Briefing Political Trends & Dynamics in Southeast Europe December 2016 | January 2017

#BriefingSEE Political Trends & Dynamics in Southeast Europe #BriefingSEE A FES DIALOGUE SOUTHEAST EUROPE PROJECT 2016–2018

Peace and stability initiatives represent a decades-long cornerstone of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s work in southeastern Europe. Recent events have only reaffirmed the centrality of Southeast European stability with- in the broader continental security paradigm. Both democratization and socio-economic justice are intrinsic aspects of a larger progressive peace policy in the region, but so too are consistent threat assessments and ef- forts to prevent conflict before it erupts. Dialogue SOE aims to broaden the discourse on peace and stability in southeastern Europe and to counter the securitization of prevalent narratives by providing regular analysis that involves a comprehensive understanding of human security, including structural sources of conflict. The briefings cover fourteen countries in southeastern Europe: the seven post-Yugoslav countries and Albania, , Turkey, Cyprus, , Romania, and Moldova. Editorial Note ern ” in several regional capitals, as well as EU member states. This consortium of think The winter months were less calm than one might tanks aims to accelerate the accession of the re- expect regarding political dynamics in Southeast maining Western Balkans countries to the EU. Europe. As in the previous period, trends within and between countries have not lent much hope The Regional Cooperation Council released two for positive change. Nationalist notions have re- flagship publications on (1) Connectivity and mained prominent, as seen in the case of Bos- (2) Competitiveness for 2016. They advocate for nia and Herzegovina, where the public discourse speeding up national reforms related to connec- was dominated by nativist narratives, or in the tivity, as well as a regional investment agenda, case of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, among other things. The publications list the where an attempt at symbolic politics followed major impediments regarding connectivity and well-known patterns of testing and provocation. competitiveness, along with an overview on RCC’s plans for the forthcoming period. The assassination of Russian Ambassador An- drey Karlov in Ankara and terrorist attacks A joint EU-Western Balkans Ministerial Forum on throughout Turkey shocked the world, buttress- Justice and Home Affairs took place in Slovenia ing the concentration of observers on region- to discuss efficiency and cooperation on matters al security. President ’s inaugura- of migration, border management, and internal tion in the and the first actions of security. Exemplifying the ongoing securitiza- his administration have created uncertainty not tion of EU-WB relations, the meeting happened only regarding the American posture, but also under the auspices of Slovakia’s EU Presidency. in Southeast Europe. A further retreat of the US from the region is to be expected. The Western Balkans Summit was confirmed to take place on July 12th in Trieste, under the pa- Attempts in solving the remaining bilateral dis- tronage of the Italian government. putes in the region may have received some backwind in Cyprus, where the population is On a somewhat different note, an article by Tim- voicing demands for peace and reunification. othy Less, published in Foreign Policy Magazine and titled “Dysfunction in the Balkans,” sparked As the old Balkan proverb says “svakog čuda, tri criticism over the authors’ views that multieth- dana dosta” – a marvel is only a marvel for three nic states in the region have failed and should days. So, despite the unusual density of media not be encouraged. hype, even for this region, it seems too early to identify a substantial trend for the new year. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Regional Developments The political agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in December and January was dominated The establishment and operationalization of by the celebration of the contested National Day the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) of Republika Srpska (RS) on January 9th, and U.S. has not received much public attention. How- sanctions against the President of Republika Srp- ever, the Governing Board had its constitutional ska; the ’s assessment of meeting in December, followed by a Boost Con- the country’s readiness to receive official candi- ference for potential partners and represent- date status for (EU) member- atives of youth organizations. Soon after, an ship; the de facto suspension of the IMF loan; open call was launched and advertised for the and increased media reporting on consequences position of the Secretary General, which is to be of failed public policies across the country. filled at the beginning of February. Crucial fur- ther steps for the finalization of RYCO’s estab- lishment will follow in the coming period. Key developments

The WB6 Advocacy Group, launched another ma- • The heated debate over the National Day of jor regional initiative, presenting their “Advoca- Republika Srpska Day continued, reaching its cy strategy for the EU integration of the West- climax when RS authorities organized a cele- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

