.

The fishing industry however has a very different attitude towards training than that assumed by its government. Basically, the industry says that skills are not so important. Seamen are being hired to do fairly basic jobs and can learn on the job. There is no need for them to come fully trained in any one area. However both industry and government both agree on one major point which is held universally by employers everywhere. Foreign fishermen need to have a good attitude towards their work and their fellow workers. They emphasise that Taiwan is interested in getting good, solid, reliable crewmen, and both stress that seamen need to have the “correct attitude” and that they need to be “trained in behaviour”.

4.5 China Overview

4.5.1 Distant Water Fisheries

The first large-scale deployment of a fishing fleet overseas consisted of trawlers sent to West Africa from Fuzhou in 1985. At that stage in Chinese development, overseas ventures were arranged through the China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC). Subsequent joint venture arrangements sent 12 vessels to Guinea Bissau, 4 vessels to Nigeria, 6 to Senegal and Morocco, and 4 to Argentina. The contribution of the overseas distant water fisheries sector is very small compared to overall fisheries production. Although China does not report its fish landings to FAO and various estimates are not verified, a figure of around 9.5 million tons, or 12% of the world total saltwater fish production, has been claimed.

In overseas tuna fisheries, Guangdong Province seems to have been a leader in China’s involvement, bringing two used large (48 meter) Japanese longliners to the South China Sea for experimental fishing in the early 1970’s. During the early 1980’s a joint venture which included an ex-Japanese low-temperature sashimi longliner was attempted, but little information is available. To date, the only known sustained involvement in overseas tuna fisheries has been the longline vessels contracted to Taiwan and Hong Kong-based fishing and trading companies which began operations in Palau and FSM (Yap) in the early 1990’s24. By 1995 Guangdong province had about 150 vessels in the longline fishery in those areas. Unlike many of the vessels connected to CNFC-sponsored operations which are reported to operate

23 Currently there are four FFA member countries which recognise Taiwan. 24One reference cited a domestic longline fleet composed “...to a considerable extent of second-hand boats that were purchased from Japan” which produces about 15,000 tons per year. Nothing is known of this fleet; one can only surmise it operates in the South China Sea for the domestic market, as no Chinese exports of tuna to Japan or elsewhere are known. 41

under the umbrella of parastatal bodies, vessels from Guangdong province are reportedly mostly operated by groups or family ventures25.

In an initial joint venture, CNFC and interests from Fujian, Shantou, Hainan and others joined with an air freight and marketing company to begin operations in Palau during the early 1990’s. None of the vessels employed in the fishery were purpose- built for tuna longlining, and their crews reportedly knew very little about the fishery, fish handling techniques or marketing requirements. However the vessels from Guangdong province were engaged by another Taiwan company for operations in Yap and elsewhere in FSM. These vessels were reportedly provided start-up loans from the Taiwanese company of an unspecified amount for fuel, equipment and fishing gear to enable them to travel from China to the Caroline Islands and commence fishing. Technical assistance was also provided by the Taiwanese company in fishing techniques and fish handling.

By 1994 the number of both parastatal and private or group vessels was about 400 in Palau, FSM and Marshall Islands. Vessels were a mixture of types and sizes, with most being under 100 tons. They came from a variety of places in China, with about half from Guangdong and the remainder from Fukien, Hainan and elsewhere. While the number of vessels in the fleet was roughly evenly divided in ownership between parastatal enterprises and private or groups, the latter are said to have landed three times the volume of fish as the former.

This proved to be the high point in the fishery, as succeeding years saw disappointing returns to both the vessels and their Taiwanese trading company sponsors who curtailed the fishery. Presently Chinese longliners are based in Palau (about 60), FSM (60 licenses have been issued), Marshall Islands (17 vessels fish in association with Ting Hong Company), and Fiji (7 fish in association with a local company).

4.5.2 Labour Situation

Regarding crew compensation, one source reports that employees of “national enterprises” receive “generally the same as that paid in China, but depending on the number of days at sea an additional payment of several dollars per day is made. Each national enterprise has its own standard, within the range of 5 to 15 dollars. Bonuses are set depending on the operating results of the vessel; ordinary crew members can be 3-5,000 dollars per voyage (8-10 months). Technically qualified personnel and navigators receive more”. In contrast to national enterprises, the income of “group-owned enterprises” is relatively higher, and “they may receive bonuses from their fleet or enterprise in addition to their wages. An ordinary fisherman working for such an enterprise can return to China after one voyage (8-10 months) with $5,000 to $8,000 dollars. In some cases it may be even more to a maximum of $10,000” (JETRO 1995).

25Ownership of the vessels is another matter. One source reports that all vessels are either owned by the national government or “group enterprises”. 42

4.5.3 Foreign Crew

There are no foreign crew on the Chinese vessels fishing in the region.

4.5.4 Legal and Institutional Considerations

Information on the institutional and legal basis of Chinese fisheries is difficult to obtain. A State Fishing License system for commercial fishermen was established in 1980 (Anon 1992). Domestic fisheries are subject to “Regulations for the Propagation and Protection of Fishery Resources”, established in 1979 which include fish size limits on capture fisheries, prohibited fishing areas, closed seasons for fishing, and the prohibition of certain fishing gears and methods (Anon, 1992). One source claims that: “Within China, an industrial enterprise can formulate its production plan freely, and if it applies for and gets permits from the authorities concerned it can carry on its productive activities within the scope of the domestic economic legislation. In the fishing areas, technical contracts and agreements on economic cooperation and other activities are based on the local fishery laws, and if disputes arise, the local fishery authorities make the determinations based on their own local laws and the content of the agreement or contract.” (JETRO 1995)

Involvement in tuna fisheries, whether domestic or foreign, by vessels or fleets from China does not seem to be hampered by a large amount of bureaucratic red tape. This is evidenced by the relative ease with which enterprises operating in FSM, both domestic and foreign, obtained the services of fleets from a variety of locations within China. It is further claimed that one reason China has not created a legal basis for tuna fisheries is that the Chinese government is not directly participating in production. It is apparently felt that the more pressing needs are in China’s domestic fisheries, and that the tuna fisheries exist solely for the financial benefit of the enterprises involved.

When a “collectively owned” fishery enterprise such as those currently active in the region wishes to deploy vessels overseas, they need only to have the permission of the Provincial Fisheries Office. However large-scale enterprises, such as those owned at the provincial level, the approval procedure is said to be more involved and requires the approval of the National Fisheries General Administration.

Overall, the government attitude towards what is called the “South Pacific tuna production project” , is positive. It is viewed as a means of lessening pressure on domestic resources and helping to solve the problem of excess domestic fishing capacity while also generating foreign exchange.

While fishing overseas, government regulations require the enterprises to report back to authorities. It is reported that these (unspecified) authorities have taken a general attitude of encouragement and have facilitated various procedures for the benefit of the enterprises such as the issuance of passports for crewmen.

43

4.5.5 Training Programmes

There are no known training programs for foreign fishermen. Conversely, there are reports of a Korea-operated training facility in China near the Korean border (Section 4.3.5).

5.0 Overview of Employment on the Foreign Fleets

5.1 United States Purse Seine Fleet

As mentioned in Section 4.1, the US purse seine fleet started commercial fishing operations in the Pacific Islands region in the early 1980s. In order to successfully operate in the western Pacific, vessels found that somewhat different equipment was required than that in the eastern Pacific, and the most successful vessels were those who expended the extra money to rig their vessels properly as early as possible. Because of the usually larger schools encountered in the western Pacific, booms, masts and all rigging has to be as strong and stout as possible. Often the capacity of refrigeration systems had to be increased to meet the heavier loads. Larger capacity and faster purse winches and deeper nets are also required for successful fishing, particularly on fast moving ”school fish”. The larger nets and schools also mean more buoyancy is required of the seine skiff, some of which approach 13 meters in length on the largest vessels. While a large number of speedboats are not required to herd dolphin into the net along with the following tuna as in the eastern Pacific, workboats equipped with strong lights and adequate pulling power are an asset when fishing operations are conducted on floating logs.

Over the last 15 years and as the fleet has shifted from its traditional southern California base, there has evolved a three-tiered structure for the deck crew that was less evident when all crew were either citizens or foreign workers with ethnic or family ties to the fleet. The more skilled deck positions of winchman, deck boss, mastman, and sometimes skiff driver are usually filled by persons who have either been in the fleet a long time, or have been recruited from an ethnic background compatible with the managers or owners. Included in this first tier are experienced crewmen of Latin American nationalities. The second tier seems to be mostly Filipino crew who are most often found in skilled jobs in the engine room. The third tier are those fishermen essentially recruited to work on the deck and particularly help with stacking the net. Pacific islanders are most often found in this third tier, with some having advanced to deck jobs requiring more skill and resultant higher pay.

In the early 1980s the fleet rapidly expanded to 62 vessels, but now only 34 fish in the area.

The FFA has carried out two surveys on the crew composition of US Seiners licensed under the multi-lateral treaty. The first covered 35 of the 38 vessels of the 7th licensing period (June 1994 to June 1995), while the second covered 31 of the 34 vessels of the 9th licensing period (June 1996 to June 1997). The results of those surveys are given in Table 8. 44

Table 8 Nationality of Crew on US Purse Seiners Nationality of Crew 1994/95 Survey 1996/97 Survey (% of total crew) (% of total crew) United States 26.5 27.6 Philippines 19.7 24.9 Portugal 12.2 11.1 Croatia 11.6 6.4 Latin America 8.9 5.7 Pacific Island 8.5 14.8 Others/unknown 12.6 9.5

The crew from Portugal and Croatia reflect the ethnic background of the vessel managers/operators; in the not-too-distant past one-third of the fleet were considered Portuguese boats, one third Slav boats, and one third Italian boats. The Latin Americans aboard stem from the former fishing grounds in the eastern Pacific, while the Filipinos represent fairly recent efforts to cut crew costs.

Although the survey results show an increase in the percentage of Pacific Islanders between the two survey periods, this is partly an artefact of a smaller fleet size and those departed vessels employing few Pacific Islanders. The Pacific Island crew composition during the 9th licensing period is: Western Samoa (41 men26), American Samoa (16), FSM (13), Tuvalu (7), Vanuatu (4), Tonga (3), Marshall Is. (2), Solomon Is. (1), and Palau (1) for a total of 88 men or about 15% of the men working in the fleet.

Much of the crewmembers hired by vessel operators are men who have already work in the fleet. Long-time crew members often “take a trip off” after a year or more on board, and sometimes switch vessels at that time. The recent decline in fleet size has produced surplus experienced labour. Recruiting entirely new crewmembers generally falls into two categories: • Crewing agencies in the Philippines are contacted and crew is dispatched from Manila to join vessels in American Samoa or Guam. This procedure is especially common when the operators desire individuals with special skills (engine room, welding, cooking). • Crew is picked up in American Samoa by either (a) closely watching the offloading crew work and picking a hard-working individual or (b) entrusting a crewmember to identify a appropriate friend/relative.

It should be noted that most Western Samoans and some of the Tongans and Tuvaluans presently working in the fleet were actually residents of American Samoa at the time of recruitment. At least some of the Vanuatu crewmembers obtained their employment while in American Samoa at the end of a longliner trip. In general, the US fleet has more of a tendency than the Asians to observe a potential crew man working and “size him up” prior to recruitment. This is important when considering mechanisms for increasing employment.

26 This number of Western Samoan crew (41 men) includes data for two vessels not included in the latest FFA survey. 45

US owners and operators are particularly sensitive to potential drug use by prospective crewmen. Because the vessels operate from mainly US ports, the vessels are subject to searches and the US “no tolerance” policy can result in the seizure of a vessel for even small amounts of contraband drugs found on board.

The living and working conditions aboard US seiners are undoubtedly better than those of the other foreign fleets operating in the Pacific Islands area. Large clean living areas, large bunks, good food, air conditioned rooms, video entertainment, and hot/cold fresh water showers are characteristic of the seiners. Although the working day may be long, especially during days with multiple sets and when net problems are experienced, there is ample rest time and (unlike on longliners) lack of sleep is not considered a problem by Pacific Island crew. Pacific Islanders, may however feel somewhat isolated as (unlike on longline and pole/line vessels) frequently only one new Pacific Islander will be recruited at a time and during the first trip that individual will be initially considered somewhat isolated and an outsider in the “crew family”. On some vessels the practice of “breaking his eggs” (i.e. teasing a crewmember until his breaking point is reached) can be especially upsetting to new crewmen. The tendency for some senior crew to get excited in periods of tension and yell/swear also may be disturbing to newly-recruited Pacific Islanders, especially if that Islander is the recipient of the verbal abuse. The liberal consumption of alcohol at the end of a working day (“highballs”) on some vessels has caused problems27.

New crew will usually be assigned to menial tasks and to assisting senior crew members in more complicated work. As such, learning the extensive purse seine vocabulary can be quite difficult for novice Pacific Islanders, but is extremely important. The work of the deck crew can be classified into 4 categories: (1) housekeeping (2) vessel/gear maintenance (3) searching for fish and (4) the seining operation, which includes setting, pursing the net, stacking the net, and brailing/sorting the catch. Probably the most difficult skill that new crew must master is the stacking of net. Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of net stacking28. The fourth category of work above can be exhausting for the crew, usually lasts from two to four hours (but much longer if complications occur), and can be performed up to five times per day. US seiners tend to make more sets per day than vessels of other nationalities.

With time, the novice crewmember will be expected to acquire proficiency in the various skills aboard the vessel. These include painting, net mending, cable slicing, using binoculars to spot signs of tuna, brailing, winch operation, and auxiliary vessel operation.

The work is dangerous, probably much more so than on longliner and pole/line vessels. Crew, including Pacific Islanders, have been seriously injured and killed. The vessels are large, the nets are in the order of a half-million square metres of mesh, and the strains on the gear are tremendous which can result serious bodily damage during a malfunction. During the fishing especially dangerous are the areas near the purse winch, the purse davits, the ramp when the skiff is being hauled on board, the upper deck during helicopter landing, and transferring between the seiner

27 For more information on social customs aboard US seiners see Orbach (1977). 28 Adapted from Gillett (1987) 46

and the various auxiliary boats. Because helicopters are carried on most US seiners, rapid medical evacuation of the seriously injured is a possibility when location permits.

During the consultancy it was not possible to obtain an actual contract, hence the following is inferred from discussions with both vessel managers and crewmen. On US seiners some crewmembers have a written contract while others, especially those that have been on a vessel for considerable length of time, work under the terms of only a verbal agreement. For those crew who are recruited outside the vessel’s base of operation (usually American Samoa), the important points of the contract (or verbal agreement) would normally be the rate of pay and the number of successive trips the crewmember would be expected to make in order to qualify for expatriation at the employer’s expense (normally a year or 4 trips). Salary is always expressed in US dollars per short ton of tuna accepted by the cannery, which would not include poor quality fish and fish under 4 pounds (1.8 kg). A “trip” is contractually defined as the period of time from the loading of supplies prior to a voyage to the point after which all the fish has been offloaded subsequent to returning to port with a full load of fish. Twenty days is a very short trip and 100 days is considered very long. The average trip would be about 60 days in length, with about 10 days to weeks in port between voyages.

In response to adverse conditions in the industry the rates of pay on US seiners have fallen during the past decade. It should be noted that prices for purse seine fish at present are the same or worse than in the early 1980s, production expenses have risen, and crew costs are one of the few means to reduce these production costs. Pacific Islanders with no previous experience in the fleet and no special skills who would have been paid $2 to $4 per ton a decade ago, are likely to paid US$1 to $1.50 per ton today. The average seiner would land between 4,000 and 5,000 tones per year. This would equate to $4,000 to $7,500 to a novice crewmember for a full year encompassing 4 to 5 fishing trips.

Increases in pay would occur initially with acquiring general experience and subsequently with assuming positions of greater responsibilities. The promotion order would vary between vessels but would generally be unspecialised deck crew, speedboat driver, winchman, mastman, skiffman, and deck boss. The highest level to which Pacific Islanders have reached in the US fleet appears to be deck boss ($10 to $13 per ton). Although the pay rates for the senior officers are considerably higher ($15 to $40 per tonne for the Captain), US law (46 USC 8304) stipulates that US registered fishing vessels over 200 gross tons must have a US Coast Guard licensed master and a licensed chief engineer and US citizenship is a requirement for those licenses.

5.2 Japanese Purse Seine Fleet

Japanese tuna purse seine vessels started experimental fishing in the 1960s in tropical waters and by the mid-1970s were carrying out year-round operations in the Pacific Islands. According to Doulman (1987), both Japanese government and industry saw merit in using US vessel design and technology, hence Japanese purse seiners of today have visual resemblance to older US seiners. By 1980 there were 47

13 Japanese seiners operating in the western Pacific (Matsuda 1987). Japanese domestic legislation specifies the maximum fleet size (35 vessels), the maximum vessel size (under 500 grt), area of operation (restricted to the west of the dateline), and various other attributes (e.g. ban on helicopter use, requirement for daily radio reporting).

There are presently 35 Japanese single purse seiners on the Regional Register. Most of the single seiners are 499 grt tonnes and about 62 metres in length except for the larger research vessels.

The Japanese purse seine fleet is based in Yaizu, Japan to the south of Tokyo. There is, however, a Japanese-style joint venture purse seiner, the F/V Kao, which is registered in Kiribati, manned by Japanese officers and Kiribati deck crew, and owned by the Japanese Otoshiro Company (51%) and Kiribati government (49%). That vessel is home-ported in Tarawa, but frequently visits other ports in the region.

Up until 1990 the crew of Japanese purse seiners was exclusively Japanese. Typically the captain would be a youngish graduate of a fishing university, the fishing master (who actually controls most the vessel’s activity) a much older seasoned fisherman, and the deck crew a mixture of mature ex-longline fishermen and young recruits. In 1990, at the request of the FSM government, Japanese purse seiners began accepting trainees from FSM. According to Micronesian Maritime Authority (MMA) staff, there are presently 45 Micronesians, including 10 trainees working on vessels of the fleet. Seven of these men have been in the scheme for more than 2 years with two serving for 74 months. Information obtained in Kiribati shows that two Japanese seiners have at least some Kiribati crew. It is probably not coincidental that the nationality of the foreigners in the crew reflect to some degree the origin of the catch: about half of the catch comes from FSM waters. Indonesians also work aboard these Japanese vessels. It appears that the typical Japanese purse seiner operating in the Pacific Islands area will carry predominantly Japanese crew with a few Micronesians (FSM and to a much lesser extent, Kiribati) and Indonesians.

