Task Force 2010
Succeeding Failure A Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening Fragile States
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies University of Washington
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The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies University of Washington
Task Force 2010
Succeeding Failure: A Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening Fragile States
Task Force Advisor: Professor Scott Radnitz
Task Force Evaluator: Ambassador Ryan Crocker
Task Force Coordinator: Amanda Piro
Task Force Editors: Devon Cook Clarke Reid
Task Force Members: Taryn Elledge Rachelle French Shannon O’Neill-Creighton Rachel Proefke Angelissa Savino Laurel Severt Christopher Sherman Amanda Shockley Brian Steyer Jessica Tarabay Eric Thesen Ryan Torpie Aisling Underwood
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Succeeding Failure by Devon Cook An Introduction to Fragile and Failed States …………….……………….………..…..pg 6
Between Rhetoric and Action by Christopher Sherman Discerning the US Government‟s Real Interests in Failed States……………..…………pg 17
Engaging with Conflict in Fragile States by Shannon O‘Neill-Creighton The Importance and Significance of a Non-Violent Approach………………….……….pg 47
Advancing Growth by Taryn Elledge Where US Intervention Policy Coincides with Development………………………..…..pg 76
The Regional Dynamics Imperative by Rachel Proefke Addressing the Exogenous Aspects of State Failure………………………………….....pg 101
Looking Forward by Amanda Shockley Grasping Opportunity in the Event of a Failed North Korean State……………..….…..pg 125
Burma by Brian Steyer A Case Study on Prevention………………………………………………………….…..pg 153
Haiti by Laurel Severt Opportunity in Disaster? …………………………………………………………….…..pg 165
Somalia by Angelissa Savino A Failed State with a Glimpse of Hope………………………………………...…….…..pg 190
Democratic Republic of Congo by Rachelle French Ongoing Violence Calls for a New Approach………………………………………..…..pg 206
Afghanistan by Jessica Tarabay Addressing Ethnic Divisions and Regional Dynamics Along the Road to Recovery…….pg 234
Sectarian Conflict in Iraq by Aisling Underwood A Case Study………………………………………………………………………....…..pg 256
Bosnia by Eric Thesen The Crisis in the Balkans…………………………………………..………….………....pg 276
Lebanon by Ryan Torpie An Analysis of Post-Conflict State Reconstruction Strategies and Implementations…...pg 299
Intervention in Failed States by Clarke Reid Policy Recommendations to the US and Concluding Remarks……………...………....pg 326
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Succeeding Failure An Introduction to Fragile and Failed States
Devon Cook
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What is it to succeed failure? What Somalia affords a haven to pirates as they does it mean for a state to fail? Can the US attack shipping lanes, disrupting the flow of ever provide a comprehensive strategy for international commerce and trade. The failing dealing with the structural inadequacies that Yemeni government is relatively powerless to cause state failure and the humanitarian stop Al Qaeda from setting up training disasters that so often result? In this report we facilities for future terrorist attacks. seek to do just that. By analyzing multiple Terrorists from Yemen, pirates from cases of state failure and expanding on Somalia, even drugs from Afghanistan and theoretical aspects of the issue, we hope to Colombia – all of these are threats to national provide the United States government with a security. One must only look to the strategy to guide future endeavors in conflagration in Central Asia, centered in strengthening fragile states. Afghanistan and Pakistan, to understand the
Fragile states, wherever they fall along implications that state failure have for the the spectrum of failure, present a serious United States. Even seemingly strong states, challenge to US foreign policy. The attacks of such as North Korea, were they ever to fail,
September 11, 2001 drew attention to the have major implications for the US, both in a security implications of state collapse. As security capacity and because of the potential states fail, they become sources of terrorism, humanitarian disaster. Not only would the weapons proliferation, organized crime, collapse of such states result in the exposure infectious disease, environmental degradation, of huge weapons caches, as was seen after the and regional instability.1 Examples of the USSR collapsed in 1991, but the already internationalization of state failure abound. suffering populations would be without
1 Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick, ―Index of State support. State failure perpetuates Weakness in the Developing World.‖ (Washington, DC: 2008) 3. Page | 7
humanitarian disasters, as seen in Rwanda, the 20th century has seen an unprecedented
Bosnia, and the Democratic Republic of the amount of change in the concept of state
Congo. The US has the capacity to provide failure, as countries have disappeared, been aid to prevent such catastrophes. The recent renamed, subsumed, and their borders earthquake in Haiti illustrates the need for redrawn, ignored, and renegotiated. A rapid each state to develop the capacity to protect succession of state failures in the latter decade and provide for its population, and failed or of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, failing states cannot deliver. If the US can from Nigeria to the USSR to Zimbabwe,3 and develop a comprehensive strategy to address the devastating consequences stemming from such situations would address many of our them, have raised questions about the security concerns and improve international international community‘s approach to failed opinion regarding the United States in the states. Indeed, the human toll of such process. collapses raises serious issues regarding the
In 1918, Max Weber stated that ―a need for a new approach to humanitarian state is a human community that successfully intervention, aid, and development. claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of In order to address the issue of failed physical force within a given territory.‖2 This or failing states, it is first necessary to develop definition encapsulates the conventional working definitions. Most current literature,
Western concept of a state. Indeed, state including the Brookings Institute‘s Index of sovereignty has been enshrined in Western State Weakness in the Developing World and law since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Foreign Policy‘s Failed States Index, focuses
And reciprocally, states have failed on definitions of state failure without throughout history. However, the latter half of 3 United States. US Agency for International Development. Fragile States Strategy. Washington, DC 2 Max Weber ―Politics as Vocation.‖ (Munich: 1918). (USAID, 2005). Page | 8
providing much in the way of guidance for core functions of the state, but also are understanding the process of state failure or responsive to the needs and desires of the recovery. Perhaps most pivotal in defining a populace and legitimate in the eyes of their failed state is first to determine what is a citizens.6 Weak states are characterized as successful state. The United Kingdom‘s those that have lapses in critical functions
Department for International Development related to security, provision of basic services,
(DFID) defines a successful state as one and protection of essential freedoms,7 or as which is able to exercise authority over its states unable or unwilling to work towards sovereign territory and has adequate poverty reduction.8 Failed states, according to administrative capacity to be effective.4 USAID‘s Fragile State Strategy, have
Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, experts on unstable, ineffective, or illegitimate the subject of state failure, define state governments.9 The Brookings Institute effectiveness by the ability of a state to defines failed states as: exercise ten critical functions, including …countries that lack the essential capacity and or will to fulfill four sets upholding the rule of law, control of a of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to monopoly on the means of violence, and an sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining ability to oversee international relations.5 The legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; Brookings Institute also defines strong states securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their as those that are capable of administering the territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population.10
4 Magui Torres and Michael Anderson. United Kingdom. UK Department for International Development. Poverty Reduction in Difficult 6 Rice and Patrick, 10. Environments Team Policy Division. Fragile States: 7 Stuart E. Eizenstat, John E. Porter, and Jeremy M. Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." Foreign Affairs (London: PRDE, 2004) 7 84.1 (2004). (University of Washington. Web. 20 Jan. 5 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart. "The Ten 2010) 136. Functions of the State." Institute for State 8 Torres and Anderson, 3 Effectiveness. (Web. 15 Feb. 2010) 9 USAID, 3
Figure 1 Parabolic Continuum of State Failure
We accept this definition, which is broadly and numbers of refugees, we emphasize the
consistent with commonsense notions of state importance of the direction in which a state is
failure. However, this report goes beyond moving. In an index such as those developed
definitions and proposes a dynamic approach by the Brookings Institute and Foreign Policy,
to understanding the trajectories of state states that are recovering are placed with
failure and recovery. states that are failing, and one cannot
Instead of looking at state failure as a differentiate between the two categories. This
static concept, in which states are assigned is important because the appropriate policy
numerical values based on their scores on toward states in different sections of the
indicators such as GDP, repressive capacity, parabola may differ. In a failing state,
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preventive measures may be necessary to Burma and North Korea, which have strong preclude its descent to failed status. In a authoritarian governments, are placed as recovering state, however, measures should ―failing‖ because their governments maintain be taken to support further improvements in power through force and provide limited governance. Keeping this continuum in mind, goods to their citizens. The Democratic these are how we will conceptualize the areas Republic of the Congo and Somalia are failed on the parabola, shown above in Figure 1: states in that they have lost control over all
Strong state. A state that enjoys aspects of governance. We argue that Haiti
legitimate control over its territory and occupies the failed portion of the continuum,
provides sufficient public goods to its due to the inability of the Haitian government
citizenry. to address the needs of its people following
Failing state. A state which is partly the February 2010 earthquake. Afghanistan
unable to maintain security and and Iraq are recovering states because,
provides limited public goods. although the state apparatus lost control over
Failed state. A state which has lost the means of violence, they have begun to
control over security and does not recover it. Further up the continuum are
provide public goods. Bosnia and Lebanon, because although both
Recovering state. A state which has have legitimate control over security and are
failed, but has begun to recover capable of delivering services, they have yet
control over security and is able to to fully recover as a result of facing
provide public goods. paramilitary threats to their authority.
Examples contained in this report are placed In addition to this new way of along the parabola according to their status. conceptualizing state failure, we are
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proposing a new set of guiding principles for Though the short-term humanitarian addressing state failure. Keeping in mind the or security costs may be high, we can strategic and humanitarian motivations behind avoid making situations worse by
US interest in failed states, these principles leaving them mid-process without the are meant to advise future US actions in such aid and resources necessary to emerge situations. Each principle is summarized and from collapse. In the long term we followed by an explanation. will avoid perpetuating an impetuous
Carry out all interventions in a and destructive image of the US, and
sustainable manner by committing reduce anti-American sentiment by
the necessary resources and avoiding situations where we appear
planning extensively before taking to involve ourselves purposelessly.
action. By conducting a We must make sure to plan adequately
comprehensive review of the for the future of each endeavor.
resources and time necessary to Be sensitive to the causes and
address each situation, the US can contexts of state failure by
avoid problems of overextension and incorporating local actors in an
inadequate resource commitments. We effort to address both the origins
may conduct such an analysis and find and symptoms of state failure. In
the costs of action too much to bear. In order to fully address the needs of
such an instance, instead of states, the US must work in concert
committing to an intervention doomed with actors on the ground. If we can
to failure, we should consider other, better understand the internal causes
less invasive, less costly measures. of state failure, and implement plans
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which incorporate those most directly organizations, and others who have involved in such situations, we will be exacerbated the situation. Not better equipped to deal with the understanding the history and interests uniqueness of each case. If we do not behind state failure dooms us to repeat exert every effort to understand the the mistakes of the past. causes and context of each failure then Realize the need for security in all we run the risk of missing crucial endeavors, recognizing that military knowledge that may inform the intervention is only of several tools, outcome of our involvement in while differentiating between active particular cases. and passive action. Though recent
Work in concert with other states, US military interventions have been of particularly neighboring states and limited or little success, the need for former colonial powers, non-state security should not be underestimated. actors, and regional and Aid cannot be distributed without first international organizations. Often ensuring the security of both the state failure is a result of externalities personnel on the ground and the beyond the control of a country‘s resources they provide. There are government or citizens. In order to situations where military intervention tailor resources to fit each situation, is necessary, particularly in instances we must understand these external of armed conflict or where violence factors which have caused failure. has become a barrier to development
This may include regional actors, in any form. When such an instance neighboring states, international calls for military forcecare must be
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taken to ensure such action is specific situation, so as to ensure future to the situation—notexcessiveand not solvency and stability. too feeble. Military intervention All of these principles should be taken should be undertaken into concert with into account, both individually and all other principles to ensure that it holistically, in any effort regarding fragile does not make a bad situation worse. states. They ensure that all aspects of state
Promote economic sustainability failure are accounted for and adequately and legal means for development by addressed. Without a careful consideration of incentivizing stability. For economic the complexity of each situation, we run the growth, a country must first have a risk of repeating mistakes made in the past. stable economy. This means the This report will cover these principles creation of institutions thatmake in more depth. Along with case studies that commerce possible, as well as the examine individual states, we also provide a integration of the domestic economy theoretical overview that examines failed into the international market. While states and elaborates our strategy in greater every effort can be made to give a depth. This section will cover the regional country the resources to raise it from aspects of state failure, bottom-up approaches failure, until a country can support to development, and humanitarian and itself it will never be a functioning military conflict resolution. We will detail a state. Every effort should be made to comprehensive strategy that reinvents the US promote sustainability and regional approach to failed states, and in the process, trade in line with an assessment of the benefits US and international security, and
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advances the well-being of people living in fragile states.
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Works Cited
Eizenstat, Stuart E., John E. Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." Foreign Affairs 84.1 (2004) 134-146. University of Washington. Web. 20 Jan. 2010.
Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. "The Ten Functions of the State." Institute for State Effectiveness. Web. 15 Feb. 2010.
Rice, Susan E., and Stewart Patrick. Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. Rep. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2008.
United Kingdom. UK Department for International Development. Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team Policy Division. Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction. By Magüi M. Magüi and Michael Anderson. London: PRDE, 2004.
United States. US Agency for International Development. Fragile States Strategy. Washington, DC: USAID, 2005.
Weber, Max. "Politics as Vocation." Lecture. Munich University, Munich. 1918. Southeastern Louisiana University. Web. 25 Feb. 2010.
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Between Rhetoric and Action Discerning the US Government’s Real Interests in Failed States
Christopher Sherman
Introduction for dealing with failed states. The format of
The purpose of this chapter is to these case studies allows for a comparison answer the question: Why does the US between what the US government said its government care about failed states? interests were in each case and what was
Answering this question is crucial for making actually done. Individually, these cases were recommendations on US policy toward failed chosen because they represent different types of US intervention. Greece was states. In order to say what ●●● Why does the US the US government should chosen because it is an example government care do in failed states with about failed states? of when the stated US interests ●●● any sense of authority, it in intervention mostly matched is important to know what it has done in the demonstrated interests, derived by failed states. To illustrate the US involvement analyzing how US aid was implemented. with failed states this paper will analyze three Simply put, Greece is a perfect example of the examples: Greece in 1947, Rwanda in 1994, US doing what it said it would. Rwanda, on and Yemen in the present. Evaluating past the other hand, was chosen because it cases of US interventions in failed states represents just the opposite of the Greek provides the opportunity to examine the case—policy and promises did not reconcile. different approaches the US government has Yemen was chosen because it represents a taken in intervening in failed states, and what contemporary case of state failure and the consequences of those approaches were. because the US government has yet to
For policy makers, determining which develop a substantive plan on how engage intervention strategies have been successful Yemen. The idea is to determine whether will work toward an improved methodology Yemen is perceived as either a security threat
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or a humanitarian mission, and thereby define lack of action of the US‘s part until after the
US goals in the country. Along with the majority of the killings had been carried out. individual merits of each case, these cases Ultimately, the goal is to compare the case of were chosen to demonstrate the spectrum of Greece, an example of stated interests past US actions in failed states and to connecting to demonstrated interests, with introduce a three regions that is not covered in Rwanda, a case where stated interests and the remainder of the report. The methodology demonstrated interests experienced a of each case study is quite simple. The goal is disconnect, and try to answer the question: to answer two questions: Why did the US say Why does the US intervene in some states and it needed to intervene? And how did the US not in others? The logic behind such an actually intervene? A brief background of approach is that if an answer to this question each case is provided to help explain US can be reached, then an answer to the original motivations for intervening. Based on an question of this chapter as to why the United examination of how the US actually States cares about failed states, is not far intervened in each case, this chapter will behind. analyze the implications for why the US Case Studies actually cares about failed states. This chapter As stated in the introduction, the will also discuss the differences between the purpose of conducting case studies is to
US intervention in Greece and the US‘s non- analyze what the US government has done in intervention in Rwanda during the massive failed states in the past, and what those genocide in 1994. This chapter will discuss actions imply about US interests. These case the apparent disconnect between stated studies will show that there are two aspects to interests in intervening in Rwanda and the the US‘s method of dealing with failed states.
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One aspect is based on rhetoric--speeches and security interests, humanitarian interests, testimonies regarding failed states and what development interests, ideological interests, the US government says it wants to do. The and political interests. For example, political other aspect is based on action-- how the US interests in the case of Rwanda refer to the government implements its various and often domestic issues President Clinton faced limited resources in failed states. As the following the events in Somalia in October following case studies will show, there are 1993, and the consequences of those events instances when the US government has (i.e. decreased public support for followed through on its stated interests in humanitarian missions) that forced Clinton to failed states—instances when the rhetorical consider the political risks of a second crisis and action aspects were correlated—as well in Rwanda. as an instance when the relationship between Of all the classifications, ideological the rhetorical and action aspects experienced interests are the most difficult to define. Much a disconnect. The reasons for this disconnect of the rhetoric discussed in the case studies is will be discussed, but the purpose of of ideological interest, often in the form of discussing it is to highlight the importance of claiming to support democracy in a failed follow-through in stated interests, and to state or working to uphold democracy. highlight the apparent priority given to However those claims, at least in the cases of different states. Greece and Yemen, are more about security
Defining the US‘s interests in a failed interests than a true interest in advancing state is not an exact science. For clarification American values for the benefit of others. In purposes, interests are separated into the case of Rwanda, the US government classifications. They are differentiated as claimed to support democratization, and one
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could argue that the US government‘s efforts In reality, the only true way to identify to broker a peace deal between the Hutu what the real US interests are, is to analyze
Rwandan government and the primarily Tutsi how the US implements aid. Usually, it is
Rwandan Patriotic Front are evidence of the clear what the US interests are in a failed
US‘s ideological interest in Rwanda. After all, state. When half of US aid goes toward a
Rwanda as a failed state did not pose much of state‘s military to help it defend against a a security threat to the US, thus it is threat like communism or Al-Qaeda, it is unrealistic to think ideology was more about clear that security was the biggest priority in security in Rwanda. However, as the case that case. Occasionally, as illustrated above, studies will show, the US‘s stated reasons for identifying the real US interests in a failed trying to broker a peace deal were its state is difficult and relies more on concerns over the violence between the two interpretation than fact. Nevertheless, in order sides and the increased risk to the Rwandan to answer the question ―Why does the US people. Thus, one could argue that the US‘s care about failed states?‖ historical methods ideological interest in Rwanda was based of intervention and implementations of aid are more on a humanitarian concern than helping the best places to find an answer.
Rwanda democratize. Ultimately, this chapter Case Study #1: Greece would like to recognize that, despite what Though the concept of a ―failed‖ state these case studies indicate about whether did not exist in the early years of the Cold ideological interests are real or not, examples War, the US government recognized the need of true ideological interests may exist; these to assist states that had been ravaged by case studies simply do not exhibit such an World War II. One example of a state that occurrence. was considered weak or failed following
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World War II is Greece.1 In a speech before hindering Greece‘s recovery.4 In order to
Congress in March of 1947, President Truman begin reconstruction, Truman explained, the asked the US government to begin sending Greek government needed financial and aid to the Greek government for two reasons. economic assistance to resume purchases of
The first reason was for the reconstruction of food, clothing, fuel and seeds, all of which the roads, railways, port facilities, were necessary for the subsistence of the communication devices, merchant marine, Greek people and the restoration of the and villages that had been destroyed by the internal order and security that was so
Germans in World War II.2 According to necessary for Greece‘s political and economic
Truman, when liberation forces entered recovery.5 Essentially, Truman‘s first reason
Greece, in addition to finding most of the for asking the US to send support to the Greek basic infrastructure destroyed, they also found government was to help alleviate the suffering that 85 percent of the children were tubercular of the Greek people and aid in the recovery and that majority of Greece‘s livestock had and reconstruction process. Thus, Truman disappeared.3 Truman elaborated that in these was stating a humanitarian and developmental conditions, a small, militant minority had interest in Greece. been exploiting the human misery and Truman‘s second reason for suffering and created political chaos that was requesting US aid to Greece was to support to
the Greek government in its civil war against
the militant arm of Communist Party of
1 For an account of the conditions within Greece 6 following WWII, see: ―Backgound Memo on Greece, Greece (KKE). President Truman‘s concern March 3, 1947.‖ Truman Library. Web. 18 February 2010.
with Greece falling to the KKE was based on statement suggests that Truman considered
both ideological opposition to communism the KKE the type of aggressive movement he
and security concerns with a communist was referring to. Therefore, if the KKE sought
Greece. The first indication of Truman‘s to impose a totalitarian regime upon the
ideological opposition to the KKE was in Greek people, a goal that ran counter to US
terming the Greek foreign policy objectives, then the Greek ●●● “totalitarian regimes government communists were opposed to US foreign imposed on free peoples, by direct or ―democratic‖ and policy objectives, and as such, were indirect aggression, undermine the the communists ideologically opposed to the US government. foundations of ―terrorist‖.7 The Thus, by requesting support for the international peace and hence the second indication ―democratic‖ Greek government against the security of the United States” was his point, in a ―terrorist‖ KKE Truman was exhibiting his ●●● speech requesting ideological opposition to the Greek
US aid to the Greek government, that US communist party.
foreign policy, which sought to create Along with an ideological opposition
conditions in which all nations could work out to a communist Greece, Truman also had
a way of life free from coercion, would not be security concerns with a communist Greece.
met unless the US government was ―willing According to Truman, The fact that Truman
to help free peoples to maintain their free considered the KKE an aggressive movement
institutions and national integrity against aimed at imposing a totalitarian regime on the
aggressive movements that seek to impose Greek people has already been shown.
upon them totalitarian regimes.‖8 This Therefore, if Truman thought the Greek
communists wanted to impose a totalitarian 7 Truman address on Greece and Turkey, p. 2 8 Truman address on Greece and Turkey, p. 3 Page | 23
regime upon the Greek people, while 22, 1947, Congress approved Truman‘s believing that totalitarian regimes represented request and granted him the aid to use at his a security threat to the US, then Truman saw discretion.10 The period of US assistance to the KKE as a security threat to the United Greece lasted until the end of June 1948, and
States. Truman‘s equation of a communist in a report issued on June 15, 1948, a
Greece to a national security threat summary was given of how the aid was spent. established a precedent for the remainder of According to the report, the US spent a total the Cold War. From then until the end of the of $338 million in Greece. $300 million of
Cold War, communism was represented as the this aid came from the Greek Aid Program, biggest threat to United States national and $38 million came from the Foreign Relief security. Truman‘s opposition to the Greek Program. 51 percent of the funds went to communists was ideological and security- military aid, 24 percent to food aid, eight based. Thus, along with a humanitarian and percent to agricultural rehabilitation, seven development interest in Greece, Truman was percent to reconstruction, and the remaining stating a security and an ideological interest in 10 percent on materials, equipment, and
Greece. miscellaneous materials.11
At the end of his speech, President
Truman asked that congress approve $400 March 12, 1947.‖ Truman Library. Web. 18 February million in assistance to Greece and Turkey, as 2010.
The distribution of US aid to Greece went to agricultural rehabilitation and provides great insight into what its real reconstruction. interests were in Greece. First, in establishing The only stated interest that was not that half of the aid was spent on training and necessarily demonstrated was ideological. equipping the Greek military, the security of While the US government sent civilian and the democratic Greek government, and its military personnel to supervise Greece‘s ability to defend itself must have been our reconstruction, the fact that the majority of most pressing priority. Truman‘s statement aid was implemented to equip and train the that totalitarian regimes imposed on free military to fight communist forces suggests people represented a security threat to the US, that the American presence was less about coupled with the massive amounts of aid sharing American ideals, and more about spent on protecting the Greek democratic making sure the security interests were government from communism, indicates that fulfilled. Truman was careful to point out that
Truman‘s stated security interest in Greece the US government had not always condoned was real. The fact that one-fourth of the aid the Greek government‘s past actions, and that went to food indicates that the subsistence implementing a democratic system there needs of the Greek people were also a major would help to correct these problems.12 This priority for the US government. Thus, the suggests a true ideological interest in Greece. humanitarian interest Truman expressed in his However, the US government continued to speech was a demonstrated interest. The provide large amounts of aid to the Greek stated interest in reconstructing Greece was government, most of which went to supported by the fifteen percent of aid that strengthen the Greek military, which is
interesting considering that in most cases of
12 Truman, p. 3 Page | 25
human rights violations, the military is ideological interest that Truman expressed in usually the perpetrator. All of this aid also his speech, and the mission of keeping Greece came before any possible reforms could have democratic, was mostly focused on security been made by the Greek government to for the US rather than other interests.. reduce the number of apparent human rights Given the complex nature of US violations,13 which suggests that while interest in Greece, one could argue that the
Truman stated a true ideological interest in US government stated and demonstrated a
Greece, the security interest was clearly more humanitarian, developmental, security, and important. This is logical, given the Cold War ideological interest in Greece. However, context in which the US intervened in Greece. because the ideological interest was so closely
This was a time when promoting democratic tied to security in this case, and the promotion ideology was less about spreading democracy, of democracy was more about combating and more about containing the threat of threats than spreading values, this case study communism. The promotion of democracy for shows that the ideological interest as defined the sake of benefiting other states was more a previously was not demonstrated. Thus, in characteristic of the post-Cold War era, and the case of Greece the US demonstrated real even then promoting democracy was still humanitarian, developmental, and security security matter of security.14 Thus, the interests, while the ideological interest was
more rhetoric. An additional point worth
13 Truman does not actually say what actions the Greek noting is the apparent priority of each interest government has carried out that the US government does not condone. Thus, it can be assumed that Truman was referring to human rights violations, but it is hard as demonstrated by how aid was distributed. to be certain. 14 See: Lake, Anthony. ―From Containment to Judging by the distribution of aid, security Enlargement.‖ Federation of American Scientists. Web. 21 February 2010. ―The addition of new democracies makes us more secure because was the highest priority, followed by democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism.‖ Page | 26
humanitarian and development assistance Affairs Committee in March of 1993, Herman respectively. J. Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for African
Case Study #2: Rwanda15 Affairs, explained that the US wanted to
In a testimony given before the resolve Africa‘s many conflicts because it
Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign was a necessary step toward stability, economic reform, democratization, and better
15 Logan, Justin and Christopher Preble. governance in Africa.16 According to Cohen, ―Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case Against a Standing Nation Building Office,‖ the human suffering caused by these conflicts Cato Institute, (2006): In 2000, the CIA produced a report to recognize occurrences of was more than a hindrance to development in state failure from 1955-1998.15 As Justin Logan and Christopher Preble explain, in the Africa, it was ―an imperative for intervention first attempt at producing such a report the CIA‘s definition of state failure was when and massive international humanitarian ―central state authority collapses for several years‖.15 According to this definition, the CIA relief…‖17 Cohen stated that the Clinton only found 20 cases of state failure in the specified time period.15 Logan and Preble administration had been ―conducting a full- explain that in an effort to produce more significant results, the CIA expanded their scale review of conflict resolution criteria to include the ―lesser events‖ of revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse requirements and resources worldwide,‖ and regime changes, and genocides and politicides.15 Within these criteria, the CIA it had ―devoted a great deal of thought to found 114 cases of ―state failure‖ in the specified time period.15 The CIA‘s report these problems in Africa…‖18 Elaborating included Rwanda in the ―NTF‖ column for 1994, citing ethnic wars, adverse regime further, Cohen cited participation in changes, and genocide as its indications of state failure. The fact that Rwanda appears in mediation efforts in places such as Rwanda as the ―NTF‖ category, which Logan and Preble claim suggests Rwanda‘s inclusion in the one of the four ways the US practiced conflict CIA‘s original 20 cases of state failure, indicates that Rwanda, even by the most basic definition of state failure, qualified as a failed state in 1994. Thus, this section will examine 16 Cohen, Herman J. "Peace-keeping and conflict the case of Rwanda, which history shows to resolution in Africa." US Department of State Dispatch 4.16 (1993): 270. Military & Government Collection. have been a case of non-intervention on the EBSCO. Web. 18 Feb. 2010. US‘s part, using the framework outlined in 17 Cohen the introduction. 18 Cohen Page | 27
resolution.19 Cohen expressed recognition of democratization, and development in Africa. the benefit of working with other states in In Cohen‘s speech there was never a direct conflict resolution, but then stated, ―…our suggestion that Africa‘s regional conflicts role as the world's remaining superpower threatened US interests or security. Cohen often makes the US imprimatur an essential also claimed that Africa‘s conflicts caused contribution to a lasting settlement.‖20 human suffering and necessitated intervention
Cohen‘s remarks established several and humanitarian relief. Without any real significant points, especially important connection between US security interests, and considering the US‘s conduct in Rwanda just evidence that the stated ideological interest one year after this speech. was based more on humanitarian concerns
According to Cohen, the US was than a desire to promote democratic ideals, interested in helping Africa resolve its many Rwanda can be classified as of strictly conflicts because such conflicts were a humanitarian interest to the US government. hindrance to African stability, Additionally, Cohen‘s remarks recognized the democratization and development. By US‘s significance in helping Rwanda reach a specifically citing Rwanda as one of the peaceful settlement of its conflict. places where the US was working to resolve In the year that followed this speech, such a conflict, Cohen was stating a security, the US government‘s actions in Rwanda ideological, and developmental interest in appeared to correspond to the interests Cohen
Rwanda. The important thing to note in the stated. The US government continued its case of Rwanda, however, is that, unlike the efforts to broker a deal between the Rwandan case of Greece, the interests were for security, government and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front, and on August 4, 1993, the two sides 19 Cohen 20 Cohen Page | 28
signed the Arusha Accord.21 The United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) was established22 to help realize the Arusha Accord‘s mandates. They included agreements to end the war and implement a power-sharing agreement between the
Rwandan government and the Patriotic
Front23.
Initially, the US did not lend its support to UNAMIR.24 As William
Ferroggiaro explains, this was because the US
―saw two potential outcomes: the Source: “Rwanda Genocide Poster” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/ authorization of a new UN force and a new events/b/ww/17867.htm mandate without the means to implement the US having to bail out a failed UN either; and worse, the very real possibility of mission.‖25 It was at this point that US actions
regarding Rwanda began to diverge from
21 GOUVERNEMENT DU RWANDA / what Cohen stated in his speech. While the GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA. Peace agreement between the government of the republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese patriotic front. 2009. US did not support UNAMIR, according to 22 United Nations. ―United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.‖ Assistant Secretary Cohen, it did plan to
issued by the OAU in May of 2000, the US‘s sharing deal.28 The meaning of Bushnell‘s role was criticized as ―brief, powerful and visit was demonstrated by the nature of her inglorious‖.27 Thus, despite the stated interest discussion with President Habyarimana. She in and need for massive humanitarian aid and expressed the US‘s concern with the lack of intervention, the US withheld support from action on the part of the Rwandan government
UNAMIR, and provided very little support to in implementing the agreed transitional the OAU. This reality illustrates a disconnect government, and justified the need for action between the US government‘s stated versus if Rwanda was to continue receiving aid from demonstrated interests in Rwanda. the U.N.29 Bushnell also explained that every
Though it did not support any of the delay was costing the Rwandan people peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, the US significant amounts of aid, and that the government did continue working with the increasing violence in Rwanda was costing leaders of the Rwandan Government and the the Rwandan government significant amounts
Patriotic Front to reach a power-sharing of support.30 Overall, Bushnell conveyed the agreement. These efforts, however, were US government‘s concern with the increasing obstructed by seven months of delays. In violence between Habyarimana‘s supporters
March of 1994, Prudence Bushnell, the and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and that the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for distribution of arms and arms caches within
African Affairs, visited both Juvenal Rwanda that threatened the security of the
Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwandan people.31
Rwanda, and leaders of the Patriotic Front to encourage the two sides to reach a power-
28 Reporting Cable on Rwanda, p. 1 27 "OAU Report Regarding Rwandan Genocide." 29 Reporting Cable on Rwanda, p. 2 American Journal of International Law. 94. 4 (2000), p. 30 Reporting Cable on Rwanda, pp. 2, 4 693. 31 Reporting Cable on Rwanda: p. 4 Page | 30
While the lack of support for the peace the US recognized its role in helping the keeping operations made it seem as though Rwandan civil war come to a peaceful end. the US was not living up to its stated When juxtaposed with the lack of humanitarian interest in Rwanda, the fact that support for peace-keeping missions, the US
Bushnell was sent to encourage the opposing government‘s support for the Arusha Accord
Rwandan parties to work together in and the power-sharing agreement makes implementing a power sharing agreement discerning the US interests in Rwanda would indicate that the US was living up to its difficult. Any ambiguity regarding the level of stated ideological interest. However, the commitment to Rwanda was eliminated on
Bushnell‘s argument regarding aid suggests April 21, 1994, approximately two weeks that her visit was less about getting the after the genocide started. The US, along with
Rwandan government and the Rwandese other members of the U.N. Security Council,
Patriotic Front to implement democratic voted to have the number of U.N. troops in ideals in their power sharing agreement and Rwanda reduced from 2,548 to 270.32 The US more about urging them to work together. government followed up by issuing
Ultimately, her advice was not about how to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 on make Rwanda democratic; it was about May 3, which outlined reform measures on reducing the physical risk to Rwandan US foreign policy toward multilateral citizens. Bushnell‘s visit indicates that the peacekeeping operations.33 PDD 25 explicitly ideological interest was based on stated ―It is not US policy to seek to expand humanitarian concerns, and therefore, that the 32 United Nations. ―United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.‖ US did have a humanitarian interest in
either the number of UN peace operations or interest in Rwanda. The continued
US involvement in such operations. Instead, encouragement by the US government for the this policy… aims to ensure that our use of Rwandan government and the Patriotic Front peacekeeping is selective and more to come to a deal supports Cohen‘s point effective.‖34 Two weeks later, however, the about the US‘s recognition of its crucial role
US voted in favor of U.N.S.C. resolution 918, in brokering a peace deal in Rwanda. which approved increasing the number of However, the US‘s vote to remove troops on
U.N. troops in Rwanda to 5,500.35 Even with April 17, 1994, and its issuance of PDD 25, the passage of Resolution 918, the damage actions that effectively minimized US had been done, and the US‘s response was too responsibility in Rwanda, shows that the US late. had bigger concerns than resolving the
The lack of US support for Rwandan civil war. Ultimately, contradictory peacekeeping operations in Rwanda directly statements and actions by the US reveal a contradicts what Assistant Secretary Cohen disconnect between the US‘s stated and stated in his speech regarding US interests in demonstrated interests in Rwanda.
Rwanda. The US government did act on its Why the disconnect? humanitarian interests, but only briefly and, The paradoxical nature of US actions realistically, only on a diplomatic level before in the Rwandan genocide has prompted many and during the genocide. It was only after the to ask, ―What happened?‖. One of the most genocide had started to wind down that the oft-cited reasons for the US‘s reluctance to US really demonstrated its humanitarian intervene in Rwanda is the deaths of 18
34 Ibid American servicemen in Somalia just six 35 "UN Security Council adopts Resolution 918 on Rwanda." US Department of State Dispatch 5.22 (1994): 352. Military & Government Collection. EBSCO. Web. 21 Feb. 2010. Page | 32
months prior to the Rwandan genocide.36 of the places the US had been working on
Evidence of this fact is found in comparing regional conflicts.37 Christopher made the the rhetoric of Herman Cohen, the former point that ―Some [regional conflicts] touch
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, in his our national interests or will if they are not testimony delivered to the House Foreign checked, but other conflicts, other regional
Affairs Committee in March of 1993, with a conflicts may not.‖38 This clear change of testimony given by former Secretary of State tone between Assistant Secretary Cohen‘s
Warren Christopher to the Senate Foreign speech in March and Secretary of State
Relations Committee in November of 1993. Christopher‘s speech in November was
As exhibited earlier, Assistant Secretary certainly, influenced by what happened in
Cohen‘s testimony stated the US Somalia. government‘s interest in helping Africa solve The political implications of US its many conflicts. There was no delineation soldiers dying on peacekeeping missions were of which conflicts the US government wanted the main force behind this change in foreign to resolve; Cohen‘s statement seemed to policy rhetoric toward regional conflicts. For suggest that the US government was the Clinton Administration, 18 American interested in solving all of them. Secretary deaths in Somalia on October 3, 1993 sparked
Christopher‘s testimony gives an alternative a ―political firestorm‖ and a massive public view, however, by discussing the , US interest outcry to withdraw troops.39 By October 7, an in regional conflicts and citing Africa as one agreement was made between Clinton and
36 "OAU Report Regarding Rwandan Genocide,‖ p. 693; Ferroggiaro; Metzl, Jamie Frederic. "Rwandan 37 Christopher, p. 12 genocide and the international law of radio jamming." 38 Christopher, p. 5 American Journal of International Law 91.4 (1997): 39 United States. Cong. Senate. Committe on Foreign 628. Academic Search Complete. EBSCO. Web. 21 Relations.Foreign Policy Update. 103 Cong., 1 sess. S. Feb. 2010, p. 629. Doc. 103-326. United States Government, 1993. Print. Page | 33
members of Congress to withdraw troops The key factor that led to the US‘s from Somalia by the end of March 1994.40 withdrawal from Somalia was the realization
While public opposition was certainly that humanitarian missions work very little a major factor in the US‘s decision to for further US strategic interests. In the withdraw from Somalia, as Eric Larson and conclusion of their book, Larson and Savych
Bogdan Savych point out in their book outline the factors that influence public
American Public Support for US Military opinion on military operations. According to
Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad, the the authors, the importance of the stakes, majority of Americans opposed the US prospects for success, and expected and actual presence in Somalia before October 3.41 casualties are the three main beliefs linked to
Citing an ABC News poll, Larson and Savych support for or opposition to military highlight that public support for pulling intervention.43 Larson and Savych elaborate troops out of Somalia increased from 58 on the meaning of ―stakes‖ by defining them , percent to 64 percent after October 3.42 This ―in terms of vital national interests, security finding suggests that, though it did increase interests, or moral or humanitarian following October 3, public opposition in interests‖.44 As Larson and Savych point out, itself was not a significant enough factor to the US explicitly stated a humanitarian influence the Clinton Administration‘s policy interest in Somalia, and there was widespread on Somalia. Therefore there must have been a belief that it would succeed in its mission of different, more powerful factor that led to the establishing a secure environment for
US‘s withdrawal from Somalia. humanitarian relief operations with few or no
40 lbid 41 Larson and Savych, p. 34 43 Larson and Savych, p. 213 42 Larson and Savych, p. 33 44 Larson and Savych, p. 213 Page | 34
casualties.45 After October 3, though, these for weighing US humanitarian interest in a beliefs changed. state against the potential causalities.
On a realistic level, US prospects for Conscious of the prospect of casualties success were still present. If desired, the US on peacekeeping missions, the fact that the government could have committed 30,000 public did not view humanitarian missions troops to Somalia and completely eliminated worthy of American lives and the reality that any opposition to its efforts to restore order humanitarian missions did not serve the US‘s and peace. Additionally, though 18 men may strategic interests, the Clinton have been more than the expected level of administration‘s decision to not intervene in casualties in Somalia, 18 casualties is still Rwanda makes sense. However, this is not to miniscule compared to many other military say that the lack of action in Rwanda was in operations in the US history. Thus, if the any way justified. This chapter is simply prospects for success were still alive, and the pointing out that similar to Somalia, events in expected level of casualties was still relatively Rwanda did not necessarily affect US national low, it must have been the importance of the interests, at least on a strategic level. Thus, stakes that changed for the US government to the political consequences for the Clinton withdraw troops. The realization that Administration were sure to be great if humanitarian missions, although popular in American soldiers were killed Rwanda. The theory and good for reputation, were not disconnect between stated and demonstrated valuable enough to the American public, or to interests in Rwanda was an effect of political
US interests, to sacrifice American lives was interests, specifically public opinion, and the ultimate influence in pulling troops out of security overriding humanitarian interests.
Somalia. Ultimately, Somalia set a precedent
45 Larson and Savych, pp. 29-31 Page | 35
Case Study #3: Yemen within the country, according to Feltman, is
According to the Fund for Peace, the Al-Qaeda related extremists operating
Yemen has been a failed state since at least within its borders. In recognition of this
2005.46 It was not until Christmas of 2009, growing threat from Yemen, Assistant however, after the failed terrorist attack on Secretary Feltman outlined the US‘s ―two-
NWA Flight #253 that Yemen‘s ―threat was pronged‖ strategy for dealing with it. The first brought home to the American public.‖47 prong focuses on strengthening Yemen‘s
Quoting President Obama, Jeffery Feltman, government to promote security and minimize the Assistant Secretary of State for Near the threat from extremists within its borders.
Eastern Affairs, in a testimony given before The second prong focuses on mitigating the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Yemen‘s economic crisis and deficiencies in
January 20, 2010, explains that the would-be government capacity, provision of basic 48 perpetrator of this attack had joined an Al- services, and transparency.
Qaeda affiliate in Yemen, where he was Elaborating on the basis of this equipped with the explosives and given strategy, Feltman recounted the several issues instructions to attack flight #253 headed for the Yemeni government faces within its own
America. Not surprisingly, the primary threat borders, including the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives who have carried out attacks on
46 For a report on Yemen‘s Failed States Index ratings, Americans and citizens of other states, a see
Houthi.49 Clearly, Al-Qaeda is a threat to US As of yet, there have been very few security, and the presence of Al-Qaeda in US actions toward Yemen. There are, to date,
Yemen makes Yemen a security interest for no US troops in Yemen, nor are there the US government. The humanitarian expected to be any troops stationed there in concerns Feltman discusses that result from the near future. US aid to Yemen has the conflicts in the north and south of Yemen, significantly increased. In his testimony, such as the thousands killed and the 20,000 Feltman stated that development and security displaced persons who are sometimes forced assistance to Yemen increased from $17.2 to live in ―appalling conditions‖, also million in 2008 to $40.3 million in 2009.52 He establishes Yemen as a humanitarian interest states that this number could go up to as much for the US 50 In addition to the security and as $63 million in 2010.53 Feltman also said humanitarian interests, Feltman also states that these numbers do not include the that the US supports a unified, stable, ―approximately $67 million in [counter democratic and prosperous Yemen.51 His terrorism] funds for 2009…‖54 The increases inclusion of ―democratic‖ in this list is a in aid, and the type of aid, that he mentioned stated ideological interest in Yemen. Thus, suggests that the US government‘s stated
Assistant Secretary Feltman‘s testimony security interest in Yemen is a very real ultimately states a security, ideological and interest. The fact that counter terrorism humanitarian interest in Yemen. funding is projected to be higher than the
security and development assistance is yet
another indicator that the US places high
49 For more information on the Houthi rebels and the priority on its security interests. conflict between them and the Yemeni government, which is Sunni-led, see: ―Profile: Yemen‘s Houthi Fighters.‖ Al-Jazeera. Web. 22 February 2010. 52 Feltman, p. 4 50 Feltman, p. 3 53 Feltman, p. 4 51 Feltman, p. 1 54 Feltman, p. 4 Page | 37
Along with the funding for extremist and anti-American sentiment development, security and counter-terrorism, wanes.‖56 The existence of these exchange
Feltman also cites the $7.5 million in food aid programs indicates that the stated ideological given by USAID, and the $3 million given by interest in Yemen is real. The fact that these the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance for programs are explained as tools to minimize relief efforts as actions carried out in Yemen anti-American sentiment also indicates that on behalf of the US government.55 These the ideological interest in Yemen is related to actions indicate that the US‘s stated US security. Thus, though the stated humanitarian interest in Yemen is a real ideological interest appeared to be for the interest. When compared with the amount of sake of the Yemeni people—given that a money spent on the security interests, these ―democratic‖ Yemen was mentioned with funds, though not insignificant, also indicate unified, stable and prosperous (i.e. terms that that humanitarian interests are less of a imply benefits for the Yemeni people)—in priority for the US government than security reality, the demonstrated ideological interest interests in Yemen. is more about security for the US.
In regards to ideological interest in The ideological interest, while
Yemen, Feltman also discusses the forwarding US security interests in the region, educational and cultural exchange programs could also be a tool to alleviate criticism for the US has with Yemen. The purpose of these providing massive amounts of funding to a programs is to help allay suspicion and government that has a history of human rights misunderstandings because, Feltman explains, violations.57 By claiming to support unity and
―[a]s public understanding of US policy and democracy in Yemen, the US government
American values increases in Yemen, 56 Feltman, p. 4 57 See: ―World Report Chapter: Yemen‖ Human 55 Feltman, p. 3 Rights Watch. Web. 22 February 2010. Page | 38
could pass off aid as a method of helping the of Yemen indicates that the real US interests
Yemeni government to build better in failed states include security and governance structures and practices. humanitarian interests, and that security is a
Admittedly, some of the aid did go toward higher priority than humanitarian interests. development, which is necessary for such Particularly congruent to Greece, the case of change. However, the majority of the aid went Yemen indicates that stated ideological toward security and counter-terrorism, which interests are closely related to security is likely being used by the Yemeni interests and less concerned with promoting government in its conflicts with Al-Qaeda as democratic ideals. well as the Houthi rebels in the north and the What do the Case Studies Imply About US Interests in Failed States? secessionist movement in the south. These are Individually, the case of Greece the very conflicts in which the Yemeni indicates that real US interests in intervening government is accused of violating human in failed states are security, humanitarian rights. Thus, though the US government concerns, and developmental issues. For claimed to have an ideological interest in Greece, ideological interests were closely Yemen, the manner in which aid has been related to US security and less concerned with implemented suggests that the ideological advancing American values for the sake of interest is more about security, and possibly others. For this reason, ideological interests, improving international opinion of the US. as defined in this chapter, were not a real Overall, the US government has, thus interest in Greece. The case of Rwanda also far, demonstrated that its stated security and indicates that the US government‘s real humanitarian interests in Yemen are real. interests in intervention are security and Similar to both Greece and Rwanda, the case humanitarian concerns, but also introduces
Page | 39
political interests as a consideration in Collectively, these case studies intervention. As previously explained, indicate that the real US interests in failed ideological interests in Rwanda were more states include: concerned with protecting Rwandan citizens Security: The majority of the funding and less concerned with advising the in Greece and Yemen went toward Rwandan government and the Rwandese combating the threats of communism Patriotic Front on how to come to a power- and Al-Qaeda, two of the most sharing agreement. Thus, the ideological recognized threats to US security interest in Rwanda was based more on throughout history. In Rwanda, the humanitarian concerns than implementing realization that US soldiers could be democratic ideals in the Rwandan killed on peacekeeping missions was government. The case of Yemen further enough of a potential security threat to illustrates that the US government‘s real keep the US government from getting interests in failed states are security and involved. Overall, the previous case humanitarian issues. The stated ideological studies indicate that any time there is a interest in Yemen is actually more of a perceived security threat to the US, security interest because, similar to Greece, either territorially or to US citizens, the US is more concerned with reducing anti- the government will go to great American sentiment than with reforming a measures to address that threat and government that has a history of human rights eliminate or avoid it. abuses. Humanitarian Issues: All of the
previous case studies indicate that
humanitarian issues, whether the result
Page | 40
of conflict or poor governance, are of political issues take precedence over concern to the US government. humanitarian issues.
Considering the large disparities Ideological Interests: By the between aid for security purposes and definition of ideological interests in aid for humanitarian issues, the case this chapter, and the evidence that studies indicate that humanitarian stated ideological interests in Greece, concerns are less of a priority than Rwanda and Yemen were either more security issues. concerned with security or
Political Issues: The case of Rwanda humanitarian issues than promoting or illustrates how political issues can be upholding American ideals, it is not an interest in deciding whether or not clear that true ideological interests to intervene in a failed state. The were present in any of the case reality that the Clinton Administration studies. This does not mean, however, was reluctant to intervene in Rwanda that true ideological interests are not because of the potential political present in instances of intervention in consequences if US soldiers died on a failed states.58 Considering the amount peacekeeping mission shows how of rhetoric concerning ideological important political issues can be in interests in failed states, it is very regards to intervention in a failed possible that there are many examples state. The fact that the political issues of true ideological interests that have regarding intervention in Rwanda motivated past interventions and that were enough to keep the US out of the these three case studies represent a country also indicates that, at times, 58 See: Collier, Paul. Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security. Rep. Oxford University, 2009. Print. Page | 41
sample void of true ideological intervention based on other pretexts (i.e.
interests. It is also possible, and more security or humanitarian concerns). Deciding
likely, that this chapter‘s conception whether ideological interests are true or
of ideological interests is inaccurate simply pretexts, however, is a highly
and in need of revision. Nevertheless, subjective endeavor.
this chapter included ideological The case studies of Greece and Yemen
interests as part of the US interests in provided strong evidence that ideological
failed states because it is possible and interest of promoting democracy was more
probable that they do exist. closely related to US security than any other
motivation. Ideological interests in the case of Conclusion Rwanda are less clear. The US government The purpose of this chapter was to did try to work with the Rwandan government answer the question: Why does the US and the Rwandese Patriotic Front to help the government care about failed states? This two sides reach a power sharing deal. chapter analyzed how the US government Initially, these efforts may have been implemented aid in each of the case studies motivated by a true interest in helping and determined security, humanitarian issues, Rwanda establish a democracy in which both and political issues as the main US interests in Tutsis and Hutus were represented in the failed states. Though these case studies did government. As Prudence Bushnell‘s visit in not exhibit true ideological interests, March of 1993 indicates, however, the US ideological interests were included as a real government‘s efforts to broker a peaceful interest because of the amount of rhetoric settlement to the civil war between the claiming ideological interests. Of course, this Rwandan government and the RPF became rhetoric may just be a tool to justify
Page | 42
less about helping the two sides install a approach to intervention in failed states is not democratic system, and more about reaching a necessarily what it should be, one need only deal for the security of the Rwandan people. look at the current conditions in Iraq and
Thus, the ideological interest in Rwanda Afghanistan. The US government intervened ultimately became more of a humanitarian in Afghanistan in 2001, albeit militarily, and concern as time went on. in 2009 Afghanistan was ranked #7 on the
While the findings of this chapter Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy‘s Failed indicate what the demonstrated US interests States Index.60 Similarly, the US intervened in are (i.e. why the US has cared, and what it Iraq in 2003, militarily, and in 2009 Iraq was has done), this chapter was not meant to ranked #6 on the Failed States Index. While suggest why the US government should care military intervention is not the only method about failed states. That is the purpose of the available for the US government in failed remainder of this report. To understand that states, it has been the most popular method in why the US has cared is not necessarily why recent years. That reality is not surprising, it should care, one need only look at the however, given the US government‘s concern consequences of the US approach to failed with security following September 11, 2001. states thus far. In Rwanda, the US The following case studies will serve government‘s interests, or lack thereof, are at as further illustration of what the US least partially responsible for the deaths of government‘s real interests in failed states
500,000-1,000,000 Rwandans.59 Granted, have been and what they currently are. It is
Rwanda was nearly sixteen years ago. For likely that most of the following case studies more recent proof that the US government‘s will mirror the findings of this chapter. It is
59 Harsch, Ernerst. ―OAU Sets Inquiry into Rwanda also possible that some findings will differ Genocide.‖ Africa Recovery, Vol.12 #1 (August 1998), page 4. Web. 23 February 2010. 60 See
from this chapter. Ultimately, the goal of this chapter and the following case studies was not to be in complete agreement. The goal of this chapter and the following case studies is to figure out what the US government has been doing in failed states, and then to figure out how to improve the US response. As Stephen
Krasner and Carlos Pascual state, ―There is an unprecedented acknowledgement throughout the world of the need to work together to prevent or manage state failure…‖.61 This chapter and this report concur that there is a need to address state failure. The goal of this report is to ensure that the US government has the knowledge and the tools to address it appropriately.
61 Krasner, Stephen D. and Carlos Pascual, ―Addressing State Failure,‖ Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (July–August 2005), p. 159 Page | 44
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A Factual Summary Concerning the American Mission for Aid to Greece. 1948. Truman Library. Web. 18 Feb. 2010.
Harsch, Ernest. "OAU sets inquiry into Rwanda genocide: A determination to search for Africa's own truth." Africa Renewal Aug. 1998: 4-4. United Nations. Web. 25 Feb. 2010.
