EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLÉE PARLEMENTAIRE EURONEST PARLAMENTARISCHE VERSAMMLUNG EURONEST ПАРЛАМЕНТСКАЯ AССАМБЛЕЯ ЕВРОНЕСТ

Committee on Political Affairs, Human Rights and Democracy

NEST_PV(2014)0211

MINUTES of the meeting of 11 February 2014, 09.00-12.30 Brussels

The meeting opened on Tuesday 11 February 2014 at 09.15, with Co-Chairs Mr Gunnar HÖKMARK () and Mr Victor DOLIDZE (Parliament of Georgia) in the chair.

Co-Chair Mr Gunnar HÖKMARK welcomed all the participants and noted that at this meeting, Members would have to hold a first discussion on the draft report of the Committee in view of the preparation of amendments, at a later stage.

1. Adoption of draft agenda

The draft agenda was adopted without change.

2. Approval of the minutes of the meeting of the Euronest PA Committee on Political Affairs, Human Rights and Democracy of 27 May 2013 in Brussels

Co-Chair Mr HÖKMARK informed that proposals for modification to the draft minutes of the meeting of 27 May 2013 should be sent to the secretariat of the Euronest PA by 12 February 2014, at 10:00. Should no proposal be submitted, the minutes would be deemed adopted without modification.

3. Presentation by Mr Gunnar WIEGAND, Director, European External Action Service (EEAS), Directorate for Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia, Regional cooperation & OSCE, on the prospect of the Eastern Partnership, until the 2015 Summit, in Riga

Mr Gunnar WIEGAND gave an overview of the outcome of the Eastern Partnership following PV\1050578EN.doc AP101.502v01-00 EN EN the Summit of November 2013 in and the prospects until the next Summit to be held in 2015 in Riga. He first stressed a much higher degree of mutual political engagement between the EU and every partner country as well as collectively since the Eastern Partnership was launched at the Prague Summit in 2009. He then explained that the Eastern Partnership was not a policy projected by Brussels only and imposed on partner countries but rather a common policy with joint ownership. Although the Vilnius Summit was dominated by the "U-turn" of Ukrainian President Yanukovich, it led to the initialling of the Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia as well as the signature of the visa facilitation agreement with Azerbaijan. Furthermore, at this Summit, Belarusian officials announced a change of position towards an agreement with the EU on visa facilitation and readmission. Mr WIEGAND took the view that the last events in Ukraine had demonstrated the impact of the Eastern Partnership. He stressed the high level engagement of the EU, shown by the frequent visits of EU High Representative Ashton and Commissioner Füle to Kyiv, aiming at de- escalating the situation, coming to a proper political process, and rendering a concrete package of economic and financial aid, provided there would be a new and inclusive government with a clear economic reform programme.

Mr WIEGAND then drew five lessons of from the last events, which are of importance to further progress towards the Riga Summit in 2015. First, the EU cannot offer the same perspectives to every partner country, given the multi-speed and multi-demand reality on the ground. For this reason, more differentiation in bilateral relations would be needed. The deepest relations would materialise in political association and economic integration which is what Georgia and Moldova were going to achieve. In this regard, Mr WIEGAND underlined that the EU hoped and believed that Ukraine would continue to strive for that integration process too. While there is a slower process with regard to the relations with Azerbaijan, he pointed out that the EU regretted but at the same time respected the decision made by Armenia to take a different course and not to sign an Association Agreement. As a consequence, there is a need to reflect on what is possible in the spirit of the Eastern Partnership with a partner country which should soon be member of the Custom Union and of the future Eurasian Union. This would also be an important reference point as regards the future of the EU-Belarus relations. Moreover, despite the recognition of differences among partner countries, the EU should ensure that European values remain at the heart of each bilateral relationship.

The second lesson is the necessity of maintaining a high level of political engagement with every partner country. This engagement should not be the privilege of executive powers, but should have a legislative dimension. Following the entry into force of Association Agreements, Parliamentary Association Committees will be set up as part of new institutional architectures. MEPs should play a key role in assisting their colleagues involved in the process of implementing the EU acquis into national legislations.