bration of the holiday on January 9th in Banja • In an effort to consolidate the political left in Luka, despite the Constitutional Court’s deci- the country, representatives of non-nation- sion from November 2015 that the holiday is alist political parties, civil society, academia unconstitutional. Politicians in Sarajevo main- and NGO’s signed the so-called “Jahorina tained their agreement with the Court, while Declaration”. The declaration calls for ‘po- politicians in Banja Luka refused to recognize litical and social conditions for a better soci- the Court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the Law ety’, and has been considered as a first step on the National Day of RS (published in the RS in the preparations for the general elections Official Gazette on December 27th 2016) was in 2018. With this declaration, chances in- passed on October 25th, predating the Court’s creased for the formation of a ‘unified front’ decision. Tensions rose further due to disputes of political forces, which consider themselves regarding the participation of some of BiH’s civic and non-nationalistic. Armed Forces in the parade celebrating the holiday. The Ministry of Defence is leading • In the reporting period, media coverage on an inquiry into the matter. While the reform problems of air pollution, water shortages, of BiH’s Armed Forces was hailed as a major interruptions in the heating supply net- success story, in this instance the military has works, failing health systems, and illiquid- been instrumentalized for political purposes. ity of public companies intensified. The air quality reached dangerous toxicity levels in • On January 17th, the U.S. State Department all the country’s major cities. Heating supply and Treasury introduced sanctions against Mi- was interrupted for weeks in Zenica, Tuzla, lorad Dodik, the president of the RS and lead- and Banja Luka. Thousands of households in er of the biggest party of the ruling coalition Sarajevo stayed without water for days. In in that entity (the Alliance of Independent the small industrial town of Lukavac, author- Social Democrats – SNSD). U.S. authorities ex- ities failed to promptly inform citizens about plained that Dodik obstructed the implemen- a factory accident which exposed them to tation of the Dayton Peace Agreement by increased levels of dangerous gases. Media holding the referendum on the National Day coverage also included reports on the coun- in RS on September 25th, in violation of the try’s growing indebtedness in the health decision of the Constitutional Court. Dodik is sector, resulting in shortages in cancer treat- banned from traveling to the U.S.A and his ment drugs, as well as the economic emigra- assets in the U.S. are frozen. He continued tion of hundreds of medical staff leaving to to demand the adoption of a new law in the pursue better paid work in the EU. Further- Constitutional Court that would allow chang- more, there are reports of the possible fore- es to its set-up and decision-making. All rel- closure of Sarajevo’s public transportation evant political forces in Sarajevo oppose such company. changes. Dodik repeatedly argued that the RS should utilize the consequences of Brexit, • As part of the process of preparing an as- the insecure future of the EU, and President sessment of BiH’s readiness to receive of- Trump’s election to achieve full independ- ficial candidate status for EU membership, ence, unification with Serbia, or the return the EU’s commissioner in charge of enlarge- of all competences transferred to the federal ment policy visited Sarajevo, on December 9th level since 1996. He announced there would to hand over a list with 3,242 questions for be at least one referendum in RS in 2017. the country’s institutions. The experience of other countries that went through the pro- • In May 2016, the IMF and BiH reached an cess of collecting the information necessary agreement on a 500 million loan to for drafting these answers suggests that this be given in 12 tranches. However, the pay- will be the most demanding challenge yet ment of the second instalment of the loan, for the BiH administration. The process will scheduled for December 2016, was halted by force the country’s administration to look the IMF citing ‘non-compliance’ with agreed into every nook and cranny of its public poli- reforms. According to BiH’s government, 75 cies, from health and environment to taxes million euros should be made available after and agriculture. BiH is expected to send one an agreement on the Law on Excise Duties is set of answers; due to the highly federalized reached. nature of the country’s constitution, the in-

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puts will have to be gathered from several out the presidential campaign. Radev’s first different levels of government. This will test presidential visit was to Brussels for meet- the government’s readiness to work togeth- ings with the President of the European er, exchange information, and agree on joint Commission Jean-Clade Juncker, the Presi- answers. BiH’s authorities are expected to dent of the , finish the task within a provisional deadline the newly-elected President of the European of six months. Parliament and the Secretary General of NATO .