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Engaging with Conflict in Fragile States The Importance and Significance of a Non- Violent Approach
Shannon O’Neill-Creighton
Page | 47
Introduction: Background and US Military intervention is not only Interests ineffective; it is costly. A recent report Humanitarian intervention in failed estimates that the US spends a quarter of a states has consistently employed military trillion dollars every year to maintain its force as a primary means to resolve conflicts. international military presence.1 Military As a result, the US and international intervention, although necessary in some community‘s multiple attempts to situations for security purposes, has successfully shift violence and conflict drastically overextended itself by additionally towards peace and resolution in these states seeking to solve deeply rooted historical, have continually failed. ―Conflict resolution‖ societal, economic, and political issues in is an ambiguous term. Most definitions allude failed states. At the core of violent conflict, to a process of resolving dispute or which appears endemic in many failed states, disagreement. The implementation of this are complex histories, tensions, and rivalries vague definition is subjective and the West that are exacerbated by extreme poverty and, has often exploited this ambiguity to often, natural resource deficiencies. The US legitimize military intervention in failed needs to re-conceptualize methods for states, usually tagging on the word managing and mitigating conflict and building ―humanitarian.‖ ―Humanitarian intervention‖ lasting peace in failed states. and ―conflict resolution‖ have in many cases Dynamic conflict resolution, when come to indicate military intervention. There broadened beyond military intervention and have been a number of attempts to restore tailored to culturally specific contexts, stability and secure peace in failed states, usually with a heavy reliance on military 1 Feffer, John. "How Much Does the US Empire Cost?" The Huffington Post 14 July 2009. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. intervention, and the track record is mediocre.
incorporates local customs and traditions as a military intervention in a number of cases. foundation for developing strategies and With these more ambitious goals covered by tools. As this chapter will demonstrate, when other groups and approaches, the military communities feel they have agency (in the could focus on what it does best - security and form of an organization, network, skills etc.) stability. If the US plans to continue to resolve their own conflict, civil society – commiting time, money, energy, and lives to the space between families and the state – is the resolution of conflict in failing states, it is strengthened or cultivated. When civil society in our interest to find effective approaches that is strong, social capital – the norms and work with, not against, local populations. values that emerge in cohesive societies – is Dynamic conflict resolution would foster and strengthened. Social capital and civil encourage local investment and ownership of engagement often stand out as the most communities‘ own well being, resulting in the important explanations for the difference overall betterment of their society. between peace and violence in local Recent History of “Conflict Resolution:” 2 communities. When dynamic conflict Military Intervention and the “Liberal resolution methods are used, conflict does not Peace” have to evolve into violence, and peace can be Overview of Military Intervention fostered and/or sustained. It is in the interest After the Cold War, no longer of the US to explore and employ alternative threatened by the fear of communism, the US methods of conflict resolution, especially and inter-governmental organizations began since these approaches have proven to to engage in ―benevolent‖ interventions, as provide a long-term, sustainable alternative to opposed to purely strategic operations – often
2 Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnic Conflict and Civil claiming to use their power for the betterment Society: India and Beyond," World Politics 53, 3, April 2001, pp. 362-398. 375-76. 374. Page | 49
of the third world, when in reality the interests preventing coups.‖5 He does not outline of the West remained the central objective.3 political or economic interest as a legitimate
Until the 1990s, military intervention in form of intervention, and for good reason. fragile and failed states was mainly an When objectives are about anything other extension of Cold War politics.4 The than simply providing security for the people international community chose where to in order to ensure the creation of sustainable intervene based largely on how a country development projects, the true causal issues affected the international balance of power, are overlooked. To examine how the the US and thus, the root of the conflict in these has chosen whether or not to intervene states often went overlooked. As a result, militarily in failed states with strategic strategic interventions often worsened already interest as the central motivation, we will bad situations across the globe. examine the past cases of Somalia and
The term ―military intervention‖ is Rwanda. broadly defined, encompassing everything US Intervention in Somalia from ―peacekeeping‖ to ―counter- After the backlash of the UN mission insurgency.‖ William Easterly states that to deliver food aid to the starving people of
―external intervention can be justified as Somalia, the US decided to intervene. The instrumental to development in three American public stood behind supportively, instances. These include: the restoration of acknowledging the need for US assistance in order, maintaining post-conflict peace, and response to images of starving children. In
reality, the mission was not so benevolent. 3 Easterly, William. The White Man‘s Burden: Why the West‘s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill The goal was political – to remove the leading and so Little Good. New York: Penguin Press, 2006. 333. 4 Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid, Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 124. 5 Easterly, Page | 50
from power. On October 3, 1993, when US supplies to give back to the starving Somalis. troops attempted to seize two of Aidid‘s From there the intervention was doomed. The lieutenants, Aidid‘s fighters in Mogadishu US pulled out immediately, wanting nothing responded by shooting down two American more to do with the war in Somalia.8 helicopters. Eighteen US soldiers were killed Lessons from Somalia and 77 others were wounded.6 Later, the In actuality the mission was far more
American public felt the aftershock of the complicated than originally thought; it was retaliation when they overly idealized. It was ●●● watched on television elated Frankly, the US was politically driven from the ignorant of the deep Somali‘s drag two naked moment the US committed historical and dead American troops away. cultural context of more troops to remove Aidid‘s the situation in This image far outweighed Somalia stranglehold on Mogadishu.9 ●●● the image of starving Unfortunately, removing Aidid children, and from there, the intervention lost from power was not the answer. Aidid was all public support. ―The American public certainly a main player, but part of a complex thought its troops were in Somalia on a web of warlords and rivaling clans.10 Military humanitarian mission – that is, to do good, intervention was used in Somalia for political not to kill, and certainly not to get killed.‖7 reasons, and as a result failed as a mode of
The media-circus led the public to realize that ―conflict resolution.‖ The tensions between
US troops were serving Washington‘s clans had been brewing since the collapse of political agenda and not simply retrieving aid 8 Rieff, 36-37. 9 Rieff, 36. 10 Colleta, Nat J., and Michelle L. Cullen. Violent 6 Rieff, David. A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: in Crisis. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 2002. Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and 36. Somalia. Conflict prevention and post-conflict 7 Rieff, 35. reconstruction. Washington D.C. World Bank. 2000. Page | 51
the central government in 1990.11 It was over- Peacekeeping mission stationed in Rwanda ambitious of the US to assume it could fix the since 1993, UNAMIR (United Nations civil war by removing a single warlord. Assistance Mission for Rwanda), commanded
Frankly, the US was ignorant of the deep by General Romeo Dallaire, to oversee the historical and cultural context of the situation peace accord between government and the in Somalia. Furthermore, the US was not Tutsi-led rebels.13 General Dallaire had willing to sustain its commitment to Somalia. received intelligence that the Rwandan
It took a leading military approach, but then government was plotting a preemptive failed to provide the support beyond the initial campaign of mass murder against the Tutsis intervention. in late 1993.14 Yet when the genocide began,
Genocide in Rwanda the UN Security Council gave clear
The media-hyped and evident failure instructions for General Dallaire and his in Somalia ultimately led to the indecision of troops to stay out of the violence. The the US and international community peacekeeping mandate in Rwanda illuminates surrounding the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the severe limitations of peacekeeping which lead to the mass murder of nearly a missions, acknowledging that had UNAMIR‘s million people. The genocide could have been rules of engagement been different, the prevented with military assistance, especially stationed peacekeeping troops could have considering that the mass killing only ended helped to prevent the genocide. In the when current Rwandan president Paul aftermath, it became clear that the US failed
Kagame used military force to stop the Hutu to fulfill its responsibility, despite credible extremists.12 There had been a UN inside intelligence exposing the events
11 Colleta 13 Rieff, 156 12 Collier 14 Rieff, 157 Page | 52
unfolding in Rwanda. What the US claimed taken to prevent the outbreak of violence as ignorance or confusion was really a before it happened, nor, for that matter, to complete lack of interest or intent.15 As David stop it once it had begun. Western powers
Rieff, author of A Bed for the Night: failed to implement alternative conflict
Humanitarianism in Crisis, states, ―…if any resolution as a preventative measure, just as slaughter in the 1990s justified military they failed to follow through with military intervention, it was the one in Rwanda.‖16 The action, when it was clearly the right approach
West essentially remained in denial, and to take. continued to refer to the conflict as African In contrast to the leading role the US
―savagery‖ far removed from home.17 took in Somalia, the UN peacekeepers took a
Lessons from Rwanda purely ―supportive‖ role in Rwanda. The
The genocide in Rwanda emerged mandate of the UN soldiers was to keep the when complex historical grievances combined peace, not restore it. Consequently, when with the escalation of ethnic tensions. This tension evolved into violent conflict, the serves as a poignant example for other purely ―supporting‖ role did nothing to stop situations, as these ethnic and societal the mass violence. The limitations of the tensions certainly exist in other failed and peacekeeping mandate proved to be a large fragile states. The international community problem in Rwanda, providing an example for was well aware of the long history of future interventions. Despite the individual oppression and tension between the Hutu and commanders and soldiers‘ commitment to
Tutsi tribes, yet, due to the lack of Western stay and help, the UN ordered that they strategic interest, no committed efforts were depart, since direct military intervention went
15 Rieff, 160 16 Rieff, 162 17 Rieff, 170 Page | 53
beyond their rules of engagement.18 In the Regardless of how it is carried out,
aftermath of Rwanda‘s genocide, it has military intervention is extremely costly. As
become evident that the cost of failing to stated earlier, the US spends a quarter of a
intervene – in terms of lost lives and trillion dollars every year in international
resources – was much higher than acting military operations.21 MSNBC reported in
when we had the chance to prevent the 2006 that it cost roughly $200 million per day
genocide, especially to sustain the war in Iraq and nearly $1.05 ●●● Regardless of how it given that UN trillion had gone to Iraq and Afghanistan.22 is carried out, military intervention peacekeeping troops Recent reports have emerged claiming that a is extremely costly were already stationed single gallon of gasoline costs approximately ●●●
on the ground. In $400 in Afghanistan.23 Furthermore, it is
2002, a total of $356 million worth of estimated that the surge of 30,000 troops in
development aid was given to Rwanda, Afghanistan will cost about $30 billion.24
making up 20 percent of Rwanda‘s gross Clearly, the incentive to find an alternative to
national income.19 In 2003, the US alone
21 Feffer. provided over $29 million in aid; Britain 22 Wolk, Martin. "Cost of Iraq war could surpass $1 trillion - Eye on the Economy- msnbc.com." Breaking provided $65 million.20 Evidently, the failure News, Weather, Business, Health, Entertainment, Sports, Politics, Travel, Science, Technology, Local, US & World News- msnbc.com. 17 Mar. 2006. Web. 24 to intervene lead to a guilty-conscience that Feb. 2010.
military intervention is strong, and a different negotiations, ―Disarmament, Demobilization, approach would redirect taxpayers‘ dollars to and Reintegration‖ (DDR), and ―Security sustainable modes of conflict resolution and Sector Reforms‖ (SSR).26 All of these peace- development. However, it must be support interventions become cursory and emphasized that if military intervention is in standardized, and ultimately, according to fact necessary, as it was in Rwanda, it is Roger Mac Ginty, ―…fail to reflect the imperative that soldiers and commanders be precise needs of the recipient society.‖27 given the appropriate mandate to ensure the Furthermore, these approaches are unlikely to protection of the people. be impactful when there is no security, or, in
The “Liberal Peace” some cases, no central government. These
Conflict resolution has not consistently approaches work more to berate individuals been confused with military intervention. The and societies than they do to involve and
―liberal peace‖ methodology has been the incorporate them.
25 primary alternative to military assistance. The Future of Military Intervention:
This approach is based strongly in Western Although it often lacks public support, ideology and operates in a highly and for good reason, military force cannot standardized format, similar to development simply be scratched off the list of potential and aid projects endorsed by the ―Washington intervention approaches in failed states. Past
Consensus,‖ using set templates to achieve examples demonstrate the severe
―resolution‖ or ―stability.‖ The list of Western complications in utilizing military. Yet, prescriptions includes: cease-fire monitoring security is a central component to change, be and agreements, formalized peace it social, economic, or political. Terrorism and
25 Mac Ginty, Roger. "Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace." Cooperation and Conflict. 26 Mac Ginty, 144. 43. 2 (2008): 139-163. 143. 27 Mac Ginty, 145. Page | 55
extremism within conflict-ridden regions form of intervention or aid must be context threaten not only US security, but also specific. Humanitarian military intervention surrounding areas of failed states. Clearly, should not attempt to resolve historical, without addressing security in failed states, societal, economic, or political issues. development cannot be sustained and However, when military intervention is used alternative modes of addressing conflict will in failed states, the historical context and potentially go in vain. The questions of when cultural complexities need to be taken into and how to provide security abroad are some consideration and the principles of of the most challenging issues faced by the sustainability and accountability must be at international community, and they must be the forefront of the mission. There must be a addressed. There are certain situations where ―continuum‖ of military intervention which military intervention should be utilized. The takes on both a leading and supporting role, if clearest examples are in times of genocide or necessary. To better understand how this can ethnic cleansing (however, the international be applied, we will look at the successful community seemed to forget their own post- British intervention in Sierra Leone.
Holocaust mantra of ―never again‖ when it British Intervention in Sierra Leone: came to Rwanda). Beyond certain specific In 2000, the United Nations crimes against humanity, however, it is intervened in Sierra Leone after the RUF impossible and unwise to create a concrete rebel movement took five hundred and static set of criteria determining when and peacekeeping soldiers hostage and stole all of how to intervene. This approach would their military equipment. A few months later, completely obscure the emphasis of this Operation Palliser was put into action. British chapter; each situation is different and any military troops (less than a thousand) arrived
Page | 56
in Sierra Leone and in response, almost Thinking dynamically: Alternative immediately, the rebel army collapsed. Approaches to Conflict Resolution
Security was enforced and maintained, and Less explored is the use of conflict the mission was extremely inexpensive, as far management and mitigation among 28 as military interventions go. Paul Collier individuals and communities, which can be asserts, ―Operation Palliser was brilliant, and used dynamically and flexibly to support local the British army can be proud of its populations in failed states. Often, these contribution to the development of Sierra populations have endured generations of
Leone. It also serves as a model for military violence, persecution, and marginalization, intervention in the bottom billion: cheap, which ultimately effect how the people, confident, and sustained. It was welcome, too groups, and governments within these
– the people of the country were truly societies communicate with each other and 29 thankful.‖ In Sierra Leone, the government invest in the betterment of their societies.30 invited the British forces and the population Innovative approaches to conflict resolution was in support of the intervention. create a number of positive outcomes. First,
Additionally, there was no alternative they require working within locally specific strategic interest that complicated or contexts, taking into account cultural interfered with the efficiency of the British particularities, histories, customs, and mission. This military intervention was there traditions, which can often lead to an to provide and maintain security. Operation established foundation for implementing
Palliser should be used as a model for goals and explaining other development successful military intervention. projects. Second, these methods motivate
30 Jacobs, Gerard A. "The Development and Maturation 28 Collier, 128 of Humanitarian Psychology." American Psychologist. 29 Collier, 128 62. 8 (2007): 932-941. Page | 57
local participation and provide sustainable the Indigenous Peoples and Community practices that will work long after military Development Unit.32 troops have left. Lastly, they strengthen On the other end of the humanitarian social capital and build strong foundations, assistance spectrum, the International which ultimately foster the development of Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent prosperous civil society.31 Societies (IFRC) headed some initial projects
Recent History of Alternative Conflict dedicated to conflict resolution, based on
Resolution: Background and Case Studies psychological support in the form of
The Development of Humanitarian assistance to victims of trauma caused from
Psychology & Psychological First-Aid natural disasters or sustained conflict zones
The introduction and use of alternative that led to large refugee populations. Their modes of conflict resolution, which address projects helped people deal with emotional, the extensive complexities of ethnic, cultural, cognitive, physiological, and behavioral 33 territorial, and/or religious conflict situations, reactions to traumatic events. The initial coincided with the growing rights of efforts were met with some resistance due to indigenous communities. As proof, the UN culturally different approaches in dealing with created the International Decade of the emotionally challenging situations. In
World‘s Indigenous Peoples, the UK response to these difficulties, the IFRC began
Department for International Development to adapt their projects to include locally based began a project dedicated to working with customs and traditions. For example, the idea indigenous communities, and the of a therapist seemed incredibly foreign to a
InterAmerican Development Bank established person living in a rural village in Somalia,
32 Mac Ginty, 140 31 Colleta, 4 33 Jacobs Page | 58
where people are far more likely to seek meet the needs of the post-genocide Rwandan support from their families and friends. With society, with the ultimate goal of reintegrating this in mind, the IFRC began to play a more returnees, who had fled during the genocide, removed, third party role as opposed to the back into society while fostering a sense of facilitator, or ―therapist.‖34 nationalism.36
Case Study – „Gacaca‟ and „Ingando‟ in Ingando camps differ slightly
Rwanda depending on which group is participating.
After the genocide in 1994, Rwanda For example, they can run from several days was in deep need of conflict resolution tools to several months. However, there are themes to help heal the wound from the mass murder central to all Ingando camps; they all discuss of nearly a million people. In response, the unity and reconciliation, teach history classes
Rwandan government resurrected the custom that highlight defects of the genocidal regime, of Ingando. The word, Ingando, derives from and include information on present the verb Kugandika, literally meaning to take government programs and policies that time from daily activities to look at problems encourage a sense of nationalism and within the community. After the National emphasize the ―democratic‖ elements of the
Unity and Reconciliation Committee was current government.37 In an interview, the established, it was required that militants Program Officer of Advocacy for the National returning from the DR Congo pass through Unity and Reconciliation Commission in
‗solidarity camps‘ where individuals learn to Kigali, Alex Rusagara, reflected on Ingando,
35 act ―…as peaceful citizens again.‖ Ingando 36 Mgbako, Chi. "Ingando Solidarity Camps: was adapted by the national government to Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post- Genocide Rwanda." Harvard Law School. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.
saying, ―we thought that if we could remove Gacaca tribunals are as follows: to reveal the these people from their daily lives and bring truth about what happened, to speed up the them together to share a common dish—to eat genocide trials, to eradicate the country of and sleep together—this would build impunity, to reconcile the Rwandans and confidence in the diverse population of reinforce their unity, and to prove that the repatriated Rwandans, confidence that we Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its could in fact live together.‖38 There has been own problems through a system of justice criticism from the West that the resurgence of based on a Rwandan custom.40
Ingando is merely an attempt of the national In the opinion of Stephen Kinzer, government to legitimize their political author of A Thousand Hills, the Gacaca trials power.39 Regardless, the government has are ―…group therapy sessions as much as taken an active role in healing the national judicial proceedings…nowhere else do trauma of genocide. Rwandans have a chance to mourn together
In addition to the process of Ingando, while confronting those who terrorized
‗Gacaca‘ tribunals were re-established post them.‖41 The Gacaca trials, too, have gained genocide to seek justice for atrocities skepticism from the West, mainly because committed. These informal judicial hearings they do not require legal representation, and are, like Ingando, based on a traditional thus go against Western models of justice. custom of Rwandan culture and are used to This goes to show how Western conceptions prosecute those who participated in the of conflict resolution are not always justified. genocide of the Tutsis. The objectives of the
40 Gacaca - Objectives." INKIKO-GACACA. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.
The Rwandan government has built on what forum to facilitate mediation between the they know, and as a result, the International government and the LRA.44
Criminal Court and USAID have supported In 1998, the ARLPI met with the Gacaca process.42 President Museveni and created a
Case Study – Acholi Religious Leaders Peace memorandum, ―A Call for Peace and an End
Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda to Bloodshed in Acholiland,‖ which signified
The conflict in Northern Uganda the formal inauguration of the intervention. between the Government of Uganda and the The intervention‘s immediate goal was to
Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA) movement assist in the process of establishing peace and emerged from the political and economic stability in Acholiland through ―…effective marginalization of the Acholi population. mediation, consensus building, participatory
Violent conflict has persisted between this involvement of all parties, and the cessation population in the North and other parties in of hostilities.‖45 The central themes in the the South since the outbreak of violence in intervention that appealed to the Museveni
1986.43 In an attempt to stop the cycle of government were the points of forgiveness violence, religious leaders from Northern and reconciliation, which were deemed
Uganda, coming from Muslim, Catholic, and crucial in the campaign for a peaceful
Protestant faiths, came together to organize a approach to conflict. Museveni was praised
42 Kinzer, 260. for working dynamically with the ARLPI to 43 United States. USAID. The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM). Greater resolve conflict, shifting away from past Horn of Africa Peace Building Project: The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace. By Larry S. practices of militarism. Benya, Michael Lund, Stacy S. Stacks, Janet Tuthill, and Patricia Vondal. Washington D.C.: Management Systems International, 2001. USAID Website: Conflict Related Publications. Web. 23 Feb. 2010.
Since the ARLPI efforts, there has grazing land, but when administrative issues been a decrease in rebel activity and an emerged in 1990s, the conflict took a violent increase in government willingness to seek a turn. The violence escalated during the 1992- nonmilitary solution to the conflict. 1993 drought, which killed 12,000, and
Furthermore, LRA rebels have lessened their intensified resource competition.47 opposition and have increasingly expressed a Efforts to resolve and manage the greater desire and openness for reintegration conflict were extremely dynamic and, as a into Ugandan society. Due to the success of result, very successful. Much of the success this approach, the Ugandan government is was a result of collaborative effort between adopting this model in other parts of the state actors and the local community, which country with rebel activity.46 developed a ―Rapid Response Team
Case Study: Traditional Elders‟ Peace composed of the army, police, and local
Process in Wajir, Kenya activists.‖48 Beyond the initial effort, a
Dating back to the 1990s, the Wajir growing and evolving partnership between the region in Kenya experienced extensive community-based organizations (CBOs) and political marginalization. As a result, local the local government institutions directly communities developed a significant amount contributed to stability and peace in Wajir. of autonomy from the national government. The community also developed a Peace
The lack of attention from the state, however, Forum that worked directly with youth, drove some state functionaries to innovatively elders, and women to create and maintain a engage local actors on pertinent issues. Wajir had long dealt with inter-clan warfare, exacerbated by issues of water scarcity and 47 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 19. 46 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 18. 48 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 19. Page | 62
peace process, also involving the local organization, utilized dynamic conflict government.49 management networks and forums to resolve
Evidently, a number of positive the dispute. Through information gathering, relationships and communication networks the creation of an early warning system, and were established during this initiative and development of new norms of behavior, the they proved to be very sustainable. This came, initiative has directly contributed to the peace in part, as a result of the strong support of the in Wajir. And the support of the local clan elders, who met to negotiate a framework government is so strong, the likelihood of declaration, which created a peace settlement sustainability is very high. between the rivaling clans. Since the Building Social Capital and Civil Society: declaration, the violent activity that directly All of the mentioned case studies affected the local communities has subsided. demonstrate how conflict resolution was used
In recognition of the success of the peace to unite communities and societies. The initiative, neighboring communities requested connection between engaging with conflict the help of the Wajir group in mediating their resolution and building civil society and 50 own similar conflicts. social capital may not seem critical at first,
The local initiative taken on by the but the resolution of most daily conflict
Wajir community exemplifies the power of involves some sort of pre-existing forum. locally-based conflict resolution. The Family, friends, neighbors, religion, community took ownership of their own ethnicities, and communities all serve as problems, and knowing more about the nature foundations for the networks that compose of the conflict than any international civil societies and promote the growth of
social capital. They also act as safe 49 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 19. 50 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 19. Page | 63
environments where people can share and civil society.52 Social Capital refers to the exchange knowledge, information, and values, norms, and systems that emerge from thoughts. In most failed states, conflict and civil society, ―…such as, worldviews, trust, violence that in some cases has endured for reciprocity, informational and economic decades severely undermines and weakens the exchange, and informal and formal groups composition of a society. War undermines and associations.‖53 To build social capital interpersonal and communal trust and means to create ●●● demolishes norms, values, and social opportunity and In order to create and encourage relations, all of which connect communities to agency for collective participation, the each other and link communal groups to the individuals and power and importance of social state.51 communities. In capital and civil Civil society (also referred to as ―civic‖ order to create society must be further emphasized society) refers to the space between family and encourage ●●● and government, which makes collective participation, the power and interconnections between individuals or importance of social capital and civil society families possible. It is independent of the must be further emphasized, and can only state, and attends to the cultural, social, help in reaching other development goals. economic, and/or political needs of citizens. Conflict resolution works to create
These definitions are very general, and it is stability prior to, during, or after conflicts. important to recognize that the purposes of But it also works to create social capital by activity are more important than the form or providing tools for communication, dispute presence of the organizations that compose resolution, and understanding where
52 Varshney 51 Colleta, 4 53 Colleta, 6 Page | 64
intervention is most needed. These are tools neighborhoods, dispel false rumors, and that are invaluable and will remain useful for provide information to the local decades to come. And their potential for administration.54 Furthermore, when civil success is maximized when they are adapted society works to build social capital through to culturally specific norms. alternative conflict resolution means, these
Case Study – Civil Society in India ―organized civil networks withstand
A study conducted by Ashutosh exogenous shocks, [and] also constrain local
Varshney explored the significance of civil politicians in their strategic behavior.‖55 society in promoting peace within ethnically Although this study was specific to India, the contentious areas. The study specifically findings of the research demonstrate the examined the relationship between India‘s importance of conflict resolution in building
Hindu and Muslim communities, which have social capital. often been in conflict. Varshney defines civil Varshney also emphasizes the society through two forms of engagement, difference between associational engagement associational and everyday. Both types of and everyday engagement. Associational engagement produce peace in a number of forms of engagement prove much stronger in ways. They promote communication between managing conflict and tension. When the members of different religious communities vibrant social, economic, cultural, and social and allow people to come together in times of needs of two different communities exist tension. In a number of populated cities in interdependently, support for cross-communal
India, ‗Peace Committees‘ were formed, peace is not only strong, but also verbalized which consisted of members from multiple communities that worked to police 54 Varshney, 375 55 Varshney, 378 Page | 65
and expressed regularly.56 Violent conflict their ―Community Driven Development‖ impedes growth and creates incentive to (CDD) projects. A pivotal component of CDD partake in potentially lucrative illegal is the ―Social Capital and Implementation activity.57 Therefore, if communities are Framework‖ (SCIF), an arrangement that economically intertwined through works to incorporate social capital into associational forms of engagement, the development initiatives. The framework of incentive to resolve and manage conflict, and SCIF emphasizes the following points: thus remain peaceful, is much stronger.58 ―Groups and Networks, Trust and Solidarity,
The Future of Alternative Approaches to Collective Action and Cooperation; Social
Conflict Resolution: Cohesion and Inclusion; and Information and 59 The need to think differently about Communication.‖ conflict resolution strategies has become The World Bank has also taken apparent not only to the international initiatives to incorporate culturally specific community, but to multilateral and US conflict resolution approaches into CDD organizations. To see how these approaches projects. In their training video, ―Building have become more integrated into policy, this Social Capital through Peacekeeping Circles,‖ section will examine the specific steps that the Molly Baldwin and Sayra Pinto, founders of
World Bank and USAID have taken. the organization Roca, Inc., were invited to
World Bank Initiatives the World Bank to share the process of
The World Bank has taken initiative peacekeeping circles, which they employ in in shifting their efforts towards recognizing their organization to help youth in Chelsea, community-oriented needs, exemplified in Massachusetts. The practice is derived from
56 Varshney, 377 59 ―Social Capital in Operations.‖ The World Bank. 25 57 Collier, 17 Feb. 2010. 58 Varshney, 377 Page | 66
the traditional customs of the Clinget people resolution. Their main mission is to in British Colombia and has been used both incorporate conflict resolution into traditional on the local level and on a large-scale level, development policy.62 The ―Peacebuilding helping to create governance structures and and Conflict Management‖ department within environmental policies.60 CDD projects now CMM works with local groups and incorporate ―an instrument for building organizations to ―…address the legacy of empowerment,‖ acknowledging that violence through activities such as support to
―…breakdowns in trust and social cohesion local and regional peace processes, restorative risk inflaming tensions and provoking more justice programs, ethnic dialog, inter-faith violence.‖61 This is a great beginning for the peace building, and grassroots
World Bank, a multi-lateral institution that reconciliation.‖63 The methods the department has spent the majority of its existence uses to facilitate such activities are as follows: imposing Western development strategies on Mediation of specific disputes and facilitation of peace negotiations a great number of third world countries. Training in peace-building, conflict management, mediation, and conflict USAID Initiatives analysis Peace media and peace education The USAID‘s Office of Conflict Community-based reconciliation Reintegration of militia groups into Management and Mitigation (CMM) has communities Mechanisms for restorative justice, recognized the importance of finding and such as truth and reconciliation commissions or shared history utilizing alternative approaches to conflict projects Psychosocial and trauma counseling 60 "Training Presentation: Building Social Capital Conflict research and analysis through Peacekeeping Circles." World Bank Group. Web. 10 Feb. 2010.
Early warning models and response dialogs centered on national conflicts and protocols Future scenario/instability controversial political and policy issues [Case development and planning64 studies included: Faith Based Facilitation of
In June of 2001, CMM conducted a study the Constitutional Review, National Council in the Greater Horn of Africa to address the of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Apostles
―…seemingly endemic nature of violent for Peace (CAP) Project in Political Dialog in conflict‖ in the region.65 The study sought to Burundi, and the War Torn Societies Project
68 discover what kinds of approaches are in Somaliland ]. And third, it explored the actually effective in conflict prevention, success of a new institution, ―Peace Radio‖ conflict management, or peace building.66 The [Case studies included: Studio Ijambo, survey examines three approaches to ―Search for Common Ground‖ show in
69 70 managing conflict through building civil Burundi and HornAfrik in Somalia ]. society. First, it analyzed the effectiveness of In summary, the study discovered a local peace processes, which use traditional number of general lessons in how conflict dispute resolution methods and institutions management and peace building processes
[Case studies included: Wajir Peace and can be most effective. There are four outlined
Development Committee in Northern Kenya, lessons that are very relevant to our
Inter-tribal Peace Conference in Southern discussion of conflict resolution in failed
Sudan, New Sudan Council of Churches states. First, conflict prevention practices are
(NSCC)67]. Second, it studied ―Middle Level‖ often predetermined by the state and location
of the conflict itself. It is important to know at
64 USAID – CMM: Peacebuilding and Conflict Management what level the shift needs to occur in order for 65 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 1. 68 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 4 66 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 2 69 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 4 67 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 4 70 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 2-3 Page | 68
conflict to be managed effectively. Second, oriented civil education. And fourth, due to traditional forms of conflict management (i.e. the regional nature of many of these conflicts, local customs, traditions, etc.) work best when peace building initiatives through the they are adapted to innovative approaches so traditional community ●●● that they do not exclude segments of the authority may be more …traditional forms of conflict management population (something that can happen with successful, as the (i.e. local customs, traditional customs). There should be an confining traditions, etc.) work best when they are emphasis on enlisting people from different characteristics of adapted to innovative parts of the community to work in tandem ―states‖ and ―borders‖ approaches so that with existing practices and institutions in new, limit our they do not exclude segments of the dynamic ways, which can lead to achieving understanding of population. ●●● sustainable conflict management solutions where and how and outcomes. Third, the importance and conflict emerges. This is especially helpful in helpfulness of religious leaders and religious working with clan related conflict.71 organizations should not be underestimated, The overall findings of the study showed since they can often be seen within the that the local peace processes approach was community and between communities as a comparatively more successful than the neutral source, resulting in the likelihood of ―middle level‖ dialogues or the ―peace radio‖ uniting different faiths. Religious leaders and approach. The local peace processes were organizations have been effective in holding more appropriate for the degree and type of mediation forums, engaging with government conflict addressed (i.e. cattle raids versus leadership in high-level dialogues, and violence between organized armies) and a creating peace efforts through community higher degree of cooperation was possible
71 USAID – Effectiveness of Social Capital, 8 Page | 69
between the study and the governing just over $15 billion.74 Given the US‘ near authorities because the major duties (i.e. $700 billion military budget,75 USAID, and policy making, security, justice, and the specifically the Office of Conflict economy) of the authority were within the Management and Mitigation, should be given jurisdiction of local actors.72 more financial support.
The other two approaches in the study The Use of Dynamic Conflict Resolution in proved to be too far removed from the source Somalia – Recommendation of the problems, which resemble many of the As illuminated earlier in the report, past Western efforts to resolve conflict. Somalia has seen the blunt end of US military
However, the authors emphasize that local intervention. The state has lacked a central peace processes are not suitable for all forms government since the early 1990s. Since then, of conflict management. Ultimately, the local Somalia has been governed by both a peace processes built on existing civil society Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and the approaches analyzed were successful which was installed after the peace in strengthening communication and negotiations in 1996, and the Islamic Courts organizational networks, which fall outside Union, which has now implemented sharia the realm of the governmental, economic, and law throughout the country. The conflict in political processes.73 Somalia is heavily clan based and the
The Obama administration should competition for resources and aid has recognize the importance of studies like this 74 United States. USAID. Fiscal Year 2008: Agency Financial Report - Managing for Development Results. and further support the efforts of USAID. 17 Nov. 2008. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.
continually served as a source of rivalry.76 As population, and build a state that will support the international community has seen and sustain peace. The War-Torn Society traditional conflict resolution approaches Project (WSP) examined the reconstruction
(peace agreements, formal negotiations, process of Somaliland under the objectives to military interventions, etc.) fail time and time ensure that international assistance again, it is time to take our cue from Somalia contributes to building peace and does not itself, and support the emerging efforts to use exacerbate or renew conflict.77 The locally-developed conflict resolution methods Participatory Action Research (PAR) program
[For more information, see chapter on developed in Somaliland helps to:
Somalia]. …[democratize] development and [empower] communities and The region of Puntland has seen more disempowered groups such as women, strengthening the capacity of national success than the rest of the country, and much and local government and civil society organizations to contribute to state- of this can be attributed to a committed building and reconstruction, and building the capacity and ensuring the process of mediation, reconciliation, and sustainability of a successor body, namely the Somaliland Center for negotiation between clan leaders. Somaliland Peace and Development (SPCD)78 has also seen improvement, which reflected in The WSP has created a neutral forum where the War-Torn Society‘s Project, examined by reconstruction activities can safely take place.
CMM‘s study in the Horn of Africa. The WSP is committed to researching policy
Somaliland has struggled with similar and supporting local community efforts, while conflicts as the rest of Somalia. It has also extending their reach to the state level. wrestled with challenges to resolve violent The SCPD further helps communities in internal conflict, build sustainable peace taking responsibility for their political needs. between the various groups within the 77 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 21. 76 78 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 22 Page | 71
This forum for dialogue has significantly communities, and above all the importance of assisted communities who have much to confronting social evils with non-violent contribute to the development of political, practices.80 Gandhi is regarded as one the economic, and social policy that will help to most influential figures not only in India, but achieve sustainable peace.79 The WSP throughout the world. The power of non- exemplifies the kinds of projects that could violence speaks to people, organizations, and and should be utilized in Somalia. In governments across a multitude of ethnicities, constructing intervention strategies and borders, religions, and beliefs. India‘s recent deciding on our level of involvement in social, economic, and political success is a
Somalia, the US government should also testimony to the influence of non-violence examine the initiative in Wajir, Kenya as an and its capacity to alter dramatically dark example for how locally based conflicts born situations, thus spreading the message and out of clan warfare can be solved. importance of peacefully addressing conflict.
Conclusion: The Power of Non-Violence Despite Gandhi and other prominent
In the 1920s, a prominent leader leaders‘ wide recognition, violence has emerged at a pivotal time in India‘s history. continually been fought with more violence.
Mahatma Gandhi believed that India‘s This chapter has shown that these militaristic independence would be hollow unless the methods have not worked to resolve decades social evils that plagued Indian society were of suffering based in deep historical, societal, addressed. He emphasized the importance of political, and economic strife. As a welcomed
Hindu-Muslim unity, self-reliance and self- alternative, the United States and the responsibility, uplifting women and tribal international community have begun to shift their focus towards dynamic conflict
79 USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society…, 22. 80 Varshney, 370. Page | 72
management, mitigation, and peace building. – without which, societies would be left
In this approach, the importance of local handicapped and violence-ridden. This actors, knowledge, and history has become an chapter has illuminated why it is in the best increasingly central theme to conflict interest of the US to continue to support these resolution projects. New, innovative initial efforts and work to move away from approaches are emerging in the most needed militarism and towards dynamic conflict of situations. As an added benefit, these resolution and peace building. dynamic approaches work to build and reinforce pre-existing civil society and strengthen social capital within communities
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Advancing Growth Where US Intervention Policy Coincides with Development
Taryn Elledge
Page | 76
interventions, and onto creating more Introduction sustainable development solutions. To make As the Obama administration scales aid and development policies effective and back its involvement in Iraq, embarks on dynamic, they must be built on a framework renewed efforts in the war in Afghanistan, which incorporates local actors. Without their and examines involvement with the support, any intervention by the US or humanitarian crisis in Haiti, US intervention international community is bound to fail. in failed and collapsed states has again Background inevitably pushed its way to the forefront of Unsuccessful past efforts to alleviate foreign policy debates. The current poverty and transform developing countries discussions surrounding intervention policy have illuminated the overall weaknesses of highlights elements of past state-building and the aid regime and the absence of effective development efforts, mainly illuminating the development policies. Historically the US, failures, and raises questions about how to along with the international community, has more effectively approach failing states and adopted an overarching development model how to better utilize our limited time and based primarily on a top-down approach. This resources. When formulating appropriate US seeks to impose its foreign ―knowledge‖ and intervention strategy, it is also critical to ―expertise‖ in a standardized and static analyze the current US aid system and fashion to a wide range of situations across a development policy, given that these concepts diverse array developing countries. Under this are intrinsically connected. Any dialogue systematized approach, the so-called aimed at formulating long-term solutions in developed countries, along with the large failed states must look beyond short-term international organizations and financial (and possibly long-term) military
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institutions, have often implemented a ―one projects, vast regions of the world, most size fits all‖ methodology which allows for notably sub-Saharan Africa, have failed to the West to pursue its own interests and escape a cyclical web of extreme poverty impose its own values, rather than addressing leading to massive human suffering. If there the well-being of the supposed recipients. is any hope to successfully improving the
Although the face of development policy has lives of the global poor, aid money must be evolved over the last several decades, the redirected towards development projects that internal mechanism has retained some key promote sustainable economic growth, and characteristics. From Cold War politics, to the stop creating further dependency and
Structural Adjustment economic reforms, to stagnation. In addition, intervention efforts the Washington Consensus Model, US need to refocus substantial time and resources development policy has failed to successfully towards effective and fluid bottom-up bridge the gap between the rich and the poor development solutions. and, as a result, has done very little to The “Planners” of the Aid Regime increase the standards of living for those most As William Easterly asserts in his in need. Failing to reform ineffective assessment of the aid regime, development policy and refusing to learn Voters in the rich country and their representatives are the ones who from past mistakes, the US and key choose the actions of the foreign aid agency. They love the Big Plans, the international organizations such as the World promises of easy solutions, the utopian dreams, the side benefits for rich- Bank and IMF, have frequently misguided country political or economic interests, all of which hands the aid their efforts to identify and/or invest in key agency impossible tasks.1 components of long-term economic growth.
1 Easterly, William. The White Man's Burden: Why Despite trillions of dollars dumped into aid the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good. New York: Penguin Press, 2006. p.169 Page | 78
The so-called ―experts‖ who design inherently flawed in its approach because it is development schemes are typically far currently ―designed for instrumentalism, not removed from those who are being affected for structural change,‖ which results in only a by their decisions, and hence miss their ―modest payoff,‖ as it is repeating the same intended goal of helping those in extreme unproductive methods. Collier continues by need. In an attempt to impose comprehensive stating that in order ―for aid to promote reforms and formulaic responses to problems structural change in countries it requires of development, the US, and the international structural change in agencies.‖2 community end up missing the key Instead of structuring foreign policy components of effective, sustainable solutions around the need to appease US leaders and to growth and poverty reduction. Being so far domestic interests, foreign policy must be removed from the effects and outcomes of shaped by a cohesive, revamped approach, policies not only leads to a lack of awareness, which puts each country‘s unique issues at the but also encourages and reinforces a lack of center. A new approach must be based on an accountability and transparency on both ends educated understanding of the regional of the aid spectrum. Over the last sixty years, context and must involve key local actors. development policies have recycled the same Including local communities in restructuring inefficiencies, and without an effective efforts provides incentives for the intended system of checks and balances, the myriad of beneficiaries and also creates accountability. agencies, organizations, and governments Another critical element of restructuring the have been caught up in an unproductive aid regime would entail concentrating more viscous cycle. In a critique of the aid regime, power and resources into a select agency or a
Paul Collier suggests that the system is 2 Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 122 Page | 79
small group of select agencies (such as the policy from truly lifting people out of
Office of the Coordination for Reconstruction poverty. This group suggests that the United and Stabilization, which was created by the Nations Millennium Development Goals, for
White House in 2004 to assist in state example, which have defined development building efforts). This would result in efforts over the last decade, ―are a vehicle for securing new, more effective and consistent charity‖ that has succeeded in making the routes for aid to travel by reducing the infinite lives of the world‘s poor ―a little bit better,‖ number of obstacles set up by agencies and but has created a ―trap‖ that ―crowds out or their donors that result in unnecessary overlap corrupts the business sector.‖ 3 According to and extensive overhead costs that could Hubbard and Duggan, boosting the market otherwise utilized for the projects they were and creating jobs is the only path for poor originally intended for. Better organized countries to reach prosperity. Those that fall development efforts would mean that the US into the charity trap have not acknowledged could work more productively in concert with the economic history that has led some poor local communities to address the root causes countries, most recently India and China, to of the crisis, and to formulate long-term prosperity. To support their argument the sustainable solutions for problems. authors highlight three countries, Sao Tomé,
The Pitfalls of Charity Aid Guinea-Bissau, and Malawi, which received
Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan the highest amount of aid per local dollar, yet from Columbia Business School represent a are ranked by the World Bank as 163rd, 176th, camp of academics who believe that it is and 127th out of 178, in terms of easiest places precisely the misguided efforts of the aid to start and run a business. ―Instead of regime that have inhibited development 3 Hubbard R. Glenn, and William Duggan, The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty. New York: Columbia Business School, 2009. p. 3-7 Page | 80
struggling to start a business, citizens of these local, regional, and state governments.‖5 countries aspire to work for the government According to many academics and and NGO agencies that deliver the aid. development specialists, low incomes and
Working as a driver for an aid agency makes slow growth are key contributors that keep you many times more money than working as poor countries in the poverty rut, and a farmer or trader.‖4 Aid money that has consequently create a welcoming traditionally flowed through governments in environment for chaos and continued conflict. developing countries has also provided US and international funding need to not only incentive for the state itself to resist taking the rethink ―charity aid,‖ but also emphasize the initiative that is necessary to open the markets building of strong infrastructure and opening and promote healthy industrialization and up resources for the business sector and thus productive economic development. creating a more hospitable environment for
By directly or indirectly reinforcing businesses to flourish. barriers to business, the current aid The Cold Hard Facts mechanisms are obstructing the development Over the last sixty or so years, the processes or, at the very least, failing to total amount of aid given to poor countries address the true root of the issue. ―Poor amounts to the extraordinary sum of 2.3 countries remain prisoners of an abnormal aid trillion dollars. Currently the annual sum system, where government agencies and amounts to around half a trillion dollars per
NGOs create jobs, foreign aid substitutes for year.6 As proof of the ineffectiveness of the tax revenue, and aid development projects aid system most of these resources have failed substitute for the tax-spending initiatives of to produce the intended results. If poverty and
4 Hubbard R. Glenn, and William Duggan, The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty. New York: 5 Hubbard and Duggan. p. 93 Columbia Business School, 2009. p. 7 6 Hubbard and Duggan. p. 87 Page | 81
lack of development are known contributors poorly researched, and consequently, lacking to state failure and massive amounts of human in overall cohesiveness and efficiency. suffering, then aid effectiveness and Critics of the US intervention in Iraq also note successful development strategies demand a that the lack of cultural sensitivity and central focus in all US intervention and state- necessary feedback of projects, only helped to building efforts from this point forward. fuel resentment of a Western presence. Some
Iraq: A Chance to Learn From the Past even claim that Americans played a hand in
As the US begins to scale-down its efforts in instigating the extremist insurgency in Iraq by
Iraq, the US government has an opportunity taking advantage of their military capabilities to look back and learn from the various and ignoring Iraqi culture and traditions. strategies that have made up the controversial ―This strategy failed in Iraq just as it had mission over the last seven years. After an earlier failed in Iran…It provoked an anti- estimated $50 billion spent on reconstruction colonial opposition to American occupation, efforts in Iraq as of February 2009 (carried which eventually took on the colouration of out mainly by private and US contractors),7 radical Islam.‖8 By disregarding critical the US has a responsibility to investigate past opinions of local leaders and community inefficiencies and shortcomings in order to members, the population was not only productively refocus its efforts in disenfranchised, but a wide range of
Afghanistan. The US government has been development projects also went without a accused of wasting a great deal of time and solid foundation for growth and sustainability. resources on efforts that were misguided, Despite the fact that most American
7 DeYoung, Karen, and Walter Pincus. "Iraq Auditor 8 Judis, John. "War on Global Terrorism was Destined Warns of Waste, Fraud in Afghanistan." The to Fail." The Carnegie Endowment For International Washington Post 2 Feb. 2009. 22 Jan. 2010 Peace. 09 Sept. 2005. Web. 16 Feb. 2010.
companies have been paid for their contracts Structural Change-From the Bottom-Up to rebuild Iraq, many reconstruction efforts Regardless of whether aid is being have either failed to surface, or have proved directed towards meeting people‘s basic needs unsustainable. The inspector general for Iraq or towards encouraging growth in the reconstruction has asserted that his agency economic sector, the framework needs to had ―regularly raised concerns about the embraces successful, existing structures and potential waste of U.S. taxpayer money foster development that emerges organically resulting from reconstruction projects that through grass-roots efforts. This bottom-up were poorly planned, badly transferred, or approach would require a significant shift insufficiently sustained by the Iraqi away from the outdated ―Washington 9 government.‖ Tens of thousands of Consensus‖ model that has dominated hospitals, schools, water treatment plants, and development efforts since the 1990s, and has electricity substations that lack the necessary often imposed a generic list of policy resources, skilled personnel, and equipment, prescriptions in a uniform, expedited fashion are functioning at either partial capacity or not to all developing countries. According to 10 at all. The US approach in Iraq William Baumol, Robert Litan, and Carl demonstrates the risk of taking on Schramm authors of Good Capitalism, Bad development endeavors that lack a Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and sustainable, contextual framework.. Prosperity, development policy structured
around a model like the ―Washington
Consensus‖ ―provides no guidance to
countries about the relative importance of the 9 Williams, Timothy. "US Fears Iraq Will Not Keep Up Rebuild Projects." The New York Times 20 Nov. 2009. different prescriptions on the list or about 26 Jan. 2010
their timing or sequence.‖11 The institutions country-specific information and cultural that prescribe these ―laundry lists‖ do not context, something that has seriously been prioritize their extensive policy demands, nor lacking from the variations in development do they provide any structure or context for models over the last sixty years. Not only is the governments and consumers on the there a responsibility to tailor strategies to receiving end. The authors argue that since regional environments, but long-term, economics and growth are not static, ―the sustainable progress requires that local specific policies that are appropriate will vary expertise, knowledge, and existing local for different countries at different times. structures be the very foundation on which
Context, culture, and history all matter. There any development process begins, yet they are is no single detailed blueprint that can or often bypassed. should be imposed on every country.‖ As a In his book The Bottom Billion, Paul testament to this fact, ―…various countries Collier addresses the often unacknowledged have achieved rapid growth rates with complexity of issues surrounding somewhat different institutional structures.‖12 development, and the need to move beyond
Whether US intervention is justified through a past failures. According to Collier, moving humanitarian mission, or under the auspices ―beyond the headless heart‖ (implying of ensuring US security interests, the US, altruistic yet uniformed liberals), in order to along with the international community, has implement effective development policies an obligation to approach intervention and will require change ―from within the societies development in a manner that acknowledges of the bottom billion,‖ increasing the potential
for success with help of Western policies. 13 11 J., Baumol, William, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm. Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity. New York: Yale UP, 2007. p. 56-57 13 Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion. New York: 12 Baumol, Litan, Schramm. p.59 Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 12 Page | 84
Shifting from top-down to bottom-up Thereby offering a better chance at success requires that US policies and ideals no longer and sustainable transformation. Under a act as the drivers of development policy, but newly directed approach, that places local that information gathered by the people being communities and experts at the focal point of affected, be the primary input used to reconstruction and intervention efforts, the structure US plans, and determine appropriate US agencies can better employ services and and effective implementation processes on the resources towards effective, long-term ground. In the aid bureaucracy, oftentimes the solutions to development. political incentives that are driving Opportunities for Bottom Development in development policy do not always line up Haiti – Case Study with what is best for the poor. ―The needs of In the aftermath of the earthquake in the poor don‘t get met because the poor have Haiti, one of the more devastating natural little money or political power with which to disasters in recent history, the US and the make their needs known and they cannot hold international aid community are faced with an anyone accountable to meet those needs.‖14 incredible responsibility to formulate not only
By including the global poor in the a rapid disaster response effort, but also the development process, we are giving them the critical question of what will follow as Haiti opportunity to utilize their own knowledge begins to pick up the pieces. With an and skill to build a solid foundation and estimated death toll between 170,000 and encourage accountability on both ends 230,000, thousands of injured survivors, and through creating a feedback mechanism. around 280,000 homes and commercial
buildings have been left in ruins.15 the heavily
14 Easerly, William Russell. White Man‘s Burden; Why the West‘s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good. New York: Penguin P, 2006. p. 15 Bajak, Frank, and Paisley Dodds. "Haiti Gives 17 Conflicting Counts for Quake Deaths." New York Page | 85
populated capital of Porte –au- Prince not foreign, top-down schemes. Instead, we only begs immediate attention, but also offers should embrace local actors in Haiti who can an opportunity to create an up-to-date model help to develop home-grown models, that for successful humanitarian intervention, work with existing local institutions, following with sustainable development infrastructure, and cultural norms. Post-war efforts. Without widespread conflict, and with Tokyo offers an example of how piecemeal the watchful eye of the international development, supported by local actors, can community mobilizing to contribute aid play a major role in the rise of the middle workers and resources, Haiti offers a prime class. ―A decentralized and highly opportunity to do things the right way, from participatory urban development process the bottom-up. The local leaders and produced areas of low-rise, high-density community members are willing and able to structures built with local skills and pull together their efforts to help rebuild their material…which strengthened communities, country. Once aid resources have served to and stimulated local economies.‖ 16 Whatever address emergency medical care, and basic development projects formulate, they need to needs, the US should take the lead to respect and embrace the local Haitian social implement creative reconstruction efforts that networks and livelihood and work to foster positive structural changes, as well as incorporate models that rebuild sound political and economic restructuring. In neighborhoods, while also rebuilding the process however, the US should set an economic opportunity. example for how effective development policy can be pursued without imposing
Times 10 Feb. 2010. 16 Feb. 2010 16 Echanove, Matias, and Rahul Srivastava. "Eight
Social Capital and Community Driven acknowledge existing political, social, and
Development economic structures, nor do they account for
Building Social Capital cultural predispositions, all of which can been
Social Capital is perhaps one of the seen in a society‘s social capital. ―Social more critical and often overlooked elements capital directly affects the ability of people to to achieving successful development. Social organize for economic ends; it supports the
Capital refers to the norms and networks that creation of institutions and the rule of law; create the foundation of a community, and and it is a vital underpinning of democracy, allow local actors to work collectively which is the source of legitimacy for the towards addressing problems.17 There is a political framework in which development 18 large group of analysts who believe that increasingly takes place.‖ Social capital economic policy alone is not enough to ensure consists of cultural values and norms yet, has development in poverty-stricken countries. been consistently left out of past central
This is precisely why the central planners of planning efforts. the Washington Consensus failed to produce The World Bank and Community Driven sustainable economic growth in poor Development countries through their neoliberal reforms. The World Bank has recognized how
Many economists and specialists regard the role of social capital has improved the certain elements of the ―Washington ―quality, effectiveness, and sustainability‖ in
Consensus‖ approach as necessary for long- Community Driven Development programs term growth and development. However (CDD). The World Bank has created the ultimately, liberalization policies fail to 18 Fukuyama, Francis. "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda." School of 17 The World Bank-Social Capital. The World Bank. 28 Advanced International Studies Review, at Johns Jan. 2010 www.worldbank.org. Hopkins University XXII (2002): 23-36. Page | 87
Social Capital and Implementation to improve their livelihoods, health, and
Framework (SCIF), as a tool to help identify living conditions.20 and incorporate social capital into The World Bank‘s Community Driven development projects. The five dimensions of Development programs are a good example of
SCIF, which demonstrate both the cognitive a bottom-up approach to development, which as well as structural forms of social capital, rely on social capital to create a basic include: ―Groups and Networks, Trust and framework for infrastructure and growth.
Solidarity, Collective Action and Instead of the traditional method of
Cooperation; Social Cohesion and Inclusion; formulating an exogenous plan directed at and Information and Communication.‖19 The serving the world‘s poor, CDD aims to
World Bank has pursued several notable CDD include the intended beneficiaries in the projects which have produced sustainable planning and implementation process. benefits for poverty-stricken villages, based Community Driven Development attempts to on a framework that embraces social capital. utilize local institutions and assets and work
For example, in Balangiga, in East Samar the from preexisting structures as the primary
World Bank has sponsored local projects to building blocks of future projects. In their build canals which channel floodwaters to the own words, CDD ―is an approach that gives sea during monsoon season. Through the control over planning decisions and drainage projects, which employ locals, the investment resources to community groups projects in Balangiga have fostered collective and local governments.‖ The World Bank participation of the local community, while Community Driven Development programs giving them an opportunity to work together use the following as guiding principles for
20 ―Philippines: Community-Driven Development 19 ―Social Capital in Operations.‖ The World Bank. 25 Strategy Frees Poor Samar Town from the Scourge of Jan.2010. Floods.‖ The World Bank. 25 Jan.2010. Page | 88
operation: ―local empowerment participatory of people. Involving actors at the local level governance, demand-responsiveness, helps people to take action in shaping their administrative autonomy, greater downward own future and to work to implement strategic accountability, and enhanced local plans based on their existing structures, which capacity.‖21 At the heart of the CDD projects work with their cultural norms. Furthermore, are a reliance on participation by local actors, involving local actors encourages people to giving them access to the resources of focus their efforts towards projects, which development and focusing on demand driven address prioritizing their needs, therefore projects, rather than supply driven. While the better utilizing time and resources, while majority of CDD projects focus on building encouraging sustainability and peer infrastructure and improving basic standards accountability. CDD programs also create of living, this grass-roots approach offers a opportunities to strengthen partnerships model to US leaders, demonstrating how to between communities, local governments, and effectively act in concert with local players to decentralized sector ministries and ensure a more holistic and country-specific departments, emphasizing the need for application of growth and economic collaborative efforts, which enhance dynamic development projects. and sustainable approaches.
