The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus In-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.

T he Asia-Pacif ic Jo urnal, Vo lume 11, Issue 15, No . 1, April 15, 20 13.

When Demo cracy is No t Eno ugh: Japan’s info rmat io n po licy and mass po lit ics in diplo mat ic and eco no mic crisis in t he 1930s 民主主義は万能ではない —1930年代の外交、経済危機における日本の情報政策と大衆政治が示すもの

T o mo ko AKAMI

Send to Kindle The his to ry o f pro paganda has lo ng been clo s ely intertwined with the develo pment o f mas s co mmunicatio n. In the twentieth century, the wo rld experienced two Wo rld Wars , the Co ld War, its ending (o r the beginning o f a s eco nd Co ld War), and numero us territo rially- co nfined wars inters pers ed with peace (o r no n-war perio ds ). Many s cho larly wo rks as s o ciate pro paganda with war (including the Co ld War), and dis tinguis h public diplo macy fro m war pro paganda.

Do the s tructures and ins titutio ns utiliz ed by the s tate to dis s eminate info rmatio n (including news ) fo r fo reign po licy fundamentally change in time o f war? A s ubs tantial literature ho lds that a s tate’s info rmatio n po licy largely defines the nature o f its po litical regime. Did liberal demo cratic regimes , s uch as the U.S., Britain, France o r Aus tralia, have fundamentally different info rmatio n po licies fro m tho s e o f auto cratic o r autho ritarian regimes ?

In appro aching thes e is s ues with res pect to Japan and Manz ho uguo , I fo cus o n three glo bal facto rs : the develo pment o f mas s po litics in an era o f univers al male s uffrage, rapidly changing mas s -co mmunicatio n techno lo gies (es pecially glo bal cable netwo rks , the develo pment o f wireles s co mmunicatio n, electro nic pho to delivery, and news reels ), and the ris e o f internatio nal public o pinio n as an impo rtant facto r in internatio nal po litics in general, and the ins titutio naliz atio n o f Japanes e news pro paganda in particular.

In February 19 32, the s eco nd general electio n in Japan after the univers al male franchis e bill had pas s ed the Diet gave Seiyūkai, o ne o f the two majo r parties o f the time, a lands lide victo ry. Japan was facing diplo matic and do mes tic cris es , and Seiyūkai pro mis ed a greatly expanded electo rate eco no mic reco very and an aggres s ive China po licy. Five mo nths earlier, in September 19 31, Japan’s Guando ng Army had begun a military incurs io n in No rtheas t China, and by December it had o ccupied a large part o f the regio n then kno wn as Manchuria. The Mins eitō Wakats uki Cabinet (April–December 19 31) fell in December, and the new Seiyūkai Prime Minis ter, Inukai Ts uyo s hi, to o k o ver and called fo r a general electio n in o rder to gain a po pular mandate fo r his new go vernment.

There were cens o rs hip, co ercio n and bribery in the electio n pro ces s , as in many co ntempo rary parliamentary demo cracies o f the time. The pro blem, ho wever, was no t limited to thes e anti-demo cratic actio ns . Rather, po litical acto rs and media o rganiz atio ns were res po nding to a new po litical enviro nment created by univers al male s uffrage and new teleco mmunicatio n techno lo gies that fed war fever. Fo r s o me mo nths befo re that February (even befo re September 19 31, but es pecially s ubs equently) o ppo rtunis tic po liticians , military o fficers , and media o rganiz atio ns were utiliz ing no t o nly print media, but als o the new media o f radio and news reels to s to ke mas s natio nalis m. A s ignificant majo rity o f vo ters bo ught into this jingo is m and the package Seiyūkai o ffered: an aggres s ive China po licy s o ld as a key to eco no mic reco very.

Ortho do x Japanes e his to rical acco unts tell us that the May Fifteenth Incident o f 19 32, in which Prime Minis ter Inukai was as s as s inated by a terro ris t attack, marked the beginning o f the end o f parliamentary demo cracy in pre-war Japan. The electio n o f February 19 32 was , ho wever, equally impo rtant becaus e the electo rate gave a mandate to the then go vernment fo r the aggres s io n in China. It was the actio n that s et a co urs e fo r s ubs equent full s cale war with China in 19 37 and then with the United States , the o ther Allied fo rces and their co lo nies in the regio n.

Thro ugho ut mo dern his to ry in Japan (and many o ther co untries ), expanded po litical participatio n has been no guarantee o f the primacy o f peaceful alternatives to co lo nialis m and war. Party po liticians , no t o nly military o fficers , have frequently led jingo is m. Media was als o no t o nly the victim o f s tate repres s io n, fo r it to o co ntributed s ubs tantially to war mo ngering. Jingo is m, after all, s ells news papers and magaz ines and creates bro adcas t audiences . Mo s t impo rtantly, many vo ters s uppo rted expans io nis t po licies . Are s imilar patterns emerging in co ntempo rary Japan, indeed, in bo th China and Japan, at a time o f mo unting territo rial co nflict?

In February 19 32, during a time o f eco no mic cris is , mas s po litics undermined mo derate fo reign po licy o ptio ns . Demo cracy did no t prevent Japan fro m taking the path to co lo nial expans io n and war. Eight decades later, we can reflect anew o n les s o ns fro m the 19 30 s .

Abst ract :

Japan’s info rmatio n po licy did no t change s uddenly during the Manchurian Cris is in September 19 31–March 19 33. Rather there was co ntinuing develo pment o f s tate po licy and ins titutio ns fo r news pro paganda in res po ns e to two o ngo ing pheno mena: gro wing mas s po litical participatio n as indicated by univers al manho o d s uffrage, and techno lo gical changes in mas s media and co mmunicatio n.

The Japanes e metro po litan go vernment did, ho wever, begin a co o rdinated and s ys tematic appro ach to news pro paganda during the Manchurian Cris is , o ne primarily driven by fo reign po licy co ncerns , rather than co ncerns with do mes tic tho ught co ntro l. At the s ame time, in the perio d that is o ften regarded as the beginning o f Japan’s diplo matic is o latio nis m, MOFA and o ther fo reign po licy elites actively s o ught to engage internatio nal public o pinio n thro ugh management o f the news fo r o vers eas pro paganda. They further emphas iz ed co o rdinatio n between metro po litan centre, To kyo , and a parallel news ins titutio n in Japanes e-o ccupied Manchuria in 19 31–3. The pro ces s o f unifying news co verage, ho wever, met s tro ng o ppo s itio ns fro m vario us s take ho lders in 19 31–5.

Key Wo rds : pro paganda, internatio nal news netwo rk, internatio nal public o pinio n, mas s po litics , media and war, public diplo macy, Japanes e fo reign po licy, the Manchurian Incident

Ortho do x internatio nal his to ry s ees the 19 30 s as the perio d o f a ‘dark valley’. The Great Depres s io n that s tarted with the Wall Street s to ck market cras h o f 24 Octo ber 19 29 s pread glo bally in the early 19 30 s . While the U.S.S.R., almo s t unaffected by this eco no mic turmo il, co ntinued its eco no mic expans io n, fas cis m emerged and gained s trength es pecially in Germany and Italy. Natio nal unity go vernments were fo rmed in Britain and Japan, and even the United States o pted fo r greater s tate eco no mic interventio n. Co mpeting fo r co ntracting markets , empires mo ved to fo rm blo c eco no mies . The perio d was to lead to the Seco nd Wo rld War, which killed tens o f millio ns thro ugho ut the wo rld.

In No rtheas t As ia, the 19 30 s began with a war and ended with a war. What co ntempo rary Japanes e called the ‘Manchurian Incident’ (Manshū jihen) s tarted with a railway explo s io n near Mukden in Manchuria o n 18 September 19 31. It was planned by the Japanes e garris o n, the Guando ng Army, which was s tatio ned in Manchuria to pro tect the Japanes e leas ed territo ries alo ng the So uth Manchuria Railway and in the s o uthern part o f the Liao do ng penins ula. Claiming the explo s io n was Chines e pro vo catio n, and us ing this as an excus e to expand its military co ntro l to the who le o f Manchuria, the garris o n executed a well-planned campaign.

The fo rces o f the warlo rd o f Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hs ueh-liang), pres ented little res is tance, altho ugh the fighting with o ther Chines e res is tance fo rces was o ften bitter, pro ducing many killed and wo unded o n bo th s ides . The fighting in Shanghai (late January–early May 19 32) was als o fierce. The campaign in Manchuria res ulted in Japan’s military o ccupatio n o f Manchuria (the eas tern three pro vinces ) by February 19 32, which was then expanded to Inner Mo ngo lia (Rehe pro vince) in early March 19 33. The Guando ng Army created Japan’s puppet regime, Manz ho uguo (1 March 19 32), and then, unhappy with the League o f Natio ns ’ s o lutio n to the Manchurian Incident, Japan withdrew fro m the League o n 27 March 19 33.

The Manchurian ‘Incident’ is o ften unders to o d as a waters hed fo r Japan; do mes tically, it marked a s hift fro m the liberal parliamentary demo cracy o f the 19 20 s to an autho ritarian regime do minated by the military. Externally, Japan’s fo reign po licy changed fro m internatio nalis t, co o perative diplo macy to is o latio nis m driven by ris ing natio nalis m. This led Japan to a s eco nd war with China (19 37– 45) and then to war with the Allied Po wers and their co lo nies in As ia and the Pacific regio n (19 41–5).1 Japanese f o rces ent er Mukden during t he Manchurian Incident Many wo rks o n the s tate and media in Japan during the Manchurian Incident unders tandably fo cus ed, and co ntinue to fo cus , o n the s tate’s repres s io n o f the media and its tho ught co ntro l. In this view, media o rganiz atio ns were victims o f the s tate’s co ercio n, which dragged a blinded po pulatio n into the war.2

Thes e wo rks , ho wever, o ften neglected the fo reign po licy as pects o f the s tate’s info rmatio n po licy, and thus to ld o nly part o f the s to ry. This chapter examines the s tate’s info rmatio n po licy during the Manchurian Cris is , which I define as a diplo matic cris is between September 19 31 and March 19 33, no t as an abrupt change o f co urs e. It lo cates the cris is in the co ntinuing develo pment o f the Japanes e s tate’s po licy and ins titutio ns fo r news pro paganda as its res po ns e to two o ngo ing pheno mena: gro wing mas s po litical participatio n, and techno lo gical changes in mas s media and co mmunicatio n.

The Japanes e metro po litan s tate began a co o rdinated and s ys tematic appro ach to news pro paganda during the Manchurian Cris is , driven mainly by fo reign po licy co ncerns , rather than co ncerns with do mes tic tho ught co ntro l.

In 19 31–3, the fo reign po licy elite, including military o fficers , did no t cho o s e is o latio nis m. Acutely aware o f the need to jus tify their actio ns to the League o f Natio ns and o ther po wers , they appealed to ‘internatio nal public o pinio n’, no t des pite Japan’s military aggres s io n, but becaus e o f it. In this perio d, which has o ften been regarded as the beginning o f Japan’s diplo matic is o latio nis m, MOFA actively s o ught to engage with internatio nal public o pinio n.3

MOFA and o ther fo reign po licy elites began a pro ces s o f creating the Map 1: Glo bal divisio n o f news dist ribut io n united natio nal/imperial news agency as the critical s trategic o peratio nal agency fo r the s tate’s co o rdinatio n o f o vers eas news pro paganda. The chapter demo ns trates the clo s e co nnectio n between the two ins titutio n-making pro ces s es (the s tate’s co o rdinating bo dy and the natio nal/imperial news agency) at the metro po litan centre, To kyo , and between this pro ces s in To kyo and the parallel ins titutio n making in Japanes e-o ccupied Manchuria in 19 31–3. In this co ntext, the Manz ho uguo News Agency o r the MNA was fo unded in Changchun in December 19 32. The pro ces s o f es tablis hing the united natio nal/imperial news agency in To kyo , ho wever, pro ved to be a lo ng and winding ro ad.

T HE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT AND MASS PO LIT ICS

Scho lars o ften s tres s ed the ro les o f the military and natio nalis m during the Manchurian Cris is , and they als o as s umed the ‘undemo cratic’ nature o f the military. They o ften, ho wever, neglected s everal crucial as pects o f mas s po litics and mas s co mmunicatio n in this perio d.

Firs t, the ‘Manchurian Incident’ was Japan’s firs t war4 fo ught in the co ntext o f mas s (male) po litics . The Univers al [Male] Franchis e Law was pro mulgated in 19 25. The firs t general electio n under this law was held in 19 28 , in which mas s -bas ed po litical parties gained eight o ut o f the 46 6 s eats o f the Ho us e o f the Repres entatives (fo ur fo r the So cial Mas s Party and fo ur fo r o ther pro letarian parties [Musan seitō]).

Seco nd, greater mas s participatio n did no t res ult in an anti-war platfo rm in 19 32. In the firs t general electio n o f 20 February 19 32, fo llo wing the Manchurian Incident, Seiyūkai, o ne o f the two majo r bo urgeo is parties , called fo r an aggres s ive po licy in Manchuria and eco no mic reco very, and wo n a lands lide victo ry agains t its o ppo nent, Mins eitō . Furthermo re, while the left (co mmunis ts ) who were the co re o f the pro letarian parties that had been es tablis hed after 19 25 argued fo r no n-aggres s io n, they were s uppres s ed by majo r- party do minated go vernments . Mo reo ver, as Andrew Go rdo n argues , the right wing o f thes e mas s -bas ed parties came to s uppo rt an aggres s ive po licy to wards Manchuria.5

Third, the Manchurian Incident was Japan’s firs t electro nic mas s - media war with radio and news reels playing a s ignificant ro le in do mes tic war pro paganda. As Lo uis e Yo ung and Ikei Mas aru demo ns trate, in 19 31–2, war s to ries came to the mas s es no t o nly in printed fo rm, but als o with vo ices and mo ving pictures .6 The war was als o repo rted with vivid pho to s . Electro nic trans mis s io n o f pho to s s till had to wait until 19 35 when AP launched ‘AP Wirepho to ’, which wo uld beco me co mmo n in news s ervices in the late 19 30 s . Yet news media began to us e airplanes and bro ught pho to s to readers in the late 19 20 s . Rengō , fo r example, s tarted do mes tic pho to news in 19 28 .7 The Manchurian Incident expanded the us e o f this new news media, the pho to s ervice, to o vers eas co verage. While Jo hn Do wer demo ns trated ho w vis ual materials s uch as Nishikie caus ed s tro ng emo tio nal res po ns es in Japan in previo us wars ,8 by 19 31 pho to Map 2: Glo bal cable net wo rks in 19 14 images had beco me a do minant fo rm o f vis ual war repo rtage, adding a greater s ens e o f reality o f war. When Japan’s attack o n Shanghai in January-March 19 32 was repo rted to the wo rld with pho to s , it created a majo r internatio nal s ens atio n.