The third lesson is that the Eastern Partnership should reach out to broader civil society. In particular, civil society actors directly affected by EU policies such as business communities should be further involved in their preparation and their implementation. The EU should also engage more with civil society in areas such as education, research, innovation and in terms of people-to-people contacts at various levels. Fourth, it is needed to improve the public impact of the Eastern Partnership. As the EU cannot do the campaigning alone, Mr WIEGAND called on Members of Parliaments to put more pressure on their national governments in order to increase efforts for this purpose. Fifth, the dialogue with the Russian Federation on the Eastern Partnership should be intensified. Mr WIEGAND reminded that during the EU- Russia Summit in January 2014, the Eastern Partnership was at the centre of the debate and he AP101.502v01-00 2/13 PV\1050578EN.doc EN also informed about upcoming formal consultations on the impact of Association Agreements including DCFTAs on Russian economy as agreed at that Summit. He added that the EU would make every effort to dispel misconceptions and to make sure people understand that there is no negative impact of DCFTAs on Russian economy but rather new opportunities for Russian business operators. However, he also pointed out that these talks should not be understood as renegotiations or trilateral consultations but as bilateral consultations about an existing agreement which the EU had negotiated with Ukraine. He concluded by stressing that the EU did not believe in zero-sum thinking on the European continent and that the EU foreign policy was geared towards the creation of new trade and investment opportunities. Sovereignty and freedom of choice must be guaranteed for every partner country and the EU rejects external pressures on any of its partners.

While thanking Mr WIEGAND for his presentation, Co-Chair Mr DOLIDZE stressed the commitment of the Members to fulfil their legislative role within the Eastern Partnership.

Co-Chair Mr HÖKMARK emphasised that the EU did not aim at imposing the future of any neighbouring countries and this conduct had also applied to the Euronest PA. He gave the example of the recent referendum on migration policy held in Switzerland independently of EU interference. This illustrated a significant and fundamental difference with what Russia had tried to do towards its neighbours, by exerting pressures. Moreover, Russian pressure gave a very awkward signal that democratic development in its neighbourhood was perceived as a negative factor by Russia. Besides, Co-Chair Mr HÖKMARK pointed out that it was not in the Russian interest to hinder such democratic development. He also asked whether trade sanctions taken by Russia were consistent with its membership in the World Trade Organisation and what the EU could do about this issue in the WTO framework.

Mr David DARCHIASHVILI (Georgia) interpreted Russian last political steps as a will to have some kind of say in the Eastern Partnership and somehow become part of the decision- making process. He wondered what could be the added value of bilateral consultations of the EU with Russia, if this perception corresponds to reality.

Mr WIEGAND pointed out that criticisms from Russia went out very late in the negotiating process of Association Agreements. The EU had never received Russian official papers raising objections or depicting a negative impact on partner countries, resulting from those Agreements. The EU remained ready to respond to any objections and wrong assumptions. Mr WIEGAND underlined that in reaction to the recently signed EU-Canada trade agreement which is far more-reaching than the NAFTA agreement between Canada, the US and Mexico, the US did not suddenly close their borders with Canada and did not ask the EU for urgent consultations. This new agreement was seen as an instrument bringing more opportunities for the Northern American and European markets. It could have only been negatively perceived when adopting a static view on economy. The purpose of future consultations with Russia should therefore consist of dispelling misperceptions.

Mr Asim MOLLAZADE (Azerbaijan) expressed fears of new threats and pressures emerging after the Olympic Games in Sochi. He illustrated current diverging views between the EU and Russia by drawing a comparison with different sports practised by two players. He reminded that for several years, Russia had threatened the independence of states coming from the former . He asked whether the EU was ready to more comprehensively help the partner countries which are about to sign Association Agreements, and to contribute to terminate the foreign occupation of Azerbaijani territories, in line with EU resolutions. He also asked about political, economic and security guarantees that those countries could expect PV\1050578EN.doc 3/13 AP101.502v01-00 EN the EU to offer.

Mr Artak ZAKARYAN (Armenia) thanked the EP Co-Chair for the constructive atmosphere of the meeting. He put forward that deepening relations with the EU remained a vector of the Armenian foreign policy. At the Summit in Vilnius, the EU and Armenia reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen their partnership in all areas of interest. Further development of their ties will be based on improvement of democratic institutions and judiciary, enhancement of human rights, rule of law and good governance. As regards the sovereign decision of Armenia to join the Custom Union, Mr ZAKARYAN pointed out that it was based on notions of vital national and state interest. Armenia will however remain committed to progress towards further economic integration under the Eastern Partnership. He also noted that the OSCE Minsk Group following the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process had no reference in its wording to occupied territories.

Mr Fuad MURADOV (Azerbaijan) commented about the role of various stakeholders in the settlement of conflicts within Eastern . Referring to a transcript of the alleged phone conversation between US Assistant Secretary of State Ms Nuland and the US Ambassador to Ukraine in February 2014, he asked whether the EU found difficult to shape its foreign policy towards its partners. Mr MURADOV's impression is that the EU had waited for the position of various players, in particular that of the US, before taking its own stance. He also asked about the possibility to involve Central Asian countries into discussions on post-Soviet space's issues, and made observations about a lack of presence of the EU in those countries.

