UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 1

Running Head: THE DEPLOYMENT

The Deployment of Bravo Company 21st Combat Support

SGM Roosevelt J. Mitchell

Operation Iraqi Freedom I 03/18/03-03/11/04

91W5M, 1SG, B CO 21ST CSH

5 October 2006

Class 57

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 2

Abstract

My personal experience paper will highlight the challenges of establishing a Combat

Support Hospital in Iraq. My unit encountered many obstacles during Operation Iraqi Freedom I

(OIF I), such as security problems, lack of logistical support, vehicles breaking down and theft of equipment. Finally, I will discuss the different phases of the operation for example pre- deployment, deployment, re-deployment and the challenges my unit faced when we returned to home station.

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 3

The Deployment of Bravo Company 21st Combat Support Hospital

My career as a Soldier afforded me the chance to serve in various leadership capacities

for over twenty-three years. I have held a myriad of positions such as Squad Leader, NCOIC of

the Emergency Treatment Section of 47th Combat Support Hospital (CSH), Detachment NCO

United States Army Health Clinic Vilseck, Germany, BDE Medical Operations NCO 4th BDE,

4th Infantry Division and the First Sergeant (1SG) of Bravo Company 21st Combat Support

Hospital. These positions enabled me to develop the essential skills to serve at the Senior NCO

level. Prior to my deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom, my pervious deployments were

Operation Desert Shield/Storm 1990-1991 with 1st Cavalry Division and Operation Uphold

Democracy (Haiti) in 1995 with the 25th Infantry Division Light. These positions enabled me to function in a major role during this campaign.

On 14 October 2002, I assumed responsibility as 1SG for Bravo Company 21st CSH, 1st

Medical Brigade, , Texas. 21st CSH is a 248-bed Medical Reengineered Initiative

(MRI) CSH, which means it has the capability of conducting split base operations in two locations Alpha Company is a 164-bed hospital and Bravo Company is an 84-bed hospital.

Within three months after assuming the position of 1SG, my unit deployed to Iraq in support of our countries fight against the war on terrorism. In January 2003, the Commander for the 21st

Combat Support Hospital (CSH), held a meeting with the leadership of the hospital. He informed us that we received deployment orders for Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIFI). Our mission to provide Level III/IV healthcare to units located in northern Iraq. Level III/IV healthcare consist of primary care, acute non-urgent, acute mental health, chronic wound care,

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 4

physical therapy care, radiology, surgical, pharmacy and emergency trauma care.

When I returned from the meeting with the commander, I felt it was imperative to inform my

Soldier’s about the upcoming mission. After briefing my Soldiers on the mission, I began training them on task geared towards preparing for upcoming mission. My role as 1SG was to train my Soldiers on individual marksmanship, convoy procedures, NBC training, force protection, healthcare operations and their individual medical specialty skills. This training allowed the full integration of all the Professional Fillers (PROFIS) personnel into their roles.

Bravo Company is not a typical unit. In a typical unit, there are platoon sergeants,

platoon leaders, motor pool officers and other leadership positions. My unit had only two

commissioned officers prior to this mission and five platoon sergeant positions. After receiving

deployment orders we had to reorganize the unit into a hospital, this called for wardmasters and

clinic NCOICs positions to be established. This meant besides holding the position of platoon

sergeant and squad leader, NCOs would serve as NCOICs or wardmasters within the hospital.

Transitioning form a garrison environment to a wartime mode caused some growing pains, roles

of the leadership within the hospital and the company leadership became an issue. The doctors

and nurses wanted total control of the Soldiers assigned to their different sections. The Soldiers

and NCOs where often placed between their hospital chain and the company chain of command.

My commander and I discussed this issue with the hospital commander. He held a meeting with

all leaders assigned to the organization and made sure they understood the role of the company

commander and me. This was reassuring and clearly defined the chain of command for

everyone.

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 5

The next phase of Pre-deployment was maintenance of vehicles and hospital equipment.

I supervised operator level maintenance ensuring 10/20 standards were met (fully mission

capable). I coordinated with the NCOIC of the rear detachment and established a vehicle storage

area in my unit’s motor pool for Privately Owned Vehicle. I assisted the commander in ensuring

all Family Care Plans were viable. I worked with the post transportation office to store my

Soldiers household goods. I ensured all stay behind personnel in-processed into the Rear

Detachment for accountability.

On 18 March 03, my unit departed Fort Hood Airfield for Kuwait. Upon arriving above

the skies of Camp Victory, Kuwait on 19 March, aboard a chartered aircraft, we received an

NBC warning. Everyone immediately donned their MOPP gear and remained in it for one hour.

Finally, the Commander gave the all clear and the plane landed. My unit off loaded the plane

and setup operations into the staging area, located at Camp Victory, Kuwait. While at the

staging area, we off loaded our equipment at the port and configured vehicles and equipment to transport Soldiers and cargo.