Fo urth, while the s tate s trengthened cens o rs hip o n media o utlets that were critical o f Japan’s aggres s io n in Manchuria, po s itive s to ries created a bo o m in the print and electro nic mas s media markets .9 Recent analys es o f majo r Japanes e news papers s ugges t that the s tate’s cens o rs hip and co ercio n, and military and right wing o rganiz atio ns ’ intimidatio n, indeed pro mpted s elf-cens o rs hip. Yet they als o s ho w that the news papers us ed the Manchurian Incident to increas e circulatio n, and that their edito rs and co rres po ndents had their o wn reas o ns to s uppo rt the aggres s io n.10

Fifth, the military in this perio d was deeply divided, and no t all were dis mis s ive o f the Meiji Co ns titutio n s ys tem. In 19 30 –2, there was a s eries o f terro ris t incidents in Japan, which invo lved Navy and Army o fficers . So me o fficers us ed fo rce, attacked parliamentary demo cracy, and wanted to create a military dictato rs hip. The terro ris ts , ho wever, remained extremis t mino rities in the military. Mo s t military o fficers , es pecially at the to p, tried to increas e their po litical influence thro ugh the framewo rk o f the Meiji Co ns titutio n, no t thro ugh a co up d’etat and/o r a military dictato rs hip. Upris ings in 19 30 –2, therefo re, o ften targeted s uperio r o fficers o r o ther factio ns within the military. While thes e events radicaliz ed military o fficers , the military co ntinued to be divided by factio nal co nflicts .

Sixth, many military o fficers did no t dis mis s , but fully appreciated, and s o ught to utiliz e fo r their o wn ends , mas s po litical participatio n. Previo us wo rks o n the s tate and media o ften as s umed the military’s inherent undemo cratic attitudes to wards the media. Thes e wo rks unders to o d that the military’s increas ed po litical influence res ulted in greater s uppres s io n o f o ppo s ing views thro ugh cens o rs hip, co ercio n, and phys ical intimidatio n. There is indeed an inherent brutality in a pro fes s io n which us es fo rce. The rigid hierarchy o f chain o f co mmand in the military als o go es agains t the demo cratic principle o f o pen dis cus s io ns amo ng equals .

At the s ame time, many o fficers were well aware o f glo bal trends and the po licies and ins titutio ns o f o ther co untries . While repres s ing o ppo s ing views , they unders to o d the need fo r and the po wer o f pro paganda in o rder to s ecure mas s s uppo rt fo r their military actio ns and budgets , and co nducted effective pro paganda in the 19 20 s and 19 30 s . Majo r bo urgeo is po litical parties were lo s ing credibility in the mid-late 19 30 s becaus e o f their tainted image (and the reality) o f co rruptio n with big bus ines s mo ney. At the s ame time, the military, alo ng with the bureaucracy, emerged with an image as a ‘clean’, ‘fair’, and ‘co mpetent’ po litical fo rce to which the mas s es co uld entrus t s tate affairs .11 By the late 19 30 s , the military’s (es pecially the Army’s ) do mes tic mas s pro paganda had been building s uch po s itive images fo r almo s t a decade.

Seventh, in the age o f mas s po litics , the main po litical acto rs needed to s ecure mas s s uppo rt fo r their po licies .

THE ARMY IN MASS POLITICS: PROPAGANDA AND A TOTAL WAR SYSTEM,19 27–30

Up until 19 31, divers e minis tries managed different areas o f info rmatio n-related activities . The s tate’s o nly attempt to co o rdinate and centraliz e s uch activities in the 19 20 s came fro m the Department o f Info rmatio n o f MOFA in 19 24. This co ncerned fo reign po licy-relevant pro paganda and intelligence activities .

The attempt was , ho wever, no t fo llo wed up. Meanwhile, different minis tries co ntinued to co ntro l different as pects o f the s tate’s info rmatio n management. The Ho me Minis try was in charge o f cens o rs hip, and the Minis try o f Co mmunicatio n (MOC) o f co mmunicatio n infras tructure. MOFA’s Department o f Info rmatio n gathered o vers eas info rmatio n and co nducted o vers eas news pro paganda, while its Department o f Cultural Affairs was in charge o f o vers eas cultural pro paganda. The Army and the Navy each had pro paganda/publicity departments . They were mainly co ncerned with do mes tic pro paganda. The Minis try o f Educatio n adminis tered internatio nal educatio nal and cultural exchanges , and the Minis try o f Railways managed internatio nal to uris m.

MOFA had been leading o vers eas news pro paganda. To gether with the no n-o fficial fo reign po licy elite, it had been res po nding to the two glo bal trends : the develo pment o f greater mas s po litical participatio n, and the develo pment o f teleco mmunicatio n techno lo gy. After the Firs t Wo rld War, Japan’s fo reign po licy elite reco gniz ed the s ignificance o f ‘internatio nal public o pinio n’, no t o nly the public o pinio n o f a s pecific co untry. MOFA’s Department o f Info rmatio n was created in o rder to adjus t to this new demand, and to deal with fo reign po licy-relevant intelligence and news pro paganda in general. Reco gniz ing the s ignificance o f Japan’s o wn news agencies , it s trengthened Ko kus ai and Tō hō news agencies .

Pho to taken in fro nt o f the headquarters o f Ko kus ai, winter 19 23.

Iwanaga Yūkich at the centre with cro s s ed arms . Rus s ell Kennedy is o n the right s ide o f Iwanaga with glas s es and a bo w tie. Furuno Ino s euke is right behind Iwanaga.

So urce: Ts ūs hins has hi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi (To kyo : Edito r, 19 58 ).

MOFA’s initial idea o f pro paganda came fro m publicity and advertis ing in the mas s market. In co ntras t, the idea o f pro paganda in the military, es pecially amo ng Army o fficers , o riginated in the pro paganda o f to tal war during the Firs t Wo rld War.12 Yet bo th ideas were clo s ely co nnected to the develo pment o f mas s po litics and teleco mmunicatio n techno lo gies . Pro paganda was a means to utiliz e what we no w call ‘s o ft po wer’ (dis tinguis hed fro m the hard po wer o f military might). The s tate needed to mo biliz e s o ft po wer, becaus e civilian s uppo rt (phys ical and mo ral) became crucial fo r it to s tay in po wer and to co nduct war effo rts . Pro paganda was a means o f mas s mo biliz atio n, no t by fo rce, but by co -o ptio n and pers uas io n, and the s tate needed to utiliz e co ns tantly advancing co mmunicatio n techno lo gies and experts . In Japan, the Minis try o f the Army es tablis hed the News paper Sectio n at its minis ter’s s ecretariat in 19 20 , which s pecializ ed in do mes tic pro paganda. Tho s e who were po s ted to this s ectio n, es pecially in the 19 30 s , s eem to have unders to o d pro paganda as a critical part o f a to tal war s ys tem.13

After the Firs t Wo rld War, Army o fficers became majo r advo cates o f the creatio n o f a to tal war s ys tem. In the 19 30 s , they were called kakushin ha o r s tatis t refo rmis ts , and fo rmed alliances with like- minded bureaucrats in o ther minis tries .14 The to tal war s ys tem was in a s ens e the ultimate vers io n o f s uch s tatis t refo rm s chemes . Ide Yo s hino ri argued that s uch s chemes became a glo bal trend. Many s tates , including the U.S., Britain, Italy, Germany, and Japan, created new minis tries and departments in the 19 20 s in o rder to res po nd to Ko kusai News Agency St af f and Family Members, a majo r cris is caus ed by glo bal eco no mic and po litical s tructural 19 23 changes .15 Similar to thes e s tate-led refo rm s chemes , the to tal war s ys tem als o aimed to es tablis h a permanent s ys tem fo r the ultimate cris is , war, by dras tically refo rming po litical, eco no mic and s o cial s tructures to increas e natio nal pro ductio n and effectively mo biliz e natio nal res o urces .

Advo cates o f a to tal war s ys tem, ho wever, were a s pecific kind o f s tatis t refo rmis t, becaus e they argued no t o nly fo r individual minis tries ’ refo rms , but als o fo r the centraliz atio n o f s tate po wer. In their view, refo rms o f individual minis tries co uld no t deal with current cris es and anticipated war. A mo re co o rdinated (inter- minis terial) o r centraliz ed (s upra-minis terial) s tate actio n was needed, and they wanted to es tablis h a s tro ng central o ffice fo r this co o rdinatio n/centraliz atio n.

Thro ugho ut the 19 30 s and early 19 40 s , thes e Army advo cates o f a to tal war s ys tem wanted the Cabinet Office, no t their o wn Minis try o f the Army o r the Army’s General Staff Office, to s erve as the s ite fo r this central o ffice. This meant that they intended to create a to tal war s ys tem within the framewo rk o f the Meiji Co ns titutio n, no t an Army dictato rs hip.16 Their path to ward a to tal war s ys tem, ho wever, was neither co herent no r s mo o th, and whether their vis io n was realiz ed o r no t is debatable. We examine belo w ho w thes e Army to tal war advo cates began to pus h their agenda during the Manchurian Cris is , ho w they regarded news pro paganda within s uch a to tal war s ys tem, and ho w o ther acto rs reacted to their vis io n.

As the firs t s tep to wards a to tal war s ys tem, they created a think tank o ffice at the Minis try o f the Army in June 19 18 . Its duty was to res earch, fo rmulate, and pro po s e po licy ideas fo r material mo biliz atio n. Altho ugh the Army als o es tablis hed the News paper Sectio n in 19 20 , to tal war advo cates in the Army were co ncerned mo s tly with the mo biliz atio n o f war-relevant materials .17 Ins pired by So viet Rus s ia’s New Eco no mic Po licy (NEP), which began in 19 21, they es pecially wanted to increas e eco no mic capacity and s trengthen eco no mic mo biliz atio n.

To tal war advo cates made little pro gres s until 19 27. After s o me trials and s etbacks , Army Minis ter, Ugaki Kaz us hige (January 19 24– April 19 27, July 19 29 –April 19 31), go t the Diet’s appro val to es tablis h the Res o urce Bureau (Shigen kyo ku) at the Cabinet Office in May 19 27. As Furukawa Takahis a and Michael Barnhart po int o ut, it was the firs t central o rganiz atio n fo r planning natio nal mo biliz atio n.18 The bureau was to beco me a key civilian o ffice thro ugh which the Army wo uld influence po licy-making.19 At this s tage, ho wever, it was co ncerned with the mo biliz atio n o f material and human res o urces , no t info rmatio n.20

The Res o urce Bureau s o o n included info rmatio n in its natio nal mo biliz atio n plan. It pro duced a do cument in 19 30 which Is hikawa Junkichi regards as the s tarting po int o f Japan’s natio nal mo biliz atio n plan.21 It was entitled ‘On the Ins titutio n to Prepare the Co ntro l and Adminis tratio n o f Res o urces ’.22 The do cument clarified what the to tal war s ys tem meant: ‘we need to nurture res o urces , res earch o n res o urces , prepare human and material res o urces in peace time, and create legal framewo rks fo r their s ys tematic us e during wartime’. Then it identified ‘the unificatio n o f info rmatio n and pro paganda [activities ]’ as o ne o f the s ix prio rities .23

In this do cument, Army o fficers at the Res o urce Bureau articulated the ro le o f info rmatio n in the to tal war s ys tem. It regarded ‘info rmatio n’ bo th as a s ignificant res o urce fo r s tate po wer, and as a means fo r s mo o th mo biliz atio n. Furthermo re, this firs t natio nal mo biliz atio n plan regarded o vers eas pro paganda and intelligence gathering as impo rtant as , if no t mo re s o than, do mes tic tho ught co ntro l. It emphas iz ed that the s tate needed to co o rdinate info rmatio n-related activities s uch as gathering info rmatio n in o rder to kno w the enemy; do mes tic pro paganda in o rder to maintain and fo s ter natio nal mo rale; reinfo rcing third co untries ’ favo urable attitudes to wards Japan; and weakening enemy natio nals ’ will to fight.24 A large po rtio n o f info rmatio n-related activities was , therefo re, o vers eas pro paganda and intelligence gathering. The po int is wo rth s tres s ing becaus e s cho lars o ften s ugges t that the Army and its to tal war agenda were mainly co ncerned with do mes tic tho ught co ntro l.

Do mes tic o pinio n, no netheles s , mattered in to tal war. Acco rding to Pak Sunae, between the late 19 20 s and mid-19 30 s , the Army’s News paper Sectio n pro duced a great number o f pro paganda pamphlets in o rder to educate the public o n the idea o f to tal war. No tably, during the Manchurian Cris is o f 19 31–3, it is s ued 123 pamphlets .25 They pro pagated a new and bro ader no tio n o f ‘natio nal defence’ that s tres s ed the impo rtance o f mas s co ntributio n. The perio d co rres po nded to the emergence o f Japan’s mas s po litics . The News paper Sectio n clearly reco gniz ed the s ignificance o f mas s s uppo rt fo r Army actio ns . Direct appeals by the Army built up mas s s uppo rt fo r its agenda fo r military expans io n and natio nal mo biliz atio n, and the idea o f a bro ader natio nal defence s tate in the mid-late 19 30 s .