The foreign crew on Japanese seiners, as well as on other Japanese tuna vessels, are recruited through official channels. There is presently a employment scheme involving the Japan Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing Association (Kaimaki), Overseas Fisheries Cooperative Foundation (OFCF), and the FSM government agencies (MMA and various state entities). Although The Micronesian Maritime and Fisheries Academy (MMFA, Section 8.1.1) in Yap was originally involved, it no longer participates directly in the scheme. In July 1990 group training commenced and in October 1990 Kaimaki began employing trained Micronesians. By January 1997 a cumulative total of about 70 FSM citizens had been trained and placed aboard Japanese purse seiners. Japanese sources indicated that of the first 26 Micronesians placed aboard, 11 individuals quit before the end of the first fishing trip necessitating vessel diversion for offloading. This high attrition rate resulted in corrective action which now includes compiling information on the reasons for quitting, more emphasis on screening, accepting for training individuals with a relationship to existing Micronesian crew with the hope of the new crew being well aware of the hardships, concentration on Kosrae crew which has shown the highest success rate, and port calls at Kosrae so that families and possible future crew could visit the vessels. It also appears that a policy was introduced in which at least two 48

foreigners of the same nationality (or in the case of FSM, from the same state) are placed on each vessel.

The small number of Kiribati seamen working on Japanese seiners are all graduates of the Fisheries Training Centre in Tarawa where they have undergone an intensive six to nine month course (Section 8.1.1), including Japanese language instruction. They subsequently obtained their employment aboard the Japanese vessels through Kiribati Fisherman Services Co. Ltd., a Kiribati-based manning agency owned largely by Japanese interests.

Less is known about the recruitment of Indonesians for work aboard Japanese seiners. The fact that there is training in Japan for Indonesian fishermen, reportedly with OFCF sponsorship, implies some form of official channel for employment.

The living conditions aboard Japanese seiners are quite good. Vessels are generally clean and the food is good, but the living space is limited. The FFA Regional Register indicates 705 crew on the 35 vessels or an average of 20 per vessel, which is slightly more crew in a space considerably smaller than that afforded by US seiners. The conditions are, however, better than those of the non-US fleets. Living spaces are air conditioned and there is video entertainment in each of the crew cabins, as well as hot/cold fresh water showers and usually a large hot tub for Japanese-style communal bathing. On most Japanese seiners alcohol consumption from personal supplies is permitted and this has been the source of problems with some Pacific Island crew. A minor difficulty is that morning and noon meals are usually very rapidly consumed which may conflict with Pacific Islander habits of eating at a more leisurely pace.

Working conditions on Japanese seiners do not differ remarkably from seiners from other countries working in the region. Compared to US seiners, less time is spent on housekeeping duties, but more time is spent using the binoculars searching for signs of tuna (no helicopter is carried). In the early days of the seine fishery in the Pacific Islands, Japanese seiners were primarily involved with log fishing (as opposed to setting on free-swimming schools) which in many cases meant that only one set of the net was made each day, with the remainder of the work day being devoted to the more leisurely searching activities or drifting. This situation has evolved since then so that the Japanese seiners are making a somewhat higher proportion of school fish sets (about 15% on a recent observer trip). This means additional work for the crew, but still considerably less sets and consequently less setting-related work than on US seiners. Japanese vessels, due to the fish storage configuration require considerable work in the shifting of frozen fish.

The Japanese fishermen are more reserved than other nationalities and there is less yelling and almost no physical altercations on the vessels.

On all tuna purse seiners regardless of nationality, the major tasks for the deck crew is stacking net (Appendix 1), searching with binoculars, sorting fishing, splicing cable, and auxiliary vessel operation. Deck crew on Japanese seiners often perform swimming work: attaching beacons to logs, setting rafts, and some manipulations of the net.

49

With regards to contractual arrangements, during the first year on the job the FSM fishermen are considered trainees and receive a stipend payment in lieu of a salary. According to MMA officials this stipend is presently US$21 per day ($630/month). Salary for more experienced crew was more difficult to determine and the information received during discussions is of unknown credibility. A Japanese source indicated the average salary for an FSM citizen is 160,000 yen per month which at 90 yen to the dollar is $US1,777 but at the more recent exchange rate of 122 to the dollar is US$1,333. An FSM source stated that the salaries could go as high as $1,600 for a deck boss. The salary is not dependent on the catch, but there appears to be a bonus for good crewmen. An SPC observer reports that FSM deck crew earn US$800 per month, plus a bonus which is 20% of the value of all fish over 600 metric tonnes on each trip and is shared amongst the crew. The employment period for crew from FSM is one year, which includes one month of leave. The employer pays the insurance, airfares, and transit expenses.

The contractual arrangements for Kiribati crew on Japanese purse seiners is likely to be similar to that for Kiribati crew on Japanese pole/line vessels. That is, A$470 (US$361) monthly for the first year, A$585 for the second year, and A$660 for subsequent years according to the contract document. These amounts are the base wage plus an allowance, but do not include a bonus which could be up to 1.5 month’s wage each year.

Promotion of Pacific Islanders to officer level does not appear possible. Although a few crew from the region (e.g. two from Kiribati) have accumulated the sea time, attended the officer training courses, and passed the required examinations, they are not able to become officers on fishing vessels registered in Japan due to Japanese domestic legislation. At the present time the deck boss level appears to be the most senior position available to Pacific Islanders on Japanese seiners.

Fishing trips on Japanese seiners average about 40 days in length and there are usually about 10 days in Yaizu between trips. More trip time is spent in transit on Japanese vessels than on the other seiners because the vessels unload in Japan which is distant from the fishing grounds.

5.3 Korean Purse Seine Fleet

The Korean purse seine fleet in the Pacific Islands consisted of two vessels in 1980, grew to 39 vessels in 1990, but was reduced to 30 in 1995 (SPC 1996). In the 1995/96 Regional Register, 29 Korean seiners were listed. Many of the Korean vessels are former US vessels (e.g. Bold Producer, Lady Marion) and a few are ex- European seiners. All of the newly-built Korean vessels are similar to US vessels in design, rather than that of the Japanese.

Korean seiners primarily fish in the waters of PNG, FSM, and the Solomon Islands, but they have been known to follow US seiners to more distant fishing grounds. Agents in Guam have stated that 80% of the Korean seine fleet occasionally makes port calls in Guam. These vessels regularly tranship at Chuuk in FSM and many (perhaps 10 vessels) are nominally part of joint venture operations in the Solomons. Some port calls in PNG occur. 50

Information on crew on Korean purse seine vessels is more difficult to obtain than for the US or Japanese fleets. Sources of information for his study were limited to reports from four observer trips undertaken by SPC staff, and discussions with a Korean shipping/manning agent in Honiara and with a Korean captain aboard a Korean purse seiner in Guam.

During the study the crew composition of five Korean purse seine vessels was determined. The vessel based in Guam had 15 Koreans, 6 Indonesians, and 1 Filipino. The Korean purse seiners which carried SPC observers (all of which fished at least part of the time in the Solomon Islands and presumably part of a joint venture operation) carried primarily a Korean crew and a few Solomon Islanders each, with one vessel having one Indonesian. American helicopter pilots are reported to be common in the fleet. From these limited observations it appears as though all officer and key deck crew are Korean with the foreign crew being Indonesian or, in some cases, Solomon Islander.

On Korean purse seiners foreign crew appears to be recruited through manning agencies. There are a large number of these agencies in the Philippines and Indonesia (Section 8.5). At least two agencies in Honiara perform some recruiting functions for Korean purse seiners.

The living conditions appear to be good aboard Korean purse seiners. Because many of the vessels are ex-US seiners or based on that design, the accommodation spaces are large. On most vessels living spaces are air conditioned, there are hot/cold showers, and there is a video in the galley for the deck crew. SPC Pacific Island observers who have spent time on both Japanese and Korean purse seiners feel that the living conditions are about the same in the two fleets.

Working conditions are probably more strenuous on Korean vessels than on the US and Japanese fleets. According to SPC data (SPC 1996) the average catch for a Korean seiner in 1995 (5,848 metric tonnes) was substantially above that of the US (3,792 mt), Japan (4,751 mt), and Taiwan (4,017), implying the Korean are spending more time at sea, making more sets, and generally working harder. Actual work performed during a set by the deck crew would be about the same for all fleets working in the region. According to a Korean agent, most of the problems which arise while working stem from communication difficulties between the various language groups aboard: nearly all the Koreans and Indonesians speak only their native language. Some individuals with knowledge of the Korean seiners (e.g. workers at net repair facilities) feel that the officers on Korean vessels are verbally harsher on their foreign crew than officers on other fleets.

Koreans have transshipment points located close to the western Pacific fishing grounds (e.g. Chuuk, Wewak) and less time is lost in transit than for some other fleets. They are also known for scheduling port visits based on availability of carriers rather than waiting for a full load, as the vertically-integrated Korean skipjack industry can allow such practices more readily than some other fleets. The amount of time spent in a port city (as opposed to a transshipment harbour) and consequently the recreational opportunities for the crew would be relatively small. Judging from the catches in 1995, the trip lengths would somewhat shorter than in the US or 51

Japanese fleets. During the study there was some mention that the Korean operators are dissatisfied with Guam and those vessels based there are contemplating a move.

The skills required for the different jobs aboard would be equivalent to that of the US or Japanese fleets. The one Korean captain interviewed for this study indicated potential recruits must possess some seiner-relevant skills in order to be considered for work aboard.

Little is known of employment contract information. It is likely that the Korean owners have a contract with the Philippine and Indonesian manning agencies and those agencies have a contract with the crew (Section 8.5). The Honiara businesses which procure crew for Korean purse seiners indicate that they are just facilitators of employment and not recruiting agents. This role may be a result of the legal responsibilities that some countries (e.g. Fiji) place on labor agents. It appears that the contract period on most Korean seiners is for one year.

The Korean captain indicated his Korean/Indonesian/Filipino crew were paid on a base salary plus catch bonus system. On one SPC observer trip the Solomon Islanders aboard the Korean seiner were reportedly paid US$140 monthly and on another observed vessel the crew were paid $1 per tonne (the source was unsure if it was US dollars or Solomon Islands dollars) plus an unloading bonus. From this limited information it appears as though the Pacific Islanders aboard Korean seiners are not well paid. It also serves to explain the contention of a Honiara agent that “most Solomons crew run away after each trip”.

A Honiara agent explained that promotions of Pacific Islanders on the vessel would be very difficult. This is reflected in the statement by an SPC observer: “Two Solomon Islanders were employed on the boat, but once again only in the lowest position. Language barriers and cultural prejudices are major if not total barriers to any improvements in their positions on these boats.”

5.4 Taiwan Purse Seine Fleet

The increase in the Taiwan purse seine fleet in the Pacific Islands followed a similar evolution to that of the Koreans: three vessels operating in 1983 expanded to 42 vessels in 1995 according to SPC data. However, with impetus for their involvement coming from Japanese trading companies, they first followed a Japanese model and began operations with group purse seiners which were constructed in Taiwan and initially operated with commercial Japanese technical assistance. This however was abandoned as the Japanese single purse seiners proved viable, and the focus was shifted in Taiwan to building single seiners. The fleet now includes both US-style vessels (built in Taiwan under arrangements with the US shipyard, Marco) which are capable of carrying helicopters as well as the more standard vessels based on the Japanese design.

At least some of the Taiwanese seiners are nominally involved in joint venture arrangements in the Solomons. During 1995 the Taiwanese purse seine fleet fished almost exclusively in PNG, FSM, and in the international waters between the two 52

countries. The vessels tranship in Yap, Guam, and in Wewak, which unlike some other ports in PNG, there is no requirement to use local stevedores to transfer fish.

It was only possible to obtain crew composition information for three Taiwanese purse seiners during the study: an MMA-observed vessel in 1994, an SPC-observed vessel in 1994, and one which was transshipping in Yap in February 1997. In general they appear to carry Taiwanese officers, about half the deck crew is Chinese, and the remainder on two vessels was Filipino, whereas on the vessel in Yap it was “mountain Taiwanese”, according to the US helicopter pilot. The crew size ranged from 25 to 28. It has been reported that one of the reasons for the relatively large crew on these vessels is for shifting and sorting fish during the course of the fishing trip as well as off-loading during transshipment. Although most Taiwanese seiners carried Japanese fishing experts during the earlier phases of fleet development, it was reported by their association that only one such advisor remains in the fleet today.

No recruitment information was available on the fleet. It is assumed that the crews of the various nationalities are recruited as groups by the manning agencies in the Philippines, China, and Indonesia (Section 8.5).

From the limited information available, it appears that the living and working conditions aboard the Taiwanese seiners are the worst of the major seine fleets operating in the Pacific Islands area. It should be noted, however, that purse seine standards are considerably above those of the longline fleet and it may well be that conditions aboard the worst seiners could compare favourably to those aboard any Asian longliner.

According to the FFA Regional Register the average Taiwanese seiner carries 25 crew as compared to 19 on US vessels, 20 on Japanese vessels, and 23 on Korean vessels. The relatively large crew aboard Taiwanese seiners coupled with the smaller size of vessel means less living space for each crewmember. At least some seiners in the fleet do not have air conditioned rooms for the crew. The vessel transshipping in Yap was reported by the helicopter pilot as being very dirty and having numerous rats aboard, cockroaches in the food, and, as a mechanism to save the water, the Captain’s waste shower water is retained for use by the crew. The pilot also stated the amount of yelling and aggressive behaviour during a set was great, but “no more so than by San Diego Portuguese fishermen”. He also witnessed several fights aboard during tense periods.29

The catch per day searching/fishing of Taiwanese purse seiners (20.5 mt per day in 1995 according to SPC) is substantially less than the Koreans (30.8 mt). This supports the anecdotal information indicating that most fishing is log-associated, suggesting fewer sets per day and less work for the crew. On the other hand, crews aboard Taiwanese purse seine vessels work particularly hard in shifting fish during the voyage, and in stevedoring the fish in port for transshipment.

29 In January, 1997 a Taiwanese captain was stabbed and killed in Yap while trying to intercede in a fight between Chinese and Filipino crewmen. 53

Wage information from the deck crew is difficult to obtain but it appears as though the crew are paid at a level about the same as longliners: $300 to 400 US per month, but costing the employer considerably more than this due to the commissions and extra charges of the manning agencies (Section 8.5).

5.5 Japanese Longline Fleet

Tuna longlining is said to have been developed in Japan over 250 years ago. The Japanese introduced it in its present form (motorised vessels, mechanical deck equipment, and basket gear) into Micronesia in the 1920s (Preston 1996). The number of longliners increased greatly, but the fleet was severely damaged in World War II. A series of geographic restrictions were placed on the fleet by the US after the war but their removal in 1952 began a period of expansion. Japanese longlining eventually covered most of the world’s oceans. In the 1950s and early 1960s Japanese longliners were operating from bases in American Samoa, Vanuatu, and Fiji and targeting tuna for canning. In the mid-1960s the Japanese began shifting away from the canning market as higher costs of operation and the rapid rise of the Japanese economy redirected investment into newer more sophisticated deep freezer vessels. These vessels, which targeted sashimi-grade tuna, offered the dual advantages of a greater profit margin and production for a uniquely Japanese market. The void in longlining for canning was filled by longliners registered in Korea and then Taiwan. A fairly recent Japanese development is the basing of small Okinanwan longliners in Guam, Palau, and various ports in FSM.

Presently there are 477 Japanese longliners on the FFA Regional Register.

Most of the vessels in the distant water longline fleet are about 500 gross registered tonnes and 44 metres in length. A vessel of this size would carry about 19 to 20 crew. This type of longliner are mainly based in the ports of Misaki, Yaizu and Shimizu The Okinawan longliners based Guam, Palau, and FSM are about 20 grt and carry 8 to 10 crew. They fish within a few days of Guam and Pohnpei.

The crew on the larger distant water tuna longliners is about 60% to 70% Japanese, with about 4,500 foreigners working in the fleet. Japanese industry sources indicated that the non-Japanese are Indonesians (75%), Filipinos (12%), and Peru (4%), with some crew from Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. A manning agent in Honiara reported 15 Solomon Islanders on 3 Japanese longliners licensed to fish in that zone. The main manning agency in Tarawa reports have Kiribati crew on seven Japanese longliners.

It appears as though the Japanese (unlike the Taiwanese and Koreans), are more apt to have all the foreign crew aboard a particular vessel from the same country. For example, a 500 grt Japanese longliner which carried an SPC observer while operating the New Caledonia zone had a crew of 14 Japanese and 7 Indonesians.

The 20 to 30 smaller 20 grt vessels operating out of Guam usually have a Japanese captain, sometimes a Japanese engineer, and seven/eight Filipinos or seven/eight Indonesians. The eight 20 grt Japanese longliners base in Pohnpei during the study period have about the same crew arrangements but 3 FSM citizens are among the 54

deck crew. In the past the Micronesians made up as much as 30% of the crew, but according to the agent, “slackness” in port was responsible for much of the attrition.

Manning agents in the Philippines and Indonesia (Section 8.5) apparently supply much of the foreign crew for Japanese longliners. Several sources mentioned a school for Indonesian crew in Japan and this would presumably be involved in the recruitment process. The Kiribati men aboard the Japanese longliners must complete a 6 to 9 month course in Tarawa and are then recruited through the largely Japanese-owned manning agency, Kiribati Fisherman Services. Solomon Islanders are hired through a Honiara-based commercial shipping agent. Up to the present many newly-recruited crews were picked up by the Japanese distant water longliners in Guam. Majuro has also been a favoured location for meeting and disembarking foreign crew in the past. Intended fishing locations, air fares and schedules, crew origins, and other factors can all influence which port(s) are used for this purpose.

Working conditions aboard any longliner are tough. Regardless of the fleet, work for the deck crew on a longliner involves long hours (16 hours per day, 7 days per week is not uncommon) and lack of sufficient sleep is an often heard complaint. Reasonably clean and comfortable living conditions can make the work more bearable and contribute to overall crew comfort. Living conditions aboard the larger Japanese longliners is deemed adequate by ex-crew. Cabins are generally air- conditioned, living space is sufficient, and the food is good. Living conditions are much worse on the smaller Japanese longliners, but the shorter trips make the conditions more bearable. The amount of work performed by a longline crew each day is greatly influenced by the number of crew shifts. For this study it was not always possible to determine for each fleet the number of shifts working on board. It is suspected (but not verified) that the larger Japanese vessels have at least two shifts, while the smaller vessels could be expected to have one or possibly two.