While at the staging area my unit received further orders, that we would convoy a 44-Bed

hospital, consisting of 181 soldiers, two HMMVs and twenty-five MTV Vehicles, eight 100

kilowatt Generator Power Units, twelve Environmental Control Units (ECUs) for heat and air

conditioning, fourteen MILVANs and fourteen Dolly sets to Mosul, Iraq. The first portion of the convoy was a 200-mile stretch to a place called Forward Operating Base (FOB) Dogwood, located on the Kuwait and Iraq border; we arrived on 12 April and remained there until 20 April.

During our stay in Dogwood, we lived in less than favorable conditions. Upon our arrival, I supervised the building of latrines, sleep areas and establish roving guards for security. There

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 6

was no dining facility, so we ate Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) for the duration of our stay at FOB

Dogwood. Although no showers were located in the area of operation, I establish a personal hygiene area to ensure my Soldiers wash up as needed.

The next segment of the mission called for a 500-mile convoy to Mosul. There were many challenges during the convoy, vehicles broke down, and Iraqi citizens stole equipment from the loads during frequent stops along the convoy route. This occurred due to limited visibility alone the convoy route and route the hospital commander chose to take. We traveled through congested cities. There was no external security provided along the convoy routes. I felt that my leadership did not plan properly for this type of mission. I felt for the distance we were traveling, we should have used a transportation unit instead of convoying. We were very fortunate to arrive safely to our final destination. We arrived on 23 April and secured the area.

The challenges we faced were farmer’s field, which consisted of rows of unplanted fields, wreckage from Iraqi aircraft, and blown up Iraqi vehicles. There were fighting positions throughout the airfield that caused safety hazards for our Soldiers and vehicles. I felt this area was not a good area to establish a hospital, there was no engineer support and the area was full of debris. These obstacles forced us to improvise by using our vehicles and some of the wreckage to plow down the grass and level the terrain to clear a area for the hospital. Once the area was clear, it took thirty-six hours for the hospital to become operational.

The 101st AASLT Division established operation on 24 April. Their arrival was significant in that they provided logistical support to my unit. The 101st quickly established operations that assigned each unit located on Forwarding Operation Base (FOB) Diamondback guard points. This was critical in providing safety to the hospital and reducing the size of the

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 7

area, the hospital guarded. Th e top priority of the hospital has always been care. During

this mission, patient care and force protection was the priority. The location of my unit created

problems with security; we were located south of the main terminal, which left us on the outer

perimeter of the compound. The advance party OIC upon our arrival made this decision. My

unit constantly received mortar fire from the hills located to our south. The 101st AASLT along

with a tank platoon from the 4th Infantry Division started patrolling our area; this provided relief

from the constant mortar attacks.

My unit was responsible for three fighting positions south of the . With a

twenty-four hour, 7 day a week mission, this became problematic. The hospital also was

responsible for staffing and providing guards for Iraqi enemy prisoners war (EPWs) that were

in the hospital. Many of the Soldiers due to the shortage of their Military Occupational

Specialty (MOS) remained off the Guard Duty roster. This caused some morale issues. I went

to the Division Rear Command group and explained my limitations and what services my unit

could provide. The Division Rear CSM offered to provided military police to assist in the

guarding the Iraqi patients while they were in the hospital. This resolved the problem and

boosted morale

The 101st AALST Division provided legal assistance, mail delivery, G1-G6 support and

flights to and from Mosul. AAFES established an internet café. This enabled Soldiers to contact

their family members back in the States. A Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) tent opened

and allowed Soldiers to watch movies, play games, relax and write letters.

My unit received its first of many indirect fire attacks from mortar fire on 13 June. I prayed that none of my Soldiers were injured. After conducting a battle assessment, I found that

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 8

there were no injuries to Soldiers or damage to equipment.

We brought in concrete bunkers and walls that would shield the hospital from a direct hit

and provided overhead cover from future attacks.

On 8 August, my unit became part of a new task force. My units’ new name became TF

21ST North (N), made up of B CO 21st Combat Support Hospital, 109th Ground Ambulance CO

(Iowa National Guard), 98th Combat Stress Control Detachment, 61st Field Sanitation

Detachment and members of the10th Combat Support Hospital. This increased my units’ strength by 45% to over 320 Soldiers; my role changed from being the First Sergeant to the

Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Task Force Commander. The new task force increased the number of eligible Soldiers that was eligible for guard duty and other details. The new elements of the taskforce quickly integrated into the unit, which lessened the burden on all the Soldiers assigned.

In September, I noticed the Temper Tent material that housed the hospital and the power supply units began showing its wear. I told Supply Sergeant to ordered replacement parts and get wooden floors for the hospital to prevent mud and water from entering the hospital. The longest period of exposure for this equipment was no more than 3 weeks at the Joint Readiness

Training Center. The power generators ran continuously for 365 days, 24 hours a day. This climate and period of exposure caused problems.