Mr Hrant BAGRATYAN (Armenia) first noted that the transition to a market economy in the early nineties in Armenia was one of the most successful examples in the former Soviet Union. He explained that following Armenia's decision to join the Custom Union led by Russia, his first impression was not morally very good but, after reflections, it changed. He asked about the vision of the EU when starting negotiations with Armenia, which is a small landlocked country depending on external energy sources. He also wondered whether the EU would have been able to make steps in favour of the opening of borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh territories. Acknowledging a moral blame for Armenia, he asked about the faults made by the EU.

Mr WIEGAND reminded that the EU was based on rules and common values and that those rules applied to every EU MS and citizens irrespective of their wealth and history. The EU was therefore stronger when it externalised what it was strong in. There are many former empires among EU MS which do no longer want to act as empires. That is why, the EU acts with soft power in the long-term and on the basis of its rules and values, while others act with hard powers in the short-term. Mr WIEGAND illustrated this principle by pointing out that the EU did not order energy companies to set prices, as EU rules on private and market economy apply. The EU with its companies is the largest trade partner and investor of the Eastern European countries. It is also the first donor even if, admittedly, the financial commitment is not enough for the needs of economic development. In Central Asia, the EU has been present and could be more present if it withstands pressures. Within the energy field, significant progress was made in order to allow reverse flows of gas between the EU and Ukraine and to connect energy transmission networks between Romania and Moldova. The EU also lifted quotas for importing Moldovan wines, in response to the Russian embargo. It continues to assist the Georgian government with regards to "borderisation" issues, along the administrative lines with Abkhazia. On this last point, Mr WIEGAND pointed out that some forces used the conflict as an instrument by promising to re-unite Abkhazia and Georgia provided that the latter did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The EU is still AP101.502v01-00 4/13 PV\1050578EN.doc EN committed to reach settlements for all the conflicts of the Eastern European region. On the WTO point raised by Co-Chair Mr HÖKMARK, Mr WIEGAND commented that the was surprised at observing Russian breaches of WTO rules and launched the first cases regarding discriminatory recycling fees on car imports from the EU. In case of disproportionate trade sanctions damaging Eastern European countries' economy, partners have to lodge cases to WTO on their own, and if so, they would benefit from the EU support. In response to Mr MURADOV's remarks, Mr WIEGAND noted that the EU did not wait for the others but had a clear policy which responded to the aspirations of its partners. For three years, the EU had negotiated with Armenia, not to impose anything but to meet the wish of Armenia to diversify its international relations. The EU will respect Armenia's decision to join the Custom Union, is supportive to Armenia's diplomacy striving to open borders with its neighbours and stands ready to provide assistance for border infrastructures.

4. Exchange of views with Mr Michael KOEHLER, Director, European Commission, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - Directorate for Neighbourhood, on the EU financing of the Eastern Partnership, through the European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020

In introducting this item, Co-Chair Mr HÖKMARK informed that in December 2013, the European Parliament had endorsed the Commission's proposal on the European Neighbourhood Instrument under the EU Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020, with a total budget of 15.4 billion Euros.

Mr KOEHLER started his presentation by reminding that the strength of the Eastern Partnership had been built on three pillars: political relations and partnership, contractual arrangements and the practical side of economic and development cooperation. The implementation of the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument as the main source for financing the Eastern Partnership's policy came to end in 2013. In the period 2010-13, the EU mobilised 2.5 billion Euros for grants benefiting to Eastern European partners. EU programmes had a bilateral, bi-regional and multiregional geographical scope, sometimes involving countries of Central Asia, such as the INOGATE programme in the energy field. Justice and human rights followed by trade facilitation, job creation, agricultural development, border management were the sectors which benefited the most from the EU financial support. In the wording for the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the word 'Partnership' disappeared because of its use for depicting other bilateral relations, and thus to avoid confusions. As from March 2014, the new ENI should be running with an indicative budget of 15.4 billion Euros which is comparable to the previous allocation. This represents the most important international financial support that Eastern European partner countries can benefit from. Money will be spent through grants, with a lever to loans to be granted by international financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EU will continue to implement programmes under various frameworks, i.e. bilateral, regional, cross-border and pan-European frameworks. Main priorities consist of:

• promotion of human rights and rule of law, support of civil society, • sustainable and inclusive growth, economic, social and territorial development, including the promotion of integration of partners into the EU internal market, • mobility and people-to-people contacts, • regional integration and cross-border cooperation.