A key component of CDD programs is Community Driven Development in to help decentralize authority, by empowering Afghanistan local governments and civil society, rather Afghanistan is an especially relevant than relying on central governments, which place to examine how we can shift our are typically out of touch with the local needs development efforts for two reasons. First, the
21 The World Bank Community Driven Development US has directly and indirectly been involved Programs. The World Bank. 28 Jan. 2010
in the region throughout the years. Second, capacity of local communities in Afghanistan
President Obama has recently decided to and around the world, to address poverty increase our commitment of time and reduction. The National Solidarity Program resources. Although military intervention is at (NSP), which has benefited from World the forefront of US efforts, it is critical to Bank‘s IDA assistance, exemplifies the sort of examine the larger picture by beginning to development projects the US should invest in, explore long-term development strategy by demonstrating the sustainable benefits of solutions. Without an effective plan for CDD. The NSP incorporates building social growth and development in Afghanistan, capital, providing a dynamic approach, which military efforts are likely to be short-lived is tailored to each specific community. The once the US departs, opening the door for projects involve local players to identify the terrorist networks to expand their reach and key challenges that their community faces, enabling them to potentially pursue attacks on and then encourages participation in the the US. Given the high level of US strategic implementation process. The National interest in securing a peaceful and prosperous Solidarity Program in Afghanistan works to future for Afghanistan, it is of utmost focus its efforts towards rural communities, importance to gain the support of local leaders especially those that are most vulnerable, and and strategic players throughout the country, most in need of assistance. As of January making sure to involve them in the 2009, the NSP had worked with 359 districts reconstruction process. in Afghanistan, reaching at least one
The International Development community in each of the 34 provinces
Association, the World Bank‘s fund for the throughout the country.22 The NSP‘s process poorest countries, has utilized the skill and 22 National Solidarity Programme. 2008. NSP Afghanistan. 28 Jan. 2010
in working with communities highlights how are responsibly utilized and to monitor the local actors can truly be involved in overall effectiveness of the project, development projects. The first step in emphasizing accountability. NSP working with a community begins with the development projects range from building assignment of an NSP facilitating partner roads, and repairing schools and hospitals, to
(often an NGO) to a province, which then creating a platform for peer mediation and contacts the local community to educate them collaboration on projects.23 about NSP. Next, the facilitating partner holds In the small village of Jurm, located in a community election to select a council of Badakhshan, a north-east region of local leaders who will act as representatives to Afghanistan, village councils have speak on behalf of the community and voice successfully managed smaller-scale, grass- their interests and needs. Once the council has roots projects with the help and funding from collaborated with the community to create a the National Solidarity Program. The projects list of project proposals, the proposed have worked to provide clean water and
Community Development Plan is then electricity, implement alternative crop submitted to NSP for review. Once approved, methods, and build new schools. The large-
NSP supplies direct grants to the council to scale projects that have lacked local input and cover the various project costs. The council knowledge, mismanaged funds and often then forms individual committees which are ended in failure. In contrast, the NSP (funded designated to fulfill specific roles during the by foreigners) has successfully implemented implementation process. The council is smaller projects, which gain the consent and required to supply reports to NSP and the request involvement of the local leaders, community , in order to assure that resources eliminating the middle men and unnecessary
23 NSP Afghanistan. Page | 91
overhead costs. Not only have the community most recent data suggests that the there is a driven development projects in Jurm been great deal of potential to meet the first effective in improving the lives of locals, but Millenium Development Goals of halving they have also helped to create more support poverty by the year 2015. The same report, for Western-backed projects (which have however, also points to the fact that ―poverty otherwise been seen as unfavorable), showing is more pervasive‖ than previously thought, locals an alternative to the Taliban. The leading to the conclusion that efforts must be framework that the National Solidarity ―redoubled…especially in sub-Saharan
Program has built its projects on rests one Africa‖25 in order to meet this goal. This is simple rule: ―Never start a project that is not not an entirely surprising conclusion, backed by all members of the community, or considering that the analysis shows that there it will fail.‖24 Jurm offers us a very useful are extreme regional disparities in poverty model for how to more successfully direct reduction between sub-Saharan Africa and the funds towards sustainable, realistic projects, rest of the world, most notably with East even if they occur on a smaller scale. Asia. The statistics show that poverty rates in
How to Alleviate Poverty through East Asia have fallen 62 percent from 1981 to
Economic Development 2005, beginning in 1981 with 80 percent of
In a recent World Bank report on the population living at or near poverty levels projected progress on the fight against and dropping to an estimated 18 percent in poverty, Justin Lin, Chief Economist and 2005. By contrast, the poverty rate in sub-
Senior Vice President of Development and Saharan Africa has remained at relatively the
Economics at the World Bank, suggest that 25 World Bank. Development and Research Group. "New Data Show 1.4 Billion Live on Less that 24 Tavernise, Sabrina. "Afghan Enclave Offers Model US$1.25 a day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains to Rebuild and Rebuff Taliban." New York Times 12 Strong." Press release. 26 Aug. 2008. 3 Feb. 2010 Nov. 2009. 09 Jan. 2010
same rate of 50 percent over the same period. can refocus its efforts to more successfully
The World Bank asserts that ―given that stimulate growth and put development money poverty is so deep in Africa, even higher to good use. growth will be needed than for other Microfinance: Setting the Stage for Pro- 26 regions.‖ Business Development Aid
While it is glaringly obvious that sub- Microfinance lending has become one
Saharan Africa has a much longer road of the more widely recognized examples of towards growth than some of its Asian how development aid can effectively be used neighbors, it is not clear how that progress to support a growing business sector at the will occur. Yet, past failures in aid bottom of the pyramid in developing resuscitation in sub-Saharan Africa, and the countries. The year 2005 was declared recent successes in parts of Asia, outline some ―International Year of Microcredit‖ by the lessons to be learned. One of the most notable United Nations, and Secretary General of the differences, especially within India and UN, Kofi Annan was quoted as crediting
China, two of the leading powerhouses in business start-ups funded by microfinance in
Asia, is the adoption of a pro-business model showing how the beneficiaries ―are the for growth. This choice does not to rely on the solution, not the problem…it is a way to build crutch of the traditional aid system, like the on their ideas, energy and vision‖ and majority of sub-Saharan Africa. There is a ―allow[s] communities to prosper.‖27 clear lesson to be learned from history if the Microfinancing helps groups of
World Bank‘s agenda plans to once again individuals in the developing world to obtain double its aid to sub-Saharan Africa. This small loans with low interest rates, which are chapter should serve as a guide for how aid 27 Boudreaux, Karol, and Tyler Cowen. "The Micromagic of Microcredit." The Wilson Quarterly. 26 Ibid. Winter 2008. 8 Feb. 2010
then used for small business start-ups. Micro- exploiting the poor through charging credit has allowed the world‘s poor, including unreasonably high interest rates and creating a those who are most vulnerable and repressed, mountain of debt for borrowers. As with other an increased capacity to earn income and gain aid projects and development pitfalls that access to means of survival. One of the have siphoned off money at the expense of reasons that microfinance has been so the poor, there needs to be a system of check successful is in part because Muhammad and balances in place to assure that
Yunus, its creator, structured microfinance microfinance organizations and banks are not lending around encouraging locals to develop taking advantage of the poor they are their own projects based on their own claiming to serve. Another potential downfall interests and needs, as opposed to the ideas of microfinance is the nature of small loans, and interests of the central planners at the which may not encourage enough growth in multilateral institutions. Microfinance lending the normal business sector or provide provides a framework for how aid can be substantial employment opportunity. productively redistributed towards building ―Microloans make poor borrowers better off. entrepreneurial activity in developing But, on their own, they often don‘t do much countries, while at the same time increasing to make poor countries richer.‖28 Still chances of sustainability through projects that microfinance offers some ideas about are developed and implemented from the successful options for the business sector in bottom-up. poor countries, and offers the US and the
It is necessary to make sure that the international community a base model for lending establishments, namely banks, are not
28 Surowiecki, James. "What Microloans Miss." The making a business out of microfinance by New Yorker 17 Mar. 2008. 05 Feb. 2010
reference when designing future, more economic growth requires companies that can expansive economic growth for the world‘s make big investments…and that can exploit poor. the economies of scale that make workers
29 Meso-Finance: An Advanced Model for more productive and, ultimately, richer.‖
Growth By directing more domestic and
A fairly recent phenomenon in the international resources to the ―missing world of micro-finance, is meso-finance, middle,‖ meso-finance offers an opportunity often referred to as the ―missing middle.‖ to multiply the benefits of microfinance and
Meso-finance is, in some sense, a graduated promote prosperity and growth on a vast version of microfinance. It seeks to reach out scale, by encouraging expansion of the to those beyond small enterprises that are also normal business sector and opening up in need of funding. Unlike small and medium- employment opportunities. Obviously sized businesses that can access the market extending loans into the $10,000+ range for funding in industrialized nations, those in creates additional risk but ultimately, there poor countries are often left without access to will have to be willing venture capitalists and capital or the institutional guidance needed to investors to help build and support local expand their businesses. With increased infrastructure so that it can foster sustainable funding, meso-finance allows for substantial development. Still, in order for economic resources to expand business and generate development to take place, capital needs to be jobs. Employment opportunity provides an built, and people need to invest; a certain increased economic growth potential for the amount of sacrifice and risk are necessary to entire country, not just for a percentage of 29 Surowiecki, James. "What Microloans Miss." The individuals within the country. ―Sustained New Yorker 17 Mar. 2008. 05 Feb. 2010
ensure future gains. Meso-finance will help which is to promote sustainable economic small and medium enterprises grow, which development. Under the Marshall Plan the could then form productive economic focus of the aid from the US government was organizations that will expand into to boost economic development and business
―complementary arrangements such that the sectors in order to stimulate industrialization product of the whole…[society]…exceeds the and promote growth throughout European sum of what can be produced by its parts‖— countries. In addition to transferring technical small micro-businesses.30 assistance and efficient business models, the
A Model for US Aid to Effectively Promote US reduced trade barriers. The end result was
Economic Growth an unprecedented period of growth and
In their book The Aid Trap, Glenn prosperity for all participants.
Hubbard and William Duggan suggest that If the US could refocus some of its the Marshall Plan, which was implemented efforts on collaborating with local actors to after WWII to resuscitate and rebuild an locate viable business models based on local economic foundation for Europe, offers a structures and find organizations to support model of how aid can be used to support the entrepreneurial activity, a similar model to the business sector and bring people out of Marshall Plan could be replicated in poverty. This is not to dismiss the necessity of developing countries to promote growth and
―charity‖ aid, which helps to meet peoples prosperity. Although Hubbard and Duggan most basic needs in the most desperate times. recognize that most poor countries today are
It is simply to suggest that there is another living in a very different environment than crucial goal for aid that deserves attention, that which existed in post-WWII Europe, they
30 Bates, Robert H. Prosperity and Violence The argue that a similar model could be tailored to Political Economy of Development. Boston: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. p. 101. Page | 96
the needs of poor countries today on a large its commitment to the global fight against enough scale to make a real difference in the terrorist networks, and rebuild a shattered lives of the global poor. Haiti, it is critical that an assessment be made
Conclusion to evaluate the effectiveness of current
This chapter has examined the development efforts. With a great deal of ineffective approaches of the aid regime that criticism, and perhaps lost faith in our have been primarily based on the intention and our ability, at the closure of the
―Washington Consensus‖ model. This model controversial occupation in Iraq, it is has failed to address the specific needs of absolutely essential that from this point local communities within the developing forward that our limited aid resources be world by enforcing policies based on top- utilized for projects that are not only effective down approach. US development policy in the short-term, but are also sustainable in directed the overwhelming majority of the long run. We have learned from past resources towards ―charity aid‖, which fails to efforts that without incorporating the local promote economic growth. There has been a communities in which we implement our recent trend, through Community Driven projects, and without gaining their support,
Development projects and micro/meso- the success rate dramatically decreases, and finance to involve and give voice to local there is a much higher likelihood of wasted populations who are ultimately the real efforts. If the US hopes to effectively utilize
―experts‖ in sustainable growth due to their our limited resources for the long-term invaluable and irreplaceable local knowledge. betterment of the developing world, it must
As the Obama Administration looks to begin by adopting development polices that increase its presence in Afghanistan, reaffirm
Page | 97
place local interests and needs at the center of intervention efforts in failed states.
Page | 98
Works Cited
Bajak, Frank, and Paisley Dodds. "Haiti Gives Conflicting Counts for Quake Deaths." New York Times 10 Feb. 2010. 16 Feb. 2010
Bates, Robert H. Prosperity and Violence The Political Economy of Development. Boston: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
Boudreaux, Karol, and Tyler Cowen. "The Micromagic of Microcredit." The Wilson Quarterly. Winter 2008. 8 Feb. 2010
DeYoung, Karen, and Walter Pincus. "Iraq Auditor Warns of Waste, Fraud in Afghanistan." The Washington Post 2 Feb. 2009. 22 Jan. 2010
Easterly, William Russell. White man's burden why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. New York: Penguin P, 2006.
Echanove, Matias, and Rahul Srivastava. "Eight Ways to Rebuild Haiti." New York Times 16 Jan. 2010. 25 Jan. 2010
Fukuyama, Francis. "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda." School of Advanced International Studies Review, at Johns Hopkins University XXII (2002): 23-36.
Judis, John. "War on Global Terrorism was Destined to Fail." The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. 09 Sept. 2005. 16 Feb. 2010.
Moyo, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How there Is a Better Way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009.
National Solidarity Programme. 2008. NSP Afghanistan. 28 Jan. 2010
"Philippines: Community-Driven Development Strategy Frees Poor Samar Town from the Scourge of Floods." The World Bank. 25 Jan. 2010.
"Social Capital in Operations." The World Bank. 25 Jan. 2010.
Surowiecki, James. "What Microloans Miss." The New Yorker 17 Mar. 2008. 05 Feb. 2010
Tavernise, Sabrina. "Afghan Enclave Offers Model to Rebuild and Rebuff Taliban." New York Times 12 Nov. 2009. 09 Jan. 2010
Williams, Timothy. "US Fears Iraq Will Not Keep Up Rebuild Projects." The New York Times 20 Nov. 2009. 26 Jan. 2010
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The Regional Dynamics Imperative Addressing the Exogenous Aspects of State Failure
Rachel Proefke
Page | 101
Introduction failure in each case, examining state failure at
As this report argues, it has become the sub-state level, the state level, and the increasingly evident that the US must address super-state level. The super-state level has the root causes of state failure as opposed to often been left out of this analysis. However, simply ―treating its symptoms;‖ the greater as the super-state level is an integral incorporation of the analytics of regional dimension in state failure, an examination of dynamics in US policy towards failed states is state failure on this level is critical to US an important element of this principle. Policy attempts to ameliorate these situations. At the towards failed states has often treated state super-state level, the US must consider and failure as monolithic and as isolated to a specifically address the regional dynamics particular state, except when it spreads across and regional political economies that borders. However, this treatment often does engender, exacerbate, and perpetuate state not reflect significant aspects of the failure. Regional dynamics of power often development and persistence of state failure create political imperatives that extend that extend beyond the traditional boundaries beyond the borders of the failed state, of the state. State failure is often in part implicating neighboring states. Similarly, produced and sustained by the regional regional political economies structure and dynamics that the state is immersed in. The restructure economic incentives within and
US should incorporate considerations of the beyond the failed state, creating direct complex regional actuality of state failure into disincentives for neighboring states to address its policies in these instances. and rectify state failure. It is vital that the US
The US must conduct multiple levels develop an analysis of the complex regional of analysis to distill the character of state
Page | 102
dynamics that each case of state failure is regional aspects of state failure cannot be implicated in. separated from a state-level analysis. Because
Why Do We Care? The Regional of this, the US must envision state failure in a
Dimensions of State Failure manner that accounts for how regional
The Regional Character of State Failure dynamics are often implicated in state failure.
Precisely because many instances of Instead, these complex, state failure involve regional dimensions, the multidimensional problems must be addressed
US must give more attention to the with multifaceted solutions, especially in the case of regional complicated interconnections between failed ●●● …the US must give states and their neighbors in addition to aspects of state more attention to the 2 examining the instance of the passive failure. This is an complicated interconnections especially paramount entanglement of regional actors in state between failed states consideration in the and their neighbors failure. Many aspects of state failure have in addition to regional dimensions that do not fit neatly into context of conflict in examining the instance of the either an assessment of the failed state in state failure but also passive bears relevance to the entanglement of isolation or an assessment of the region as a regional actors in whole. Instead, state failure often represents regional political state failure ●●● complex, hybrid, regional issues that can be economies that state best thought of as transnational in character.1 failure is enmeshed in. Currently, state failure
Essential to a comprehension of the character and the war economies that are often related of state failure, the US must recognize that the with such a condition are momentous in that
1 Micheal E. Brown. ―New Global Dangers,‖ Leashing 2 Micheal E. Brown. ―New Global Dangers,‖ Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela AA (Washington, DC: United States and Pamela AA (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2007) 43. Institute for Peace, 2007) 48. Page | 103
they are at once both local and dependent on towards failed states will miss crucial factors transnational connection, built on chains and in state failure that remain unaddressed only lines of plunder, black market transactions, to engender instability again and counteract and external assistance that extend beyond the US efforts. In addition, the US has other borders of the state itself and implicating extenuating interests in addressing the other surrounding states.3 An examination of regional causes of state failure and its the regional dynamics at work in and persistence, especially because they imply a undergirding state failure is therefore a greater level of instability than that limited to necessary element in addressing state failure the state itself. Regional instabilities create in the present. the potential for the ―epidemic‖ spread of the
US Interests elements of state failure - many of which
Noting that state failure often involves directly jeopardize US security and economic the causal element of regional dynamics, the interests. Containing the situation of state
US must maintain a super-state level of failure involves particularly an examination of analysis in the examination of state failure. the complex regional dynamics that state
Without this perspective, attempts at failure is immersed in and tends to spread counteracting state failure neglect some of the along. Similarly, regions of instability create integral reasons for its development and thus larger and more vulnerable areas for the cannot fully resolve this problem. Without scourges of humanitarian crises. This concern sensitivity to regional dynamics, US policy registers strongly with the US‘s commitment
to democratic and humanitarian ideals across
3 Cynthia J. Arnson. ―The Political Economy of War: the globe. Situating the Debate,‖ Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), 2. Page | 104
Regional Incentives state failure not only highlights the effects of
The US must work to understand state external actors on the production of state
failure in its regional context if the roots of failure but also begins to account for the
state failure are to be distilled and then dealt complicated and consistent incursion of
with. The US should internalize a dissection regional dynamics into instances of state
and address of the different motivations that failure. The incentives, capacities, and
neighboring states have in these situations.4 opportunities within failed state are structured
Only if the continued interests and incentives strongly by other involved regional actors as
of neighboring states are addressed and well as through factors endogenous to the
counteracted in US policy can the state itself.5 The US should recognize that
perpetuation of state failure be arrested. such an analysis is necessary to disentangling
The US must utilize this examination state failure from its regional roots.
of regional dynamics to extract the incentives The US must internalize the political
of regional actors for the perpetuation of state and strategic incentives that structure
failure. Without neighboring states‘ involvement in the ●●● …the US must also addressing these propagation of instability and failure in account for economic incentives that war incentives, as has examining these instances. Often, economies create for regional actors often been the case in considerations for the political and strategic ●●● previous attempts to imperatives for involvement provided by
approach state failure, a number of the causes some of the aspects of failing states condition
for state failure will persist and engender 5 Ted Robert Gurr. ―Minorities, Nationalists, and further instability and state failure. Examining Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the Twenty-First Century,‖ Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester the intersection of regional dynamics and A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 4 Ibid. 2007) 149. Page | 105
the interactions of regional actors in state regional instability in the failed state.8 When failure. While external forces are occasionally permissive conditions for conflict already instrumental in engendering state failure, the exist in the target country, especially where deliberate actions of neighboring states in this is reflected as the commencement of state their own political and strategic interest are failure, the causal factors often involve the often of greater significance.6 In fact, this is deliberate actions by other governments for often the rule as opposed to the exception; political, economic, or ideological purposes of few instances of state failure are hermetically their own.9 Whether by direct action of the sealed. The vast majority both involve and government such as in Rwanda in the DRC or affect neighboring states, as they are parts of via decisions that allow for other non-state larger regional dynamics.7 This stems actors and agents to continue to destabilize precisely from the fact that state failure has the region such as in Pakistan in Afghanistan, palpable effects for neighbors as well. these policies must be addressed. Problems
However, while the effects of state that precipitate failure therefore come from failure on neighboring states provide these two directions that are mutually causal - from states with a stake in the situation, the within the state and as a product of responses are often not productive. Often neighboring states and other supra-state neighboring states are as much active regional actors,10 and each of these directions contributors to military escalation and involve political and strategic incentives.
8 Ibid. 6 Michael E. Brown. ―The Causes and Regional 9 Michael E. Brown. ―The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,‖ International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,‖ International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 571. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 580. 7 Michael E. Brown. ―The Causes and Regional 10 Michael E. Brown. ―The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,‖ International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,‖ International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 572. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 600. Page | 106
In addition the examination of the power, and even protection.12 Instead of political and strategic incentives of regional simply constituting the means to an end, the actors engaged in the production and capture of resources and commodities in the maintenance of state failure, the US must also regional political economies of conflict and account for economic incentives that war state failure rather often represent the economies create for regional actors. In objectives or ends of involvement in the state particular, the war economies that are often failure, therefore creating incentives and allowed by, and also help to produce, state disincentives. As regional actors become failure implicate the motivations of and invested in the profit production generated by intersections with regional actors. In the war these war economies, so too do the economic economy, the traditional objective of incentives these economies involve function defeating the enemy militarily is replaced strongly in conditioning decision-making and with economically-driven interests in creating the disincentive to furthering regional continued fighting and the institutionalization stability. of violence at what is, for the arbiters of Therefore, the instance of entering violence and predation, a profitable level of into war and conflict might not immediately intensity.11 Similarly, war does not always stem from anything other than political involve the breakdown of a particular system motivations; however, sometimes these but instead represents a mechanism for original agendas have mutated into conflicts creating an alternative system of profit, in which short-term economic benefits are the
paramount consideration of some, if not all,
11 Mats R. Berdal and David Malone. Greed and 12 David Keen. The Economic Functions of Violence in Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Ottawa: Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Development Research Centre, 2000) 2. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998): 11. Page | 107
parties to the conflict.13 Therefore, multiple the super-state dimensions of state failure if actors, including regional actors who have attempts to rectify state failure are to be dipped their hands into conflict, often have successful. In each case, strong political, more to gain from a continuation of conflict economic, and strategic incentives for than peace. They have an interest in initiating neighboring states to interact with the failing and sustaining it.14 US policy towards failed state, as well as prior transnational states must therefore not only address the connections, have structured the nature of incentives of continued conflict within the state failure and thus its recourse. In both state itself but must also be sensitive to the situations, these regional dynamics and incentives of external actors to perpetuate regional political economies that are state failure, or at least to continue to be unaddressed on the super-state level have led involved in state failure. When these channels to the persistence of certain dimensions of remain open, the actions of neighboring states state failure and the possibility of further continue to influence the possibilities for the instability. Therefore, both of these cases reinstatement of stability in the failed state. demonstrate that in approaching state failure,
What Has Been Done? Cases of the especially in the context of conflict, the US
Regional Dynamics of State Failure must have an analytical perspective that
The cases of state failure in the DRC incorporates this level of analysis. and Afghanistan offer examples of not only Restructuring the Regional War Economy: Afghanistan and Central Asia the role of regional dynamics in the State failure in Afghanistan reflects development and the persistence of state more than simply endogenous factors of state failure but also the necessity of considering capacity and willingness. The exogenous 13 Arnson: 17. 14 Collier. ―Doing Well Out of War: An Economic factors of regional economies and geopolitics Perspective‖: 96. Page | 108
have also served to exacerbate and structure state failure in Afghanistan. Trade in narcotics, the transit trade, and other economic circuits throughout the region as well as the policies of neighboring nations, particularly those of Pakistan that allow for the porous borders that precipitate transborder illicit trade and spillover,15 have directly influenced Afghanistan‘s failure.
Afghanistan‘s current situation also involves and refracts the complex interaction of US Source: "The World Factbook: Afghanistan". CIA. 14 Feb 2010 and Russian policy, in influences of Iranian
present.18 The US must focus more heavily on 15 Barnett R. Rubin. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan" (World Development 28. 10, 2000): 1794. 16 Barnett R. Rubin. "The Political Economy of War Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall and Peace in Afghanistan" (World Development 28. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 10, 2000): 1791. 2007) 108. 17 Mohammed Ayoob. ―State Making, State Breaking, 18Arpita Absu Roy. Challenges and Dilemmas of State- and State Failure,‖ Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Building in Afghanistan: Report of a Study Trip to Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Kabul (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2008) 63. Page | 109
integrating an examination of the complex but is not limited to an increase in the dynamics between Afghanistan and its following economic activities: the spread of regional neighbors into an analysis of state drugs, selling and smuggling of precious failure in Afghanistan. The lessons gained mineral materials, and the transit trade, which from such an analysis must also be reflected in particular has its roots in the demands of in the development of policies towards the Pakistani market. How Afghanistan fairs
Afghanistan, not only restructuring affects Pakistan‘s stability, mostly via trade
Afghanistan itself but also addressing the circuits20 incentives of its neighbors, such as Pakistan, In general, Afghanistan‘s geographic
Iran, and Saudi Arabia, in perpetuating state position and relations (both formal and failure. informal) with neighboring states has posited
Afghanistan is enmeshed in a larger Afghanistan as a trade bridge across the economy of war that has its roots in a conflict region, connecting the larger political that has been going on for over twenty years. economy of the region and thus heavily
A consequence of this economy of war structured by it and especially by the entities together with the break-down of political that use it as a bridge. Therefore, the stability in Afghanistan has been an increase economic situation of Afghanistan often of less formal economic practices that have reflects this regional dimension21 and been implicated in a larger regional economy development must be planned as a regional that the US must internalize in its assessment affair. Such an engagement of regional actors of state failure in Afghanistan.19 This includes and working from the existing entangling of
20 Sumit Ganguly. ―Conflict and Crisis in South and 19 Moonis Ahmar. The Challenge of Rebuilding Southwest Asia,‖ International Dimensions of Internal Afghanistan (Karachi: Program on Peace Studies and Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Conflict Resolution, Dept. of International Relations, Press, 1996) 166. Univ. of Karachi, 2006) 81-82. 21 Ahmar : 188. Page | 110
the economics in the region interests provides Afghanistan. 23 The historical and persistent an opportunity for greater regional integration roots of this regional element make such a of trade that benefits both Pakistan and focus an imperative as these factors have
Afghanistan in addition to its neighbors if this become entrenched in Afghanistan‘s political existing trade is channeled and retooled in the economy by product of this extended period. correct manner.22 In addition, such a regional Therefore, while considering economic perspective that hinges on ●●● reconstruction within this opportunities beneficial to Regional dynamics region, the US should involve a factor so strongly in all neighbors will the condition of multilateral, regional effort, Afghanistan that strengthen the stability of regional cooperation engaging all other actors who must be the first step the region and create the have the capacity to and have in the process of incentive for continued developing and already influenced reconstructing stability and the Afghanistan. Afghanistan‘s internal ●●● reinforcing of such economics, politics, and stability. The US should therefore support the security, such as Pakistan and Iran. greater integration of these transborder Regional economic dynamics that economies, channeled in more licit manners. persist as unaddressed by Afghanistan
Regional dynamics factor so strongly reconstruction, regional powers, and in the condition of Afghanistan that regional international donors has thus contributed to cooperation must be the first step in the the persistence of state failure in Afghanistan process of developing and reconstructing
23 Barnett R. Rubin. The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New 22 Ahmar: 209. Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 145. Page | 111
in a number of dimensions.24 Notably, parallel political economies both within and
Pakistan, in addition to Afghanistan‘s other between the two. In this case then, an neighbors, has both indirectly and directly examination of the characteristics of exploited the internal fragmentation and inter- Pakistan‘s policy that influence the state of group rivalry in Afghanistan to advance its Afghanistan must be internalized into US own strategic interests.25 In general, policy towards state failure within
Pakistan‘s actions have fueled the complex Afghanistan. The product of this enmeshed enmeshing of the two states and produced the and mutually-effective relationship requires a circular and mutual exchange of instability. policy attention that is not limited to
For example, Pakistan‘s own actions served to Afghanistan alone. Instead, the US must treat restructure civil society relationships in both Pakistan as both a cause of Afghanistan‘s nations by sidelining its own civil society. failure and instability and as a source of
This policy engendered a civil society that future instability. However, by incorporating was politicized and alienated from the state as Pakistan and its incentives into the dialogues well as creating the circumstances for its concerning Afghanistan, and extending this incursion in Afghanistan.26 More generally, pattern to other stronger regional actors such
Pakistan‘s foreign, military, economic, and as Iran, the US can capitalize on the fact that domestic policy often impinge on Afghanistan it is in the interest of both of these states to as well in a manner that each of these work for greater stability in Afghanistan27 that elements has further exacerbated the untamed is supported as opposed to antagonized by
24 Paula R. Newberg. ―Surviving State Failure: Internal persistent regional dynamics. War and Regional Conflict in Afghanistan‘s Neighborhood,‖ Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, ed. Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005) 225. 27 Barnett R. Rubin. "The Political Economy of War 25 Ahmar: 209. and Peace in Afghanistan" (World Development 28. 26 Newberg: 222. 10, 2000): 1799. Page | 112
but also reflect the dimensions and
characteristics of how this state failure has
manifested. Instead of addressing the DRC in
the traditional sense, the historically regional
Complicated Regional Economic and character of state failure in the DRC must be Political Incentives: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central Africa internalized in the address of state failure in
this case. What collapsed in the Congo in the
early 1990s were not simply the formal state
structures of the DRC but rather the
complicated webs of patronage networks and
links with external actors that the state
functioning of the DRC was predicated on.28
Therefore, the concept of merely state-level
failure is not apt at describing state failure in
this case or prescribing the methods of
redress.
Source: "The World Factbook: Democratic Republic of Therefore, as opposed to the isolated Congo". CIA. 14 Feb 2010
Addressing the root causes of conflict and failure in the DRC reflect several factors that
state failure within the Democratic Republic are not limited to the state itself or
of the Congo (DRC) likewise requires a demarcated by the traditional boundaries of
super-state level of analysis. The US‘s
28 approach must reflect not only the incentives s and Dunn: 128. Boaz Atzili. "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict" (International and interests of regional actors in state failure Security. 31. 3, 2007) 158. Page | 113
states. Instead, predominantly the most recent restructuring ●●● period of conflict in the DRC, spanning from incentives and The most recent 1998 to 2003, was characterized by relations of period of conflict in the DRC, spanning unprecedented political and military power in from 1998 to 2003, was characterized by involvement of outside forces, involving a manners that the unprecedented multiplicity of states within the Central US must address political and military involvement of African region in a tangled web of incentives if state failure in outside forces ●●● and intentions.29 Additionally, even after the this case is to be settlement of this conflict, these persistent and ―treated.‖ Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, unaddressed regional dynamics continue to Angola, and Namibia, have all given material precipitate greater instability in the DRC and support to at least one side of the conflict, and loom as dangers for further incursion of Rwanda and Uganda have intermittently neighboring interests into conflict in the DRC. controlled portions of the DRC‘s territory
As the conditions of state failure in the DRC with their own armies. By intersecting with therefore reflect a more complicated situation local and national processes, regional actors above the national level, so too then must US fomented the militarization of politics to a responses to state failure in this region reflect hitherto unprecedented degree, both a critical consciousness towards the regional exacerbating and perpetuating the dynamics dynamics of the Central African region. of state failure within the DRC.30 For
In addition, from 1994 on external example, the influence of these regional
(and violent) actors have directly influenced powers, particularly in the case of Rwanda, and shaped political outcomes in the country, indirectly involved the exclusion of the
29 s and Kevin C. Dunn. African DRC‘s civilian political actors from any Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine (Boulder: L. Rienner, 2007) 113. 30 Ibid. Page | 114
meaningful participation in shaping the incapability or unwillingness to do so. The country‘s future. These actions have thus African Union‘s (AU) Peacekeepers could be perpetuated the militarization of politics an integral tool. Regional organizations, such within the DRC, a characteristic that as the AU and the Great Lakes Group, engenders a fundamentally instable political provide useful opportunities to counter the system even into the post-conflict present. regional dynamics that engender state failure
While Rwanda was supposed to withdrawn its as these organizations both have the local forces following the ceasefire agreement knowledge required to address these signed in Lusaka in 2002, the UN Mission situations and also cannot afford to ignore the
(MONUC) has reported a continued Rwandan problems at their doorsteps.33 Also, the US presence.31 Likewise, disarmament and should advocate for the increasing regional repatriation of foreign groups, notably dialogue through these mechanisms as
Rwanda and Uganda, was supposed to occur paralleled by regional partnerships among per peace terms but has not yet occurred.32 states. As well, the US should assist these
Despite the stated security concerns on behalf organizations in upgrading and deepening of these nations, this removal is an essential to their capacities - the crucial flaw (as opposed fostering stability in the DRC. to having the mandate to engage in the
The US should support this action by situation of state failure in this context) of providing assistance and strengthening the attempts to negotiate state failures through capacity of regional organizations to do so and also to help police the borders of the these states where state forces have either the 33 Paul F. Diehl. ―New Roles for Regional Organizations,‖ Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall 31 Turner: 8. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 32Turner: 140. 2007) 539. Page | 115
these organizations.34 However, as these following previous models.35 In post-1989 organizations often have limited resources Africa power sharing as the ur-text of political and power, the US should support and assist solutions to state failure characterized by their efforts. conflict has been a low-key and low-stakes
In addition to prescribing a particular engagement strategy in a region not always perspective for the US, the importance of recognized for the imperative consideration it these regional dynamics in the DRC‘s failure represents.36 However, often in failing to and conflicts mandates certain policies. address the organic dynamics of state failure,
Particularly notable is the possibility of such a solution often serves to further traditional solutions to the partitioning of complicate the problem of state failure as political power within the DRC. Often the opposed to stabilizing it. In failing to address political solution to conflict and state failure the incentives and causality of regional actors, in Africa since 1989 has been power sharing. power sharing does not address the factors of
This is mostly a product of the conception of state failure. These considerations are a vital the lack of vital national interest at stake in lesson on the imperative that the US instead the Central African region that structures the work to incorporate all actors, not just reluctance to intervene either coercively or national and sub-state, into the process of non-coercively in these conflict and instead to resolution. create low-efficacy, low-effort policies In the DRC, power sharing has
involved only the national dimensions of state
failure, neglecting the addition levels of state
34Chester A. Crocker. ―The Place of Grand Strategy, Statecraft, and Power in Conflict Management,‖ 35 David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild. The Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United University Press, 1998) 289. States Institute of Peace, 2007) 362. 36 s and Dunn: 129. Page | 116
failure. Notably, regional players have been condition of the DRC. In failing to address excluded and neglected in the process of these dimensions, these causes of state failure crafting a political solution. In the DRC, persist. Therefore, power sharing as a political political solutions of external conflict brokers tool not only reflects the ineptitude of such a have failed to address the most powerful prescription to solve the present crisis but also player in the conflict, Rwanda.37 Also, to precipitates incentives to future conflicts as some extent, the recurrent use of power well. Instead, the political solutions for state sharing in the 1990s for the sake of peace has failure must reflect a consciousness of instead created an incentive structure for regional dynamics within state failure; state would-be insurgents to use violence to fight failure must also be addressed above the state power or at least to receive a seat at the vantage point of the state in isolation. bargaining table.38 In addition, this incentive In addition to its lack of intention to structure has meant that it is not even relinquish its indirect political control in the necessary often for insurgents to encode their Kivu province, the Rwandan presence in the struggles in ideological pretenses but rather DRC reflects the predatory economic allows for simply raw military power, objectives of remaining at least indirectly magnifying the destruction of state failure in embroiled in the state failure of the DRC. conflict. The same lessons on the impunity of Therefore, Rwanda‘s culpability has involved actors that contribute to state failure are both political and economic spoils generated present in this solution in its exclusion of from the persistence of conflict in the DRC. regional actors, neglecting to address how Most recently, Rwanda benefited from the
Rwanda‘s and Uganda‘s actions structured the sharing of resources from violent resource
exploitation per its links with the RCD rebel 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. Page | 117
group in the DRC with Kigali. Reports have Kivu province.40 As such, the US‘s policy
shown that Rwanda has gained more from towards economic restructuring and
exploitative mineral resource extraction under development in the DRC must address these
conflict than the insurgents it has supported, regional economic incentives in addition to
perennially deriving its junior partner of any determining a better character of mineral
significant share in resources and resource extraction and the siphoning of
39 ●●● prerogatives. resource revenues within the DRC itself. The Access to the Rwanda‘s US should advocate for and support efforts to economic resources of illicit trade has economic certify and privatize the DRC‘s natural played an important and observable role incentive in the resources. This process would wrest control in the nature, DRC therefore from the grasping hands of neighboring states duration, and intensity of conflict involves not only that profit from the DRC‘s instability. and state failure… ●●● engaging in the In Summation
conflict but also its persistence. Similarly, In the case of both the DRC and
both Rwanda and Uganda have been cited as Afghanistan, state failure, particularly in
noting pressing security concerns for entering terms of governance, has been militarily,
into and continuing their presence in the politically (in terms of other state‘s actions),
DRC. However, both nations have benefitted and economically feasible and profitable.41
from the situation of state failure and conflict Access to the economic resources of illicit
as an opportunity to indirectly yet materially trade has played an important and observable
capitalize on the plundering of gold, role in the nature, duration, and intensity of
diamonds, and colombo-tantalite in the conflict and state failure, contested and/or
eastern portion of the DRC, particularly the 40 Turner: 162-163. 39 s and Dunn: 127. 41 Arnson: 10. Page | 118
reinforced by the actions of regional actors at incorporate these dimensions therefore into the super-state level as well as within the state tactics of recovery. itself.42 In fact, the capacity of actors within the state to realize income from legal and illegal primary commodities depends integrally on transborder relationships that What Can Be Done Differently? Towards a Regional-Dynamics Approach extend beyond the state‘s porous 43 Options boundaries. These relationships implicate While addressing the regional neighboring states in the region of state dynamics of state failure is imperative, the failure that the US must also address in policy manner that the US structures its role in the to counteract the causes of state failure in response to these issues is malleable based on these situations. This turns the continuation of how the US conceives of the threat of each failure into an avenue to self-enrichment and case of state failure to national security and political ends.44 Notably, if the opportunities US interests. The US may either take a that create incentives for war and state leadership role in addressing the regional failure‘s continuation are unaddressed in the aspects of a case of state failure or may take a event settlement and recovery, these more indirect, but nonetheless pressing, opportunities persist to shape, distort, and approach by supporting, assisting, and pervert the establishment of the postwar encouraging the actions of others that reflect a economic order.45 The US must consciously sensitivity to the unique conditions that
regional dynamics in state failure present.
42 Arnson: 7-8. Where the US‘s interests and security are the 43 Arnson: 8. 44 Arnson: 11. vital consideration in a particular case the 45 Arnson: 12. Page | 119
former of these approaches will be As state failure does not always conform to traditional state implemented; where the US‘s interests and boundaries, and as state failure often involves other regional actors, the US security are a more marginal concern must give attention to the regional dynamics that in part cause and regarding a case of state failure, the latter of exacerbate state failure. these will function more strongly. As regional political economies structure and transform economic incentives within failed states, the US Recommendations approach to failed states must involve sensitivity to, and a restructuring of, To fully address the causes of state the counterproductive aspects of regional political economies to state failure, the US must examine such cases at the stability. Such a consideration is vital to economic development, aid, and super-state level in addition to the state-level institution-building if these are to be successful at achieving their and the sub-state level. The incorporation of respective intended goals. the super-state level into the analysis of cases In situations where state failure reflects larger regional dynamics, the of state failure provides a set of causes for US should work towards and support the greater integration of regional state failure‘s perpetuation as well as its actors into political resolutions of state failure. development. If neglected, these conditions o The US should address regional will only serve to further destabilize the actors as factors in the development and persistence of regions in which state failure presents its, state failure and therefore must consider these features in the entrench state failure further, and counteract amelioration of such a situation. measure taken to ameliorate the condition of o Also, the US should involve regional actors in partnering to state failure. These causes therefore lend an turn around state failure. When integrally involved in such a additional set of recommendations to the US‘s process, they can be a source of continued support for the approach to state failure. propagation of state stability, reinforcing the process of engendering state success. General Recommendations
Page | 120
Containment of state failure and establishing basic security requires o Similarly, the US should work to sensitivity to the manner in which more comprehensively integrate state failure is enmeshed within regional players, such as Iran, into regional dynamics. This characteristic efforts to address state failure in of state failure enables the spread of Afghanistan. The resources, failure to other states and jeopardizes incentives, and influence that Iran regional stability more generally, and represents must be incorporated therefore the US should conduct such into a US strategy to address an analysis as an integral component Afghanistan. of fighting state failure. Central Africa Case-Specific Recommendations Afghanistan-Pakistan and Central Asia The US should advocate for harnessing the DRC‘s mineral Economic development within resources for the general population Afghanistan must take into account and for the nation with a focus on not the larger war economy that only developing the capacity of the Afghanistan is implicated in. DRC to properly manage and police mineral resources but also prevent the o The US must account for regional predatory and militarized extraction trade circuits across and within both by internal and external actors. and across Afghanistan and that characterize the economic o The Kimberley certification incentives in the region. process coupled with a privatization scheme modeled after o The US should emphasize the Botswana‘s Debswana can also useful tools of greater trade help to divest regional actors from integration and harness and profiting from the DRC‘s natural rechannel the capital of these resources as well as decreasing preexisting trade circuits to address internal instability and predation. the regional war economy. (See DRC Case Study for further details.) Regional actors, such as Pakistan, that have a stake in Afghanistan must be In discouraging the continued integrated into attempts at supporting unproductive interjection of increased state stability in neighboring states into the affairs of Afghanistan. This will both target the the DRC, the US should advocate for sources of state instability and buttress the increased engagement of these redress. regional actors in the process of stabilizing the DRC. o The US should work to develop the cooperation of Pakistan in these o As opposed to power sharing efforts by addressing Pakistan‘s between insurgent groups and the economic and political incentives to official state government, the US perpetuate such as situation. should press for the involvement
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of Rwanda and Uganda in all political negotiations and resolution tactics. Strengthening the position of these states in partnering for the increased stability of the DRC is essential to rectifying state failure in this case. o The US should advocate for and support all attempts to hold Rwanda and Uganda accountable as actors who have both directly and indirectly acted to destabilize the DRC and perpetuate the violent conflict there. With their current impunity, there is no disincentive to capitalize on continued failure in the DRC. The US should therefore use its international and diplomatic position to work to hold these regional actors accountable for contributing to both state failure in the DRC and its persistence. o Because the failure of the state in this case represents a distinctly regional complex of problems, the US should support the efforts of regional institutions to ameliorate the situation in the DRC. As the African Union (AU) has both the mandate and the interest to stabilize the DRC, the US should assist and strengthen the AU‘s capacity to address state failure there. Similarly, the US should work to strengthen the capacity of the Great Lakes Group and provide much-needed technical assistance.
Page | 122
Works Cited Ahmar, Moonis. The Challenge of Rebuilding Afghanistan. Karachi: Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Dept. of International Relations, Univ. of Karachi, 2006. Print.
Arnson, Cynthia J. ―The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate.‖ In Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed. Ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005. 1-22. Print.
Atzili, Boaz. "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict." International Security. 31. 3 (2007): 139-173. Print.
Ayoob, Mohammed. ―State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure.‖ In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. 95-114. Print.
Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2000.
Bøa‘s, Morten, and Kevin C. Dunn. African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine. Boulder: L. Rienner, 2007. Print.
Brown, Michael E. ―The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict.‖ In International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Ed. Michael E. Brown. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 571-601. Print.
Brown, Michael E. ―Introduction.‖ In International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Ed. Michael E. Brown. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 1-31. Print.
Brown, Michael E. ―New Global Dangers.‖ In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. 39-51. Print.
Crocker, Chester A. ―The Place of Grand Strategy, Statecraft, and Power in Conflict Management.‖ In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. 355-367. Print.
Diehl, Paul F. ―New Roles for Regional Organizations.‖ In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. 535-551. Print.
Ganguly, Sumit. ―Conflict and Crisis in South and Southwest Asia.‖ In International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Ed. Michael E. Brown. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. 141-172. Print.
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Gurr, Ted Robert. ―Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the Twenty-First Century.‖ In Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007. 131-160. Print.
Lake, David A. and Donald S. Rothchild. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. Print.
Keen, David. The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.
Kennes, Erik. ―The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need.‖ In Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed. Ed. Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005. 140-177. Print.
Lake, David A., and Donald S. Rothchild. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. Print.
Nest, Michael Wallace, Francois Grignon, and Emizet F. Kisangani. The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 2006.
Newberg, Paula R. ―Surviving State Failure: Internal War and Regional Conflict in Afghanistan‘s Neighborhood.‖ In Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed. Ed. Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005. 206-233. Print.
Roy, Arpita Basu. Challenges and Dilemmas of State-Building in Afghanistan: Report of a Study Trip to Kabul. Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2008. Print.
Rubin, Barnett R. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan." World Development 28. 10 (2000): 1789-1803. Print.
Rubin, Barnett R. The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Print.
Turner, Thomas. The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality. London: Zed Books, 2007. Print.
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Looking Forward Grasping Opportunity in the Event of a Failed North Korean State
Amanda Shockley
North Korea lives apart from the It is necessary for the United States to world system, anchored in the fabrications consider the actions it would take in the event invented by the propaganda machine of the of North Korea‘s failure, in particular because
Kim regime which suffocates its people and of the geopolitical situation of the Korean has forced the country to hang over the edge peninsula, and its strategic role in Northeast of complete failure. While prospects for the Asian affairs, in conjunction with the US country are uncertain, the United States must interests in strategic and humanitarian be prepared for North Korea‘s failure, as the concerns. stakes in its own interests and for the US interests in North Korea international community are exceedingly The failure of North Korea presents a great. challenge, but also an opportunity for the
For this policy report on failed states, United States to strengthen the economic and
Succeeding Failure : A Comprehensive political situation of Northeast Asia, while
Approach to Strengthening Fragile States, simultaneously achieving its own interests.
North Korea has been included, despite the By American interests, this report refers to its fact it has not yet failed. It shows the primary concerns as: possibilities that exist for the United States to Ensuring the safety of the American implement our described principles using this people from weapons of mass specific country as a theoretical case study. destruction and a country with a Although experts cannot predict what North foundation based upon aggressive Korea will do in the future, its position on our militarization parabola is that of a country that threatens to Eradicating poverty and securing the descend in a downward spiral towards failure. North Korean livelihood, in order to
Page | 126
lay the foundation for long-term dangerous externalities such as allowing
development based upon American millions of soldiers to exist in such an
altruist ideals unstable country. However, rapid
Strengthening ties with allies to demilitarization would be at the cost of
maintain order and key relationships internal stability, and the United States must
in the economically and geopolitically learn from the mistakes in Iraq. We must
strategic area of Northeast Asia refrain from leaving such a large, skilled part
of the population disenfranchised and Strategically North Korea is of primary unemployed. concern to the US, and it is of interest to Immense human suffering has ensure the American people‘s safety through occurred on the disarmament and gradual demilitarization. ●●● As one of the most Korean peninsula. Most Americans are aware of the dangers of militarized countries One of the United in the world, North the weapons of mass destruction in the hands Korea must be States primary of the Kim regime. Even more frightening is demilitarized in order to promote a concerns should the possibility that upon failure, these greater peace in be to increase in Northeast Asia... terrifying weapons may end up in the hands ●●●
the standard of of radical groups that could be a direct threat living of North Korean citizens based upon to the security of the people of the United universally accepted ideas that people have States. the right to live healthy and prosperous lives. As one of the most militarized countries in Alleviating poverty is also an essential first the world, North Korea must be demilitarized step towards a developed society. It allows in order to promote a greater peace in the people to move away from merely focusing Northeast Asia, but slowly to avoid any
Page | 127
on their individual needs to survive, and current relationships in the region. We also permits for productive development as a seek to eventually unify the North Korean nation. peninsula, utilizing what our report,
The United States will have to be Succeeding Failure : A Comprehensive aware of their position in the delicate balance Approach to Strengthening Fragile States of powers that occupy Northeast Asia, in identifies as essential principles for assisting conjunction with following the United States‘ failed states, including: own interest. Consequently, the United States Create a sustainable and realistic cannot act unilaterally. It is in our best interest timeline based on careful planning and that the leadership burden is led by the South an acute understanding
Korea, a country that is not only our ally, but Promote a strategy not only with the also the most knowledgeable, and can obtain North Koreans, but one that focuses the legitimacy needed to successfully on international multilateralism and intervene in North Korea. In addition, it is incorporates South Korea and China important to be mindful of China‘s position as leaders and desires in the process of stabilizing and Establish security and stability rebuilding North Korea. The United States through disarmament of weapons of must not disregard its place in the process at mass destruction and gradual the cost of hardening tensions with this reduction of the North Korean military powerful nation-state. Alleviate suffering of the North
The ultimate goal of the United States Korean people through immediate in regards to North Korea is to create a stable humanitarian aid to lay the foundation and prosperous country while maintaining our for long term economic development
Page | 128
Build a sustainable open economic continue this dynastic legacy by passing on
structure that can provide an his position as North Korea‘s supreme leader
opportunity for investment and growth to one of his sons. However, this transition
Incorporate local actors through will be complex because his sons were absent
demystifying the Kim regime and from much of the elite policymaking circle,
integrating the citizens into a reformed and until recently, there was little public
economic and political system propaganda to set ●●● In a country where In order to effectively integrate these tools up such a transfer propaganda has built 1 a strong legacy that this paper separates the North Korean issue of power. In fuels legitimacy, a into two chronological periods: immediately such an event, it failed succession could be the event after failure and after stability is established. is imperative that that leads to disorder the collapse of its In these two periods this case study will the United States fragile order. ●●● explain the application of these principles in is prepared to act recommendations throughout the paper as swiftly to ensure that North Korea quickly they can be catered to these situations. recovers from their collapsed state.
In the scenario of complete collapse, Immediate Failure experts have predicted that country would Amidst concerns of the sustainability quickly fall into disorder. Different factions of North Korean dynastic authoritarian power, within the North Korean military elite would it appears the most likely trigger for the compete for control as result of the political government‘s demise would be due to a failed vacuum and upon being freed from the succession of Kim Jong-il. Based on precedent from his father, Kim Il-Sung, it is 1 Marcus Noland and Institute for International logical to presume that Kim would try and Economics (US). Korea after Kim Jong-Il. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. (2004): 2 Page | 129
regime‘s grasp refugees would flood the Korea ―wearing blue UN helmets3.‖ Though borders.2 After all, before development of the the United States will not take a leading role, country can occur security must be it must remember to utilize its own talents and established and the humanitarian issues must technology that may go beyond the be brought to a point of stability. In this capabilities of the other countries. situation, the importance of multilateral Military Stabilization cooperation cannot be stressed enough. The In the event of a collapse, pacifying
US must pay close attention to North Korea‘s the North Korea army will be one of the main geopolitical situation, working together with concerns of a stabilization effort. The chief countries with a stake in the process, in order of staff of the US Special Operations in South to effectively and efficiently lift North Korea Korea, Colonel David S. Maxwell, explained: out of failure and onto the path to The regime in Pyongyang could collapse without necessarily its army development. Particularly, as South Korea is corps and brigades collapsing…so we might have to mount a relief operation more knowledgeable about the region and has at the same time that we'd be conducting combat ops. If there is a direct stake in the health and progress of the anybody in the UN who thinks it will just be a matter of feeding people, North Korea, it is the natural leader of any they're smoking dope.4 multilateral effort. The initial collapse will be Not considering the effects of state collapse handled through a combined effort of the on the army would be a grave mistake, and
South Korean forces along with the US efforts must be made immediately in order to
Pacific Command (PACOM) and US Forces avoid dangerous situations.
Another reason that South Korea
would not be able to act unilaterally is that in 2 R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's catastrophic collapse." ATLANTIC MONTHLY 298.3 3 Ibid, 69 (2006): 67 4 Ibid, 68 Page | 130
addition to the enormous magnitude of this and in the case of resistance a stronger burden, recent political sentiment in the presence would be necessary.7 country has led to plans to reduce the South The United States must also learn
Korean military by 30 percent in the next from their experience in Iraq and understand decade.5 American forces would have no that dissembling a highly trained army may choice but to aid their ally, and the amount of not be the best solution, as it makes millions
American troops necessary for this action of people unemployed and indigent. Unlike would be quite large: Iraq, North Korea has confirmed stockpiles of
Based on previous experiences weapons of mass destruction, and it is elsewhere, the rule of thumb for the number of troops required for a important to maintain order as much as successful stability operations in a permissive environment is somewhere possible in this initial period of chaos to between five and ten per thousand people… successful operations would protect against a potentially devastating require between 115,000 to 230,000 military personal [sic].6 disaster. Colonel Maxwell stressed the
Even with these troop levels, the United importance of communicating with the army
States forces would confront a daunting task, before it becomes an impediment to as it is reported ―as many as five million of development by explaining "a successful
North Korea‘s citizens are under arms and relief operation would require making have for six decades been devoted to an contacts with KFR generals and various authoritarian regime.‖ Successful operations factions of the former North Korean military, are contingent on the fact that the North who would be vying for control in different would be cooperating with outside efforts, region‖, he continues, ―if the generals were
not absorbed into the operational command 5 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. structure of the occupying force, they might (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 2009): 21 6 Ibid, 21 7 Ibid, 20 Page | 131
form the basis of an insurgency.‖8 It is regime as feared, claiming ―that while the essential that this be a main goal of the initial special-operations forces live well, the action, because these high rankings military extreme poverty of conventional soldiers officials could not only create an insurgency, would make their loyalty to Kim Jong-il in a but also capitalize on the disorder to lay the difficult war questionable.‖10 While the groundwork for continuing the brutal regime special-operations forces may provide to be under their own power through the appeal to more of a challenge for troops, the demise of local authorities.9 Therefore, learning from the Kim regime could provide an opportunity mistakes in Iraq, the United States and its to change the allegiance of the regular stabilization forces must bring these groups soldiers that would greatly assist any onto their side before they become their attempted efforts, and the United States enemies. Although it will not be simple to should not ignore this opportunity to create a win over these forces, which were under the stable North Korean society. strict control of the regime for so many years, Humanitarian Concerns interviews with North Korean defectors reveal Immediately after collapse, in addition that the bonds with the regime and Kim Jong- to facing difficulties providing stability and il might not be impossible to break. Robert security, forces in North Korea would have to
Kaplan, noted correspondent for the Atlantic address the enormous humanitarian problems
Weekly, interviewed a defector that explained that already exist within the country, and that the soldiers might not be as tied to the would be inevitably intensify in the event of
8 R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: collapse. The issue that would be of biggest The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's catastrophic collapse." ATLANTIC MONTHLY 298.3 10 R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: (2006): 68 The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests 9 Scott Snyder. "North Korea's Challenge of Regime obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the catastrophic collapse." ATLANTIC MONTHLY 298.3 Future." Pacific Affairs 73.4 (2001): 525 (2006): 66 Page | 132
concern in the immediate aftermath of state North Korea determined to pursue its policy failure would be dealing with the fragile food of self-reliance, requested for foreign nations distribution system, which in all likelihood to stop their humanitarian efforts, although would collapse from the strain of political the country has never completely recovered unrest.11 from the effects of the devastating famine.