MOFA als o reco gniz ed the need fo r do mes tic pro paganda in this critical perio d o f develo pment o f mas s po litics . In 19 27, Ko mura Kin’ichi, then Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n at MOFA, expanded his department’s s co pe beyo nd o vers eas news pro paganda and intelligence activities . The department s ho uld no w, Ko mura argued, pay attentio n to the guiding do mes tic public o pinio n o n fo reign po licy.26 Bo th the Army and MOFA, therefo re, were preparing fo r mas s po litics befo re 19 31.

APPEAL TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION, TOKYO, SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 19 31 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS A REFERENCE POINT

The Manchurian Cris is pro vided a catalys t fo r Japan’s po licy elite to fo rm a mo re co o rdinated po licy and ins titutio ns fo r o vers eas news pro paganda. This did no t happen o vernight, ho wever. Co herent actio n did no t emerge until June 19 32, and even then there were different vis io ns amo ng the po licy elite, which included high o fficials o f MOFA, the Army, and the Navy, as well as members o f the Cabinet (and the Cabinet Office). The news agency men, Iwanaga Yūkichi, Rengō ’s Executive Managing Directo r (Senmu riji) and Furuno Ino s uke, its General Manager (Sōshihainin),27 als o co ntributed po licy ideas , and were res po ns ible fo r news pro paganda.

While certain Army o fficers s aw the Manchurian Cris is as an o ppo rtunity to advance their to tal war s ys tem pro jects , in 19 31–3, a majo rity o f the po licy elite was mainly co ncerned with o vers eas news Iwanaga Yūkichi So urce: T sūshinshashi kankō kai pro paganda, ed., Tsūshinshashi (T o kyo : Edit o r, 19 58). no t do mes tic tho ught co ntro l. As a res ult, they unders to o d the creatio n Furuno Ino suke So urce: T sūshinshashi o f the united kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi (T o kyo : Edit o r, 19 58). natio nal/imperial news agency as a mo s t urgent is s ue, and let MOFA take the lead in this perio d.

Japan’s po licy elite had go o d reas o n to prio ritiz e internatio nal public o pinio n in 19 31–3. The Manchurian Incident was a cris is o f Japan’s relatio ns no t o nly with China, but als o with the League o f Natio ns , its member co untries and the U.S. It was als o an internatio nal cris is .28 Only a few days after the Japanes e Guando ng Army began an attack in Manchuria, China’s Natio nalis t Go vernment appealed its cas e agains t Japan to the League (21 September 19 31). As a res ult, the Manchurian Incident entered the League’s co llective s ecurity s ys tem, while it als o came to the attentio n o f the U.S.-initiated internatio nal co nventio ns (the Nine Po wer Treaty, 19 22 and the Pact o f Paris , 19 28 ). The incident aro us ed internatio nal public o pinio n at the League’s General As s embly and public o pinio n o f a no n-League member, the U.S. Furthermo re, Japan’s attack o n Shanghai in late January 19 32 to o k the lives o f expatriates as well as Chines e, and ho rrifying news and pho to s o f the bo mbing o utraged Chines e and Euro -American metro po litan public o pinio n.29

Develo pments at the League in 19 31–3 pro vide a reference po int fo r the fo rmatio n o f Japan’s news pro paganda po licy and ins titutio ns . Having failed to devis e effective meas ures to s to p the Guando ng Army’s aggres s io n in September–No vember 19 31, the League decided o n 10 December to s end an inquiry co mmis s io n to China and Japan. The co mmis s io n co mpris ed members fro m Britain, France, Italy, Germany and the U.S., and was headed by the Britis h Lo rd Victo r Lytto n (hence it was kno wn as the Lytto n Co mmis s io n). It arrived in Japan o n 29 February 19 32. The Guando ng Army created its puppet s tate, Manz ho uguo , o n 1 March 19 32, s ho rtly befo re the co mmis s io n landed in China (14 March). The co mmis s io n co nducted an inquiry in China fro m 14 March to 28 June, and examined the ‘incident’ o n the railway and the nature o f Manz ho uguo . It then came back to Japan via Ko rea o n 4 July, and went back to Beijing o n 20 July, where Lytto n wro te a draft repo rt.

The repo rt was co mpleted o n September 4 and fo rmally s ent to the go vernments o f Japan and China as well as o ther League member co untries o n 30 September 19 32. The Japanes e go vernment realiz ed that while the repo rt was s ympathetic to Japanes e interes ts in Manchuria, it did no t reco gniz e Manz ho uguo as a ‘genuine’ natio n, no r Japanes e actio ns after 18 September 19 31 as ‘s elf-defence’.

Lo s ing o n thes e two crucial po ints , the Japanes e go vernment hurriedly gave fo rmal reco gnitio n to Manz ho uguo , o n 15 September 19 32. The League’s Co uncil dis cus s ed the co mmis s io n’s repo rt and its pro po s ed s o lutio ns in late 19 32 and early 19 33. Its General As s embly finally vo ted to ado pt the co mmis s io n’s pro po s al o n 24 February 19 33. Japan cas t the o nly vo te agains t this res o lutio n, and s pecial envo y Mats uo ka Yō s uke led his team in their dramatic exit fro m the as s embly in pro tes t. The Japanes e go vernment then co mmunicated its fo rmal no tice o f withdrawal fro m the League o n 27 March 19 33. Acco rding to League regulatio ns , withdrawal was to beco me effective two years after o fficial no tificatio n.

Clo s ely examining Japanes e dealings with the League in 19 31–3, co ntempo rary o bs ervers and later s cho lars co ncluded that Japan had ‘lo s t the battle fo r wo rld o pinio n’ to China by March 19 33.30 Between September 19 31 and March 19 33, ho wever, the Japanes e fo reign po licy elite wo rked hard to win the s ympathy o f this very ‘internatio nal public o pinio n’. Japanes e o vers eas pro paganda bo th fro m To kyo and fro m Japanes e-o ccupied Manchuria targeted the Lytto n Co mmis s io n (between December 19 31 and September 19 32), and the League’s Co uncil, its General As s embly, its member co untries , and the U.S.31

IWANAGA’S BLUEPRINT FOR THE ‘UNITED’ NEWS AGENCY, DECEMBER 19 31

What was happening to Japan’s news pro paganda po licy and ins titutio ns in the initial perio d o f the Manchurian Cris is in 19 31? There is little s urviving archival material o n this is s ue. One no te by a MOFA o fficial, Amō Eiji (18 8 7–19 6 8 ), which was co mpiled in his reprinted pers o nal papers , gives a clue. Amō was Directo r o f MOFA’s Department o f Info rmatio n fro m June 19 33 to April 19 37. In April 19 34 he created a glo bal s ens atio n by co mmenting to the pres s that Japan wo uld o ppo s e any eco no mic and o ther as s is tance to China by o ther po wers . This became kno wn as ‘Japan’s Mo nro e Do ctrine declaratio n’. He later s erved as Directo r-General o f the Bo ard o f Info rmatio n fro m March 19 43–July 19 44). Amō , therefo re, held a central po s itio n in the s tate’s info rmatio n po licy in the years leading up to the war and during the war.32

Amō ’s no te entitled ‘A Summary o f the Pro ces s o f the Es tablis hment o f a New News Agency’ chro nicled ho w Dō mei News Agency came into being between 19 31 and 19 35.33 It was written as a MOFA departmental no te, and Amō mus t have written it s o me time in 19 35 as Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n.

Acco rding to this no te, MOFA made the very firs t mo ve to co o rdinate fo reign news pro paganda. MOFA initially pro po s ed, it reco rded, the creatio n o f a s tro ng news agency, no t the es tablis hment o f a s tate o ffice to co o rdinate and s upervis e news pro paganda o peratio ns . In autumn 19 31, s o o n after the Guando ng Army had begun its aggres s io n in Manchuria, MOFA (under Fo reign Minis ter Shidehara o f the Wakats uki Cabinet) was co ncerned abo ut the ‘bad pres s ’ o n Japan’s actio ns in the aftermath o f the ‘Manchurian Incident’, and began res earch o n the creatio n o f a s tro ng news agency. This was impo rtant, the no te co ntinued, becaus e Japan needed to ‘defend its elf agains t fo reign pro paganda and to clearly explain Japan’s cas e to the wo rld’.34

The Amō no te s ugges ts that the matter was no t taken up until the next cabinet was fo rmed. The Wakats uki Cabinet, in which Mins eitō was the majo rity party, had pro mis ed the League to res train the Guando ng Army’s aggres s io n and had failed in this pro mis e. Unable to unify the cabinet, it res igned. The o ppo s itio n party Seiyūkai fo rmed the new cabinet o n 13 December 19 31 with Inukai Ts uyo s hi (18 55–19 32) as Prime Minis ter (he was als o Fo reign Minis ter until mid-January 19 32). This was o nly three days after the League’s decis io n to es tablis h an inquiry co mmis s io n.

So o n after this new Cabinet was fo rmed, the Amō no te s tated, Cabinet Secretary Mo ri Kaku (18 8 2–19 32) fo rmed a three-minis try co mmittee (MOFA, the Army and the Navy) to wo rk o ut a plan to amalgamate Rengō and Dents ū. The plan was to create a unified news agency in To kyo to s trengthen o vers eas news pro paganda.35 Altho ugh Mo ri had clo s e co nnectio ns with the Army,36 it is unclear whether this initiative came fro m Inukai, Mo ri, MOFA o r the Army.

The amalgamatio n o f the two majo r news agencies , Rengō and Dents ū, became a mo s t urgent is s ue fo r the fo reign po licy elite in late 19 31. They fo und co nflicting news o n Manchuria by Rengō and Dents ū co nfus ing bo th internatio nally and do mes tically. The Cabinet Office, MOFA, the Army, the Navy, and Rengō agreed that the ‘co rrect’ and ‘unified’ view o n Japanes e po licy in Manchuria had to be pres ented to the wo rld as well as to the Japanes e public.37

At this precis e mo ment when Mo ri ins tructed the three-minis try co mmittee to wo rk o n this amalgamatio n, the Executive Managing Directo r o f Rengō , Iwanaga Yūkichi, wro te a pro po s al, ‘On the Fo rmatio n o f the State’s Great News Agency: the Amalgamatio n o f Rengō and Dents ū’.38 Iwanaga dis cus s ed this pro po s al with Prime Minis ter Inukai, who was his relative.39 He then mo s t likely s ubmitted it to the abo ve three-minis try co mmittee. Co ns idering the timing (the pro po s al was written after the League’s decis io n to s end an inquiry co mmis s io n to Japan and China), Iwanaga was mo s t likely thinking abo ut ho w to appeal the ‘Japanes e cas e’ to the League and its co mmis s io n.

Here, Iwanaga argued that a s tro ng and credible news agency was ‘abs o lutely neces s ary fo r a mo dern s tate’. Such a co mpetent news agency s ho uld be public, he co ntinued. It s ho uld co ns o lidate media o rganiz atio ns in the natio n. It s ho uld als o have edito rial independence, but s ho uld be ‘res po ns ible’ to the s tate. Stres s ing the s ignificance o f the credibility o f its news , and being cautio us abo ut the go vernment’s ‘s upervis io n and as s is tance’ (Kantoku enjo), Iwanaga s ugges ted that this news agency s ho uld ‘co ntribute to the go vernment’s po licy’ o n a vo luntary bas is . It s ho uld no netheles s have, he argued, privileges fro m the s tate, s uch as exclus ive right to internatio nal wireles s co mmunicatio n. This was becaus e mo s t o ther natio nal news agencies already had this privilege, and witho ut it, he ins is ted, the pro po s ed news agency wo uld no t be able to co mpete with them.40 Iwanaga’s pro po s al o f December 19 31 was the blueprint fo r what became Dō mei News Agency in December 19 35.

At the s ame time, Iwanaga and o ther members o f the fo reign po licy elite were als o wo rking o n the creatio n o f a united news agency in military-o ccupied Manchuria.

THE MAKING OF THE ‘NATIONAL’ NEWS AGENCY FOR A PUPPET STATE, AND METROPOLITAN POLITICS, DECEMBER 19 31–MAY 19 32

IWANAGA’S BLUEPRINT

The Guando ng Army was a do minant fo rce in the making o f bo th info rmatio n po licy in Manchuria and o f the Manz ho uguo News Agency (Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha) o r the MNA. The MNA was es tablis hed in Changchun, the new capital city o f Manz ho uguo , in December 19 32. The memo irs o f MNA’s fo unding members (publis hed in 19 42) reveal that the garris o n relied o n two expert gro ups . One gro up came fro m the So uth Manchuria Railway Co mpany (SMR). So o n after the Guando ng Army’s military aggres s io n began in September 19 31, fo ur co mmis s io ned s taff members (Shokutaku) o f the SMR were s eco nded to the Fo urth Department o f the Guando ng Army’s General Staff Office. This department s pecializ ed in pro paganda wo rk. Acco rding to Katō Shinkichi, who was o ne o f the fo ur, by 19 31 SMR’s Department o f Info rmatio n had been fo rmulating media and info rmatio n po licy in Manchuria fo r s o me time.41

The s eco nd gro up o f experts was fro m Rengō , namely Iwanaga and Furuno , and Sas aki Kenji, who was s ent to Mukden as a Rengō co rres po ndent in mid-No vember 19 31.42 While the SMR men wo rked o n pro paganda within the military-o ccupied Manchuria, the Guando ng Army relied o n Rengō fo r o vers eas pro paganda. Rengō eagerly o ffered help. Acco rding to Sas aki’s memo ir o f 19 42, upo n his arrival at Mukden as Rengō ’s co rres po ndent o n 17 No vember 19 31, he called o n the Guando ng Army Headquarters . The Guando ng Army to ld him that it s aw ‘internal’ pro paganda go ing well in Manchuria, but was co ncerned with its ‘bad internatio nal publicity’. They as ked Sas aki’s advice o n ‘internatio nal publicity’. He co ntacted Furuno in To kyo , who as s ured Sas aki that Rengō wo uld co me up with a go o d s o lutio n.