Besides lack of sleep, the other major problem for Pacific Islanders, especially on the larger Japanese vessels, is having to work in the very cold freezer. After what are perceived as being long trips, the work required in port (offloading, cleaning, preparing gear) is thought by many Pacific Islanders as being excessive and has caused problems with vessel managers.

A description of skills required on a longliner is given in Appendix 2.

With respect to training/skills, the Japanese longline vessel operators are quite unlike the Taiwanese. The latter feel that training/skills are not crucial and that desire to work hard overrides all other factors. The Japanese prefer to recruit crew with skills, have established schools for crew in at least two locations, and give preference to hiring graduates. They feel that training to work the specialised longline equipment is important, as well as the skill of making up the fishing gear. The spoken Japanese language, as well as on-board discipline, are considered skills which should be learned.

The small 19 grt vessels mainly based in Micronesia usually stay out 16 to 19 days. Many of the larger Japanese longliners fishing in the Pacific Ocean have voyages which last just less than a year. Kiribati crewmen report that their longline trips to the Pacific Islands area are 3 to 4 months in duration, while the ones to the eastern 55

Pacific are much longer. Some Japanese longliners which fish other oceans have 18 month trips.

It was not possible to obtain a copy of a crew contract for Japanese longliners during the study, but some salary information was obtained. For the larger freezer vessels: • Information from former Solomon Island crew indicates they were paid US$200 per month plus $2 per tonne of tuna which equated to about $270 per month for a recent 3 month trip. • Information from Kiribati suggests that fishermen on Japanese longliners are paid about 10% more than their counterparts on Japanese pole/line vessels or about US$400 a month for a first year fisherman to $500 for one with more than two years of experience plus a discretionary bonus each year which reportedly could be up to 1.5 month’s wage. • An SPC observer reports that Indonesians are paid US$350 to $500 a month plus some form of bonus.

For the smaller 19 grt vessels: • A Filipino crewman in Guam reports that through his Manila agency first year crew earn a flat rate of US$360 per month on Guam-based boats and after one year the rate is increased to $524. • According to the Japanese agent, Micronesians working on Pohnpei-based 19 grt vessels earn US$400 per month and the Indonesians and Filipinos “earn about the same”.

It appears that the contracts for foreign crew on Japanese vessels are for one year. An SPC observer report contained an interesting observation: “The Bosun explained to me that the Indonesians only lasted one year and disharmony within the crew which arose after about 8 months into the boat’s yearly cycle, generally took the lines of the Japanese vs the Indonesians”.

As for the Japanese purse seine vessels, promotion to officer level on Japan- registered longliners is not possible due to Japanese legislation. Little information is available on the possibility of promotion from unspecialised deck crew to a more senior non-officer job (e.g. bosun).

5.6 Korean Longline Fleet

Korea began tuna longline fishing in the Pacific Islands in the late 1950s, over thirty years after the Japanese commenced their operations in Micronesia. Starting in the early 1950s Korean longliners were based in American Samoa, Fiji, and Vanuatu. The Korean fleet expanded rapidly and by 1974 there were 270 vessels fishing in the Pacific (Park et al. 1991). According to Reipen (1987), a number of developments took place in the mid-1970s: longlining for albacore slumped due to lower prices, some Korean longliners began targeting tuna for the sashimi market using second- hand Japanese vessels, and the fleet (unlike the Japanese at that time) began unloading their catches directly onto ultra-cold reefer vessels.

The Korean longline fleet now consists of about 150 vessels in the Pacific ocean, of which 105 are on the FFA Regional Register. Information from American Samoa and 56

Fiji suggests that there are less than 10 conventional Korean longliners operating in the Pacific Islands30, and therefore the vast majority of the 105 Korean vessels on the register are of the sashimi type. According to a Korean agent in Suva there are presently 150 to 170 Korean longliners in the Atlantic and about 100 in the Indian Ocean. This number is significantly different than that given in Table 6.

The average size of the Korean longliners, as judged from the Regional Register is 456 grt. American Samoa immigration records show that vessels of that size carry a total of about 24 crew.

The sashimi-type Korean longliners are based in Korea and call into various ports in the region to tranship sashimi-grade tuna, to discharge non-sashimi fish, and to take on supplies. Because the fishery has moved to the eastern portion of the Pacific islands in recent times, many port calls are made in Tahiti. An agent in Guam stated that he is unaware of any Korean longliner visiting Guam in recent years. Most of the foreign crew appears to join vessels in Korea.

Discussions with agents/crew and examination of immigration records indicates that the Korean prefer not to have all the foreigners of one nationality, apparently to prevent crew solidarity in tense periods. Crew is obtained from China (the majority), Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, and to a lesser extent Kiribati and perhaps Tuvalu. The crew manifest of the Korean longliner Chance 803 appears typical: Korea (captain plus 6 men), China (10 men), Vietnam (3), Solomons (2), and Vanuatu (2). From Table 2 it can be seen there are about 220 Pacific Islanders working in the Korean longline fleet, many of whom are probably working outside the Pacific Islands area or even in a different ocean. Several sources mentioned that the Chinese crew on Korean vessels come from “Korean China” (presumably an area of China near the Korean border) where the language, culture, and food is similar to that of Korea.

Korean vessels obtain their Pacific Island crew through manning agents. It is known that there at least two such commercial agencies in Suva. In Vanuatu the government-owned South Pacific Fishing Company procures crew for Korean longliners. For Asian crew, there are many manning agents in the Philippines and Indonesia. Apparently, the Koreans have opened a school for longline crew in “Korean China”31 which would presumably be involved in recruitment of Chinese crew.

Three groups of ex-Korean longline crew from Fiji and Kiribati were interviewed and indicated that excessive work hours, lack of sleep, and poor food at the end of a trip were the major problems. The conditions were probably not completely intolerable as all crewmen interviewed had completed from two to five one-year contracts. One Kiribati fishermen explained that, over a series of five contracts on the same vessel, initial hostility between the Korean captain and the crew evolved into a feeling of mutual respect. The on-board relationship are not always this amiable: the issue of poor treatment of Kiribati crew on Korean longliners was brought up in the Kiribati parliament in September 1990, apparently in response the dismissal of an entire

30 This would include the longliners owned by Korean interests but registered in Latin America. 31 One agent mentioned that the school was located in Yanpyum(?) City. 57

Kiribati crew. It was not possible to identify crew who had worked on both Korean and Taiwanese vessels, but a former Fijian crew of Korean longliners who had friends working on Taiwanese longliners felt the conditions were better with the Koreans because of the higher degree of mechanisation aboard. It appears as though more English is spoken by Korean vessel officers than Taiwanese officers.

There have been numerous allegations by Pacific Island crew of maltreatment by the longline vessel officers. Because this appears more prevalent on Taiwanese longliners (apparently about twice as often as on Korean longliners), it is discussed in the Taiwanese longline section (section 5.7).

The trips are very long. It appears as though most vessels depart from Korea and return after nine to ten months with an occasional port call for unloading or supplies. These Korean vessel voyages are about three times the length of those on the Taiwanese longliners based in Fiji or American Samoa.

Several contracts for work aboard Korean longliners by Pacific Islanders were examined. Major features of the contract most often used for Korean longliners in Kiribati are: • If ownership of vessel changes during the course of the contract, crewmember shall be offered repatriation at the expense of the former owner • Employment period of between 10 and 14 months at the master’s discretion • Severance pay of 2 months if contract terminated prematurely and this termination not crewmembers fault • For (a) recruitment (b) completion of contract and (c) early termination due to illness and accident, all transportation charges and reasonable living expenses en route to be paid by employer • If early termination caused by the mis-behaviour of the crewmember, repatriation expenses to be shared equally • Wages are US$300 per crewmember plus a fish bonus of US$2 per ton • Hours of work to be determined by master but a total of 6 hours rest in 24 hours shall be given • Safety helmet, raincoat, 2 boiler suits (for each 5 months), hand gloves, and rubber boots to be supplied to crew • Accident insurance giving coverage at least as favourable as that stipulated by the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance shall be provided by the employer • In the case of disability, the basic wage shall be paid from the date of disability for a period not to exceed 6 weeks.

Features of the contract used by a Korean commercial manning agency in Fiji: • Contract is for period of year • In the event the either party wishes to terminate the contract “a month’s notice on pay in lieu of notice shall be given to the other party” • Wages are $260 per month • 50% of the wages are to be paid to a specified party, 50% are retained by the employer until fulfilment of contract. If the contract is “prematurely 58

frustrated” by the employee, the employer shall have the right to recover expenses including repatriation from the 50%. • “Crews will be paid when departing Fiji until disembarkation from vessel on their own reason”. • Shore allowance of US$40 shall be paid to each crew member at the completion of each trip. In the case of the sale of shark fin, there is no shore allowance and the proceeds from the shark fin sale shall be shared equally among the crew. • Crew shall work on Saturday, Sundays, and holidays during the fishing operation and a work day can “be up to 16 to 20 hours per day”. • Leave and “housing accommodation” provisions appear to be taken from the Fiji Employment Act. • A pack of cigarettes per day is to be provided during the term of embarkation • Contract is to be attested by a government official before employee departs from Fiji • Added note (from the Fiji Employment Act) stating contract must not exceed one year if the employee is not accompanied by his family.

The wages paid to Fijian crew are presently US$240 to $260 per month (depending on the agency) plus sharkfin sales which on a recent 10 month voyage resulted a total of US$300 per Fijian. This is perceived by Fijians as being substantial better than the US$214 paid on Taiwanese longliners. The wages presently paid to Kiribati fishermen on Korean longliners are US$300 to $400 per month depending on experience plus a $2 per tonne bonus which during a recent one-year contract totaled $700.

The Korean agent in American Samoa reports the cost of employing a Pacific Islander is about the same as for Chinese, Filipinos, and Indonesians but greater than that for Vietnamese. The Korean agent in Suva indicated the cost of employing a Chinese crew was greater than for the other nationalities. This may be related to the fact that it is customary for the manning agency in China to bear the cost of transporting crew to replace failed crew.

As evidenced from the graduated salary scale, crewmen receive increases in wages. There also appears to be some sort of advancement in rank on board. This can produce some friction aboard. A Kiribati crewmember reported that his biggest problems aboard was that after his promotion to second bosun, the other nationalities of deck crew (Vietnamese, Indonesians, and Chinese) at times refused to follow his orders. The comments on promotion of Pacific Islanders to officer level on Korean seiners (Section 5.3) would also be applicable to longliners.

5.7 Taiwanese Longline Fleet

Taiwan's domestic tuna fishery began under the Japanese occupation during the early part of this century and as such was controlled by the Japanese as more or less an extension of their own fishery. The Taiwanese entered the longline fishery in the Pacific Islands several years after the Koreans and several decades after the Japanese. The fleet originally supplied tuna to the cannery in American Samoa, but 59

expanded its operation with additional bases in Fiji and Vanuatu. This fleet, targeting tuna for canning, peaked in size in the mid-1970s with about 200 vessels (Wang 1991) and has since declined. The Vanuatu base closed several years ago, there are now only about 16 Fiji-associated vessels, and the fleet in American Samoa is now reduced to about 30 vessels32.

With respect to employment of Pacific Islanders, two other types of Taiwanese longliners are important: • The relative small vessels fishing from Micronesian ports, using ice (rather than refrigeration) and targeting sashimi tuna. There are 25 in Majuro, about 25 in Palau, and seasonally nearly 200 of these vessels fish from Guam. • Far seas deep freezer longliners, most of which operate in the Indian Ocean

The FFA Regional Register lists a total of 127 Taiwanese longliners for the 1995/96 period.

The Taiwanese longliners in Fiji and American Samoa are mainly older vessels of 150 to 250 grt in size. The Micronesian-based vessels are all about 60 grt. The Taiwanese longliners in Singapore are large deep freezer vessels in the 400 to 700 grt size class.

The three Taiwanese fleets above have remarkably different crew composition. The cannery vessels in Fiji and American Samoa in former years had a deck crew of 2 to 5 Fijians, 2 to 5 men from Vanuatu, and some Asians, but now have about 90% from China. It is estimated that at the end of 1996 there were about 50 Pacific Islanders working on those vessels. The Chinese recruited recently are from non-coastal provinces and have little longlining or even seagoing experience.

The smaller offshore longliners that began basing in Guam and FSM in the late 1980’s first used crew from the Philippines. However around this time some Taiwanese tuna companies began operating in sashimi fisheries in Indonesia, and seamen from that country were also employed. Both Indonesian and Philippine crew were already experienced in fisheries in their own countries, and some had longline experience before joining Taiwanese vessels. The Taiwanese longliners presently based in Micronesia typically have Taiwanese captains and engineers with the deck crew from Philippines, Indonesia, and China. Specific crew information was obtained on 23 of the 25 Taiwanese vessels in Majuro: 46 Taiwanese officers and 203 deck crew which were comprised of 10 Filipinos (5% of total deck crew), 104 Indonesians (51%), and 89 Chinese (44%).

According to Taiwanese industry sources, most of the Indian Ocean deep freezer vessels use Chinese crew. Information from Vanuatu indicates they employ about 70 Vanuatu men or about 70% of all Vanuatu men presently working on Taiwanese vessels. Apparently, those crewmen originally served aboard Taiwanese albacore longliners and the transition to the deep freezer vessels was not difficult.

32 Due to the mobility of the fleet and problems with the cannery in Fiji, some of the Fiji-associated vessels may be among those counted as being based in Pagopago. 60

The crews are recruited through various agencies. In Vanuatu the government- owned South Pacific Fishing Company (SPFC) has an arrangement with the Ming Dar Fishing Co. of Taiwan whereby each is the sole agent for Vanuatu crew in their respective countries. In Fiji the government-owned Pacific Fishing Company (PAFCO) was formerly the agent for Fijian crew aboard Taiwanese longliners but now the commercial agent Burns Philp Shipping performs the function. There are a large number of manning agencies in Indonesia (Malindo Mitra Perkasa Co. of Jakarta supplies crew to Majuro-based vessels) and the Philippines (Jupiter Maritime Corp. supplies crew to some Guam-based vessels). Less is known about the agents in China (Section 8.5).

Only limited information was obtained on the recruitment practices of the various agencies, apart from that of SPFC. Agents, crew, government officials, and an FFA consultant (Brown 1995) feel that the procedures used by the Government-appointed managers of SPFC to select and subsequently administer Vanuatu crew were poor and were at least partially responsible for the decline in Vanuatu men on Taiwanese vessels.

The living and working conditions would be different between the cannery longliners in Fiji/Samoa and the sashimi vessels in Micronesia. Little is known of the condition on the Taiwanese vessels based in Singapore, other than the voyages are much longer.

As for the Japanese and Korean longliners (Sections 5.5 and 5.6), life aboard a Taiwanese longliner is not easy and the working conditions are strenuous. Judging from crew experiences and observer comments, the situation on Fiji/Samoa-based Taiwanese vessels appears to be less desirable that those of any fleets where Pacific Islanders are presently working. Older vessels, long trips, low degree of mechanisation, and very long working hours all contribute to the level of hardships aboard. The vessels characteristically are noisy inside, have poor ventilation and lighting, and there is no fresh water available for bathing. Pacific Islanders are frequently disturbed at the proximity of the food preparation areas to the toilet facilities. Even for those crewmembers that accept the lifestyle (as indicated by the completion of several contracts), there is the feeling that in periods of sickness or injury, the rest/recovery period allowed by the vessel captain is inadequate. The Taiwanese seem reluctant to return to port for even serious injuries. Another frequently heard complaint by Pacific Islanders is that many of the Chinese aboard are totally inexperienced in longlining and are lazy.

The sub-optimal conditions aboard the Fiji/Samoa vessels are probably aggravated by the length of the trips and made even worse by recent changes. These trips have historically been 3 to 5 months in length. At least for many of the Pago Pago-based cannery longliners, only one call at the home base per year is now made, with transshipment on the high seas or in a French port, apparently to reduce port charge and/or pollution-related fines. Taiwanese sources indicate that the Singapore-based deep freezer vessels have voyages that last about a year.

Pacific Island crew have made allegations of maltreatment by the vessel officers. Because the news media in the region occasionally contains stories on this topic, an 61 attempt was made to determine their validity by contacting the appropriate Senior Labour Officer in Fiji’s Ministry of Labour and Industrial Relations. The officer explained that about 70 percent of such complaints involved Taiwanese longliners with the remainder being from Korean longliners. The usual case is for the Fijian crew to dispute with the vessel officers over the excessive work hours and, because of frustration’s due to language problems, a physical altercation may occur after which the vessel returns to port. In port, the Fijian crew is most often dismissed and there will frequently be a dispute over wages not yet paid. According to the Labour Officer, most of these disputes will be settled out of court, primarily in favour of the Fijian crew. The Labour Officer had not dealt with, and was not aware of, any such cases involving serious injury or death.

Labour disputes on Taiwanese longliners are not limited to Pacific Islanders. Brown (1996) reports that the 11 Chinese crew of a Taiwanese vessel visiting Port Vila in July 1996 went on strike and demanded to be repatriated.

The conditions aboard the smaller Taiwanese longliners based in Micronesia are remarkably different. Although the living space is smaller, the vessels are much newer. It is reported that the vessels are reasonably clean, well-ventilated, and have video for crew entertainment. Because the vessels use ice, they return to port to discharge the fresh fish catch about every 16 to 18 days. During the port calls the crew is allowed some free time and food supplies are replenished.

For the vessels operating from Fiji and American Samoa, the monthly base pay for Fijian crew is F$300 (US$214) and that for Vanuatu crew is Vt 25,000 (US$225). To this amount is added money for the sharkfins which according to ex-crewmen can be $400 to $1100 per man per trip. Information on the wages of Chinese deck crew was obtained from the Chinese themselves and from Pacific Island crew, observers, and agents. It appears that their pay may range from US$150 (source: SPC observer) to $300 (source: agents, Chinese crew) plus proceeds from sharkfin sales. Detailed salary information was obtained for Indonesians on the smaller Taiwanese longliners based in Micronesia: crewmen on their first one-year contract with are paid by the Jakarta agent US$240 per month plus $60 per trip which equates to slight less than $360 per month. For the second one-year contract the rate is $310 plus $160 per trip, and finally for the third contract they receive $350 plus $100 per trip or slightly less than $550 per month.