Currently, North Korea is on the brink Even now, the United Nations of famine, thus the failure of the state might Children‘s Fund (UNICEF), reports that, be the final straw in tumbling the people back ―each year some 40,000 children under five into dire conditions. In the nineties, North are becoming acutely malnourished, out of
Korea underwent a devastating famine that which 25,000 are admitted to hospitals for was a direct result of the regime‘s ruthless treatment.‖13 These conditions are only an policies and failed attempts to organize the example of the remaining undercurrent economy and agriculture under a self-reliant problems in North Korea, which will be communist system. Unfortunately for the exacerbated with disturbance to the current regime, and more importantly for its people, system. These conditions were created government control of the food distribution through poor economic decisions based on the system slowed delivery and productivity with regime‘s strict policy of self-reliance coupled devastating effects on the food supplies that with nature‘s harsh weather conditions. Even led to the death of millions from starvation.12 under the strict Kim regime, public unrest has
While outside support was utilized for food, developed because of concerns for health and
survival. One scholar contends that although 11 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 2009): 18 13 At a glance: Korea, Democratic People's Republic 12 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland. "Famine in of Korea, 6 November 2006, UNICEF, January 3 2010 North Korea Redux?" Journal of Asian economics.
these shortages fomented discontent within dangerous incidents in these areas will society, it was overwhelmed by the need for undoubtedly increase.15 The fear among basic necessities, and the ―1997 and 1998 experts concerning border security is that the
[food shortages] had contradictory influences loosening of the tight political grip on the on North Korean stability, increasing unrest people would send a flood of refugees to the over food shortages while effectively borders, threatening order in both China and eliminating the threat of political dissent in South Korea. As South Korea has been an favor of the more immediate challenge of important ally since the end of the Korean ensuring personal survival by foraging for War, it is vital that the United States does not food.‖14 In any effort, the famine and the ignore border conditions, and should prepare continuing food shortages are an important for any disturbances that may occur. In aspect to consider, as it is not possible to addition, the United States also maintains a change Korean society without dealing with delicate relationship with China, and should humanitarian concerns that will undoubtedly be wary of missteps that could result from an worsen in the case of complete failure, incorrect handling of initial border problems making it impossible for the North Korean amongst the chaos. people to focus on advanced development. For South Korea, while many would
Border Tensions be excited by the prospect of moving closer
In additional to the internal situation, towards a united Korea, others would the United States should be aware of military continue to be suspicious of the North, and disturbances on the borders resulting from the border tensions will be high during this initial heightened military alert. The risk of
15 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for 14 Scott Snyder. "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. Future." Pacific Affairs 73.4 (2001): 520 (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 17 Page | 134
period. Years of an unsteady armistice have from facing negative effects from the initial made many South Koreans suspicious of the failure of North Korea from a surge of
North, and it is important to closely watch the refugees that could later be an impediment to borders in order to maintain peace. Although their eventual unification.
South Korea would seemingly be more In addition to South Korea, the accepting of North Korean refugees than Chinese, who have maintained the closest ties other countries—many South Koreans have to the Kim Jong-il regime, would also relatives across the border and are eager to experience a surge in refugees. The Chinese see a united Korea—South Korean officials have previous experience with North Korean are also aware that this would put a great refugees from the famine in 1996, as there burden on the society. The Council on was a surge in refugee crossing to the
Foreign Affairs report on the matter remained People‘s Republic at Intojilin and Liaoning pessimistic about how far their effort could provinces as they searched for food.17 The go: Chinese can draw from actual experiences
Although Seoul has made plans to with North Korean refugees during such times provide care and housing using abandoned schools and other of crisis. Additionally, China holds the installations in the South Korean countryside and intends to harness the resources necessary to deal with humanitarian help of nongovernmental and private organizations, the difficult it has disasters, and a report on preparation for experienced in handling the few thousand refugees who have already North Korea‘s failure by the Council on left the North raises doubts about its ability to manage an influx of hundred Foreign Affairs explains that ―Beijing would of thousands.16 have the option of accepting and taking care The United States must assist South Korea in of these refugees, possibly by drawing on controlling its border to prevent its citizens
17 Scott Snyder. "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the 16 Ibid, 24 Future." Pacific Affairs 73.4 (2001): 523 Page | 135
many of the same internal resources that Russia, and North Korea intersect, with good allowed China to cope with its own natural port facilities on the Pacific.‖20 Whether this disasters, such as the recent earthquake in is a legitimate concern remains to be seen, but
Sichuan.‖18 However, the United States and the United States must be conscious of the
South Korea are suspicious of China‘s power that China has in the region, and strategic intentions over helping in a large attempt to coordinate actions as much as scale, therefore it is essential to promote possible, rather than make this situation an coordination at this time to avoid unnecessary international power struggle. In addition, the disturbances. Furthermore, it it is uncertain United States‘ force should be aware in North whether China would aid these refugees as it Korea that internal political factions might is unenthusiastic to help North Korean start border disputes in attempts to strengthen refugees amongst fears that ―eventually [these their power.21 Although this is not an refugees may] demand greater autonomy from exhaustive list of the issues that the United the central government‖ as well as become a State would encounter in an attempt to large economic burden.19 China has often stabilize a collapsed North Korean state, it accepted defectors from the North by highlights some of the concerns such an effort claiming they would be sent back after a would immediately face. regime collapse "in order to build a favorable political base for China's gradual economic takeover of the Tumen River region — the
20 R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: northeast Asian river valley where China, The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's catastrophic collapse." ATLANTIC MONTHLY 298.3 18 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for (2006): 68 Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in 21 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 18 North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. 19 Ibid, 20 (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 17 Page | 136
Undeniably, the issue of North Korean peninsula upon regime change in the
Korean refugees will be of primary ●●● North, the resounding While sovereign concern in the immediate aftermath countries should be consensus among of state failure, and the United States able to determine the most scholars and particular course of must keep these delicate situations in action within their officials from the own borders, the mind as they help build order. It is United States must do United States, South essential that from the beginning the its part in helping Korea, and even, ensure the security United States promote a multilateral and order of the North Korea, is that border in the initial approach to fixing these problems, aftermath to reach a the ultimate goal is instead of relying on individual point where reunification. development may countries‘ actions. While sovereign begin. Unfortunately, ●●● countries should be able to determine unification is a goal the particular course of action within their that will have to remain in the background, as own borders, the United States must do its the reality is that unification between the two part in helping ensure the security and order Koreas cannot occur without significant of the border in the initial aftermath to reach a reforms in North Korea even after point where development may begin. stabilization.
Long-term goal: Unification Bound by war history, the United
After the immediate concerns States naturally must have a part in the associated with the collapse of the North unification process of the two Koreas.
Korea state are dealt with the real challenge Although the combat of the Korean War has of development begins. Although there has long ceased, sentiment in both Koreas still often been discourse about the future of the points blame in the direction of the American
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aggressors that unwillingly separated the caused Koreans so much trauma in the past.23 country for their Cold War aims. In both While the North and South do not always
Koreas ―it is an article of faith that the United agree on all issues, both remain intent placing
States deserves the principal blame for the blame for their broken ties upon the United division of the peninsula and thus has a States. Therefore, whether the United States special responsibility for helping to restore agrees with their analysis or not, in order to national unity.‖22 This conflict set the stage maintain our valuable relationship with South for the world‘s emerging national order that Korea, it is essential that we help oversee the seated the world‘s superpowers, the United eventual unification of the peninsula.
States and the Soviet Union, in a struggle for While the international community dominance of the international system. Korea will certainly be interested in any prospects was the first in several conflicts that would for unification, South Korea has the legitimate emerge during the period of the Cold War, but claim, strengthened by international law, to regardless of the supposedly noble intentions legally absorb of its northern neighbor. It is of the Americans, the brutal Korean War left written in Article Three of the South Korea scars that both Koreas feel they have the constitution that it may exercise the right to obligation to heal. North and South Koreans reproduce the entire peninsula in order to start alike argue that the war was not conducted in preparations for unification.24 However, their name, but rather to protect American rather than immediately absorbing its the strategic interests in East Asia, in particular fragile neighbor, a more gradual approach to the developing Japanese archipelago that unification would be more realistic, as the
23 Ibid, 102 24 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for 22 Selig S. Harrison. Korean endgame : a strategy for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in reunification and US disengagement. Princeton, N.J.: North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. Princeton University Press, 2002: 102 (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 25 Page | 138
Council on Foreign Relations report movements of people as well as
Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea uncontrollable demands for economic aid and writes: legal, administrative problems of absorbing a
Seoul, in conjunction with any large and economically backward North.‖27 residual authority remaining in the North, might choose to manage this in South Korea is currently unprepared for the stages or at least to slow down the pace of absorption through an interim vast set of changes that would occur would it confederated political arrangement as a precursor to full union25. quickly unify as in the case of post-Cold War
It makes logical sense that the United States Germany. Immediate unification would put and South Korea adopt this policy so that this too much of a burden on not only the South, process is dealt with multilaterally and with a but also the United States and international practical timeline. To highlight further why community that would be expected to aid in unification must wait, a comparison of the the process. Eventual unification is differences between the levels of growth contingent on a sustained pace of absorption within the two countries provides staggering that would allow the North Korean results: government, economy, and people to adjust to
In the case of South Korea, the growth the changes. rate of the economy steadily slows, averaging between 4% and 5% real Forcing a completely different system growth for the period 1998-2007. In the case of North Korea, the rate at may result in unforeseeable clashes within which the economy shrinks moderates, with the country averaging between - North Korean society as they attempt to 2% and -3% growth for the period.26 comprehend the new world post-Kim regime. Consequently, abrupt unification would also make the South face ―the prospect of massive 27 ―Exploring the Implications of Alternative North Korean Endgames: Results from a Discussion Panel on 25 Ibid, 14 Continuing Coexistence Between North and South 26 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-gang Korea.‖ Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Asian Liu. "The Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification: Pacific and Latin American Analysis (21 January Alternate Scenarios." Asian Survey 38.8 (1998): 807 1998): 8 Page | 139
A combination of efforts from the United Upon the opening of the country it is natural
States and South Korea that would lead them that people would want to use superior onto the path to converging on the gradual Southern products than rely on emerging development of the region. The most homegrown industries. It is important to reasonable progression from failure would be remember that unification will not become a for the South to either leave the country as a feasible economic option for the South until separate or confederated entity until it can be the North has experience its own growth. This effectively absorbed without negative impacts would eliminate the fear of destroying these in its own society28. markets due to a lack of demand as better
In addition, unlike the German products are provided by external sources. circumstances, the regime has been relatively Development After Stabilization successful in completely isolating its Admittedly, rebuilding the country for people—even from its Southern neighbors: eventual unification is a complicated process,
Since the North Koreans are nevertheless, several key points arise in the considerably more isolated than the East Germans, they are presumably case of North Korea. First of all, a major less familiar with South Korean consumer goods and may not have concern for the American people would be to access to consumption transfers on the scale the East Germans did. All of safely ensure that nuclear weapons and other these forces would have to encourage North Koreans to continue buying weapons of mass destruction are dismantled home goods, maintaining the value of 29 the North Korean capital stock. in order to prevent them from falling into
more dangerous hands. In addition, it is
important to demilitarize the country that has 28 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. devoted so much of its resources to the (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 19 29 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. military. In order for North Korea to proceed "Modeling Korean Unification." Journal of Comparative Economics 28.2 (2000): 14 Page | 140
onto the road of modernization it is essential United States not alienate these forces in that resources be taken away from solely order to effectively and efficiently locate and devoting funds to the army, and into more dismantle nuclear facilities. Unfortunately, a economically productive activities. As common theme among the study of North previous explained, the unification process Korea is that even its weaponry is ridden with would not be able to proceed until it can avoid unknowns and dangerous misinformation, any negative affects on the South Korean including the location of all the facilities and population. Finally, the re-socialization of the the amount of stockpiles already in
North Korean people will be an important existence.30 Using only our own intelligence step in preparing them for the transition to an coupled with that of the South Korean open society after being blinded by the military, the American forces would not be rhetoric of their oppressive government for able to ensure the destruction of all stockpiles. such a long time. It is of primary concern that the military
Eliminate threat of weapons of mass obtain information as swiftly as possible, destruction using information from the North Koreans
Securing the weapons of mass themselves. destruction is the primary object of the United One facility that is commonly known
States, and after the initial period of to produce plutonium and develop nuclear stabilization is complete, the eradication of weapons is the installation at Yongbyon. this deadly threat can be achieved only While this facility will be one of the first to be through coordinated efforts of our own dismantled, the US-Korea Institute at John intelligence and cooperation with the former
30 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for North Korean military. It is essential that the Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009: 18 Page | 141
Hopkins University offers the possibility of the developing country, which could aid the using its personnel for positive scientific development process. Eventually a united research center: Korea would ―have to be a party to relevant
[Yongbyon‘s personnel] would not international agreements— the only assist with the dismantlement process but their skill sets could lend Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical themselves to non-nuclear activities, such as working on electric, hydro and Weapons Conventions, and the Biological wind power stations as well as water, gas and oil pipelines.31 Weapons Conventions—prohibiting
While the nuclear ambitions of the North are signatories from possessing such weapons.‖33 feared in international society, upon This would eliminate any threat of recurrent reconstruction these facilities can be dangers of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. converted from a source of terror into Economic reconstruction something beneficial for society. These Controlled by the iron fist of the Kim facilities themselves and resources would not Jong-il regime, the North Korean economy be wasted, while simultaneously they would relied on socialist economic controls that have cease to be a threat to the international order. devastated society, and must be changed in
In addition the US-Korea institute explains order to successfully integrate into the that if the United States could ―refurbish the international economic system. Kim Jong-il‘s small, Soviet-supplied IRT research reactor at economic aspirations revolve around the the site, enabling it to produce radioactive concept of self-reliance that would allow it to isotopes for export.‖32 This in turn would maintain its complete isolation while bring in a significant amount of money into attempting to make North Korea the only
31 US strategy towards North Korea rebuilding 33 Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for dialogue and engagement, US-Korea Institute at SAIS. Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in (2009): 51 North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. 32 Ibid, 52 (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009):22 Page | 142
country that was completely self-sufficient. despite its flaws.35 Instead, it is important to
Going beyond a mere economic plan, the respect that the old governance and legacy of
North Korean philosophy of self-sufficiency, the traditional nation will continue to have a
Juche ―has been used since the 1950s to strong influence on society. Gradual change is perpetuate power by the central government a better solution in the long run, because it and to build an aura of the supernatural gives society time to adjust without around their supreme leaders Kim—both threatening the old social order that could stop father and son.‖34 It will not be a simple shift change altogether. and it is critical that the North Koreans are An example of a successful transition eased into a new system rather than forcing it. to the free market economy is Deng
One cannot expect that a nation can Xiaoping‘s allowance of market economic radically change everything simply with a elements into Chinese society. He did so quick fix, as it takes time and small under the realization that China could not incremental developments to make a remained closed off to the international difference. For example, the Soviet Union system, and that foreign investment was used ―shock therapy‖ to force its failing needed to help develop its industry and communist system into a capitalist market manufacturing. Deng began to allow with disastrous consequences that made it development on the periphery of Chinese partially reject capitalism and caused some to society without ―shocking‖ the entire system revert back to the comforts of the old system into a market economy. Although China has
its own share of problems resulting from its
34 Dick Kazuyuki Nanto and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. The North Korean 35 William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan , and Carl J. economy background and policy analysis. Schramm. Good capitalism, bad capitalism, and the Congressional Information Service, Library of economics of growth and prosperity. (New Haven: Congress (Washington D.C., 2004): 121 Yale University Press, 2007): 164 Page | 143
changing economic policies, particularly North Korea will not prosper without income disparity and overproduction, it serves an open trade system and investment within as an example of a country that was able to its home industries. Experts have predicted gradually change its economic system into that once cross-border trade is opened up, the something completely different. In addition economy will see rapid gains. As the article, to China‘s model, the South Korean way of Modeling Korean Unification, in the Journal developing would be a conceivable path, and of Comparative Economic explains, ―the a familiar system would attract South Korean impact of economic integration with the business: North on the South Korean economy would
If such socioeconomic transition in a be non-trivial once restrictions on cross- partially deindustrialized, re-ruralized, extremely atomized, and semifeudal border labor and mobility were removed37.‖ North Korean society were to proceed without civil strife, one might expect In fact, even during the Kim regime, some the formation of privatized chaebol- like economic conglomerates on the bureaucrats have urged for the opening of ruins of the North Korean socialistic economic edifice, with substantial trade between outside countries, as the government stakes in flagship industries.36 country‘s economy was floundering:
Using such institutions like the South Korean According to a North Korean journal, in the mid-1990s, when the society chaebol, large, complex Korean business was suffering from mass starvation, some pragmatic bureaucrats proposed groups, in the North Korea, building upon policies for introducing foreign capital and promoting the people's motivation what they are already familiar with, could to work through material incentives in order to revive the economy.38 also help it transition without completely forcing radical change upon society. 37 Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. "Modeling Korean Unification." Journal of Comparative Economics 28.2 (2000): 24 38 Jae-Cheon Lim. "Institutional Change in North 36 Alexandre Mansourov. "The Hermit Mouse Roars: Korean Economic Development Since 1984: The North Korea." Asian affairs, an American review. 30.2 Competition Between Hegemonic and Non-hegemonic (2003): 55 Rules and Norms." Pacific affairs. 82.1 (2009): 19 Page | 144
Even some in the strictly socialist government conditions imposed from above, than it is understood the value of promoting investment natural to assume that it is possible a legal and trade to jump-start the failing economy. market could form if the burden of the regime
Loosening government control over the was removed. During the worst moments of system will encourage home markets to the famine in the 1990s, North Koreans began develop, and is essential to allowing the to look for other options, and John S. Wit of economy to grow to allow for eventual John Hopkins University, explained that reunification with the South. ―growth and diversification of markets inside
One of the strongest indicators of how the country first developed during the famine changes to the economic system of North of the mid-1990s as a grassroots response to
Korea will spur development is through the the breakdown of the Public Distribution study of the black market under the Kim System39.‖ In fact, it is stated ―nearly half the regime. Market activities were starting to respondents reported that all of their income form in North Korea, but were halted through came from private business activities at the the regime‘s relentless pursuit of strict time they left North Korea.‖40 Although the socialist economic policies controlled by the North Korean people have lived under the central government. These black markets that suffocating environment of Kim Jong-il, the emerged despite these conditions prove that spirit of an open market has not been crushed, the spirit of the market economy is alit within and the United States must help encourage its the bosom of the people, and was merely unimpeded development. temporarily extinguished through the severely controlled environment of the old regime. If 39 John S. Wit. US strategy towards North Korea rebuilding dialogue and engagement. (US-Korea Institute at SAIS 2009): 34 the market was able to exist despite the harsh 40 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland. "Famine in North Korea Redux?" Journal of Asian economics. 20.4 (2009): 7 Page | 145
Resocialization propaganda created to influence the people.41
Holding onto power for more than 60 Often Kim Il-Sung is depicted as a god-like years, the Kim family has successfully created figure in their literature, and a common theme a propaganda machine that has completely is the image of ―a mature Kim, sometimes brainwashed its citizens in order to gain surrounded by children in tableaux legitimacy to rule. Separation from this reminiscent of the Sunday-school pictures that system will not be simple, as North Koreans illustrate the words of Jesus, ‗Suffer the little have had these myths ingrained in their minds children to come unto me.‘‖42 Part of the for so many years, but is necessary in order to reason that Kim Il-Sung was able to garter complete a shift into an unfamiliar system. such verdant support from his followers, and
The United States must first understand what eventually the rest of North Korean society, these people have been taught in order to was the creation of his image as the glorious reconcile the façade these people have been savior of the Korean people. He created a living under with the truth. myth that after the Korean War he took it
More so than his son and North upon himself to rebuild North Korean society,
Korea‘s current leader, Kim Jong-il, the and offered ―solicitude toward war orphans…
Korean people were trained to worship the the state raised youngsters who had lost their supreme leader, Kim Il-Sung. Taught from a parents, teaching them to think of Kim Il-sung young age, the North Korean people are as their father, themselves as his children.‖43 shown propaganda that teaches that god-like Keeping strict control on society and access to
Kim Il-Sung is the savior of his country, and the outside world, the Kim regime was able to even Western historians cannot often separate 41 Bradley K. Martin. Under the loving care of the fatherly leader : North Korea and the Kim dynasty. the truth about Kim Il-Sung‘s life from the New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004: 11 42 Ibid, 6 43 Ibid, 3 Page | 146
convince North Koreans that their society was form of isolation was only possible because envied throughout the world, and ingrained Korea had been occupied or under threat for the vileness of their wartime enemies, Japan so much of its history. People truly believed and America.44 Although the United States that it was safer within their homeland than does not often dwell on the issues of the abroad.46 Although limited contact had been
Korean War, it remains a significant tool for allowed in more recent years, following Kim the leadership in North Korea that will have Il-Sung‘s death in 1994, and after Pyongyang to be overcome once society is free from the had to appeal to external forces faced with the propaganda machine. famine in the mid-1990s, little progress has
In order to maintain their fabricated been made to free the North Korean people worldview, the North Korean government from the influence of its government.47 developed an isolationist policy that Although during this brief period of access by completely blocked out foreign influence. the international community, the foundation
Kim Il-Sung reasoned this was necessary to of international understanding began to grow eliminate impure elements, which he within North Korea, the United States must explained were ―spies, people trying to recognize that these people have been taught destroy the system… South Korean or their entire lives to hate and fear Americans.
American agents, including the saboteurs It is essential that the population be gradually against whom rifle-toting soldiers were posted reeducated and opened to the international at highway and railway bridges.‖45 However system. Although complete reconciliation strong this propaganda appeared, this extreme
46 Gordon G. Chang. Nuclear showdown : North 44 Gordon G. Chang. Nuclear showdown: North Korea Korea takes on the world. New York: Random House, takes on the world. New York: Random House, 2006: 9 2006: 11 45 Bradley K. Martin. Under the loving care of the 47 John S. Wit. US strategy towards North Korea fatherly leader : North Korea and the Kim dynasty. rebuilding dialogue and engagement. (US-Korea New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004: 6 Institute at SAIS 2009): 35 Page | 147
with external powers will not come easily, Create ties with high ranking officials slowly opening their isolated system and and members of the North Korean allowing their economy to be rejuvenated will military in order to aid the help overcome the loss of ideological stabilization effort and avoid negative legitimacy. It will encourage a change in their externalities of ignoring their way of thinking that will help lead to both importance in the reconstruction of the long-term development and set North Korea nation on the path to uniting with the South. Alleviate the suffering of the North
Conclusion Korean population through aid and
Recommendations recognize that further development
Although the future of North Korea cannot occur without moving the has not yet been written, the United States North Koreans away from merely must be prepared for the event of sudden focusing on sustenance failure. This paper has made specific Work with both South Korea and recommendations based on the two periods of China to ease border tensions and initial failure and development after issues related to refugees that could stabilization. Summarizing the main points of threaten the security of these countries this paper, for the period of initial failure the After these objectives have been achieved the
United States is urged to: United States can turn to further development
Allow South Korea to take the lead in that will aid in what we have concluded to be
all actions as it knows more about the the ultimate goal of unification of the Korean
region and has direct ties to the peninsula. In this time of transition, this
situation paper recommends that the United States:
Page | 148
Obtain knowledge from both South Encourage domestic markets that had
Korean and North Korean intelligence existed under the Kim regime despite in order to successfully eliminate the government controls threat of weapons of mass destruction Recognize the conditions under which
Convert nuclear facilities into the North Koreans have lived their productive entities by exploring lives under the Kim regime in order opportunities for non-nuclear activities aid in their resocialization to an using former nuclear faculties international society
Set the foundation for North Korea to Introduce gradually knowledge of the be able to join international world outside of North Korea to help organizations promoting non- break the people from their proliferation dependence on isolationist policies
Ease North Korea into an open and fear of foreign societies economic system avoiding ―shock Although the failure of North Korea presents therapy‖ tactics in favor of gradual significant challenges, it also is an change opportunity to break the control that the Kim
Promote an open trade system that can regime has exerted over every aspect of North provide opportunities for the revival of Korean society. Failing state home industry that can set the path to countermeasures are difficult to implement in rapid growth that can lead to authoritarian regimes, particularly ones in unification which the people are kept completely isolated.
Despite the current stalemate, the United
States must consider North Korea‘s place in
Page | 149
failed state policy by preparing for solutions to handling its failure.
While the fate of North Korea has not yet been determined, the United States must develop a realistic plan, such as the one outlined in this case study, to deal with countries in danger of failing. In the case of
North Korea, successfully combating immediate security and humanitarian concerns will lay the foundation for the implementation of long-term development recommendations tailored to North Korea‘s situation in accordance with our policy report‘s principles. Using North Korea as an example, our principles will be able to foster realistic solutions to country specific issues, despite having universal significance for failed state policy. The case study of North
Korea is an example of how countries that have not yet failed but remain in danger of doing so must still be considered in policy, so that the United States is effectively prepared to handle an emergency situation if it arises.
Page | 150
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Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. "Modeling Korean Unification." Journal of Comparative Economics 28.2 (2000): 400-21.
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Stares, Paul B., Joel S. Wit, and Center for Preventive Action. "Preparing for sudden change in North Korea." Council on Foreign Relations : [Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, distributor]. 2009.
Snyder, Scott. "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future." Pacific Affairs 73.4 (2001): 517-33.
Wit, Joel S., Johns Hopkins University. School of Advanced International Studies. US-Korea Institute., and Weatherhead East Asian Institute. "US strategy towards North Korea rebuilding dialogue and engagement." US-Korea Inst
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Burma A Case Study on Prevention
Brian Steyer
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Issue assessed for signs of state failure—a five
Burma is an example of a country place increase from its previous ranking of 18 1 where American foreign policy makers must in 2006. Even though the SPDC has not used focus on primary and secondary prevention of direct military intervention recently to state failure. This case study emphasizes suppress its constituents, multiple conflicts in diplomatic engagement in sectors where several weak domestic areas indicate that public services and government protection are Burma‘s government is highly susceptible to still in the very preliminary stages of collapse. a large-scale humanitarian crisis. One
Burma‘s military-controlled government important distinction that influences Burma‘s provides an exceptional challenge because the failed state status is that Burma‘s government
US cannot directly intervene and must instead has not experienced foreign military focus on diplomacy. Because of the regime's intervention or comprehensive state failure. unresponsiveness, US government actions US actions now could help Burma avoid such must be modified to operate effectively within crisis in the near future. the limitations posed by Burma. Recent Overview: Cyclone Nargis and the
Background Saffron Revolution
Burma‘s military-controlled In 2007, The SPDC dramatically government, known as the State Peace and increased the price of fuel and natural gas.
Development Council, (SPDC) has recently This sudden decision caused a dramatic spike become known for neglecting international in the cost of living for Burma‘s local norms and domestic obligations. In the FfP‘s population. As public dissent against this
2009 Failed State Index, Burma placed 13 out government policy increased, Burmese monks
1 The Fund For Peace. "Burma Country Profile." 2009. of 177 countries whose governments were
from around the country banded together with multilateral action put a lot of pressure on the
local community leaders to put pressure on SPDC, which could not easily be ignored.
the government to change its policies. This On May 2nd 2008, Cyclone Nargis
●●● event, termed by caused substantial damage in the Irrawaddy The heightened the media the Delta located along Burma‘s southern border. degree of chaos that resulted from this Saffron Revolution, For several days immediately following this natural catastrophe further was one of the event, Burma‘s government did not take the demonstrated that largest and most major steps needed to help the 2.4 million Burma’s government was unable or politicized protests people put at risk during this disaster.3 While unwilling to meet the 2 needs of people in almost 20 years. a limited quantity of medical supplies were during periods of Immediately allowed into the country during the first few domestic crisis. ●●● following this days, humanitarian aid workers were not
political incident, the United Nations Human allowed to enter the country to provide basic
Rights Council (UNHRC) council issued a health services to people affected by the
public statement calling for political reforms storm. Poor infrastructure and lack of
from the Burmese government. The Saffron emergency services caused food shortages,
Revolution set an important precedent of health problems, and refugee spillover in
collaboration between major stakeholders. surrounding regions. As a result of this
China and Russia‘s participation in the negligence, more than 800,000 people were
UNHRC helped legitimize the multilateral displaced and over 130,000 people were
process of engagement. This decisive reported killed or missing.4 The heightened
2 Selth, Andrew. "Burma's "Saffron Revolution" and 3 S Seekins, Donald. "State, Society, and Natural the Limits of International Influence." Australian Distaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar." Asian Journal of Journal of Social Science 37.5.726 (2009). International Affairs 62 (2008). 4 Seekins 717-718 Page | 155
degree of chaos that resulted from this natural country‘s capacity to establish a stable catastrophe further demonstrated that political climate. Despite strong pressures
Burma‘s government was unable or unwilling from local and transnational sources, Burma‘s to meet the needs of people during periods of core political interests have remained the domestic crisis. In this situation, the SPDC‘s same. The durability and longevity of the indifference to human suffering was driven by SPDC‘s military regime over the last 40 years the political interests of the ruling elite to has been a product of these survival tactics. maintain military control and stability of the For effective governance in Burma, a strong region. security presence is required in order to
Throughout these conflicts, Burma‘s consolidate control of the military and fortify military leader, Than Shwe, has remained the government‘s sphere of influence inside unreceptive, hostile, and often fanatical in Burmese territory. response to the US and other foreign actors. US Interests
In times of crisis, the SPDC has emphasized The most salient political interests of self-sufficiency and isolationism as primary the US government are ensuring the modes of operation and ignored the needs of unconditional release of Burma‘s political local community members. Burma‘s stakeholders, including democratic activist withdrawal from foreign affairs and strategic Aung San Suu Kyi, convincing SPDC‘s neutrality helps explain the hardening of leadership to take efforts to stop drug
Burma‘s leadership to available resources and trafficking, and securing a long-term outside support. Local and international commitment from Burma‘s government to actions have not been able to break through abstain from future human rights violations. the political stalemate that has atrophied the In an annual report released by Transparency
Page | 156
International in 2009, Burma‘s government of US markets, denied Burma loans from the was ranked 3rd lowest for corruption and other World Bank and IMF, and put a freeze on indicators of poor governance.5 Without Burmese leaders‘ assets in the US: political legitimacy and accountability within ‗The crisis between the United States and Burma arising from the the Burmese government, it will be extremely actions and policies of the Government of Burma, including its difficult to engage in constructive diplomatic engaging in large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, relations. The first steps toward collaboration that led to the declaration of a national emergency on May 20, 1997, and its on these important issues will depend on expansion on October 18, 2007, and April 30 2008, has not been resolved. sincere reciprocal gestures and long-term These actions and policies are hostile to the US interests and pose a commitment from military leader Than Shwe. continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and America’s Previous Policy Position: foreign policy of the United States.‘ -George W. Bush 20086 Distancing and Isolation Burma’s Response to US Sanctions In the past, The US has responded to This decisive policy decision in 2003 crisis in Burma with selective targeting, and subsequent denouncement in 2008 by distancing and limited engagement. Previous President George W. Bush has made many US administrations believed that the political Burmese officials fearful that the US tools of isolation were the most viable and government is a political threat whose effective strategies for putting pressure on the objective is to overthrow Burma‘s current SPDC. In 2003, George W. Bush passed the political leadership. In response to these US Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. pressures, the SPDC has moved in the This legislation kept Myanmar‘s exports out opposite direction from what US policy
5 Transparency International. "Corruptions Perception Index 2009." 2009.
makers anticipated. Economic sanctions were take small actions seriously and respond seen as a way to put pressure on the SPDC to decisively during Burma‘s current stage of adopt a new stance that would be in better government collapse while the US alignment with US interests and would government still has the capacity to influence ultimately provide the country with more the direction of the outcome. The advantage access to US goods, services, and other trade of this policy stance is that it allows the US benefits. Instead, Burma‘s response to government to negotiate many of the strict sanctions and threats of regime change has prerequisites that are often needed for been to tighten its grip further and develop governments and multilateral organizations to independently from the influence of western take action. nations. Previously, American policy towards
Options Burma was based on sanctions and a loud call
In Burma, there is a tremendous need for regime change advocated by the United for decisive action to alleviate the suffering of States and its western allies. An alternate local citizens. US principles and State approach has been to follow a more
Department priorities have placed several US diplomatic form of engagement that involves policy options outside the scope of what is subtle redirection of Burma‘s regime possible in Burma. When assessing the range priorities. Diplomacy from regional of US policy decisions available in Burma it‘s stakeholders is likely to be more effective essential that the US government focus on than US foreign diplomacy alone. This could specific issue areas where US officials can take the form of cross-regional partnerships if make measurable progress. In order to be the US government is willing work with effective, US diplomatic engagement must
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Japan and other regional allies to encourage a Sanctions need to be applied as a change in SPDC‘s priorities. collaborative effort or not at all. When
Sanctions in Burma sanctions are a joint effort applied across a
A World Bank Report issued in 2000 wide spectrum of countries, it sends a calculated that Burma receives about 2 US powerful message that prevents recalcitrant dollars per person each year in aid compared governments like the SPDC from seeking to 33 dollars in Cambodia and 53 dollars in alternative methods of survival.
Laos.7 Although Burma receives significantly In the last several years, Burma signed less money from the US government, US a 2.9 billion dollar agreement with China to sanctions have been unsuccessful in construct fuel transportation infrastructure influencing the SPDC‘s ability to secure that facilitates the transport of crude oil from resources from neighboring stakeholders. Africa and the Middle East into China. These
Sanctions have been ineffective lucrative agreements have extended the because the SPDC is not dependent on US longevity of the Burmese government and markets or the interests of the US allowed the SPDC to function without the governments to retain power. Attaining support of the United States. Burma‘s multilateral sanctions from regional powers geopolitical and strategic importance for remains challenging because regional players regional stakeholders makes it difficult for US are already invested in sectors of Burma‘s policy measures to be effective. When the economy. Economic relations with China Burmese government joined ASEAN in 1997 represent a large part of Burmese trade, it demonstrated another means of approximately 17% in 2002. (Bert 2004) circumventing US pressure and generating a
certain degree of power without western 7 Holliday, Ian. "Rethinking the United State's Myanmar Policy." Asian Survey 45 (2005). Page | 159
involvement. Unless the US can influence policies were ●●● regional economic trade policies with implemented in Diplomacy from regional Burma‘s neighbors, the SPDC will continue Burma, Burma‘s stakeholders is likely to shrug off restrictive US policies. strong domestic to be more effective than US foreign When examining new policy options it grip might diplomacy alone. ●●● is often helpful to look what policy decisions soften. have been effective in fostering change Another tactic the US might consider elsewhere. According to US Senator and is to establish contact with SPDC military
Vietnam veteran Jim Webb the removal of personnel who are being trained outside of sanctions in Vietnam may have actually been Burma. In Singapore, there are several one of the strongest factors in precipitating training sites where US officers have a the fall of Vietnam‘s communist government. presence as well. This is an opportunity to
Loosening economic sanctions exposed the influence emerging leaders outside of the government and civil society to new ideas that SPDC‘s immediate purview. undermined the conventional wisdom of the The US also, should consider how it might work with the Tatmadaw, if not Vietnamese government. directly, then indirectly. Perhaps engagement can start small by ‗I believe the greatest factor in planting long-term seeds. For instance, creating a more open society inside Burma currently sends officers to Vietnam was the removal of other countries in the region for America‘s trade embargo in 1994‘ military schooling and training. -US Senator Jim Webb.8 Singapore educates Burmese officers in its military schools, and US officers This radical shift in American policies had a attending Singaporean military schools with Burmese officers can try significant impact on Vietnam. If such to develop relations with their Burmese classmates in order to foster rapport for mil-to-mil cooperation 10- 15 years in the future9
8 Webb, Jim. "We can't Afford to Ignore Myanmar." 9 Heaney Page Number Heaney, Dennis. "Burma: The New York Times 2009. Assessing Options for US Engagement." Master of Page | 160
agreement was signed between Burma and Regional Interests in Burma Russia. The implications of this dangerous Burma‘s poor record of governance relationship remain unclear, but the US may and relative abundance of jade, teak, and be pushed to intervene militarily in the future natural gas make it a good place to do if Burma were to obtain nuclear weapons. business. There is a strong need for stability Several outbreaks of lymphatic filariasis, but there are few incentives for promoting a known informally as elephantiasis, have also positive business environment that would lead been documented as a potentially serious to a more progressive and responsible threat that could lead to some form of direct government in Burma. Many of Burma‘s policy intervention.10 regional stakeholders including China, Recommendations: Russia, and India have the capacity to help As suggested throughout this paper, reform the SPDC‘s economic practices, but small steps can be taken by the US to prevent the political interests of these regional state collapse. While Burma may not contain stakeholders is to minimize conflict and the high degree of political importance to maintain their respective sovereign interests American strategic interests, tactful in Burma. engagement with Burmese leaders would Scenario’s for possible US intervention plant seeds for improving future relations. In Several events have occurred in the recent years, the Obama Administration has past few years that could indicate a need for begun to engage diplomatically with the US intervention in the future. In 2007, news SPDC‘s leadership. In 2009 Secretary of State was released that a nuclear research reactor Hilary Clinton stated: ―We're seeking to see a
Science in Defense Analysis Naval Post Graduate School, 2009. 10 Heaney, 81 Page | 161
process inside Burma that would inspire and pressure on the SPDC. When the political permit dialogue among all of the stakeholders stalemate lifts, Burma may emerge as a so that there could be a growing consensus competent democracy capable of self- within Burma itself about the way forward."11 governance or the country‘s political structure
The Obama Administration has started a new may continue to unravel until a larger and process of engagement by sending Jim Webb more dangerous humanitarian crisis occurs on a diplomatic mission to Burma—the first that demands a stronger international high level diplomatic visit to Burma in 10 response. While Burma‘s political future years. (Webb 2009) During his visit in 2009 remains uncertain, new methods of policy
Jim Webb met with political leader Than persuasion will be essential to prevent future
Shwe to discuss mutual foreign policy movements toward state failure in Burma. concerns. Jim Webb also had the opportunity to meet with democratic leader Aung San Suu
Kyi to discuss future policy options in Burma.
In Burma, there are a number of possibilities for political change in the near future. A constitutional referendum and general election are planned to take place in
2010. These events will be an important time for the US government to comment and put
11 Clinton, Hillary. "Secretary Clinton's Remarks at APEC Conference." 2009.
Page | 162
Works Cited
Bert, Wayne. "Burma, China and the USA." Pacific Affairs 77.2 (2004): 263-82.
Bush, George. Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Burma., 2008.
Clinton, Hillary. "Secretary Clinton's Remarks at APEC Conference." 2009.
Ferrara, Federico. "Why Regimes Create Disorder: Hobbes's Dilemma during a Rangoon Summer." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47.3 (2003): 302-25.
Green, Michael and Mitchell, Derek. "Asia's Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma." Foreign Affairs 86 (2007).
Gupta, Sourabh. "US-Burma Relations: ―Pragmatic Engagement‖ Greets ―Discipline-Flourishing Democracy‖." Asia Pacific bulletin 46 (2010).
Heaney, Dennis. "Burma: Assessing Options for US Engagement." Master of Science in Defense Analysis Naval Post Graduate School, 2009.
Holliday, Ian. "Rethinking the United State's Myanmar Policy." Asian Survey 45 (2005). ---. "Voting and Violence in Myanmar: Nation Building for a Transition to Democracy." Asian Survey 48 (2008).
Internat. Crisis Group. Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement Or another Way Forward?. International Crisis Group, 2004. PAIS International
Maung Thawnghmung, Ardeth. "Rural Perceptions of State Legitimacy in Burma/Myanmar." Journal of Peasant Studies 30.2 (2003).
Min, Win. "Looking Inside the Burmese Military." Asian Survey 48.6 (2008).
Seekins, Donald. "State, Society, and Natural Distaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar." Asian Journal of Social Science 37.5 (2009).
Seekins, Donald M. "Burma and US Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime." Asian Survey 45.3 (2005): 437-52.
Selth, Andrew. "Burma's "Saffron Revolution" and the Limits of International Influence." Australian Journal of International Affairs 62 (2008).
"Even Paranoids have Enemies:Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar‘s Fears of Invasion." Contemporary Southeast Asia 30.3 (2008).
Steinberg, David. "The United States and its Allies: The Problem of Burma/Myanmar Foreign Policy." Contemporary Southeast Asia 29 (2007).
Stover, Eric and Vinck, Patrick. "Cyclone Nargis and the Politics of Relief and Reconstruction Aid in Burma." The Journal of the American Medical Association 300.6 (2008).
The Fund For Peace. "Burma Country Profile." 2009.
Thomson, Curtis N. "Political Stability and Minority Groups in Burma." Geographical Review 85.3 (1995): 269-85.
Transparency International. "Corruptions Perception Index 2009." 2009.
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Haiti Opportunity in Disaster?
Laurel Severt
Page | 165
Issue rebuild the country and create a better
Even before the devastating functioning state, the United States needs to earthquake on January 12, 2010, Haiti was enter into an efficient multilateral effort to considered a failed state. 80 percent of its create jobs, build infrastructure, and promote population living below the poverty line, 54% a stable political and economic environment in abject poverty, and the Haitian government so that Haiti can begin the process of long- that was providing virtually no political goods term development. ●●● to its citizens.1 Haiti already held the status of For the recovery The combination of extreme poverty, effort to be poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, fragile democratic
2 successful, there institutions, and the with a GDP per capita of around $1,300. lack of legitimate According to the International Monetary must be an economic opportunities has Fund, in 2007 76 percent of Haitians lived on emphasis on characterized Haiti multilateral as a failed state. less than two dollars per day, and 55 percent ●●● lived on less than 44 cents per day.3 coordination of
The combination of extreme poverty, recovery efforts, sustainable institution fragile democratic institutions, and the lack of building, community driven development, and legitimate economic opportunities has the importance of lasting economic characterized Haiti as a failed state. To development. The 7.0 magnitude shock that hit Haiti
1 ―Haiti‖ The World Factbook, Central Intelligence on January 12 was followed by 56 aftershocks Agency, 15 Jan. 2010,
Source: USAID “Haiti Earthquake Program Map.”
Princes, the earthquake destroyed 70 percent fifteen ministries, were destroyed.6 Around of structures in extensive areas of the capital, one million of Haiti‘s inhabitants were left with up to 90 percent destroyed in towns in homeless, and approximately three million or closer proximity to the epicenter.5 Key more are in immediate need of food aid.7 official buildings, such as the presidential In a country of 8.7 million people,
these numbers are staggering. A study 4 ―Haiti Earthquake_By the Numbers,‖ CBS News 26 Jan. 2010, 6 Feb. 2010 6 ―The Challenge of Rebuilding Haiti,‖ BBC News 29
released by the Inter-American Development important to quickly address. It is evident that
Bank just over one month after the earthquake there is a great deal of need in Haiti, both due estimates that the total cost of the damages to preexisting conditions and the widespread could be $7.2 billion to $13.2 billion, an early destruction caused by the earthquake. The estimate based upon an analysis of data from United States must develop a policy of how to
2,000 natural disasters in the last 40 years.8 deal with both the immediate basic needs of
The distribution of aid thus far has the population, and the long-term process of been impeded by a lack of infrastructure, elevating the country from its status as a including extremely poor roads. UN failed state.
Humanitarian chief John Holmes has stated Background that efforts until this time have been poorly In considering actions to take in Haiti funded and coordinated, and there is still an to improve its current condition, it is 9 enormous amount to be done in the nation. important to take into account historical
Following this statement, the United Nations context. Haiti is unique as the only nation in issued a revised appeal on February 18, 2010 the world founded by slaves, and has for $1.44 billion to aid in Haiti‘s recovery, undergone many drastic political changes and marking the largest humanitarian request revolutions since gaining independence from 10 following a natural disaster. The quickly France in 1804.11 Since independence, Haiti approaching rainy season makes the issue of has adopted twenty-one different constitutions emergency relief even more timely and and been led by forty-two heads of state,
twenty-nine of whom were overthrown or 8 Marc Lacey, ―Estimates of Quake Damage in Haiti Increase by Billions,‖ The New York Times 16 Feb. 2010: A8. assassinated, and nine whom declared 9 ―Haiti Earthquake: UN Seeks Record Aid Donations,‖ BBC News 19 Feb. 2010
themselves heads of state for life.12 The frequently debated reasons ranging from tumultuous nature of Haitian politics has led protecting Chase National Bank assets to to numerous foreign interventions or attempts halting mob violence to preventing World to create democracy in the nation, yet a War I related threats to American security.14 nation-state that consistently acts in the The US actively sought opportunities for interest of the Haitian people does not yet investment in the country during this time exist. Past international occupation, period, and stated their intention to develop intervention, and failure are essential to Haiti. However, techniques used included understanding the political and economic forcibly conscripting peasants into road crews culture of Haiti, and therefore must be and development projects. These actions were discussed before developing strategy seen by the Haitians as reminiscent of slavery regarding whether to intervene in the present. and led to resistance.15 Corruption persisted in
Independence and Early US Occupation Haiti‘s leadership, and the abuse of citizens
Due to the circumstances of Haiti‘s and exploitation of the state‘s resources 16 independence, viewed by much of the world remained commonplace. The occupation, as a menacing slave uprising in a global lasting until 1934, did have positive legacies, economy that still relied heavily upon slavery, including the building of schools, hospitals,
Haiti was very isolated immediately following and roads; the development of a police force its independence. It was not recognized as a and army; and the centralization and country by the United States until 1862.13 In increased efficiency of the Haitian 17 1915, the United States occupied Haiti for government. Overall, the occupation did not
12 John J. Curry, Approaching Failed State Status: A Case Study of Haiti, USAWC Strategy Research 14 Mintz 73, 84. Project (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, 15 Mintz 84. 2005) 13. 16 Curry 6. 13 Curry 6. 17 Mintz 85. Page | 169
result in the establishment of accountable regime had a significant impact on the state institutions in the long-term, and instead continued weakness of Haiti‘s infrastructure was followed again by authoritarian regimes and the distrust of Haiti‘s population toward dependent on repression and coercion to its political leaders. Foreign inaction allowed control Haiti‘s resources.18 widespread human rights abuses and high
The next ―stable‖ administration came levels of poverty to go unchecked. with the 29-year Duvalier regime, a father-son Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Operation leadership spanning from 1957 to 1986, that Uphold Democracy was characterized by human rights abuses and Under the Clinton administration, the the extreme levels of corruption. However, US began to again take a role in the
US policy toward Haiti from 1934 to 1986 management of Haiti. In September 1991, 19 closely approximated total disengagement. Haiti‘s first freely elected president Jean-
Under this dictatorship, institutions were Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a bloody intentionally weakened at the expense of military coup.22 This action was condemned increasing and maintaining the power of the internationally, and led to strong actions be 20 Duvalier administration. A military junta the United Nations and the Organization of eventually displaced the regime, repressing American States (OAS). By imposing an the population for three years until the extremely restrictive trade embargo, the democratic election of 1990 that placed Jean- United Nations managed to cut off nearly all 21 Bertrand Aristide in power. The Duvalier contact between Haiti and the rest of the
world, devastating the country‘s 18 Curry 7. 19 Curry 7-11. 20 Terry F. Buss, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign manufacturing sector and leaving millions of Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It, National Academy of Public Administration (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008) 2. 22Michele Wucker, "Haiti: So Many Missteps," World 21 Buss 2. Policy Journal, 21. 1 (2004): 41. Page | 170
Haitians in immediate danger of starvation.23 Following Aristide‘s return to power
Eventually, in September 1994, the Clinton and the February 1996 election of Rene
administration, with UN authorization, sent Préval, Aristide‘s former prime minister,
20,000 American troops in a mission titled Haiti‘s focus turned to recovery of its export
―Operation Uphold Democracy‖ to restore industry, still severely damaged by the 1991-
Aristide to power. The nation, however, only 1994 embargo. Haiti was forced to follow
●●● experienced Washington-based economic reforms to Haiti ceased to be a frequently discussed democratic ensure the inflow of foreign aid and support news item and governance for a of international lenders.26 This money was international aid decreased short eight months desperately needed to rebuild the long- significantly. ●●● before the junta neglected roads and infrastructure that could
took power.24 The US mission was generally begin the process of economic recovery. Yet
accepted as successful, and Aristide returned as the government spent its political capital in
from exile to again lead the country. attempts to meet the international demands.
However, the United States was as The National Academy of Public
abandoning Haiti as soon as it achieved its Administration stated this period ―was
goal of restoring Aristide to power, instead of marked by donor-driven reform agendas and
alleviating the significant humanitarian crisis conditionality-based financing in
that was worsened by the economic Haiti…[which] contributed to poor
devastation of the trade embargo.25 commitment and ineffective implementation
on the part of the government of Haiti and to 23Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy As Social Work," Foreign Affairs, 75. 1 (1996): 21. 24 John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti," Foreign Policy 102 (1996): 143. 25 Philippe R. Girard, Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004): 162. 26 Wucker, ―Haiti‖ 44. Page | 171
frustration and Haiti fatigue for the donor wary to trust government institutions in community.‖27 managing and distributing funds and taking
Directly following US intervention in into account the true needs of the Haitian
1995, Haiti received $730 million from population. Politically, Haiti has still not international donors, more than 10% of the experienced long-term stabile leadership. country‘s GDP. Within two years, however, Aristide was reelected for another term as total international aid dropped significantly, president in 2000, only to be overthrown in averaging under $182 million annually from another violent coup and forced into exile in
1997 through 2002.28 These funds were February 2004.30 The United States, largely mismanaged, with little if any directed disappointed Aristide‘s democratic record, did toward long-term investment projects to nothing to intervene as it had in 1994. improve health care, education, or Democratic elections in February 2006 placed infrastructure. As Robert Maguire, the Préval back in power, continuing a cycle of director of the Haiti Project at Trinity political confusion and violence in the
College, stated, ―With fewer and fewer country.31 The stabilization of Haiti needs to resources to manage, the government was left include the discontinuation of continual coups to manage scarcity and became increasingly and juntas that disrupt the activities and desperate and corrupt‖.29 Corruption and intentions of Haiti‘s governing powers. This ineffective government agencies and civil will require strong and honest leaders that servants have dominated the country, without produce tangible development results in the regard to the well being of the population. country.
Because of this, international donors were
27 Buss 18 28 Wucker, ―Haiti‖ 44. 30 Buss 3. 29 Wucker, ―Haiti‖ 45. 31 Buss 3. Page | 172
Recent Intervention in world food prices in 2008 triggered
Recent US and international efforts extensive riots across the country.35 A series have attempted to stabilize Haiti both of four hurricanes in a time period of less than economically and politically, creating an a month in 2008 destroyed infrastructure, environment more favorable to development. homes, and livelihoods in all ten of Haiti‘s
In 2004, the United Nations, responding to a regions.36 While there was a short period of period of crisis in Haiti, created the UN time in which it looked as though Haiti may
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) be in a position to launch lasting economic to establish credible security in the country.32 development, external shocks in the last
With this mission approximately 8,000 UN several years have left Haiti in an even worse peacekeepers were stationed in the nation to position than before. create and maintain civil order.33 In 2008, the A tradition of rulers that have enhanced security was complemented by US siphoned surpluses and neglected to economic legislation under the Haitian contribute to the development of the country
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership have left Haitians with an inherent distrust in
Encouragement (HOPE) II Act, giving Haiti the abilities of the government to produce preferential access to US markets for the next lasting change. Haiti ranked in the bottom one ten years.34 This act had the intention, and percent of all countries in corruption and initial success, of strengthening Haiti‘s government effectiveness in 2004.37 Decades apparel exports and investment. However, of unfulfilled promises have disillusioned these gains were offset by external shocks Haitian citizens, who have little reason to even before the 2010 earthquake. An increase believe that either the government or
32 Collier 3. 35 Collier 3. 33 ―Haiti‖ The World Factbook 36 Lacey, ―US Troops”. 34 ―Haiti‖ The World Factbook 37 Buss 6. Page | 173
international agencies will have any positive society decisively out of fragility‖.39 Unlike impact on their lives. United States policy many failed states, the country has no real towards Haiti was historically characterized ethnic or religious divisions, and therefore no by on-again, off-again foreign assistance, deep ideological factions that often lead to including embargos, and the restriction of conflict and weakness.40 The feasibility of charitable aid from American and economic development in Haiti places the multinational organizations.38 The project of country at a strategic as well as humanitarian rebuilding Haiti is one that will take at least a advantage, as it has the opportunity to become decade. If the United States is to begin the poster child for US-led development engagement in the country, a long-term success. commitment is necessary to garner the trust of Strategic the Haitian people. The National Academy of Public
US Interests Administration in its report on foreign aid to
Haiti is both a humanitarian and Haiti concluded that ―Haiti is of strategic strategic interest for US policymakers. Haiti importance to the United States because of its has many distinct factors that make it a location, perpetual state of violence, and favorable area for reconstruction, and instability, its role as a base for drug economist Paul Collier argues that Haiti trafficking, its potential as a trading partner,
―offers the American and Canadian its strong ties to a large Haitian-American governments a rare opportunity to diaspora, and its relationship with the Latin demonstrate that their support can lift a American and Caribbean community.‖41 The
economic development of Haiti could thus
39 Collier 4. 40 Mintz 83. 38 Buss 5. 41 Buss 1. Page | 174
have a positive effect in the United States by important strategic interests when deciding lowering the amount of illegal migration of policy toward Haiti‘s development.