PV\1050578EN.doc 5/13 AP101.502v01-00 EN Mr KOEHLER stressed continuity but also changes in the way to implement the new ENI. First, there will be more differentiation depending on progress made by individual partners and their needs. The programming is more than ever incentive-based. Determining amounts of EU funding should be functional to the progress of commonly agreed reforms. Every country will receive a multiannual financial allocation which is expressed in a range of amounts within programming documents. A specific mechanism will be implemented whereby 10% of the overall available funding should be awarded to countries which make progress towards deep and sustainable democracy, including respect for human rights. Programmes have been elaborated on a four-year initial period. In this period, bilateral programmes will be focused on a set of three priorities agreed with every partner country. More than in the past, the ENI should be used to facilitate the participation of partners in EU internal programmes and instruments. EU-Russia cooperation will not be eligible to the ENI, but the EU will let Russia participate in regional activity under the ENI, if it is in the mutual interest of every partners. Through the strategic dialogue between the European Commission and the European Parliament, the latter has an increased role in the programming process, by providing views and recommendations. At this stage of discussion, the intention was to dedicate 75% of the total budget to bilateral programmes, 20% to multi-country programmes and 5% to cross- border cooperation.

Mr Hrant BAGRATYAN (Armenia) noted that monopolies hindered Armenian economy and Armenian entrepreneurs only represented 4% of the population. He asked whether the EU would address these issues in programming bilateral assistance and if the promotion of alternative sources of energy would be included.

Mr Jeyhun OSMANLI (Azerbaijan) expressed concerns about the general approach regarding European integration. Priorities of partner countries should not be proportionate to amounts of money that the EU is ready to grant. He asked the speaker about his feelings concerning Armenia which chose the opposite way than the path towards integration to the EU and also about his recommendations for Azerbaijan. Mr OSMANLI noted that at every Committee's meeting, Members had faced speculations on the issue of territorial integrity, what entailed a negative impact on the quality of discussions.

Mr Artak ZAKARYAN (Armenia) asked whether ENI funding could be spent for developing civil aviation in small countries.

Mr Asim MOLLAZADE (Azerbaijan) asked about EU prospects for supporting major transport infrastructures connecting the EU and its partners. He wondered how the EU measured the impact of its programmes, also mentioning that in the past, part of the EU financing went to Russia-led projects.

Answering questions, Mr KOEHLER explained that the ENI was meant to countries which would implement reform agendas. By monitoring the implementation of those agendas, the European Commission strives to make sure that EU funding goes to the right bodies for right purposes. As regards the situation of Armenia, the EU would not impose an anti-trust policy but would certainly be ready to support it if Armenia decided it. Mr KOEHLER pointed out that, in most partner countries, there were programmes to promote renewable energy, such as biogas and he underlined the high potential of the agricultural sector for developing new sources of energy. He added that investments for transport infrastructures could benefit from EBRD and EIB loans, with EU financial aid and that the area of civil aviation, for instance the modernisation of its operational and legal framework would fall in the scope of the ENI. As regards the issue of territorial integrity, he expressed his belief in the effectiveness of cross- AP101.502v01-00 6/13 PV\1050578EN.doc EN border programmes of common interest for building confidence in the long term. Mr KOEHLER concluded by observing that the Eastern Partnership was built on a win-win scenario which extended its positive effects over Russia and that the EU assistance helped partner economies to be more competitive and was not conditioned to the increase of EU exports towards the Eastern European region.

5. Exchange of views with Mr Jeff LOVITT, Co-Chair of the Steering Committee and Ms Leila ALIEVA, Working Group Coordinator, of the Civil Society Forum (CSF), on the CSF involvement in programmes and activity within the European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020

Mr Jeff LOVITT first briefly presented the structure of the Eastern Partnership CSF and its national platforms. He called on all the institutions of the Eastern Partnership to involve the CSF in their process of discussion and decisions in order to make its contribution the most constructive. The EU soft power can be more instrumental to democratic progress in partner countries. To deeply transform societies, there is a need for ownership of populations over democratic processes. For this reason, information to largest public and involvement of civil society are essential. Public information should focus on the concrete benefits citizens can draw from the European integration. The EU as a whole should make further progress in acting more consistently through its initiatives. Same treatment should apply to every partner country when there are breaches to values. The EU should address both internal and external threats within the EU and partner countries, by elaborating sustainable policies in important areas, like visa liberalisation. From the CSF's point of view, priority should be given to core freedoms, democratic elections, legal environment for NGOs, independence of judiciary and fight against corruption. The CSF would also like to see the EU exerting more pressure on the issue of political prisoners. It stands ready to further engage in the implementation of the ENI and expects to be involved in the evaluation of its output. The impact of stakeholder engagement should be measured through a dialogue with CSF experts and public consultations.