A mo nth later, o n 19 December 19 31 (les s than a week after the fo rmatio n o f the new Inukai Cabinet in To kyo ), Iwanaga s ubmitted his pro po s al to the Guando ng Army: ‘On the Manchuria and [Inner] Mo ngo lia News Agency’.43 In Japan, Iwanaga had the bes t kno wledge and experience o f internatio nal news pro paganda. He als o had intimate kno wledge o f Manchuria, having s pent his early career as a co lo nial o fficer o f the SMR in Changchun in the 19 10 s . Tho s e who were invo lved in the making o f the Manz ho uguo News Agency (MNA) regarded Iwanaga’s pro po s al as its blueprint.44

In December 19 31, therefo re, jus t after the fo rmatio n o f the Inukai Cabinet, and aro und the time when the League o f Natio ns decided to s end an inquiry co mmis s io n to Japan and China, Iwanaga wro te two pro po s als , o ne fo r the united natio nal/imperial news agency at the metro po litan centre, To kyo , and ano ther fo r a news agency fo r Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia. He viewed the two ins titutio ns as integral to Japan’s news po licy.

When he wro te the pro po s al o n the news agency in Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia, ho wever, the Japanes e military o ccupatio n did no t enco mpas s the who le o f Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia. The regime, Manz ho uguo , was als o yet to be es tablis hed. Iwanaga was , therefo re, bas ing his pro po s al o n two as s umptio ns that were mo re o r les s s hared by o ther fo reign po licy elites in To kyo in December 19 31.

The firs t as s umptio n was that a certain trans itio nal adminis trative bo dy s ho uld be fo rmed in the Japanes e-o ccupied area in Manchuria. This meant that he regarded the current Guando ng Army o ccupatio n o f Manchuria as a fait acco mpli.45

By December 19 31, many Japanes e fo reign po licy elites were s uppo rting an o ptio n o f creating an ‘auto no mo us ’ regime in the o ccupied area, altho ugh there was no unanimo us view o n what fo rm this regime s ho uld take. The Guando ng Army initially had wanted to annex the regio n. Already by 22 September 19 31, ho wever, it decided to create a pro -Japan regime, which was ‘virtually’ s eparated fro m the Chines e Natio nalis t Go vernment. Japan wo uld co ntro l its defence and diplo macy.46 Such an auto no mo us regime was a no n-annexatio n o ptio n. In this way it was ho ped, Japan co uld appeas e o ther po wers and the League o f Natio ns . At the s ame time, it co uld co ntro l the area, s ecure Japan’s interes ts , and exclude o ther po wers ’ interventio n.47 In late Octo ber, the Guando ng Army argued this pro -Japan regime s ho uld be an ‘independent’ s tate with no co nnectio n with the Natio nalis t Go vernment; a s tate which ‘o n the s urface’ was run by the Chines e, but was virtually under the Guando ng Army’s co ntro l.48

The new Prime Minis ter Inukai accepted and s uppo rted the Guando ng Army’s o ccupatio n plans . After being appo inted as Prime Minis ter, Inukai called a general electio n in February 19 32 in o rder to s ecure a po pular mandate. His Seiyūkai Party argued fo r a ‘s tro ng’ China po licy and eco no mic reco very, co ntras ting them to Mins eitō ’s (Shidehara’s ) ‘s o ft’ China po licy and its failed eco no mic reco very s chemes . Inukai’s Seiyūkai wo n a lands lide victo ry (30 1 s eats ) agains t Mins eitō (146 ), which lo s t mo re than 10 0 s eats fro m the previo us electio n o f 20 February 19 30 .49

A few facto rs co ntributed to this victo ry. Firs t, two bo urgeo is po litical parties s uppres s ed s everely the radical left centered o n the co mmunis ts , who held to an anti-imperialis m and anti-imperial war po licy. Seco nd, fo r the pas t five mo nths s ince September 19 31, the mas s media had been s tirring jingo is m and s uppo rting the aggres s ive China po licy, while the right wing o f the mas s -bas ed parties , s uch as the So cial Mas s Party, prio ritiz ed natio n/empire o ver clas s .50 Third, Inukai’s decis io n o n the go ld embargo in December co ntributed to an eco no mic reco very, which was welco med by the po pulatio n when the o fficial figure o f unemplo yment was clo s e to half a millio n. Fo urth, o n 20 February 19 32, electio n day, the Japanes e military s tarted a full-s cale attack in Shanghai,51 further fueling jingo is m.

In December 19 31 when Iwanaga pro po s ed a news agency in Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia, therefo re, the fo reign po licy elite as s umed that s o me fo rm o f an ‘auto no mo us ’ s tate wo uld s o o n be created in this military-o ccupied area. Iwanaga pro po s ed a ‘natio nal’ news agency fo r a trans itio nal go vernment befo re the exact nature o f the go vernment was wo rked o ut.

Iwanaga’s pro po s al o f December 19 31 was als o bas ed o n a s eco nd as s umptio n. Iwanaga regarded Manchuria and the eas tern part o f Inner Mo ngo lia as a co herent area, as relatively auto no mo us fro m China, and as within Japan’s s phere o f influence.52 Acco rdingly, he called the pro po s ed news agency ‘the news agency o f Manchuria and [Inner] Mo ngo lia’. He as s umed that the envis aged ‘new auto no mo us s tate’ wo uld eventually integrate the adminis tratio ns o f all the areas o f Manchuria and eas tern Inner Mo ngo lia, and that the pro po s ed news agency wo uld co ver thes e areas , which were beyo nd the current Guando ng Army’s o ccupatio n.53

Iwanaga reco gniz ed, ho wever, that this ‘natio nal’ news agency in the military-o ccupied regio n was no o rdinary ‘natio nal’ news agency. The general principle o f a natio nal news agency co uld no t be applied here. In the mid-19 20 s , Iwanaga had o ppo s ed s tro ng s tate co ntro l o ver Japanes e news delivery in China, arguing that an abundant, and high-quality news s upply wo uld bes t s erve pro paganda o bjectives .54 Fo r the Japanes e metro po litan ‘natio nal’ news agency, he als o s till s tres s ed edito rial independence in December 19 31. In co ntras t, Iwanaga was aware o f the s trategic ro le o f his pro po s ed news agency in military-o ccupied Manchuria. He argued that the pro po s ed news agency s ho uld be o fficially co ntro lled, and s ho uld mo no po liz e news delivery in the regio n jus t as the So viet Tas s , the s tate-funded news agency, did. Witho ut s tate co ntro l, he argued, the area wo uld beco me ‘a dumping market o f fo reign and Chines e pro paganda’, and this wo uld o bs truct the effo rts o f the Japanes e metro po litan s tate and the new s tate in Manchuria to make the wo rld unders tand their po licies co rrectly.

The pro po s ed ‘natio nal’ news agency in Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia no netheles s had features co mmo n with o ther natio nal news agencies . Iwanaga argued it s ho uld have privileges fro m the pro po s ed new s tate in Manchuria, as o ther ‘natio nal’ news agencies had fro m their res pective s tates . Thes e privileges were: an exclus ive right to wireles s co mmunicatio n and firs t acces s to o fficial s tatements . Iwanaga went further to s ugges t that there s ho uld be no cens o rs hip o f news in the area s o that news wo uld no t be delayed. Fo r the pro po s ed news agency to be influential, Iwanaga s tres s ed, its news had to be no t o nly accurate and s elective, but als o s peedy and lo w priced.55

Rengō tried to implement Iwanaga’s pro po s al in Manchuria. In January 19 32, Furuno travelled to Mukden, the headquarters o f the Guando ng Army, and met to p o fficers , Lieutenant-Co lo nel Ho njō Shigeru, Co lo nel Itagaki Seis hirō , and Lieutenant-Co lo nel Is hiwara Kanji. He als o s aw Do ihara Kenji, the head o f the Army’s Special Service Unit at Harbin. Furuno had kno wn Itagaki well s ince the time he had been po s ted to Ko kus ai’s Beijing Bureau in 19 20 –23.56 Thes e o fficers endo rs ed Iwanaga’s pro po s al. They s hared Iwanaga’s view that ‘news was central in pro paganda and a news agency wo uld be a crucial ins titutio n o f pro paganda war’.57

CONFLICTS IN METROPOLITAN POLITICS

Internal fights , chao s and co nfus io n do minated po litics in To kyo until June 19 32. This delayed the pro ces s o f es tablis hing the news agency in Manchuria. As Satō Junko o bs erves , the metro po litan s tate was far fro m reaching co ns ens us o n info rmatio n po licy.58 The Inukai Cabinet had to wo rk o n eco no mic reco very, while dealing with Seiyūkai’s internal co nflicts . The two majo r po litical parties (Seiyūkai and Mins eitō ) were als o challenged by a s eries o f military co up attempts and terro ris t attacks , and military factio nal fights were intens e in this perio d.

Such develo pments o ccurred no t des pite, but becaus e o f the ris e o f mas s po litics in the late 19 20 s and early 19 30 s , and in this co ntext, party po liticians thems elves co ntributed to their o wn decline. Bo th the Seiyūkai and Mins eitō go vernments were res po ns ible fo r s uppres s io n o f the radicals and the left o f the new po litical fo rces . The Mins eitō go vernment, which had wo n the electio n o f February 19 30 , fo r example, arres ted the co mmunis ts s o o n after this victo ry. At the s ame time, they co -o pted mo derate pro gres s ives and the right. The Mins eitō -do minated Ho us e o f Repres entative pas s ed a bill to allo w female franchis e at the municipal level (but no t natio nal level) in May 19 30 . In o rder to s o lve intens ifying indus trial dis putes , the Ho us e o f Repres entatives als o pas s ed the refo rmed Labo ur Unio n Law, and Labo ur Dis pute Mediatio n Law in March 19 31.

Meanwhile, Seiyūkai’s o ppo rtunis tic attacks were detrimental to parliamentary demo cracy. Pres s ed by the eco no mic depres s io n, the Mins eitō go vernment purs ued dis armament po licy, and co ncluded the Lo ndo n Naval Dis armament Treaty in early April 19 30 . The o ppo s itio n party, Seiyūkai, led by Inukai Ts uyo s hi, and the Navy’s Chief o f General Staff ( Gunrei buchō), attacked the go vernment, arguing that this treaty vio lated the prero gative o f s upreme co mmand o f the military that had been defined by the Meiji Co ns titutio n. The actio n undermined the co nventio n o f parliamentary demo cracy and the autho rity o f the elected go vernment. While the matter was finally s ettled in September, a pers is tent campaign by Seiyūkai and Navy hardliners s tirred right-wing fanatics , and Prime Minis ter Hamaguchi Os achi was s ho t in No vember 19 30 .

In March 19 31, the ratificatio n o f this dis armament treaty in the Diet pro mpted a failed military co up (the March Incident) that s o ught to mo biliz e ‘pro letarian parties ’ and ‘left-wing and right-wing’ mas s es to attack the headquarters o f Mins eitō , Seiyūkai and the Prime Minis ter’s o fficial res idence.59

While the military was increas ing its po litical po wer, it was als o deeply divided. The Guando ng Army and its liais ing Army o fficers in To kyo were increas ingly unhappy no t o nly with the ‘s o ft’ appro ach by the Mins eitō go vernment to anti-Japanes e mo vements in Manchuria, but als o with the to p s taff o f the Minis try o f the Army. In March 19 31, they planned a s imultaneo us attack in Manchuria and a co up attempt in To kyo fo r later in the year.6 0 The attack in Manchuria was executed in September 19 31.

The co up attempt in To kyo was , ho wever, abo rted in Octo ber 19 31 (the Octo ber Incident). The Octo ber Incident was led by a gro up o f middle-ranking o fficers mainly fro m the Army. Its aim was to as s as s inate the Cabinet members , o ccupy the metro po litan po lice headquarters , and fo rce the to p level o f the Army to create a new Army-led cabinet.6 1 After this failed attempt, the Army’s to p level became mo re vigilant agains t s ubvers ive actio ns by middle and lo wer-ranking o fficers in as s o ciatio n with private terro ris t gro ups s uch as Kets umeidan. Kets umeidan s hared a s imilar agenda with thes e middle-ranking o fficers —to get rid o f majo r bo urgeo is po litical parties , ‘co rrupt’ with big bus ines s mo ney. No w largely is o lated fro m Army o fficers , but in co ntact with s o me Navy o fficers , Kets umeidan targeted po litical party and big bus ines s leaders in early 19 32.6 2 Meanwhile Japanes e and Chines e fo rces were in full- s cale co nfro ntatio n in Shanghai and the Guando ng Army o ccupied Harbin.

Terro ris t activities reached a peak in To kyo in May 19 32. Altho ugh Inukai s uppo rted the aggres s ive China po licy, this did no t s ave him fro m beco ming a terro ris t target. The Inukai Cabinet decided no t to fo rmally reco gniz e Manz ho uguo in March 19 32, in o rder to avo id the accus atio n o f vio lating internatio nal treaties and further alienating the majo r po wers .6 3 While the po lice s trengthened s urveillance agains t Kets umeidan in early 19 32, the gro up carried o ut a terro ris t attack with s o me Navy o fficers in May 19 31 (the May 15 Incident) in which Inukai was as s as s inated.6 4

THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF A COHERENT INFORMATION POLICY, TOKYO AND MUKDEN, JUNE–AUGUST 19 32

THE ARMY AND MOFA, TOKYO, JUNE 19 32

A co herent go vernment po licy o n Manchuria and news pro paganda o ver the Manchurian Cris is began to appear o nly in the aftermath o f this terro ris t attack. Saitō Mako to , Navy Admiral, fo rmed the natio nal unity go vernment o n 26 May 19 32. One o f the urgent is s ues which the Saitō Cabinet faced was to decide the fo rm o f an imperial s upervis o ry bo dy o ver Manz ho uguo . The main s takeho lders were: the Guando ng Army, the Minis try o f the Army, MOFA (and its mis s io ns in Manchuria), the Co lo nial Minis try, and the SMR. The Co lo nial Minis try, which was fo unded in 19 29 , had been the s upervis o ry minis try o f the SMR and the Guando ng Agency (Kantō chō ). The Guando ng Agency was Japan’s co lo nial adminis trative bo dy fo r the leas ed territo ry (fro m China) o f the s o uthern tip o f the Liao do ng penins ula, where two majo r po rts , Dalian and Po rt Arthur, were lo cated.