Haitians into the country and limiting the flow Humanitarian of illegal drugs from Haiti into the United While the strategic importance of
States.42 Haiti of relevance, the humanitarian interest
The George W. Bush administration in Haiti is more significant. With so much of linked illegal Haitian immigration with the population living in extreme poverty even
American vulnerability to terrorism, before the earthquake, the devastation caused identifying the migration as ―an area of by the recent disaster has left millions in need interest for the Global War on Terrorism‖.43 of immediate relief. Haiti‘s proximity to the
More than two-thirds of the Haitian labor United States gives the country a position to force do not have formal jobs, with some be an appealing candidate for generating figures suggesting that as much as 95% of popular support. The recent crisis has drawn a employment is in the underground economy, great deal of American attention, and while leading to a dependence on remittances and this visibility is in danger as the earthquake informal economic opportunities.44 Because becomes an event of the past, much can be the Haitian state currently does not have the established now while the issue is still in the capacity to ensure functioning institutions, public eye. Highly publicized US celebrity drug trafficking, especially in the cocaine fund raising campaigns, such as ―Hope for industry, has flourished virtually unchecked. Haiti‖, which raised over $66 million, the
These elements may be considered to be remake of the song ―We are the World‖, and a
widespread text messaging campaign, have
42 Curry 10. generated large profits. These efforts have 43 Curry 10. 44 ―Haiti‖ World Factbook, Buss 5. Page | 175
provided the opportunity to utilize funds to corruption.46 The opinions proposed by these not only remedy the immediate problems of scholars should be taken into account when basic needs for the Haitian people, but to considering options for expanding US policy propose solutions and dedicate funds that will toward the development of Haiti. create long-term programs to stabilize Haiti Role of the United States in Development and begin the process of development.45 The earthquake is a unique opportunity to garner widespread popular support for American spending in a humanitarian crisis.
Options
Scholars, writers, government officials, and others have developed a number of proposals for how to deal with both the immediate and long-term needs of the Haitian people. It has been proposed that the Haitian government take the lead in rebuilding, yet others believe that its fragile history means Source: USAID “USAID Food Distribution site in that international agencies should virtually Petonville.” <://www.flickr.com/photos/usaid_ images/4322120297/>. completely take over the reconstruction The role of the United States in Haiti‘s process. The disaster in Haiti demonstrates reconstruction was heavily debated in the the overarching need to restructure the international aid regime to decrease waste and 46 Clare Lockhart, ―Focus on the Structure of Aid,‖ 45 Stephanie Strom, ―Haiti Crisis Prompts Fresh Talk of Foreign Policy 19 Jan. 2010, Pooling US Relief Money,‖ The New York Times 1
weeks following the earthquake. After the strategy developed with the Haitian earthquake, American troops took control of government, rather than working above it. the international airport, becoming a more Others question the ability of the Haitian visible public presence than the Haitian government to effectively develop and government itself.47 Some, such as Dr. Paul implement the necessary changes, given its
Farmer, founder of Partners in Health and history of corruption and the lack of deputy United Nation envoy, argue that our legitimacy with the Haitian population. historical role in overthrowing or blockading Immediately following the crisis,
Haitian American conservative politicians and ●●● Past aid has proved government commentators argued that the United States inadequate, or s has played should not be taking as strong of a stance in ineffective, so it is questionable what a large role the crisis, given our already extensive foreign effect increased international in the policy commitments.49 The United States, presence or funds current with costly involvements in Iraq and will have on the country. trend of Afghanistan, may not have the means to ●●●
dysfunction engage to a great extent in another area in al government in the country.48 This crisis. Past aid has proved inadequate, or governmental instability has contributed to ineffective, so it is questionable what effect many of the ailments that Haiti faces today. increased international presence or funds will
The United States should, according to this have on the country. William Easterly, a school of thought, commit to a long-term professor at New York University, is an
advocate for the United States playing less of
47 Lacey, ―US Troops‖ 48Neil MacFarquhar, ―Haiti is Again a Canvas for 49Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, ―US Mulls Role in Approaches to Aid,‖ The New York Times 30 Jan. Haiti After the Crisis,‖ The New York Times 17 Jan. 2010: A14. 2010: A10. Page | 177
a role in the country, stating, ―[…] the whole limited to the Haitian government, with idea of the earthquake being an opportunity mutual responsibility given to the contributing for foreigners to do more aggressive parties.51 On January 25, 2010, international interventions is really problematic and donors met in Montreal to begin plans for a objectionable. We have tried basically ten-year rebuilding commitment for Haiti.52 everything in the book already in Haiti as far During this meeting, donor nations expressed as grandiose plans, and those haven‘t concerns over Haiti‘s historical worked‖.50 Those in this manner of thinking mismanagement of aid and the government‘s promote modest, locally developed plans for ability to manage such a large reconstruction reconstruction, with minimal international project, which President Préval originally oversight or intervention. It must be estimated will cost $3 billion. While no considered whether the United States has the detailed recovery plan was established, capacity to bring the necessary changes to donors requested a comprehensive
Haiti‘s population, either by itself or in independent damage assessment, and agreed coordination with international actors. to meet again in March at the United Nations
Multilateralism headquarters in New York to come up with a 53 Looking at the history of intervention more concrete strategy. This meeting was an both in Haiti and in other case studies of this important first step in the integration of report, it is evident that the United States will international efforts to map the key priorities not be successful acting unilaterally. Strategy in reconstructing Haiti and developing a will most effectively be adopted with the multilateral long-term development strategy. consensus of all key actors, including but not 51 Collier 9. 52Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, "Agreement on Effort to Help Haiti Rebuild," The New York Times 25 Jan. 2010: A8. 50 MacFarquhar. 53 Lacey ―Agreement”. Page | 178
Recovery Fund Inter-American Development Bank is seen as
Several prominent scholars, such as a possible venue for this fund, with
Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Collier, have proposed management from the Haitian government, the development of a Haiti Recovery Fund. the United Nation, and major donors. The
The structure of this relief fund differs Inter-American Development Bank would be slightly between authors, but the consensus is ideal for structuring this account, as it is the needs for a single, transparent already Haiti‘s largest development financier multibillion-dollar recovery fund that and is widely regarded as well run.57 The fund addresses more than just immediate needs.54 would issue a single appeal to raise money,
55 This approach emphasizes the need for and then distribute money to organizations multilateral coordination between currently working in Haiti and community governments and international agencies based organizations to assist in relief efforts. working to aid in the reconstruction process. Sachs additionally emphasizes the long-term
Currently, there are more than 10,000 NGOs need for food security, encouraging the working in Haiti, and therefore it is important delivery of seed and fertilizer to strengthen that the efforts of these actors are harmonized the agricultural sector.58 This fund is intended instead of duplicated or complicated.56 The to be for lasting, sustainable change, and will
be a means of communicating specific targets 54 Jeffrey D. Sachs, ―After the earthquake, how to rebuild Haiti from scratch,‖ The Washington Post 17 and monitoring progress toward these goals. Jan. 2010 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/artic A model for a multi-donor fund is the le/2010/01/15/AR2010011502457.html 55 Paul Collier and Jean-Louis Warnholz, “Endow a Multibillion-Dollar Haiti Fund,” Foreign Policy 19 reconstruction model used in Aceh, Indonesia Jan. 2010
distributed $700 million to local rebuilding website in which donors could track where projects. Representatives from the World donations are being used, based upon the
Bank and European Union, the largest donor, transparency process that worked in the as well as an Indonesian representative, tsunami area.62 To an extent, lessons can be conducted the fund‘s oversight, and each were taken from the successes of different relief given one vote.59 However, the major models following the 2004 tsunami. difference between the fund‘s success in Aceh Institution Building and Infrastructure and its implementation in Haiti is that Aceh Development represented a small section of a strong and The importance of institution building wealthy Indonesian government, whereas is a frequently discussed topic in creating 60 Haiti does not have the same conditions. long-term development improvements.
This does not necessarily mean that a single Authors Brinkerhoff and Garcia-Zamor argue relief fund would not be successful in Haiti, that of the lessons learned from Third World but the management structure would have to economic development, the most important be modified to accommodate for these element is the need for effective institutions, differences. Other models for pooled fund which ―provide the organizing framework for programs may be seen in the Louisiana a country‘s capacity to solve its development
Disaster Recovery Fund after Hurricane problems.‖63 Haiti‘s institutions and
Katrina and the Disasters Emergency infrastructure need to not only be rebuilt 61 Committee in Britain. Former President Bill physically, in terms of the actual structures of
Clinton, the appointed UN special envoy for schools, roads, hospitals, and government Haiti, has further proposed a UN sponsored 62 ―Haiti Earthquake‖ BBC News 63Derick W. Brinkerhoff & Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, 59 MacFarquhar Politics, Projects, and People: Institutional 60 MacFarquhar Development in Haiti (New York: Praeger Publishers, 61 Strom 1986): 3. Page | 180
buildings, but also reworked from the the hundreds of millions, the government has previous inefficient and corrupt systems.64 not yet proved to be strong enough to harness
Institution building is difficult, as it takes a it.66 decade or more to establish fully functioning Education should be a key emphasis in and self-sustaining institutions, and these the long-term investment into Haiti‘s gains will be largely undramatic and difficult infrastructure reconstruction. Before the to show quantifiable results.65 Yet without earthquake, 40 percent of Haiti‘s youth were these institutions, there is little chance that not in school, and of those who were, 80
Haiti will experience the improvements in percent were enrolled in private schools, quality of life and governance that are paying for an education of questionable necessary to raise itself out of fragility. quality.67 Because of the massive population
Before the earthquake, Haiti‘s growth in the country, the youth need to be a institutions were characterized by a lack of focus in creating policy to develop the nation. trained personnel and an emphasis on top Four-fifths of Haiti‘s college-educated down management. Rebuilding the civil citizens reside outside of the country, and society of Haiti will need to remedy these past there is a large opportunity to reengage these failures. This requires competent and honest previously dismissed expatriates.68 According
Haitian leadership, including a legitimization to Andrew Natsios, a professor at Georgetown of the government in the eyes of the Haitian University and former USAID administrator, people. With foreign aid pouring into Haiti by
66 Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, ―In Quake‘s Wake, Haiti Faces Leadership Void,‖ The New York Times 31 Jan. 2010: A5 64 James Dobbins, ―Eight Ways to Rebuild Haiti: Skip 67 Bernard Gwertzman, ―Rebuilding Haiti: The Work the Graft,‖ The New York Times 16 Jan. 2010: WK9. of Decades. Interview with Mark Schneider,‖ 65 Andrew Natsios, ―After Reconstruction: Rebuilding Council on Foreign Relations 19 Jan. 2010 Haiti Means More Than Just Bricks and Mortar. It
the most successful institution-building these export industries to be strengthened, it is program used by USAID worldwide is their necessary to again look at the infrastructure scholarship program, which brings 18,000 improvements that will need to be in place for students to American universities to later Haiti to be competitive. Road systems need to return to their home countries as reformers.69 be improved to more quickly transport items,
Natsios recommends that this program be electricity needs to be reliable and cover a further utilized in helping Haiti erect a larger portion of the country, and most functioning civil society, stable economy, and importantly the port in Port-au-Prince needs legitimate government. If the need for to be run more efficiently.71 Port-au-Prince improvements to the education system is not currently holds the highest cost port in the addressed, Haiti will most likely face Caribbean, posing a significant detriment to continued and possibly worsening hardship in the export industry. Proposals to remedy this the future. cost inefficiency include placing the port
Economic stabilization and job under management contract or permitting the creation will be key to a long-term recovery development of new private ports to lower and development process. Economic strategy costs. should be simple and realistic, with the In terms of job creation, the rebuilding attempts of stabilization to lure investment. process in Haiti should be used to provide
Authors have proposed multiple areas of immediate job relief in the reconstruction of possibility for economic development, infrastructure, combining two areas of need in including most notably the expansion of the the country. This option could enjoy both garment industry and mango exports.70 For immediate results, appeasing both the Haitian
people and the donors to these projects, and 69 Natsios 70 Collier 9 71 Collier 9 Page | 182
long term impacts. The UN has begun a cash- institutions will more than likely fail.73 for-work program already, paying roughly Immediately following the earthquake, the
$4.50 for six hours of labor to Haitians United Nations Security Council approved willing to provide services such as removing sending 3,500 more peacekeeping forces and rubble from the streets, disposing of debris, police officers to uphold public order and and crushing and sorting reusable material.72 assist in the delivery of aid.74 Combining
These efforts are a strong beginning, but job these commitments with the previously in creation efforts need to be continued in some place MINUSTAH security assistance, it is manner to include more work in the difficult to know whether or not security will rebuilding of infrastructure and the be adequate for the relief efforts and development of effective institutions. reconstruction process to develop. Security
Economic development, especially in job must be a focal point in the international creation must be a consideration in strategy to rebuild, yet it may be too soon to developing a strategy for Haiti‘s know what additionally resources will be reconstruction. needed to enforce order and eventually
For all of these efforts to succeed in transition the Haiti police force into a self- the long run, security in Haiti must be sustaining, legitimate and trustworthy security improved. Criminal gangs have ever- entity. increasing power, and without the decrease in Community Driven Development criminal activity, efforts to build lasting In establishing the background of
inconsistent foreign intervention and distrust
72 ―With Haiti‘s quake relief efforts going more of the Haitian government, it becomes evident smoothly, UN looks to longer-term goals,‖ UN News Centre 1 Feb. 2010
there must be consideration given to projects that focus on infrastructure community driven development rather than a development, and projects of a social nature, top-down approach. Haitian peasants have not such as cultural centers and school historically had a stable institutional manner construction.78 Supporting the funding of of conveying their political interests or local community organizations in poor rural economic needs.75 A community based communities allows for greater access to approach to project development gives this basic infrastructure, small-scale financing of previously voiceless group with the means to income-generating activities, and the building create projects to respond to the issues they of social capital through increased see as most important. The World Bank began participation in the decision making process79. a project in January 2004 entitled the It is necessary to include individual
Community-Driven Development Project contractors to provide technical assistance and
(CDD), or known in Haiti as PRODEP.76 The incremental management of the projects to the
CDD is a five-year, US$38.6 million, since community based organizations.80 In the extended until 2014, aimed at strengthening aftermath of the earthquake, donors should community-based organizations by promoting again focus on these objectives in community the local planning and development of driven projects, as they will be the most projects and allocation of public resources.77 effective in generating lasting solutions to the
This project assumes that sustainable deeper problems. development is best achieved through local involvement and ownership, with priorities in 78 ―Community Driven Development‖ 79 ―Project Details: Community-Driven Development (CDD) Additional Financing‖ The World Bank 9 Jun. 2009. 75 Brinkerhoff 103.
Recommendations managed by members appointed by both the
International actors need to first Haitian government and the largest donors. provide and restore the basic services needed Aid coordination in the relief effort must be a for survival in Haiti, but donors must soon priority to avoid a situation where a large shift focus to lasting improvements for the number of donors are distributing funds and country. The focus of rebuilding the country organizing projects independently through should be placed on strengthening hundreds of different organizations. It is infrastructure and institutions, promoting important that this coordination happens both economic development, and incorporating between donors themselves and between local actors into project development. donors and the Haitian government. The
Programs must be developed on the basis of contents of this relief fund should be directed sustainability and the ability of the project to towards community-run development significantly alleviate the problems facing the projects, especially in the rural sector.
Haitian population. The most effective way to Infrastructure needs to be not only rebuilt, but coordinate the funds coming into Haiti is the also reconfigured to better suit the needs of development of a Haitian Relief Fund, the Haitian population. This fund should be organizing community-based projects with organized by a board, including members the aim of developing infrastructure, and appointed by President Préval, the UN building lasting governmental and economic secretary general, and major donors such as institutions to stabilize the country. the United States government. The board will
International donors need to work in a manage the development and execution of cooperative and efficient fashion through the plans for the funds in the Inter-American development of a single recovery fund Development Bank account, in which all
Page | 185
donors can deposit aid. Projects developed out should serve as the front of the international of this recovery fund should first focus on effort to reconstruct the country, yet there emergency relief efforts, but need to quickly needs to be a high degree of transparency and shift to reconstruction and development tracking of funds, as remedied by the single projects at the community level. In focusing recovery account. Aid programs need built in on local, community-driven efforts, a focus performance assessment and evaluation may be placed on the rehabilitation of basic elements to maintain a sense of socio-economic infrastructure, as well as accountability.81 These performance productive financing of income generating assessments must be done by an independent investment opportunities. A single recovery agency that will publish detailed information fund would ensure full transparency in about both the successes and failures of tracking of funds to ensure a greater projects, so as to learn from the consequences, accountability in the use of aid. both positive and negative, of each program.
Reconstruction projects should focus The most important recommendation on providing jobs for Haitians in building is that whatever strategy is developed, the what was destroyed in the earthquake and United States must make a reasonable and further infrastructure that the country was in lasting commitment to Haiti. Extreme need of before the natural disaster. Other fluctuations in international support and possible areas of economic opportunity, such intervention have hurt Haiti‘s chances for as the mango and garment industries, need to development in the past, and the international be explored and made more competitive on community should make a dedicated effort to the global market by decreasing unnecessary extend development past the period of initial cost inefficiencies. The government of Haiti rebuilding projects. The relief fund would be
81 Buss 150 Page | 186
an ideal manner to make this commitment, and the United States needs to take the lead in the follow-through of its implementation. The
Haitian people and government need to be involved and see progress both in the short- term immediate relief and in real, lasting development. A single recovery fund provides a comprehensive solution that encompasses many of the principles covered in this report.
Page | 187
Works Cited
Brinkerhoff, Derick W. & Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor. Politics, Projects, and People: Institutional Development in Haiti. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986.
Buss, Terry F. Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It. National Academy of Public Administration. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008
Collier, Paul. Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security. Jan. 2009.
Collier, Paul and Jean-Louis Warnholz. ―Endow a Multibillion-Dollar Haiti Fund.‖ Foreign Policy 19 Jan. 2010.
―Community Driven Development Project.‖ The World Bank 14 Jul. 2008.
Cooper, Helene and Mark Landler. ―U.S. Mulls Role in Haiti After the Crisis.‖ The New York Times 17 Jan. 2010: A10.
Curry, John J. Approaching Failed State Status: A Case Study of Haiti. USAWC Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks, Pa: U.S. Army War College, 2005.
Dobbins, James. ―Eight Ways to Rebuild Haiti: Skip the Graft.‖ The New York Times 16 Jan. 2010: WK9.
Girard, Philippe R. Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004.
Gwertzman, Bernard. ―Rebuilding Haiti: The Work of Decades. Interview with Mark Schneider.‖ Council on Foreign Relations 19 Jan. 2010.
―Haiti‖ The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Jan. 2010. Web. 8 Feb. 2010.
―Haiti Earthquake_By the Numbers‖. CBS News 26 Jan. 2010. Web. 6 Feb. 2010.
―Haiti Earthquake: UN Seeks Record Aid Donations.‖ BBC News 19 Feb. 2010
James, E. C. "Ruptures, Rights, and Repair: The Political Economy of Trauma in Haiti." Social Science & Medicine 70.1 (2010): 106-13. Web.
Lacey, Marc, and Ginger Thompson. "Agreement on Effort to Help Haiti Rebuild." The New York Times 25 Jan. 2010: A8.
Lacey, Marc, and Ginger Thompson. ―In Quake‘s Wake, Haiti Faces Leadership Void.‖ The New York Times 31 Jan. 2010: A5.
Lacey, Marc. ―Estimates of Quake Damage in Haiti Increase by Billions.‖ The New York Times 16 Feb. 2010: A8.
Lacey, Marc. ―U.S. Troops Patrol Haiti, Filling a Void.‖ The New York Times 19 Jan. 2010: A1.
Lockhart, Clare. ―Focus on the Structure of Aid.‖ Foreign Policy 19 Jan. 2010. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/19/how_to_help_haiti_rebuild?page=0,2
Mandelbaum, Michael. "Foreign Policy As Social Work." Foreign Affairs. 75. 1 (1996): 16-32.
MacFarquhar, Neil. ―Haiti is Again a Canvas for Approaches to Aid.‖ The New York Times 30 Jan. 2010: A14.
Mintz, Sidney W. "Can Haiti Change? " Foreign Affairs. 74. 1 (1995): 73-86.
Natsios, Andrew. ―After Reconstruction: Rebuilding Haiti Means More Than Just Bricks and Mortar. It Means Building Institutions.‖ Newsweek 22 Jan 2010.
―Project Details: Community-Driven Development (CDD) Additional Financing.‖ The World Bank 9 Jun. 2009.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. ―After the earthquake, how to rebuild Haiti from scratch.‖ The Washington Post 17 Jan. 2010.
Strom, Stephanie. ―Haiti Crisis Prompts Fresh Talk of Pooling U.S. Relief Money.‖ The New York Times 1 Feb. 2010: A12.
Sweeney, John. "Stuck in Haiti." Foreign Policy. 102 (1996): 142-151.
―The Challenge of Rebuilding Haiti.‖ BBC News 29 Jan. 2010.
United States. Haiti's Development Needs: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, March 13, 2007. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2007.
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Somalia A Failed State with a Glimpse of Hope
Angelissa Savino
Introduction humanitarian missions, and joint aid efforts
With recent reports appearing in with international organizations. The Obama mainstream media of terrorist threats, administration has been handed this humanitarian crisis, and piracy problems, deteriorating situation and it must create a
Somalia is once again becoming a top priority comprehensive policy to address the of international policy makers. Somalia is shortcomings of past strategies in a timely considered a failed state by almost any recent manner. To do so, we must draw on lessons development report and has remained in that learned from the past while utilizing category for over ten years. Its failure has successful tactics from interventions in other caused thousands of deaths, the displacement failed states. of 1.8 million Somalis, and made 3.2 million The following case study will survey a dependent on food aid.1 We have strategic history of the formation and demise of the interests in the region which include fears it centralized government of Somalia, touch on will become a safe-haven for terrorist past US involvement, review US interests in organizations, the emergence of aggressive the region, and present varying options for piracy disrupting economic activity, and the policy makers to consider. Lastly, it will many Somali lives that are being recommend that policy makers collaborate compromised. with the international community, work with
Past United States interventions have local communities to invest resources into consisted of failed military ventures, training young Somalis for work, channel food aid through the central government, 1United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. initiate inter-clan conflict resolution methods, Developing a coordinated and sustainable strategy for Somalia : hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, May 20, 2009. Washington: U.S. G.P.O Page | 191
protect the waters around Somali from illegal but it was ultimately granted independence in fishing and dumping of toxic waste, and allow the 1960s.2 In 1969, Mohamed Barre led a
Somalia to function as a loose federation of successful military coup and established an
Source: “Ethnic Groups.” Map. US Central Intelligence Agency. University of Texas Libraries.
Somaliland. The United States must continue brought stability to the country for over three to invest resources and intelligence in the decades. Strict socialism was adopted in the region to ensure its success. country and almost every enterprise was nationalized. Barre knew that entrenched Background clan-identities had the power to destabilize his The Somali borders were first drawn government and sought to rid the population during the land grab of the 1800s by western powers. Italy, French, and Great Britain all 2 CIA - The World Factbook -- Somalia , , 2/6/2010 laid claims to the territory at different times, 2010
of their clan-loyalties through a number of The persistent fighting and a timely social programs.3 Despite his temporary drought caused the agricultural lands to be success in unifying the country, a series of destroyed and a famine swept throughout the droughts, multiple human rights abuses that country.5 Pictures flooded into the western earned him one ―of the worst human rights world capturing the attention of the public and records in Africa‖ by the United Nations, and politicians alike. ●●● The country plunged surfacing clan disputes ultimately ended his In August into a civil war from rule in 1991.4 (See Figure 1 for overview of of 1992, the UN which it has never fully recovered. geographical clan composition.) Security Council ●●●
The country plunged into a civil war decided to take action and began Operation from which it has never fully recovered. Clan Provide Relief to bring food and medical aid identities were amplified because of to Somalia.6 To their dismay, the UN groups competition for power, extreme Islamist transporting the food were frequently looted groups were formed, and Mogadishu became and an estimated 80% of all food was stolen a prime target of conflict. by warlords and sold to other countries to
Battle of Mogadishu raise revenue to buy weapons.7 The UN called
on the international community to provide
military relief and President George Bush 3 One such program that Barre instituted was outlawing people asking each other which clan they made the decision to commit 25,000 US belonged to. He even outlawed the question of which ―ex-clan‖ you belonged to because it revealed prior identity. Barre also established a standardized written language that he forced the population to use. 5 Frontline: ambush in Mogadishu: readings: the International Crisis Group. Somalia : to move beyond lessons of Somalia - not everything went wrong , , the failed state. Nairobi; Brussels: International Crisis 2/24/2010 2010 Group, 2008. http://worldcat.org. Web.
soldiers to enable food to be delivered and However, with a $25,000 bounty on distributed appropriately.8 He had hoped the his head, Aidid began attacking UN forces troops would be out by Clinton's inauguration and gaining support of Somali clans by two month time following. convincing them that the foreigners were
By the following May 1993, Clinton trying to control the country.10 US soldiers in was finally able to scale troops down to 4,200 Somalia were then ordered to find Aidid. 17 as UN officials replaced US soldiers.9 The US soldiers were killed, one captured, and
UN officials were less politically attuned to pictures of Somalis dragging lifeless US the area and a miscalculation caused the soldiers through the streets streamed onto US deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers. Wanting to televisions. Clinton responded by promising send a strong signal that violence against UN the American people that all troops would be forces was not acceptable, the United Nations out of the country within 5 months and started
Security Council (UNSC) declared that scaling back US presence. By the spring of whoever was responsible for the deaths was 1995, all UN troops had exited and the now considered enemies of the UN forces. mission was seen as a failed attempt to bring
The ―enemy‖ was General Mohamed Farrah humanitarian aid to the country.
Aidid who had led the coup that forced Barre The horror of seeing US soldiers being out of power and was seen as a hero to many dragged through the streets by those they
Somalis. The United States had worked were trying to protect remained in the minds closely with Aidid while they were in of the Clinton administration as they decided command to establish some type of agreement to abstain from intervening during the to restore order. Rwandan genocide and adopted a policy that
8 Ibid, see chronology and interview with Ambassador hesitated to enter humanitarian ventures. This Oakley 9 Ibid 10 Ibid, see interview with Ambassador Oakley Page | 194
event also taught US foreign policy makers a the means by which they were creating few key lessons. successful dialogue and maintaining peace so
One of the lessons is that it is that the UN officials could follow their important to maintain as much peaceful footsteps. Instead, the UN peacekeepers were dialogue as possible with warring parties. much more hostile, less diplomatic, and this
Before the US started scaling back troops, US ultimately caused the clash which killed the
Ambassador Oakley was meeting with Pakistani soldiers. affiliates of General Aidid on a daily basis A third lesson that can be learned from and making diplomatic progress.11 However, the Battle of Mogadishu is that although time after the incident with the Pakistani soldiers, tables can be successful to ensure the UNSC's proceeding declaration towards interventions do not turn into lengthy
Aidid stopped this dialogue and resulted in a occupations, they must also allow a sufficient very costly battle. If the UN peacekeepers had amount of time to achieve authentic security. maintained dialogue with Aidid and not Because the Clinton administration pulled out provoked him, this battle may have been troops prematurely in response to the clash, avoided. much progress was lost and the US left the
Another lesson learned from this country in only a mildly better condition than incident is that it is imperative to maintain when it had arrived. If the presence of clear communication amongst actors. The American troops had been slowly scaled back, catalyst incident involving the Pakistani much of the progress made may have been soldiers could have been avoided if the US preserved. had clearly communicated to the UN officials
11 Frontline: ambush in Mogadishu: readings: the lessons of Somalia - not everything went wrong, see interview with Ambassador Oakley Page | 195
Transitional Federal Government and incorporated the more moderate ICU
After the Battle of Mogadishu, the clans into the TFG government.13 following years were spotted with several In the beginning of 2009, the failed ventures by various clan leaders to form Transitional Federal Government elected a a central government. In 2004 they finally new set of politicians during a meeting in achieved the largest success in the formation neighboring Djibouti and moved back to of the Transitional Federal Government Mogadishu. A former leader of a more
(TFG). It failed to bring complete stability to moderate branch of the ICU, Sheik Sharif,
Somalia and fostered extreme corruption and was elected President. Although Sharif anarchy. A loose coalition of clans then declared Somalia an officially Muslim state formed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and under Sharia law, the former military wing of overthrew the TFG in Mogadishu and the ICU, al-Shabaab, countered by saying the
Southern Somalia. The group of moderate and TFG was too secular and declared its own extreme Muslims created a Sharia court goal to ―oppose the TFG and turn Somalia system and was backed by a strong military into an Islamic state.‖14 Since then, it has branch the al-Shabaab.12 With the help of the continued to engage in heavy fighting in
United States and Ethiopia, the TFG Mogadishu and surrounding regions against eventually reclaimed territory from the ICU the TFG. The al-Shabaab is the biggest threat
13 A major concern of Somalis was the presence of Ethiopian troops in their country. Al-Shabaab capitalized on this and is waging a campaign against foreign troops. UNHCR | Refworld | USCIRF Annual Report 2009 - 12 Somalia is predominantly Muslim but is The Commission's Watch List: Somalia known to hold a much more moderate view of Islam. 14It is believed that Sheik will impose a less strict Many Somalis supported the ICU mainly because it version of Sharia law which explains the al-Shabaab‘s was the only governing body since 1991 that was able intense opposition.UNHCR | Refworld | USCIRF to establish even a nominal sense of order. Annual Report 2009 - The Commission's Watch List: International Crisis Group. Somalia Page | 196
to the success of the TFG in establishing law are able to unite for the purpose of stability and order in Somalia. and form a parliamentary political system, the
Somaliland entire state can follow its example.
Somaliland consists of northern Puntland
Somalia and was under British rule from 1884 The region of Puntland, including until 1960 when it gained its independence. Bari, Nugaal, and Mudug, attempted to gain
At this time it joined the Italian Somalia, some autonomy from Mogadishu when it present day Somalia excluding Somaliland became apparent the TFG would fail.16 The and the region of Soog and Sanaal, and leaders of the Puntland clans created a formed the Somali Republic. In 1991 when political system modeled after the United the country collapsed, Somaliland formed a States with the exception that there is only congress and unilaterally ―withdrew from the one legislative making body; the House of
Union with Somalia to reinstate Somaliland‘s Representatives. Citizens vote for their 15 sovereignty.‖ It has a fully functioning representatives in each region ensuring military, currency, education ministry, representation for all clans. economic ministry, and foreign relations A new President, Dr. Abdirahman ministry. It is a successful state in comparison Mohamed Mohamud, was recently elected to the rest of Somalia and is seeking president in January of 2009. The proceeding international recognition as a country. transition of power was relatively peaceful,
Somaliland‘s success should be seen prompting one American observer, Michael as a source of hope for national reconciliation Weinstein, to declare, ―the success of the in Somalia. If Somaliland clans and citizens Puntland elections can begin to provide a
15 Puntland State Of Somalia , 4 Feb. 2010.
model for the whole of Somalia. It actually business contracts. It is also attempting to worked.‖17 Puntland is also working to remain a part of the deliberation process in provide its citizens with better health care, Djibouti to ensure it is given adequate education, and benefits from working with representation in the central government. multinational corporations. Puntland is rich The success of Puntland is attributed with natural resources including oil and to the painstaking process of mediation, seafood and has a thriving livestock reconciliation, and negotiation amongst clan industry.18 In 2006, it also laid the foundation leaders. Like Somaliland, it serves as a of the Bosaso International Airport, which is beacon of hope to the Somali people and the seen as a significant development venture.19 TFG that peace and security can be
Unlike Somaliland, President established. For this peace to be secured the
Mohamud‘s goal is to keep Puntland as a part United States must be willing to invest more of the Somali Union.20 He stepped down from time and resources into the country. To his previous government position because a receive funding from Congress, we must decision was made to sign a contract without recognize our strategic interests in the the approval of the central TFG. The country, to which we will now turn.
President believes that although Puntland is US Interests relatively independent from Mogadishu, it is The United States has invested billions still part of the country and must have the of dollars and varying military and
TFG‘s approval in international policies and peacekeeping forces in the Horn of Africa
17 New Puntland President Faces Stiff Challenges because it is in our strategic interest for News, 2/24/2010 2010
functioning state.21 Our interest in this small organizations, mainly Al-Qaeda. This was country half way around the world rests on thought unlikely until 2008 when videos were several aspects. released by Saleh al-Nabhan, an East African
A prominent issue that motivated the al-Qaeda operative, ―inviting foreigners to first invasion during the Bush and Clinton travel there for training.‖23 Al-Shabaab administrations was the humanitarian officially announced that it is aligning with concerns that arose from the thousands of Al-Qaeda‘s global jihad this February.24 US
Somalis being abused, displaced, and killed.22 intelligence has confirmed foreign fighters in
Desperate faces were painted across western the region for some time but a public media screens and in the midst of sending commitment to Al-Qaeda confirms the fear donations, citizens contacted members of that militant Islamist groups in Somalia have
Congress who became allies to the Somali expanded their goals from a national population and prompted our intervention. As movement to a global focus. Because it is these incidences of rape, torture, and such a lawless area, Al-Qaeda would thrive starvation steadily continue to flow out of the and could possibly use it as a permanent country, the humanitarian concern also location for its activities. This elevates the continues to be a motivating factor to importance of stability in Somalia. investing resources into the region. The United States also has national
Additionally, Somalia is now a prime interest in the area because of increased candidate to become a safe haven for terrorist piracy activity originating from Somalia.
21 United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on There were over 200 occurrences of piracy in Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. 22 Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu: Readings: the lessons of Somalia - not everything went wrong , 2/24/2010 2010 23United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on
2009 that cost $60 million.25,26 This concern strengthened so that it can effectively bring
is aggravated by recent surveys that 70 these pirates to justice once they are on land
percent of Somalis "strongly supported the with the hope of deterring future crimes.
piracy as a form of national defense of the . Somali refugees are fleeing the
country's territorial waters."27 This is because country and adding stress to their neighbors‘
Asian and European countries are dumping already waning budgets. Additionally,
●●● toxic waste on unemployed refugees can also fall prey to If Somalia continues Somali shores and insurgent groups in need of members that can in this perpetual state of failure, it also reaping huge further exacerbate domestic skirmishes in poses a threat to the entire Horn of Africa. benefits from other countries. The threat to regional stability ●●● fishing off is particularly relevant because of strong clan-
uncontaminated sections of their shores.28 identities that make citizens more loyal to
Although the international community is their clan then country, inviting the possibility
attempting to create solutions to stop the for neighboring rebel groups to set up camp in
piracy, the Somali government needs to be Somalia across the border from their home
state.29
25AfricaNews - Pirates made $60m in 2009: report - In particular, Ethiopia is a major point The AfricaNews articles of Muhyadin , , 2/24/2010 2010
Somali extremist groups as an attempt to should not attempt to undermine clan-
Christianize the Somalis and force them to loyalties but instead capitalize upon them to renounce their Islamic faith because Ethiopia create a space that has nominal governance. has a Christian government. A stable Somalia Our actions would include facilitating would decrease tensions on the Ethiopian meetings and encouraging leaders to uphold border. agreements. This is how the Somaliland and
Options Puntland governments were formed as well as
After examining our interests in the the standing TFG. Skeptics may argue this is region, we will now turn to our options for futile, but with cautious politics it is more action. Because we have linked the Somali than feasible. insurgents with Al-Qaeda terrorists, it is likely We could also begin funneling aid that we will have access to a substantial through more formal government ties instead amount of funds through Congress, and a of non-governmental organization (NGO) sizeable military force. Contributions of camps on the ground. This would strengthen peacekeeping forces and aid are being the legitimacy of the governing bodies in the provided by the African Union, United eyes of Somalis because they will be going to
Nations, and neighboring countries. These the government for aid as opposed to western multiple sources of aid mean we have NGOs. Although NGOs are making progress adequate resources to embark on any course on the ground, they can undermine the of action, but that we are still in search of an government by causing citizens to become effective strategy to employ these resources. dependent on them. NGOs are only temporary
Any proposal must recognize the solutions, whereas the government is a more importance of clan affiliations. Policies permanent solution.
Page | 201
The current Somali President, Omar two areas will be incorporated into Somalia.
Sharmarke, has argued that some key policy Both have the option of becoming recommendations be implemented in Somalia. autonomous countries, states as part of a
These include training security forces, federal Somalia, or being wholly integrated enforcing Somalia's rights over natural into a pre-1991 Somali State. Before a resources including oil and fishing, and ― decision is made concerning these regions, launching a large- scale civil affairs special attentions should be paid to the desires programme [sic] to train our young people of the citizenry and leaders in the regions. and establish legitimate commercial Another option to explore is engaging livelihoods.‖ 30 The last of these in dialogue with the leaders of al-Shabaab and recommendations, to train the young people, other insurgent groups. Given that Al- is especially important in Somalia. Shabaab has aligned itself with the global
Unemployed Somalis are targeted by jihad against the west, encouraging insurgents to join their militias in exchange diplomatic efforts would be particularly for basic necessities such as food and shelter. challenging. In the current state of affairs, it
With minimal training these individuals could does not appear to be feasible to engage with be contributing to the legitimate economy the core of this group of militants because helping to bring stability as opposed to they have declared war on the TFG. As the contributing to the breakdown of normalcy. conflict progresses this may change and the
Concerning Puntland and Somaliland, TFG should be flexible and willing to work there are different possibilities for how these with them if afforded the opportunity. The US
should encourage the TFG to continue to 30 Barack Obama‘s Afghan vision can work for Somalia -Times Online , 2/24/2010 2010
Page | 202
invite other insurgent groups to participate in past conflict with Ethiopia must be taken into dialogue and ultimately a unified government. consideration because there is deep mistrust
Recommendations between Ethiopia and the Somali people. A
The state of Somalia has been in successful strategy will secure the border disarray since the fall of Barre‘s dictatorship. between the two countries. This will reassure the Ethiopian government that it Since then, the situation ●●● has deteriorated in The political disarray does not need to engage in in Somalia is Mogadishu where warring affecting neighboring military ventures to secure itself Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Somali people that parties are still fighting and Kenya. ●●● for power. A solution to Ethiopian forces will not be the different issues facing the state are not allowed to intervene. easily defined, solved, or executed. However, Time-sensitive there are some recommendations that the As discussed above, Somalia has
Obama administration should utilize in taken steps to successfully bring stability in making policy decisions concerning Somalia. certain regions but we must make a long term
Regional commitment to aiding it in establishing
To begin, the conflict in Somalia must complete order. Any direct involvement not be viewed as an isolated incident. These should be primarily aid. The US must give the countries are bearing the burden of thousands TFG long-term commitments to give them the of refugees crossing their borders. Any assurance that they can move forward in other comprehensive plan must include areas knowing that their population will be compensation for these countries as they fed. When Congress grants the quantity and attempt to care for the Somali refugees. Also, type of aid for Somalia, it should be
Page | 203
accompanied with a comprehensive timeline, the TFG and local governments, and those but any time-sensitive plan must be flexible to that are showing commitment towards account for daily developments on the diplomatic resolutions. ground. This will prevent premature Another local issue that policies must withdrawal of troops and/or aid and ensure be sensitive to is the fact that many young that US interventions do not turn into physical Somalis do not have means to provide for or material occupations. themselves and their families. As mentioned
Recognition of Local Situation above, it is imperative that adequate foreign
Although it is painful to hear reports aid be committed to training and educating and see pictures of suffering Somalis, we this sector of the population to empower them must resist the urge to over-engage and to contribute to local, legal economies, and escalate the problem with the presence of care for themselves. Without this essential foreign troops. Any US involvement must component, they will fall prey to the have the complete support of the TFG. We incentives of insurgent groups and only must also be willing to work with the local exacerbate the situation. governing bodies and be ready to engage in International Collaboration dialogue and support the different clans that The US must also collaborate with have been successful in establishing order. international and regional bodies,
These clans are the basis of identity for many predominantly the United Nations and
Somalis and they should be encouraged to African Union. These organizations have continue and maintain dialogue with one similar goals to the United States and have another. This could include offering economic made vast contributions as stated above. To incentives for clans that communicating with ignore this fact would be to ignore our allies
Page | 204
and forfeit the opportunity to share the burden since the greater Somalia will be losing their of providing resources and servicemen to the northern part, and Somaliland will be area. surrendering their claim on two regions that
Working with the international they believe are rightfully theirs. The community should involve a renewed importance of this recommendation is that it commitment to protecting the Somali limits the conflict to a smaller area and coastline from being exploited by other rewards the success of regional government. countries. This would allow the Somali Somaliland is already well established and fishermen to once again use their natural any attempt to incorporate it back into the rest resources to make a living and renew their of Somalia is sure to bring conflict. ability to utilize one of their most valuable Somaliland citizens who have enjoyed peace natural resources; seafood. This could also may fear that committing them to the rest of help alleviate the piracy problem as fishermen the country will welcome conflict back in are able to make a living off of fishing as their region. Somaliland citizens have labored opposed to capturing foreign ships. to secure peace, and the United States and the
Multi-state solution international community should support this
A more specific recommendation is that collaboration, not discourage it by forcing it the US should encourage the TFG to grant to reunite with the rest of the country.
Somaliland independence without the Conclusion 31 inclusion of the Sanaal and Soog regions. Somalia has been an unsuccessful
This involves mutual sacrifice for both parties state for over twenty years and has a complex
31These two regions are disputed because the original history, political makeup, and cultural British territory of Somaliland included these regions, but the Italian Somalia also included them. characteristics. As the Obama administration Somaliland a way out of the electoral crisis, 2009, International Crisis Group. Page | 205
reviews comprehensive policy recommendations for failed states, Somalia should always be included in the discussion and hopefully used as a case study to recommend or deter specific policies from being applied. Although currently a failed state, Puntland and Somaliland offer glimpses of hope that Somalia could be rising above its failed status and the United States of
American should contribute to that progress.
Page | 206
Works Cited
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Ansems, A. "Somalia 2007: Starting from scratch on the long and winding road to peace and democracy?" 2009. Web. /z-wcorg/. http://worldcat.org.
"Barack Obama‘s Afghan vision can work for Somalia -Times Online "Web. 24 Feb. 2010
"The Bombs that Stopped the Happy Talk; the Resurgence of Al-Qaeda." The Economist. 30 January 2010 Web.
"CIA - The World Factbook -- Somalia "Web. 6 Feb. 2010
"Courting Trouble." Economist 380.8486 (2006): 11. Web.
"Dilemmas of the Horn - Washington Wanted to Keep Somalia from Turning into another Afghanistan. Now it's an African Iraq." Newsweek 2008, sec. 151: 30. Web.
Doornbos, Martin. "Somalia: Alternative Scenarios for Political Reconstruction." African Affairs 101.402 (2002): 93. /z-wcorg/. Web.
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Hari, Joann, and Johann Hari. God Save the Queen: Monarchy and the Truth about the Windsors . Totem Books refworks; ISBNDB.Com. Web.
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"Somalia's Clan Families - Council on Foreign Relations."Web. 5 Feb. 2010
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United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable Strategy for Somalia : Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, may 20, 2009. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2009. Web.
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Democratic Republic of Congo Ongoing Violence Calls for a New Approach
Rachelle French
Page | 209
Introduction the playing out of neighbor countries‘ 1 The Democratic Republic of Congo conflicts on Congolese soil.
(DRC) is at the bottom of the parabola of state Also unique to the DRC is its vast failure due to ongoing violence and the natural resource wealth. It has prolonged the inability of the central government to expel conflicts by allowing the development of a the rebel groups that control portions of the profitable and sustainable war economy. US country. Years of governance by an infamous policy toward the DRC should integrate the dictatorship and two successive wars have imminent need to wrest control of these caused the state to fail; ongoing violence resources from warring factions and funnel indicates that it has yet to recover. The this revenue to the central government for situation in the DRC is unique because the infrastructure building and the provision of conflict there is linked to and in many ways social goods for the Congolese. propagated by its neighbors. Thus, the DRC is Issue a good example of where a thorough An estimated 5.4 million people have understanding of regional dynamics and an died since 1998 as a result of the ongoing incorporation of regional actors should be a conflict in the Democratic Republic of key component of US strategy in the DRC. Congo.2 Despite international aid and the
The crucial ties between the Congo‘s civil largest UN peacekeeping force in the world wars and its neighbors have caused some to (MONUC), the DRC remains fraught with argue that the conflicts on DRC soil have not been ‗civil‘ wars, as much as they have been
1 Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality (London: Zed Books, 2007) 8. 2 Benjamin Coghlan, et al. ―Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis,‖ International Rescue Committee (2007), 16. Page | 210
violence.3 Portions of the country, particularly seventh in 2007 due to a resurgence in
North and South Kivu, continue to be violence.7
4 occupied by militia groups. Recently the Background
Congolese government has stepped up its Throughout modern history the region efforts to eliminate these rebel groups, that makes up today‘s Democratic Republic resulting in over 100,000 displaced civilians of Congo (formerly Zaire) has been riddled 5 fleeing the violence in recent months. This with violence, inaugurated when King has prompted the UN to extend MONUC‘s Leopold of Belgium declared it his personal peacekeeping mandate until May 31, 2010, protectorate in 1885.8 Leopold‘s Congo was pending further evaluation of effective tactics marked by such brutality that it is known as 6 for civilian protection. As a result the DRC ―Congo‘s genocide.‖ Anywhere from five to earned fifth place on the list of most failed eight million Congolese lives were lost state in Foreign Policy Magazine‘s Failed through brutal enslavement of the local
State Index – an improvement from its second people for resource extraction.9 This was the place ranking in 2006 but a regression from first instance of a recurring problem for
Congo – foreign intervention out of a desire
to access Congo‘s wealth of natural resources.
3 Danielle Beswick, "The Challenge of Warlordism to The DRC is extremely wealthy in natural Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo," Round Table 98.402 (2009): 334. 4"Background Note: Democratic Republic of Congo (01/10)," U.S. Department of State, Web, 26 Jan. 2010 7 "2009 Failed States Index - Interactive Map and
resources, which include diamonds, gold, oil, using the national treasury as his personal copper, cobalt, coltan and timber.10 bank account, and records from 1992 show
The DRC gained its independence that Mobutu designated 95% of the national from Belgium in 1960. In 1965, Mobutu Sese budget for his own purposes.12 As a result of
Seko came to power by military coup his kleptocratic practices, the Congolese following the assassination of democratically elected nationalist Patrice
Lumumba (supported by
Belgian secret service and the CIA due to
Lumumba‘s perceived sympathies with the
Soviet Union).11 Mobutu was able to remain in power from 1965-1997,
Source: “Democratic Republic of Congo.” Map. US Central during which time both the Intelligence Agency. University of Texas Libraries. 22 Feb. 2010
10 Theodore Trefon, Van Hoyweghen Saskia, and Stefaan Smis, "Editorial: State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions & Realities," Review of African Political 12 Pierre Englebert, ―Life Support or Assisted Suicide? Economy 29.93/94, State Failure in the Congo: Dilemmas of US policy toward the Democratic Perceptions and Realities (Le Congo entre Crise et Republic of Congo,‖ Low-Income Poorly Performing Régenération) (2002): 381. States and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Brookings Institute 11 Gondola, 126-127 Press, 2005) 4. Page | 212
was in 1960. Mobutu was able to stay in purposeful encouragement of anarchy
power by playing both regional and Cold War throughthe halting of payment to soldiers.14
politics to his advantage, garnering continued Unpaid soldiers began violently rioting and
US support (both monetary and military) by looting.
●●● promoting his regime In 1994, civil war broke out in “The five year ‘civil as a ―stalwart of anti- Rwanda that resulted in the genocide of 1 war’ that followed has colloquially communism.13 millions Tutsis and moderate Hutus by more called “Africa’s world 15 war”…It was the Breakdown of the radical Hutus. This violence spilled over deadliest conflict since World War II, state and the First into eastern Zaire as first refugees and then, with an estimated fearing reprisal, the Hutu militiamen death toll of 3.3 Congo War million people.” When the responsible for the genocide took refuge ●●●
Cold War ended, there. Of the 1.2 million Hutu refugees that
western aid to Mobutu quickly dried up and fled into eastern Zaire, as many as 100,000 16 the dictator came under increasing pressure belonged to the armed interahamwe militias.
both domestically and internationally to hold This massive influx of armed refugees further
democratic elections. In 1990, he finally destabilized the Zairian state and amplified 17 conceded to hold elections and transition into existing ethnic differences. The complex
democratic state structures. In actuality, interactions between these indigenous ethnic
however, he was determined to retain power groups and their Rwandan counterparts
at all costs, as demonstrated by his brutal 14 Gondola 157; Michael Nest, Francois Grignon and repression of anti-Mobutu student protests at Emizet F. Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006) 9. 15 Nest 20 the University of Lubumbashi and his 16 René Lemarchand, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction, Occasional Paper (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2001) 15. 13 Englebert 2-7 17 Ibid. 159 Page | 213
provoked, and continue to provoke, violence president.19 However, it quickly became clear in eastern DRC. The disconnect between that Kabila had no interest in restarting the
Kinshasa and its remote provinces prompted democratization process and there was a sense
William Reno, an expert on the region, to of ―Mobutuism without Mobutu‖ that stoked write in 1998, ―Kivu in the east has closer discontent domestically and internationally.20 contact with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda The Second Congo War: “Africa‟s World 18 than with most of Zaire.‖ War”
Mobutu‘s inability to reassert central In August 2008, the second Congolese control over eastern Zaire proved fatal, as war began when Kabila‘s expulsion of clashes between rival ethnic militias engulfed Rwandan military officers finally provoked the region and insecurity spread. By 1996, action against him. Rwanda and Uganda
Rwandan backed rebel group AFDL (Alliance backed an anti-Kabila uprising, in response to des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération which Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent du Congo-Zaïre) was marching on Kinshasa. troops to defend Kinshasa. The five-year
With support from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola ‗civil war‘ that followed has colloquially been and the US for the rebel group, the state of called ―Africa‘s world war‖ because five of
Zaire finally collapsed in 1997. The AFDL its neighbors were involved – Rwanda and took control of the country, renamed it the Uganda in support of rebel groups and
Democratic Republic of Congo, and instated Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe in support of the their leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila as
19 Gondola 160; "BBC News - Democratic Republic of Congo country profile," BBC NEWS | News Front Page, Web, 3 Feb. 2010 18 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States,
central government.21 It was the deadliest certainly funded and prolonged the conflict since World War II, with an conflicts.24 In 2001, Laurent Kabila was estimated death toll of 3.3 million people.22 assassinated by his bodyguard and his son
This conflict speaks to the regional Joseph Kabila took over the presidency. A dynamics at play in the DRC‘s failure. The peace deal between the Kinshasa government, regional complexity can be seen in the shared Uganda, Rwanda and the predominant rebel ethnicities across state lines and in the groups in 2002 formally ended the conflict, development of a regional war economy that and was followed by an interim government financed many of the fighting groups. There period and democratic elections in July of has been documented evidence that 2006.25 Despite these formal peace neighboring countries have used the ongoing agreements, violence is an enduring problem conflict as a means to access the country‘s in the DRC and the central government vast mineral wealth and may have gone so far continues to struggle to exercise authority in as to provoke and prolong conflict for this the East Kivu provinces.
23 reason. Although most would agree that the US Interests
Congo wars did not erupt solely out of Due to its size, location, and resource economic interests, the war economy wealth, the DRC could play a strong role in
Central African regional stability. For this 21 "BBC News - Democratic Republic of Congo country profile," BBC NEWS | News Front reason, it is in US interest to formulate and Page, Web, 3 Feb. 2010
state. Conversely, if action is not taken, the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.27 humanitarian crisis will continue and the This could become a major challenge to the already fragile Congolese government could US‘s nuclear non-dissemination efforts if left collapse. unregulated. The US government has already
National Security noted this threat; allegations have been made
Uncontrolled territory, such as the against Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) and Iran eastern territories, poses a national security that they were seeking to acquire uranium 28 threat for the United States by providing a from within the DRC. There is valid cause haven from which terrorist groups can for concern. Not only does the DRC provide operate. This can be seen in countries such as uncontrolled territory and uranium, but polls
Afghanistan and Somalia. In Somalia, these also show that the USA is relatively rogue actors have gained international unpopular among the Congolese, further recognition through their acts of piracy, which magnifying the risk of the DRC becoming a both endanger lives and impose a base for anti-American terrorism. Since 1996, considerable economic cost to their victims.26 the USA has consistently placed within the
In the DRC, the development of anti-western top three least popular countries among the terrorist groups would prove dire. Among its Congolese, according to public opinion 29 many rich natural resources, the DRC is also polls. This is largely due to allegations by home to a substantial supply of uranium, the the Congolese that the US assisted Rwanda in same supply that was used in making the its 1998 invasion of the DRC and has since
27 "DR Congo 'uranium ring smashed'" BBC News. 8 Mar. 2007. 28 United States. Cong. House. Declassified Excerpts from October 2002 National Intelligence 26 Raymond Gilpin, Counting the Costs of Somali Estimate on Iraq. By Peter T. King. H. Piracy, Working paper (Washington DC: United States Congressional Record. Institute for Peace, 2009) 12. 29 Englebert 22 Page | 216
been supporting a state partition that would DRC. Since 1998, 5.4 million people have benefit Rwanda.30 died in the DRC as ●●● Sexual violence is National Economy a result of the used to “undermine conflict and the whole social US interest in the DRC goes beyond structure” and “to 32 national security interests, as a stable DRC displacement. weaken any opposition in the would be a valuable trading partner and a This death toll is population”. ●●● valuable asset to the global economy. If the staggering but
Congolese government were able to control there are additional human costs of the war. It its resources, it would weaken rebel groups by has been widely reported that in the DRC, removing a large source of income, provide a particularly in the war torn eastern provinces powerful income to the DRC state, and open of Kivu, systemic raping of women and up these resources for global markets. The $9 children is occurring with startling frequency billion deal made between the DRC and and the number of victims have reached the 33 China in 2008 in which China will build hundreds of thousands. According to the infrastructure in exchange for natural resource UN, members of rebel groups and the access shows the potential trading power that Congolese army (the FADRC) itself raped 34 a fully functioning DRC would add to the more than 8,000 women in 2009. Men and global economy.31 children as young as four are also falling
Humanitarian Concerns victim to this form of violence. These rapes
In addition to the reasons previously constitute a strategic ―act of terrorism‖ that discussed, there is more than sufficient 32 Coghlan 16 33United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on Foreign humanitarian cause for intervention/aid in the Relations. 111th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 2009. Web.
decimates communities and forces women out demonstrate that it is indeed committed to of villages, leaving them free for the extremist promoting its democratic and humanitarian militias.35 Sexual violence is used to ideals.