Ms Leila ALIEVA expressed her appreciation for the concept of the Eastern Partnership, giving a signal and acknowledgement to partner countries on their path towards reforms. She however noted a growing concern over the situation of human rights and democracy in partner countries. There should be a revision of the EU approach towards them. In particular, partner countries should know what they could reach at the end of their path and a perspective for EU membership would be a valuable offer. National ownership of the integration process should be seen both at the levels of the governmental elites and the civil society. The leverage of Russia in the region relies on the weakness of democratic institutions and legitimacy of leadership, which makes them vulnerable to manipulations. For this reason, the EU has an important role in building institutions and should find new incentives to help to transform societies. Civil societies should be more involved and associated in agenda setting, shaping and monitoring of the actions benefiting from EU budget support.

Mr David DARCHIASHVILI (Georgia) wondered how much civil society organisations were rooted in genuine democracy and asked about how to measure the impact of their activity and to help them to be more effective.

Mr Fuad MURADOV (Azerbaijan) reminded that, in his country, there were more than one million refugees and IDPs. He referred to the Kojhaly massacre, qualifying it as genocide and urged civil society organisations to keep memory of this, in order to prevent new generations PV\1050578EN.doc 7/13 AP101.502v01-00 EN from again facing such events.

Mr Aertsvik MINASYAN (Armenia) first pointed out that civil society was well developed in Armenia and raised the problem of its response to the Safarov case. He also deplored that, when studying history, Azerbaijani new generations were taught to hate Armenia and its religion.

Mr Jeyhun OSMANLI (Azerbaijan) asked about precise information on Azerbaijani history books to which the previous speaker referred.

Ms ALIEVA and Mr LOVITT answered by underlining that any institutions and organisations, including the ones of civil society, own power and influence over democracy, while remaining dependent on their environment. As a network, the CSF has been an effective instrument in bringing the voice of national organisations out of their borders. Within the CSF, human rights and democracy are issues which unite all the six partner countries. This positive example could be spread to various layers of the society.

Co-Chair Mr DOLIDZE (Georgia) concluded by saying that the legacy of the soviet space left several tough zones of conflict and that civil society organisations had an important role to play to mitigate tensions.

6. Presentation by Co-Rapporteurs Mr Victor DOLIDZE, Member of the Parliament of Georgia and Mr Jacek PROTASIEWICZ, MEP, and discussion of the draft Report on "Engaging in a stronger partnership between the EU and Eastern European partner countries through the European Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020".

Co-Chair Mr HÖKMARK informed that the Committee draft report would be discussed for the first time at the meeting and there was yet no deadline set for submitting amendments, since this would have to wait for the re-constitution of the European Parliament’s component of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, following the European elections on 22-25 May 2014. There should be at least, then, some eight months for submitting amendments to the report.

In his presentation, Co-Chair Mr DOLIDZE highlighted the structure of the draft report divided in two parts. In the first part, lessons are drawn from the outcome of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. They reflect the principles guiding the Eastern Partnership. As regards relations to Russia, Co-Rapporteurs call on the Russian Federation to refrain from expanding its political influence via economic pressures and to allow its neighbours to freely choose their political and economic destiny. In Co-Chair Mr DOLIDZE's view, there was no ground for Russia to threaten its neighbours. In its second part, the report includes recommendations for the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern European partners until the Summit in 2015, in Riga.

Co-Rapporteur Mr Jacek PROTASIEWICZ (EP) first welcomed the adoption of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for the period of 2014-2020. He also welcomed the incentive-based and tailor-made approach foreseen for the ENI implementation. He underlined the call to the EU for establishing visa free-regimes for short-term travel, with the partner countries which have engaged in and completed visa liberalisation actions plans.

AP101.502v01-00 8/13 PV\1050578EN.doc EN Mr David DARCHIASHVILI (Georgia) welcomed the general messages of the report, noting that the EU should appreciate the desires of partner countries, in particular those which could apply for EU membership following Article 49 of the Treaty on the EU. Besides, the EU should continue strengthening democratisation processes and the rule of law. Another positive aspect is the clear message that the report vehicles to Russia. As regards democratisation in partner countries, Mr DARCHIASHVILI suggested to introduce a general recommendation for governments to obey resolutions of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe and to shift the report, by finding a new balance between the text addressing general principles and a new additional text to be focused on concrete realities.

Mr Asim MOLLAZADE (Azerbaijan) voiced great concerns over the situation in Ukraine, fearing that this new theatre of conflict would have to be added to the list of other regional conflicts, like that of Nagorno-Karabakh. He proposed that the topics of violence and territorial integrity in Ukraine be addressed within the report.