After a s eries o f dis cus s io ns amo ng thes e key players , the imperial s upervis o ry bo dy was es tablis hed as the Three-in-One Sys tem in July 19 32. It was a co mpro mis e amo ng the Guando ng Army, MOFA and the Co lo nial Minis try (the Guando ng Agency). The Japanes e Ambas s ado r Extrao rdinary to Manz ho uguo headed the bo dy and als o s erved co ncurrently as the Guando ng Army’s Co mmander and the Guando ng Go verno r. The firs t Ambas s ado r Extrao rdinary was Mutō No buyo s hi, the Guando ng Army’s Co mmander.

Altho ugh the Guando ng Army was do minant in military-o ccupied Manchuria, Tak Mats us aka s ugges ts that it was no t s ufficiently do minant to rule the military o ccupied area witho ut nego tiating with o ther s takeho lders in 19 32–3.6 5 The imperial s upervis o ry bo dy was an inter-minis terial bo dy. In 19 32–4, the Guando ng Army and the Minis try o f the Army, alo ng with MOFA, tried to reduce the influence o f the Co lo nial Minis try (the Guando ng Agency) in this imperial s upervis o ry bo dy. They s ucceeded in this attempt in December 19 34. The Manchurian Affairs Bureau replaced the Three-in-One s ys tem, and the Army Minis ter became its head. The o ffice abs o rbed the Guando ng Agency as o ne s ectio n within this new o ffice. It came, ho wever, directly under the Prime Minis ter (To kyo ), no t the Minis try o f the Army.6 6 The po wer dynamics amo ng thes e co mpeting fo rces s haped news pro paganda po licy in Japanes e- o ccupied Manchuria in mid-late 19 32.

Ano ther layer o f bureaucracy further co mplicated thes e po wer dynamics . The Co uncil o f the State was the adminis trative bo dy o f Manz ho uguo , and the co uncil’s General Affairs Bo ard was the main decis io n-making bo dy. Japanes e high o fficials fro m the metro po litan minis tries filled its key po s ts , while its co ntro l was es s entially in the hands o f the Guando ng Army.6 7 Altho ugh the Guando ng Army was do minant and increas ed its po wer o ver time, as Mas umi Junno s uke indicates , there were co ns tant internal co nflicts amo ng divers e Japanes e gro ups . MOFA, fo r example, us ed the Meiji Co ns titutio n to argue that the military s ho uld no t intervene in civilian affairs in o ccupied Manchuria. MOFA and the Minis try o f Finance bo th us ed the co ns titutio n to legitimiz e their co ntro l o ver adminis trative matters , while als o pro mo ting metro po litan minis terial interes ts .6 8

When the new Saitō Cabinet was fo rmed, the League’s Lytto n Co mmis s io n was in the middle o f co nducting an inquiry in Manchuria. The go vernment had to wo rk o ut an effective campaign to pres ent the Japanes e cas e to the co mmis s io n, the ‘internatio nal public’, and the League. It ins tructed MOFA and the Army to re-s tart co o rdinating o vers eas news pro paganda, which Mo ri Kaku o f the Inukai Cabinet had begun in December 19 31, but which had s ince been dis rupted.

Acco rding to the no te written by the Bo ard o f Info rmatio n in April 19 41, the Army and MOFA fo rmed an info rmal co mmittee (Jikyo ku dō s hikai) to co o rdinate external and do mes tic pro paganda (Keihatsu senden) s o o n after the Saitō Cabinet was fo rmed. This co mmittee held its firs t meeting at MOFA s o me time in June 19 32.6 9 I will call this co mmittee the June Co mmittee.

Furuno ’s bio graphy claims that MOFA to o k the initiative, and Iwanaga and Furuno played a key ro le in bringing an o therwis e reluctant Army o n bo ard. It explains that the Army and Dents ū News Agency o ppo s ed Iwanaga’s pro po s al to amalgamate Dents ū and Rengō . This was becaus e bo th Dents ū and the Army s aw the amalgamatio n as the creatio n o f a Rengō -centred news agency. As MOFA had been clo s e to Rengō , it co ntinues , the Army s aw this mo ve as a MOFA plo t to do minate the pro po s ed ins titutio n.70 Iwanaga as ked Furuno to o verco me Army o ppo s itio n to the amalgamatio n. Furuno us ed his co ntact, Lieutenant-Co lo nel Suz uki Teiichi (18 8 8 – 19 8 9 ), who m Furuno had kno wn s ince their time to gether in Beijing in the early 19 20 s . Furuno , as his bio graphy claims , pro po s ed to Iwanaga to invo lve Suz uki no t o nly in the nego tiatio ns fo r this amalgamatio n, but als o in the inter-minis try co mmittee o n info rmatio n.71 The po litics o f the amalgamatio n o f Dents ū and Rengō was , therefo re, far mo re co mplex than the s imple dicho to my o f pro -aggres s io n Army (Dents ū) vers us peace-lo ving MOFA (Rengō ).

Acco rding to the abo ve-mentio ned no te by the Bo ard o f Info rmatio n o f 19 41, this info rmal June Co mmittee’s firs t meeting was attended by three members fro m MOFA and fo ur fro m the Army (two fro m the Minis try o f the Army and two fro m the Army’s General Staff Office). At the firs t meeting the Army’s General Staff Office s ubmitted the do cument, ‘The Bas ic Plan fo r Overs eas Pro paganda’. It argued fo r co nducting pro active, no t defens ive, pro paganda. The main mes s age o f s uch pro paganda wo uld be, it argued, to tell ho w crucial the eco no mic develo pment o f Manchuria was fo r Japan. The pro paganda wo uld target mainly big po wers , but als o no t neglect s mall co untries . The plan als o pro po s ed to integrate the Army’s and MOFA’s o vers eas activities .72

In June 19 32, bo th MOFA and the Army wo rried abo ut internatio nal public o pinio n. The Lytto n Co mmis s io n was finis hing up its inquiry in Manchuria and was co ming back to To kyo in early July. The newly fo rmed info rmal info rmatio n co mmittee (the June Co mmittee) had to make the Japanes e cas e to the co mmis s io n as well as to the internatio nal public o pinio n o f the League’s member co untries and the U.S.

The Army, ho wever, had a mo re ambitio us plan—the fo rmatio n o f a central o ffice fo r info rmatio n management fo r the to tal war s ys tem. By this s tage, bo th the Army and MOFA had co me to regard o vers eas and do mes tic pro paganda as integral, and unders to o d united do mes tic s uppo rt as crucial fo r s ucces s ful fo reign po licy. In July 19 32, the co mmittee agreed that it wo uld aim to enco mpas s a bro ader area o f info rmatio n management in the future. To this end, it decided to include o ther relevant minis tries —MOC, the Ho me Minis try, and the Minis try o f Educatio n.73

The Army pus hed its agenda further. In Augus t 19 32, after co ns ulting with thes e minis tries , Lieutenant-Co lo nel Suz uki Teiichi s ubmitted a pro po s al to the co mmittee. Suz uki was clo s e to the Army’s Co ntro l Factio n (Tōseiha), which was attuned to s tatis t refo rmis m and the creatio n o f the to tal war s ys tem. He was als o s o o n to head the News paper Sectio n at the Minis try o f the Army in 19 33–5. In Augus t 19 32, he argued that ‘a new co mmittee o n do mes tic and o vers eas pro paganda’ s ho uld be created at the Cabinet Office. It s ho uld be chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, and co ns is t o f two members res pectively fro m MOFA, the Army, and the Navy, and o ne fro m the Ho me Minis try, the Minis try o f Educatio n, and MOC. Its main o bjectives were: ‘to dis cus s and res earch pro paganda po licies and means in o rder to unify and s trengthen current pro paganda activities ’; and ‘to res earch and prepare the co o rdinatio n o f info rmatio n and pro paganda o rganiz atio ns fo r a cris is o r war’74 Suz uki’s pro po s al aimed to create a permanent central o rganiz atio n to manage info rmatio n at the Cabinet Office as a part o f the to tal war s ys tem, no t o nly fo r the inter-minis terial co o rdinatio n o f o vers eas pro paganda o peratio ns with a s pecific aim.

MOFA AND THE GUANDONG ARMY, MUKDEN, SUMMER 19 32

In s ummer 19 32 the June Co mmittee declined to endo rs e the Army’s pro po s al fo r a central s tate o ffice to manage a bro ad range o f info rmatio n gathering and dis s eminating o peratio ns as a part o f the to tal war s ys tem. Rather, it identified the mo s t urgent is s ue as o vers eas pro paganda, no t do mes tic tho ught co ntro l, and called fo r the amalgamatio n o f Rengō and Dents ū o peratio ns in Manchuria.75 Reflecting this fo reign po licy prio rity, in s ummer 19 32, MOFA led metro po litan inter-minis try co o rdinatio n o f news pro paganda o peratio ns in Manchuria. It acted quickly. Shirato ri To s hio , then MOFA’s Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n, s ent Secretary Suma Yakichirō to Mukden with this mis s io n.

Co rres po nding to this co herent appro ach o f the metro po litan go vernment, inter-minis terial co o rdinatio n o f info rmatio n po licy began in Manz ho uguo in Augus t 19 32. There, it was decided that the es tablis hment o f a ‘natio nal’ news agency fo r Manz ho uguo was a prio rity. On 17–18 Augus t 19 32, the firs t meeting o f an inter-minis terial co mmittee was held at the Yamato Ho tel in Mukden. The co mmittee (which I call the Mukden Co mmittee) co ns is ted o f repres entatives o f the Guando ng Army’s General Staff Office, the Japanes e Co ns ulate at Mukden, the Guando ng Agency, the SMR, and the Manz ho uguo adminis tratio n. They decided to ho ld mo nthly meetings . In this firs t two -day meeting, they dis cus s ed general is s ues , s uch as co ntro l o ver media o rganiz atio ns in Manz ho uguo , and the co ns o lidatio n o f Japanes e-run (pro -Japan) news papers in Chines e, Englis h, Rus s ian, Ko rean, and Japanes e languages in Manz ho uguo and the leas ed Guando ng area.76 The co mmittee then decided that ‘it was an abs o lute neces s ity to es tablis h a news agency in Manchuria, and make Manz ho uguo advance into the internatio nal news wo rld’. This pro po s ed news agency’s main ro le was o vers eas pro paganda. In this dis cus s io n, they clearly identified Iwanaga’s pro po s al o f December 19 31 as a blueprint, and us ed his term, the ‘news agency o f Manchuria and [Inner] Mo ngo lia’, fo r the planned news agency. The term, the ‘Manz ho uguo (Natio nal) News Agency’, had no t yet emerged.77

The Guando ng Army to o k charge o f the fo rmatio n o f this news agency in Manchuria. When MOFA’s Secretary Suma Yakichirō arrived at Mukden, his main co ntact was a man fro m the Guando ng Army, Sato mi Hajime. Sato mi was , ho wever, no t a military o fficer, but an SMR man, currently s eco nded to wo rk at the Fo urth Department o f the Guando ng Army. The garris o n entrus ted Sato mi with the tas k o f es tablis hing the news agency in Manz ho uguo .

Sato mi was no s tranger to Japan’s news pro paganda in China. Having graduated fro m the Shanghai-bas ed Japanes e imperial ins titutio n, the Eas t As ia Co mmo n Culture Academy,78 Sato mi was fluent in Chines e, and had extens ive co ntacts in China, including in the pro -Japanes e undergro und. While Sato mi had been a s tringer agent fo r Japanes e military intelligence and an o pium dealer, he had als o been engaged in news pro paganda at Japanes e-funded news papers in Tianjin and Beijing. He then became a ‘co ns ultant’ fo r the SMR’s Nanjing o ffice, and fo llo wing the Manchurian Incident, he was called to the SMR’s headquarters at Mukden.

Suma and Sato mi had kno wn each o ther s ince they s pent time to gether in Beijing. In Mukden in the s ummer o f 19 32, they wo rked o ut a plan fo r the amalgamatio n o f Rengō and Dents ū. Sato mi then wro te an o utline o f the pro po s ed news agency fo r the Fo urth Department o f the Guando ng Army’s General Staff Office.79

In September 19 32, the Guando ng Army s ent Sato mi to To kyo o n three majo r mis s io ns : to get funding fro m MOFA; to s o rt o ut the technical details o f the us e o f teleco mmunicatio n infras tructure in Manz ho uguo with the Minis try o f the Army and MOC; and to get an agreement fo r the integratio n o f Rengō and Dents ū.

The timing co uld no t have been a co incidence—Sato mi arrived in To kyo at the precis e mo ment when the new (info rmal) inter- minis terial co mmittee to co o rdinate Japan’s info rmatio n po licy was o rganiz ed.