―undermine the whole social structure‖ and US Options
―to weaken any opposition in the The inability of the Congolese 36 population‖. Hillary Clinton‘s visit to the government and the international community
DRC regarding this sexual violence has to halt the ongoing violence in the DRC shown an important commitment by the US speaks to the need for renewed commitment 37 government. However, the brutal rapes and strategic reevaluation. Thus US policy continue unabated in eastern DRC. On toward the DRC must also be reassessed to
January 26, 2010 the UN refugee agency reflect the recent escalations in violence and stated that it is assisting over 100,000 the inability of current approaches to establish civilians who have fled from eastern stability there. provinces ―due to the ongoing military Military Intervention offensive against Hutu militants and banditry Lack of security in the DRC is armed groups‖.38 A clear US commitment to impeding development and perpetuating improving conditions in the DRC would violence. This issue must be addressed if aid
35 A Doctor and His Patient. Dir. Nicholas D. Kristof. New York Times. Web. 5 Feb. 2010. is to provide benefits for the Congolese. The
with the DRC. Instead the US should seek resources to achieve its goals and as being alternative avenues for promoting security unable to protect civilians. In an effort to there. The US could choose to deploy a small remedy this, on December 23, 2009, the number of military personnel to demonstrate Security Council approved the use of force by its commitment to ending the violence and its peacekeepers and ―to use all necessary means desire to help protect the Congolese people. to protect civilians.‖41 The US should use its
Support UN Peacekeeping Mission MONUC position on the Security Council to encourage
In response to the recent escalations in a sustained and reinforced commitment to violence, the UN is reassessing the needs of peacekeeping in the DRC and an elevated the DRC. It has recently extended its mandate commitment of troops. This would strengthen until May 10, 2010 with the likelihood of peacekeepers ●●● The US should use its further extension following reevaluation of ability to protect position on the how best to protect civilians.39 The current both Congolese Security Council to encourage a peacekeeping force of 20,000 troops has civilians and sustained and reinforced proven insufficient due to the size of the DRC themselves from commitment to peacekeeping in the and current levels of violence.40 Though the violent attacks. DRC and an elevated largest UN peacekeeping mission in the In the past, US commitment of troops. world, from the very beginning the MONUC financial ●●● mission has been criticized as having too few contributions to the MONUC mission have
been substantial. The US should continue its
39 United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 1906 (2009): Security Council Extends Mandate of United strong support for MONUC until violence Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 31 May 2010. New York: United ceases and a stable peace is obtained. Nations, 2009. Web. 40 Go Funai and Catherine Morris, ―Disaster in the DRC: Responding to the Humanitarian Crisis in North 41 ―DR Congo: UN peacekeepers to use ‗all necessary Kivu,‖ Briefing, (Washington DC: United States means‘ to protect civilians,‖ UN News Service, 23 Institute for Peace, 2008) 4. December 2009, English ed. 23 February 2010. Page | 219
DRC Military Reform Development Aid
Not limited to militia groups, the Although violence continues to be a
Congolese army (FADRC) has been prevalent problem in the DRC, a study implicated in human rights abuses. The US conducted by the IRC estimates that violence should encourage the DRC government to put is only directly responsible for an estimated an end to these abuses. A dependable and .4% of deaths within the DRC. Most deaths trustworthy security force is needed both for have been caused by infectious disease, the protection of civilians and for the state to malnutrition and pregnancy related conditions be viewed as legitimate. The US could assist due to the social and economic costs of war the Congolese government in a couple (e.g. displacement, breakdown in healthcare manners to achieve this end. First it should and food production systems).42 This insist that members of the FADRC be held emphasizes the importance and life-saving accountable for human rights abuses through capabilities of aid programs to combat the criminal charges. Establishing a system for other known killers of disease and accountability is key to preventing future malnutrition. The US has recognized the abuses. Second, the US should provide DRC‘s need for bilateral aid and in the year resources for training the military in the 2009 provided more than $191 million to the protection of civilians. This could be done DRC for humanitarian programs.43 USAID‘s through the provision of monetary resources ―Strategic Plan‖ for 2007-2012 in the DRC or by providing military officers who could offers development assistance with six assist in training that would professionalize the army and prevent further human rights 42 Coghlan 14 43 United States, USAID, U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. Situation Report 31, Fiscal Year (FY) abuses. 2010: East and Central Africa Region. Web.
targets: peace and security, governing justly Development aid should be directed toward and democratically, investing in people, the more stable central and western regions, economic growth, humanitarian assistance, while the security measures discussed and program support.44 This comprehensive previously (namely support of MONUC) plan includes many important aid targets and should be pursued in eastern Congo. should be targeted to areas where there is Additionally, history shows that DRC‘s relatively less violence and insecurity. natural resources have fueled and prolonged
A study published in 2007 found that conflicts within its borders. Thus it is while mortality was slightly decreased in the necessary to pursue a clear strategy to east, mortality has been increasing in central regulate natural resources and stop looting by parts of the DRC that have been mostly rebel groups. conflict-free since 2002. This is because Technical Assistance international aid and governmental efforts The situation in the DRC exemplifies have been focused on the east, despite the fact the ―resource paradox‖, in which natural that central Congo remains destroyed by past resources fail to enrich their host countries, conflicts.45 Much of eastern DRC remains and instead trap them in a cycle of consumed by violence and a certain level of exploitation that attracts foreign intervention security must be in place before development and destabilizes the country.46 Historically the projects can be effective in these areas. DRC‘s natural resources have proven to be an
incentive for conflict with neighboring 44 United States. USAID. Democratic Republic of Congo: FY 2007-2009 Foreign Assistance 47 Appropriations. Web. states. The ―resource paradox‖ continues to
destabilize the DRC, as its wealth of state, decreasing its need for foreign aid in the resources is controlled by and contributing to future. the rebel groups thereby provoking violence Private Investment and instability in the country.48 Thus If state control of resources proves controlling the DRC‘s natural resources is of incompatible within the current political and primary importance. The USAID‘s 2005 infrastructural context, another option for the strategy delineated the goal of providing harnessing of the DRC‘s resources would be technical assistance to the Congolese through the involvement of multi-national government for the purposes of resource natural resource corporations (MNC‘s).50 This management. This assistance would be approach would only be beneficial insofar as through the evaluation of mineral resources the terms of their contracts were carefully and the improvement of systems that generate crafted to ensure benefits to the state and revenue for the DRC government.49 As of society as a whole. However, with the proper
February 2010 the mineral resources remain conditions, these companies could use their unsecured. This goal of technical assistance expertise to effectively and efficiently protect for urgent resource management should be and control the use of these resources, reaffirmed as a way to promote both local and funneling money back into the state for use in regional stability. Success in this aspect infrastructure building and the good of the would also provide enormous revenue for the Congolese people. Foreign policy analyst
Seth Kaplan argues that MNC‘s are the only
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations, actors with ―sufficient incentives and 2001. 48 Global Witness, ―US Policy Recommendations to capabilities to establish security and good Combat Natural Resource Conflict and Corruption,‖ (Washington DC: Global Witness, 2009) 1. 49 United States, USAID, Fragile States Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for 50 Seth Kaplan, "The Wrong Prescription for the International Development, 2005) 14. Congo," Orbis 51.2 (2007): 306. Page | 222
governance in resource-rich areas.‖51 Beyond health and education.53 Botswana‘s ability to providing steady revenue to the state, these harness its diamond industry for social good contracts could go so far as to mandate that a serves as an example of how the DRC could specified percentage of revenues be used for capitalize on its wealth of resources through social and security programs within the using private enterprise. communities in which they work, with failure Another option is through the signing to do so being a violation of contract resulting of contracts such as the one with China in in the loss of right to mine. While countries September 2007. In this contract, China gets such as Nigeria provide an example of the 10 million tons of copper and 620,000 tons of failure of MNC‘s to provide stability, cobalt. In exchange, China will build roads,
Botswana serves as a counter example in railways, hospitals, health centers, and which private investment has brought social schools. To reduce risk of corruption and good.52 Carefully crafted contracts and tax pilfering, the exchange will be a ―straight laws give the Botswana government between swap: raw materials for infrastructure‖. The
75 and 80 percent of Debswana‘s diamond projects will also employ and train local profits (a company owned 50:50 by the De workers (although undoubtedly many of the
Beers diamond cartel and the Botswana workers will be Chinese).54 This exchange has government). Much of this money is then been criticized as an unfair trade, in which the used to fund social spending, particularly in DRC receives less worth than it gives.
53 Santosh Mehrotra and Richard Jolly, Development 51 Ibid. 306 with a Human Face: experiences in social achievement 52 O‘Reilly, Finbarr. ―Nigeria‘s Oil Curse.‖ Global and economic growth (Oxford: Oxford University Post. 25 May 2009. Press, 1997) 116.
However, the idea is sound. Utilizing the Certification Scheme has been working to capabilities of foreign companies to build ensure diamonds on the market come from infrastructure, provide private security forces conflict-free sources. This has provided in mining areas, and employ local workers important progress in vetting diamond could be the long-sought-after solution. The sources, however, according to a recent report
US should encourage and assist the published by Global Witness, this process has
Congolese government in securing a been slow and had limited success in dealing combination of contracts that provide direct with non-compliance. To assist in this exchanges of resources for infrastructure, as process, the US should support legislation that well as contracts that will provide steady requires transparency within natural resource revenue to the state so that it can participate in companies and the disclosure of the precise reconstruction as well. sources of mineral goods coming from the
Controlling Access to Markets DRC. The US should also insist that the
Furthermore, the ability of natural DRC‘s neighboring countries prevent further resources to fuel conflict must be viewed importation of illegally mined minerals.56 within its larger geographical context. Global Additionally, the US government should trade networks enable these resources to support the development of a comprehensive access markets and be converted into revenue strategy to break the link between armed for the warring parties.55 Analysis of the conflicts and global trade in natural resources geographical context of natural resource (other than diamonds).57 This should include exploitation allows for the identification of the development and implementation of intervention target points. Established in
2003, the UN‘s Kimberley Process 56 Global Witness 5 55 De Billon 361 57 Ibid 6 Page | 224
source transparency processes for other non- invested in the public good. He believes this diamond natural resources.58 would lead to a more sustainable federalized
Decentralization/Building local governance state structure, responsive to the varying capacities needs of its different peoples.60
Discussions of a decentralized state While these are compelling arguments structure in the DRC point to Kinshasa‘s for decentralization of governance, political historically limited control over and limited practicality dictates that this avenue is interactions with parts of the DRC territory as unlikely to be pursued in the near future, as it proof of the incompatibility of the DRC with would likely conflict with the interests of the a strong, centralized government. Seth central DRC government. Instead, USAID
Kaplan proposes a ―looser, more horizontal should increase aid to localized grass-roots governing structure, in which municipal operations thereby distributing power over governments had full control over their development aid throughout the country as a budgets and full responsibility for most whole. One such organization is FOCHI programs.‖59 Pierre Englebert takes a similar (Foundation Chirezi), which works stance arguing that by aiding the central specifically to empower women and their
Congolese government, the US is allowing for children through microfinance loans, the continuation of a failed state structure. education and healthcare programs.61 Focus
While acknowledging it as an unlikely course should be given to the development of local of action, Englebert instead argues that the state administrative capacities, which would
US should support alternate sub-state regional provide the infrastructure needed for further actors, if proven to be trustworthy and
60 Englebert 26-28 61 ―A Word from the President.‖ Fondation Chirezi 58 Funai 3 FOCHI ASBL. Mineterére de la Justice. Web. 59 Kaplan 308; Beswick 343 21 February 2010. Page | 225
development. Aid funneled through the local 2000, Bill Clinton signed the ICC founding governance structures would build local document (the Rome Statute).62 However, government capacities, increase social capital once in office, George W. Bush nullified and enhance the sustainability of the Clinton‘s signature and pursued an active development programs. policy of opposition to the ICC, saying that it
Post-Conflict Resolution: Work with the would undermine the authority US national
International Criminal Court (ICC) judicial authority by allowing for the trial of
To stop the conflict and heal the US nationals in the ICC.63 In August 2009, wounds of war, those that have committed Hillary Clinton said, ―it is a great regret‖ that and are continuing to ●●● the US is not a part of the ICC To stop the conflict commit war crimes and and heal the wounds because it limits our ability to crimes against humanity of war, those that encourage and participate in the have committed and in the DRC need to be are continuing to trial of war criminals.64 commit war crimes held accountable and and crimes against The ICC has demonstrated humanity in the DRC prosecuted. The capture success in trying war criminals, need to be held and trial of such people accountable and and commenced a joint trial of prosecuted. would serve both to ●●● Congolese rebel leaders Germain
diminish the reoccurrence of such crimes and Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui for war to send a strong message to would-be- 62 "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," United Nations Treaty Collection/Collection offenders that the international community des trait, Web, 10 Feb. 2010,
crimes and crimes against humanity on regional actors in the process. The US should
November 24, 2009.65 The ICC provides an encourage neighboring countries to secure important avenue for accountability and trial their shared borders with the DRC and to of those who have been and continue to be eliminate the transport of illicitly mined involved in human rights abuses and violence goods across these borders. These regional in the DRC. As such, the US should diplomatic efforts should work in conjunction reconsider its involvement with the ICC. It is with the African Union to emphasize the not necessary to join the ICC in order to offer regional cooperation toward peace, its support, however, working directly with incorporating neighboring states as the IRC would substantiate US desire to assist stakeholders in the agreements. In order to be in achieving an end to the violence in the successful these peaces resolutions must
DRC. More generally, this action would serve recognize the economic and political to reaffirm US commitment to judicial incentives of that have confounded the peace processes and human rights, and would process, such as access to natural resources. demonstrate a willingness to participate in Personal diplomacy efforts, such as Hilary multilateral interventions. Clinton‘s recent visit to the DRC, should also
Diplomatic Efforts continue. Such efforts are a powerful way to
The US should also continue its lend political support to the state and help diplomatic efforts in the DRC to assist in rebuild trust with the Congolese people. post-conflict reconciliation and Recommendations reconstruction, while working to incorporate The current situation in the DRC
65 ―ICC/DRC: Second Trial of Congolese Warlords,‖ dictates the need for a renewed commitment Human Rights Watch News, 23 November 2009, Web, by the international community to ending the
violence there. The US should play a pivotal services. Botswana‘s contract with role in this effort, as it is in its national Debswana should be used as a model, security interest to do so and as it would in which the Botswana government prove the US to be an international leader in owns the company 50:50 with De the support of human rights. To achieve this Beers diamond cartel of South Africa, end, the US should focus its attention on the and receives 75-80 percent of following: Debswana‘s diamond profits. This
Actively promote the protection of the money should be specifically allocated
DRC‘s natural resources as a way to for the building of state infrastructure
end the conflicts. This should be done and provision of social goods (e.g.
by providing technical assistance to health and education systems).
the Congolese government through the Assist in the development of a
evaluation of mineral resources and comprehensive strategy to break the
the improvement of systems that link between armed conflicts and
generate revenue for the DRC global trade in natural resources. Great
government. Specifically, the US progress has been made in the
should encourage private investment diamond trade due to the UN‘s
of multi-national natural resource Kimberley Process Certification
companies and should assist the Scheme that works to ensure the
Congolese government in crafting sources of diamonds in international
contracts that will provide substantial markets are not fueling violent
revenue to the state and require conflicts. To further this progress, the
reinvestment of revenues into social US should support legislation that
Page | 228
requires transparency within natural The US should insist on their shared resource companies and the disclosure responsibility for halting all activities of the precise sources of mineral that fuel the conflicts (to the extent goods coming from the DRC. The US that their own state capacity allows). should also work with the UN to The African Union has the mandate to develop similar vetting mechanisms engage in this situation and the US resources other than diamonds. should advocate for the strengthening
Engage in regional diplomatic efforts of AU operational capacity to do so. to procure peace. These should work Continue US support of MONUC secure state borders in an effort to stop peacekeeping mission and encourage a illegal resource trade and border strengthening and extension of this crossing by rebel/militia groups. mission beyond May 31, 2010.
Regional economic incentives that Security is a prerequisite for have perpetuated conflict must by development, particularly in reference addressed and incorporated into the to eastern Congo. MONUC has been peace process. This can be done widely criticized has having too few through the privatization of DRC resources and being unable to protect resources, emphasizing corporate civilians. The authorization of transparency and accountability, and peacekeepers to use all necessary the strict enforcement of the means to protect civilians, including
Kimberley Process. Neighbor the use of force, is a positive step. countries must be held accountable for However, even the ability to use of their roles in sustaining the conflicts. force may prove useless if the
Page | 229
peacekeepers are stretched too thin, unsuccessful. As such, we advocate that the
and may endanger the peacekeepers. US engage in the DRC in the five previously
Thus, the strengthening of MONUC delineated ways.
should include the commitment of
additional peacekeepers in an effort to
finally stop the violence and enable
the success of reconstruction efforts.
Encourage the building of local
governance capacity through grass-
roots development projects,
particularly in the more stable regions.
The persistence of high mortality rates
in these regions speaks to the need for
immediate development aid. These
projects should focus on providing
social goods (e.g. education,
healthcare) to these areas thereby
increasing social capital and sowing
the seeds for long-term, sustainable
development.
The situation in the DRC constitutes a massive humanitarian crisis. Thus far, efforts at ending the violence have been
Page | 230
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Afghanistan Addressing Ethnic Divisions and Regional Dynamics Along the Road to Recovery
Jessica Tarabay
1 Issue forces‖ . The report states that the Obama
Afghanistan has had the attention of administration is focused on reversing and the world and been a source of major political changing negative trends commonly criticized debate and discussion for the past eight years. in Afghanistan and has outlined a new policy
The country is currently the site of an that defines the main areas of focus for
American-led occupation and has received a Afghanistan: reconstruction and development, great deal of aid and attention from other improving governance, reintegration, regional international players like NATO. In addition diplomacy, and communications. to fighting terrorism, the US intervention in With this newly outlined agenda in
Afghanistan seeks to establish a sovereign, mind, one of the major current issues in secure, and self-supporting state that can Afghanistan relevant to successful withstand the threat of extremism and reconstruction and development is national insurgency internally and externally. In the security and stability. An analysis of the most recent statement issued by the State progress that has been made in Afghanistan
Department regarding Afghanistan, President up to the present shows that the deterioration
Karzai outlined an aggressive agenda for the and lack of security in Afghanistan has had country that would focus on ―reintegration; negative affects on every aspect of the economic development; improving relations reconstruction effort. For example, the with Afghanistan‘s regional partners; and deterioration and lack of security has hindered steadily increasing the security the transition of refugees returning to responsibilities of the Afghan security
1 United States of American. Department of State. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Web. 07 Feb. 2010.
Afghanistan after two decades of war and insufficient national security and stability is strife. In regards to the repatriation program attributed to two cardinal factors: ethnic in Afghanistan, ―voluntary organizations and divisions within the state and external
UNHCR pointed out that the deterioration in regional dynamics. Afghanistan is a the security situation in the country made it multiethnic state with a long history of difficult for the refugees to return‖ to the tribalism and ethnic tension. This has been country, most notably Pashtun refugees who exacerbated greatly by fratricidal civil wars attempted to return to the northern areas of that have consumed the country for nearly the
Afghanistan2. Repatriation is not the only part past 30 years and the devotion of support and of the reconstruction effort that has suffered aid to specific ethnic groups within the state from an insufficient level of national security by various international actors. Consequently, and stability in Afghanistan. This problem has a considerable amount of attention must be also contributed to issues regarding opium devoted to ethnic divisions and regional drug trafficking, insurgency, and dynamics in Afghanistan in order to mitigate infrastructural development among other conflict and resistance. affects. Additionally, upon recognizing and
It is apparent that the national security understanding these ethnic divisions/tensions and stability of Afghanistan is a primary and associated regional influences, it is concern that must be resolved in order to imperative that US foreign policy develop conduct a successful and effective methods of conflict resolution and reconstruction and nation building agenda in reconstruction of relations between ethnic
Afghanistan. In this chapter, the issue of divides in order to establish a foundation in
Afghanistan upon which stronger governance 2 Warikoo, K., ed. Afghanistan the challenge. New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007. Print. Pg 121. Page | 236
and state institutions as well as economic dynamics in order to increase security and development, reintegration, and state security stability in Afghanistan. can be built. This includes the creation of Background discussion forums and summit meetings at the Ethnic groups and tribes within the international level between Afghanistan and Afghan state are numerous and complex. regional actors to increase dialogue and to These ethnic groups are rarely homogenous develop foreign policies that focus on even within single ethnic affiliations, meaning establishing and maintaining Afghan national that each general ethnic division is further security and stability. On a more local level, divided by an allegiance to specific Afghan domestic conferences and meetings can be regions and then again by an affiliation with established to promote dialogue and smaller cities or towns. The past, present, and discussion between various ethnic groups future of Afghanistan has been and still is within Afghanistan. This will promote and heavily influenced by ethnic divisions, create better intra-ethnic relations and conflicts, and interethnic relations. In this strengthen national identity and cooperation report, five different Afghan ethnic groups among all Afghani people. (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and
This chapter will start by analyzing Turkmen) will be discussed and studied as the effects ethnic divisions and regional they relate to an Afghan history of ethnic dynamics have had on Afghanistan and will divisions and tensions, regional influences conclude with recommendations detailing associated with each ethnic group, and the methods that will improve and correct issues present status of interethnic relations in regarding ethnic divisions and regional Afghanistan.
Page | 237
majority Pashtun4. Historically, the idea
of an Afghan national identity was
attributed to the Abdali Pashtun tribe
that founded Afghanistan in the 16th
century; they initially focused on the
unification of Pashtun areas and
eventually increased power to conquer
Hazara, Uzbek, and Tajik areas as
well5. In the past, this meant Pashtun
groups generally identified more
heavily with the idea of an Afghan Source: Photograph. Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan. The University of Texas at Austin - Perry-Castañeda Library Map national identity than the other ethnic groups, Collection: Afghanistan Maps (Thematic Maps). Web. 23 Feb. 2010.
construction of this national identity is Pashtuns credited to the Pashtuns and thus other ethnic The Pashtuns represent the largest groups viewed it as not theirs. ethnic group in Afghanistan with an estimated The Pashtuns can be divided into the majority of 50% to 54% of the Afghan Durrani and Ghilzai sects. Additionally there population3. Concentrated in the southern and are smaller tribe divisions and sub-divisions eastern parts of the country, the Pashtuns have that associate with local leaderships6. The traditionally been identified as the ethnic base status of interrelations between the various of the Taliban regime, since the Taliban is
4 Figure 1 5 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, 3 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 30. Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 29. 6 Ibid. pg 30. Page | 238
Pashtun tribes vary at times bouncing country located to Afghanistan‘s north. Thus between rivalry and allied integration and they identification as ethnically Tajik as while the primary language of the Pashtuns is opposed to Afghani. Their political/ethnic
Pashto, the majority is able to speak Persian party, Jamiat-i-Islami, has been historically or Dari as well, which is the national language linked to Pakistan and other countries where of Afghanistan7. Lastly, the Pashtuns were the the party could generate money and arms to main ethnic group to accept and follow the support the Tajik resistance forces9.
Taliban during the late 20th century due in In the Post-Taliban, US administered large part to the underlying element of Afghan government, the Tajiks have been
Pashtun ethnicity in the Taliban regime. This placed in a more dominate political position ethnic association of Pashtuns and the Taliban and they have main control over ―the three has proven to be an aiding factor in ‗power ministries,‘ Defense, Interior, and exacerbating ethnic divisions, especially in Foreign Affairs, as well as intelligence times of violence and conflict between the services‖10. Their new political power and
Taliban and other ethnic minorities in higher political position has created tension
Afghanistan. between the Tajiks and the Pashtuns, who fear
Tajiks losing their previous political domination and
The Tajiks are the second largest majority. It has yet to be seen how new ethnic group in Afghanistan, with an political positions between all the different estimated population of 26% to 30% of the ethnic groups in this new Afghan greater Afghan population8. The Tajiks have strong ties and affiliations with Tajikistan, a 9 Ibid. pg 31. 10 Fukuyama, Francis. Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Forum on Constructive 7 Ibid. pg 30. Capitalism). New York: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005. 8 Ibid. pg 31. Print. Pg 111. Page | 239
administration will be accepted and rectified civil war for political support13. The Hazaras amongst the various ethnic divisions. have been the poorest and most marginalized
Hazaras ethnic community in Afghanistan as they
The Hazaras are a much smaller ethnic have continuously experienced inferior minority in Afghanistan, representing about economic and social positioning in
7% of the total Afghan population11. The comparison to the other ethnic groups of
Hazaras are not native to Afghanistan and it is Afghanistan. believed that these people are descendants Uzbeks from Ghangis Khan and his men; the Hazaras The Uzbeks in Afghanistan also have distinct Mongolian features and their compose a much smaller ethnic minority, ethnic language of Hazaragi has strong representing 8% of the total population14. elements of both Turkish and Mongolian They are, like the Hazaras, not natives to languages12. These characteristics exemplify Afghanistan and foster family and clan their relation to foreign people over affiliations with Uzbekistan across the Afghan indigenous Afghani people. border. They also keep their ethnic language
Over time, the Hazaras adopted Dari as their primary language but the majority as their commonly spoken language and speak Dari as their second language. The converted to Shia Islam as their religion. This major Uzbek city in Afghanistan is Mazar-i- allegiance with Shia Islam has put the Hazara Sharif which had been occupied by the ethnic community in close relations with Iran, Taliban twice, leading to major conflict and who the Hazaras have turned to in times of violent atrocities during the Afghan civil war
11 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. pg 33. 13 Ibid. pg 33. 12 Ibid. pg 33. 14 Ibid. pg 32. Page | 240
and instability15. Again, these acts of violence reinforcing ethnic divisions among the and conflict between the Uzbeks and the Afghani people. The majority of the
Pashtun associated Taliban contributed to Turkmen live in the ●●● rivalry and disdain between the two ethnic north of Afghanistan They are different not only ethnically groups. In the post-Taliban administration, near the Turkmenistan but often religiously and linguistically the Uzbeks have received better positions for border17. ●●● national leadership giving them the ability to Ethnic Tension, Conflict and Relations: Past increase their power and resources as well as and Present claim authority over their region. Provided with the previous
Turkmen information on several of the ethnic
This ethnic group is the smallest communities in Afghanistan, it is not difficult ethnic minority of all mentioned in this paper. to see the issues that arise from the diversity
They represent less than 4% of the Afghan and various allegiances, both internal and population but are notable due to their external, of the greater Afghan population. relationship with Turkmenistan which These ethnic communities differ on many influences regional dynamics as it relates to identity markers such as a common lineage,
Afghanistan16. This close allegiance with sect, tribal history, languages etc. They are
Turkmenistan fosters a sense of ethnic different not only ethnically but often identity among the Turkmen and therefore religiously and linguistically. Although 99%
Turkmenistan plays a key role as one of the of the Afghan population adheres to Islam, regional neighbors to Afghanistan that the general population may be divided as supports one ethnic groups above the others, much as 20% to 80%, following Shia Islam
15 Ibid. pg 32. 16 Ibid. pg 33. 17 Figure 1. Page | 241
and Sunni Islam respectively18. Although both the US backed and supported ―mujahedeen sects follow Islamic faith, there is conflict and freedom fighters‖ to combat the Soviet tension between the Sunni and Shia divisions, invasion of Afghanistan; the mujahedeen with the Shia followers being primarily fighters were headquartered in Peshawar,
Hazara in ethnicity. As a result of all this, Pakistan19. It was clear that from the these diverse ethnic groups have experienced American stand point, the incentive to help a long and atrocious history of ethnic tension the Mujahedeen warriors was to combat the and conflict in Afghanistan. spread of Soviet power in the region as well
From the time of the Cold War up as fight the threat and spreading of the until the beginning of the 21st century, communist ideology at the hands of the
Afghanistan has been engaged in one war or Soviets. However, the Mujahedeen warriors conflict after another, all the time carving had a slightly different agenda for ethnic divisions and rivalries deeper and Afghanistan then merely fighting against the deeper as the Afghani population continues to communist invasion, ―the Afghan become more fragmented along ethnic and mujahedeen, or ‗holy warriors‘…came from regional affiliations lines. Afghanistan was nearly all ethnic groups and tribes in the brought into the Cold War as a state in the country. ‗What united them was the will to middle of the two warring super powers, the resist the godless Soviets and their ‗servants‘
Soviet Union and the United States. As a in Kabul‖20. And in April of 1992, the response to the Soviet invasion of resistance fighters successfully ended the
Afghanistan in 1979, the United States began an intervention from 1980 to 1989, in which 19 Fitzgerald, Paul. Invisible history Afghanistan's untold story. [San Francisco]: City Lights, 2009. Print. Pg 171-173. 18 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, 20 Misdaq, Nabi. Afghanistan political frailty and ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: foreign interference. New York: Routledge, 2005. Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 35. Print. Pg 143. Page | 242
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan with the aid of Pashtun based Taliban that took control of the US and Pakistan. But this was only the Afghanistan resulting in oppression and beginning of conflict between the Afghani violence against other Afghan ethnic people. minorities, these minorities formed a
After the Soviets withdrew, the resistance group called the Northern Alliance.
Mujahedeen and resistance freedom fighters The notable thing about the Taliban versus the wanted to seize power at the national level Northern Alliance is that ―the Taliban army, and Afghanistan fell into a bloody and violent mainly recruited from the majority Pashtun, civil war that had been unprecedented in the was larger and better equipped with arms country‘s history as competing ideologies, supplied by Pakistan. The Northern Alliance ethnicities, religions, and resistance groups was an alliance of convenience composed of fought over the power and future of the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other minorities state21. As the fighting and chaos of a like Turkmen and Nuristanis‖23. Therefore, fratricidal civil war continued and grew, the conflicts based on ethnicity were continually
Taliban were able to rise above all the reinforced as the Taliban and Northern competing warlords and take power. The Alliance were fiercely combating one anther,
Taliban regime subjected many of the defiant viewing the conflict and violence between the ethnic minorities to violence and ethnic two organizations in terms of ethnic cleansing that has greatly harmed inter- differences and divisions and breeding hatred relations between ethnic communities in among the ethnic groups.
Afghanistan to this day22. In response to the
21 Ibid. pg 167-167. 22 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: 23 Warikoo, K., ed. Afghanistan the challenge. New Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 44-47. Delhi: Pentagon, 2007. Print. Pg. 114. Page | 243
As a result of the civil war and the rise Regional Dynamics and Influences
of the Taliban regime, the ethnic groups Afghanistan is a country that finds
found great disparity with one another in the itself at the center of three strategic
face of ethnic cleansing and inequality and geographical regions: central Asia, south
therefore ―the ethnic and social forces of Asia, and southwest Asia. For this reason,
Afghanistan are more conscious of their international roles and regional dynamics
separate identities today than any time in the have been very influential in the country‘s
history of the country‖24. history and will continue to play a role in the
reconstruction of a post-failed state. The
affiliations between the various Afghani
ethnic groups and their international
counterpart have made regional dynamics a
significant issue in the case of Afghanistan
mostly because there is a great deal of
international interest and involvement in the
country. Therefore, it is apparent that all
bordering countries and countries in close
proximity to the region, such as Russia and Source: Photograph. Afghanistan. CIA- The World Factbook. Web. 23 Feb. 2010.
24 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, counterpart from whom they receive political ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 17. Page | 244
support, aid, arms etc. For example, the pertain to Afghanistan and all the respective
Pashtun are supported by Balochistan and the ethnic groups within the state is that ―the
Northwest Frontier Province, both Pashtun support of neighboring states can have an
regions in Pakistan25. The Hazaras have found important influence on the consolidation of
an alliance with Iran stemming from a weak and divided states‖28. Therefore, the
common adherence to Shia Islam while the regional dynamics and foreign policy of each
●●● Hazara ethnic state surrounding Afghanistan are important Each ethnic group in and political factors in establishing state security and Afghanistan has an international party, Hizb-i- stability. The role of regional dynamics and counterpart from whom they receive Wahdat, international actors in the case of political support, aid, remains under reconstructing Afghanistan cannot be arms etc. ●●● Iranian overlooked or diminished. The influence that
influence26. Uzbekistan allies with the Uzbek the surrounding regional countries have on
ethnic community in Afghanistan and Afghanistan is vast and therefore special
Tajikistan allies with the Tajik-Afghan foreign policy should be established in order
community. In addition, Russia and India to determine a beneficial role that these
hold significant role in the surrounding region international players will have in helping to
and therefore have an interest in Afghanistan secure the Afghan state and reconstruction
as well27. effort.
The important note about regional
dynamics and international relations as they
25 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, 28 Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 28. Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. America's role 26 Ibid. pg 32-33. in nation-building from Germany to Iraq. Santa 27 Ibid. 177-178. Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. Print Page | 245
US Interests crimes outside of Afghanistan. After refusal
from the Taliban to cooperate and comply The United States has been involved with the US demands regarding bin Laden, in the reconstructing and nation building the United State launched Operation Enduring efforts in Afghanistan for the past 8 years, Freedom29. This operation commenced on beginning in October 2001. During that October 7, 2001 with the operational goal to period of time, the US interests and strategy ―eliminate Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan‖30. The regarding Afghanistan has changed and US Operation Enduing Freedom was able to conformed to the present state of affairs in the enter Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban reconstruction effort. Because efforts in within a few weeks of intervention. From this Afghanistan have constantly wavered point forward, the United States and various between success and failure, the United States other participating international players began has been forced to continually adjust its to work towards rebuilding and reconstructing approach to rebuilding the failed state. a sovereign, secure, and efficient Afghan The United States‘ current presence nation. and involvement in Afghanistan was initially In order to institute an interim sparked by the Al-Qaeda led terrorist attack government, a conference was held in Bonn, on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on Germany during December of 2001. This September 11, 2001. In a response to this conference ―put in place a provisional infamous and horrific event, the United States administration headed by Hamid Karzai, a demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama Pashtun….[and, in addition] three important bin Laden (who was, at the time, believed to departments of foreign affairs, defense and be operating his terrorist organization out of
29 Afghanistan) so that he could be tried for his Ibid. 110. 30 Ibid, pg 129. Page | 246
interior went to the Northern core US goal remains to disrupt, dismantle,
Alliance…[o]ther ethnic groups were also and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in accommodated in the cabinet‖31 The goal the Pakistan, and to prevent their return to international community was aiming for at Pakistan or Afghanistan.‖ In addition, this point in time was to establish an Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirms administration that would lead to peace, that civilian, political, diplomatic, and security, and sovereignty for the Afghani state economic efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as incorporate all ethnic groups as will remain long-term goals even after US state actors in order to mitigate interethnic military intervention has ended32. With conflicts . This is apparent in the appointment specific reference to Afghanistan itself, the and representation of each ethnic group to a report states that the US focus ―is building the governmental position. While over the past capacity of Afghani institutions to withstand several years US strategy in Afghanistan had and diminish the threat posed by depended on what progress Afghanistan was extremism….focusing our support at the making in securing the nation, holding national level on Afghan ministries that can elections, developing infrastructure, and have the most direct impact on service stabilizing the economy, among many other delivery.‖ Additionally the report states that major factors of the reconstruction effort. ―we are also adapting our programs to
The most recent statement on US account for local realities, and broadening our interests and strategy regarding Afghanistan support and engagement at the provincial and was issued by the US State Department in
January of 2010. This report states that ―the 32 United States of American. Department of State. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Web. 07 Feb. 2010. 31 Warikoo, K., ed. Afghanistan the challenge. New district levels to enhance the visibility, principal characteristics of an effective strategy34: effectiveness, and accountability of the i. Primacy of political strategy ii. A central role for the Afghan institutions that impact Afghan lives the government iii. A region-wide strategy most.‖ Lastly, the main topics of focus as iv. A population-centric approach to security outlined in the report are: Reconstruction and v. A comprehensive approach vi. Effectiveness, presence, and local Development, Improving Governance, Rule partnerships vii. Prioritization of Law, Reintegration, Regional Diplomacy, The strategy proposed by Kilcullen Communications, Focused Civilian has many strong points. With the first Assistance, and Expanded Civilian principal, Kilcullen identifies the importance Presence33. There appears to be an increased of political legitimacy and effectiveness of the effort in strengthening the state of Afghan government; it is highly important in Afghanistan as a whole at political, social, order to combat sympathy for insurgents. If and economic levels. the Afghan government is legitimate and Options effective, the people with have more faith in Many options have been proposed in the institution and a good working order to address the issue of security and governmental framework can easily be stability in Afghanistan and successfully established along with an allowance for reconstruct the failed state. Below are two political reform and development. The second different strategies proposed by David principle improves the sovereignty of the Kilcullen and Clare Lockhart: national government. Principle three 1) In his book ―The Accidental Guerilla‖, incorporates the need to work with regional David Kilcullen introduces the seven neighbors and international actors to mitigate 34 Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla. New 33 Ibid. pg 4. York: Oxford UP, 2009. Print. Pg 109-114. Page | 248 insurgency and disrupt insurgent safe havens. does not pay enough attention to the rivalries The fourth principle accounts for the need to between ethnic groups or the influence of provide citizens with security and establish international actors in exacerbating ethnic security forces that protect the civilian divisions. In addition to the above plan so population and the need to establish carefully laid out by Kilcullen, it is imperative indigenous security forces who are deemed that the strategy include a more developed reliable by the local populations. The fifth plan or method pertaining to ethnic divisions principle seeks to promote counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and how to reconcile the deep through closely integrated political, security, rooted tensions and hatred these groups foster economic, and information components. The for one another. sixth principle highlights the importance of 2) In her article entitled, ―Leaving Afghanistan is not an option. There is still establishing effective governance at the local much work to do‖35 Clare Lockhart establishes a three part system that builds level. And the seventh principle focuses on security in Afghanistan and eventually allows for a safe exit. These three parts prioritization. Kilcullen writes that are as follows: i. Government bound by rule of law reconstruction in Afghanistan should be ii. Investment in the Afghan people iii. Creation of Jobs concerned firstly with building up and In Lockhart‘s explanation these three strengthening the Afghan state, secondly with main points are essential in developing combating insurgency, and thirdly, dealing national security in Afghanistan. The first with illegal drug trade. principle, a government bound by rule of law, The outline strategy provided by is important in order to maintain public order Kilcullen is a well designed and though out plan to establish sufficient security in 35 Lockhart, Clare. "Leaving Afghanistan is not an option. There is still much work to do." Afghanistan. The only point lacking is the he Guardian.co.uk. 13 July 2009. Web. 20 Feb. 2010. in the country. This would allow the can rest upon. In order to create this government to create basic institutions that foundation, ethnic conflict and international would enable Afghani people to live actors must be addressed and incorporated in peacefully and protect the county‘s revenue. the reconstruction process in order to work Overall this first principle strives for the towards a secure and stable Afghan nation. establishment of a reliable and capable Although her principles are well thought out governmental institution for the Afghani and viable options for the reconstruction people. Secondly, Lockhart writes that it is effort, they must be paired with other imperative we devote time and money to the principles that address regional conflict and education of the Afghani people so that they relations in order to successfully establish a will be able to govern and control themselves secure and stable state. without being dependant on foreign aid and Recommendations intervention. Additionally, she stresses the Afghanistan is a country that failed in need to invest in Afghanistan through large part due to years of internal conflicts universities, technical colleges and agriculture and wars that ―have sharpened ethnic and schools. And lastly, Lockhart stresses the regional identities that now present greater need to create more jobs for the Afghani challenges than before to manage and govern population. a multiethnic society with each group having While Lockhart presents strong larger ethnic affiliations across then before‖ principles for developing the post-failed state 36. Therefore, in addition to a well thought out of Afghanistan, she appears to miss the and well rounded program like that proposed importance of creating a strong political and by David Kilcullen, the most effective way to social foundation that a secure Afghan nation 36 Ibid, pg 5 Page | 250 establish a stable and sustainable nation state other kinship networks‖38. Therefore, an is to address the issues of ethnic divisions and integration and conflict resolution program is regional dynamics at a local, national and imperative in this present reconstruction of international level. This involves establishing Afghanistan ●●● The most effective dialogue and conflict resolution programs so that the way to establish a between the various ethnic groups within government stable and sustainable nation Afghanistan, including the Taliban, and at a national state is to address the issues of ethnic establishing the same programs at a national level can divisions and and international level. ―Time and patience function as a regional dynamics at a local, national and are needed to build the infrastructure and cohesive unit international level ●●● institutions to stabilize the Afghan state and with an root out the jihadi networks‖37. Such Afghan national identity as opposed to a programs should include conflict resolutions fragmented society allied with various ethnic and dialogue forums that lead to greater communities. integration between ethnic divisions. These options are not designed to A major problem is that, ―Individuals ignore military intervention but to instead and social groups interact with the state not as recommend a structured agenda to group citizens in any modern sense but as members military intervention with other forms of of a tribe, ethnic community, religious sect, or conflict resolution in Afghanistan. It is important to acknowledge that ―military action or counterinsurgency operations in 37 "International Crisis Group - B89 Afghanistan: New situations like that of Afghanistan are US Administration, New Dire." International Crisis Group - Conflict prevention and resolution. Web. 06 Feb. 2010. 38 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, essential but have to be linked to peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as building, negotiations, and conflict resolution India, Russia, Iran and many Central Asian through a shared vision of good society and countries should be a primary concern and by integrating interests of all vital focus in rebuilding and reconstructing efforts, stakeholders‖ 39. Therefore, military acknowledging that ―if the insurgents find intervention may be a start to nation building sanctuaries and support bases across the but could be highly ●●● borders with or without the unsuccessful and even Programs that connivance of governments, the encourage ethnic detrimental to the re- communities to work postconflict societies find it together at a local building effort if and national level on extremely difficult to revive political, economic, appropriate programs are themselves‖40. Therefore, and social agendas not instituted to rectify the could be extremely recommendations for nation- beneficial in internal and underlying establishing a strong building efforts in Afghanistan sense of national roots of conflict in a failed- as they pertain to the issue of identity and unity. ●●● state, which, in the case of regional dynamics and relations Afghanistan, is ethnic tensions and conflict. begin with the establishment of regional Regional Dynamic Recommendation dialogue programs. This will allow Regional dynamics and relations neighboring countries and key regional actors between Afghanistan and the international to convene with Afghanistan to institute community play a key role in the successful productive policies that will aid the establishment of security and sovereignty in development of security and sstability in the United State‘s nation building effort in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Therefore, foreign relations 40 Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: 39 Ibid, pg 19. Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 177. Page | 252 Writing about the rebuilding effort in collective effort in helping the Afghani Afghanistan, Marvin G. Weinbaum population as a whole in order to strengthen commented that, ―Although none of the sentiment for a greater national Afghan Afghanistan‘s neighbors have actively identity over smaller ethnic and tribal worked to undermine the Karzai government, identities in the country. all continue to hedge bets and remain patrons Concluding Recommendation to those groups and individuals in the country The recommendation of this chapter with whom they have traditionally been for establishing a secure and stable Afghan 41 associated‖ . Therefore, the neighboring state is to combine Kilcullen‘s seven principle countries to Afghanistan and those in close strategy with extensive programs in conflict regional proximity to the country are vital in resolution and dialogue among local, national aiding the establishment of state security and and international actors. The combination of a stability. It is essential, for example, that more general, comprehensive plan focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan work to secure their social, political, and economic methods of common borders in order to mitigate the state security, such as the Kilcullen strategy, ability for insurgents to use uncontrolled with top-down and bottom-upconflict zones as grounds for revitalize and regroup resolution and dialogue forums between their insurgency efforts. Additionally, it is ethnic groups, state actors and international important that regional and international state actors would allow the reconstruction countries channel all support efforts for efforts in Afghanistan to address the most individual Afghani ethnic groups to a important and underlying threats to national security and actively work to establish a 41 Fukuyama, Francis. Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Forum on Constructive strong foundation and social, political, and Capitalism). New York: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005. Print. Page | 253 economic institutions that a stable and secure nation could be built on. Page | 254 Works Cited Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. America's role in nation-building from Germanyt to Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. Print "International Crisis Group - B89 Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, New Dire." International Crisis Group - Conflict prevention and resolution. Web. 06 Feb. 2010. Rais, Rasul Bux. Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. United States of American. Department of State. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Web. 07 Feb. 2010. Fitzgerald, Paul. Invisible history Afghanistan's untold story. [San Francisco]: City Lights, 2009. Print. Fukuyama, Francis. Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Forum on Constructive Capitalism). New York: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005. Print Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla. New York: Oxford UP, 2009. Print. Lockhart, Clare. "Leaving Afghanistan is not an option. There is still much work to do." Guardian.co.uk. 13 July 2009. Web. 20 Feb. 2010. Misdaq, Nabi. Afghanistan political frailty and foreign interference. New York: Routledge, 2005. Print. Warikoo, K., ed. Afghanistan the challenge. New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007. Print Iraq A Case Study Aisling Underwood Issue category of a failing state. After the first few Since the invasion of Iraq on March months of US occupation, Iraq was left with 19th, 2003, the United States has faced a no real infrastructure, viable governing multitude of obstacles and unforeseen apparatus, and a lack of security that fueled challenges while deposing a dictatorial regime and enabled sectarian violence. and building new infrastructure and Understanding the unique cultural and governance systems. The problematic issues political history of Iraq lends insight into how faced in Iraq are largely related to historical some of the deciding actions made by the ethnic conflict and forms of government. Coalition Provisional Authority during the Even prior to the Saddam Hussein first year of US occupation brought Iraq to its dictatorship, Iraq never had a fully democratic current state. By neglecting Iraq‘s unique or united governing body. Historic situation as a country of ethnically divided governance structures coupled with long- people, and alienating the previous ruling standing ethno-cultural tensions, laid the class, the United States created a situation in ground for a complicated and difficult US which ethnic conflicts were exacerbated and occupation. By looking not only at the history sectarian violence thrived. In order for the US of Iraq as country but also as a group of to continue progress towards a stable Iraqi ethnically diverse people, it becomes clear state, cultural norms as well as regional that there are many considerations that needed differences need to be taken into account in to be taken into account before the US took government formation. major action. While some of these factors Background were considered, many were ignored, and the Iraq is a country that is shaped by its resulting US action placed Iraq into the long history of ethnic conflict. With three Page | 257 distinct groups (Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds), 32 percent to 37 percent Sunni.1 This makes ●●● opposing ideas and Arabs the ethnic majority and Kurds the Understanding these ethnic groups, their beliefs have played minority. Shiites are the religious majority, beliefs and conflicts, a major role in the and Sunnis the minority. Iraqi Kurds are is paramount to understanding Iraq direction of Iraq‘s primary Sunni, but have been harshly treated as a nation and how 2 the United States formation over the in the past due to their Iranian heritage. It is should have last five centuries. important to understand each faction in order intervened. ●●● Understanding to have a better conception of how these these ethnic groups, their beliefs and groups have interacted throughout history and conflicts, is paramount to understanding Iraq how they currently come into conflict. as a nation and how the United States should There are around 30 million Kurds have intervened. It also may show how we worldwide, and this makes them ―one of the can continue to improve our actions in the largest ethnic groups without their own future. nation-state.‖3 Historically Kurds have been The People of Iraq repressed due to their minority status in most Iraq is composed of three major countries. The Iraqi Kurd population lives factions: Shiite, Sunni and Iraqi Kurds. Iraq predominately in northern Iraq, although there is ethnically between 75 percent and 80 is a significant population in Baghdad. Kurds percent Arab, 15 percent and 20 percent are a distinct population with their own Kurdish and 5 percent other ethnic groups. language, and have fought for an independent Religiously, Iraq is 97 percent Muslim, Kurdistan for years. between 60 percent and 65 percent Shia and 1 CIA factbook 2 David W. Riggins. Ending the Conflict in Iraq: Is Partition the Answer? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2007), 4 3 Riggins, 4 Page | 258 Like the Kurds, Shia Muslims have caliph.5 Because of the origin of Sunnis and also been historically repressed in Iraq. Shiites differences, they have diverged into Concentrated in the southern half of the two distinct groups with their own theologies, country, Shia Muslims religiously differ from practices, laws, and history. Sunni Arabs have Sunnis in their belief of who holds power been the ruling ethnic group since the after the death of Muhammad. Shiites believe that Muhammad‘s son-in law Ali should have held power after the death of the prophet.4 This means that Shiites believe their rulers should be the direct descendants of Muhammad, and Source: “Religious and Ethnic Groups in Iraq.” Map. BBC. 21 Feb. 2010. factions of Iraq, they view power is inherent 4 Riggins 5. 5 Riggins 5. Page | 259 and rightfully theirs.6 Sunni Arabs are were ultimately expelled in 1638. The generally concentrated in the northern half of Safavid-Ottoman conflicts created great Iraq, excluding Kurdish areas. tension between Sunnis and Shias. Both For a good visual of ethnic and religious Islamic sects were used to mobilize their concentrations, the map below illustrates the respective domestic support, and as a result ethnic/religious demographics of Iraq; it also both groups suffered under the opposing shows where these groups are concentrated. rulers reign. The constant fighting between The Ottoman Empire Safavids and Ottoman Turks weakened the Since the 1500s, Sunni-Shia conflict Ottoman Empire, and the Ottomans began to has played a key role in shaping Iraqi history. lose control over its provinces. As a result, Between the 16th and 20th centuries, the Shia Iraqi tribal organization became more Islamic Safavid Empire of Iran sought to powerful. control Iraq due to its religious and historic Tribal migrations had a large effect on importance to Shia Muslims. Iraq housed holy the political and ethnic divides within Iraq. In places in Karbala and An Najaf, and Baghdad central Iraq, the Sunni Saadun family was the old seat of the Abbasid Empire. The controlled the Muntafiq tribal confederation. Ottoman Turks of Iraq feared Shia control of In the South, the Shia Madan and Shammar Asia Minor and tried to maintain a Sunni- tribes gained control. In the north, the Baban ruled ―buffer state‖ in Iraq. Between 1509 and Dynasty held Kurdish power, and made it 1638, a series of battles were waged between difficult for the Ottoman Empire to maintain the Safavids and the Ottomans and control any power over the Iraqi Kurdistan. In the vacillated between the two, until the Safavids early 1700s, the Mamluks began to gain authority over the Ottoman Empire, and 6 George Packer. The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005) 416. Page | 260 eventually came to control Basra and the river and elections were held. This introduced Iraq valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, which to self-governance. 7 reached from the hills of Kurdistan to the By the early 1900s, the power of the Persian Gulf. The Mamluks were able to Ottoman Empire in modern day Iraq began to effectively rule Iraq and instated many weaken as western influences became improvements and advancements, including: increasingly powerful. It is important to note creating an army, clearing canals, starting that while the Ottomans ruled Iraq, Iraqi industries as well as establishing a printing Sunnis held political power and as a result press. Despite this period of success, the gained experience governing. During this period of Mamluk control ended in 1831 after time, Sunnis were able to utilize new a flood and plague ravaged Baghdad. educational and economic opportunities, Ottoman rule was reinstated in 1869 while the neglected Shias were effectively through the rule of governor of Baghdad excluded from all economic, educational or Midhat Pasha. By establishing a provincial political opportunities. The position of power representative system along with elected held by Sunnis is an important trend up to the municipal assemblies, Pasha was able to overthrow of Saddam Hussein‘s government change the tribal-urban power balance. By in 2003. secularizing the school system, children of British Control in Iraq varying social classes were able to climb the At the turn of the 20th century, the social ladder. In 1908 the newly ruling Young territories of the Ottoman Empire attracted Turks began to try to make a unified Ottoman European interest for commercial Empire. The 1876 constitution was reinstated possibilities. When Turkey entered World 7 Metz Page | 261 War I on the side of the Germans, the British insurgency. Fatwas were issued condemning tried to take Basra for fear of German non-Muslim rule in a Muslim country as it is presence in the Middle East. Although they against Islamic law.10 From the beginning, failed to capture Basra, the British eventually British commissioners in charge of Iraq felt won Baghdad in March of 1917, and Mosul that the country was too fragmented to be a the following November. In 1919 the Paris viable independent state. The Kurds that came Peace Conference was held. It was at this from Mosul expected to become and conference that Iraq was made a Class A independent Kurdish state after the end of the mandate entrusted to Britain.8 During the war and were not happy to learn that they conference, European diplomats effectively would once again take a minority role to a created modern day Iraq by combining Mosul, ruling party.11 As fragmentation continued to Baghdad and Basra.9 The British intended to cause revolts and costly insurgency, the give Iraqis back their power, separate from British turned power over to the Iraqis while Ottoman rule. However, as in most cases, it still maintaining indirect control. Prominent was hard for the British to take control and Sunni and Shia tribes fought for power in the create a form of government that the people new government, however the unprecedented would accept. Tribal disputes were a common ―democratic‖ government had little issue during this time. Tribes wished to legitimacy with the Iraqi people. confirm and expand their power while having In 1932 Iraq was inducted to the other tribes restrained. Aside from conflicting League of Nations when it became a tribal interests, the paternalistic attitude with sovereign state as a monarchy. Despite its which Britain governed Iraq fueled independence, Iraq was reoccupied until after 8 Metz 10 Metz 9 Packer 333. 