Next month’s prospects • President Radev’s first task was to ensure a smooth transition to a stable government. In the next month, political tensions are expect- Prime Minister Borisov and his cabinet re- ed to continue as are the devastating results of signed in November after the GERB party’s failed public policies. In the beginning of Febru- candidate lost the presi- ary, the publication of the findings of the De- dential elections, sparking a political crisis. fence Ministry’s internal inquiries on the partici- Radev disbanded the 43rd National Assem- pation of the Armed Forces in the January 9th bly and nominated a caretaker government celebrations in the RS is expected to provoke on January 27th. Former Chairman of Parlia- further tensions. Budget constraints are likely to ment professor became lead to a much-needed agreement on reforms Prime Minister. Radi Naydenov, Ambassador for the IMF loan to continue. to Germany, was made foreign minister. The caretaker government insist of experts from different political wings. The Socialist Party Bulgaria (BSP), which supported the nomination of , declined any interference in Bulgaria’s political agenda was dominated by the appointment process, while Radev prom- the inauguration of the newly-elected President ised to install a government composed of Rumen Radev, the uncertainties around the ap- experts. Only one of the four deputy Prime pointment of a caretaker government, and alle- Ministers - Denitsa Slateva is a member of the gations accompanying the campaign ahead of BSP. On his first day in office President Radev early parliamentary elections. signed a decree on the appointment of his cabinet members: Dimitar Stoyanov, former Air Force commander was appointed Secre- Key developments tary General; the journalist and director of the left-wing foundation Solidary Bulgaria • After winning the second round of presiden- Ivo Hristov will be the President’s Head of Of- tial elections on November 13th 2016 with fice; Atanas Krastin, Bulgaria’s former Consul nearly 60 per cent of votes, Rumen Radev General in Nis (Serbia) will serve as Foreign took office on January 22nd as the fifth Presi- Policy Secretary. dent of Bulgaria. In his farewell speech, out- going President reiterated • The Bulgarian political debate is already the need for more justice in Bulgarian soci- dominated by the upcoming early parlia- ety in order to counter the rise of populism mentary elections convened by the Presi- built on people’s fears. Plevneliev assessed dent to take place on March 26th. Given that his term as difficult and praised himself for it is highly unlikely that any party will win setting the right priorities and for avoiding the majority of votes, the building of a sta- strategic mistakes in Bulgaria’s foreign poli- ble government will be a very difficult task cy. In turn, President Rumen Radev’s solemn in a polarized society. A coalition between speech called on political parties and soci- the two largest parties, GERB and BSP, seems ety to unite for justice and firm defence of unlikely. GERB’s leader Borisov publicly in- Bulgarian interests. Notably, Radev said he vited the winner of the election to hastily would actively work with Bulgaria’s partners form a minority government in an attempt for a speedy integration with the EU, thus to avoid an impasse. In the meantime, GERB downplaying the pro-Russian image painted has undertaken a campaign to counter what by his opponents and the media through- they claim is disinformation on the part of

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the BSP. GERB regularly publishes counter- tiations are divided in six chapters – five dis- active statements in response to allegations cussed by the two Cypriot leaders, and the last made by the BSP; for example, BSP accused discussed together with the guarantor pow- GERB of mismanaging EU funds and Bulgar- ers (Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom). ia’s energy sector and failing on a number of No agreement on any chapter can be signed reforms. Recent opinion polls showed a tiny until all six chapters are agreed upon. On the difference in support for GERB and BSP. The first five chapters, the two Cypriot leaders third largest party coalition, the ultra-right- agreed on the basic framework of a deal to wing Patriotic Front is expected to be key for reunify the country, namely a ‘bi-zonal, bi- the forming of a government, as their can- communal federation’ with a deep decentrali- didate Krasimir Karakachanov won 15 per zation and a shared-power in the center. This cent of votes in first round of presidential is believed to be the deal that would gather elections. the most support from the two communities on the island. For the first time in history, the two leaders offered their proposed map Next month’s prospects of the administrative borders in the country. The difference between the Turkish-Cypriots’ Media and society will continue to focus on the and the Greek-Cypriots’ proposal came down unstable political scene. The political debate will to a single percentage – the Turkish-Cypriots be dominated by the early elections and the im- want control over 29.2 per cent of the island, portance of finding a working coalition and sup- while the Greek-Cypriots have offered them port to form a stable government. The upcom- 28.2 per cent. However, the differences are ing Bulgaria’s Presidency of the Council of the much bigger than it seems given that the EU in January 2018 will certainly be an incentive maps differ considerably on the areas to be for political parties to work for stability. returned. The question of the presidency is still ongoing; the Turkish-Cypriots support a rotating presidency, but the Greek-Cypriots Cyprus oppose it, arguing that giving this amount of power to the Turkish minority would not fol- Domestic support for peace negotiations has low democratic principles. President of north been increasing in the last few months, as dem- Cyprus Mustafa Akinci insisted that he would onstrated by the organization of several peace not agree to a relocate Greek-Cypriots who rallies, with Turkish and Greek Cypriots stand- had to flee their homes in 1974, as it would ing side by side to support the island’s leaders in displace the Turkish-Cypriots now living there. their attempt to reach an agreement. The nego- More negotiations are needed to determine tiations resumed in January in Switzerland, after the sort of compensation will be necessary. their premature halt in November, and are ex- pected to go ahead at a steady pace. • The chapter concerning security is the main cause of the stall of negotiations, as the talks include both Cypriot leaders and the guaran- Key developments tor states. The issue relates to the Guarantor status of Turkey, Greece and Britain, which • Thousands of people demonstrated for the was used by Turkey as the justification for political reunification of the island. The dem- the invasion of 1974 as well as the military onstrations were organized in the UN buffer presence of Turkey (but also Greece) after a zone and gathered Cypriots from both com- solution. The Greek-Cypriots want to elimi- munities. These rallies were attended by both nate the Treaty of Guarantee, while Turkey Greek and Turkish Cypriot organizations. and the Turkish Cypriots are only willing to Their main purpose was to urge their leaders modify it and insist on the need for a per- to intensify their effort to find a solution to manent Turkish military presence on the is- reunite the island. land. President proposed instead the creation of an international po- • The negotiations ended in early January with- lice force. President Akinci opposed this as out a conclusive agreement, though many of now, but remained open to deal with controversial topics were discussed. The nego- this question after the creation of the Cyp-