Sharkfin is interesting because it has a large effect on the total wage package on most fleets. According to one Taiwanese boat owner, it is possible to double the wages if shark catches have been good and the vessel has the opportunity to land the shark fin in a port where high prices are paid, such as Singapore. The type of fishing gear used has an affect on the numbers of sharks caught. Those vessels which switch to monofilament leaders tend to land fewer sharks, and the crews do not like this. Ports with few shark buyers naturally have lower prices. Pago Pago is known as a port with only one or two shark fin buyers and the low prices there prices can have a direct impact on crew compensation. An SPC observer aboard a Taiwanese longliner operating in the Marshall Islands recently made the observation that shark trunks (only silky shark and oceanic white tip) are also retained for sale by the crew.

62

Major points of the contract currently used for Vanuatu fisherman aboard Taiwanese longliners (both the Fiji/Samoa and Singapore based vessels) include: • Resolution of differences by consulting the labor laws of Vanuatu (Cap. 160) (note: some parties have interpreted this as meaning compliance with the labor laws) • Maximum of 56 hours work per week • Fixed monthly rate of compensation plus fishing and sharkfin bonuses • Provision of suitable food for meals aboard and elsewhere • Public holidays outside the jurisdiction of Vanuatu to be decided by the employer • If the contract is terminated on the expiry of the contract or (1) by the employee with more than 3 month’s notice (2) by the employee for serious health/injury reasons with one month’s written notice, the employer will pay repatriation costs, otherwise all repatriation expenses to be paid by the employee. • A 3 year contract period (recently increased from 2 years)

It was not possible to examine a contract for Fijians aboard Taiwanese vessels, but it is known they are for one-year periods and must be attested by a government labour officer. The Chinese aboard Samoa-based vessels are now contracted for three year periods. According to Pago Pago agents, about 80% of the Chinese finish their three year contracts.

The opportunities for promotion on Taiwanese longliners appear limited. The pay for Pacific Island crew does not depend on experience; a novice receives exactly the same as for a man who has served many years. A Fijian crewman stated that after several years experience he has been promoted to “third bosun”, but enjoys no increase in salary. Pay increases over time may not be real increases; in the 15 years between 1982 and present the base pay for Vanuatu crew has increased from Vt20,000 to Vt25,000, but the value of the vatu relative to the dollar has weakened.

5.8 Chinese Longline Fleet

According to JETRO (1995) China’s first tuna longliner was built in 1954. In the 1970s experimental longlining was carried out in the South China Sea. After some initial overseas effort in Mauritius, the South Pacific became an area of concentration. By 1991 there were 34 Chinese longliners in the region, growing to nearly 500 in 1995. During the 1995/96 period there were 308 Chinese longliners on the FFA Regional Register. According to published information and observer reports, many of the Chinese longliners are about 70 to 110 grt, 28 to 30 meters in length, and carry 8 to 10 men. The officers and deck crew are entirely from China.

Presently there are about 130 Chinese longliners base in Micronesia and 7 in Fiji.

It appears that ownership of the vessels can take three forms: JETRO (1995) indicates that the vessels are owned either by the national government or group enterprises. Chinese industry officials during the study stated that many of the vessels in the Pacific Islands are family businesses. It is likely that the employment 63 conditions (recruitment, geographic origin of crew, wages) would vary greatly depending on the ownership situation.

On Chinese longliners the salaries are thought to be lowest in the family businesses. In national government enterprises JETRO (1995) states that ordinary crew are paid US$3,000 to $5,000 per 8 to 10 month voyage and in the group enterprises $5,000 to $8,000. An SPC observer reports that the base salary of the crew of an observed vessel in 1995 was US$100 per month but that the catch bonuses and shark fin sales raised the average to about $490 for deck crew.

Although the vessels are relatively large and roomy, the living conditions are extremely poor, especially the food hygiene. A seasoned observer writes of a Chinese longliner “Food preparation and handling was of a lower standard than I had previously experienced on any fishing vessel. Decks were subject to a very cursory hose down after each haul but there appeared to be no other routine to maintain ship cleanliness. Exposed food was constantly left lying, or prepared on the same deck that was worked on, bathed on, urinated on, and spat on“ (Sharples 1995).

Safety is also a concern. Several months ago the Reuters News Agency carried a story on Chinese fishing vessels in general: “On July 17, 1996 China announced a new program to promote fishing vessel safety after 742 fishing vessels sunk and 600 fishermen died in 1995, a 38% increase in deaths and an almost 50% increase in vessels lost compared to 1994. Direct losses were calculated at $32.5 billion of which only $27,700 was compensated by insurance.”

In Majuro a quick visual inspection of the life raft inspection cards was carried out on the nine Chinese longliners tied up to the wharf on February 17. One 1997 expiry date was noted, with the remaining vessels having life rafts with inspection expiry dates ranging from 1990 to 1996.

Judging from the amount of hooks set per day, the actual longlining work appears less strenuous than on other Asian longliners. The Chinese vessels presently fishing in the Marshall islands set 800 to 1000 hooks per day whereas longliners of other nationalities would set twice that number per day. Because the Chinese longliners target sashimi tuna and carry the catch on ice, the trips are short. Majuro-based Chinese longliners average about two weeks per fishing trip. The fishing “season” for Chinese vessels in FSM and Palau begins in March or April of each year and continues until about November when vessels return to China.

5.9 Japanese Pole/Line Fleet

Poling for surface schools of tuna using motorised vessel, live bait, and barbless hooks was introduced into Micronesia by the Japanese in the 1920s. Catches in that region expanded to 33,000 tonnes, but as with the Japanese longline fishery, it suffered greatly in World War II. Recovery in the domestic pole/line fishery was rapid as the industry was labour intensive and a ready market existed. By the early 1960s the Japanese pole/line fleet expanded its area of fishing to include the Mariana and northwest Caroline Islands. The fleet peaked in size in the mid-1970s when there were nearly 400 vessels active in the Pacific Islands region and fishing 64

grounds were as distant as the Tasman Sea. Much of the fleet fished two-thirds of the time in the tropical skipjack fishery with the remaining period in the albacore fishery off Japan.

The fleet has declined dramatically in the last two decades. In 1995 42 vessels were active in the SPC area and the FFA Regional Register listed 58 in the 1995/96 period.

Most of the active vessels appear to be 350 to 500 grt, with the average size on the regional register being 456 grt. This is considerably larger than the size of pole/line vessels based in Pacific Island countries which are generally less than 100 grt.

The vessels are mostly based in Yaizu, to the south of Tokyo. Trips are one to three months in duration, with the larger vessels usually making longer trips. About 6 days are spent in port between trips.

The crew size for most of these distant water pole/line vessels is about 30 men. Although the exact number of Kiribati men working in this fleet is not known, it is believed that about 85% of the 200 Kiribati crew on all Japanese vessels are on pole/line vessels. At least aboard the vessels which carry Kiribati crew (for which reasonably good crew information is available), there are only Japanese and Kiribati crew.

To be eligible for work aboard Japanese pole/line vessels, all of the Kiribati crew are required to attend a six to nine month course at the Fisheries Training Centre (FTC) in Tarawa. Subsequent to successful completion of that course, a manning agency, Kiribati Fisherman Services Co. Ltd. (99% owned by the Japan Tuna), arranges for employment on the vessel, provides for the air tickets to Japan, handles remittance payments, and provides counselling service while the men are away from Kiribati.

Several Kiribati were questioned on the conditions of employment for Kiribati fishermen aboard Japanese pole/line vessels. Although they feel the job is hard and hours are long, they are generally satisfied with the work. The crew is unanimous in the opinion that offloading the fish is the hardest task. The work is thought by the crew to be easier than that aboard a longliner chiefly because the all crew are able to get sufficient sleep, the work day is much shorter, and the work of fishing (poling fish) is considered exciting.

It appears as though conditions are better than in the past when there were cases of only one Kiribati man in the entire crew (there are now 2 to 12 per vessel). It was reported that there have been three Kiribati suicides, but that these incidents resulted in an improvement in conditions. Most of the attrition in Kiribati crew is due to alcohol-related problems in port, homesickness, and learning of family problems at home.

Relative to longlining, the labour intensive pole/line fishery requires that the deck crew have greater skill at their work. Poling fish rapidly and accurately is important, but according to Japanese staff of FTC, it will take Kiribati crew 5 or 6 years to reach the level of skill of the average seasoned Japanese crew. Searching for signs of tuna with binoculars is another area in which deck crew are expected to become proficient 65 in, but years of experience are required. Considerable skill must be developed in caring for the live bait, baiting the schools, and the manufacture of lures, bait crowders, and other gear.

Features of the contract for Kiribati fishermen on Japanese pole/line vessels are: • On completion of contract or in case of “mourning of a relative in the first degree”, illness, or accident, the Owner shall bear the cost of repatriation and all reasonable living expenses during such transportation • Fishermen entitled to travel with 20 kg of personal luggage and excess up to 50 kg will be forwarded at the owner’s expense by sea • 12 days paid holiday per 10 month period • “The nature of all offshore work is such that the crew must work as and when reasonably instructed by the Captain of the vessel” • Accident insurance to be provided by the owner and sickness insurance to be paid half by the owner and half by the employee • For illness disability, basic wage will be paid for not more than 6 weeks • One month’s severance pay to be provided for termination should owner discharge a fisherman prior to the expiry of the contract • Compensation rates (basic wage plus allowance) are: first contract A$470 (US$361), second contract A$585, third and subsequent contracts A$660. To these amounts at the Captain’s discretion, a bonus is added each 10 months which can be up to 1.5 months of wages.

According to the management of KFS, the 200 Kiribati men on all types of Japanese vessels remit about A$80,000 (US$61,538) a month to Kiribati.

5.10 United States Troll Fleet

There has been a seasonal troll fishery for albacore in the temperate waters of the North Pacific since the early 1900s. Exploratory fishing in the South Pacific in the mid-1980s was quite successful and by the late 1980s over 50 US vessels and a smaller number from New Zealand were involved. The fishing area is located to the south of the Cook Islands and to the east of New Zealand, almost entirely outside the 200 mile zones of any country. The season extends from November to April and targets schooling immature albacore in the 4 to 8 kg size classes.

According to NMFS (1996) about 40 troll vessels participated in the 1995/96 season. Industry sources indicate that only about 25 vessels were active in 1996/97. The vessels are mainly 18 to 30 metres in length and are generally larger than the US vessels used in the North Pacific due to sea conditions and distances involved.

The vessels are relatively small and highly mechanised so that relatively few crew is required. The smallest vessels have operated with just husband/wife team as crew, but 3 to 5 crew is a most common arrangement. Little information is available on current overall crew composition but there are presently about 7 crew from Kiribati, 12 from Western Samoa, and 2 from the Cook Islands in the fleet. The Kiribati crew originated from the Tarawa-based refrigerated carrier Moamoa which for several years has been involved in transshipping and supplying the fleet at sea. The 66

Western Samoans and Cook Islanders reportedly obtained their employment on vessels which made port calls in those countries. In the past several vessels were based in Suva and obtained at least some crew there, but alcohol-related problems in port resulted in their dismissal.

The small size of the vessels restricts the living space, but most are comfortable, clean, and have good food. The small crew has much work to do, especially during periods of good fishing. Because the wages are dependent on the catch, the extra work when fish are being rapidly caught is usually gladly accepted.

The work is seasonal and most of the vessels also fish in the north Pacific. Although the Pacific Island crew may be taken along, under current US regulations those without visas or “green card” work status cannot disembark from a US vessel in a US mainland port.

Salary information is not readily available and would probably vary from vessel to vessel. Traditionally, deck crew in the troll fleet can be expected to earn 5 to 10 percent of the gross proceeds from the sale of fish less fuel costs. The 50 to 80 tons of fish caught in a four to five month season could translate into US$3,000 to $10,000 per crewman per season. This would be expected to vary depending on experience of crew, size of vessel/crew, whether the captain is the owner, and other factors. It is not known, however, how Pacific Island crew would fit into this scheme.

6.0 Perceptions of Pacific Island Crew

6.1 US Vessel Operators

6.1.1 General Perceptions

The operators of the US seine fleet state they have no general objection to hiring Pacific Islanders, but rather somewhat of a desire to do so. This inclination may stem from a feeling of obligation due to the fishing area being in the Pacific Islands or from other reasons such as an opportunity to economise on airfares. Eighty-eight Pacific Islanders are now working in the fleet and many are quite highly regarded by their employers. In general, Pacific Islanders get along well with the other crew and while at sea there is no major difference between their work ethic and that of the other nationalities in the deck crew. Vessel operators perceive that the major deterrent from hiring more Pacific Islanders is the difficulty of identifying/recruiting suitable crew, low skill level, high attrition of recruited crew, and availability of an alternative source of labour (Filipino crew).

From the vessel operator’s perspective, the high attrition rate of Pacific Island crew is the most problematic. A fair amount of effort must be invested into teaching new crewmen the work aboard the sophisticated seiners. It is the expectation of the owners and officers that, having taught the new crew, and as long as his personal behaviour is acceptable, he will remain with the vessel for a substantial amount of time. This is though by operators to mean working for a year, taking a trip (2 67

months) off, followed by a repetition of this pattern for several years. Their experience with Pacific Islanders is that most would not work for more than a year.

It is noted in Section 5.1 that most of the Pacific Islanders aboard the fleet were picked up in American Samoa or Guam from the offloading gangs or from friends of existing crew. These procedures usually mean that prospective crew must be physically present in those ports. Crew so recruited in the first instance are those whose jobs will be the most basic, and do not require experience. Captains either know most Pacific Island crew who have had experience and are not presently working on board a vessel, or can find out his reputation from others in the fleet fairly quickly. Those that have caused trouble, are incompetent, or are undesirable for other reasons are usually known among prospective employers.

There is no well-established mechanism for recruiting crew from areas away from American Samoa and Guam. Vessel operators have stated that, even if they wanted to hire Pacific Islanders, it is far easier to hire crew from the distant Philippines due to the presence of commercial manning agencies in that country.

Most Pacific Islanders recruited, especially those from the offloading gangs, have no specialised skills. Vessel operators compare this to crew from the Philippines where it is possible to easily obtain crew knowledgeable in welding, net mending, outboard mechanics, engine room procedures, hydraulics, and cooking. Most vessel operators do not feel that the present Pacific Island training institutions (Section 8.1.1) are relevant to the purse seine industry or teach appropriate skills. They consequently would not have much tendency to hire graduates.

Crew from the Philippines are thought of as the major alternative to hiring Pacific Islanders and there are presently almost twice as many men from the Philippines as from all the Pacific Islands together aboard US seiners. The ease of hiring, the skill level, likelihood of staying with the vessel are major factors for their prevalence in the fleet. Also mentioned by vessel operators is a tendency of the Filipinos to cause less problems in port than their Pacific Island counterparts. Financial considerations do not seem a major factor in preferring Filipinos.

The US operators perceptions of Pacific Island crew are largely conditioned by those Pacific Islanders with whom they have had contact. Presently many of the crewmen were former residents of countries and territories which have been closely affiliated with the US. It has been said that the labour from those countries has high expectations with respect to salary and work conditions and low inclination for strenuous sea-going employment .

6.1.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet

Although some operators had no suggestions for increasing Pacific Island employment in the fleet, some recommendations were put forward. These were usually related to making it easier to hire Pacific Islanders (manning agency oriented to the US fleet, roster of available men/skills), more information on Pacific Islanders (hiring practices outside of Guam/Pago Pago, the relative work ethic of the different 68 counties), and some novel ideas (Pacific Island government pressuring canneries for higher prices to enable more vessels to fish the area, hiring of observers, having the training institutes of the region act in a role analogous to a military “boot camp” to eliminate those with little stamina).

6.2 Japanese Vessel Operators

6.2.1 General Perceptions

Japanese tuna vessel operators’ perceptions of Pacific Island crew depends considerably on crew nationality and the particular fishery. The operators of purse seiners and small longliners interact chiefly with the men from FSM while the pole/line vessels and large longliners experience with Pacific Islanders is mainly with Kiribati crew.

Because one of the Japanese motives for hiring Pacific Island crew is to enhance relations (a factor in maintaining access, Section 4.2), the Japanese make every effort to accommodate Pacific Island crew from relevant countries. While commercial concerns such as crew productivity and behaviour are important, perceptions by operators may be less critical as an employment factor than on fleets where maintaining access is presently not a consideration (e.g. the US seine fleet). It also should be noted that in many cases, unlike the US fleet, the operators of the vessels have little input into the selection of foreign crew as that function is usually performed through the relevant fishing association.

Purse seine operators initially had a poor opinion of men from FSM. Despite a training programme for 26 men in the early 1990s, almost 42% dropped out during their first voyage. They attributed this to both character of the men and the process for selecting the men. Anon (1995) states: “we determined that lack of mental attitude or preparedness on the part of the quitters, or to put it more bluntly, no guts, and moreover a problem in selection of seamen to be dispatched to Japanese vessel, are responsible for their premature disembarkation”. After initial problems, the Japanese noticed that men from Kosrae had a higher rate of contract completion/renewal and subsequently concentrated their recruitment efforts on that island. The crew performance gradually improved and now about 40% of the FSM crewmembers aboard Japanese seiners are on their second one- year contract, with some working in the fleet in excess of 6 years. The purse seine operators appreciate the work ethic of the FSM men while at sea, but are worried about their drinking habits and subsequent behaviour in port.

The operators of small Okinawan longline vessels based in Palau, Guam, and FSM carry very few Pacific Islanders. According to Japanese managers in Pohnpei, the men from FSM “are not hungry enough” and lack the work ethic that longlining requires. Excessive drinking and absenteeism in port affected the performance of past FSM crew. They did feel, however, that those men from remote outer island performed considerably better than those from the main population centres.

