Daf Ditty Yoma 47: Kimchis as Exemplar

Sheitels, Snoods, Tichels And Shpitzels: A Visual Guide To Orthodox Jewish Women’s Head-Coverings1

1 https://jewinthecity.com/2020/10/sheitels-soods-tichels-and-shpitzels-a-visual-guide-to-orthodox-jewish-womens-head- coverings/

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MISHNA: They brought out the spoon and the coal pan to the High Priest so he may perform the service of the incense. He scoops his handfuls from the incense and places it into the spoon. The High Priest with large hands fills the spoon with incense in an amount corresponding to the large size of his hands, and the High Priest with small hands fills the spoon with incense in an amount corresponding to the small size of his hands. And this was the measure of the spoon, i.e., it was made to correspond to the size of his hands. He took the coal pan in his right hand and the spoon in his left hand.

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GEMARA: The Gemara expresses surprise at the statement of the Mishna. In an earlier Mishna, the Tanna already taught that the High Priest must bring the coal pan: He takes a coal pan and ascends to the top of the altar and rakes and descends. Why does the Tanna mention the taking of the coal pan again? The Gemara explains: There the Mishna deals with the coal pan of burning coals, and here the Mishna is referring to the coal pan of incense, which he would later scoop out. As it was explicitly taught in a baraita: They brought out an empty spoon for him from the chamber of vessels, and a coal pan heaped with incense from the Chamber of the House of Avtinas.

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§ The Mishna taught: He scoops his handfuls from the incense and places it into the spoon. The High Priest with large hands fills the spoon with incense corresponding to the large size of his hands, and the High Priest with small hands fills the spoon corresponding to the small size of his hands, and this was the measure of the spoon, according to the size of his hands. The Gemara asks: Why do I need a spoon on Yom Kippur?

After all, the Merciful One states:

And he shall take a censer full of coals of fire from 12 בי חַקָלְו אֹלְמ - הָתְּחַמַּה יֵלֲחַגּ - שֵׁא לַﬠֵמ לַﬠֵמ שֵׁא off the altar before the LORD, and his hands full of ,ַחֵבְּזִמַּה יֵנְפִלִּמ ,הָוהְי אֹלְמוּ ,ויָנְפָח תֶרֹטְק תֶרֹטְק ,ויָנְפָח אֹלְמוּ ,הָוהְי יֵנְפִלִּמ ,ַחֵבְּזִמַּה .sweet incense beaten small, and bring it within the veil םיִמַּס ;הָקַּדּ ,איִבֵהְו תיֵבִּמ .תֶכֹרָפַּל תיֵבִּמ ,איִבֵהְו ;הָקַּדּ םיִמַּס Lev 16:12

“And he shall take a coal pan full of coals of fire from off the altar from before the Lord, and his hands full of sweet incense beaten small and bring it within the veil”

This verse suggests that the handfuls are brought by hand rather than in a vessel.

The Gemara answers: The High Priest uses a spoon because it is impossible to perform the service otherwise. The Gemara elaborates: As what should we do? Let him bring in the coal pan and then bring in the incense? The Merciful One states one act of bringing for the coals and the incense, and not two acts of bringing.

Instead, let him take the incense by his handfuls and place the coal pan on top of his two handfuls and enter, carrying it all in one go. This suggestion is also impractical, as when he arrives there, in the Holy of Holies, what should he do?

5 How can the High Priest put down the coal pan where it is? Let him take the coal pan in his teeth and lower it. Now, before a king of flesh and blood one would not do so, as it is disrespectful. All the more so, one would not act in this manner before the King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He.

The Gemara concludes: Therefore, it is impossible for the High Priest to behave in another way, and since it is impossible to act in any other manner, he acts as we find with regard to the sacrifices of the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle. On that occasion, the princes brought spoons filled with incense:

;one golden pan of ten shekels, full of incense 14 די ףַכּ תַחַא הָרָשֲׂﬠ ,בָהָז הָאֵלְמ .תֶרֹטְק הָאֵלְמ ,בָהָז הָרָשֲׂﬠ תַחַא ףַכּ Num 7:14

“One golden spoon of ten shekels full of incense”

The Gemara continues to discuss Rabbi Yishmael ben Kimḥit. They said about Rabbi Yishmael ben Kimḥit: Once he was talking to a certain Arab in the market on Yom Kippur, and a drop of saliva sprayed from the Arab’s mouth onto the clothes of Rabbi Yishmael, who was the High Priest at the time. This spittle rendered him ritually impure by rabbinic law, like the ritual impurity of a zav, preventing him from serving in the Temple. And his brother Yeshevav entered and served as High Priest on that day in his stead. And, consequently, their mother saw two of her sons serving as High Priests on a single day.