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riot federation. However, Greece and Turkey testers were supported by all political parties could not reach an agreement, each blam- and from all social backgrounds in Kosovo. ing the other for the failure. The UK pledged Protests in front of Serbian embassies and dip- that they would follow the wishes of the lomatic missions in some countries triggered two communities, provided that they reach an angry reaction from Serbian Foreign Minis- an agreement. ter Ivica Dacic, who suggested that protesters were planning to a Serbian embassy.

Next month’s prospects • On December 8th Kosovo’s Ministry of Envi- ronment and Spatial Planning ordered a halt Senior civil servants are now laying the ground- to the building of the two-meter-high wall work to agree on a roadmap for future talks. on the Serb-controlled north side of the Ibar A meeting between the two leaders, based on River in Kosovska Mitrovica. Kosovo Serb au- these preparations, will take place soon (though thorities in north Mitrovica had begun erect- no date has been fixed yet). However, any deal ing a concrete wall on the banks of the Ibar before the referendum about the presidential River, just next to the bridge that divides the system in Turkey in April is unlikely. There is still town’s Serb-dominated north and largely Al- hope that an agreement can be reached soon banian-populated south. The move angered thereafter – in time to organize a referendum Kosovo Albanian officials, although Serb in late summer or fall. However, fear of foreign officials in the divided city insisted that the interference remains high and could hinder fur- construction is purely practical and implies ther progress. For example, Turkish President Re- no aggression. Due to the last moves in the cep Tayyip Erdogan stated: “We have told Cy- relation between the two states, President prus and Greece clearly that they should not Thaci stated that those who built the wall expect a solution without Turkey as guarantor. will have to demolish it as well. We are going to be there forever.” • On January 24th a high-level meeting between Prime Ministers Isa Mustafa of Kosovo and Kosovo Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia and Presidents Hashim Thaci and Tomislav Nikolic took place A variety of topics regarding Kosovo-Serbia re- in Brussels, continuing the EU-led talks on lations dominated the public discourse, mainly ‘normalizing’ relations between Serbia and in negative tones. However, an agreement was Kosovo, which were started in 2011. The meet- reached between the two sides on Kosovo ob- ing comes at a time of palpable tension and taining its first international dial code, +383. evident disagreements over a number of issues that could be seen as targeted provocations.

Key Developments • Srpska Lista, the ethnic Serb party in Kosovo’s coalition government, announced on Decem- • Former Prime Minister and the head of the Al- ber 28th that it would seize its participation in liance for the Future of Kosovo, Ramush Hara- Kosovo institutions, following a request from dinaj, was detained on January 4th by police in Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic. It is eastern France, after flying in from Prishtina. believed that this is due to the dismissal of He was detained on the basis of a Serbian ar- Ljubomir Maric, the Minister for Local Gov- rest warrant alleging he committed war crimes ernance in the Kosovo government, after while he was a guerrilla commander with the he met with Serbian politician Marko Dju- Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Haradinaj was ric in north Kosovo – despite the fact that acquitted twice by the International Crimi- Prishtina had issued a ban on Djuric’s entry nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. He into the country. The sacking provoked an has since been granted bail in France, pend- ‘ultimatum’ from Belgrade, demanding the ing the final decision of the French courts on reinstatement of Maric. Some days after the whether he will be extradited to Serbia or re- dismissal, Kosovo’s Prime Minister appointed leased. At the same time, protests calling for the former deputy Minister of Labor and So- his release were organized in Kosovo and by cial Welfare Mirjana Jevtic to take up Maric’s Albanian diaspora around the world. The pro- position. While Srpska Lista appeared divid-