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The Japanese operator of pole/line vessels and distant-water longliners seem relatively satisfied with their Kiribati crew. There appears to be a consensus that the Kiribati men are well trained (including Japanese language training) and are good workers. This is evidenced by the fact that the Japanese industry-owned manning agency feel that their goal of eventually having 1000 Kiribati men aboard Japanese vessels can be achieved. On the negative side, the Japanese feel that the Kiribati men sometimes cause problems while drinking and are overly prone to homesickness.

6.2.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet

Japanese industry ideas for increasing Pacific Island employment in the various fleets appear to be mainly involve improving the performance of those recruited thereby increasing demand. This includes getting families involved (e.g. seiner visits to Kosrae, urging family member to write to crew in order to control drinking habits), better psychological preparation, and urging the responsible government agencies to have better candidate selection.

6.3 Korean Vessels

6.3.1 General Perceptions

Only a limited number of perceptions of Pacific Island crew were obtained from the Koreans. Their experience is mainly with Solomon Islanders in purse seining and men from Vanuatu, Fiji, and to a lesser extent, Kiribati in longlining.

Because of the apparent policy in the Korean fleet of having deck crew from several countries to prevent solidarity, Pacific Islanders are viewed as being beneficial because they are non-Asian. Another positive perception is that a large body size enables the Melanesians to do work that the Asians, especially those from Southeast Asia, are incapable of. On the other hand, there is the perception that the Solomon Islanders, Ni-Vanuatu, and Fijians will quit the vessel at the end of each trip, or even each port call if that port is in the country of the crew. Heavy drinking and alcohol- related violence are also considered major drawbacks of Pacific Island crew. In the words of one experienced Korean manning agent, “Big man, hard worker but drink too much”.

6.3.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet

Suggestions for increasing Pacific Islanders aboard Korean vessels were different depending on the fleet. Purse seine operators feel that if they knew how to hire qualified, experienced Pacific Islanders (especially Solomon Islanders) quickly during times when they need replacement crew, more such men would be hired. Longliner operators indicate how important the selection process is for the level of crewing by 70

Pacific Islanders. They cite the example of Vanuatu to show that a deterioration of the procedures for selecting men in the last 7 years has resulted in a major decline the numbers of crewmen from that country. The view was also expresses that the agents supplying Pacific Island crew are charging too much for their services.

6.4 Taiwanese vessels

6.4.1 General Perceptions

There appears to be a major difference in perception of Pacific Island crew between the operators of small Taiwanese longliners based in Palau/FSM/Marshalls and the operators of the larger longliners based in Fiji, American Samoa, and the Indian Ocean. It was not possible to obtain the views of the operators of Taiwanese seiners; there are no Pacific Islanders presently employed in that fleet.

On the smaller sashimi longliners that predominate north of the equator the operators feel that the available Pacific Island labour is not willing or able to withstand the rigours of longliner employment. What few crew they have obtained from those countries did not last long. They have observed, however, that the crew from the outer island performed better than those from the centres. Captains interviewed felt that because the work for longliner deck crew is all very simple, there is no need for formal training. They feel that it is purely a question of being able to take the hard work and lack of sleep.

For the operators of larger vessels, there appears to be a tendency to hire deck crews of several nationalities and hence Pacific Islanders would be desirable because they are different. Also, as with the Korean operators, the large body size of most Pacific Islanders is considered quite desirable for wrestling with large fish and operating machinery on board. Perceived disadvantages are alcohol-related fighting in port and difficulty in communicating with the ship’s officers.

The Chairman of the Taiwan Deep Sea Tuna Association which is involved in vessel operations out of Fiji, American Samoa, and Singapore writes “There are more than 20,000 foreign crew working on Taiwanese fishing vessels, but under the same working conditions, the salaries of the Ni-Vanuatu crew are the highest. Not only because SPFC strives for their advantage but also their well performance make them deserve such a high payment”.

One Taiwanese vessel owner interviewed stated that he likes Vanuatu crew because they work harder than the Chinese and are very capable, but the cost of sending fishermen from China to the Indian Ocean was reportedly about $1,000 whereas the cost from Port Vila is about $2,50033. Thus, he said most replacements for Vanuatu crew are almost always Chinese if it is an unskilled position. A second disadvantage is that in contrast with China, if a Vanuatu seaman is recruited and does not work out, then the owner has to stand the cost of repatriation and transportation for a

33The Indian Ocean vessels usually make port calls in Singapore or sometimes Port Louis. 71

replacement, however in China it is reported the labor agent must pay for such repatriation.

Taiwanese owners are appreciative that the Vanuatu government cooperates in sending crewmen overseas. They are interested in placing more seamen on board Taiwanese distant water vessels however are concerned that both government and labor unions sometimes try to impose impractical labor practices, such as the 8 hour work day, on fishing vessels. In the past this has not caused much of a problem, because in Vanuatu both sides accepted the fact that while there were laws on the books, they were impractical and thus inapplicable to fishing vessel employment. This had been the practical situation for many years. However now Taiwan is having trouble with the Vanuatu labor unions which want to make these laws applicable to fishing vessel employment. It is causing serious concern among Taiwan vessel owners, as it would in any industry requiring the long hours and difficult conditions of the tuna longline fishery.

The Taiwanese vessel owners interviewed also offered their views on Chinese deck crew. They feel the only interest the Chinese have in going to work on these longliners is to earn cash. Most do not re-apply after their 3 year term is up. The Taiwanese feel they have no long-term interest in becoming fishermen. One owner said that they put in their time on the longliners much like a soldier who is drafted into the army. For this reason he sometimes hires one or two additional crewmen to make up for the lost efficiency.

6.4.2 Suggestions from Employers for Increasing Pacific Island Employment in the Fleet

Suggestions for increasing Pacific Islander employment on Taiwanese vessels include better selection of crewmen (Vanuatu was again cited as an example) and refraining from insisting on contracts with conditions far more generous than that for the Asians. One Taiwanese agent insisted that improved in-port behaviour is the key to expanded employment. The Taiwanese vessel owner would like to see an arrangement where he does not have to pay for the transportation for the replacement of a failed crewman.

6.5 Chinese vessels

Presently there appears to be no Pacific Islanders working on Chinese vessels. Taiwanese agents familiar with the Chinese fleet believe that the Chinese operators would object to having foreign crew on their vessels, primarily because the existing crews are well-established and are often from the same extended family. Communication would with the non-Chinese speakers would also be a problem. It will be interesting to observe in Fiji how the seven newly-arrived Chinese longliners (with exclusively Chinese crew) will deal with Fiji’s policy of localising the labour on foreign fishing boats based in the country.

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7.0 Perceptions of Pacific Islanders Regarding Employment Aboard Foreign Fishing Vessels

It is difficult to generalise on the perceptions of Pacific Islanders of employment aboard foreign fishing vessels. Even within a single nationality of Islanders in a single fleet there are large differences in the objectives of the employment. Depending on whether the objective is to have an adventure, to obtain cash for a one time expense (e.g house construction), or as part of a planned career, the views of the work can be very different. The training and psychological preparation also can affect the perception of the work.

In general, most Pacific Islanders feel that they should receive more pay for their work and, like most seamen, that it is difficult to reconcile the length of time which must be spent at sea with the expectations of family life. On most longliners it is thought that the hours are too long, there is not enough sleep, there should be overtime payments, and some of the other nationalities aboard are too lethargic. On purse seiners there is the common perception that the pay should be comparable to that of other groups aboard.

Additional insight into the perceptions of Pacific Island crew can be obtained by considering indicators of job satisfaction. From existing employment levels, contract renewals, and the relation between the supply of crew and demand, certain features at the national level are apparent. In general, crew from the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, and Kiribati are willing to work in all the fleets that are presently hiring Pacific Islanders and there are more men who want to work than jobs available. Although the attrition is considerable, many men are willing to return to this type of employment after completing a one or two year contract. It appears that, despite what the crew may indicate verbally, employment on foreign fishing vessels is attractive to many men relative to the other options available.34

Men from former US affiliated countries and Western Samoa appear unwilling to accept foreign longliner employment on vessels of any nationality but do work on US and (if the option is available) Japanese purse seine vessels where the salary is greater and working/living conditions are easier. High turnover is characteristic and there does not appear to be an large excess of labor over demand for the labour, except in the case of Western Samoa.

8.0 Specific Issues

8.1 Training

The majority of Pacific Island countries have a marine training school and about half operate either fishery training schools or fisheries training is included in the

34 It is sometimes heard that there is not much interest on the part of Pacific Islanders in working on the Taiwanese longline fleet. It should however be noted that a cumulative total of 980 men in Vanuatu alone have worked on those vessels and there are presently many more men in Fiji and Vanuatu waiting for such employment than available jobs. 73

curriculum of the marine schools. During the present study the fisheries training schools in Tarawa, Majuro, and Yap were visited and an official of the School of Marine in the Solomon Islands was contacted.

8.1.1 Description of the Training Institutes

In Kiribati the Fisheries Training Centre (FTC) was established in 1989. Originally a part of the Marine Training Centre in Betio, in 1995 the Centre moved to new premises at the old hospital. Facilities at the centre include 3 classrooms, a language laboratory, an engine workshop, a fishing workshop, plus mock-up pole-and-line and long-line work areas. The centre also has a small longline training vessel. Subjects taught are: longline, pole-and-line fishing methods; Japanese language (basic communication abilities, specific fishing commands and orders); engineering (maintenance, repairing and overhauling of outboard motors, generators and ship engines); and seamanship (watch-keeping, knotting, basic ship construction, fire- fighting, deck-work, first aid, general ship maintenance). The course lasts from six to nine months and all the trainees live at the centre during the training. The principal of the college is I-Kiribati and there are 11 teaching staff, of whom 3 are Japanese. They teach fishing and Japanese language and are supported by 8 local Instructors and assistant instructors. The local staff are all government employees. Japan Tuna and the Kiribati Government jointly fund the centre. Government recurrent funding is A$300,000 per year. Japan Tuna provides 3 senior personnel, equipment, and fishing gear as well as some of the operational expenses of the training vessel. According to the principal there have been about 400 graduates of FTC and the dropout rate is about 10%. All of the graduates are destined for jobs on vessels belonging to Japan Tuna members and, conversely, Japan Tuna members will not accept Kiribati fishermen who are not graduates of the school. Presently the demand for graduates in the fleet exceeds the number of available; recently a number of trainees were sent to Japan prior to actually graduating due to excess demand. The school appears to perform the dual function of both technical training as well as a mechanism for eliminating those individuals who would not be suited for prolonged work on Japanese vessels.

In Yap the Micronesian Maritime and Fisheries Academy (MMFA) has trained around 200 individuals. The institution was begun as an off-shoot of Pacific Missionary Aviation (PMA) and in the past there was substantial Japanese involvement. Through OFCF, instructors and equipment were provided to the Academy and the training was largely oriented to work on Japanese longliners and purse seiners. The course included 200 hours of Japanese language instruction. According to the present Director, there has been a change of emphasis and the Academy is now oriented to producing well-rounded graduates who have received instruction in a wide range of topics. There is presently no Japanese input into the academy. The entry-level deckhand course (42 components) is followed by either the skipper course (37 components) or the engineer course (34 components). The primary objective of the Academy appears to be the production of individuals who are capable of operating small and medium locally-owned fishing vessels. Secondarily, it is stated that MMFA wishes to provide their graduates with the skills which are in demand on foreign fishing vessels. The Director indicated that much attention is focussed into cultural aspects of Micronesians working on foreign fishing vessels, 74

with the idea that it is important to prepare their students for living in another culture which may at times seem hostile. Funding is now provided to the school through Pacific Missionary Aviation, the Government, and through various grant programmes. There are presently three full-time and 6 part-time instructors.

In Majuro the Fisheries and Nautical Training Center (FNTC) operates under the auspices of the Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority. Since establishment in its present form in 1992, 51 students have finished the Center’s nine-month course. The FNTC has advertised in regional magazines and has a home page on the Internet. It has recently established contact with the US Tuna Foundation which indicates that the lack of trained Marshallese is the reason that they have not been employed on US purse seiners. At least partially in response to this, the Center is now attempting to recruit an instructor experienced in both longlining and purse seining. A status report produced by the Principal at the end of November 1996 shows eight Center graduates have obtained employment, all in Hawaii on longline vessels owned by Mid-Pacific Fishery Company of Hilo. Recently, Pacific Ocean Producers of Honolulu has employed other graduates on Hawaii-based longliners and the total employed has now risen to 12. It is anticipated that in the near future additional men will be sent to San Diego and Seattle.

It also should be noted that training institutions for foreign deck crew have been established by some of the Asia fishing nations. The Japanese have operated training programmes for Indonesian deck crew in Japan and in early 1997 opened a training facility for Indonesian crew in Jakarta. The Koreans have reportedly established a school for Chinese crew in an area of China close to Korea.

8.1.2 Comments on the Fisheries Training Institutes

There is a remarkable difference between the Fisheries Training Centre in Kiribati and the other two schools mentioned above. The FTC is geared to a particular market (Japanese distant water vessels) and has substantial input from that industry into the design of the school curriculum, teaching, funding and job placement. On the other hand, the Majuro and Yap schools appear to be less certain about the markets they are targeting, and have limited input, if any, from the industry they are supposedly targeting. The results are strikingly different: there are over 200 graduates of the Kiribati school presently working aboard vessels, all of the graduates are offered jobs by the industry, and they appear to be highly regarded by their employers.

At the time of the visit, 12 of the 51 graduates of the school in Majuro had obtained employment on foreign fishing vessels and there was some doubt on the part of the main employer as to the relevancy of the training received: “The “graduates” were supposed to know something about fishing. They knew nothing. NOTHING. They could not even tie a bowline knot. Did not know anything about safety. Did not know anything about fishing or fish. If they did know anything, it was totally superficial. Basically totally unskilled. They don’t cook on the boat. They don’t know how and it would be dangerous. They have no idea about nutrition. One said he went to Solomon Islands training school for additional training. He wasn’t any better than the others. “ 75

Although the US-type purse seiners are cited as being one of the targets for the school in Yap, according to managers of the two companies that hire graduates, there are only 6 or 7 graduates presently working in the fleet. The management of the school indicates post-graduate involvement with the students is somewhat outside their mandate and communication problems make it difficult to follow up on former students.

To be fair, it should be mentioned that the Majuro and Yap schools have objectives other than producing graduates for foreign fleets and for the Kiribati school, there may be danger in targeting so closely a single market. It is, however, concluded that the Majuro and Yap schools could be made much more effective in their role of promoting employment on foreign fishing vessels if they had substantial additional input from the fishing industries they are targeting.

It also should be noted that the effectiveness of training as a tool for promoting employment on foreign fleets is dependent on the perceptions of the managers of those fleets. In other words, training programmes will do little good for getting men jobs if managers that employ crew think the training is irrelevant. The opinion of deck crew training by the various foreign fleets in the region varies greatly. On one end of the spectrum, the managers of the Japanese distant water fleets believe that formal training (including Japanese language) is essential. Conversely, many operators of Taiwanese longliners feel that, because all the work aboard is simple, training institutes and the skills they teach are worthless. The attitudes of the US and Korean fleets seem to fall between these extremes. US seiner operators express the opinion that they are not against the concept of training; it is that the training usually given is irrelevant to work on seiners: “Merchant ship steward skills such as fire fighting, rather than things like safety on seiners and the working skills that are used aboard”.

There may be some truth in the Taiwanese longliner’s assertion that skills do not matter. Although many complaints were heard about Pacific Islands crew, lack of appropriate longline skills was not among them.

It should be noted that all captains and managers interviewed during the study (Taiwanese included) felt there was considerably value in the training schools performing such functions of attitude conditioning for the rigorous work ahead, psychological preparation for the long periods away from home, and elimination of those individuals who would not be suited to deck crew employment.

In analysing the expressed views of industry and the performance of the various training institutes in the region certain desirable features emerge. Ideally, the managers of fisheries training institutes charged with training men for work on foreign fishing vessels will know of the available employment opportunities, target specific fleets, seek industry input in curriculum design/teaching, carefully select only those trainees who strongly desire employment on foreign vessels and are aware/wiling to make the required sacrifices, set high standards for graduation, and be involved in post graduate activities such as job placement and follow up surveys.

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8.2 Regional Standards

The subject of training crew for work aboard foreign fishing vessels is related to the concept of a regional standard qualification for such work. The need for such a qualification was mentioned by the management of several of the fisheries training institutes in the region. Because the findings of the present study are somewhat contrary to the optimistic views on this subject prevalent in the regional literature, some comment is warranted.

According to SPC (1992) “the introduction of a fishing deckhand certification programme could be of considerable benefit in enhancing employment opportunities and improving working conditions for Pacific Island Nationals employed on DWFN vessels”. Anon (1994) states “the Forum Fisheries Agency has informally offered support in principle to the adoption of a base qualification for commercial fishermen employed on foreign flag and national vessels in Pacific Island EEZs.” Proponent of the scheme feel that such a regional qualification would be attractive to employers and result in greater employment of Pacific Islanders as minimum skill level would be assured.

The value of such a qualification was discussed with managers/operators in several of the foreign fleets during the study. The concept was not well received. According to the responses, it appeared that few, if any, individuals responsible for hiring crew would give preference to qualification holders. The operator’s scepticism is related to numerous concerns. For a regional standard to be valued, it must deal with attributes widely appreciated. From Table 2 it can be seen that there are 10 foreign fleets employing Pacific Island crew. Characteristics deemed desirable vary tremendously between the fleets. The Taiwanese desire for crew that will work hard for long hours every day is markedly different than the American desire for crew with specialised skills and crew willing to make a long-term commitment. Furthermore, some captains believe the most important factors for hiring and which their recruitment is based upon (attitude, sociability, work ethic) could not be address by a regional qualification. Although certification of sea time (as included in the regional qualification) may in some cases be appreciated, it is felt there are more appropriate methods of learning of the relevant sea experience of an applicant.

If the objective of the regional qualification is to promote additional employment, careful attention must be given to the concerns of the individuals responsible for hiring who are supposed to be favourably impressed by such a credential. In addition, the question of the cost of implementing such a regional standard must be considered.

8.3 Employment Contracts

Discussions during the present study indicate that crew contracts are a subject of concern, have a large effect on the benefits received by Pacific Island crewmen, and are a source of many disputes. Considering this, specific attention to the subject appears justified.