Mr Artak ZAKARYAN (Armenia) proposed to leave out the second part of recital C. of the report: [the Eastern Partnership Summit] "was also tarnished by decisions of some partner countries to renounce deepening relations with the EU". In the prospect of the next Summit, this sentence could be misunderstood. He suggested to replace the wording "dependent" by "interconnected" within the recital F and proposed a new formulation for the recital A.

Referring to the long timeline for adopting the report, Mr Marian LUPU (Moldova) explained that in the forthcoming year, the EU Council and the European Parliament might adopt new strategic approaches for the Eastern Partnership, which Co-Rapporteurs would have to take into consideration. In the frame of the Eastern Partnership, the situation is expected to rapidly evolve. For instance, amongst partner countries, Moldova was working hard to sign and ratify the Association Agreement with the EU, before next parliamentary elections. The content of the report will be certainly updated, in the light of future developments in the region and the positions of geopolitical players.

Mr Aertsvik MINASYAN (Armenia) saw no relation between the situations of Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh. In his view, the latter was ruled as a genuine democracy.

Co-Chair Mr HÖKMARK stressed the importance of EU effort and decisions to be made in the forthcoming six months and the current feeling of uncertainty about where partner countries would be heading to. He reminded Members of the clearly defined common interest that the EU and partner countries share over peace, stability and economic development. Further emphasis should be given to this common interest, within the report. A negative alternative would be an extremely fragmented structure, very little cooperation across borders and much fewer trade opportunities. The Eurasian Union based on a Custom Union is driven by a closing-in rather than an opening-up principle regarding economic development. In this context, the EU and partner countries face great challenges, and thus, have to make crucial decisions shaping their long-term development.

7. Planning and preparation of the Committee's activity for 2014-15

Co-Chair Mr DOLIDZE reminded that at the last meeting, on 27 May 2013, the Committee selected the following topic as a priority for its next report: “Common positions and concerns of the EU Member States and Eastern European partner countries over foreign policy and external threats to their security”. He also informed that scheduling the next meeting of the PV\1050578EN.doc 9/13 AP101.502v01-00 EN Committee depended on the timing of the next plenary session of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly. This was foreseen to take place in the last quarter of 2014. As 2014 is an electoral year for the European Parliament, the final dates should be made only after the May European elections.

8. Any other business

None.

The meeting closed at 12.24.

AP101.502v01-00 10/13 PV\1050578EN.doc EN ПРИСЪСТВЕН ЛИСТ/LISTA DE ASISTENCIA/PREZENČNÍ LISTINA/DELTAGERLISTE/ ANWESENHEITSLISTE/KOHALOLIJATE NIMEKIRI/ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΩΝ/RECORD OF ATTENDANCE/ LISTE DE PRÉSENCE/POPIS NAZOČNIH/ELENCO DI PRESENZA/APMEKLĒJUMU REĢISTRS/DALYVIŲ SĄRAŠAS/ JELENLÉTI ÍV/REĠISTRU TA' ATTENDENZA/PRESENTIELIJST/LISTA OBECNOŚCI/LISTA DE PRESENÇAS/ LISTĂ DE PREZENŢĂ/PREZENČNÁ LISTINA/SEZNAM NAVZOČIH/LÄSNÄOLOLISTA/DELTAGARLISTA/ СПИСОК ПРИСУТСТВУЮЩИХ

Бюро/Mesa/Předsednictvo/Formandskabet/Vorstand/Juhatus/Προεδρείο/Bureau/Predsjedništvo/Ufficio di presidenza/Prezidijs/ Biuras/Elnökség/ Prezydium/Birou/Predsedníctvo/Predsedstvo/Puheenjohtajisto/Presidiet/Бюро (*)

EP/PE Mr Victor DOLIDZE (Georgia) - Co-Chairman Mr Gunnar HÖKMARK, EPP (Sweden) - Co-Chairman

Членове/Diputados/Poslanci/Medlemmer/Mitglieder/Parlamendiliikmed/Μέλη/Members/Zastupnici/Députés/Deputati/Deputāti/Nariai/ Képviselõk/ Membri/Leden/Posłowie/Deputados/Deputaţi/Jäsenet/Ledamöter/Депутаты ARMENIA EP/PE Mr Aertsvik MINASYAN Mr Ryszard CZARNECKI, ECR (Poland) Mr Hovhannes SAHAKYAN Mr Hrant BAGRATYAN - substitute Mr Leonidas DONSKIS, ALDE () Mr Artak ZAKARYAN - substitute

Mr Vytautas LANDSBERGIS, EPP (Lithuania) AZERBAIJAN Mr Justas PALECKIS, S&D (Lithuania) Mr Asim MOLLAZADE Mr Fuad MURADOV- substitute Mr Jacek PROTASIEWICZ, EPP (Poland) Mr Jeyhun OSMANLI - substitute