11 Packer, 333 Page | 262 World War II in order to control oil supplies. extreme brutality and humanitarian violations. Following World War II the monarchy was Throughout his presidency Saddam constantly able to bring some economic success, but question the allegiance of Iraqi citizens, and ultimately continued pattern of shaky Iraqi would erratically lash out at groups he leadership.12 thought were being disloyal. This included The Saddam Hussein Regime purging the Baath party, filling jails with In 1963 the first of a series of military political prisoners, and even killing 5,000 coups occurred when the Baath party Kurds in 1988 by in a poison gas on their overthrew then ruler Qasim. These military village. In 1980, Saddam tried to overthrow coups continued until 1979 when Saddam Iran‘s Islamic government, with support from Hussein became President of Iraq. Saddam‘s the US. The war ended eight years later after Baathist government alienated many of the the deaths of more than 200,000 Iraqis. Gulf States and sparked tension with Following the war, US support for Iraq waned countries such as Iran. The Baath party in Iraq until the US ultimately suggested that the was composed of mainly Sunni Arab Iraqi people overthrow Saddam themselves. intellectuals with strong socialist ideologies. This was unsuccessful and resulted in more In order to be successful during the Saddam Iraqi deaths. Saddam‘s tyrannical ruling regime, it was almost essential to be a united Iraqi factions in their oppression until member of the Baath party.13 2003, when the US ordered Saddam to step 14 From a US perspective, the most down and invaded Iraq. important aspect of Saddam Hussein‘s 24 year reign as President of Iraq was his 14 Neil MacFarquhar. Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies. The New York Times. December 30, 2006. 12 Metz The US in Iraq installed in official jobs could be removed The history of the United States in Iraq after their initial appointment if a subsequent is complicated. While occupying Iraq, the review by American authorities found that an United States has made multiple decisions official had been a senior Baath Party that have fueled ethnic conflicts. It is member.‖15 In many cases these people were important to understand how these actions the most qualified candidates. Additionally, served to perpetuate violence and conflict many professionals, in order to move ahead between ethnic groups. In order to understand professionally, had to cooperate with the how sectarian violence has played a large role Baathist party and often join it. Frequently in Iraq in the last seven years, it is necessary this affiliation with the Baath party had to look at the decisions made by the Coalition nothing to do with the person‘s actual beliefs Provisional Authority (CPA) during 2003- or political ideologies and was simply a 2004 and the Iraqi elections of 2005. business decision. In other instances, though The first important US decision in Iraq members of the Baath party may have liked to was barring the Baathist party. Due to their denounce their membership to the party, the historical connections to the Saddam Hussein fear of the backlash against them and their government, the US chose not to hire current families was too strong. or former Baath party members. While this An assassination campaign was held may have helped to avoid a new government against former Baathists who cooperated with with strong ties or alliances to Hussein, in the US occupation, and there were instances many ways it also crippled the economy and of assassinations of Baathists without any ties infrastructure of Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld 15 Schmitt, Eric. AFTEREFFECTS: RUMSFELD; Top explained that, ―it was possible that Iraqis Baathist Officials to Be Barred From Government. New York Times. May 9, 2003. Page | 264 to the US efforts. Unemployed and fearing for Unequivocally, yes.‖17 Essentially firing the their lives, there was an exodus of entire professional class was a misguided professional Iraqis, including teachers, move by the United States if they hoped to engineers and doctors. As if the exclusion of keep Iraq‘s power in the hands of Iraqis. By Senior Baathists was not harmful enough, completely alienating the previously ruling when Paul Bremer became head of the CPA class, the United States effectively stripped he, ―[i]ssued a sweeping ban of the Baath the Baathists of their duty to uphold the law. Party: all senior party members were barred The US created and fueled the lawlessness from public life; lower-level members were that followed the overthrow of Saddam also barred, but some could appeal. In effect, Hussein‘s regime. Bremer had fired the entire senior civil In May of 2003 the United States service.‖16 After banning Baathists, what was ordered the disbandment of the Iraqi army left at the Iraqi public disposal was mainly through the head of the CPA Paul Bremer. bottom-tier workers, with little knowledge or This US decree left approximately 500,000 experience compared to those who were no armed and trained Iraqi men unemployed and longer allowed to work. ―The problem with resentful.18 With half a million bread-winners the blanket ban is that you get rid of the out of work, Iraqi men needed to find infrastructure; after all, these guys ran the alternative means of supporting their family. country, and you polarize them. So did these Joining insurgencies was one way to find decisions contribute to the insurgency? temporary employment. The fact that these men were angry and indigent was not the only issue. Iraqi soldiers had access to weapons 16 Anderson, Jon Lee. Out on the Street. New Yorker. November 15, 2004. stockpiles, and in the weeks following the Following the firing of the Baathists and disbanding of the army, these fired soldiers the disbanding of the Iraqi army, there a large began to collect weapons that were formerly increase in looting and organized violence. owned by the Iraqi government. Allowing the Looting became a means of protection and army to dissolve in this way was not only livelihood. In the city of Al-Qaqaa alone, 380 harmful to Iraqi national security, it also tons of powerful ammunition went missing.20 eliminated a ready-made resource for the Unemployment not only weakened the morale United state. Had they chosen to, the US of the Iraqis, it destroyed their livelihoods and could have utilized the army to quell sectarian shifted their perception of Americans. violence following the invasion. Instead, the Another mistake the US made was US turned this resource over to insurgents. rushing the formation of the Iraqi constitution. According to Jay Garner, who served as the By sticking to such a strict deadline, certain Director of the Office of Reconstruction and aspects of the drafting of the Iraq constitution Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) at the fueled ethnic conflicts. Sunnis felt beginning of the US invasion, ―[b]y marginalized by negotiations in August when abolishing the army, we destroyed in the Iraqi they ―were moved from the Constitutional mind the last symbol of sovereignty they Committee to an informal forum of Shiite and could recognize and as a result created a Kurdish leaders.‖21 Sunnis felt that the draft significant part of the resistance.‖19 The last that was accepted from these negotiations symbol of security in Iraq was lost with the ―threatens their existential interests by disbanding of the army. 20 Anderson, 2 21 Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone 19 Axe, David. Was Disbanding the Iraqi Army a Good Awry, Middle East Briefing N°19 < 26 September Idea? Defense Tech. November 2nd, 2006. < 2005 http://defensetech.org/2006/11/02/disbanding-the-iraqi- implicitly facilitating the country‘s Baathists, and as a result felt rejected from the dissolution, which would leave them new government. One of the largest Sunni landlocked and bereft of resources.‖22 The political parties boycotted the 2005 election, second error was in the actual content of the thus giving the Sunnis a low voter turnout draft. Certain passages, like those that dealing rate. 24 with taxation power and decentralization, are It is important to look to the effects of not specific enough and therefore may lead to US actions on Iraqi sectarian violence. future conflict. By leaving such ambiguities, Understanding the gravity of sectarian the constitution will allows those who take violence in Iraq is essential as it, ―continues to power the ability to shape the document to take an enormous toll, averaging over 1,000 their desires. Iraqi civilian and security force fatalities per Another main issue was that the United month and over 50 US military fatalities per States favored Shia political exiles in the month.‖25 The Iraqi insurgency is perhaps the formation of the new government. Figures most troubling concern to the United States such as Chalabi were brought back to Iraq. currently, because it may foreshadow an Iraqi The Sunnis felt that the people being elected civil war. to government were pawns of Iran and the Just like the history of the US in Iraq, United States,23 and many Iraqis in general the history of insurgency in the last seven felt that those shaping their government were years is complicated. There have been large- out of touch with the needs of modern day scale and small-scale occurrences of sectarian Iraqis. Sunnis also felt that de-Baathification violence. The main insurgency that has been did not distinguish between Sunnis and 24 Graaeme Herd. Weak Authoritarianism and Iraqi State Building. Defense Academy of the UK October 22 Unmaking Iraq 2005 5. 23 Packer, 417 25 Riggins, 2 Page | 267 present since the fall of Baghdad is the Sunni between Arabs and Kurds is intensifying. Arab insurgency.26 After losing power and Both the Kurdistan regional government and being disenfranchised from the government, the Iraqi federal government contest control the Sunnis had and continue to have strong over gas and oil resources in disputed reasons to rebel. Aside from the Sunni territories, specifically Kirkuk.28 Regardless insurgency, Shiites and Kurds have been of increasing or lessening sectarian violence, sources of violence. Ethnic groups have the fact remains that as long as sectarian exacted revenge on one another, as well as violence continues in Iraq, permanent growth fought each other for power. The root of and governmental legitimacy will not be sectarian violence in Iraq is the struggle for achieved. In order for Iraq to make social, power in the new government, whether it is political, and economic progress, sectarian fighting the US troops or fighting one violence needs to be stopped. another, major Iraqi ethnic groups wish to US Interests attain representation and power in the new While the initial US interest in Iraq was Iraqi government. Since the power of the based on a national security issue, that interim government was passed to Iraq in reasoning no longer holds up. There were no June of 2004, Iraqi insurgency has grown in weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, as was 27 both size and sophistication. asserted in the compelling argument to go to According to the International Crisis war with Iraq. The lack of security resulting Group, in the last year levels of violence have from the US occupation, and increasing ethnic fallen in many areas of Iraq. However, while rifts have actually increased sectarian some tensions may be easing, the conflict violence and terrorist activity. 26 Packer, 335 27 Herd 1. 28 (International Crisis Group-Conflict History- Iraq) Page | 268 There are a couple interests that the US positive light, there is the possibility that Iraq currently has in Iraq. The first is to finish will not only descend into civil war, but host what was started. The US invaded Iraq, and anti-American terrorist groups. removed the former government; the US has Options the responsibility to deal with the aftermath. There are a wide range of options for After weapons of mass destruction were the US in Iraq; these range from intensive dismissed as a reason for war, bringing structural changes to more minor democracy to the Iraqi people was peacekeeping efforts. While some of these implemented as a new driving force for the options are more feasible and practical than occupation. In order to gain international others, it is important to keep in mind that respect, the US needs to make good on its there is more than one path to success. It is promises. It is not in the interest of US also important to note that any US action foreign relations to leave Iraq a weak and taken at this point needs to focus on easing violent state. ethnic tensions, generally placating the three The US also needs to keep in mind that major factions, and increasing Iraqi security the lack of security in Iraq, along with the so as to quell sectarian violence. ethnic tensions that have reemerged in full One possible option for lessening force, create a hot bed for terrorism and sectarian conflict in Iraq is to partition the 29 violence. Perhaps now more than ever, the government. This plan would divide Iraq into status of Iraq causes a national security ―three mainly autonomous federated regions problem. Until violence in Iraq has subsided with a ‗strong‘ central Iraqi government.‖30 and the US intervention is viewed in a more These regions would be divided based on the 29 Eizenstat, S., J. E. Porter, and J. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." FOREIGN AFFAIRS - NEW YORK-. 84 (2005): 134-147. 30 Riggins 1 Page | 269 three Iraqi majorities: Shiites, Sunnis, and intermingled population settlement patterns create real Kurds. These three ethnic groups have security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate remained at a fairly consistent levels within ethnic ‗cleansing,‘ ad prevent de-escalation unless the their respective majority regions, have been groups are separated.31 moderately geographically secure, and have By understanding that mixing ethnic groups historically fought for political power and causes conflict, it becomes clear that forming relevance. Partition may be an option to a cohesive and fully inclusive government represent 99 percent of the Iraqi population. may not be the best or most effective method Because each ethnic group has been in of governance. This may be especially true in conflict with at least one of the other two a country with a tribal history. During the majorities, partitioning may also be a way to Ottoman Empire and even through British lessen ethnic-warring. Through partitioning, occupation, Iraq‘s social and political cases like the Hussein regimes ethnic structure was strongly influenced by tribal minority ruling ethnic majorities may be structure. These more local and specialized eliminated. forms of government are better suited to This idea of partition is supported by diverse ethnic groups. The Iraqi tribal international relations theorist Chaim structure allowed conflicting groups to be Kaufmann‘s findings regarding ethnic semi-autonomous and as a result lessened conflict, some of the ethnic power struggle. Although First, in ethnic wars both on a larger scale, partitioning Iraq may have hyper nationalist mobilization rhetoric and real atrocities the same effect as the historical tribal harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic structures. political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less 31 Chaim Kauffman. "Possible and Impossible likely to be heard. Second, Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." International Security. 20.4 (1996): Print. 160 Page | 270 Another main option for the US is to fundamentally different society from our own. promote diplomatic discussions between Deep ethnic and religious cleavages may warring factions in Iraq. This may include prevent a divided society from ever bargaining over disputed territories, but more functioning as a cooperative whole. Though importantly should involve coming to a this is discordant with the United States goal consensus on a new constitution in which of Iraqi democracy, similar to our own, it is a each ethnic and religious group feels fairly truth that must be ●●● represented in the government. accepted in order to For Iraq to progress politically, it needs to Finally, the United States has the option move forward with be secure. ●●● to send more troops to Iraq, in order to development. By suppress insurgencies and stabilize the understanding these fundamental differences, country. For Iraq to progress politically, it US policy makers may be able to start to think needs to be secure, and if the US were to outside the box when it comes to developing provide a surge of troops it may allow the an effective form of Iraqi governance. By necessary level of stability for the 2010 keeping in mind the historic conflicts between elections to have equal ethnic voter turnout. Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, the US can Recommendations to US: hopefully begin to lessen these Iraqi divides, The recommendations to the US and quell insurgency. As with any case, government as we continue our involvement understanding the basics of a country is of in Iraq revolve around the recognition of utmost important before forming any plans of cultural differences within the Iraqi people development. The lack of foresight and and between Iraqis and the United States. It is understanding of the Iraqi people has cost the important to keep in mind that Iraq is a US years, thousands of US and Iraqi lives, Page | 271 ●●● and billions of able to draft a constitution that represents the The lack of foresight and understanding of dollars. needs of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. the Iraqi people has Although Using overwhelming force in Iraq is cost the US years, thousands of US and partitioning is an also not the most practical or favorable Iraqi lives, and billions of dollars.. interesting and option. While there is the potential to control ●●● possibly beneficial sectarian violence, sending more forces to option for Iraq, it holds too much risk and Iraq is unpractical given the push to leave uncertainty for the US to implement. As the Iraq. Sending more US troops will cost more US has already poured billions of dollars into tax payer dollars and may make it hard to the current political structure in Iraq, it would withdraw soon, if newly found peace is due to not only seem retroactive to the international the stabilization of US troops. Although this community, it would place an even larger is not the best option for proceeding in Iraq, it economic burden on US tax payers. The is an option to remember in future better course of action for the United States is interventions. Providing more troops early in to take a stronger position on equal an occupation allows for increased levels of representation in the Iraqi government. The security and added structure. It would be United States needs to proctor diplomatic easier for the US to send more troops over discussions in disputed territories such as initially and then withdraw if needed, and this Kirkuk, and help to blend the needs of the will help to prevent initially damages and three major ethnic groups. The culmination of squash startup insurgent groups. these efforts should be a redrafting of the The best recommendation for the US as constitution. By doing this without such a we proceed in Iraq is to support one political strict deadline, and led by Iraqis, Iraq may be group and to promote their control over Iraq. Page | 272 By gaining a singular source of governance in When the US enters a foreign country it Iraq, control could be more easily harnessed. needs to utilize the resources at hand. This Instead of attempting to have equal will not only help to keep costs lower but representation in the government, it is more will also be more sustainable. It is not important to have the values of all ethnic feasible for the United States to govern a groups represented in the constitution. If the foreign country and then try to pass the fundamentals of the Iraqi government meet power off. Had the US used the trained the needs of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, a less and experienced Baath officials, there representative government will not only be may have been more collaborative work more feasible, but will make governmental and a better outcome. This also applies to action and decisions easer. Having the disbanding the Iraqi army. Using existing governmental power divided between ethnic knowledge and experience is more groups, pins the interests of these groups productive and effective. against one another. With one group in power, Do not alienate large groups. This may the needs of all Iraqis can be better met, apply to ethnic groups or simply without and intergovernmental struggle for organized groups. By banning Baath power. party members from the new government, The case study of Iraq lends some the US not only threw away capable and universal lessons that can be applied to other qualified resources, but also alienated the instances of US intervention. These lessons previously ruling class. This only include, but are not limited to: heightened cultural rifts between Sunni Using local resources. In the case of Iraq and Shias. By alienating the ruling Sunni this would include Baath party members. class, balances of power were Page | 273 dramatically shifted and some degree of Learn from past examples. The British chaos was bound to result. tried to implement a novel form of Do not favor certain groups. By government in the 1900s and failed as a favoring the Shia political exiles during result of the historically fragmented the Iraqi elections, the US slighted other population. The U.S. could have used this ethnic groups and as a result appeared to historical attempt as a strong lesson to not press their own agenda in Iraq. This force foreign government structures on discredited the US presence in Iraq and another country. led to a lack of equal representation. Page | 274 Works Cited Amias, Jennie, Audrey Marrs, Jessie Vogelson, Charles Ferguson, Campbell Scott, Richard Lee Armitage, Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Larry Jay Diamond, and Jay Montgomery Garner. No end in sight. Los Angeles, Calif: Magnolia Home Entertainment, 2007. Anderson, Jon Lee. Out on the Street. New Yorker. November 15, 2004. Axe, David. Was Disbanding the Iraqi Army a Good Idea? Defense Tech. November 2nd, 2006. Eizenstat, S., J. E. Porter, and J. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." FOREIGN AFFAIRS. New York-. 84 (2005): 134-147. Herd, Graaeme. Weak Authoritarianism and Iraqi State Building. Defense Academy of the UK October 2005. Kaufmann, Chaim. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." International Security. 20.4 (1996): Print. MacFarquhar, Neil. Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies. The New York Times. December 30, 2006. <://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html?pagewanted=1&_r= 1>. Metz, Helen Chapin, Iraq: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988. < http://countrystudies.us/iraq/>. Packer, George. The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005. Riggins, David W. Ending the Conflict in Iraq: Is Partition the Answer? Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2007. Schmitt, Eric. AFTEREFFECTS: RUMSFELD; Top Baathist Officials to Be Barred From Government. New York Times. May 9, 2003. Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry, Middle East Briefing N°19 < 26 September 2005 Bosnia The Crisis in the Balkans Eric Thesen Issue can and should be applied to American This case study examines the conflict intervention in failed states in the future. in the Balkans that took place between 1991 More specifically, the American experience in and 1995, including both the Bosnian War Bosnia calls into question the efficacy of UN and the conflicts that broke out in other peace keeping operations and diverging Balkan states. The study focuses more perceptions of exactly what degree of human specifically on the war in the Balkans in the suffering constitutes sufficient justification context of American interests and for American intervention. Additionally, the perceptions, the role of the United States in case of Bosnia reaffirms the need to not mediating the conflict and the principles and oversimplify conditions on the ground, both lessons learned for future interventions. The in terms of causes and solutions, and disintegration of the Republic of Yugoslavia, demonstrates the effectiveness of prevention which began in 1991, precipitated Europe‘s over delayed involvement in failed states and worst conflict since World War II, resulting in the necessity of clarity of objectives during roughly a quarter million deaths and a intervention. massive refugee crisis. American interests Background were not self-evident in the crisis, provoking The crisis in the Balkans in the 1990‘s a poorly implemented United Nations is and always has been enigmatic to many in Peacekeeping force, but prolonging more the West. The region is anomalous in nature, substantive American involvement until and few scholars or policy makers are able to NATO bombings in 1995. fully grasp the complexities of its inhabitants The war in the Balkans is a valuable and their politics. When the crisis eventually case study, offering a variety of lessons that gained the attention of the world, many Page | 277 looked to the past for an explanation for the peninsula cannot avoid depressing the sudden bloodshed. While many factors were reader.‖2 at play, some roots of the conflict are The region‘s history of ethnic strife distinguishable in the region‘s long history. contains a diverse array of allegiances, The Pre-State Period identities and meta-narratives. Many in the The Balkans is a region in West described the events of the 1990‘s as southeastern Europe, bordered by the Black, simply inevitable manifestations of ―ancient Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, and hatreds,‖ glossing over the idiosyncrasies of consisting of the modern day nations of the region‘s convoluted history. Former Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Holbrooke, sardonically described the popular Serbia and arguably Romania and Slovenia as usage of the term ancient hatreds as ―a vague well. More than fifteen different ethnic groups but useful term for history too complicated (or have lived in the region for centuries. The trivial) for outsiders to master, made it largest groups in the former Yugoslavia are impossible (or pointless) for anyone outside the Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Bosnian the region to try to prevent the conflict.‖3 A Muslims, Macedonians and Montenegrins.1 highly detailed analysis of the region‘s history As Mark Almond writes of the region‘s is beyond the scope of this study but it is fair notoriously complex past, ―anyone daring to to say that the various ethnic groups step into the disputed minefield of Yugoslav experienced long stretches of both peace and history is likely to face sniping from all war, living since the Middle Ages until 1918 sides…Any history of the Balkans and under the rule of different empires. Slovenes foreign involvement in the politics of the 2 Almond (1994): ix-xi 1 Cox 3 Holbrooke (1998): 22 Page | 278 and Croats lived mostly under the rule of the complicated in Bosnia, an extremely Hapsburg Empire from Vienna while the heterogeneous territory. Steven Burg and Paul Bosnian Muslims and ●●● Shoup write that ―language, historical Religious fault lines the majority of Serbs are a crucial experiences, economic conditions and lived predominantly component of Balkan other elements of culture were dynamics... ●●● under the rule of the nonetheless shared, if not always Turkish Ottoman Empire.4 experienced in identical ways, by the three Religious fault lines are a crucial religious communities.‖ Yet these component of Balkan dynamics; the Serbs commonalities never equated to a common have a celebrated Christian Orthodox idea of a Bosnian nation.7 heritage, Croats are predominantly Roman The Formation of Yugoslavia Catholic, and much of Bosnia is inhabited by Composed of the current states of Bosniaks, who are generally Muslim.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Bogdan Denitch comments that, for the Serbs, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, ―a separate religion was both grounds for Yugoslavia was amalgamated into a kingdom discrimination and a basis for maintaining a in 1918 following the disintegration of the distinct national identity. It is very unlikely Austrian Empire at the end of the First World that the Serbs would have maintained a War (See Figure 1). It quickly became clear separate national identity from the Croats in that the Serbs, Yugoslavia‘s most numerous the Austrian Empire if it had not been for the ethnic group, were not interested in a Serbian Orthodox church.‖6 It is worth noting completely balanced power scheme and that that the role of religion was particularly ethnic divisions would be extremely 4 Cox 5 Bert (1997): 23 6 Denitch (1996): 24 7 Burg and Shoup (1999): 19 Page | 279 politicized.8 The political structure of Denitch writes that, ―the lack of Yugoslavia was highly contested, with ―the thorough negotiations about unification meant Serbs wanting a strong centralized that major differences on how the new state government, where they would have the most was to be organized were hastily papered influence, while the Slovenes and Croats over‖ and that, while the Croats, Slovenes, preferred a federation that gave local units and Bosniaks thought of Yugoslavia as ―a most of the political voluntary federation authority.‖9 Since its of equal peoples who inception, Yugoslavia would jointly failed to spawn political construct a new state,‖ parties that transcended the Serbs ―basically ethno-nationalist self- regarded the new state identification. Mark as an extension of Almond writes that Serbia.‖11 This ―from the start, Serbs Source: “Former Yugoslavia.” Map. US Central Serbian understanding ,Intelligence Agency. 22 Feb. 2010 supported Serb-led It was much the same with other nationalities, region in the 1990‘s. The basic imbalance of in so far as they participated in politics at power and divergence in perceptions is one of all.‖10 the most significant roots of the eventual collapse of Yugoslavia. It is also worth noting that for the first twenty years after 1918, 8 Almond (1994): 118 9 Brune (1998): 65 10 Almond (1994): 119 11 Denitch (1996): 24-5 Page | 280 ―Bosnia-Herzegovina remained under the Adolf Hitler ordered the invasion of administrative control of Belgrade‖ (the Yugoslavia in 1941 and after the ruler at the capital of Serbia) while Muslims ―enjoyed de time, King Peter, fled to England, the facto autonomy with respect to religious Germans established puppet governments in matters and education.‖12 While these various Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia.13 ethnicities, religions, and cultures had While brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing achieved a degree of unity under a single flag, were conducted against Slavs, Jews and what Yugoslavia should be remained highly Gypsies by Hungarians, Bulgarians, Italians contested. and Albanians, the most atrocious campaigns The Second World War were conducted by ―Croatia‘s pro-Nazi For Yugoslavia, like every other Ustashe, led by Ante Pavelic, who used racial, country in Europe, World War II was a religious, personal and irrational excuses to greatly destabilizing crisis. However, perhaps kill or deport non-Croatians.‖ Estimates of in the Balkans more than any other part of the Ustashe victims ranging from 350,000 to world, what happened during the War never 750,000 deaths and another 300,000 left the collective psyche of the region‘s deportees.14 While all parties were peoples. The atrocities committed during the responsible for some level of brutality during war are remembered distinctly by all sides in World War Two in the Balkans, the Serbs the former Yugoslavia and the ethnic arguably more than any other group have cleansing campaigns of the 1990‘s were integrated suffering they withstood during the viewed by many as a natural continuation of War into their collective identity. the horrors of World War Two. 13 Brune (1998): 66-7 14 12 Burg and Shoup (1999): 36 Brune (1998): 67 Page | 281 The deputy mayor of Prijedor, a town enemies‖ as occupiers and their collaborators in Bosnia where Croats and Muslims were put were exterminated during a Tito-directed to death in camps in the 1990‘s, said that death march in ●●● Rule under Tito ―there is a direct connection...during World 1945 which killed masked ethnic War Two the Croats killed us; this time it was between 20,000 animosities under highly centralized the other way around, we killed them. Perhaps and 30,000 and aggressive leadership, and Tito in fifty years, it will happen again to us.‖15 To people.17 managed to create a many, the genocide in Bosnia in the 90‘s was Yugoslavia relatively successful socialist system. just a matter of picking up where things left emerged from ●●● off. As Wayne Bert writes of World War World War II and the constitution of 1946 Two, ―that period has become a major made it a socialist federated republic where ―a reference point for the demonization, one-party government restricted political historical distortion and ethnic stereotyping dissent, violated civil liberties, conducted that is central to ethnic conflict.‖16 ‗rigged‘ elections, and sacrificed individual Rule under Tito rights to the ‗greater good‘ of the state.‖18 Yugoslavia‘s future leader, Josip Broz Tito went on to rule Yugoslavia for 34 Tito became influential conducting guerilla years, from 1946 until his death in 1980. Rule operations against the German occupation and under Tito masked ethnic animosities under at the conclusion of World War Two Tito and highly centralized and aggressive leadership, the Yugoslav communists came to power in and Tito managed to create a relatively Yugoslavia. ―The inauguration of the new successful socialist system, claiming regime was marked by a massacre of its neutrality during the Cold War and receiving 15 Oberschall (2000): 989 17 Almond (1994): 150 16 Bert (1997): 24 18 Brune (1998): 68 Page | 282 aid from both the United States and the Soviet seemed to marginalize ethno-nationalist Union. Tito had managed to effectively sentiments. But ethnicity slowly began to play discourage the nationalist sentiments of a greater and greater role in politics.22 Tom Yugoslavia‘s opposing ethnic groups, Gallagher describes a Yugoslavia in which something made much easier by the fact that ―civil society remained stillborn, along with the Serbs, the republic‘s largest ethnic group, those political initiatives which might have did not comprise more than forty percent of enabled successful mobilizations against the population.19 destructive forms of nationalism to have taken ―Tito‘s scheme was to create six place in the 1980‘s. Citizenship lacked national republics which theoretically had effective means of expression. Collective autonomy, but owed primary loyalty to Tito identities prevailed over individual ones.‖23 and the party.‖20 Tito created a concentration With the death of Tito, the imposition of camp on the island of Goli Otok and dealt Yugoslavian identity waned and political extremely violently with those who opposed allegiance was increasingly determined by his policies in Yugoslavia, suppressing ethno- ethnic identification. George Schopflin national sentiments through cooperation, comments that ―Tito‘s enormous prestige, power balancing, and the terror of authority and power brought with it the major persecution.21 disadvantage that it was all but impossible for The Post-Tito Period a reasonably open-minded and sophisticated Immediately following the death of successor generation to take its place.‖24 Tito in 1980, concerns over the economy, Bogdan Denitch writes that ―by 1990 democratization and integration with Europe Yugoslavia was irreversibly on the road to 19 Denitch (1996): 36 22 Denitch (1996): 38 20 Bert (1997): 25 23 Gallagher (2003): 11 21 Almond (1994): 158 24 Schopflin (2006): 24 Page | 283 multiparty pluralism as the framework within Yugoslavian National Army following the which both the fate of democracy and the breakup of Yugoslavia because the majority future of the Yugoslav federation itself would of its officers were ethnic Serbs.27 In June of be determined.‖25 As a result of the 1991, Milosevic sent forces to Slovenia in an combination of long dormant ethno- attempt to preclude their secession. The nationalist yearnings and the inability of the conflict was short-lived however, and after Yugoslav government to resolve a variety of ten days of fighting Milosevic withdrew his pressing economic and political issues, the forces.28 process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia More substantive fighting broke out in began in 1991 with Slovenia and then Croatia August between the Serbs and the Croats in declaring independence from Yugoslavia. By Croatia. At first isolated to local incidents, it April 1992, Yugoslavia had fallen apart. escalated with the support of Milosevic in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Belgrade and within weeks it had spread Macedonia became independent states and the through Croatia.29 A peace agreement was union of Serbia and Montenegro maintained signed between Croatia and Serbia by the end the name of Yugoslavia.26 of 1991 but did not last and in early 1992 full Small conflicts had broken out before scale ethnic cleansing broke out in Bosnia. As the complete disintegration, and continued to seen in Figure 2, ethnic group dispersion in intensify as the new nations fought for the former Yugoslavia was messy and did not territory. Serbia‘s extremely aggressive and cohere to the newly formed national now notorious leader, Slobodan Milosevic, boundaries, particularly in Bosnia. was able to maintain control of much of the 27 Brune (1998): 78 25 Denitch (1996): 42 28 Holbrooke (1998): 29 26 Brune (1998): 78 29 Holbrooke (1998): 30 Page | 284 Wayne Bert notes that, ―the status of cleansing campaigns were conducted, leaving the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia was the Bosnian Muslims, without an external the most important issue standing between state‘s support, particularly vulnerable. peace and war‖ and Serbia was intent on US Interests unifying its peoples as states were rapidly At first, an analysis of American seceding from Yugoslavia (Serbs made up 32 interests in the region ●●● As Milosevic in Serbia percent of the Bosnian population and 12-14 and the conflict is and Franjo Tudjman, percent of the Croatian population at the striking in that very Croatia’s leader, vied for territory and the outset of the war).30 As Milosevic in Serbia few interests appear protection of their own, Bosnia was cut and Franjo Tudjman, Croatia‘s leader, vied self-evident beyond up and full-scale humanitarian ethnic cleansing campaigns were exigencies. Like conducted ●●● other major humanitarian crises that occurred during the war in Bosnia - Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia for example - it was unclear to US policy makers whether or not they had any relevant interests in the crises. The Balkans are not resource rich; no American lives were at risk; Source: “Yugoslavia Ethnic Divides.” Map. Dan Kiser: US an over-arching war on terror was not yet an Department of State. 22 Feb. 2010 < Bosnia was cut up and full-scale ethnic of the Cold War. In 1991, Secretary of State 30 Bert (1997): 32-4 Page | 285 James Baker famously said of American restored to their rightful primary place in the interests in Bosnia that ―we don‘t have a dog relationship among nations.‖32 in that fight.‖31 Second, the crisis in the Balkans was Ultimately, American interests in the seen as a major test of the reliability of the conflict can be boiled down to three major United States, the United Nations and the subjects. The first is purely humanitarian, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) factor that to many observers was more than and their willingness to demonstrate an enough to justify intervention in the genocide. intolerance for aggression and human rights Many policy makers and analysts were abuses, as well as the coherence of NATO as hopeful that the conclusion of the Cold War a whole. Wayne Bert writes ―the argument signified an opportunity for the United States goes that if NATO shows that it is not up to to make the promotion of human rights and the challenge of an appropriate response to the alleviation of human suffering central to the Yugoslav crisis, then it will not have a its foreign policy. In 1993 John Shattuck, the future as a military organization.‖33 John assistant secretary of state for human rights Thompson, Britain‘s UN ambassador in 1993, and humanitarian affairs, said ―with the said that the United Nations and NATO, passing of the Cold War, all of its negative which were meant to provide security, were impact has changed. The basic principles of ―weakened by the success with which the human rights and democracy must no longer Serbs and the Croats have called their bluff. be debased with impunity. Nor should they be As a result, the assumption that there is some blinked at for the sake of some larger sort of collective global security has been geostrategic goal. Rather, they must be undermined, making international chaos a real 32 Forsythe (1997): 257 31 Shattuck (2003): 119 33 Bert (1997): 66 Page | 286 34 possibility.‖ In The Road to the Dayton the conflict, showing ●●● American Accords, Derek Chollet argues that the that only ―43 percent involvement in the strengthening and enlargement of NATO was favored the use of conflict was reluctant and indecisive President Clinton‘s chief policy priority in ground troops to ●●● Europe and this objective was threatened by provide humanitarian relief in Bosnia‖ and NATO‘s perceived impotence in Bosnia.35 over two-thirds of the public were against the Finally, the United States had a use of ground troops for the sake of ending strategic interest in containment of the the violence.37 Ultimately, none of these conflict and stability in Europe. In The previously discussed interests proved Reluctant Superpower: United States‟ Policy overwhelmingly compelling to American in Bosnia, 1991-95, author Wayne Bert writes policymakers, obfuscating the debate over that ―the potential involvement of other involvement and prolonging heavy-handed former Yugoslavian republics seemed American intervention until 1995. significant in the early phases of the Bosnian Options War‖ and describes fears over the potential Reflecting its limited interests, the for the conflict in Bosnia to provoke a Serb or simultaneous developments in Somalia and Greek invasion of Macedonia and the Haiti and budgetary woes, American involvement of Bulgaria or Hungary in the involvement in the conflict was reluctant and 36 conflict. indecisive. The United States‘ chose to act A poll of the American public in the primarily through the United Nations and summer of 1992 offers in part a reflection of NATO while not pushing in either of these the perceived lack of American interests in forums for aggressive engagement, essentially 34 Gallagher (2003): 128 35 Chollet (2005): 185 36 Bert (1997): 66 37 Herrmann and Peterson (1997): 302 Page | 287 equating to a major lack of involvement in the conditions, with grievous results. Serbs had crisis as it developed. Focused on more asked for the arms embargo because they pressing matters at the time, ―the United already had control over the majority of the States decided to dump the problem on the weapons in the region and were attempting to United Nations—to act only multilaterally. It limit the ability of the Croats and Bosniaks to seems that, by this time, it was already clear import arms and resist the formation of to American policymakers that the United Greater Serbia in self-defense. Nations might not be up to the task, and that The United Nations successfully this move was meant merely to sweep the mediated a cease-fire and peace agreement in problem under the UN carpet.‖38 late 1991, signed by Tudjman and Milosevic In 1991, the United States supported and enforced by the deployment of a United the United Nations arms embargo of the Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of former Yugoslavia and the deployment of 14,000 soldiers which arrived in January of peacekeepers to maintain the ceasefire 1992, predominantly from Britain and France, between the Croats and Serbs. When the UN with no American soldiers involved.40 Cease- Security Council passed Resolution 713 that fire zones in Croatia were finalized and supported an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, it maintained and the conflict shifted quickly to was at the request of its Serb-dominated Serbian and Croatian attempts to carve out government.39 While the imposition of an territory and influence in the hapless Bosnia. arms embargo on a region in conflict was Bosnia had voted for independence in ostensibly a good idea, the international February of 1992, but this was boycotted by community was unaware of the local Bosnian Serbs who soon declared Serbian autonomous regions within Bosnia and began 38 Popovic (2006): 45 39 Bert (1997): 34 40 Brune (1998): 89 Page | 288 the campaign of ethnic cleansing to create even the remotest parts of Bosnia along roads homogenous pockets of Serbs, to which built by the UN and using airfields operated Croats and Bosniaks responded with as much by the UN.‖43 force as possible.41 While the aid supplied to Bosnia was The United Nations reacted to the effective, the UNPROFOR forces deployed shifting nature of the conflict by imposing there did little to curb ethnic cleansing economic sanctions on Serbia and campaigns and frequently in fact worsened Montenegro, airlifting aid to Bosnia and the situation. The impotence of UN deploying UN forces in Bosnia. Lester Brune peacekeeping forces in Bosnia is due writes that ―while Bush opposed NATO air primarily to the unclear and severely strikes, he ●●● constrained mandate with which they were …bureaucratic did accept regulations went so deployed and secondarily to a lack of collective far that the manpower. The United Nations, with the peacekeeping forces action to were able to do very support of American policy makers, stipulated little to protect establish innocent civilians in that the UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia must no-fly zones Bosnia. adhere to the principles of impartiality and ●●● and a tighter could use force only if fired upon or to naval blockade to enforce the UN arms support humanitarian objectives. embargo and economic sanctions.‖42 The role The UN‘s desire for its peacekeeping of the UN in supplying aid to Bosnia is seen forces to remain noncombatants is as an unequivocal success, as ―over 2,000 understandable, but the bureaucratic metric tons of stores a day were delivered to regulations went so far that the peacekeeping forces were able to do very little to protect 41 Bert (1997): 147 42 Brune (1998): 94 43 Rose (1998): 156 Page | 289 innocent civilians in Bosnia. The UN Clinton shifted course and unsuccessfully peacekeeping forces were so committed to encouraged NATO air attacks against Serbs, neutrality that they ―were reluctant to use partly as a result of the President‘s distaste for force against Serb aggression even when the the newly developed Vance-Owen peace Serbs blocked aid convoys, refused to move plan.47 The Vance-Owen plan, negotiated by heavy weapons away from Sarajevo‘s airport, the European Community and the United and violated the no-fly zones and safe Nations, called for the division of Bosnia into havens.‖44 Sir Michael Rose writes of ―provinces which were then allocated peacekeeping forces that ―if it is to deliver according to a dominant ethnic group‖ but aid, maintain the regime of a total exclusion many American policymakers, and the zone or deter attacks against Safe Areas then President himself, felt that the plan ―went too it will have to adopt a very forceful approach far in legitimizing Serb gains and ethnic to peacekeeping indeed. To be credible, a partition.‖48 peacekeeping mission must be in a position to As The New York Times reported, a escalate…to peace enforcement.‖45 Security Council resolution proposed by the In 1993, President Clinton, who had British and the French to offer the full support campaigned on a platform of heightened of the international community for the Vance- military involvement in Bosnia, initially Owen plan was rejected by the Clinton failed to understand the idiosyncrasies of the Administration for rewarding Serbian conflict and to act more effectively through aggression and leaving the Serbs in control of the UN and NATO.46 After minor successes 43 percent of Bosnia.49 Bert writes that ―what with airlifts and safe havens, on May 1 such a plan added up to was a kind of hybrid 44 Brune (1999): 91 47 Brune (1999): 98 45 Rose (1998): 157 48 Bert (1997): 191 46 Bert (1997): 164-7 49 Lewis (1993) Page | 290 state where a weak central government Muslims, was perhaps the greatest catalyst for maintained a façade of multi-ethnicity, but the action.52 provinces in effect segregated people In late August 1995, President Clinton according to ethnic group or religion.‖ successfully prodded NATO into extensive Clinton refused to endorse the plan but also bombing campaigns against Serbian weapons, failed to offer many constructive alternatives air defenses, munitions stores, and for it and declined to take military action.50 communications infrastructure in Bosnia and After prolonged inaction and the ―for the first time in the war had taken intensification of conflict in Bosnia, President military action that had a decisive impact on Clinton finally settled on a more aggressive the Serbs and their ability to fight the war.‖53 stance towards ending the violence in the Clinton however stubbornly continued to Balkans. ―The evolution of this involvement support the arms embargo on Bosnia, going apparently was driven by the White House‘s so far as to veto twice congressional gradual realization that Balkans problems legislation that would end American could be resolved and European security participation in the embargo.54 reestablished only if the US exerted a major Clinton‘s new commitment to role in directing the peace effort.‖51 The aggressive and direct diplomatic engagement, massacre of Srebrenica in the summer of in conjunction with NATO bombing 1995, in which Serb forces over-ran a UN campaigns against the Serbs, quickly yielded declared safe haven in the town of Srebrenica results in the form of the Dayton Peace in Bosnia and killed thousands of Bosnian Accords. The presidents of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and leaders of Bosnia‘s 52 Cushman and Mestrovic (1996): 1 50 Bert (1997): 193-5 53 Bert (1997):220-4 51 Brune (1999): 100 54 Purdum (1995) Page | 291 factions engaged in negotiations for three rewarded Serbia‘s hostility in Bosnia, which weeks in Dayton, Ohio and reached an would have given the Serbs 43 percent of agreement on November 21 of 1995, later Bosnian territory, and two years later signed in completion on December 14 in accepted the Dayton Accords that left the Paris.55 The Accords stipulated that Bosnia Serbs with 49 percent of Bosnian territory.58 would be a unified country divided between a Thus with Dayton, the US under Clinton not Muslim-Croat federation and a Serbian only supported the precedent of benefiting republic and would have a ―weak central from aggressive land grabs and ethnic government that ultimately lacked authority cleansing, but also lacked a clearly defined over the ethnically based entities.‖56 understanding of what outcomes were and Although Dayton is widely regarded were not acceptable. as an overwhelming success and, as Richard Recommendations and Lessons Learned Holbrooke points out, over 30 ceasefires and The United States‘ role in the conflict agreements in Bosnia existed and failed is now widely regarded as being terribly before the success of the Dayton Accords, and inadequate. In an article published in Foreign many academics and politicians were critical Affairs in 1995, Assistant Secretary of State 57 of the plan. The most prominent critique Richard Holbrooke referred to the former was that, by accepting the division of Bosnia Yugoslavia as ―the greatest collective security along ethnic lines, the Accords legitimized failure of the West since the 1930‘s.‖59 What Serbian aggression. It is worth noting that lessons can be learned from America‘s role in President Clinton rejected the 1993 Vance- a conflict that took the lives of hundreds of Owen plan largely because he felt that it thousands? 55 Brune (1999): 108 58 56 Silber (2005) Bert (1997): 195 59 57 Holbrooke (2005): ix Holbrooke (1998): 21 Page | 292 One major criticism is that . Many in effective role for the United States in the the Bush and Clinton administrations former Yugoslavia, complicating its portrayed the Bosnian War as a natural involvement there and sometimes causing manifestation of ancient religious and ethnic unintentionally ●●● American hatreds occurring in the context of a civil war deleterious results policymakers over- in which all sides were equally guilty. Thus, despite good simplified conditions on the ground to the severity of the conflict was intentions. As a their own detriment… the underestimated and the implementation of principle, the United States must be genocidal policies and aggressive tactics by United States must acutely aware of local dynamics when Milosevic were not identified. Many in the be acutely aware attempting to intervene in a failed West failed to fully appreciate the degree to of local dynamics state ●●● which Milosevic was committed to a when attempting campaign of ethnic cleansing and the extent to to intervene in a failed state and acknowledge which Bosnian Muslims were vulnerable to that a ‗one size fits all‘ approach to American these policies. involvement in failed states is destined to fail. Marko Prelec writes that the West‘s American support for the United role in the Balkans was ―a failure of Nations arms embargo imposed on all of the understanding: the Western world did not, or states of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 is a would not, fully come to grips with the nature strong example of the United States‘ of the war and its combatants, and therefore inattention to local conditions and the has been unable to craft a constructive following regrettable consequences. response.‖60 This lack of sensitivity to local Ostensibly, an arms embargo on states dynamics was a major obstacle to a more engaged in civil conflict seems like an 60 Prelec (1993): 191 Page | 293 intelligent policy, and perhaps in a This principle is seen most horrifically in the prototypical civil conflict this policy would massacre of Srebrenica in 1995 in which have led to success. However in Bosnia, Bosnian civilians sought safety in a UN Serbians were in control of the majority of proclaimed ―safe haven.‖ When Serb forces arms at the outset of the war, having overran the safe haven, the undermanned and maintained control of Yugoslav military overregulated UN forces were forced to sit supplies, while the Croats, and to an even and watch as over 7,000 Bosnian civilians greater extent the Bosnian Muslims, were left were executed by Serb forces.62 While some without the means to adequately defend level of neutrality and bureaucratic regulation themselves.61 In future conflicts, the United is necessary for UN peacekeeping forces, the States must pay special consideration to the United States should not support the potential existence of an arms imbalance that deployment of peacekeeping forces that are could lead to a situation of defenseless not adequately prepared, both in terms of slaughter before imposing arms embargoes. force size and operational capacities, to Another major lesson learned is that effectively execute their missions. United Nations‘ peacekeepers are futile unless In general, the United States should they have an adequate mandate to keep order try to act multilaterally in dealing with failed and defend civilians. Many critics suggest that states, but must avoid supporting policies that a UN force with restrictions like ‗fire only are poorly thought out or employing when fired upon‘ is in fact worse than no institutions like NATO and the United international intervention at all because local Nations as a substitute for substantive civilians are given the impression that they involvement. Bogdan Denitch argues that, are safe in certain areas when they are not. ―here we must remind ourselves that the 61 Brune (1999): 78 62 Chollet (2005): 24 Page | 294 limitation of the powers of the UN forces is controlled by Serbia was unacceptable, but in mostly the result of US and West European 1995, 49 percent Serbian-controlled was policies, just as the passivity of the European permissible.64 Fluctuations like these Community and NATO is in good part, undermine international American credibility although not exclusively, the result of the and the ability of politicians and military absence of an energetic and clear US personnel to assess and carry out missions. policy.‖63 It is apparent that in Bosnia, for the Whenever possible, the American government majority of the conflict, the United States was should establish very clearly defined content to obscure debate over a more objectives and costs when intervening in significant American role in the conflict by failed states. pawning the problem off onto international Finally, the United States should institutions, a practice which must be avoided. emphasize prevention in failed states before Additionally, clarity of objectives and full-scale conflict breaks out. A variety of acceptable costs was lacking during the scholars and policymakers, including United States‘ involvement in the Balkans. ambassador Warren Zimmerman, have Uncertainty concerning US goals and commented that Milosevic and Tudjman may acceptable costs in failed states seriously well have interpreted American passivity undermines any attempt at foreign during the escalation of hostilities in Bosnia intervention. This is seen in Bosnia in a as an acceptance of all manners of aggressive variety of manifestations. At first the United policies and that if even a small fraction of the States considered NATO airstrikes as bombing campaigns conducted in 1995 had undesirable and later pushed NATO to engage occurred in 1991 the war may have been in them. In 1993, 43 percent of Bosnia 63 Denitch (1996): 195 64 Bert (1997): 195 Page | 295 precluded entirely.65 Eventual decisive action in the form of air strikes in this case was clearly effective as Serbs were anxious to bargain at Dayton following NATO bombing campaigns, when years of soft American diplomacy had done little to encourage negotiations. This is seen again in the failure of the Vance-Owen plan, which was not supported by the United States in 1993, and allowed for the intensification of bloodshed in Bosnia before the US showed support for a similar treaty. American policymakers should be acutely aware that it is much more practical to prevent a state from failing than it is to reinstitute peace and order in a state that has already failed. 65 Brune (1998): 93 Page | 296 Works Cited Almond, Mark. Europe's Backyard War. London: William Heinemann ltd, 1994. Print. Bert, Wayne. The Reluctant Superpower: United States‟ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997. Print. Brune, Lester. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998. Print. Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1999. Print. Chollet, Derek. The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statescraft. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print. Cox, John K. "Teaching About Conflict and Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia." ERICDigests.org. 1993. Web. 19 Jan 2010. Cushman, Thomas , and Stjepan Mestrovic. This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia. New York: New York University Press, 1996. Print. Denitch, Bogdan. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. Print. "Ethnic Groups." The History Place: Genocide in the 20th Century. Web. 8 Feb 2010. Forsythe, David. "Human Rights Policy: Change and Continuity." U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War. Ed. Randall Ripley and James Lindsay. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997. Print. Gallagher, Tom. The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2003. Print. Herrmann, Richard, and Shannon Peterson. ―American Public Opinion and the Use of Force.‖ U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War. Ed. Randall Ripley and James Lindsay. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997. Print. Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998. Print. Holbrooke, Richard. "Foreword." The Road to the Dayton Accords. Derek Chollet. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print. Lewis, Paul. "U.S. Rejects British-French Bosnia Peace Step." The New York Times. 31 March 1993. Web. 22 Feb 2010. "Map of Former Yugoslavia." The University of Texas at Austin: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection. Web. 10 Feb 2010. Oberschall, Anthony. "The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia." Ethnic and Racial Studies 23.6 (2000): 982-1001. Web. 21 Feb 2010. Popovic, Srdja. "Milosevic's Motiveless Malignancy." War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation. Brad Blitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Print. Prelec, Marko. "A House Built on Sand: The Western Response to the War in Bosnia." Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War. Ed. Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz. Stony Creek: Pamphleteer's Press, 1993. Print. Purdum, Todd. "Clinton Vetoes Lifting Bosnia Arms Embargo." The New York Times. 8 Aug 1995. Web. 21 Feb 2010. Rose, Michael. "Military Aspects of Peacekeeping." UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia. Ed. Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998. Print. Schopflin, George. "Yugoslavia: State Construction and State Failure."War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and Cooperation. Ed. Brad Blitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Print. Shattuck, John. Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America's Response. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. Print Silber, Laura. "Dayton, 10 Years After." The New York Times. 21 Nov. 2005. Web. 24 Feb 2010. Page | 298 Lebanon An Analysis of Post-Conflict State Reconstruction Strategies and Implementations Ryan Torpie Issue ethnic/religious conflict resolution. In Last year, the Republic of Lebanon retrospect, important state reconstruction celebrated the twenty-year anniversary of the lessons can be learned. By tracing Lebanon‘s Lebanese Parliament‘s approval of the Ta‘if progress through the last two decades, one Accord on 4 November 1989. The Ta‘if can examine the difficulties of heavy foreign Accord marked the end of a fifteen-year civil involvement and time necessary for war that is estimated to have killed 144,240, rebuilding states and infrastructure. Lebanon wounded 197,506, and caused a third of the is generally no longer considered a failed population to emigrate.1 Moreover, the war state, but important lessons for other failed destroyed much of Lebanon‘s economy and states can be learned from its history and infrastructure and inflicted heavy social costs. transition out of weakness. The most striking aspect of the Lebanese The social tensions derived from the Civil War is that the warring factions were salient sectarian divisions in Lebanese society not merely the state and a well-defined rebel played an enormous role in destabilizing the group, but a complex, multi-dimensional mix state and accelerating it into civil war. Such of parties fighting each other simultaneously entities and groups, present before the and even fighting amongst themselves.2 The founding of the state of Lebanon, have been a dynamic nature of the Lebanese civil war major obstacle to Lebanese nationalism and makes an interesting case study for multi- the development of a peaceful, cohesive Lebanese society. Since the inception of the 1 Barak, Oren. ―Don‘t Mention the War? The Politics of Remembrance and state, these groups have been entrenched in Forgetfulness in Postwar Lebanon.‖ The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January the political system, often requiring 2007): 49-70. 52 2 Makdisi, Samir A. The Lessons of Lebanon: representational quotas in relation to the Economics of War and Development. I.B. Tauris Publishing, 2004. 42 Page | 300 population proportion.3 Thus, significant needs.6 Already fragile because of its tensions in Lebanese politics and society are sectarian nature, the Lebanese government derived from not only historical conceptions could not withstand the socio-political impact defining group relationships but also the of the influx of displaced Palestinian Muslims debate over how Lebanese nationality should who established camps in the south of the be accomplished and portrayed. Lebanon is country.7 In addition to various socio- characterized by an institutionalized economic disparities within the Lebanese definition of identities, both political and population, the effect of the Palestinian social; the identity of individuals is refugees and the PLO severely destabilized determined by birth into a sectarian political the government and rendered it susceptible to community.4 Since the end of the civil war, civil war. instead of lessening, the sectarian identities Partially caused by the weakness of have heightened.5 the Lebanese state, regional dynamics leading Additionally, the state, no doubt up to 1975 also took a toll on Lebanese negatively influenced by the social conflicts, political and civil society. In October 1973, an became reliant on outside support. Lebanon outbreak of hostilities with Israel brought started under French influence following the renewed vigor to Israeli attacks on Southern First World War and many of its institutions Lebanon targeting the PLO but placing reflected foreign concepts and organizations Lebanese citizens in the crossfire.8 These incongruous with Lebanese culture and Israeli attacks not only made further problems 3 Safa, Oussama. ―Lebanon Springs for the Lebanese government, but prompted Forward.‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 1 6 Safa 25 (January 2006): 22-37. 25 7 Khalaf, Samir. Civil and Uncivil Violence in 4 Traboulsi, Fawwaz. A History of Modern Lebanon. Columbia University Press: Lebanon. Pluto Press: London, 2007. 174 NewYork, 2002. 220 5 Makdisi 149 8 Khalaf 225 Page | 301 angry expressions of Arab nationalism, awareness of stark religious differences.10 In heightening already present tensions between November 1936, prominent Maronite leader Muslim and Christian groups in Lebanon. Pierre Jumayyil created the Phalange Background (Kataeb) party ―as a paramilitary youth The major divisions in Lebanese organization to preserve and promote the society are religions, which were constantly Maronite sense of community and 11 perpetuated by the nature of sectarian quotas interests.‖ in government and administrative positions. The Sunni Muslims are of Arab origin The three major groups are Maronite and have always been the majority in the Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shi‘a region. In Lebanon, they compose the second 12 Muslims. According to Badredine Arfi, largest Muslim sect. Under French Maronite identity involves four main preferential treatment of the Maronites, the 13 dimensions: the historic role of Maronite Sunni sense of community was heightened. religion, the ethnic and civilizational origin of The Shi‘a Muslims are the largest Islamic the Maronites, the group memory of the group in Lebanon. They live mostly in West massacres in the nineteenth century, and Beirut and in its southern suburbs, southern 14 historical ties between the Maronites and the Lebanon, and in the Biqa‘ Valley. West.9 A significant factor in Maronite Ottoman Empire (1516-1919) identity is the social construction of a sense of siege within the Arab world and a heightened 10 Arfi 186 11 Arfi 186 12 9 Collelo, Thomas: editor. Lebanon: a Arfi, Badredine. International Change and country study. Federal Research Division, the Stability of Multi-ethnic States: Library of Congress. United States Yuguoslavia, Lebanon and the Crisis of Government, Washington D.C.; 1989. 