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Considerable effort was made to obtain as many contracts as possible during the study period. The following contracts were collected: • Korean/Fiji longliner • Taiwanese/Vanuatu longliner (current) • Taiwanese/Vanuatu longliner (1982) • Marshall Islands (general) • Japanese/Solomon longliner • Korean/Kiribati longliner • Kiribati (general) • Japanese/Kiribati (all vessels) • Korean/Kiribati longliner • Proposed model Taiwanese/Vanuatu • Proposed model FFA contract

There has been much interest in the topic of crew contracts on the regional level. Consider: • At 1991 PNA meeting a paper was presented (PNA 10/3, 1991) which stated: “the development of a standard contract for Pacific Islanders employed on DWFN vessels would have advantages both for the employee and the employer. Provided that the terms and conditions stipulated in the contract are consistent with international standards and practice, there should be no major objections from DWFNs” • The Aqorau and Lili Report presented to PNA12 in 1993 contained the recommendation “that the PNA consider reactivating the issue of standardised terms and conditions for employment of Pacific Island nationals on foreign fishing vessels as soon as possible” • FFA carried out some work in this area in 1995 but was constrained by lack of information and contracts from member countries.

Judging from the information acquired during the present study, it appears as though there is substantial need and justification for contract standardisation work and such efforts are likely to result in considerable benefits for Pacific Island crew. Most, if not all, the contracts presently used by the major employers have been formulated by the employers in their favour. Some of the most widely used contracts have provisions which are blatantly malevolent (e.g. the requirement in the Taiwanese/Vanuatu longline contract which stipulates that, in the case of serious health/injury problems, the crew must give one month’s written notice to be eligible for repatriation costs). The English language used in some of the contracts is so poor that it is not understandable (e.g. in the Korean/Fiji longline contract the provision: “Crews will be paid when departing Fiji until disembarkation from vessel on their own reason”). Few deck crew would be in a position to obtain professional legal assistance when considering the contract. Finally, it appears as though they may be some “regionalisation” among employers: the Japanese/Solomon longline contract is almost identical with the Taiwanese/Vanuatu longline contract, including misspelled words. The contract used by the different Korean manning agencies in Suva is identical except for the salary provision.

Although considerable benefits may be derived through contract standardisation, some caution is warranted. If the contract provisions become too generous to the 78

Pacific Island parties, it may adversely affect competition with Asian crews. Standardisation of wages across the region may not be desirable due to the large differences in wage conditions found in the Pacific Islands area. Consideration must also be given to the characteristics of the various fisheries and prevailing traditions in those fisheries. Lastly, such contract work should be carried out bearing in mind that there is always the possibility that, if not done carefully, it may be counter-productive and reduce the number of Pacific Islanders employed.

It is suggested that a reasonable objective for the regional contract standardisation work would be to produce a template document which is fair to both employees and employers, has flexibility to accommodate the characteristics of the various fisheries, sensitive to the issue of competition with the Asian crews, and takes into consideration previous problems.

The production of such a template document is beyond the scope of the present study but some mention should be made of the contract-related lessons learned from the current work. It is recommended that the following should be carefully considered when drafting any standardised contract: • Judging from the Fiji experience, the main source of contract-related disputes relates to payment of wages for work already performed when the contract is being terminated by crew for alleged abuses by the captain. • The issue of repatriation often causes problems. Repatriation at the expense of the employer for all circumstances may be an encouragement for crew to depart prematurely and damage the reputation/competitiveness of a crew-supplying country. Repatriation only at the end of a contract can result in unfairness for the crew. It is suggested that full repatriation expenses be paid by the employer on (a) completion of contract (b) early termination due to illness or accident (c) all other causes not the fault of the employee (sale of vessel, sinking, labour unrest by other crew, etc.). • Similarly, severance pay for premature contract termination when the crewman is not responsible should be part of a contract. • The issue of limitation of hours of work per day/week and holidays at sea is contrary to the traditions of all the foreign fleets operating in the area, but is incorporated into some of the model contracts being promoted. • If provision for remitting money by the employer is made in the contract, it is likely that more long-term benefits would accrue to the crew and families. • Insurance coverage is only alluded to in most contracts. Ideally, the details of the accident/illness/death insurance and applicable workmen’s compensation laws of the vessel’s flag state should be specified along with the length of time that the salary continues in cases of disability. • The exact method of calculating the bonus should be specified. • Provision for withholding wages by the employer until the end of the contract (e.g. 50% of wages in the Korean/Fiji are held until contract is completed) should not included as it is an incentive for financial abuse. • Three-year contracts as now being promoted by the Taiwanese appear too long for most Pacific Islanders. • Contracts should include provision for in-transit expenses. Although crew are supplied with airtickets, the cost for meals and hotels during recruitment and repatriation travel is often not covered in existing contracts. 79

• The relationship of the contract to the national legislation of the crewman’s country should be specified. • Contracts should have some provision for mediation and/or arbitration and state which country’s laws governs the contract. • A common problem with many of the existing contracts concerns their enforceability. Unless the owner or agent has assets which are physically present the crewman’s home country, it may not be possible for crewmen to obtain compensation even if a favourable court judgment is made. In addition, in some countries of the region the agent may not be legally co- responsible with the owner for such debts.

It is important that any standardised contract be consistent with international practice. The Fishermen’s Articles of Agreement Convention, 1959 (No.114) suggests that crew contract should state the rights and obligations of the parties and include the following particulars: • The name age and perhaps birthplace of the worker • The place and date of the agreement • The name of the vessel or vessels on which the worker is to serve • The voyage or voyages to be undertaken (if known) • The capacity in which the worker is to be employed • The place and date of commencement of service • The scale of provisions to be supplied • The amount of wages and/or the amount of the worker’s share and method of calculating the share, and any agreed minimum wage • The term of the agreement

It is suggested that the drafting of any standard contract be a tripartite effort, with input from a legal adviser with extensive experienced in commercial practices and labour issues, fisheries specialist with a thorough knowledge of the foreign fleets, and a labour officer experienced in Pacific Island crew affairs. It also would be essential to have comprehensive information from each flag state on the laws governing labour aboard their vessels. Lessons learned from any similar exercise covering seamen on merchant ships would be useful.

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8.4 The Asian Crews

In order to cut costs, vessels from the US, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are increasingly relying on labour from the low wage countries of Asia. It is estimated that on the foreign fleets operating in the waters of the Pacific Islands region there are at least ten times more deck crew from China, Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam than Pacific Islanders. It appears that for the foreseeable future, the main factor constraining the level of Pacific Island employment on the foreign fleets of the region will be competition in varying degrees with these nationalities. It is therefore thought that additional information on these Asian crews would be of considerable interest.

A very cooperative Taiwanese agent who has worked with longline crews in several Micronesian countries provided his views on the various Asian crews. This information, which is consistent with information from several other sources, is summarised in Table 9. It should be noted that some of the information is specific to longlining (e.g. no US captain has been killed by Filipino fishermen).

Table 9 Some Characteristics of Asian Crews Crew Salary Arrangements Main Advantage Main Disadvantage Nationality Chinese Cost the vessel about $500 per Cheap; if on Taiwanese vessel, Laziest of all foreign crew; month of which crewmen can speak a common language Highest attrition rate, possibly receive about $200 to $250 with the officers because of booming economy at home Indonesians Intermediate between Chinese Learn fast, even the language Many of the crew arrive without and Filipino crews any experience Filipinos Cost the vessel about $600 per Good workers There have been several month of which crewmen incidents where the captain has receive about $300 to $350 been killed by the Filipino crew; Quality of crew in recent years has deteriorated; Cause the most problems in port

It is often thought that those Asian crews are considerably cheaper than Pacific Islanders. Although this may have been true in the past, costs for Asians have risen remarkably to the point that it appears that crew from “low wage” Asian countries actually are nominally more expensive than Pacific Islanders from Solomons, Vanuatu, Fiji and Kiribati. Considering the growth of their economies, it is likely that this will become even more pronounced in the future. For example, World Bank (1996) indicates that the average annual growth of the GNP per capita in Indonesia for the period 1985 to 1994 was 6% while that of Vanuatu was -.3%.

A comparison of crew cost is difficult for two main reasons: (1) the overall cost to employer (information that can be quite difficult to obtain) can be very different that the relatively easy-to-obtain crew salaries (2) the various types of catch-related and catch-independent bonuses complicate a comparative study.

Conflicting information is received about the wages of Chinese crew. Monthly wages range from US$150 (source: Taiwanese tuna industry representatives, bonus not included) $200/$250 (agents referring to crew for Micronesian-based Taiwanese 81

longliners, not including bonus), $270 (Indonesian crew referring to their co-workers, bonus included), $300 (crew travelling to join Pago Pago-based longliner, bonus not included), $490 (SPC observer on Micronesia-based Chinese longliner, bonus included), $550 (SPC observer on wages and bonus of Taiwanese purse seine crew), and $444 to $772 (Japanese report (JETRO 1995) of deck crew on Chinese longliners in Pacific Islands area, bonus included). Considering this and other information obtained during the study, the likely situation is that in the huge country of China a large number of factors influences crew salaries: origin of crew (coastal area, interior), type of business (Section 4.5, national government, group enterprise, family), nationality of vessel (Chinese, foreign), experience of crew (many of the newly-recruited crew have never seen the ocean, others have spent their lives at sea), length of usual trips (15 days on Micronesian-based vessel, 300 days on Korean longliners), and varying responsibilities of the agents (some are responsible for the travel costs of the replacement for a failed crewman). Considering these factors, the reported variability is understandable. The important point to be made here is that, even considering the range the range of salaries, it can be generalised that the Chinese crew are probably not preferred over crew from the South Pacific on the basis of cost.

Information from manning agents in the Manila and Jakarta and discussion with several Filipino and Indonesian deck crews also suggests that, in general, crew costs from those countries are not lower than that for crews from Solomons, Vanuatu, Fiji and Kiribati.

It seems that preference for deck crew from Asia is related to behaviour and other non-financial factors. Agents and operators often indicate a preference for Chinese, Filipinos, and Indonesians because of lower attrition within and between contracts, less difficulties in port, especially alcohol-related problems, and in some cases a common language. It therefore appears that a strategy for competing with the Asian crews would include a effective selection process focussed on choosing men who are likely to remain in the industry for a considerable length of time and who are unlikely to cause problems in port.

Crews from other low-wage Asian countries must also be considered as they may eventually become competition for the Pacific Islands. Vietnam is becoming an important source of crew. FSM immigration documents show that men from Myanmar are on a few of the fishing vessels that make port calls. The Korean make extensive use of Sri Lanka crew on their longliners operating in the Indian Ocean.

8.5 Manning Agencies

Much of the Asian crew used on the various foreign fleets is recruited through manning agencies in their country of origin. Typically, the agents identify crewmen, arrange/pay for medical examination, visas, and airfare, and handle remittance payments. Other agents merely identify crew for employers. Indonesia has several fishing vessel manning agencies and the Philippines, being the world’s most important exporter of labour, has a very large number. The situation in China is less clear.

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Some details of the charges were obtained from an agency in the Philippines and one in Indonesia. Although the information is dated (1990 and 1993), it serves to indicate the manner in which the business operate. Agency in the Philippines In 1990 the agency invoiced a longline operator in Micronesia for: basic salary ($286), standard 30% of basic salary as overtime ($86), leave pay ($24), extra overtime for longliner work ($30) for a total salary of $426 to the crewmember. To this is added a $9 employer contribution to a social security scheme, and $80 per month agency fee, for a total cost to the employer in 1990 of $515 per man per month. Agency in Indonesia In 1993 crew was provided to Guam-based operators and the charges consisted of the crewmember’s wage ($450 to $550 per month) plus a one-time agency fee which consisted of 7 components: government tax ($130), airport tax ($30) USA visa ($15), Immigration process ($50), Medical check up ($45), transportation ($50), and fee for tel/fax/documents ($100) for a total agency charge of $420.

The situation in China is somewhat different than in the other countries. According to vessel operators in Taiwan, all crew recruitment is done through agents, but it is not known whether these agents are from within or outside government. Discussion with Taiwanese vessel Captains reveal they either do not know or do not care about how much the Chinese labor agents charge. The operators pay the basic wages and incidental expenses of obtaining the crew (transportation being the greatest). The agent is responsible for all aspects of hiring, medical checks, transportation and repatriation of wages to China. The vessel owner makes his needs known to the agent and all is taken care of from the Chinese end. The vessel owner must pay transportation costs to and from China. The contractual term is three years in all fisheries. This is standard and required by China. If for some reason a crewman does not work out, or is dismissed for cause, then it is the responsibility of the agent to find a replacement. The vessel owner is not charged the transportation costs of this replacement. Such an arrangement puts significant pressure on the agent to choose people who will have the greatest chance of success on board the vessel and cause the least problems. This does not always work out, but it is far superior to the vessel owner having to take the time, energy and expense to find his own crew, arrange for their transportation, and stand any costs which might arise from a problem with the crewman’s employment which necessitates return to China.

There are numerous allegations by employers that some Asian agencies are involved in illegitimate activities such as non-payment of remittances, over-charging, and false qualifications35. That contention is supported by closely examining the agency charges above. For example, the Indonesian departure tax in 1993 was Rp25,000 or $11.02 and the cost for the medical exam appear to be an order of magnitude larger than actual charges. Even if the agency charges are entirely legitimate, they account for a high portion of the crew costs. It has been stated that the net salary of an Asian crewman is only about half of the cost (exclusive of airfare) to the employer. There has been the suggestion that these high Asian manning agency costs may work to the advantage of Pacific Island crew.

35 This refers to the Indonesian and Philippine agents. No Information from China is available. 83

The Asian agencies are, however, efficient. Vessels operators have stated that in the Pacific Islands region it is easier to hire a crew from a distant Asian country than a Pacific Island crew. A US seiner captain stated: “one telephone call to Manila and a few days later the taxi drives up to the dock in Pago with qualified Filipino crew”.

Although agencies exist in the Pacific Islands, they do not seem to be well known by the vessel operators. For example, despite there being a Korean manning agent in Honiara, a Korean purse seiner captain interviewed in Guam said he would not know how to hire a man with seining experience from the South Pacific. There are two manning agents in Kiribati who have indicated a strong desire to target to US seiners, but those business appear totally unknown to the US fleet. Another difficulty is that some agencies which do manning work, do so as only a small component of a larger business, and hence fishing vessel manning does not receive much attention. Many of the Pacific Island countries have government manning agencies, or least government units that carry out some manning function. Those agencies, although charging only a small or no fee, appear far less efficient than the commercial businesses and often do not aggressively seek new opportunities. At least in one country, there appears to be political interference in the management of the government manning agency and in the agency’s crew selection. A basic fact not to be overlooked is that no country in the Pacific Islands has the volume of readily available, experienced and qualified labour that exists in countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia. Thus direct competition with agencies in those countries is difficult.

In many respects the Kiribati Fisherman Services Co. Ltd. (KFS) In Tarawa could be used as a model of what is desirable in a Pacific Islands manning agency. The agency is largely owned by commercial interests, but the 1% owned by the government and government representation on the board of directors assures sensitivity to the needs of the crew. KFS has strong links with both industry (the majority shareholder is Japan Tuna) and the training institute: KFS insists that all of its recruits successfully complete a 9-month course training course. In addition to recruiting crew, KFS also handles remittances and provides counselling before/during employment. The company policy is that competition against Asian the crews is to be done on the basis of quality, hence the high selectivity, the long training period, counselling to reduce attrition, and requirements for physical and medical fitness. In general, the KFS operation appears well-organised, professional, technically knowledgeable, and interested in the welfare of the fishermen. Its major weakness seems to be total reliance on a single market, the Japanese fleet.

Because the agents in China have a large interest in keeping their crews from returning home prematurely, they take considerable measures in this regards. Taiwanese sources report that in some cases video taped messages are made of the crewmen for their relatives back home. The Chinese crew are seen standing in strange surroundings, well dressed with perhaps an exotic-looking island in the background, talking about their life on the vessel. In reply, tapes of the crewmen’s families are shown, urging them to stay employed, to work hard and save money, and come back home with many gifts and cash. According to the Taiwanese operators this system functions well.

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8.6 Relevancy of International Conventions

There are a number of international agreements which have some bearing on the issue of Pacific Island crew on foreign fishing vessels, especially the labor and safety aspects. Most of these take the form of conventions promoted by United Nations agencies. The International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have such agreements. Most of these international accords consist of recommendations intended to be incorporated into national legislation, rather than international agreements which are binding on the signatories. It also should be noted that Taiwan’s status/obligations in such international conventions is unclear.

Although the ILO has an umbrella convention laying down minimum standards all aspects and conditions of work for seafarers on merchants ships (Convention 147), there is no such over-all convention for work on fishing vessels. There are however, a large number of ILO conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Conference that deal with fishing vessel crew. These include the Vocational Training (Fishermen) Recommendation 1966, Convention No. 196 (fee charging employment agencies), Fishermen Articles of Agreement Convention 1959, Medical Examination (Fishermen) Convention 1959, Hours of Work (Fishing) Recommendation 1920, Accommodation of Crews (Fishermen) Convention 1966, and Fishermen’s Competency Certificates Convention 1966.

The IMO has the Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels which consist of two components. Part A concerns safety and health practice for skippers and crew and Part B covers safety and health requirements for the construction and equipment of fishing vessels. It is important to note that the Code is not a substitute for national law; it is a guide to framing such laws and regulations. As such, they area a series of recommendations which lack enforceability unless supported by national law. It also should be pointed out that that the conditions aboard national industrial fishing fleets of many Pacific Island countries do not appear consistent with many provisions of the Code, hence the enthusiasm for incorporating the code into national legislation may be somewhat tempered.

IMO also has the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel, 1995 (the 1995 STCW-F Convention). An examination of the convention indicates only limited applicability to deck crew of foreign fishing vessels as it primarily deals with standards and certification of skippers, officers in charge of a navigational watches, engineering officers, and radio personnel. There is one section dealing with the principles of watchkeeping but this is mainly concerned with the responsibilities of the officer in charge of the watch, and the planning, arrangements, and equipment for watchkeeping. These are items that the deck crew on foreign fishing vessels are rarely involved in.

FAO has the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries which was adopted in October 1995 by FAO member countries. Particularly applicable to Pacific Island deck crew is Section 8.2.5: “Flag states should ensure compliance with appropriate safety requirements for fishing vessels and fishers in accordance with international conventions and internationally agreed codes of practice and voluntary guidelines”. 85

This Code is largely advisory in nature and its voluntary nature is stressed in its introduction.