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ed on the issue, Jevtic eventually resigned indicated a very close electoral result: the the post, following continued pressure by governing coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE the Serbian Prime Minister. won 454,577 votes, which, according to the six electoral units, resulted in 51 seats. The • The election of President Trump was seen as opposing coalition led by SDSM won 436,981 a disappointment by Kosovo Albanians, who votes or 49 seats, whereas other parties that hold deep respect for former Secretary Hillary exceeded the threshold and won MPs in the Clinton, whose husband launched the NATO Parliament were DUI (86,796 votes – 10 seats), bombing campaign which ended the war in BESA (57,868 votes – 5 seats), the “Alliance the country. There are fears among Kosovo’s for the Albanians” coalition (35,121 – 3 seats), public that President Trump’s favorable view and DPA (30,964 votes – 2 seats). Although towards Russia and the actions of President VMRO-DPMNE clearly won the most votes Vladimir Putin could put the strong rela- and seats, the opposing coalition led by SDSM tionship Kosovo has forged with the United experienced a big comeback, after winning States at risk. On the other hand, the new only 34 mandates in the 2014 parliamentary U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis de- elections in 2014, with many votes originat- clared that the Kosovo Security Forces should ing from Albanian-populated areas (estimat- receive a mandate to conduct domestic se- ed between 50,000 and 70,000 votes). On the curity and territorial defense. Vlora Citaku, other hand, the ethnic Albanian party DUI Kosovo’s ambassador to the U.S., met briefly lost almost half of its MP group compared to with incoming President Donald Trump, stat- the last elections (down to 10 from 19), re- ing that Kosovo was the most pro-American ceiving only half of the votes it won in 2014 country in the world. (153,646 in 2014 compared to 86,796 in 2016). This indicates a big swing in the mood of Al- banian voters in Macedonia, who have put Next month’s prospects their confidence in SDSM rather than in one of the ethnic Albanian parties. Preparations for the Kosovo Specialist Chambers are expected to continue, as the Hague-based • The electoral result indicated that there are court readies to put on trial some members of numerous possibilities of both VMRO-DPMNE the Kosovo Liberation Army, who are suspected and SDSM forming a government, given that of war crimes. Issues in need of resolution in the a coalition with some (or all) Albanian parties coming months are the formation of the Serb- is necessary in order to form a government majority legislative body in the north, known as (for which a total of 61 MPs are needed). The the Association of Serb Municipalities, and the practice of the two parties with most votes ratification of the law on the border demarca- in the two ethnic groups (Macedonian and tion with Montenegro. After the last events, Albanian) forming the government has been many national and international security ex- a long-established practice in Macedonia. perts say that it’s time for Kosovo to change the Since no party leader stepped forward with Kosovo Security Forces into the Kosovo army. the possibility of having a clear parliamentary majority, President Gjorge Ivanov, within the constitutional deadlines, gave the mandate Macedonia to the leader of the VRMO-DPMNE, Nikola Gruevski. However, since Gruevski cannot The political ambient in the Republic of Mace- form a parliamentary majority, it remains un- donia in the months of December and January clear if the mandate will then go the second was dominated by the elections that took place party in line, SDSM. Although such a prec- on December 11th 2016 and their aftermath. edent has been made in Macedonia (in the 1992 elections), expert opinions differ on the issue. Key developments • In the aftermath of the elections three Alba- • Election Day passed calmly, without greater nian parties and coalitions (DUI, BESA, and breaches of the Electoral Law, and without the “Alliance for the Albanians”) drafted major incidents. The results of the elections a joint platform that should serve as a pre-