And they further said about Rabbi Yishmael ben Kimḥit: Once he went out and talked to a certain officer [hegmon] in the market, and a drop of saliva sprayed from the officer’s mouth onto the clothes of Rabbi Yishmael, and his brother Yosef entered and served as High Priest in his stead. And, again, their mother saw two of her sons serving as High Priests on a single day.

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The Sages taught in a baraita: Kimḥit had seven sons, and they all served in the office of the High Priesthood, as High Priests or as his substitute. The Sages said to her: What good deeds did you perform to merit this?

She said to them: In all my days, the beams of my house never saw the braids of my hair, as she was extremely modest and was strict about covering her hair even inside her own house.

They said to her: Many women did so and did not succeed to such a degree; you must have been granted a special gift from God.

Summary

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:2

A spoon was used to bring the incense to the Kodesh Ha’Kodashim, since this was the only way feasible. The Mishnah says that the Kohen Gadol would carry a shovel-full of coals in his right hand and a spoon-full of incense in his left hand. There is a mitzvah for the Kohen Gadol to cup his two hands and take the incense with his hands. Given that the mitzvah is to bring the incense with his hands, the Gemora wonders as to the necessity of the spoon.

2 http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Yoma_47.pdf

7 The Gemora answers that this was the only way possible. He could not bring the shovel first and then return for the incense, for the Torah says that he should bring everything at once into the Kodesh Ha’Kodashim. He cannot put the shovel on top of his two cupped hands, because he would not be able to put the shovel down, except with his teeth. This manner is considered disgraceful, because one wouldn’t act in such away even in front of a human king, all the more so it is inappropriate in front of Hashem. Therefore, the Kohen Gadol took the incense with his hands and put them in a spoon, which he proceeded to carry into the Kodesh Ha’Kodashim. The use of a spoon is derived from the Nesi’im (tribal leaders) who brought the incense in spoons.

Rabbi Yishmael Ben Kimchis was a very large Kohen Gadol, who was able to take four kavin (a measurement) of incense in his two cupped hands.

The Gemora says that usually the amount of coal in the shovel (three kavin) was greater than the amount of incense in the spoon. The Gemora does record, however, a story with Rabbi Yishmael ben Kimchis, where he was able to take four kavin in his large hands. He said about his mother, “Every woman received zered; my mother received it to the roof.” There is a difference of opinion as to what zered means. One opinion is that it is something which pregnant women were given, in order to strengthen themselves. Kimchis was given more, so her son was larger than most. The other opinion is that it is seed. Kimchis received choice seed, so that her son grew to be very big. The Gemora records that Kimchis had seven sons who became Kohanim Gedolim. When asked, she said that she merited this because she was very modest and the walls of her house never saw her hair.

The amount of meal offering offered on the Mizbei’ach (Altar) should be exactly a fist full.

When one brings a minchah (meal offering), the Torah instructs that a fist-full should be taken and burnt on the Mizbei’ach. The left over, after the fist-full has been taken, is eaten by the kohanim. The Gemora rules that if there are crumbs sticking out of the kohen’s hand, it is considered more than a fist’s worth. If the kohen merely takes the meal with the tips of his fingers, the fist isn’t considered full. The kohen, therefore, must take it with his hand, clench his fist, and use his thumb and pinky to level meal, thereby leaving three fingers full. There is a question concerning the status of the flour stuck between the fingers of the Kohen, when he is taking the fist-full of flour. It is clear that flour towards the inside of his fist is considered part of kemitzah (fist-full). Flour towards the outside of his fist is not considered kemitzah.

There is a question as to the status of the flour stuck in between the kohen’s fingers. According to Rabbi Eliezer, one could put this questionable flour on the Altar and make the following stipulation, “If this part of the Minchah is not considered part of the kometz, I am placing it on the fire as wood (merely as fuel for the fire and not as a sacrifice).” According to the Rabbis, one cannot make such a stipulation, so a large kohen should be used for kemitzah. Such a kohen will have fat fingers, so that nothing will get caught between them. The Gemora concludes that this is preferable, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, because it is not ideal to make a stipulation.

The obligation of a woman to cover her hair

8 Our Gemora describes how Kimchis merited to have seven sons become Kohanim Gedolim, because the walls of her house never saw her hair. It appears from the Gemora that this was not the halachah, but an act of piety beyond the letter of the law.