Mr Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI, EPP (Poland) GEORGIA Ms Eka BESALIA Mr David DARCHIASHVILI

MOLDOVA Mr Marian LUPU

Заместници/Suplentes/Náhradníci/Stedfortrædere/Stellvertreter/Asendusliikmed/Αναπληρωτές/Substitutes/Zamjenici/Suppléants/ Supplenti/Aizstājēji/Pavaduojantysnariai/Póttagok/Sostituti/Plaatsvervangers/Zastępcy/Membros suplentes/Supleanţi/Náhradníci/ Namestniki/Varajäsenet/Suppleanter/Заместители

EP/PE

Наблюдатели/Observadores/Pozorovatelé/Observatører/Beobachter/Vaatlejad/Παρατηρητές/Observers/Observateurs/Promatrači/ Osservatori/Novērotāji/Stebėtojai/Megfigyelők/Osservaturi/Waarnemers/Obserwatorzy/Observadores/Observatori/Pozorovatelia/ Opazovalci/Tarkkailijat/Observatörer/Наблюдатели

По покана на председателя/Por invitación del presidente/Na pozvání předsedy/Efter indbydelse fra formanden/Auf Einladung des Vorsitzenden/Esimehe kutsel/Με πρόσκληση του Προέδρου/At the invitation of the Chair(wo)man/Sur l'invitation du président/ Na poziv predsjednika/Su invito del presidente/Pēc priekšsēdētāja uzaicinājuma/Pirmininkui pakvietus/Az elnök meghívására/ Fuq stedina taċ-'Chairman'/Op uitnodiging van de voorzitter/Na zaproszenie Przewodniczącego/A convite do Presidente/La invitaţia preşedintelui/Na pozvanie predsedu/Na povabilo predsednika/Puheenjohtajan kutsusta/På ordförandens inbjudan/По приглашению председателя

PV\1050578EN.doc 11/13 AP101.502v01-00 EN Съвет/Consejo/Rada/Rådet/Rat/Nõukogu/Συμβούλιο/Council/Conseil/Vijeće/Consiglio/Padome/Taryba/Tanács/Kunsill/Raad/ Conselho/Consiliu/Svet/Neuvosto/Rådet/Совет (*)

Комисия/Comisión/Komise/Kommissionen/Kommission/Euroopa Komisjon/Επιτροπή/Commission/Komisija/Commissione/Bizottság/ Kummissjoni/Commissie/Komisja/Comissão/Comisie/Komisia/Komissio/Kommissionen/Комиссия (*)

Европейска служба за външна дейност/Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior/Evropská služba pro vnější činnost/ EU-Udenrigstjenesten/Europäischer Auswärtiger Dienst/Euroopa välisteenistus/Ευρωπαϊκή Υπηρεσία Εξωτερικής Δράσης/European External Action service/Service européen pour l'action extérieure/Europska služba za vanjsko djelovanje/Servizio europeo per l’azione esterna/Eiropas Ārējās darbības dienests/Europos išorės veiksmų tarnyba/Európai Külügyi Szolgálat/Servizz Ewropew għall-Azzjoni Esterna/Europese dienst voor extern optreden/Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych/Serviço Europeu para a Acção Externa/ Serviciul european pentru acţiune externă/Európska služba pre vonkajšiu činnosť/Evropska služba za zunanje delovanje/Euroopan ulkosuhdehallinto/Europeiska avdelningen för yttre åtgärd/Европейская служба внешнеполитической деятельности (*)

Други участници/Otros participantes/Ostatní účastníci/Endvidere deltog/Andere Teilnehmer/Muud osalejad/Επίσης Παρόντες/ Other participants/Autres participants/Drugi sudionici/Altri partecipanti/Citi klātesošie/Kiti dalyviai/Más résztvevők/Parteċipanti ohra/Andere aanwezigen/Inni uczestnicy/Outros participantes/Alţi participanţi/Iní účastníci/Drugi udeleženci/Muut osallistujat/ Övriga deltagare/Другие участники

Секретариат на политическите групи/Secretaría de los Grupos políticos/Sekretariát politických skupin/Gruppernes sekretariat/ Sekretariat der Fraktionen/Fraktsioonide sekretariaat/Γραμματεία των Πολιτικών Ομάδων/Secretariats of political groups/Secrétariat des groupes politiques/Tajništva klubova zastupnika/Segreteria gruppi politici/Politisko grupu sekretariāts/Frakcijų sekretoriai/ Képviselőcsoportok titkársága/Segretarjat gruppi politiċi/Fractiesecretariaten/Sekretariat Grup Politycznych/Secr. dos grupos políticos/Secretariate grupuri politice/Sekretariát politických skupín/Sekretariat političnih skupin/Poliittisten ryhmien sihteeristöt/ Gruppernas sekretariat/Секретариаты фракций