265 Governance. Indiana University Press: 13 Arfi 189 Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2005. 184 14 Collelo 265 Page | 302 The area of contemporary Lebanon memories and create a certain ―legacy of was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to bitterness.‖18 the end of World War I. As a result of the Between 1860 and the First World diversity of the empire, the Ottomans War, the Ottomans created a provincial institutionalized the millet system of council in the territory known as ‗Mount governance that allowed religious groups and Lebanon‘ that achieved some measure of communities some measure of autonomy in stability.19 This social and political stability local administration and legal operations.15 was in part a result of the prototypical However, Ottoman rule was still consociational apportionment of ruling characterized by the persecution of positions based on sectarian groups, a system conspicuous religious minorities, rendering that would become cemented into Lebanese religious identification paramount in the political culture.20 Moreover, this exogenous region.16 And despite local autonomy, the rendition of political organization has had Ottomans employed several renditions of profound effects on contemporary Lebanese ―divide-and-conquer tactics‖ to control the structure, encouraging and legitimizing the different groups, promoting certain rivalries heavy role of outside influence in determining that remain today.17 Thus, the sectarian domestic affairs.21 tensions of today are imprinted in groups‘ French Mandate (1919-1943) 15 Stewart, Dona J. ―Economic Recovery and Following World War I, the League of Reconstruction in Post-War Beirut‖ Geographical Review, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Oct., Nations issued France a mandate to control 1996): 487-504. 489 16 Bieber, Florian. ―Bosnia – Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multi-religious States.‖ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr. 2000): 269- 18 Ibid. 281. 19 Ibid. 270 20 Safa 25 17 Safa 24 21 Ibid. Page | 303 Lebanon and Syria.22 Under French influence, Christians and denied by Lebanese Mount Lebanon expanded to include parts of Muslims.26 Syria, adding more Shi‘a and Sunni Muslims From Independence to Civil War (1943-1975) to the ‗Lebanese‘ population.23 The French With sectarian divisions deeply modeled the Lebanese constitution after that ingrained in both society and political of France‘s Third Republic, thus continuing structures, the difficulty of creating a cohesive the trend of outside dictation on internal national identity was ●●● affairs in Lebanon.24 It was under the French exponentially more It was under the French constitution constitution that the 6:5 Christian to Muslim difficult. Agreed that the 6:5 Christian to Muslim ratio was ratio was institutionalized, and following the upon by Sunni and institutionalized, and following the subsequent demographic changes leading up Maronite leaders, the subsequent to 1975, caused salient grievances in the National Pact of demographic changes leading up to Lebanese Muslim community over accurate 1943 was an 1975, caused salient grievances in the representation.25 Harking to Christian unwritten agreement Lebanese Muslim similarities, the French favored the Lebanese that shaped Lebanese community over accurate Maronites and such promotion was reflected politics for decades representation ●●● in the institutions of the French mandate leading up to the period. This relationship effectively forged a state‘s collapse in 1975.27 It stipulated that connection between Europe and the Middle both the Christian and Muslim communities East, a connection cited often by Lebanese identify with Lebanese state rather than the West or a pan-Arabism.28 Additionally, it outlined a consociational political system in 22 Stewart 488 23 Safa 25 26 Stewart 488 24 Ibid. 27 Arfi 191 25 Ibid. 28 Ibid. Page | 304 which no single sect would be able to parties that opposed Maronite political dominate.29 But by institutionalizing the sects, hegemony, parties that ―demanded a change the system solidified the identities without in the political set-up in favor of more addressing the already nascent concerns and equitable power-sharing.‖34 tensions between them.30 According to the In 1958, Lebanon experienced Pact, the president would always be Maronite, political and social turmoil in a war that the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker stemmed from Lebanese Muslims‘ desire to of the Parliament a Shi‘ite.31 Moreover, the see Lebanon integrated in the newly founded Pact stipulated near unanimity in national United Arab Republic; it represented the ―first decisions, which later severely hindered the major breakdown in political order after Lebanese government.32 nearly a century of relative stability.‖35 The creation of Israel in 1947 Moreover, it rendered Lebanon more reliant compromised the religious balance in on international actors as Lebanese President Lebanon as a large influx of Palestinian Camille Chamoun had to ask President refugees settled in southern Lebanon; by Eisenhower to send troops to fight the Muslim 1975, more than 350,000 Palestinians lived in rebels.36 The fighting ended with Shihab‘s Lebanon.33 As the Palestine Liberation presidency and through his ―reputation for Organization (PLO) increased its activity in evenhandedness‖ and minor reforms in Lebanon, it started to support Lebanese governance, religious divisions were temporarily healed.37 29 Safa 25 30 Ibid. 31 Traboulsi 110 32 Safa 26 33 Stewart 488; Hallenbeck, Ralph A. Military 34 Makdisi 39 Force as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: 35 Khalaf 142 Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982- 36 Khalaf 144 February 1984. Praeger Publishers: 1991. 2 37 Collelo 186 Page | 305 In 1970, the PLO was expelled from attack occur.42 This marked a significant Jordan and moved into southern Lebanon, reliance on outside forces for domestic determined to continue the resistance against protection, a reliance that remained in place Israel from that location.38 The weakness of throughout the fifteen-year civil war. the Lebanese state was evident as it was Throughout this brief war, the PLO continued unable to take action against the PLO to stage attacks from southern Lebanon, operating from within the Lebanese state.39 prompting a massive Israeli retaliation.43 Israel continued its reprisals against the PLO, Ultimately, Israeli action effectively sometimes injuring Lebanese villages and heightened the tension in southern Lebanese citizens.40 And the presence of Muslim villages and in Beirut‘s suburbs, aggravating insurgents fighting against oppression served Lebanon‘s domestic issues. By June 1976, as inspiration to Lebanese Muslims who Syrian President al-Assad had sent a total of considered themselves cheated by the unequal 15,000 Syrian troops to Lebanon. Syrian representation in the state government. support engendered an Arab League meeting October 1973 marked the start of a in Cairo in which the members agreed to send second Arab-Israeli War, necessitating a an Arab Deterrence Force (ADF) to Lebanon renewed friendship between the Lebanese and to highlight pan-Arab support.44 Syrian presidents, Franjiyah and al-Assad.41 Economically, the period leading up to This alliance engendered a treaty which 1975 witnessed the oil-boom that placed the required Syria‘s involvement in Lebanon‘s Middle East at the apex of foreign capital and defense against Israel should another Israeli investment.45 This influx of foreign economic 38 Khalaf 221 42 Traboulsi, 182 39 Khalaf 220 43 Khalaf 225 40 Khalaf 165 44 Traboulsi 199 41 Traboulsi, 182 45 Khalaf 163 Page | 306 activity in the region placed wealth in the protestors.49 President Franjiyeh condoned the hands of business owners and upper classes attack by blocking an investigation instead of the Lebanese national economy as a questioning the army‘s legitimate use of whole.46 Thus, this period was also marked by force.50 Violent contacts between the PLO, significant economic disparity in Lebanese various sectarian militias, and the Lebanese society.47 Army began to spring up and the government The Civil War (1975-1990) was slow to respond.51 Moreover, the The 1975 -1990 Civil War in Lebanon Lebanese Army fell apart along confessional was far from mono-causal. Sectarian strife lines, rendering the state itself domestically was not a new phenomenon leading up to defenseless.52 The violence between groups 1975; several other factors exacerbated the escalated through the spring of 1975, marked already fragile links composing the national by the killing of civilians in a Phalange Lebanese identity. The plural society, the congregation outside a church and a Phalange weakness of the state, and regional dynamics retaliation, which killed 21 Palestinians.53 all contributed to a war that lasted fifteen After the Army opened fire on the years. protestors in February 1975, Franjiyeh formed On February 26, 1975 widespread a military cabinet on 23 May headed by violence in Lebanon began.48 In Sidon, a Muslim Brigadier Nur ad Din Rifai, the group of fisherman protested against Protein, retired commander of the Internal Security a corporate fishing company partially owned Force.54 In September 1975, a new cease-fire by Camille Chamoun, prompting the Lebanese army to open fire, killing several 49 Ibid. 50 Khalaf 228 51 Traboulsi 183 46 Khalaf 163 52 Safa 27 47 Collelo 94 53 Traboulsi 183 48 Traboulsi 183 54 Traboulsi 188 Page | 307 was declared and a twenty-member operating outside the context of the state and committee called the Committee for National along sectarian lines and remained a powerful Dialogue (CND) was created to discuss militia throughout ●●● Throughout the civil reforms. During its tenure, the fighting in the the fifteen years of war, Hezbollah gained both social country did not stop, but the committee did fighting.58 and political provide some hope for the people and Additionally, momentum by providing a network exhibited some willingness and effort – at Hezbollah began in of social services in Southern Lebanon least by some parties – to stop the war.55 The 1982 in response to ●●● CND addressed the complicated conflict that heavy and severe Israeli attacks on Southern was Lebanon in search of PLO terrorists.59 ‗sectarian in form and social in Throughout the civil war, Hezbollah gained content and demands‘ and held the system of ‗free enterprise‘ responsible both social and political momentum by for the ‗social inequities, covered by sectarian packaging‘ and consequently providing a network of social services in the prevailing violence.56 Southern Lebanon, ultimately gaining the A unanimous vote to reform the Lebanese respect of much of the population there.60 system of sectarian quotas in parliamentary Such insurrection by Lebanese citizens of the representation and administration was over- state indicates a lack of consensus over the ridded by the ruling troika: Camille Chamoun, form of government and the identity of the Suleiman Franjiyeh, and Pierre Jumayyil.57 country itself.61 The Lebanese state was The founding of the Amal movement severely weakened by the political grievances in 1975 by Shi‘a leader Musa al-Sadr marked a significant solidification of armed militias 58 Traboulsi, 192 55 Traboulsi 190 59 Safa 28 56 Traboulsi 191 (quoting Edmond Rabbath) 60 Ibid. 57 Traboulsi 191 61 Bieber 272 Page | 308 in some sects of the population from unequal in ending the war, especially as some groups representation in the government.62 profited from the protracted fighting.66 By the As the state collapsed into civil war, mid-1980s, the central government had lost Lebanon was divided into smaller units the ability to effectively control the characterized by multi-religious fighting for population and the escalation of the conflict. the control of the state.63 These para-states Various para-states hindered any national ―ensured social services, provided their efforts to supply state services and terrorism, respective population with food and other most notably through car bombs, became a basic needs, developed their own daily occurrence to undermine whatever administration and army.‖64 Some of these authority the state had claim to.67 structures, interspersed throughout the The Document of National country outside Beirut, even exercised the Understanding (Ta‘if Accord), discussed and power to levy taxes from the territories under signed in Ta‘if, Saudi Arabia in September their control. Most notably, the Biqa‘ Valley and October 1989, ●●● While the semblance in the south was a prominent producer of was ―based on the of a single state hashish early in the conflict but later moved reaffirmation of the remained, the institutionalized towards opium production for greater principle of sectarian fractionalization rendered the state all 65 revenues. While the semblance of a single power-sharing, albeit but powerless and state remained, the institutionalized according to a represented a major difficulty in ending fractionalization rendered the state all but modified formula.‖68 the war… ●●● powerless and represented a major difficulty In terms of regional influence on this particular pact, Syria played 62 Makdisi 39 63 Bieber 270 66 Makdisi 73 64 Bieber 275 67 Collelo 226 65 Collelo 120 68 Makdisi 79 Page | 309 a major role in both support and transparency. In Reality, it readjusted the implementation of the Accord‘s stipulations. sectarian power sharing by requiring equal The Ta‘if Accord ―recalibrated representation for the Muslim and Christian political power among Lebanon‘s various communities, a change from the previous confessional communities‖ and represented a organization where the Maronite Christians product of elected officials who were not, in claimed that they were the majority of the most cases, belligerents in the war.69 The Lebanese population.72 Another change was Accord allowed certain members of the elite in the dispersion of power among the three to remain in power but also granted some heads of state forming a ruling troika: the warlords and militia chiefs some decision- Sunni Prime Minister and the Shi‘ite Speaker making power for postwar Lebanon.70 of Parliament gained greater powers while the Moreover, the Ta‘if Accord stipulated a Maronite President‘s constitutional powers power-sharing structure of governance with were diminished. 73 And each position had the intent of promoting moderate and the ability to veto one another, opening more cooperative behavior among contending opportunities for political stalemates and tug- people.71 Ideally, such a power-sharing of-wars.74 scheme would have allowed the different Postwar Reconstruction (1990-2010) groups an arena for dialogue and Despite the ability of the Ta‘if Accord to end the civil war and stave off massive 69 Norton, Augustus Richard. ―Lebanon after Ta‘if: is the civil war over?‖ Middle East civil violence for two decades, the political Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991): 457- 473. 460 reconstruction based off the Ta‘if Accords 70 Safa 28 71 Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. still has not been democratic; equal rights are ―Institutionalizing the Peace: Power Sharing and Post-civil war Conflict Management.‖ 72 Makdisi 79 American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 73 Safa 27 47, No. 2 (Apr. 2003): 318-332. 318 74 Safa 27; Makdisi 92 Page | 310 not enjoyed by each group of the population. eradication of corruption and nepotism, and Sectarianism is still firmly rooted in Lebanese greater independence of the judicial system.77 political culture. thus, removing ―the sectarian In 1977, the barraged Lebanese nature of the system [would] require a gradual government founded the Council for cultural and political break with past modes of Reconstruction and Development (CRD) as behavior.‖75 While the Ta‘if Accord held the an entity responsible for drafting a plan for necessary elements to ending the civil war, it the comprehensive development of the state.78 did not necessarily translate to contemporary Its conception was derived from the belief Lebanese society. that the war had mostly ended and it was State economic reconstruction efforts necessary to start outlining drafts for national focused heavily on infrastructure such as economic reconstruction.79 However, once the factories and business centers in Beirut, the fighting escalated again in 1983, financial and largest urban center in the country.76 This has economic conditions deteriorated quickly, encouraged a socio-economic polarization in including the severe depreciation of the society because of the concentration of Lebanese pound, rendering any of the planned development in urban centers and lack of efforts mute.80 After 1989, the new resources and development in the rural sector. government planned the reconstruction of the Following the Ta‘if Accord, the government state through two phases: short-term and expanded its role in the economy drastically long-term goals.81 The initial goals included a from the war levels but did not implement concerted effort to repair the ―built necessary institutional reforms: transparency, environment,‖ which concerned commercial 77 Makdisi 163 78 Stewart 496 79 Makdisi 66 75 Makdisi 167 80 Makdisi 67 76 Makhoul 613 81 Stewart 495 Page | 311 and residential buildings and services of to adapt to the conditions of open markets by telephone lines and sewage systems.82 And becoming efficient and competitive.‖86 the CDR developed certain long-term plans Since the end of the civil war, concerning investment programs with the Lebanon has implemented numerous intent of ―restoring economic activity and restoration projects in tandem with increased alleviating social hardship.‖83 However, many economic activity. Most notably, the of its proposed reforms fell short of its Lebanese banking sector has substantially announced targets.84 progressed and modernized.87 There is As the global economy becomes more certainly room for improvement, however, important to individual nations‘ economic namely in bank monitoring.88 And large success, a major challenge for Lebanon will public debt from the war years represents a be to integrate its own economy into the major threat to further improvements and global system. A plan must be devised to progress in the Lebanese economy.89 ―maximize [Lebanese] welfare by ensuing Regional instability deters a large foreign that the benefits of integration in the world direct investment (FDI) in Lebanon. Up to economy outweigh, to the greatest possible 2002, the relative price and exchange rat e extent, its associated costs.‖85 Thus, Lebanese stability has largely been restored.90 political economy should focus on phases to Moreover, the estimated GDP of Lebanon in open up to globalization. Essentially, this 2001 ranked first among the non-oil phasing will allow ―viable national industries producing Arab countries.91 86 Ibid. 87 Makdisi 92 82 Stewart 495 88 Makdisi 116 83 Makdisi 118 89 Makdisi 92 84 Makdisi 119 90 Makdisi 161 85 Makdisi 171 91 Ibid. Page | 312 Socially, the reconstruction effort of The war provoked a mass exodus of Lebanon has been hindered by the fact that affluent Lebanese citizens and an element of sectarian identities have gained more the post-war recovery plan was to entice prominence after the end of the civil war.92 Lebanese nationals living abroad to return.95 Because the war destroyed many public In addition to the affluent, the war displaced a spaces, such as parks, market places, and large population of the Lebanese middle and neighborhoods in general, many places lower classes. associated with inter-sectarian interaction The United States’ Actions and Interests 93 disappeared. Also, the sectarian nature of Over the years, the United States‘ the civil war was at the expense of an overall general strategy and goals in the Middle East Lebanese national identity. The war have been defined by three general principles: ●●● ultimately the Truman Doctrine (1945) and the Socially, the heightened reconstruction effort Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), which sought to of Lebanon has been sectarian identities contain Soviet Union influence in the area, hindered by the fact that sectarian and simultaneously the continued commitment of support for the identities have gained more emphasized state of Israel, and the determination to prominence after the conflicting sectarian end of the civil war. protect a continued availability of military 94 ●●● aspirations. Even 96 bases and communication. During before the war, such salient cleavages were Lebanon‘s 1957-58 conflict, the United States recognized and suggestions were made to responded to President Chamoun‘s request help eradicate the stark divides between the intervention and protection by sending 14,000 groups. troops. Lebanon had signed the Eisenhower 92 Makdisi 149 93 Stewart 494 95 Stewart 494 94 Makdisi 73 96 Arfi 158 Page | 313 Doctrine and Chamoun argued that the the US expressed concern for Israel‘s borders. Lebanese Muslims were being helped by Israel itself responded to an eminent Syrian Syria, who was in turn supplied by the Soviet intervention by covertly sending Israeli forces Union.97. In this conflict, the official US into Lebanon.101 The multiple parties motivation was involved and the switching of alliances to protect American lives and property complicated the dynamic nature of the civil and to preserve Lebanon‘s territorial sovereignty while influencing the war. In the beginning of the war, Syria Soviet and Egyptian images of the United States and enhancing the entered Lebanon at the behest of the Lebanese credibility of US commitments around the world.98 president on the side of Christian militias Armed with machinery and such good fighting the PLO.102 However, the Syrians intentions, the US marines waded ashore in eventually switched to the side of the Muslim Beirut ―among sunbathers and swimmers‖ militias, prompting the Lebanese Christians to and the conflict ended without US Marines‘ employ Israeli support.103 In reaction to the direct involvement.99 changing elements of the conflict, United During the 1975-1990 civil war, the States Secretary of State under President United States lead by Secretary of State Reagan, Alexander Haig, proposed three main Henry Kissinger supported Syria‘s role within objectives in Lebanon and the region: Lebanon and approved the constitutional withdrawal of all foreign forces (including document signed in Damascus by Franjiyeh Israel), emergence of a sovereign Lebanese and Karami.100 However, when actual intervention came to fruition in March 1976, 101 Traboulsi 196 102 97 Collelo 24 Nedzi, Lucien N. ―Lebanon‘s 98 Arfi 162 Contemporary Significance.‖ Mediterranean 99 Collelo 186 Quarterly, Vol 17, No. 4 (Fall 2006): 1-12. 10 100 Traboulsi 195 103 Ibid. Page | 314 government, and the security of the September 1982, the Israeli Army moved Lebanese/Israeli border.104 again into Beirut in violation of the Habib Following the Israeli invasion of agreement in search of PLO militiamen.108 In Southern Lebanon in June 1982, the United subsequent days, Lebanese Christian States more actively engaged in diplomacy in militiamen attacked and killed thousands of Lebanon and the region.105 Months later, in men, women, and children at two Muslim August 1982, President Reagan announced refugee camps located outside the city.109 The that United States Marines would be sent to massacres at the camps involved both Israeli Lebanon to help stabilize the Lebanese Army complicity (as the killings occurred as Israeli and support the insubstantial Lebanese forces surrounded the camps) and the open government. However, on 1 September, violation of the US-brokered Habib Reagan announced that the Marines could agreement.110 Following these events, on 20 withdraw within two weeks, cutting his September, the Lebanese Prime Minister original thirty-day commitment in half as the Wazzan sent President Reagan a formal fighting had appeared to lessen.106 By request to resend US troops to Lebanon.111 removing military means to obtain the US The attack on the Marine barracks objectives towards the situation in Lebanon, outside Beirut on 23 October 1983 prompted President Reagan made clear that the US the figurative and literal US withdrawal from would pursue the objectives non-militarily.107 the Lebanese Civil War.112 The act of terror However, following the assassination that killed 241 US Marines, soldiers, and of president-elect Bashir Jumayyil on 14 sailors sleeping inside the headquarters struck 108 Hallenbeck 21 104 Hallenbeck 11 109 Ibid. 105 Hallenbeck xi 110 Ibid. 106 Hallenbeck 16 111 Hallenbeck 22 107 Hallenbeck 18 112 Nedzi 11 Page | 315 a horrifying psychological chord in the US the sovereignty of the independent state of attitude toward Lebanon.113 Following a letter Lebanon.116 Moreover, the UNSCR 1559 from President Reagan to Congress on 30 advocated the disarmament of all militias, March 1984 to remove all US forces save 100 including Hezbollah operating in Southern Marines to help secure the US and United Lebanon.117 Kingdom‘s embassy in Beirut, by 2 April, the Following the assassination of former government of Lebanon terminated the Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on 14 February Multinational Force (MNF).114 2005, nonviolent protests in the subsequent By the time of the Ta‘if Accord in months solidified the United States‘ position 1989, the United States supported Syrian against Syrian intervention in Lebanese influence in Lebanon and even supported the domestic affairs.118 After Syrian withdrawal Lebanese/Syrian forces‘ coup against General in 2005, the political power vacuum was Aoun in October 1990.115 However, as the filled by Hezbollah, which appeared as a protracted Syrian influence in Lebanon began legitimized political force in the 2005 to exhibit signs of unilateral control, the parliamentary elections.119 United States took a position against Options continued Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The US should consider the effects of With the United Nations, the US supported Lebanon‘s domestic situation in the Middle United Nations Security Council Resolution East and be ready to deal with the potential (UNSCR) 1559 of 2 September 2004 which worsening of stability in the entire region called for the immediate withdrawal of should Lebanon descend into another civil foreign troops inside Lebanon and supported 116 Safa 29 113 Hallenbeck 108 117 Ibid. 114 Hallenbeck 169 118 Safa 33 115 Makdisi 80 119 Safa 35 Page | 316 war. To keep Lebanon on the ‗right track‘ for the Lebanese state‘s social component, the democratic stabilization, the United States endogenous growth and legitimization of should continue its support of the national Lebanese ●●● government, encourage free elections and sentiment would Domestic security in Lebanon is a Lebanese national identity, and discourage eclipse the strategically support of Hezbollah by multilaterally sectarian divides important goal for the United States encouraging peace-talks with Israel. As which continue to because the country’s domestic instability Lucien Nedzi observes, cause social and has historically Rather than delving into the intricacies political strife. proven to negatively of Islam for answers to the terrorism impact stability in encouraged by Hezbollah and other The the entire Middle such organization, it is more East region. productive to deal with underlying meeting between ●●● secular causes – cultural, economic, psychological, and social – that Lebanese President Sleiman and President provide young, willing recruits for those who build their political power Obama last December reinforced the on the shaky foundations of widespread popular alienation.120 relationship between Lebanon and the United Thus, it is an option for the United States to States and elements such as continued support proactively seek the roots of the attraction to for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to terrorism and avert the evils to which they strengthen the government‘s control over its may tend. Such efforts might include borders and territory.121 Additionally, advancing bottom-up development throughout President Obama promised a ―commitment to the communities and villages in Lebanon, a resolve [the regional] issues through dialogue tactic that would allow for case-specific and negotiations as opposed through attention to the individual problems each 121 Obama, Barack H. ―Remarks Following a community faces. With the improvements of Meeting with President Sleiman.‖ Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents 120 Nedzi 8 12/14/2009: Special Section; Speech: 1-3. 1 Page | 317 violence.‖122 Domestic security in Lebanon is States faces the risk of alienating many and a strategically important goal for the United damaging the image of the United States in States because the country‘s domestic the Muslim world. The US should distinguish instability has historically proven to the armed presence of Hezbollah from its negatively impact stability in the entire political representation and support the Middle East region. In turn, President disarmament of its militia while actively Sleiman pledged to ―keep cooperating and trying to integrate it into the Lebanese coordinating with the United States on issues political system. In December 2009, the related to the world‖ to ―reach better Lebanese Parliament approved a national solutions.‖123 unity government allowing Hezbollah to In dealing with Hezbollah, the United retain its weapons.126 This indicates that States has two main options: straight disarming Hezbollah will be complicated and disarmament or integration of Hezbollah‘s may even infringe upon Lebanon‘s domestic forces into the Lebanese national defense sovereignty. By supporting LAF and structure.124 Many in the Middle East consider Hezbollah integration through leadership and Hezbollah a legitimate political group. And it officer training, the United States can attempt remains an active part of Lebanese society, to ease sectarian divisions and possibly de- especially for the Shi‘a community.125 Thus, radicalize Hezbollah. in dealing harshly with Hezbollah, the United Lessons and Recommendations United States‟ Intervention 122 Obama 3 123 Ibid. One valuable lesson learned from 124 Salem, Paul. ―The Future of Lebanon.‖ Foreign Affairs. Vol. 85, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2006): 13-22. 20 Lebanon is the merit of a clear timetable. The 125 Talbot, Brent and Heidi Harriman. ―Disarming Hezbollah.‖ Mediterranean 126 The Associated Press. ―Lebanon Vote Lets Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Fall 2008): 29-53. Hezbollah Keep Weapons.‖ The New York Times. 10 31 December 2009 Page | 318 United States should in the future have a clear better job of proactively dealing with conflict consistent approach to involvement. President situations instead of merely reacting to Reagan‘s decision to send US troops only to elements it cannot fully comprehend. call them back two weeks later hindered the State Building efforts of the US to stabilize the country. Lebanese society‘s multi-confessional Moreover, US intervention in Lebanon nature renders it very difficult, but not exhibits the importance clear strategies impossible, to build and maintain a stable pertaining to the achievement of each state structure. With salient historical memory individual objective. In general, during of persecution from one group or another, the intervention in Lebanon, the US suffered from sects have limited past examples to draw upon not only a lack of organization pertaining to in constructing means and methods of concrete timelines and steps to achieve cooperation on a political and social level. For specific goals but also a lack of knowledge example, the Lebanese Army crumbled along pertaining to the causes of the war. sectarian lines soon after the fighting started During the Lebanese Civil War, when in 1975.127 This not only rendered the state multiple parties were involved, the United defenseless but also indicates that at times of States was not sensitive enough to the tension, identification was not with the nation, complicated situation. Instead of helping to but with the sub-groups composing the nation. treat the causes of the Lebanese civil war, the A state is not only composed of the structures US efforts in Lebanon focused mainly on and institutions that organize and improve addressing the symptoms, namely inter- lives but also a collective idea embodied in confessional fighting, through military action. nationalism. The Lebanese state may be In the future the United States should do a strengthened and bolstered against future 127 Safa 27 Page | 319 internal attacks by a stronger sense of national tree flags rather than different group identity rather than with the sectarian groups banners.129 composing the country. In terms of the Lebanese state‘s The Ta‘if Accord did not address the stabilization in the postwar period, there has concrete steps necessary to unify society been much controversy concerning the role of besides abolishing sectarian quotas in civil Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The Ta‘if service posts, the judiciary, the police and Accord legitimized substantial Syrian army;128 it is the duty of the Lebanese involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs, government, in tandem with international namely the presence of Syrian troops to support, to provide an example of inter- maintain order and stability. The international confessional cooperation and Lebanese community, in the voice of the United national identification. This development of a Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 national rather than confessional civil society demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops would take time to grow, but the Lebanese from Lebanon and in 2005, the last Syrian state can promote it by encouraging troops left. However, the departure of Syrian cooperation between groups that compose the involvement has led to the rise of Hezbollah government. Such nationalism may indeed be as a legitimate political entity in Lebanon. possible; in the nation displayed a rare show Hezbollah itself in the past has cited the of unity when demonstrators in the rallies weakness of the government as a reason to held after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in continue its barrage against Israel.130 The the spring of 2005 carried Lebanese cedar- Lebanese state must gain the capacity and the collective will to ―fully exercise its writ and 129 Safa 33 130 128 Traboulsi 244 Salem 20 Page | 320 provide services outside the capital;‖ it was And finally, the Ta‘if Accord the government‘s failure to provide services embodied the solution to end the civil war in in the south which lead to overwhelming 1990, but may not have the same significance support for Hezbollah in the area, especially in a Lebanon two decades removed from the among poor Shi‘ite communities.131 problems of the times. Thus, the international In Lebanon‘s effort to rebuild, the community, in tandem with the Lebanese international community has focused largely government, should readdress the stipulations on supporting the LAF. Such plans are aimed of the Accord and the subsequent at enhancing the legitimacy of the organization of the Lebanese government to government by improving the execution and more adequately fit the contemporary practices of the LAF for defending the state as situation. Perhaps readdressing the need for a whole. The United Nations‘ attempts to the sectarian nature of the system will allow supply better coordination between UN for civil society to identify with the good of offices, the United Nations Interim Force in the nation as a whole rather than fighting for Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the LAF, pledging a the power of each individual sect. However, ―holistic and integrated approach.‖132 this endeavor will necessitate both time and Continued support of Lebanon‘s security conscientious planning. sector and the maintenance of power-sharing Development settlements are integral to the success of In the social reconstruction, there has Lebanon‘s postwar recovery. been a failure to address the needs of the poor.133 Beirut has gained the brunt of 131 Mooney, William K., Jr. ―Stabilizing economic development and infrastructure Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-Building.‖ Parameters, Vol. 37, Issue 3, (Fall 2007): 28- while the country‘s rural areas have received 41. 29 132 Mooney 34 133 Stewart 495 Page | 321 little.134 If the Lebanese government hopes to And, lastly, the Lebanese case control Southern Lebanon and mitigate the highlights the importance of integrating effects of Hezbollah, it will need to actively religious factors in development planning and compete with Hezbollah as a provider of implementation. In a study of two separate services and security, especially against the Lebanese villages, Makhoul and Harrison threat of Israeli attacks.135 advocates even development among all Much of the humanitarian aid going to sectors of the state, including cultural and Lebanon has been through various Non- social development. Specifically, they found governmental Organizations that have little or that no connection to the Middle East.136 These Islam defines development in a comprehensive way to incorporate Western NGOs, while cost-effective and spiritual as well as material elements… Society should strive expedient, represent an ―almost exclusive toward human resource development, equitable availability of useful reliance on western aid organizations [that] products, and the evolution of indigenous technology.138 does little to enhance the Lebanese Lebanon has not done enough to incorporate government‘s capacity or its legitimacy in the all sectors of society in the plans of eyes of its citizens.‖137 Working in tandem development. With the rural areas lagging far with the Lebanese government to promote behind urban centers, society is more anti-corruption and accountability will make susceptible to future conflict. It is the duty of the government more legitimate and culturally the Lebanese state, with international aid, to adept. implement balance in development strategies. Moreover, the aid that is given should reflect the needs of the specific community. With 134 Mooney 30 135 Mooney 30 136 Mooney 33 137 Ibid. 138 Makhoul 620 Page | 322 multi-religious communities, Lebanon‘s national development cannot expect an immutable panacea to work. As a multi-faceted society, Lebanon reflects the challenges of development compounded by socially competing interests. However, the majority of Lebanese society has exhibited the will to improve and move beyond sectarian conflict. With the help and support of actors in the region and the international community, Lebanon could stabilize and grow to become a much stronger state. Page | 323 Works Cited Arfi, Badredine. International Change and the Stability of Multi-ethnic States: Yuguoslavia, Lebanon and the Crisis of Governance. Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2005 Barak, Oren. ―Don‘t Mention the War? The Politics of Remembrance and Forgetfulness in Postwar Lebanon.‖ The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2007): 49-70. Bieber, Florian. ―Bosnia – Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multi-religious States.‖ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr. 2000): 269-281. Collelo, Thomas: editor. Lebanon: a country study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. United States Government, Washington D.C.; 1989. Hallenbeck, Ralph A. Military Force as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984. Praeger Publishers: 1991. Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. ―Institutionalizing the Peace: Power Sharing and Post-civil war Conflict Management.‖ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr. 2003): 318-332 Khalaf, Samir. Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon. Columbia University Press: New York, 2002. Makdisi, Samir A. The Lessons of Lebanon: the Economics of War and Development. I.B. Tauris Publishing, 2004. Makhoul, Jihad and Lindsey Harrison ―Development Perspectives: Views from Rural Lebanon.‖ Development in Practice, Vol. 12, No. 5 (Nov, 2002): 613-624. Mooney, William K., Jr. ―Stabilizing Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-Building.‖ Parameters, Vol. 37, Issue 3, (Fall 2007): 28-41. Nedzi, Lucien N. ―Lebanon‘s Contemporary Significance.‖ Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol 17, No. 4 (Fall 2006): 1-12. Norton, Augustus Richard. ―Lebanon after Ta‘if: is the civil war over?‖ Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991): 457-473. Obama, Barak H. ―Remarks Following a Meeting with President Sleiman.‖ Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents 12/14/2009: Special Section; Speech: 1-3. Safa, Oussama. ―Lebanon Springs Forward.‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 1 Page | 324 (January 2006): 22-37. Salem, Paul. ―The Future of Lebanon.‖ Foreign Affairs. Vol. 85, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2006): 13-22. Stewart, Dona J. ―Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in Post-War Beirut‖ Geographical Review, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Oct., 1996): 487-504. Talbot, Brent and Heidi Harriman. ―Disarming Hezbollah.‖ Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Fall 2008): 29-53. Traboulsi, Fawwaz. A History of Modern Lebanon. Pluto Press: London, 2007. The Associated Press. ―Lebanon Vote Lets Hezbollah Keep Weapons.‖ Printed in The New York Times: 10 December 2009 Page | 325 Intervention in Failed States Policy Recommendations to the US Clarke Reid During the past decade, the US been reduced with better planning and launched two massive military interventions – organization. one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. Congress In this section, we will give specific has approved $1.05 trillion dollars to date for policy recommendations to the US the military operations involved in these government with special attention to interventions.1 Based on the financial integrating the principles and lessons learned investment and the attention of the media, the of this report, namely: 1) commitment to American public, and the international sustainable, well-funded, and well planned community, these interventions have and organized interventions 2) the practically defined and singularly incorporation of local and regional actors in encompassed the United States‘ recent policy problem states, 3) the involvement of the UN, toward failed states and strategy for NGOs, other states, and other international reconstruction and stabilization. They provide organizations, 4) the importance of security, prime examples of some of the problems with not as a primary strategy, but as support for the current US policy toward intervention in broader reconstruction goals, and 5) fostering weak and failed states. Primarily, they economic growth and sustainability. demonstrate a lack of coordination and First, we recommend the promotion foresight in the planning and execution of and expansion of the existing Office of reconstruction efforts. They have also been Reconstruction and Stabilization. We also enormously expensive. Shortcomings and recommend that the office be structured so failings indicate areas where costs could have that attention and effort can be directed toward certain principles of this report. 1 United States. Congressional Research Service. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Second, we recommend that the US reduce Terror Operations Since 9/11. By Amy Belasco. 28 Sept. 2009. Page | 327 the role of the military in reconstruction in December 2005 by the Bush administration efforts in weak and failed states in favor of in response to such criticisms, especially in shifting resources to more appropriate Iraq.3 The office‘s mission is ―to lead, agencies. Third, we recommend that the US coordinate and institutionalize U.S. unwaveringly support the UN and other Government civilian capacity to prevent or relevant multilateral organizations whenever prepare for post-conflict situations, and to possible when dealing with weak and failed help stabilize and reconstruct societies in states. transition from conflict or civil strife, so they Recommendation # 1: Empower the Office can reach a sustainable path toward peace, 4 of Reconstruction and Stabilization democracy and a market economy‖. As many scholars, politicians, and The CRS has a number of divisions. reporters have pointed out, one of the biggest The Office of Civilian Response Operations reasons for failures of intervention in both organizes the Civilian Response Corps, a Iraq and Afghanistan has been a lack of collection of civilian federal employees and appropriate organization, planning, and volunteers from the private sector and state coordination between government agencies and local governments who are trained and involved in the interventions.2 The Office of equipped to be deployed in countries in crisis the Coordinator for Reconstruction and to provide reconstruction and stabilization Stabilization (CRS) was created as a stand- assistance. Funding is currently being alone agency within the Department of State 3 United States. The White House. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44. (By George W. Bush. 7 Dec. 2005.) 2 Diamond, Larry. Squandered Victory The American 4 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Occupation And the Bungled Effort to Bring Stabilization (S/CRS) : Mission Statement." (Office of Democracy to Iraq. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. 2006). Kem, Jack D. "Stability and Reconstruction Web. 01 Mar. 2010. Efforts: Connecting the Dots Between Military and requested to increase the Corps to 250 active approach to US intervention in failed states, members, 2000 standby members, and 2000 the office is still small and weak. In 2006, the reserve members. The Office of Conflict office had a minuscule budget of $16.6 prevention coordinates with other agencies to million and a staff of 25.7 The President‘s identify states at risk of instability, provide 2010 budget has requested $323.3 million for intelligence for the rest of CRS, and develop the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which preventative strategies with foreign countries, would substantially increase the capabilities NGOs, and private sector actors. The and resources of CRS, but the office is still Planning Office leads the planning and not getting the attention or funding it needs.8 conduct of US Government reconstruction By comparison, the department of defense‘s and stabilization operations in specific proposed budget for 2010 is $663.8 billion, countries.5 CRS has sent a number of only a small portion of which is designated personnel to different countries recently to for civil affairs.9 The Office of Reconstruction help coordinate stabilization and and Stabilization has the potential to be the reconstruction efforts. For example, CRS just lead agency for US intervention in failed received an award for a strategic plan drawn states but it does not yet have the necessary up by a group in Bangladesh to help the resources or the power and mandate to play country continue a transition to democracy.6 such a role. We recommend the following: While the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization was an 7 Charles Oleszycki "Update on Department of State important step toward a more organized and Department of Defense Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance". (Army Lawyer) 8 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 5 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Stabilization 9 United States. Department of Defense. Office of the 6 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Assistant Secretary of Defense. DoD Releases Fiscal Stabilization 2010 Budget Proposal. 7 May 2009. Page | 329 The CRS should be raised to a included leading the reconstruction and cabinet-level agency that reports directly to political transition in post-war Iraq on the the President of the United States. This ground. With a fully staffed Civilian promotion would bestow the office with a Response Corps and large body of status reflecting its importance and information and intelligence concerning undoubtedly garner more attention from the weak and failed states, CRS would have been government, the media, and the public. It the most qualified department for this effort. would, as Stuart Eizenstat puts it, give the US The CRS budget should be greatly reconstruction, stabilization, and increased. In order to recruit the necessary development agenda toward failed states a staff to make such important decisions and single strong voice within the government.10 gather necessary information, CRS requires The CRS should be given the authority more resources. Some of these funds could to lead (or more accurately be the primary be redirected from existing programs dealing advisor to the president concerning) with reconstruction, stabilization, and reconstruction and stabilization efforts that development, for example within the are not already specific mandates of other Department of Agriculture,the Department of departments. While the Department of State Defense‘s Civil Affairs, the State Depatment, conducts diplomacy and the Department of and USAID. Personnel and other resources Defense is in charge of national security, within these agencies could also be CRS should be put in charge of civilian assimilated into the proposed DRS. The reconstruction efforts in weak and failed efficiencies gained from planning and states. This would have, for example, organization provided by a stronger and 10 Eizenstat, Stuart E., John Edward Porter, and Jeremy better funded CRS would certainly be worth M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." (Foreign Affairs 84.1 (2005): 133-46) Page | 330 more than the $320 million currently coordinate with different agencies in charge budgeted. We believe that, once it is up and of different elements of reconstruction and running, the newly proposed DRS should stabilization. The Office of Coordination have a budget at least equal or similar to that (OC) would work primarily with the of USAID. To justify tax money going Department of State, the Department of toward such a budget increase, the Defense, and other US agencies involved in government would have to make a clear case reconstruction or development. The OC to the American public about the importance would convene regular interagency meetings of failed states to the US, and to Congress of top decision-making officials and organize about the benefits of consolidating resources panels involving experts (scholars, into a single agency. practitioners, etc.) on reconstruction and Additionally, we recommend the stabilization. The OC would also be formation of a three different specific offices responsible for providing these departments within the proposed Department of and agencies with pertinent information Reconstruction and Stabilization to direct generated by the Office of Intelligence and attention and resources toward some of the Information. Such coordination would be main principles of this report. We recommend useful because experts and officials from an Office of Internal Coordination, an Office different fields and departments could provide of Intelligence and Information, and an Office insight unique to their particular field but of Implementation. relevant to the decisions and strategies of all Office of Coordination – The most departments. For example, diplomats or important role of the proposed Department of anthropologists could explain regional Reconstruction and Stabilization would be to Page | 331 dynamics that might affect how military force reconstruction and stabilization efforts. It is accepted in a particular weak or failed state. would provide information to all involved The Office of Coordination would also actors and departments before, during and be responsible for working with NGOs and after interventions. Such information could agencies based in other countries that deal take the form of detailed warnings of with aspects of reconstruction and imminent crises in weak states gleaned from stabilization, including the European Union, data mining programs on the internet, more the World Bank, the United Nations, and typical reports on political and social regional organizations such as the African dynamics pertinent to interventions, real-time Union. Its role would involve coordinating updates on the successes and shortcomings of and opening lines for information sharing. ongoing interventions, and a variety of other Information could range from innovative mediums. The OII would also coordinate with conflict resolution strategies to new the Intelligence community (the CIA, the Air agriculture technologies that could help Force‘s ISR, the INR, which gathers and development efforts. The OC could analyzes intelligence for the purposes of additionally organize panels of international diplomacy, etc.) to obtain and relevant experts and politicians or sponsor information and make it pertinent to the needs collaborative reports on topics relevant to of reconstruction and stabilization efforts. reconstruction and stabilization. Before the US decides to intervene in Office of Intelligence and a country, the OII would be in charge of Information – The Office of Intelligence and providing reports on the feasibility and costs Information (OII) would be the clearinghouse of different intervention strategies and for all information and intelligence relevant to provide evidence-based, case-specific Page | 332 recommendations. Before the US went to war could be especially useful in situations like in Iraq, the State Department commissioned a that of the US in Lebanon in 1982-83 (see report entitled, ―The Transition to Democracy Lebanon case study) where events are in Iraq,‖ that detailed a comprehensive, happening quickly and the US needs to make relatively quick plan for reconstruction and a variety of major decisions (such as whether democratization post-war. It was directed by to deploy troops) rapidly. A rapid response career officer Thomas Warwick and included division of the OII could assemble and a number of diverse and important provide necessary information quickly and contributors including thirty-two Iraqi exiles. concisely when needed. While the DRS and In retrospect, the strategy outlined in the the OII would usually help adherence to report would likely have worked better than following timelines by providing better strategies eventually used, but due to information for planning in the first place, in squabbling between executive departments this case, the OII would allow for more and with the leadership of the military, the flexible, realistic, and still cost-effective plans report was almost completely ignored.11 With and timelines. the increased visibility and power of the Office of Implementation – The proposed Department of Reconstruction and Office of Implementation (OI) would be in Stabilization and its OII, such a report would charge of leading and coordinating civil, be less likely to be ignored. political, and economic reconstruction efforts The OII, with the help of the CIA and during interventions (i.e. conflict resolution, other agencies, would also be able to provide democracy building, development). The comprehensive real-time information department would have to be informed of covering interventions. Such information important local dynamics and develop 11 Diamond 27 Page | 333 nuanced, case-specific strategies for involving Corps should provide as much funding and all local actors in mediation and ultimately the assistance as possible to proven local actors as political and economic reconstruction process. opposed to creating its own distribution, It would call on the expertise and capacity of construction, etc. policies and structures. If USAID, the State Department, and the local groups have proven their commitment to military when needed and work with other rebuilding and governing in a manner agencies on the ground. Programs would consistent with US values, they deserve range from aid distribution to sustainable support and financial aid for projects and development projects to conflict resolution to plans as they see fit. capacity building when needed. In the Congo (see Congo case study), The OI would also be in charge of the where violence between different regions and Civilian Response Corps, and must keep its groups is rampant and poverty is high, while ranks up to date with qualified, ready-to- also striving for greater security, we deploy experts. The Corps will be the civilian recommend the US work with sub-state task force for interventions. It would include groups and local governments in more stable administrators to help organize and areas to create innovative development plans. implement elections, engineers to help local We also recommend that the US encourage groups build clean water systems, translators the government of the Congo to partner with and anthropologists to communicate, provide international corporations to reap benefits local knowledge, and mediate conflicts. In the from the abundance of natural resources in the interest of minimizing costs and empowering country, and suggest that the US or relevant everyday people within weak and failed multilateral institutions oversee the states, the OI and the Civilian Response distribution of these resources through Page | 334 avenues within the (hopefully growing) element of reconstruction. In both Iraq and infrastructure of the country to local level Afghanistan in the past decade, the military projects. was given almost complete control over While not necessarily fragile or failed, affairs and efforts on the ground, including Burma represents a different challenge those involving post-war reconstruction. One because it has a number of humanitarian of the primary blunders of the intervention in deficiencies but the government is generally Iraq was the decision to put the military in not willing to work with the international charge of post-war reconstruction. It was the community to help change them (see Burma first time since World War II the State case study). We recommend that the US work Department would not be in charge of a post- with ASEAN and other regional actors to war reconstruction.12 In his book, Squandered provide economic and political incentive for Victory¸ Larry Diamond details how the ruling Burmese junta to build reconstruction efforts in Iraq faltered from the infrastructure and respond to constituent beginning because the Department of Defense needs and possibly allow outside groups like and the military operation in Iraq under the OI to work with sub-state actors on things General Garner did not have the experience or like development projects in the future. the tact to organize or implement the 13 Recommendation #2: Reduce the role of elaborate civil reconstruction required. the military in reconstruction Advice was ignored, plans were simplified or The military is clearly an important short-sighted in the first place, important Iraqi part of reconstruction and stabilization mostly actors were alienated, chaos heightened, and because of the security it can provide. But as 12 Gordon, Michael R. ―The Strategy to Secure Iraq detailed above, military power is only one Did Not Foresee a 2nd War,‖ (New York Times October 19, 2004) 13 Diamond 25-52 Page | 335 deadlines were extended many times at great reconstruction efforts must address these root expense. causes. The US Government planned on The military does some things very intervention in Afghanistan being short and well; it uses force to accomplish specific sweet. After a short war against the Taliban goals and in the case of failed states, it is with minimal investment of troops, the usually necessary to provide stability and military thought the enemy had been security so that political and economic decimated and the country was on its way to reconstruction can commence. But the becoming a peaceful, successful state. But military does not have the expertise to plan some, including R. Nicholas Burns in the long-term interventions that take into account State Department were skeptical.14 Now many factors or carry out the kind of Afghanistan is again embroiled in conflict and infrastructural or developmental work needed Taliban insurgency. It was short-sighted of in many weak and failed states. Overuse of the military to think that Afghanistan could be the military is also probably the easiest way to righted by a simple military intervention. alienate the population of a state during an Military security has been and will continue intervention. In Iraq, the military made a lot to be necessary for reconstruction in of enemies by having soldiers barge into Afghanistan, but other forms of conflict civilian houses in full attire looking for resolution should also be utilized (see insurgents. On top of all this, military Afghanistan case study). Failure in intervention is expensive. While the military Afghanistan is partially defined by regional is sometimes necessary, we recommend that and ethnic conflict and dynamics and the US use other means of conflict resolution 14 Rohde, David, and David E. Sanger. "How a ‗Good when possible and to always leave civil War‘ in Afghanistan Went Bad." (The New York Times 12 Aug. 2007.) Page | 336 affairs during interventions to non-military action. Unilateral action is generally more departments and agencies such as USAID, the expensive (because it is only funded by one State Department, and the proposed Office of state) and often engenders antagonism from Reconstruction and Stabilization. weaker states and actors because it lacks Far removed from military action, legitimacy. Unwavering US support of conflict resolution can also take the form of multilateral actions and organizations also local customs and practice (see Conflict shows a commitment to multilateral actions, Resolution chapter). In Rwanda after the which sets an example for other states. genocide, informal judicial hearings based on Whenever feasible, the US should encourage old customs called, ‗Gagaca tribunals‘ were and support the UN, NATO, the African used to try those who participated in the Union, ASEAN, and other multilateral genocide. While they were criticized by many organizations in reconstruction and for not following western judicial procedure, stabilization efforts. they were generally forgiving and they In the past, the US approach to failed worked remarkably well for the specific states has often been regionally short-sighted. Rwandan context. While most efforts focus specifically on Recommendation #3: Defer to multilateral single states, many failed states are enmeshed institutions when possible in regional systems that perpetuate their While the proposed Department of situation (see Regional Dynamics chapter). Reconstruction and Stabilization would focus We recommend that the US consider other on and strengthen US reconstruction and regional players and involve them in the stabilization efforts in weak failed states, the reconstruction process. For example, the US should give precedence to multilateral entire Central African region is involved in Page | 337 the system of porous borders and population ground but the fund board would make over- movements that has kept the Congo weak. We arching decisions and distribute funds. recommend the US work with and when Concluding Remarks necessary defer to regional multilateral During the twentieth century, the most organizations like the African Union and the visible and pressing of the world‘s problems Great Lakes Group when dealing with were characterized by conflicts between great reconstruction in the Congo. states. Now, the world‘s most pressing and Haiti is a perfect example of a country visible international problems are civil wars, in need of reconstruction where a united, natural disasters, terrorism, humanitarian multilateral effort would work well (see Haiti crises, and nuclear weapons security. As case study). All the rich donor countries recent events have demonstrated, state sending aid to Haiti have roughly the same weakness and failure, that is, the inability of agenda and strategies; their efforts should be governments to control and provide for their unified so different aid agencies and constituents, is a very important cause of reconstruction efforts aren‘t covering the these modern-day international problems. same ground or even working against each And the US, the richest country in the world other. We recommend that the US encourage and also the country with the largest military the creation of a single recovery fund and aid programs15, is in the best position to organized by the UN with a board of help weak and failed states. US policy representatives from major donors. USAID towards failed states is thus one of the most and the proposed DRS would still be involved important issues in the world today. It has in implementation of reconstruction on the enormous potential to improve international 15 Steven, Radelet. "Think Again: U.S. Foreign Aid." Foreign Policy (2005). Feb. 2005. Web. Page | 338 security and the well-being of people commitment required when full-scale domestically and around the world. But interventions are necessary. Our primary intervention in weak and failed states is also recommendations stem from five main very complicated and easy to make a mess of. principles: US interventions in failed states in If the US wishes to make a difference in the the future should 1) commit to sustainable, world and consequently promote US interests well-funded, and organized efforts supported and security, it must reform its strategies for by pre-intervention planning and information intervention in weak and failed states and from a variety of sources during all steps of commit appropriate effort and resources. the process; 2) incorporate local and regional In this report, we have outlined and actors in problem states to help make supported a number of specific and general decisions and to implement strategies and policy recommendations to the US provide development assistance; 3) involve or government in dealing with weak and failed defer to the UN, NGOs, other states, and other states. We have also demonstrated with case international organizations whenever such studies how a variety of factors, such as actors would be more suitable or legitimate; regional dynamics and war economies, can 4) provide security, not as a primary strategy, perpetuate state failure and make it very but as support for the efforts of other agencies difficult for failed states to stabilize and and actors for broader reconstruction; and 5) reconstruct, and illustrated this phenomenon foster economic growth and sustainability by with the metaphor of the parabola. Thus we alleviating poverty, harnessing natural have also recommended that the US focus on resources, promoting private enterprise, and prevention of state failure whenever possible supporting local communities. and recognize and plan for the enormous Page | 339 Intervention in failed states and the interventions must be far-sighted, reconstruction and stabilization involved has comprehensive, sensitive, and properly-led. been a large part of US foreign policy for the last few decades and will probably continue to grow in importance in the future. Intervention in the past has sometimes been characterized by poor planning, indecisiveness, unilateralism, and military control. It has also been expensive. In order to improve its intervention record and hopefully use resources more efficiently, the US must adopt a comprehensive strategy that can incorporate lessons learned from mistakes quickly. The US needs a powerful, unified voice in government, the proposed Department of Reconstruction and Stabilization, to bring together disparate actors involved in interventions and provide necessary coordination, information, planning, and attention to detail. The US must recognize that situations in failed states are always difficult and complicated and that Page | 340 Works Cited Diamond, Larry. Squandered Victory The American Occupation And the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006. Print. Eizenstat, Stuart E., John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." Foreign Affairs 84.1 (2005): 133-46. Print. Gordon, Michael R. ―The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee and 2nd War,‖ New York Times October 19, 2004. Kem, Jack D. "Stability and Reconstruction Efforts: Connecting the Dots Between Military and Civilian efforts." Small Wars Journal 7 (2007). Print. 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Bush. 7 Dec. 2005. Web. 10 Feb. 2010. Steven, Radelet. "Think Again: U.S. Foreign Aid." Foreign Policy (2005). Feb. 2005. Web.