THE INFORMAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE (THE SEPTEMBER COMMITTEE) AND THE ‘NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY’, TOKYO AND CHANGCHUN, SEPTEMBER 19 32 to 19 33

In To kyo , the majo rity in the June Co mmittee regarded o vers eas pro paganda, no t the creatio n o f the to tal war s ys tem, as the s tate’s prio rity in late s ummer 19 32. The co mmittee co ncluded that it wo uld take to o lo ng to get o fficial appro val fo r Lieutenant-Co lo nel Suz uki’s pro po s ed permanent central o rganiz atio n to manage info rmatio n at the Cabinet Office. Meanwhile the Lytto n Co mmis s io n was abo ut to pro duce its repo rt. The co mmittee s tres s ed the pres s ing need to co nduct co o rdinated o vers eas pro paganda targeting the League. As a res ult, a new info rmal info rmatio n co mmittee was fo rmed in September 19 32 (I call it the September Co mmittee). The new co mmittee no netheles s did no t to tally reject Suz uki’s pro po s al: its member minis tries remained as extens ive as Suz uki had wanted. Suz uki hims elf agreed that o vers eas pro paganda was the utmo s t prio rity at that time,8 0 and he mus t have been s atis fied that the co mmittee retained the po tential to co ver a bro ader area o f info rmatio n management in the future. MOFA led this co mmittee o f inter-minis try co o rdinatio n o n info rmatio n po licy and o peratio ns . This reflected the co mmittee’s prio rity o n o vers eas pro paganda. The Saitō Cabinet’s co nclus io n o f a diplo matic agreement with Manz ho uguo in mid-September als o s trengthened MOFA’s po s itio n, as Manchurian affairs were no w ‘diplo matic’, no t co lo nial o r military matters . The Vice-Minis ter o f MOFA (then Arita Hachirō ) headed the September Co mmittee, no t the Cabinet Secretary, no r Suz uki fro m the Minis try o f the Army. The co mmittee met every Tues day afterno o n at MOFA. After January 19 33, it became a lunchtime dis cus s io n gro up, until it became fo rmaliz ed as the Cabinet Info rmatio n Co mmittee in July 19 36 .8 1

The duties o f this September Co mmittee were: to wo rk o n the Fo reign Minis ter’s o fficial s tatements , and dis s eminate a mes s age o n ho w critical the eco no mic develo pment o f Manchuria was fo r the Japanes e empire; to make the Minis tries o f Fo reign Affairs , the Army, the Navy, and Educatio n info rm their o vers eas mis s io ns and o vers eas Japanes e s tudents co rrectly and tho ro ughly o n Japanes e po licies , and co -o pt thes e o vers eas Japanes e to co nduct their pro paganda activities ; to enco urage fo reign jo urnalis ts ’ vis its to Manchuria and make them ‘unders tand’ its ‘de facto independence fro m China’; to s ho w the Lytto n Co mmis s io n united s uppo rt fro m the Japanes e peo ple fo r the actio n in Manchuria; and make the co mmis s io n favo urable to Japan’s actio n. The co mmittee s aw the League as Japan’s pro paganda target, altho ugh it did no t neglect the s ignificance o f uniting do mes tic o pinio n.8 2

Sato mi Hajime arrived in To kyo fro m Mukden jus t as the September Co mmittee was fo rmed, which meant that he met o fficials who were wo rking o ut a co herent o vers eas pro paganda po licy at the metro po litan centre.8 3 Sato mi’s vis it (and the events in Manchuria) pro mpted s peedy and co o rdinated actio ns by the o therwis e fragmented and co mpeting metro po litan minis tries in To kyo . Shirato ri immediately as s ured MOFA’s funding o f ¥20 0 ,0 0 0 fo r the fo undatio n and ¥240 ,0 0 0 fo r the firs t year o f the pro po s ed new agency’s o peratio n in Manz ho uguo . The Minis try o f the Army and MOC als o nego tiated the details o f the news agency’s us e o f wireles s in Manz ho uguo during Sato mi’s o ne-mo nth vis it to To kyo .8 4

Sato mi unders to o d that the third o bjective was the hardes t. Since late 19 31, Rengō had been taking the initiative in fo unding the pro po s ed news agency in Manz ho uguo . Dents ū s aw it as a plo t fo r Rengō and MOFA to es tablis h Rengō ’s do minance in Manchuria. Pers uaded by patrio tic rheto ric, ho wever, Dents ū co mpro mis ed. Sato mi managed to gain a partial, yet s atis facto ry agreement fro m Dents ū that news input wo uld be channeled to the s ingle pro po s ed new news agency in Manchuria, while o utgo ing news wo uld be dis tributed to bo th Rengō and Dents ū.8 5

Upo n Sato mi’s return to Manchuria, the Guando ng Army anno unced the fo rmatio n o f the Manz ho uguo News Agency (MNA) o n 15 No vember 19 32. It was fo rmally es tablis hed o n the s no wy firs t day o f December in Changchun. Changchun was no w called Xinjing, the new capital o f Manz ho uguo . The Guando ng Army als o mo ved its headquarters fro m Mukden to Changchun.

The making o f the natio nal/imperial news agency in To kyo pro ved, ho wever, far mo re difficult. Metro po litan minis tries guarded their o wn juris dictio ns . No r were no n-o fficial gro ups ready to s tand as ide, and there was no po litical will o r mechanis m to fo rce them to do s o . Dents ū and its clients , pro vincial news papers , s tro ngly o ppo s ed the Rengō -initiated amalgamatio n plan.

Acco rding to the Amō memo o f 19 35, the Cabinet fo rmally decided o n the amalgamatio n o f Rengō and Dents ū and the creatio n o f a s tro ng and united news agency in September 19 32, mo s t likely in the firs t meeting o f the September Co mmittee. Amō ’s memo s aid: ‘the creatio n o f this s tro ng natio nal news agency was needed fo r s tate po licy’, and ‘the go vernment was determined to achieve this go al agains t all o dds ’. Amō ’s predeces s o r as Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n, Shirato ri To s hio , began to nego tiate with Rengō s traight away, while Army Lieutenant-Co lo nel Ao ki Shigemas a talked to Dents ū.8 6 The amalgamatio n o f Rengō and Dents ū and the creatio n o f the united news agency were s imultaneo us ly nego tiated in To kyo and Manchuria.

In To kyo , the go vernment’s vis io n was largely bas ed o n what Iwanaga had pro po s ed in December 19 31. Ano ther to p-s ecret no te o f 26 September 19 32, mo s t likely written by Amō , co nfirmed the go vernment’s decis io n to create a united natio nal news agency in Japan. It res tated Iwanaga’s reas o ning o n why Japan needed the s tro ng news agency, why the two majo r news agencies needed to be united, and why the s tate needed to s uppo rt the pro po s ed news agency.8 7 The fo rm o f the pro po s ed news agency was an AP mo del o f MAP 3: Manz ho uguo News Agency’s net wo rk in 19 4 3 a co -o perative o f news media o rganiz atio ns , as Iwanaga had 8 8 So urce: Manshūko ku t sūshinsha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi o utlined. (Xinjing [Changchun]: Edit o r, [19 4 2]), n.p.; T sūshinshashi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi (T o kyo : This no te o f 26 September 19 32 clarified the s trategic ro le o f the Edit o r, 19 58), p. 39 2. pro po s ed news agency. Saitō Hiro s hi, then MOFA’s Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n (January 19 29 –May 19 30 ), had al ready made this po int in early 19 29 . It was the firs t time MOFA regarded the natio nal news agency as a s tate agency. Saitō then no ted:

One do es no t need to detail the very impo rtant ro le which news agencies wo uld play in future fo reign po licy. All mo dern s tates have o r s ho uld have an influential news agency. Do mes tically, it wo uld explain do mes tic and internatio nal affairs to all the natio nals , and nurture healthy [natio nal] public o pinio n. Externally, it wo uld repo rt its o wn co untry’s affairs and views in detail and quickly [to the wo rld], while repo rting fo reign affairs [to Japan] s o that Japan co uld take appro priate s teps [in fo reign po licy].8 9

In Saitō ’s view, the natio nal news agency as a s tate agency had a s trategic ro le in s tate po licy. Iwanaga’s pro po s al o f December 19 31, ho wever, differed s lightly o n this po int. It s till maintained that the pro po s ed news agency s ho uld be independent fro m the s tate, but s erve the s tate when needed o n a vo luntary bas is .9 0 In co ntras t, s tate o fficials , s uch as Saitō and Amō , as s umed o fficial co ntro l. Amō dis cus s ed which minis try s ho uld adminis ter the pro po s ed news agency. A draft o n the adminis trative details o f the news agency, which MOFA mo s t likely prepared, s tated that MOFA, the Army, and the Navy wo uld jo intly co ntro l it, each appo inting o ne directo r o f the bo ard. The o ther fo ur directo rs wo uld be elected fro m amo ng the as s o ciated members o f the pro po s ed news agency at their general as s embly, as the agency was , like Rengō , to fo llo w an AP mo del o f a co -o perative o f news media o rganiz atio ns . Furthermo re, ‘the appo intment and dis mis s al o f thes e [elected] directo rs as well as the pres ident needed appro val by thes e minis ters , except fo r tho s e who m the minis ters had appo inted’.9 1

The go vernment’s nego tiatio ns with Rengō and Dents ū, therefo re, as s umed s tro nger s tate co ntro l o ver the pro po s ed united news agency than did Iwanaga’s pro po s al o f December 19 31. The go vernment s ugges ted to bo th news agencies that it wo uld buy o ut the two o rganiz atio ns ’ res pective news departments with ¥1,10 0 ,0 0 0 .

The September Co mmittee no netheles s ado pted ano ther po int o f Iwanaga’s pro po s al: the pro po s ed news agency s ho uld have privileges fro m the s tate, s uch as exclus ive right to us e wireles s co mmunicatio n. The go vernment indeed threatened Rengō and Dents ū that if they did no t co o perate, they wo uld be deprived o f the privilege.9 2 The go vernment knew this was a s tro ng bargaining chip to make them dro p o ppo s itio n to the amalgamatio n. If they were to lo s e this wireles s co mmunicatio n privilege, they co uld no t gather and deliver internatio nal news co mpetently.

Rengō res po nded po s itively. After all, it was a plan largely fo rmulated by Iwanaga. MOFA s till as ked Rengō fo rmally in Octo ber 19 33 whether it wo uld go alo ng with the amalgamatio n s cheme. Rengō replied yes , and res tated what Iwanaga had pro po s ed in December 19 31.

Rengō , ho wever, tried to weaken the s tate’s co ntro l in this pro ces s . Firs t, it wo uld no t demand any mo ney fo r trans ferring its bus ines s and its co ntracts with the o ther majo r internatio nal news agencies , becaus e unlike Dents ū, it had been a no n-pro fit o rganiz atio n. In o ther wo rds , Rengō s o ught to retain its private s tatus . Seco nd, Rengō als o wanted to retain edito rial independence, and put two co nditio ns to the go vernment. One was that in o rder to s ecure the independence and fairnes s o f news repo rting, the pro po s ed news agency s ho uld remain a no n-pro fit co -o perative o f media o rganiz atio ns . The o ther co nditio n was that repres entatives o f thes e o rganiz atio ns s ho uld be co ns ulted o n majo r decis io ns .9 3

Pro bably yielding to Iwanaga’s pers uas ivenes s , and als o having an abs o lute trus t in Iwanaga, MOFA s tepped back and agreed to thes e co nditio ns . As a res ult, by late 19 33, the plan fo r direct s tate co ntro l o ver directo rs and management s eems to have been dro pped.

In 19 31–33, o vers eas pro paganda, no t the co ntro l o f do mes tic o pinio n, remained a go vernment prio rity. The go vernment dis cus s ed the co ntro l o f do mes tic o pinio n as relevant to s pecific fo reign po licies . Furthermo re, while jo int minis terial s upervis io n fo r the news agency was pro po s ed in autumn 19 32, MOFA had been mo s t influential in this pro ces s . Its Department o f Info rmatio n had led the nego tiatio ns fo r the amalgamatio n o f Rengō and Dents ū. The Ho me Minis try (in charge o f do mes tic tho ught co ntro l) was no t included in this jo int s upervis io n team.

Rengō ’s s trategic ro le fo r the s tate was further articulated during the diplo matic cris is . One epis o de demo ns trates this po int. On 27 May 19 33, Iwanaga s ent a letter to AP’s General Manager, Kent Co o per, co nfirming Rengō ’s new s ervice to AP. Rengō wo uld s end a text o f Japanes e o fficial s tatements and co mmuniqués , fo r which Rengō wo uld prepay the co s t. AP wo uld fo rward them to the Japanes e Ambas s ado r in Was hingto n D.C., to the Co ns ul-General in New Yo rk, and if feas ible, to the Co ns ul-General in San Francis co . AP was ‘at liberty to give o ut thes e mes s ages in full o r in s ummary to its members in the United States fo r publicatio n’. Co o per unders to o d that this was a cheaper way fo r the Japanes e go vernment to s end its mes s ages in the U.S. than us ing the go vernment cables and wireles s . In return, AP wo uld get the info rmatio n mo re quickly than its co mpetito rs . Co o per was happy to accept this o ffer.9 4 Rengō made a s imilar arrangement with Reuters and Havas .9 5 The epis o de s ugges ted that Rengō was acting in the s tate’s interes t. At the s ame time, AP co llabo rated with Rengō with clear unders tanding o f its intentio n. Such a co nventio n was no t regarded as a co mpro mis e o f jo urnalis tic co des o f co nduct at the time, but as a widely practiced no rm. It is wo rth no ting that this agreement between Rengō and AP was co ncluded during the perio d o f diplo matic tens io n between Japan and o ther co untries , es pecially the U.S.

CO NCLUSIO N

The s tate began to co o rdinate o vers eas news pro paganda o peratio ns during the Manchurian Cris is o f 19 31–3. This diplo matic cris is , which s tarted with the Guando ng Army’s aggres s io n in Manchuria in September 19 31, exacerbated the pro blems o f party go vernments in the age o f mas s po litics and eco no mic depres s io n as a s eries o f military co up attempts and terro ris t attacks ro cked po litics in To kyo in 19 31–2. In this co ntext, a co herent info rmatio n po licy did no t emerge until late May 19 32. The natio nal unity cabinet was fo rmed after the May 15th Incident claimed the life o f Prime Minis ter Inukai.