PPE S&D ALDE ECR Verts/ALE GUE/NGL EFDD NI

AP101.502v01-00 12/13 PV\1050578EN.doc EN Кабинет на председателя/Gabinete del Presidente/Kancelář předsedy/Formandens Kabinet/Kabinett des Präsidenten/Presidendi kantselei/Γραφείο Προέδρου/President's Office/Cabinet du Président/Ured predsjednika/Gabinetto del Presidente/Priekšsēdētāja kabinets/Pirmininko kabinetas/Elnöki hivatal/Kabinett tal-President/Kabinet van de Voorzitter/Gabinet Przewodniczącego/Gabinete do Presidente/Cabinet Preşedinte/Kancelária predsedu/Urad predsednika/Puhemiehen kabinetti/Talmannens kansli/Кабинет председателя

Кабинет на генералния секретар/Gabinete del Secretario General/Kancelář generálního tajemníka/Generalsekretærens Kabinet/ Kabinett des Generalsekretärs/Peasekretäri büroo/Γραφείο Γενικού Γραμματέα/Secretary-General's Office/Cabinet du Secrétaire général/Ured glavnog tajnika/Gabinetto del Segretario generale/Ģenerālsekretāra kabinets/Generalinio sekretoriaus kabinetas/ Főtitkári hivatal/Kabinett tas-Segretarju Ġenerali/Kabinet van de secretaris-generaal/Gabinet Sekretarza Generalnego/Gabinete do Secretário-Geral/Cabinet Secretar General/Kancelária generálneho tajomníka/Urad generalnega sekretarja/Pääsihteerin kabinetti/ Generalsekreterarens kansli/Кабинет генерального секретаря

Секретариат на Асамблеята/Secretaría de la Asamblea/Sekretariát shromáždění/Forsamlingens sekretariat/Sekretariat der Versammlung/Assamblee sekretariaat/Γραμματεία της Συνέλευσης/Assembly secretariat/Secrétariat de l'assemblée/Tajništvo skupštine/Segretariato dell'Assemblea/Asamblejas sekretariāts/Asamblėjos sekretoriatas/A Közgyűlés titkársága/Segretarjat tal- Assemblea/Secretariaat van de Vergadering/Sekretariat Zgromadzenia/Secretariado da assembleia/Secretariatul adunării/Sekretariát zhromaždenia/Sekretariat skupščine/Edustajakokouksen sihteeristö/Församlingens sekretariat/Секретариат Ассамблеи

EP/PE

Сътрудник/Asistente/Asistent/Assistent/Assistenz/Βοηθός/Assistant/Assistente/Palīgs/Padėjėjas/Asszisztens/Asystent/Pomočnik/ Avustaja/Assistenter/Ассистент

* (P) = Председател/Presidente/Předseda/Formand/Vorsitzender/Esimees/Πρόεδρος/Chair(wo)man/Président/Predsjednik/ Priekšsēdētājs/Pirmininkas/Elnök/'Chairman'/Voorzitter/Przewodniczący/Preşedinte/Predseda/Predsednik/Puheenjohtaja/ Ordförande/Председатель (VP) = Заместник-председател/Vicepresidente/Místopředseda/Næstformand/Stellvertretender Vorsitzender/Aseesimees/Αντιπρόεδρος/ Vice-Chair(wo)man/Potpredsjednik/Vice-Président/Potpredsjednik/Priekšsēdētāja vietnieks/Pirmininko pavaduotojas/Alelnök/ Viċi 'Chairman'/Ondervoorzitter/Wiceprzewodniczący/Vice-Presidente/Vicepreşedinte/Podpredseda/Podpredsednik/ Varapuheenjohtaja/Vice ordförande/Заместитель председателя (M) = Член/Miembro/Člen/Medlem./Mitglied/Parlamendiliige/Μέλος/Member/Membre/Član/Membro/Deputāts/Narys/Képviselő/ Membru/Lid/Członek/Membro/Membru/Člen/Poslanec/Jäsen/Ledamot/Депутат (F) = Длъжностно лице/Funcionario/Úředník/Tjenestemand/Beamter/Ametnik/Υπάλληλος/Official/Fonctionnaire/Dužnosnik/ Funzionario/Ierēdnis/Pareigūnas/Tisztviselő/Uffiċjal/Ambtenaar/Urzędnik/Funcionário/Funcţionar/Úradník/Uradnik/Virkamies/ Tjänsteman/Должностное лицо

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