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condition for forming a government with Next month’s prospects any of the Macedonian parties. The platform was previously drafted and agreed upon in The following period will be mostly devoted to a meeting of the Albanian political parties forming a new government. Since several sce- and the President of the Republic of Albania narios are possible due to constitutional am- in Tirana. The platform consists of biguities and the relatively equal political po- ethnic demands such as enhancing the posi- tential of the two political blocks, moderate tion of the Albanian language in the coun- instability may follow. However, the major issue try (acceptance as an official language) and that has been debated and shall be intensively full implementation of the Ohrid Framework discussed in the upcoming period is the date for Agreement, among other things. This spurred new elections, since no major political party is in reactions on the ethnic Macedonian side, a position to form a stable and long-lasting gov- with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly ernment with the present distribution of seats. accusing Tirana of interfering with the inter- nal affairs of its neighbor. The platform also hampered efforts to form a government coa- Moldova lition between VMRO-DPMNE and DUI, with both parties drawing “red lines” related to Key Developments acceptability of the demands put forward in the joint platform. The newly elected President ’s high- ly divisive statements in Moscow instigated • The Special Public Prosecutor’s Office contin- strong reactions at home and abroad. Mean- ues its activity. On January 24th 2017 it raised while, the EU dispersed 100 million euros worth allegations related to two new cases – “Tar- of aid, while other domestic controversial devel- iff” and “Tank”. The first case relates to mis- opments were overshadowed by President Do- allocation regarding the public procurement don’s trip. of software in ELEM (Macedonian power plants), while the second relates to abuse of • In the first visit of a Moldovan president to public position in cases of procurement of a Moscow in 9 years, Dodon sought to reaffirm vehicle for the Prime Minister in 2012. Besides his geopolitical aspirations vis-à-vis the Kremlin its constant activity, the future of the Special and his electorate. Despite his open pro-Rus- Public Prosecutor is uncertain, since its man- sian views, Dodon’s strongly-worded geopolit- date is time-constrained by law. One of the ical rhetoric was unexpected given his earlier major conflicting points in the negotiations promises of merely restoring good neighborly for forming a new government is the con- relations with Moscow. In a meeting with Pres- tinuation of the Special Public Prosecutor’s ident Putin, Dodon announced that he would mandate, which has been denied by VMRO- scrap the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, DPMNE as a possibility. citing erroneous trade facts, and suggested solving the Transnistrian conflict through fed- • In January 2017 a group of intellectuals eralization under the “Kozak Memorandum,” formed an organization named “Stop Opera- proposed by Russia. Dodon caused further tion Soros” protesting against the activity of outrage by posing alongside Putin with an old the Foundation Open Society Institute – Mac- map of ‘greater Moldova’, featuring parts of edonia (FOSIM). They accused FOSIM of anti- today’s Romania and Ukraine. governmental activity, calling for the State Department of the U.S., the Congress, and the • Prior to his Moscow visit, Dodon showcased Senate to revise the work of USAID in Mac- his soft antagonism towards the EU and edonia in the last four years. “Stop Operation neighboring Romania in particular. During Soros” accused FOSIM and USAID of politiciza- his first days in office, Dodon removed the tion and abuse of US aid to Macedonia, claim- Presidency’s EU flag and stripped former ing that they directly supported the political Romanian President Traian Basescu of his opposition in overthrowing the governing Moldovan citizenship. He also requested structure in the Republic of Macedonia. It also (unsuccessfully) to recall the Moldovan am- announced further actions related to investi- bassador to Romania for stating his personal gating the activity of FOSIM in Macedonia. views. The president’s initiated meeting with

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the Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky, ever ballot. Although originally described as prompted the coalition’s to call ‘anti-establishment’, in this election USR prag- for an impeachment referendum against matically backed Ciolos, who governed Roma- him, as they claimed the move was illegal. nia for the past year. Unlike in other countries, Romanian elections did not experience any • The EU dispersed 100 million euros in macro- geopolitical or -sceptic motif. financial assistance in three progressive in- stalments, subject to reform. Up to 40 million • Since PSD’s leader Liviu Dragnea has a two- euros of the sum are grant, while the rest are year suspended jail sentence for abuse of loans at favorable rates. This came weeks af- power, his plans of becoming Prime Minister ter the government suggested a draft law on would have been upset by President Klaus ‘capital liberalization’, which international Iohannis (PNL), who promised to reject any experts said would further facilitate money candidate with a criminal record. Therefore laundering. The media scene has also been the designation of the new PM Sorin Grind- affected – Jurnal TV, famous for criticizing eanu on December 30th came with potentially the ruling Democratic Party, were forced to destabilizing effects. Grindeanu, the former leave their premises for allegedly defaulting Communications Minister, was the party’s sec- on rental payments, which they openly deny. ond candidate that President Iohannis consid- Moldovan extra-parliamentarian opposi- ered after rejecting Sevil Shhaideh, a Muslim tion leaders Andrei Nastase and presidential woman from the ethnic Tatar minority. runner-up Maia Sandu claimed that Dodon’s hard geopolitical statements in Moscow only • Eventually, the 43-year-old Grindeanu’s gov- served to strengthen the ruling coalition’s ernment won a confidence vote in Romania’s role as the only pro-Western force. parliament on January 4th by a wide majority, bringing stability to year-long political un- certainty under a minority government. The Next month’s prospects new government proposed stimulating eco- nomic measures such as increasing the mini- Dodon’s second official visit will be to Brussels, mum wage (from 277 to 322 euros), elimina- where he is expected to change his tone. His tion of the threshold on social and health statements are nevertheless generally perceived insurance, wage increases to public servants, as populistic and deceptive. pension increases, and tax cuts to companies with a threshold below 500,000 euros.