The Army began an attempt to create a to tal war s ys tem, in which a bro ad range o f info rmatio n management was to be centraliz ed at the Cabinet Office. This attempt was , ho wever, uns ucces s ful in 19 32–3. The main co ncern o f the po licy elite at this s tage remained fo reign po licy, es pecially develo pments at the League o f Natio ns and in the U.S. This was why MOFA led the inter-minis terial info rmatio n Iwanaga at a dinner part y held by Kent Co o per o f co mmittee, which fo cus ed o n o vers eas news pro paganda and no t AP, New Yo rk, Aut umn 19 32. Iwanaga is in t he f ro nt , tho ught co ntro l o r do mes tic mo biliz atio n, and why this co mmittee t hird f ro m t he lef t . So urce: Furuno , Ino suke ed., identified the creatio n o f the natio nal news agency as the mo s t Iwanaga Yūkichi kun (T o kyo : Iwanaga Yūkichi kun urgent prio rity. denki kankō iinkai, 19 4 1). Iwanaga’s po licy inputs were critical in this develo pment as he pres ented a blueprint fo r this natio nal/imperial news agency in To kyo and ano ther fo r a natio nal/co lo nial news agency fo r newly o ccupied Manchuria in December 19 31. Rengō wo rked clo s ely with MOFA in To kyo fo r the fo rmer pro ject, while it wo rked with the Guando ng Army in Manchuria fo r the latter. All thes e ins titutio n-making pro ces s es in To kyo and Manchuria (the inter-minis terial info rmatio n co o rdinatio n o ffice, the natio nal/imperial news agency at the metro po litan centre, and the creatio n o f a news agency in a puppet regime) were clo s ely co nnected. In this co ntext, the s tate s haped the bas ic nature o f the pro po s ed united natio nal news agency in Japan.

In the diplo matic cris is o f 19 31–3, no t o nly MOFA, but als o the Army reco gniz ed the s ignificance o f mas s po litics and ‘internatio nal public o pinio n’. They felt the need fo r pro paganda to the League, its Lytto n Co mmis s io n, the U.S., and China. This is an edited vers io n o f Chapter Eight o f To mo ko Akami, Japan’s News Propaganda and Reuters’ News Empire in Northeast Asia, 1870– 1934 (Do rdo recht: Republic o f Letters , 20 12).

To mo ko Akami teaches and res earches at the Scho o l o f Culture, His to ry and Language and the Res earch Scho o l o f As ia and the Pacific at the Co llege o f As ia and the Pacific at the Aus tralian Natio nal Univers ity. Her wo rk o n news agencies in Japan’s fo reign po licy after 19 34 is fo rthco ming: Soft Power of Japan’s Total War State: The Board of Information and the National New Agency, 1934–45 (Do rdrecht: Letters o f Republic). Other publicatio ns include Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45 (Lo ndo n: Ro utledge, 20 0 2); ‘The natio n-s tate/empire as a unit o f an analys is o f the his to ry o f internatio nal relatio ns : A cas e s tudy in No rtheas t As ia, 18 6 8 –19 33’, in Is abella Lö hr and Ro land Wenz lhuemer eds , The Nation State and Beyond: Governing Globalization Processes in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (New Yo rk; Springer, 20 13); ‘The emergence o f internatio nal public o pinio n and the o rigin o f public diplo macy in Japan in the inter-war perio d’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vo l. 3 (20 0 8 ), pp. 1–30 ; ‘Between the s tate and glo bal civil s o ciety: No n-o fficial experts and their netwo rk in the As ia- Pacific, 19 25–45,’ Global Network, vo l. 2, no .1 (January 20 0 2), pp. 6 5–8 1.

Recommended Citation: Tomoko Akami, "When Democracy is Not Enough: Japan’s information policy and mass politics in diplomatic and economic crisis in the 1930s," The As ia-Pacific Jo urnal, Volume 11, Issue 15, No. 1, April 15, 2013.

No t es

1 Fo r the o rtho do x view, s ee, fo r example, Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–1932 (Berkeley & Lo s Angles : Univers ity o f Califo rnia Pres s , 19 6 4), pp. 176 –7. See als o a s ummary o f the o rtho do x view in Sandra Wils o n, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–33 (New Yo rk: Ro utledge, 20 0 2), pp. 2–3. In co ntras t, Wils o n s tres s es the trans ito ry impact o f the Manchurian Incident, and ques tio ns the no tio n o f the fifteen-year war. Ibid, pp. 3, 5–8 , 217–18 .

2 See, fo r example, Uchikawa, Masu media hōseisakushi kenyū, pp. 217–18 .

3 I have argued els ewhere a s imilar po int abo ut the active pro paganda activities o f ‘liberal internatio nalis ts ’ and their internatio nalis t o rganiz atio ns es pecially in the mid-late 19 30 s . Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, pp. 18 8 –9 1, 227–31. Ino ue als o argues that Japan withdrew fro m the League in o rder to maintain go o d relatio ns with o ther empires , while s aving the face o f the League. Ino ue To s hikaz u, ‘Ko kus ai renmei dattai to ko kus ai kyō chō gaikō ’, Hitotsubashi ronsō, vo l. 9 3, no . 3, pp. 36 5–6 , 36 9 . Wils o n examines MOFA’s active campaign in 19 31–3, and refutes the label o f is o latio nis m. Sandra Wils o n, ‘Co ntaining the cris is : Japan’s Diplo matic Offens ive in the Wes t, 19 31–33’, Modern Asian Studies, vo l. 29 , No . 2 (May 19 9 5), pp. 26 9 –70 , 338 .

4 It was a war. Japanes e aggres s io n met little military o ppo s itio n fro m the Natio nalis t Go vernment o r the warlo rd Zhang Xueliang in Manchuria in 19 31–2, while there were majo r armed co nfro ntatio ns in Shanghai in January–May 19 32.

5 Andrew Go rdo n, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: Univers ity o f Califo rnia Pres s , 19 9 1), pp. 28 3–7.

6 Ikei Mas aru, ‘19 30 nendai no mas u media: Mans hū jihen e no taiō o chūs hin to s hite’, in Miwa Kimitada ed., Saikō Taiheiyō sensō zenya: Nihon no 1930 nendairon toshite (To kyo : Sō s eiki, 19 8 1). On radio and news mo vies , s ee Lo uis e Yo ung , Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: Univers ity o f Califo rnia Pres s , 19 9 8 ), pp. 6 3–4, 6 5–6 , 6 7–8 , 8 2–3. Wils o n argues that this metro po litan new media had limited influence in rural areas in Japan in the early 19 30 s . Wils o n, The Manchurian Crisis, pp. 49 –52, 139 –40 .

7 The jo urnal was initially s o ld fo r 25 s en (a quarter o f o ne yen). By the end o f 19 35, its circulatio n was aro und 7,0 0 0 , and it created an annual revenue o f ¥43,0 0 0 . Ts ūs hins has hi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi, pp. 28 4, 330 .

8 Jo hn Do wer, ‘Thro wing o ff As ia II: Wo o dblo ck prints o f the Sino -Japanes e War (18 9 4–9 5)’, and ‘Thro wing o ff As ia III: Wo o dblo ck prints o f the Rus s o -Japanes e War (19 0 4–0 5)’ in a s eries o f Vis ualiz ing Cultures , Cambridge Mas s : MIT 20 0 8 , here, and here.

9 See no te 6 fo r Yo ung, Japan’s Total Empire.

10 As ahi s himbun ‘s himbun to s ens ō ’ s huz aihan, Shimbun to sensō (To kyo : As ahi s himbuns ha, 20 0 8 ).

11 Go rdo n, Labor and Imperial Democracy, pp. 316 –7.

12 Furukawa Takahis a, Showa senchūki no sōgō kokusaku kikan (To kyo : Yo s hikawa kō bunkan, 19 9 2), p. 25; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Co rnell: Co rnell Univers ity Pres s , 19 8 7), pp. 23–4.

13 Satō , Genron tōsei, p. 232. The News paper Sectio n was mo ved under the Res earch Co mmittee o n Military Affairs in 19 29 , and then under the Department o f Res earch o n Military Affairs in 19 33. The s ectio n was s trengthened during the Manchurian cris is , and after the February 26 Incident o f 19 36 , it was regarded as a s ignificant po s t in the Military Affairs Bureau and functio ned as po licy-making advis er to the Army Minis ter.

14 On the term kakushin, s ee Itō Takas hi, Showa shoki seijishi kenkyū (To kyo : To kyo daigaku s huppankai, 19 6 9 ), pp. 7–11. Fo r the termino lo gy o f ‘s tatis t refo rmis m’, s ee als o Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, p. 77. Thes e refo rmis ts s aw the s tate as the key ins titutio n to implement refo rm and welfare s chemes in o rder to s trengthen the po wer o f the s tate and the natio n. Thes e s tatis t refo rmis ts agreed o n the need fo r a dras tic res tructure o f the s tate machinery and a greater s tate co ntro l o f natio nal res o urces . They prio ritiz ed the rights o f the s tate o ver tho s e o f wo rkers and farmers . Furukawa, Showa senchūki, p. 16 . Furukawa, ho wever, no tes that kakushin bureaucrats at MOFA were dis tinct fro m tho s e in o ther minis tries .

15 Ide Yo s hino ri, ‘Hijō ji tais ei to Niho n “kan”s ei’, in To kyo daigaku s hakai kagaku kenkyūs ho ‘Fas hiz umu to mins hu s hugi’ kenkyūkai ed., Undō to teikō, vo l. 1 (To kyo : To kyo daigaku s huppankai, 19 79 ), pp. 254–5.

16 The po int als o s uppo rts Yi’s argument that des pite the military’s do minance in po litics , even in the late 19 30 s and early 19 40 s the Army s o ught no t a military dictato rs hip, but a co ns titutio nal, and indirect po litical influence o ver the civilian go vernment. Yi, Gunbu no Showashi, vo l. 1, pp. 6 –7.

17 Thes e attempts were Gunjukyo ku (at the Cabinet Office), June 19 18 –May 19 20 , and Ko kus eiin (an o uter bureau), May 19 20 – No vember 19 22. Furukawa, Showa senchūki, pp. 25–6 ; Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, p. 24.

18 Furukawa, Showa senchūki, p. 27. It was planned to enco mpas s all eco no mic activities o f Japan at all times , no t o nly in wartime. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, p. 25.

19 Katō Yō ko , ‘Sō ryo kus enka no s ei-gun kankei’, in Kuras awa Aiko et. al. ed., Ajia Taiheiyō sensō vo l. 2 (To kyo : Iwanami s ho ten, 20 0 5), p. 15. The bureau was to las t until it was abs o rbed into the Planning Bo ard in Octo ber 19 37.

20 ‘Shigenkyo ku kans ei’, 27 May 19 27, reprinted in Is hikawa Junkichi ed., Kokka sōdōinshi: Shiryō hen, vo l. 3 (Fujis awa: Ko kka s ō dō ins hi kankō kai, 19 75), pp. 17–20 . In 19 30 , the bureau began planning natio nal mo biliz atio n. The Cabinet decided o n the firs t natio nal mo biliz atio n plan in 19 33. The las t and third plan began in 19 36 , which was then interrupted by the o utbreak o f the Sino - Japanes e War in 19 37. Furukawa, Showa senchūki, p. 28 .

21 Is hikawa Junkichi, ‘Kaidai’, in Is hikawa ed., Kokka sōdōinshi: Shiryō hen, vo l. 3, p. 4.

22 It als o attached a s urvey o f key co untries ’ natio nal mo biliz atio n s chemes , s uch as tho s e o f France, Italy, the U.S., Germany, and Britain. Shigen kyo ku, ‘Shigen no tō s ei unyō jumbi s his ets u ni ts uite’, 19 35, reprinted in Is hikawa ed., Kokka sōdōinshi: Shiryō hen, vo l. 3, pp. 113–14.

23 It als o no ted: ‘res o urces are defined as s o urces o f s tate po wer’. Ibid., pp. 10 7, 10 9 .

24 Ibid., p. 10 9 .

25 Pak Sunae, ‘“15 nen s ens ō ki” nio keru naikaku jō hō kikō ’, Media shi kenkyū, vo l. 3 (June 19 9 5), p. 3.

26 Gaimus hō hyakunens hi hens an iinkai, Gaimushō, vo l. 1, p. 10 38 .

27 Furuno had been the head o f the Bureau o f Do mes tic News and the Bureau o f Fo reign News at Rengō ’s headquarters in To kyo , while Higas hikawa Kaichi had managed Os aka-bas ed eco no mic news (es pecially news o f the s to ck market). After Higas hikawa’s death, in Octo ber 19 31, Furuno abs o rbed this Os aka o peratio n, and became General Manager in charge o f all regio ns in Japan. ‘Furuno Ino s uke nenpu’, in Furuno Ino s uke denki hens hū iinkai ed., Furuno Inosuke, p. 532.

28 On this internatio nal as pect o f the cris is , s ee Chris to pher Tho rne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (Lo ndo n: Hamis h Hamilto n, 19 72); Ian Nis h, ‘Intro ductio n’, in Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931–3 (Lo ndo n: K. Paul Internatio nal, 19 9 3), pp. vii, viii, 22.

29 O’Co nno r, The English Language Press Networks, p. 20 1. Japan’s attack o n Shanghai als o o utraged Chines e public o pinio n. Co ble, Facing Japan, p. 44. Wils o n, ho wever, po ints o ut that the res po ns es o f the to p o fficials and bus ines s leaders in the U.S. and Britain were mo re nuanced. Wils o n, ‘Co ntaining the cris is ’, pp. 36 6 –8 .

30 Nis h, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, pp. 19 1, 239 , 240 ; O’Co nno r, The English Language Press Networks, p. 213.