This is the opinion of many poskim including Rav Moshe Feinstein. He was asked if a woman is required to cover her hair in front of her family, and he responded by saying that according to the law, it is not required. He quotes our Gemora.

The Chasam Sofer, however, quotes the Zohar which says that a woman’s hair, no matter how small, much never show. He says that the community has accepted the ruling of the Zohar and therefore it becomes halachah. This is also the opinion of Rav Moshe Sternbuch.

This issue is connected to a Gemora in Kesuvos. The Gemora discusses two levels of head coverings. There is an extra head covering for the marketplace, and a minimal head covering, which the Gemora suggests that a woman must wear in her own courtyard. The Gemora questions this and says that if this indeed is the halachah, every woman would be in violation. The Gemora concludes that a woman must wear this minimal head covering when traveling between courtyards, but not in her own courtyard.

Tosafos points out that one could go without any head covering in her own courtyard. The Yerushalmi, however, concludes that a woman is obligated to cover her hair in the courtyard. Many Poskim hold like this Yerushalmi including the Beis Shmuel in his commentary on Shulchan Aruch. Even according to those opinions, it could be that one may be more lenient in a house than a courtyard. (There is a disagreement as to the nature of the head covering required between courtyards. Some Poskim hold that some hair may be visible. Many, however, hold that it must cover the entire hair. They hold that although it covered the entire hair, it was the equivalent of an undergarment, and therefore, inappropriate for the marketplace).

Modesty has its Rewards

The Gemora states that Kimchis had seven sons who served in the position of Kohen Gadol. When questioned by the Chachamim what she did to merit such a great reward, she replied, “In all my days, the beams of my house did not see the braids of my hair.”

Rashi quotes a Yerushalmi that states that it is written: all her glory-the daughter of a king-is inside, her raiment is of golden settings. This verse is interpreted to mean that a Jewish woman who conducts herself modestly will merit having a son who wears the vestments of a Kohen Gadol which has gold settings. What is the deeper understanding of this Gemara?

Why is it that Kimchis, who was so modest, merited seven sons who served as Kohanim Gedolim? The answer is that although it appears that the glory of the Kohen Gadol was only external, the truth is that his glory emanated from his modesty. The Torah states: you shall make vestments of sanctity for Aharon your brother, for glory and splendor. Kavod, glory, is an external pride, where people see the beautiful vestments and are in awe of the stature of the Kohen Gadol. Tiferes, splendor, is an internal beauty.

9 It is said: for the lips of the Kohen should safeguard knowledge, and people should seek teaching from his mouth; for he is an agent of HaShem, Master of Legions. The Kohen reflects knowledge, which is internal, and this knowledge must be safeguarded. One can only safeguard knowledge if there is modesty, which was the trait that Kimchis exemplified. By conducting herself modestly, Kimchis was able to merit perpetual modesty through her sons, who served as Kohanim Gedolim.

THE FLOUR BETWEEN THE KOHEN GADOL'S FINGERS

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah asked about the status of the flour that gets stuck between the fingers of the Kohen Gadol when he performs Kemitzah (the act of scooping up a handful of flour from the Minchah offering to burn on the Mizbe'ach). Is that flour considered part of the Kometz (which is burned upon the Mizbe'ach) or part of the Shirayim (the leftover flour which is eaten and not burned upon the Mizbe'ach)? The Gemara relates that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah answered his own question after he asked it. He concluded that the status of the flour between the fingers of the Kohen Gadol remains uncertain, a Safek.

What sort of answer is that? When he asked his question in the first place, the status of the flour was also uncertain.

TOSFOS (DH v'Hadar) explains that perhaps at one point Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah thought that there was an answer to his question and that the flour between the Kohen's fingers was either certainly Kometz or certainly Shirayim. Upon further thought, however, he concluded that no such answer can be given and that his original question remains, and thus the status of the flour remains in doubt.

TOSFOS answers further and says that the original question of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah was not whether the flour is considered Kometz or Shirayim. His question was whether the flour that remains between the fingers of the Kohen has the status of flour of Kometz/Shirayim or whether it has the status of a Minchah offering for which Kemitzah was not performed ("Tevel"). The reason why the flour would be considered Tevel even though an act of Kemitzah was performed with it is because flour inside the Kohen's fist is fit to become the flour of Kometz only if the Kohen intends for it to become the Kometz. Since a person normally does not consider the substance between his fingers to be part of what he is holding in his fist, it is possible that the Kohen did not intend to sanctify the flour between his fingers as Kometz and thus it cannot have the Kedushah of Kometz. On the other hand, it cannot be considered Shirayim, because it was actually taken within the fist. For this reason, it should retain its previous status of Tevel -- flour of a Minchah offering for which Kemitzah was not performed.