My Motor Sergeant (SFC Glen Paulino) and his crew were the heroes during this conflict

while temperatures consistently stayed above 100 degrees or higher, they kept the lights and air

conditioning running throughout our deployment with minimal problems. This provided comfort

for patients and staff. In October, we broke ground for a new 36-bed fixed facility hospital. This

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment 9

facility would replace the Temper (tent) Hospital during OIF II. The facility would provide a

better facility for surgeries and the patient evacuation.

During this mission, the Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers were an important asset to my organization. Soldiers from the RC demonstrated how important their roles were during this mission. The 109th Ground Ambulance Company of the Iowa National Guard, upon their arrival they quickly became an integral part of my unit. The RC Soldiers provided patient care, patient transport and took on many other responsibilities of the active component Soldiers without missing a beat.

My organization like many others experienced some major shortfalls during this

deployment. For example, the Medical Re-engineering Initiative (MRI) equipment life

expectancy is no more than 180 days, however due to harsh weather conditions it began to dry

rot within 120 days. Some of the other major issues during this deployment were the terrain and

weather in November; the weather changed with high winds, rain and flooding. Tents blew

down and flooding accrued in parts of the hospital. This resulted in poor sanitary conditions for

patients and staff. Shortly after Christmas sleep trailers, showers and latrines arrived. This was

a welcomed sight; it boosted morale and improved the quality of life. The trailers powered by a

separate power source, kept the troops warm and dry during the winter months.

In February 04, the 67th Combat Support Hospital arrived in Mosul as our replacements.

Upon their arrival, I met with their NCO leadership and began the learning and transition process

(left seat/right seat ride) phase of the operation. We exchanged information and talked about lessons learned during our past 12 months of deployment. Prior to the Transfer of Authority,

Taskforce 21 North returned the command and control of all units in the taskforce back to their

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment

10

commands. After all hand receipts and equipment inventories were complete, the 67th CSH took

over the mission of providing Echelon III/IV healthcare to the units assigned to the area of

northern Iraq.

After the transfer of authority, 120 members of my units’ advance party departed Mosul

for redeployment to Fort Hood. On 9 February, the remainder of my unit convoyed 800 miles

from Mosul to Arifjon Airfield in Kuwait. We arrived in Arifjon on 13 February. Upon our

arrival in Arifjon, I briefed my Soldiers about the mission of preparing our vehicles and

equipment for shipment back to the United States. My unit worked around the clock at the wash

rack, cleaning equipment and vehicles in preparation for the Joint Inspection (JI). My unit

received first time goes on all equipment during the JI.

I must give the NCO leadership assigned to my unit high praise; they played a pivotal

role during all phases of this deployment by ensuring all vehicles and equipment was prepared

for deployment. They ensured all personal property at home station received proper attention.

During this deployment, we received our equipment in theater, packed it for convoy operations

and met all mission requirements.

The re-deployment, we ensured all vehicles were ready and prepared for shipment to the

United States. My five platoon sergeants, Chief Wardmaster and the other members assigned to the Task Force, made this mission a success. My unit lost no Soldiers or suffered any major

injuries during this campaign. I must give credit to the NCO Corps for the success of my unit;

they led by example, took care of Soldiers and conducted every mission in a professional

manner.

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

The deployment

11

On 11 March, the remainder of my unit arrived at Fort Hood. Immediately upon our

return, we started block leave for 30 days. Upon our return, a reverse Soldier Readiness Process

(SRP) began. The next phase of the operation was to conduct re-ordering and refitting our

vehicles and equipment for future operations. The challenge of getting back to a normal routine was interrupted by the loss of 25% of our personnel due transitioning. This caused challenges with recovery of equipment and vehicle maintenance. I lost almost all my licensed personnel.

I learned a lot from this conflict, it taught me to be open to new things. By doctrine, a

CSH is a Corps level asset. This conflict had no forward lines or rear area, my unit was near the

front lines. This added the responsibility of the hospital providing its own security and guard

duty. Our mission was not just patient care, it changed to defend the hospital, guard EPWs and

provide guards for the guard towers.

I feel my prior assignments and various levels of training I received contributed to the

success of my unit’s mission during combat. This particular mission highlighted the need for the

army to equip our NCO corps with strategic and operational capabilities. Normally doctrine

outlines each echelons responsibility of command; however, during this conflict those

responsibilities merged on the battlefield. We must equip our NCOs with the knowledge base

that will enable them to operate in any tactical situation. Our Soldiers must begin developing

these skills now. Without a quality trained NCO corps, we will be unable to train our future

leaders. The battlefields of the future will continue to evolve and our NCOs must progress with

them.

UNCLASSIFIED