Romania • Romania’s poor prison conditions and the Constitutional Court’s demands to address After a year of a technocratic government, Ro- certain legislative loopholes spurred the new manians elected the Social Democrat party (PSD) government to introduce two draft emer- back into power in a landslide victory. The form- gency ordinances on amending the criminal ing of the new government, however, was not code and providing for collective pardon. unproblematic. The decrees were pushed through during the night of January 31st which intensified the al- ready growing popular protests against the Key developments decrees.

• The Parliamentary elections on December 11th saw the center-left PSD winning by 45.5 per Next month’s prospects cent of the vote, allowing them to form an easy coalition with liberals from ALDE (5.62 %). The Just after the European Commission released its center-right Liberal Party (PNL), running with annual report on corruption in Romania, Brussels technocrat Dacian Ciolos as their candidate, warned the government to “urgently reconsider” came a distant second with 20 per cent of the its latest ordinances saying that it’s funding could vote. The Save Romania Union (USR), a brand be at risk. President Iohannis vowed to refer the new anti-corruption movement-turned-party ordinances to the Constitutional Court, as the last were pleased with 8.8 per cent in their first resort to prevent them from becoming law.

10 Political Trends & Dynamics in Southeast Europe

Serbia of non-Serb prisoners from Vukovar in Cro- atia in 1991. He was released in 2011, after The political discourse in Serbia has been shaped serving two-thirds of his sentence. by bilateral disputes and agreements. Croatia first blocked and later unblocked the opening • Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic’s meet- of the negotiations chapter on culture and edu- ing with former Bosnian Serb parliament cation in Serbia’s EU accession. At the same time, speaker and convicted war criminal Momcilo Belgrade took a controversial stance regarding Krajisnik on January 11th, who has served a the National Day of Republika Srpska. Progress sentence for war crimes, was met by anger in the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade from human rights groups in Bosnia and was hampered by diverging views, amongst oth- Serbia. On another note, a delegation of ers regarding a newly established train from Bel- high-level Bosnian government officials led grade to North Mitrovica. by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Denis Zvizdic visited Belgrade and held meet- ings with Prime Minister Vucic, discussing a Key Developments variety of topics. The meeting was held in a seemingly constructive atmosphere, reach- • A new train connection from Belgrade to ing agreement on a future highway between North Mitrovica caused tensions between Belgrade and Sarajevo, among other things. Serbia and Kosovo, mainly due to the exte- rior design of the train, which included the phrase “Kosovo is Serbia” in 21 languages. Next month’s prospects The train was seen as a provocation by of- ficials in Prishtina, who sent special forces The Serbian presidential elections are expect- to the northern border of the country to ed to take place in April of 2017, and most of prevent the train’s entry on January 14th. In the political rhetoric will be focused around the response, Serbian President Nikolic said that campaign. The opening of EU accession chapters he and his sons were ready to “fight in Ko- and the dialogue with Prishtina are thought to sovo if need be.” Causing a storm of public- be the main foreign policy points for the com- ity, the train eventually returned to Belgrade ing months. without having reached its final destination. The affair has been received as a PR stunt, albeit both creative and successful, by Serb Turkey officials. While constitutional amendments divided the • Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic vis- public, the Turkish government made major ited Moscow on December 21st to finalize an changes in its foreign policy stance towards Syr- arms deal with Russia wherein Serbia will ac- ia and Iraq. Terrorist attacks have led to growing quire six MiG-29 fighter jets and other mili- tensions, while economic trust was decreasing. tary equipment. The cost for maintenance and pilot training is estimated as very high. Critics of the deal have argued that the MiG- Key developments 29 jets could only be used for a maximum of 10 years, so fewer and newer planes should • While the EU December summit decided not be bought to minimize costs in the long run. to mention the resolution of the to freeze accession negotiations • Activists of the Youth Initiative for Human with Turkey, the ruling AK party and the Rights NGO were physically attacked in Bes- nationalist MHP agreed on constitutional ka, close to Novi Sad, after they unfurled a amendments, which would establish a rein- banner saying “Criminals should shut up forced presidential system. Presidential and so we can talk about victims” in a protest parliamentary elections will now be held on against a speech by former Yugoslav People’s the same day, and the President is allowed to Army colonel and convicted war criminal Ve- also be a party member or even the leader selin Sljivancanin. Sljivancanin was jailed for of a political party. The President can further ten years for aiding and abetting the torture call for snap elections, but must resign be-