3 https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yoma/insites/yo-dt-047.htm

10 In summary, there were three possible answers to the question with regard to the status of the flour between the Kohen's fingers. Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah concluded that the flour cannot be considered Tevel. Rather, it is considered Minchah with which Kemitzah was done, and thus it can be only Kometz or Shirayim.

However, since Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah concludes that the status of the flour is still in doubt (the doubt being whether it is Kometz flour or Shirayim flour), what practical difference does it make whether the doubt involves two possibilities (Kometz or Shirayim) or whether it involves three possibilities (Kometz, Shirayim, or Tevel)? Tosfos answers that if it is possible that the flour is Tevel, then if it falls into a permitted food it will forbid that food and will not become Batel even if there is a quantity of food many times greater than the flour, because Tevel does not become Batel. If the doubt is only whether the flour is Kometz or Shirayim, then if the flour falls into a permitted food it will be Batel and the food will be permitted.

RITVA answers that when the Gemara says that Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah concluded that the status of the flour is a Safek, he concluded that it is definitely not Kometz alone and not Shirayim alone, but rather it consists of both Kometz and Shirayim. The only doubt that remains is the exact point at which the flour between the fingers ceases to be Kometz and begins to be Shirayim. The Ritva compares this doubt to the doubt of Bein ha'Shemashos in Shabbos (33b); Bein ha'Shemashos is part day and part night, but the point during Bein ha'Shemashos that separates between day and night is unknown.

According to the Ritva's explanation, the continuation of the Gemara seems problematic. The Gemara says that the flour left between the Kohen's fingers may not be burned before the Minchah, because "perhaps the flour is Shirayim." Why does the Gemara say "perhaps" it is Shirayim? According to the Ritva, Rebbi Yehoshua ben Uza'ah concluded that it definitely contains Shirayim! Apparently, the Ritva understands that the word "Dilma" ("perhaps") here means "certainly" and not "perhaps," as the Ritva himself indeed explains the meaning of the word elsewhere (Eruvin 3a and 48a).

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:4

The fifth perek (=chapter) of Masechet Yoma begins on our daf (=page).

In it the Mishnayot continue with the description of the Temple service performed by the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur. In particular, our perek focuses on the avodah (=service) that is done inside the Holy of Holies, beginning with the burning of the incense and its placement in the kodesh kodashim. The first Mishnah in the perek teaches that, after collecting burning coals from the altar, the kohen gadol is handed two utensils – an empty kaf (=spoon) and a machtah (=shovel) filled with finely ground incense. He then takes a handful of the ketoret from the machtah and places it in the spoon (see Vayikra 16:12).

4 https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_yoma_4450/

11 The Mishnah further teaches that the appropriate amount of ketoret that is to be taken is subjective, as it depends on the size of the kohen gadol‘s hands.

This rule leads the Gemara to present the kohen gadol Rabbi Yishmael ben Kimhit, whose hands were so large that he would fill the spoon with four kabin of incense.

Another interesting thing about Rabbi Yishma’el ben Kimhit is that he is identified by his mother’s name – Kimhit – rather than by his father’s name, which is the common practice in the Talmud. The Maharsha explains that Kimhit must have been married to different kohanim and had children with each of them.

The Gemara notes that Kimhit had the unique privilege of being the mother of seven kohanim, each of whom served as kohen gadol. The Gemara relates how, on separate occasions, each of them – including Rabbi Yishma’el ben Kimhit – became ritually impure at the last moment and was replaced by one of his brothers.

When asked what led to this honor, Kimhit attributed it to her great modesty, specifically that she kept her hair covered even inside her own home. The Sages reject this explanation, saying that others who behaved in a similar manner did not merit such a reward.