31 Wils o n’s analys is o f MOFA o vers eas mis s io n activities in 19 31–3 s ugges ts that mas s ive pro paganda activities to o k place in the U.S., while MOFA als o s tres s ed Euro pe and So uth American co untries , and did no t to tally neglect China. Wils o n, ‘Co ntaining the Cris is ’, pp. 340 , 341, 348 , 352–3.

32 As a res ult, he was charged as a war criminal at the Internatio nal Military Tribunal fo r the Far Eas t (the To kyo Trial) in 19 45, and purged fro m public o ffice. The charge was dro pped and he was releas ed fro m the Sugamo Pris o n in 19 48 . His purge was lifted in 19 51. Amō ’s papers , which have been reprinted, include MOFA do cuments , his diary, his no tes , and publis hed and unpublis hed articles which he wro te befo re and after 19 45.

33 [Amō Eiji], ‘Shints ūs hins ha s ets urits u keikaku keika gaiyō ’, reprinted in Amō Tamio ed., Amō Eiji nikki shiryōshū, shiryō hen, vo l. 2 (To kyo : Edito r, 19 8 9 ), pp. 1529 –36 .

34 Ibid., p. 1529 .

35 Ibid.

36 Mo ri Kaku (Ts uto mu) began his career in bus ines s as the head o f the Tianjin branch o f Mits ui Trading Co mpany in 19 14. After a brief but s ucces s ful bus ines s career, he became a po litician (Seiyūkai) in 19 18 and was elected to the Diet in 19 21. As Parliamentary Vice-Minis ter fo r Fo reign Affairs during the Tanaka Giichi Cabinet (April 19 27–July 19 29 ) he pus hed a hardline po licy to wards China. After the o utbreak o f the Manchurian Incident, he became ins trumental in the Army’s increas ing invo lvement in po litics . He s erved as Cabinet Secretary o f the Inukai Cabinet in December 19 31.

37 Dō mei ts ūs hins ha, Dōmei no soshiki to katsudō (To kyo : Dō mei ts ūs hins ha, 19 41), reprinted in Ariyama and Nis hiyama eds , Dōmei tsūshinsha, vo l. 5, pp. 236 –7.

38 Iwanaga Yūkichi, ‘Ko kkateki daits ūs hins ha s ets urits uro n’, December 19 31, reprinted in Furuno ed., Iwanaga Yūkichi kun, (Part III), pp. 16 3–73.

39 Furuno Ino s uke denki hens hū iinkai ed., Furuno Inosuke, p. 19 3.

40 Iwanaga, ‘Ko kkateki daits ūs hins ha s ets urits uro n’, December 19 31, (reprinted), pp. 16 3, 16 4, 16 6 , 16 7–8 , 170 .

41 The department was lo cated at the o ffice o f the Directo r o f the SMR, and it began res earch o n media and info rmatio n po licies o f Manchuria in 19 27 when Mats uo ka Yō s uke became Vice Directo r. Katō Shinkichi, ‘Kio ku o tado ru’, in Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi (Xinjing [Changchun]: Edito r, [19 42]), p. 24.

42 Sas aki created a s erio us pro blem with the Natio nalis t Go vernment o f Nanjing in March–September 19 31. See Chapter Seven and Chapter Nine.

43 Sas aki Kenji, ‘Ko kuts ū no s hinwa o kataru’, in Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi, pp. 28 –30 . 44 Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi, p. 39 .

45 Iwanaga Yūkichi, ‘Manmō ts ūs hins ha ro n’ [December 19 31], reprinted in Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi, p. 39 .

46 Katakura Tadas hi, ‘Mans hū jihen kimits u s eiryaku nis s hi’, 18 September–31 Octo ber 19 31, reprinted in Ko bayas hi Tats uo and Shimada To s hihiko eds , Gendaishi shiryō, vo l. 7 (To kyo : Mis uz u s ho bō , 19 6 4), p. 18 9 .

47 Y. Tak Mats us aka, ‘Managing o ccupied Manchuria, 19 31–19 34’, in Peter Duus , Ramo n H. Myers , and Mark R. Peattie eds , The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeto n: Princeto n Univers ity Pres s , 19 9 6 ), pp. 10 3–4; Gaimus hō hyakunens hi hens an iinkai, Gaimushō, vo l. 2, pp. 215–19 .

48 Bas ed o n the Guando ng Army’s pro po s al, the Minis try o f the Army began res earch o n the legal and eco no mic as pects o f an auto no mo us s tate o n 1 Octo ber 19 31. The idea o f the es tablis hment o f a new ‘independent’ s tate became the co re o f the s ubmis s io n o f the Guando ng Army o f 24 Octo ber 19 31 to the Minis try o f the Army, ‘Manmō mo ndai kaikets u no ko npo n hō s aku’, 24 Octo ber 19 31, reprinted in Inaba Mas ao , Ko bayas hi Tats uo , and Shimada To s hihiko eds , Gendaishi shiryō, vo l. 11 (To kyo : Mis uz u s ho bō , 19 6 5), pp. 337–8 .

49 In 19 32, pro letarian parties wo n five s eats . In 19 30 , Mins eitō had wo n a lands lide majo rity o f 273 agains t Seiyūkai (174) and pro letarian parties (5). The to tal number o f the Ho us e o f Repres entatives was 46 6 in this perio d, and the res t o f the s eats were wo n by o ther independent parties . The exact number o f the s eats wo n by bo th majo r parties in 19 32 varies by two s eats fro m o ne s o urce to ano ther. Kitao ka Shin’ichi, Seitō kara gunbu e (To kyo : Chūō kō ro n s hins ha, 19 9 9 ), p. 171.

50 Go rdo n, Labor and Imperial democracy, pp. 275–6 , 28 3–4.

51 The Japanes e Navy had attacked the Chines e military in Shanghai o n 28 January 19 31.

52 Duara argues that s uch a claim had been valid until the late nineteenth century, and had been co mmo nly ackno wledged in Japanes e and Wes tern s cho lars hip. Japanes e s cho lars hip, ho wever, deliberately igno red the s ubs tantial Han-Chines e migratio n into the area in the firs t two decades o f the twentieth century. This s erved Japan’s s trategic and eco no mic interes ts . Pras enjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lo ndo n: Ro wman & Littlefield Publis hers , 20 0 3), pp. 56 –8 .

53 Such an idea was als o co mmo nly expres s ed at MOFA and its diplo matic mis s io ns in Manchuria in December 19 31–January 19 32. Gaimus hō hyakunens hi hens an iinkai, Gaimushō, vo l. 2, pp. 217–18 .

54 Ōtani, ‘ “Shimbun s ō jū” kara’, pp. 8 8 –9 .

55 Iwanaga, ‘Manmō ts ūs hins ha ro n’, pp. 39 –41.

56 Sas aki, ‘Ko kuts ū no s hinwa o kataru’, p. 32; Ts ūs hins has hi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi, p. 356 ; Furuno Ino s uke denki hens hū iinkai ed., Furuno Inosuke, pp. 18 7–8 .

57 Sas aki, ‘Ko kuts ū no s hinwa o kataru’, p. 31.

58 Satō Junko , ‘Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha no s ets urits u to jō hō tais aku’, Media shi kenkyū, vo l. 9 (March 20 0 0 ), p. 39 .

59 ‘Iwayuru s angats u jiken’, cited in Mas umi Junno s uke, Nihon seitō shiron, vo l. 6 (To kyo : To kyo daigaku s huppankai, 19 8 0 ), pp. 10 0 – 1.

6 0 Mas umi, Nihon seitō shiron, vo l. 6 , pp. 9 –10 .

6 1 ‘Tanaka s huki’, cited in Mas umi, Nihon seitō shiron, vo l. 6 , pp. 113–16 .

6 2 Kets umeidan as s as s inated Ino ue Junno s uke, a pro minent Mins eitō po litician, in February 19 32, and Dan Takuma, Directo r o f Mits ui Co mpany, in March 19 32.

6 3 ‘Manmō s hinko kka s eirits u ni kans uru taigai kankei s ho ri yō kō ’, (Cabinet decis io n, 12 March 19 31), reprinted in Ko bayas hi and Shimada eds , Gendaishi shiryō, vo l. 7, p. 49 5.

6 4 Mas umi, Nihon seitō shiron, vo l. 6 , pp. 118 –21.

6 5 Mats us aka analys es the Guando ng Army’s failure in co ntro lling the SMR in 19 32–3. Mats us aka, ‘Managing o ccupied Manchuria, 19 31–19 34’, pp. 120 –7.

6 6 Ibid., pp. 112–20 , 127–33.

6 7 Mats us aka, ‘Managing o ccupied Manchuria, 19 31–19 34’, p. 10 7; Mas umi, Nihon seitō shiron, vo l. 6 , pp. 59 –6 7.

6 8 Mas umi, Nihon seitō shiron, vo l. 6 , pp. 6 5–7; Gaimus hō hyakunens hi hens an iinkai, Gaimushō, vo l. 2, pp. 228 –6 6 .

6 9 Jō hō kyo ku, ‘Jō hō kyo ku s ets urits u ni itaru made no rekis hi’, 1 April 19 41, reprinted in Is hikawa Junkichi, Kokka sōdōinshi: Shiryōhen, vo l. 4 (Fujis awa: Ko kka s ō dō ins hi kankō kai, 19 76 ), p. 10 9 . The s ame do cument is als o reprinted in Ogino Fujio ed., Jōhōkyoku kankei gokuhi shiryō, vo l. 1 (To kyo : Fuji s huppan, 20 0 3).

70 Furuno Ino s uke denki hens hū iinkai ed., Furuno Inosuke, pp. 171, 19 3–4.

71 Ibid. pp. 19 3–4. It is unclear, ho wever, whether s uch nego tiatio ns to o k place befo re o r after June 19 32. Furuno ’s bio graphy mentio ns the invo lvement o f Uchida Yas uya, Shigemits u Mamo ru, and Amō Eiji. Uchida was Fo reign Minis ter after July 19 32. Shigemits u became Vice Minis ter o ne year later in May 19 33, and Amō became Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n, als o in June 19 33. 72 Jō hō kyo ku, ‘Jō hō kyo ku s ets urits u’, 1 April 19 41, (reprinted), p. 10 9 .

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi, p. 47.

76 Katō , ‘Kio ku o tado ru’, pp. 25–6 ; Satō , ‘Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha’, pp. 30 –32.

77 Katō , ‘Kio ku o tado ru’, p. 26 .

78 On this o rganiz atio n, s ee Do uglas R. Reyno lds , ‘Training yo ung China hands : Tō a Dō bun Sho in and its precurs o rs , 18 8 6 –19 45’, in Duus , Myers , and Peattie eds , The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937, pp. 210 –71.

79 Ts ūs hins has hi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi, p. 359 ; Sato mi Hajime, ‘Sō rits u no z engo dan’, in Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi, pp. 15, 23; Mats umo to Shigeharu, Shanhai jidai, vo l. 1 (To kyo : Chūō kō ro ns ha, 19 74), p. 18 6 .

8 0 He in fact argued that the co mmittee s ho uld have an adminis trative gro up, headed by the Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n o f MOFA. This gro up s ho uld be co mpo s ed o f repres entatives o f thes e minis tries and if neces s ary, include repres entatives o f private o rganiz atio ns . Jō hō kyo ku, ‘Jō hō kyo ku s ets urits u’, 1 April 19 41, (reprinted), p. 10 9 .

8 1 Jō hō kyo ku, ‘Jō hō kyo ku s ets urits u’, 1 April 19 41, (reprinted), p. 110 .

8 2 Ibid., pp. 110 –11. The Army do cuments s ugges ted that the Minis try o f the Army and the Guando ng Army wo rked clo s ely to facilitate fo reign jo urnalis ts ’ vis it to Manchuria, s uch as an AP jo urnalis t, James A Mills . [Rikugun] s himbunhan to Rikugun daijin, 7 No vember 19 32; ‘Fukukan yo ri Kantō gun s anbō chō ate ts ūchō ’, 7 No vember 19 32, in the file o f ‘Rikuman kimits u: Mits u fu dainikki’, Bō eis hō bō ei kenkyūs ho (fo rmally called Bō eichō Bō ei kens hūs ho Sens hi s hiryō s hits u).

8 3 Satō , ‘Mans hūko ku ts ūs hins ha’, pp. 34–5.

8 4 Sato mi, ‘Sō rits u no z engo dan’, p. 19 .

8 5 Sato mi, ‘Sō rits u no z engo dan’, p. 20 ; Ts ūs hins has hi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi, pp. 359 –6 0 .

8 6 [Amō ], ‘Shints ūs hins ha s ets urits u’, (reprinted), pp. 1529 –30 .

8 7 [Amō Eiji], [No title], 26 September 19 32, reprinted in Amō ed., Amō Eiji nikki shiryōshū, shiryō hen, vo l. 2, pp. 1450 –57.

8 8 ‘Dainiho n ts ūs hins ha teikan s ō an yō ryō ’, reprinted in Amō ed., Amō Eiji nikki shiryōshū, shiryō hen, vo l. 2, p. 1458 .

8 9 [Amō ], [No title], 26 September 19 32, (reprinted), p. 1451.

9 0 Iwanaga, ‘Ko kkateki daits ūs hins ha’, December 19 31, (reprinted), p. 16 3.

9 1 ‘Dainiho n ts ūs hins ha teikan s ō an yō ryō ’, (reprinted), pp. 146 0 , 146 1.

9 2 [Amō ], ‘Shints ūs hins ha s ets urits u’, (reprinted), pp. 1529 , 1530 .

9 3 Ibid., pp. 1530 –31; ‘Shimbun rengō s ha kaitō s ho ’, Octo ber 19 33, reprinted in Ts ūs hins has hi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi, pp. 426 – 7.

9 4 Iwanaga to Co o per, 27 May 19 33; Co o per to Ellio tt, 31 May 19 33, reprinted in Ariyama and Nis hiyama eds , Kokusai tsūshinsha, vo l. 2, pp. 419 –21.

9 5 Ts ūs hins has hi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi, p. 336 .

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