The voluntary and/or advisory nature of many of the above international conventions results in the situation that they only have a very limited effect on the actual employment practices concerning the Pacific Island deck crew of foreign fishing vessels.

9.0 Future Demand for Pacific Island Crew

A multitude of factors will affect the future demand for Pacific Island crew on the foreign fleets. The total number of jobs for all nationalities of crew will depend on the current size of the fleets and changes within the industry. The partitioning of the total jobs between Pacific Islanders and others will depend mainly on commercial competition and any employment requirements of access agreements. Although Pacific Island countries have little control over internal changes in the fleets, they can take an active role in competition and licensing.

9.1 Changes in the Fleets

Extrapolation of past trends and some insight into industry conditions offer some indication into likely future fleet dynamics. Figure 1 gives information on the recent history of the fleets. It can be seen that the total number of crew jobs on the fleets of the FFA Regional Register doubled between 1992/93 and 1994/95 and that changes in longliner employment was responsible for almost all of the variation. Much of that was probably due to fluctuations in the Chinese fleet. For extrapolation purposes, a longer time series of information than the four years given in Figure 1 would be required.

SPC (1996) contains information on the history of the major purse seine fleets operating in the Pacific Islands region and was used to compile Figure 4 which shows the seiner fleet size over a 22 year period.

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Figure 4 Trends in the Number of Purse Seiners in the Major Fleets

180

160

140

120 US 100 Japan Taiwan 80 Korea No. of Seiners 60

40

20

0 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995

There was slight decline in the number of seiners in all the major fleets in the early 1990s. In more recent years than shown on the figure the decline of the numbers of US seiners in the region has accelerated. From 48 US vessels licensed to fish under the multi-lateral arrangement in 1994/95, there are only 34 at present. Regional policies and industry trends suggest that that the Western Pacific will continue to be a major tuna seining ground, the number of seiners will probably decrease slightly, and there will be growth in the Taiwanese and Korean seine fleet at the expense of the US fleet. If other factors affecting employment remain unchanged, this would translate into somewhat fewer jobs for Pacific Islanders on seiners and those jobs would be under less favourable conditions.

Predicting the likely changes in the number of longliners and associated jobs is much more complex and would probably be more appropriate as the subject of a separate study. The four Asian nations and the three different fisheries (large and small sashimi freezer longliners, small sashimi ice longliners, and cannery longliners) complicate future projections. Nevertheless, some observations can be made. These include: • The number of large cannery Taiwanese longliners based in the South Pacific has decreased recently, and that for the Koreans has fallen quite remarkably. • Data in SPC (1996) suggests that the number of Japanese and Korean sashimi longliners in the region has remained fairly constant. • Chinese longlining has expanded greatly in recent years but there has been considerable oscillation due to the rise and fall of business arrangements. 87

• Changes in fleets sizes for the vessels in the Pacific may in some cases be balanced by reverse changes in the same fleets in the Indian Ocean where employment of Pacific Islanders has been important.

Further in-depth study of the sashimi and canning industries in which these vessels are employed is required to obtain a reasonable prediction of future trends in the numbers of longliners. For the purpose of this study, it will be assumed that what is suggested by the limited amount of data available will in fact occur; that is, the demand for the products currently produced by these vessels will remain strong, and as a consequence there will be no major changes in the overall number of longline vessels but the Chinese proportion is likely to increase for the following reasons: • Although the existing types of Chinese boats are excess to domestic needs in China (as per Section 4.5.4), a major problem of the existing longliners converted from other fisheries is their inability to sustain catch and quality levels high enough to encourage sustained involvement in the longline fisheries, suggesting better boats are needed. • Judging from the lessons of the past, it is likely that investment from other Asian countries will provide the necessary capital for purchasing vessels from neighbouring countries, creating a second stage of development. In a third stage vessel construction will take place in China. At this point the longline fleets of neighbouring countries may face stiff competition. • The greatest need of the Chinese longline fleet will be for trained engineers as the sophistication of vessels is increased. That is one factor which could hold back Chinese fleet development.

With respect to overall longline employment for Pacific Islanders, if other factors affecting employment remain unchanged, an increase in the Chinese proportion of the fleet would translate into somewhat fewer jobs for Pacific Islanders due to the present practices/conditions on Chinese vessels.

In the pole/line fleet the situation is more straightforward. The fleet size peaked in the mid-1970s and declined sharply in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Figure 5, compiled from SPC (1996), the change in the numbers of vessels during the last 16 years.

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Figure 5 Numbers of Japanese Pole/Line Vessels Active in the Pacific Islands Region

350

300 s 250

200 e Vessel n i L / 150 e Pol

. 100 o N 50

0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

From the Figure as well as from the general conditions in the industry, it can be seen that the fleet has leveled off and can be expected to remain constant at least for several years into the future. Even with the fleet size remaining constant, the employment opportunities for the Kiribati crew employed in the fleet should expand due to the increasing difficulty of obtaining Japanese crew and because of the apparent satisfaction with the current Kiribati crew. The Kiribati goal of having a thousand men in the future on Japanese fishing boats (mostly on pole/line boats) is ambitious but there are already arrangements in place for increasing crew by 18% during the first half of 1997. The current lack of a bilateral access agreement (the arrangement was terminated in early February 1997) may have a negative impact on the employment of Kiribati men should the situation continue, but that possibility itself is likely to be an incentive for Kiribati to reach an agreement.

From the above it can be seen that the number and nationality of vessels in the various fleets can have an affect on employment opportunities. In general, it appears no great change in vessels numbers are expected, but an increase in the Taiwanese/Korean component of the purse seine fleet and the Chinese component of the longline fleet, suggests a slight decrease in opportunities for Pacific Island crew in the medium-term future.

9.2 Competition with the Asian Crews

The outcome of competition with the crews of China, Indonesia, and the Philippines will have a major effect in future demand for Pacific Island crew. Presently it appears as though Pacific Island crew are losing the competitive battle on the Fiji and Samoa based longliners, the small Japanese/Taiwanese longliners based in Micronesia, and to a lesser extent on the US seiners. The competition situation on the other fleets is less clear. On the Korean longliners there may be some cause for optimism, primarily because of the desire to have crew on a particular vessel of several nationalities. It has been stated by knowledgeable Koreans that this policy would 89 result in the 150 Korean longliners in the Pacific requiring about a total of between 300 and 400 Pacific Islanders, which represents almost a doubling over the current level.

On the foreign fishing vessels based in Fiji, the Fijians have certainly out-competed the Asians, but the situation may have been greatly affected by the immigration policies of that country. Nevertheless, the case does demonstrate that some groups of Pacific Islanders are willing and capable of working effectively on foreign vessels. This highlights the fact that in most locations in the region where small foreign longliners are based, the alternative to Asian deck crew are Pacific Islanders who are not prepared to accept longline employment. It appears to be a situation of some of the most competitive crews are not in a location where the competition is occurring.

In general, Pacific Island crew are not faring especially well in the competition with the Asians at present. The situation will, however, be altered by the rapidly expanding economies of many of the Asian countries and accompanying increasing expectations in salary and working conditions. During the study there was much reference to these changes having already occurred: increased attrition of Chinese attributed to domestic opportunities, large increases in salaries of the Chinese from coastal areas, and Filipinos now expecting generous over-time payments. Although unthinkable a decade ago, Asian crew salaries sometimes exceed that given to Pacific Islanders. This disparity may be increased by another factor: if Pacific Island economies continue to under-perform as they have in recent years (Section 8.4) there may actually be lowered expectation on the part of Pacific Islanders and a growing pool of available labour. Shocks to the economies (e.g. termination of compact funds for Micronesia, loss of preferential trade access to EU countries) could accelerate this process.

9.3 Employment Requirements of Access Agreements

The third factor which may have a large influence on the future demand for Pacific Island crew is the placement of requirements on the fleets to employ Pacific Islanders as one of the conditions of access. Such licensing requirements could conceivably be a mechanism to increase crew, but on closer examination the net results may not be as spectacular as might be thought. Considering the geographic areas of operation and willingness of the national crews to work particular fleets, this mechanism would be a possibility for: • the foreign purse seine fleets in operating within FSM, PNG, Kiribati, and the Solomons; but it should be pointed out there are already substantial numbers FSM men in the US and Japanese purse seine fleets and Solomons men on Korean/Taiwanese purse seiners. • the longline fleets fishing in Kiribati, Solomons, Vanuatu, and Fiji; but it should be pointed out that Vanuatu reportedly already has such a requirement, while Fiji may be reluctant to place any crewing demands on the longliners which are being encouraged to the offload at Fiji’s cannery.

From a practical standpoint, the number of such legally-required crew on a per vessel basis could not be large, at least in the short-term (too many novices on a 90 vessel are unacceptable for safety reasons as well as the negative effect on productivity). It therefore appears that the imposition of crew requirements in access arrangements could result in a moderate increase in demand for Pacific Island crew from certain countries. However, the converse is also true: the termination of access agreements could easily produce a reaction reducing demand.

9.4 Likely Future Demand

The above-mentioned factors of changes in fleet size, competition with the Asian crews, and licensing requirements involve numerous variables, many of which are not well understood. Some of the factors presently affecting demand for Pacific Island crew work in opposition, making an even more complex situation. Although there is considerable uncertainty, the most likely scenario is that, in the absence of active measures taken on behalf of Pacific Island crew (Section 10.0), there is will be a slight to moderate decrease in the demand for Pacific Island crew in the medium- term future.

10.0 Conclusions on Measures for Increasing Pacific Island Crew on Foreign Fishing Vessels

Measures that might be taken to increase employment fall into two categories: (a) those that make it easier or more attractive to employ Pacific Islanders and (b) requirements placed on the fleets to make it obligatory to hire such crew. The present study suggests that any mechanisms for increasing crew on the foreign fleets should take into consideration: • The expressed concerns of the operators • Past problems experienced with the employment of Pacific Islanders • Any comparative advantage that Pacific Island crew may have relative to the competition • The other benefits apart from employment which accrue from the various fleets, chiefly access fees, but also local basing and port calls • The very large difference between the recruitment practices of the various nationalities involved, especially that between the US operators and the Asians

Given the unique regional situation presented by the US Tuna Treaty as well as the importance in practice of the last item, it appears appropriate to discuss mechanisms which could be used on the US fleet separately.

10.1 US Purse Seine Fleet

It may be difficult to force US operators to carry Pacific Island crew on board. Consider: • The multi-lateral treaty with the US is considerably more generous to Pacific Island parties relative to the other arrangements in place, and there is a perception among operators that this has granted them a certain level 91

of freedom in conducting their business affairs in the ways they feel are best suited to their industry. • The actual wording of the treaty does not appear to be consistent with requiring Pacific Islanders to be employed: “The Government of the United States shall, as appropriate, promote the maximisation of the benefits generated for the Pacific Island parties from the operations of fishing vessels of the United States pursuant to this treaty, including...... the employment of Pacific Island parties on board licensed fishing vessels of the United States.” • The recent large decrease in vessels licensed under the treaty would make it very difficult to re-negotiate aspects of the treaty which would place additional obligations on the US parties36 It is therefore suggested that efforts to increase employment should concentrate on facilitation, rectifying problems, and addressing operators’ concerns.

One way in which the US government could facilitate hiring and thereby promote ... employment” would be to seek ways in which US State Department procedures can be amended to expedite the issuance of visas into Guam and American Samoa. Currently the consular officers who issue such visas are either placed in locations which require either extra travel or travel delays which can make hiring from a particular country or countries more expensive and thereby less desirable. Such a competitive disadvantage could be lessened by an appropriate visa issuance mechanism37.

In considering the perceptions of the US fleet (Section 6.1), additional contact between the operators and prospective deck crew is required. The regional nature of the situation and lack of manning agents knowledgeable in the US fleet in any location outside of American Samoa and Guam dictates the requirement for some regional catalyst and/or coordination. It is therefore suggested that foreign vessel employment issues should be part of the job the soon-to-be-recruited FFA Industry Adviser or, failing that, some entity (“honest broker”) in the region. That person/entity will (a) assist the preparation of a roster of men with a good reputation and record of long-term experience aboard foreign fishing vessels (b) identify the procedures required to hire the various nationalities of men on the roster (c) inform manning agents or other interested parties in the applicable countries of the opportunities that exist and of the recruitment practices in the US fleet, and facilitate the commercial involvement of those agencies in providing crew38 (d) liaise with the official interfaces in the US fleet: the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) staff stationed in Pago Pago.

36 A further complication may be a contention on the part of the US that requiring the employment of Pacific Island nationalities to the possible detriment of other nationalities is inconsistent with US law which prohibits discrimination in job recruitment on the basis of national origin. This may be a complicated area of US labor law, and beyond the scope of the current project; however it is recommended that the subject be investigated thoroughly should any action be contemplated. 37 One example could be where the State Department official issues a visa by telecommunication means, perhaps with the bona fides of the recipient guaranteed by the appropriate authorities of the Pacific Island Party. 38 The FFA officer only would be in a position to inform in-country authorities/agencies of the opportunity. Follow-up on this opportunity would be the responsibility of those authorities/agencies and experience has shown that the private sector has a much better success record of doing so. 92

The NMFS staff based in Pago Pago is quite competent, knows the US fleet well, and appears to be very respected by the operators. That individual would be in a position to know when crew are needed. Considering the US Government’s responsibility to “promote employment”, that US Government employee may be in a position to alert the coordinating entity above and regional agencies of the opportunity.

The possibility of using FFA observers to promote employment should not be underestimated. The observers have a large amount of time to discuss employment while aboard, many observers are highly respected by vessel officers and come from countries with a large pool of experienced crew who may have limited opportunities for contact with the US fleet. Observer training should include promotion of the employment of fellow countrymen and observers should be supplied with an up-to- date version of the roster mentioned above, as well as the instructions/procedures for recruitment.

In considering (a) the negative views put forward by some vessel operators on the relevancy of the training institutes of the region (b) the observation in Section 8.1.2 that many of these institutes suffer from lack of contact with industry and (c) the large amount of resources that are channelled into training activities, it is proposed that key individuals from the various institutes be sponsored to visit Pago Pago. During such a study tour, vessels would be visited and discussion would take place with employers and crew. The objective would be for the trainers to learn of the commercial realities, realistically assess opportunities, learn what training is considered appropriate, and possibly establish job placement contacts. In summary, the visit would cater to the identified need that the institute need to know the market better. This may also be an appropriate activity for the commercial manning agencies of the region.

10.2 The Asian Fleets

10.2.1 Employment Requirements Placed on the Asian Fleets

Perhaps the simplest mechanism to increase Pacific Island crew, although not necessarily the most effective, is to require that locally based vessels (and nominally joint-venture vessels) must employ a specified minimum number of local crew. Although this may not be desirable or possible in some locations (e.g. Majuro or Pohnpei), there are locations (e.g. Honiara, Suva) where the vessels operators have agreed in principle to localise a portion of the deck crew positions, but have not followed through on the commitment, usually citing the non-availability of appropriate and reliable crew.

The use of Pacific Island crew as a requirement for access deserves careful consideration. It was concluded in Section 9.4 that the number of such required crew would not be great in the short-term. Due to the mobility of the fleets, some form of regional accord would be necessary, as taking on many crew of several Pacific Islands countries may be overly-burdensome to operators. Having an employment requirement in the Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access (e.g. that at least some Pacific Island deck crew is employed) is a possibility, but this may be very difficult to put into practice, given the wide disparity of crew requirements, availability 93

and varying conditions within FFA member countries and the various fisheries involved. Changing fishing patterns may adversely affect crew hired under such an arrangement. In addition, such a mechanism would do little to assist employment on fleets outside the zones of FFA member countries which is presently significant. It also should be considered that there may be vessels on which Pacific Island crew may not want to work and it may be a real hardship for individual Pacific Islanders to be “token crew” in what could be a hostile environment. Experience from Indonesia39 in localising crew on foreign fishing vessels by regulation was met with great industry resistance and was unsuccessful.

On the other hand, there is a certain appeal to the simplicity of a mechanism which puts the onus on the fleet operators. In the absence of a catalyst, some fleets may continue operating indefinitely without Pacific crew. Employment requirements may create enough business for agents so that their main attention can be focussed on the subject, rather than a part-time activity. There is, however, danger in stipulating something which the vessel operators may feel is extreme or unwarranted for economic or other reasons and may result in an inability to operate at desirable economic levels, causing unfavourable financial consequences to both parties.

The experience of one vessel owner, although not Asian, may illustrate the problems created by having employment of nationals a requirement for access. In seeking access for its vessels in the EEZ of an FFA member country, it was required to employ a specific number of nationals from that country as one of the licensing terms. There was initial difficulty in contacting the manning agency in the licensing country. After contact was established it was found that the employment proposed contract stipulated terms vastly different from all the other crew on the vessels and was in fact designed for employment in a different fishery by a different type of vessel. The owner did not have an opportunity to investigate past employment of the applicants prior to recruitment, and there were major visa and logistical problems getting the crew to the boat. In the end most of the crew which was recruited at great effort and considerable expense in relation to other suitable crew available, lasted only a few months before resigning.

From the evidence gathered during the present study, it is not clear that employment requirements for licensing would be a positive step for Pacific Island countries to take. Recognising, however, that certain countries of the region may wish to do so, a careful cost/benefit analysis at the national level should be carried out should such requirements be contemplated. Official discussions with the fleets concerned prior to implementation may result in agreement for voluntary employment targets. As an alternative to rigid requirements, there may be merit in a licensing system whereby an operator may retain his exclusively non-Islander crew for the payment of a premium. Lastly, employment of a certain number of Pacific Island crew might be a requirement for re-instatement on the Regional Register after a vessel’s removal40.

39 Indonesia’s Minister of Agriculture Decree No.816 of 1990 states that foreign fishing vessels must work under a charter arrangement with a local company and must gradually increase the use of Indonesian crew so that within six month at least 30% of the total crew of each vessel must be Indonesian. 40 In 1985 FSM circulated a request to remove an unlicensed US flag vessel from the register after it 94

10.2.3 Facilitation of Employment on the Asian Fleets

A strategy for facilitation of employment on the Asian fleets should be centred on reduction of problems in port, improvement in the attrition rate, assistance in the recruitment process, and improvements in the manning agency situation.