The Jerusalem Talmud explains that the Rabbis did, in fact, appreciate Kimhit’s high level of modesty, but they were simply pointing out that there must have been other factors involved as well, since others who were equally careful about such things did not merit a similar reward.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:5

Our daf (Yoma 47a) makes reference to the righteous actions of some of Kimchit’s sons, and it then quotes a Beraita stating that she had seven sons and that all of them served as Kohen Gadol. המ ישע ת :This clearly impressed the Sages of the time, and they therefore enquired of Kimchit what actions did you perform to achieve this extraordinary outcome [that all of your‘ ,? זש כ תי ךכל יכז seven sons serve as Kohen Gadol]?’ - which could mean, ‘which particular religious/ritual action did you do which made you spiritually worthy that all your seven sons serve as Kohen Gadol?’, or it could mean, ‘what were your methods of education in your home to have all seven of your sons capable and willing to be Kohen Gadol?’.

in all my days, the beams of my house‘ – ימימ אל ואר תורוק יתיב יעלק ירעש To this, Kimchit replied did not see the braids of my hair’ – meaning that Kimchit identified a particular stricture that she had adopted of keeping her hair covered, even while within her home, which she thought to be the cause of her sons being worthy to serve as Kohen Gadol. Attempting to explain the logic of her argumentation, Rashi - quoting the Yerushalmi (Yoma 1:1) – references Tehillim 45:14 which states how, ‘all the honour of the king’s daughter is within; her raiment is superior to settings

5 www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

12 of gold’, which the Yerushalmi explains to mean that ‘a modest woman is worthy to have sons who are Kohanim Gedolim who wear clothes that have settings of gold’.

However, the Sages then respond to Kimchit with a phrase (which is also employed elsewhere in meaning, ‘many have done this - הברה ושע כ ן ו אל ה ו ע ולי the Gemara – see Niddah 70b & 71a) that and it did not bring about this [kind of] result’.

What this tells us is that the Sages challenged the claim made by Kimchit of causation, and perhaps even correlation, between the stricture which she adopted of covering her hair in her home, and the outcome of her seven sons being worthy of the position of Kohen Gadol (which further suggests did not presume that there was המ ישע ת זש כ י ת ךכל that the original question asked by the Sages of a singular religious/ritual action which Kimchit had performed to generate this outcome, but instead, sought to ask her about the methods of education which she had employed in her home).

The problem is that while the first part of this Gemara, namely the claim of Kimchit, is often quoted in schools and Jewish books, the response of the Sages is often omitted. And why is this problematic? Because a prevalent feature in contemporary Orthodoxy is the presumption that the adopting of particular religious/ritual strictures, especially by women, will ‘guarantee’ children who wish to serve God faithfully. Yet, as the Sages response shows, this is not what this Gemara is saying. In fact, it actually challenges the presumption made by Kimchit that her stricture was the cause of this outcome.

Of course, none of what I have explained is meant to undermine the pious actions of individuals who humbly, and of their own volition, adopt strictures for themselves within their own home. At the same time, what is clear is that we should all be very wary of presuming or of claiming that the actions that we perform – however sincerely we perform them – is the cause of particular outcomes in the lives of others, or that there is a direct correlation between specific religious/ritual strictures that we practice, and the religious choices of our children.

Sara Ronis writes:6

Our daf tells us the story of a remarkable woman named Kimchit:

The sages taught: Kimchit had seven sons, and they all served in the office of the high priesthood. The sages said to her: What good deeds did you perform to merit this? She said to them: In all my days, the beams of my house never saw the braids of my hair.

Kimchit was so modest that she covered her hair even within her own house, even while sleeping and bathing!

I can’t tell you how many times my teachers told my class the story of Kimchit when I was a young woman at a Jewish day school. The talmudic tale of a woman whose extreme modesty was rewarded by having all seven of her sons serve as high priests in the Temple was held up as a

6 Myjewishlearning.com

13 model for our own modesty, and a reminder of a mother’s power to shape her children’s lives, not only biologically but through her continued actions.

And yet, when I read today’s daf in preparation for writing this piece, for the first time I noticed the ending:

They (the sages) said to her: Many women did so and did not accomplish (this).

The story concludes with the rabbis dismissing Kimchit’s own explanation for her sons’ successes!

Versions of the story of Kimchit appear in both the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud (Yoma 5a). Dr. Marjorie Lehman has pointed out key differences between the two versions. The Jerusalem Talmud’s version ends by connecting Kimchit to Psalm 45:14, traditionally translated “All glorious is the king’s daughter within the palace ” and frequently used as a biblical model for women’s modest behavior. This version is filled with glowing praise of Kimchit’s actions and their effects on her sons’ professional and spiritual success.