11 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

forehand. As leader of the party, the Presi- Moreover, the police received increased ac- dent can decide on the party list of candi- cess to internet traffic data – citizens can now dates. Another change in the constitutional lose their citizenship if they fail to return to amendment is a reform of the election pro- Turkey within 90 days upon receipt of a judi- cedure of the members of the Council of At- cial summons. Several public meetings were torneys and Judges. Those members will now prohibited, and in Ankara any public assem- be elected by both Parliament and the Presi- blies were forbidden in January. dent. The AKP maintains that this amend- ment guarantees more stable governments • The main indicators for economic trust, as in the future. The opposition party CHP well as those for the industry, service, trade, criticized the changes, claiming they would consumers, and construction reached a year- lead to a dictatorship, with no real author- long low in December. With the beginning ity held by Parliament. Both the CHP and the of the New Year, the Turkish Lira experienced Kurdish-oriented HDP insisted that no consti- a large depreciation which is attributed to tutional changes should be effected during a global developments as well as high internal state of emergency. The amendment passed political risks. Inflation was high in December in the parliament with 339 out of 500 votes and reached 8.35 per cent for the whole year. on January 20th, 2017 and will lead to a refer- endum in April. Next month’s prospects • With Turkish participation, an agreement to secure a ceasefire in Aleppo was reached in The constitutional campaigns for the referen- Moscow on December 20th, noticeably de- dum will be the most controversial subject on spite of the assassination of the Russian Am- the political agenda. The policy of the Turkish bassador in Ankara the day before. Turkish Central Bank and of the rating decision of Fitch authorities have suspected the Gulen move- will be of foremost importance for the stability ment behind this attack. Turkey, Russia, and of the Turkish Lira and economic trust. New ac- Iran agreed that they would focus on com- tions against the media are likely. For Turkey’s batting terrorist groups like the Islamic State military campaign in Syria, the government will and Al-Nusra. With this agreement, the Turk- seek support for the occupation of areas now ish government gave up its insistence on the controlled by the Kurdish PYD and the Demo- resignation of Syrian President Assad as a cratic Syrian Forces. Topics for public debate will precondition for talks to find a political solu- likely be the relations with the EU including the tion. Whilst the Moscow compromise allowed Syrian Refugee Agreement, expectations for vi- the (contested) evacuation of civilians from sa-free travel for Turkish citizens, the extension Aleppo, it also led to a decrease of fighting of the Common Market Treaty, and the fight in most parts of the country. Negotiations be- against terrorism. tween the Syrian government and the oppo- sition followed, with Russia, Iran, and Turkey as mediators. Prime Minister Yildirim visited Baghdad to discuss the Turkish military pres- ence in Mosul – he eased tensions by agree- ing that Turkish troops will be redeployed to Turkey, though without stating when.

• In December, an organization affiliated to the PKK attacked policemen in Istanbul and Special Forces soldiers in Kayseri with car bombs, resulting in a high number of casual- ties. On New Year’s Eve, an Islamic State sup- porter attacked a nightclub in Istanbul, kill- ing 39 persons. The state of emergency was prolonged on January 4th and is now expect- ed to last until April. Dismissals in the public service, the police, and the army continued.

12 The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Europe

After more than two decades of engagement in southeastern Europe, the FES appreciates that the challenges and problems still facing this region can best be resolved through a shared regional framework. Our commitment to advancing our core interests in democratic consolidation, social and economic justice and peace through regional cooperation, has since 2015 been strengthened by establishing an infrastructure to coordinate the FES’ regional work out of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Regional Dia- logue Southeast Europe (Dialogue SOE).

Dialogue SOE provides analysis of shared challenges in the region and develops suitable regional programs and activities in close cooperation with the twelve FES country offices across Southeast Europe. Furthermore, we integrate our regional work into joint initiatives with our colleagues in Berlin and Brussels. We aim to inform and be informed by the efforts of both local and interna- tional organizations in order to further our work in southeastern Europe as effectively as possible.

Our regional initiatives are advanced through three broad working lines: • Social Democratic Politics and Values • Social and Economic Justice • Progressive Peace Policy

Our website provides information about individual projects within each of these working lines, past events, and future initiatives: http://www.fes-southeasteurope.org

© 2017 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue Southeast Europe Kupreška 20, 71 000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina www.fes-southeasteurope.org Orders / Contact: [email protected]

Responsible: Felix Henkel, Director, Dialogue Southeast Europe Project coordinator: Denis Piplaš

Editor: Denis Piplaš Authors: Una Hajdari, Dimitar Dermendzhiev, Serghei Sadohin, Nenad Marković, Stefan Hibbeler Proofreading: Tea Hadžiristić Design / Realization: pertext, Berlin

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), or of the organization for which the authors work. The FES cannot guarantee the accuracy of all data stated in this publication. Commercial use of any me- dia published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. Any reference made to Ko- sovo is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. Any reference made to Macedonia is understood as reference to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.