Port problems identified among Pacific Island crewmen are largely alcohol-related. Careful screening of applicants to eliminate those who have had prior legal problems involving alcohol would not go far enough. A selection process is required which accepts only individuals who are known to be non-drinkers or those who have proven or exhibited responsible behaviour when they drink. Several operators have remarked that experience has shown them that the presence of facial scars of prospective crewmen reveal much about their likely behaviour in port.

The Asian complaint that most Pacific Island men do not finish their contacts could be addressed by (a) a roster of men to have successfully completed several contracts, and (b) using some of the techniques that some of the Asians use: post- recruitment counselling, and support/involvement from the crew’s families (Section 8.5). Training institutes targeting Asian fishing boats should include discipline and psychological preparation for the work ahead, and strive to eliminate all trainees which are unlikely to work under the demanding conditions. In addition, the difficulty of the work should be strongly stressed in the recruitment process and some evidence sought of the applicant’s past which might mentally and physically have prepared him for such work.

If it were easier to hire Pacific Island crew, it is likely that more from certain countries would be hired. Some degree of contract standardisation which is fair to both parties (Section 8.3) would eliminate some of the protracted pre-recruitment negotiations which have taken place in the recent past. A listing of manning agencies including contact details and recruitment procedures may assist employment, especially in the Taiwanese and Korean fleets. The preparation of such a list may require input at the regional level.

Improvements in the manning agencies operating in the Pacific Islands are likely to produce more positive results, but the actual steps to be taken are dependent on the particular country involved. Monopoly situations which exist in two countries have led to inefficiencies and lower crew levels. Government agencies might strive to identify those crewmen who have worked for long periods on foreign vessels and who might want to be employed as advisors or employees of the agencies. Ideally, agents should have close contact with the fleets but this is not often possible in the Pacific islands.

One possibility for improved contact with industry would be to encourage and support commercial joint-venture manning agencies located in the region. It is possible that such a private sector development scheme, especially one focussed on

had been seen fishing illegally but was unable to be apprehended. A subsequent settlement with the vessel owner which caused FSM to rescind their request included a requirement that the owner employ a certain number of FSM crew at an agreed salary for a minimum amount of time. 95

job creation and located in some of the more resource-poor countries of the region, may be attractive to a number of donor organizations.

10.3 Concluding Remarks on Measures to Increase Pacific Islander Employment The suggestions in the preceding sections 10.1 and 10.2 should be considered options which may contribute to incremental rather than remarkable increases in crew levels. There does not appear to be any single measure which would result in spectacular increases in employment; but rather action in several areas is believed likely to stimulate moderate increases in jobs for Pacific Islanders under current conditions. The logistical, organisational, and communication efforts required to secure even small amounts of employment should not be under-estimated. The skills required and/or business incentives may be lacking in some countries within the region. This, together with the complex nature of such efforts supports the notion that some form of regional coordination or at least catalyst would be helpful.

10.4 Summary of Measures for Increasing Pacific Island Crew on Foreign Fishing Vessels

For the US purse seine fleet:: • Facilitation of issueing visa by US authorities • Increased reliance on observers to promote employment • Increased contact between the region’s fisheries training institutions and the US fleet • Coordination on the regional level: (a) preparation of roster of qualified men (b) identification of procedures required to hire the various nationalities on the roster (c) informing manning agents or other interested parties in the applicable countries of the opportunities that exist and of the recruitment practices in the US fleet (d) liaison with the official interfaces in the US fleet:

For the Asian fleets: • Reduction of problems in port • Reduction in attrition rate of employed crew • Improvements in the manning agency situation • Regional level assistance for improvements in the recruitment process: (a) contract standardisation (b) listing of manning agencies and their procedures

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11.0 References Aqorau, T. and T. Lili (1993). The Nauru Agreement - the First Decade, 1982-1992. Report 93/11, Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara. Anon. (1992). China: Fishery country profile. FAO, Rome. Quoted in: Parry-Jones, (1996) R., TRAFFIC Report on shark fisheries and trade in the People's Republic of China, TRAFFIC, London. Anon (1994). Workshop Background and Suggested Objectives. Workshop Paper 1, Workshop on Standardised Certification for Fishing Vessel Crews., Forum Secretariat, 26-28 September 1994. Anon (1995). Employment of Foreign Seamen as Viewed from the Japan Far Sea Purse Seine Association. Kaimaki, Tokyo.

Anon (1996). Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Bartsch, W. (1992). Employment and Manpower in Fiji. Employment Promotion, Manpower Planning, and Labour Administration in the Pacific, International Labour Office, Geneva. Brown, C. (1995). Proposed Multilateral Arrangement for Taiwan Longline Albacore Vessels: Country Concerns. Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara. Choi, K. (1995). Korean Tuna Industry. Infofish 1995. Douglas, N. and N. Douglas (1994). Pacific Islands Yearbook. Fiji Times Ltd., Suva Doulman, D. (1987). Development and Expansion of the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery. Pages 133-160, In: D.Doulman, Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region. East-West Center, Honolulu. FFA (1994). Regional Opportunities in the Tuna Industry for Creating Sustainable Jobs. Information Paper No.10, Workshop on Deckhand Certification, South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara. FFA (1995). Tuna Industry Development Study - Regional Report. FFA Report 95/66, South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara. Gillett, R. (1987). Notes on the Training of Western Samoa Seamen for Employment on Pago Pago-Based Purse Seiners. FAO/UNDP Regional Fisheries Support Programme, Suva. Ho, (1995). Taiwan Tuna Fisheries: Present Status and Future Prospects, INFOFISH. JETRO (1995). China’s Tuna Fishery. Japan Export Promotion Organization, Food Production Management, 95-AGC. Matsuda, Y. (1987). Postwar Development and Expansion of Japan’s Tuna Fishery. Pages 71-91 In: D.Doulman, Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region. East-West Center, Honolulu. Miles, R., A. Moneer, and T. Larhed (1992). Employment in Kiribati - present and potential. Employment Promotion, Manpower Planning, and Labour Administration in the Pacific, International Labour Office, Geneva. 97

Nixon, D. (1984). A commercial fisherman’s guide to marine insurance and law. University of Rhode Island Marine Bulletin No. 50. URI Sea Grant. Orbach, M. (1977). Hunters, Seamen, and Entrepreneurs - the tuna seinermen of San Diego. University of California Press, Berkeley. NMFS (1996). Tuna Newsletter. Issue 122, August 1996, National Marine Fisheries Service, La Jolla. Park, Y., W. Yang, and T. Kim (1991). Status of Korean Tuna Longline and Purse Seine Fisheries in the Pacific Ocean. Background Paper 17, FAO Expert Consultation on Interactions of Pacific Tuna Fisheries, FAO, Suva. Preston, G. (1996). Domestic Tuna Longlining in Papua New Guinea. In: Papua New Guinea Fishing Industry Seminar, (Record of Proceedings), South Pacific Project Facility, Sydney. Reipen, M. (1987). Distant Water Tuna Longline Fishery. Pages 161- 173 In: D.Doulman, Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region. East-West Center, Honolulu. Sharples, P. (1995). Zhong Yuan Yu #953 Observer Trip Report 29th April to 11th May 1995. South Pacific Commission, Noumea. SPC (1992). Pacific Island Fishing Vessel Deckhand Certification - Preliminary Considerations. Working Paper, 24th Regional Technical Meeting on Fisheries, South Pacific Commission, Noumea. SPC (1996). Tuna Fishery Yearbook. South Pacific Commission, Noumea. Taya, K. (1995). An Overview of Japanese Tuna Industry and Recent Developments in Tuna Culture. In: Nambiar, K. and K. Krishnasamy (Eds.) Papers of the 4th World Tuna Trade Conference, INFOFISH, Kuala Lumpur. UNDP (1994). Pacific Human Development Report. United Nations Development Programme, Suva. UNDP (1996). Sustainable Human Development in Vanuatu. United Nations Development Programme, Suva. UNDP (1997a). Sustainable Human Development in the Marshall Islands. United Nations Development Programme, Suva. [In press] UNDP (1997b). Sustainable Human Development in the Federated States of Micronesia. United Nations Development Programme, Suva. [In press] UNDP (1997c). Sustainable Human Development in the Western Samoa. United Nations Development Programme, Suva. [In press] UNDP (1997d). Human Development Choices for the Cook Islands. United Nations Development Programme, Suva. [In press] Wang, C. (1991). Taiwanese yellowfin fisheries in the Pacific Ocean. Background Paper 11, FAO Expert Consultation on Interactions of Pacific Tuna Fisheries, FAO, Suva. World Bank (1995). Pacific Island Economies: sustainable development of fisheries. Report No.14615-EAP, Country Department III, The World Bank, Washington. 98

World Bank (1996). From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996. World Bank, Washington DC. 99

Appendix 1: Notes on Stacking Net

One of the most important but difficult to learn skills for the deck crew of a seiner, regardless of the nationality of the vessel, is stacking net. The following is a brief review of the stacking procedure.

After the seiner has set the net, the bottom of the net is drawn together by purse cables, and any tuna which may be within the net will eventually see the inside of a can. The problem at this point is to get the net, that is, almost a half-million square metres of webbing, 5000 corks, and two kilometres of heavy chain back onto the boat. Thanks to a clever fishermen named Puretic who invented the power block, most of the pulling force required for this operation is performed hydraulically. The net is drawn from the water up to a huge power block mounted on the main boom and then falls onto the stern area of the vessel below. The net being 240 metres wide going onto a deck just 12 metres wide creates a situation requiring the attention of a large portion of the crew. The orderly placement of net onto the stern area is known as stacking and enables the net to function correctly on the following set. Although conceptually simple, the novice purse seine fisherman may find stacking the net exhausting, confusing, and perhaps the most skill to master.

Net stacking may be divided into cork sacking, chain stacking, and webbing stacking, all of which occur simultaneously. On US purse seiners the chains are placed to port (the vessel set the net counter-clockwise) while on most Japanese vessels the reverse occurs. The corks are placed on the opposite side to the chain and the webbing obviously in the middle. Typically, two men will handle the corks, two men on the chain/rings, and about a half dozen men on the webbing.

As the net comes off the roller of the power block, it falls vertically to the deck about 12 metres below. One of the cork men will grab the selvedge next to the corks and pull it towards the side of the vessel, unwrapping any webbing wound around the corks. The second cork man layers the corks back and forth (perpendicular to the axis of the vessel) in lines about one-quarter the width of the vessel. On the other side of the deck the chain man pulls the chains to port and assures that the attached selvedge is not wrapped around the chain. He passes the chain bridles to the other chain man who lays them over a rail so that the rings hang down from the outboard edge. A line is passed through each ring as it is placed on the rail. Eventually the purse cables will replace this line.

Between the cork men on one side of the vessel and the chain men on the other, a half dozen men will stack webbing. Novice crew will find that this is the area where they work. About three men will be at the aft end of the pile and three on the forward end, alternating in a “W” formation. That is, from starboard to port: one man aft, one man forward, one aft, etc. Each man will attempt to guide a bundle of net 20 to 30 cm in diameter to a growing pile in such a way that the net between him and the man on either side is not totally slack. The men lay the net on the pile evenly so that the edges of the pile are straight and there are no large cavities or mounds as the pile grows. In order to do this, the men must guide the net to both side by their hands, throw net behind them, and also walk around distributing webbing. The net does not enter the power block in an especially orderly manner and receives a tremendous 100

compression load while in the block so when it comes out it can be somewhat jumbled. Also, the net itself tapers and uses various sizes of net twine and mesh sizes so that the section of net being stacked by a man can get larger or smaller and the amount of net between two men can vary a great deal. To counter-act this problem, the men “pass mesh” to crew on either side at slightly higher than head level (the net is less chaotic there) where it is somewhat easier to sort out the side of the mesh bundle from which the mesh should be passed. Passing involves just releasing a controlled amount of mesh as the man to whom the net is being passed will take up the slack.

While stacking is in progress, small holes in the net are ignored, but larger rips are marked by pieces of brightly coloured material and the webbing surrounding the holes is dragged to the edge of the pile where it will be patched after stacking. The same is done for fish or flotsam which may be stuck in the net.

To the apparently simple above situation complicating factors are added. The size of the bundle a man handles, the other crew, the side of the net pile, and the top of the pile must be watched simultaneously. This is done while the webbing is falling rapidly. The vessel rocking, webbing piling around one’s feet, and unsteadiness of the newly-piled webbing makes balance difficult on top of the net pile which may be three meters above deck level. Mesh catching on clothing, wind blowing the net around, and the occasional unsympathetic fellow crewmember do not help the situation. The biggest problem, however, is from falling objects. A tuna may be thought of as a nice pliable object, but these fish falling from the power block 12 metres up can do damage like a cannon ball. Jellyfish and seawater constantly rain down on the crew and the occasional dodging of steel rings keeps the men on the pile from being lulled into tranquillity. The man operating the power block offers some degree of safety as he will do his best to warn of impending danger. Occasionally, however, the operator will reverse the direction of the power block to correct a problem. When this occurs, the comrades on the pile must be cautious that they are not jerked off their feet as the webbing on which they are standing becomes airborne.

Clothing is important in stacking net. Nothing should be worn on which the net can snag because if the net can possibly snag, it definitely will snag. This includes shoe buckles, buttons, watches, and necklaces. A hard hat must always be worn while the net is being stacked, as well as during all fishing operations. Gloves are also a “must”. Some crew prefer to wear a T-shirt or foul weather jacket for protection from the bits of jellyfish while others choose to wear no shirt because of the heat.

Anytime a group of people is participating in an intense activity directed at a common goal which involves some degree of difficulty, danger, and physical exhaustion, a certain camaraderie develops between the individuals. Working on the net pile is no exception. A novice fisherman after stacking net several times will find that the work is not quite so miserable as it appeared at first and a fair amount of work satisfaction can come from doing the job well. 101

Appendix 2: The Longline Operation and Skills Required

Many of the skills required in longlining are common to all the foreign fleets. A description of specific duties and skills required of longline vessel crews requires distinction to be made between crews manning vessels equipped with traditional basket gear and those manning vessels using compact monofilament gear.

Traditional basket longlining

This type of gear makes use of a mainline of tarred 6 to 7 mm diameter, 3-strand PVA line known as Kuralon, which may be up to 80 nautical miles in length. The branchlines, which carry the hooks and which are clipped to the mainline during fishing, may be up to 50 m long, and combine sections of 3-strand line and galvanised steel wire whipped with cord. Owing to its bulk and complexity, this type of gear typically requires a deck crew of between 9 and 13 to handle efficiently.

Sections of mainline are stored in baskets away from the area of setting and hauling and must be brought to this area, or removed from it, as required. Sometimes this is achieved by the use of a mechanical conveyor. The line is set by towing it off the vessel as the vessel moves through the water, or it may be thrown into the sea mechanically at a rate faster than the vessel’s speed to ensure a better sinking rate and thus depth attainment. Mainline sections are joined together, and baited branchlines are clipped to the mainline by hand as it is paid out.

To retrieve the line after soaking (fishing) the end of the line is fitted into a open sheave on a powered hauler which grips and hauls it. The hauler automatically fakes the mainline into baskets, section by section. As branchlines appear they are unclipped from the mainline and coiled by hand, or mechanically by a separate piece of machinery, the branchline coiler, and stored in baskets.

During fishing operations, which may extend over 4 - 6 hours for setting and 8 - 12 hours for hauling, deck crew typically rotate duties and must therefore be proficient in all the skills required. These include; operation of the powered line hauler, operation of the powered branchline coiler, connecting and disconnecting sections of mainline, clipping and unclipping branchlines to and from the mainline, gaffing and boating hooked fish, and killing, processing and packing fish in ice or in freezer holds. On some vessel only officers operate the hauler while on others (e.g. Ting Hong Taiwanese vessels in Majuro) an experience deck crewman is paid a premium to do the job well.

Before and between fishing operations deck crewman are required to rig and repair mainline sections and branchlines. These duties require knotting and splicing skills with 3-strand rope and the ability to splice light wire. Crewmen must also be proficient in the use of swages, or metal sleeves, which are crimped onto the line to form eye connections, and swaging pliers.

Compact monofilament longlining

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This longlining method makes use of a continuous length of 3 to 4 mm diameter monofilament nylon line up to 70 nautical miles long, which is stored on, and set and hauled from, a hydraulically-driven steel and aluminium drum. The branchlines are most often made from a single piece of monofilament nylon around 2 mm in diameter, and usually around 30 m in length. These branchlines are not usually coiled for storage, but faked loosely into upright bins with the attachment clip fixed to a rail running around the upper edge for ready access. Because the mainline is stored entirely on a drum and branchlines are stored so as to be immediately ready for use, this method requires a deck crew of only 3 or 4 to operate efficiently.

During fishing operations the mainline is set and hauled directly from the mainline drum. During setting the mainline drum is set to spool freely and the vessel’s movement through the water tows the line from the drum, or a line setter may be used. A single crewman is required to bait branchlines, clip baited branchlines to the moving mainline and cast the bait into the water. This crewman also attaches buoys and markers to the mainline as required. Other crewmen keep up the supply of branchlines, buoys and buoylines, and bait.

During hauling the mainline drum is controlled by one crewman, who also controls the branchlines as they appear. Branchlines not holding fish are unclipped immediately and passed to a crewman who restores them to the holding bins. Those holding hooked fish are not immediately unclipped, but passed to another crewman who takes control of boating the fish. Once the fish is secured, the branchline is unclipped and passed to the crewman stationed by the branchline bin. Another crewman is responsible for hand-hauling, coiling and stowing the buoy lines and buoys as they appear, and for processing fish.

As this method is most often used to produce iced fish for the sashimi market, specialised fish processing techniques and skills are employed. Target species are killed by brain spiking, the fish is bled, the gills cut away, gut removed and gut cavity scrubbed, some fins may be removed, and the fish then placed in an ice slurry bin or packed directly into crushed ice. Because crewman typically rotate duties over the long hours of hauling, all crewmen are usually required to be able to perform any and all of these duties.

Crewmen are also required to prepare new branchlines and replace damaged ones before and between fishing operations. Monofilament branchlines are simpler to rig than those used for basket gear and crewmen need only be proficient in the use of swages and swaging pliers. Rope work skills including knotting and splicing are essential, however, in the preparation and repair of buoy lines and other routine shipboard tasks.