The Babylonian Talmud doesn’t quote this verse at all, and instead ends, as noted above, by challenging Kimchit’s explanation. This ending can be read as a rejection of the idea that women’s extreme modesty is beneficial to their children. But it also undermines Kimchit’s sense of her own agency in setting her children up for success. And indeed, modern commentator Adin Steinsaltz takes this explanation and runs with it, adding that Kimchit’s sons’ success was a special gift from God, without attributing it to any of her actions or attitudes.

We don’t know if this talmudic story contains a history kernel of something that actually happened hundreds of years earlier when the Temple stood. It is certainly clear from reading both versions of the story that the rabbis of Roman Palestine and Sasanian Babylonia shaped this story in different ways to make larger and divergent points. Did Kimchit exist? And was her modesty actually exceptional? We may never know. But we can know that different rabbis in the Land of Israel and Babylonia used this story to think through bigger questions of women’s modesty, agency and parenting. Who gets to tell women’s stories? How much do each of us shape our families? These questions are still with us today.

Our Daf tells the story of Rabbi Yishmael ben Kimchis who served as Kohen Gadol.7

Once, he was speaking with an Arab in the market, when a drop of spittle flew out of the mouth of the Arab and fell upon R’ Yishmael ben Kimchis. Due to a condition of tum’ah, R’ Yishmael could no longer serve that day, and he was replaced by his brother, Yeshvav. Rashi and Meiri both explain that this took place on Yom Kippur itself. Maharsha points out, based upon the Yerushalmi,

7 https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yoma%20047.pdf

14 that it does not seem reasonable that the Kohen Gadol would be walking in the market on the day of Yom Kippur. Rather, this story took place on erev Yom Kippur.

The condition of tum’ah required that R’ Yishmael immerse and only become tahor after nightfall. In the meantime, his brother served as Kohen Gadol, and R’ Yishmael returned and served the remainder of the day. Thus, the two brothers both served during Yom Kippur.

notes that this explanation of Maharsha is problematic. If R’ Yishmael simply had to יח תו ”ץ רהמ go to the mikveh and then wait until nightfall, why did his brother Yeshvav have to serve at all? יח תו .As soon as Yom Kippur commenced, R’ Yishmael would have been immediately available .offers two alternative explanations of the story רהמ”ץ

The Yerushalmi here has a text reads which reads This should not be read that he met the King on erev Yom Kippur, but rather that he met the King of Arabia on Yom Kippur itself. Accordingly, this is why he served on Yom Kippur, but when he became defiled, his brother took over.

Nevertheless, the Yerushalmi in Megillah clearly tells that the story happened on erev Yom Kippur. The reason why he did not immerse and then serve on Yom Kippur that very night must and there was no time ( שח י כ ה םע ) have been because the story took place very late in the afternoon for him to go to the mikveh before nightfall.

It was taught in a Beraisa: Kimchis had seven sons and all of them served in the position of Kohen Gadol. Chachamim asked her, “What did you do to merit this?” She responded, “My whole life the beams of my house never saw the braids of my hair.” I t is a matter of debate whether this practice by Kimchis establishes a binding standard of halachah. The behavior of Kimchis is cited approvingly as an act of modesty by R’ Moshe Isserles (1) .

Furthermore, the Zohar (2) emphasizes the importance of the totality of a woman’s hair remaining covered at all times. According to the Zohar this is not only an additional expression of modesty, but it is also conducive towards raising children who will be committed to Torah and its values, and it serves to protect the family from danger.

This passage from the Zohar is cited by Magen Avrohom (3) who concludes by writing that this is an appropriate way to act. Mishnah Berurah (4) also cites the Zohar and follows with quoting our Gemara regarding Kimchis. R’ Moshe Sofer (5) notes that where he lived the custom was to follow the strict ruling of the Zohar and women did not go out with any hair uncovered.

15 Moreover, R’ Sofer writes that women treat their hair as an ervah even in the privacy of their homes and keep it covered. Rav Moshe Feinstein (6), however, takes issue with this position. He demonstrates that even the strictest opinions only require a woman’s hair to be covered when she is outside her home and in public, but while she is in her home everyone agrees that her hair is not an ervah and may be uncovered.

Rav Moshe (7) concludes that although it is appropriate to follow the strict ruling of Chasam Sofer, nonetheless, a woman who chooses to follow a strict reading of the law is not in violation of any halachah and her behavior should not cause a person to hesitate marrying her if she has fear of Heaven, is careful in her performance of mitzvos and is in possession of good character.

On Our daf we find that Rabbi Yishmael was invalidated from performing the Yom Kippur service because he was defiled by the spittle of a non-Jew during a conversation in the marketplace. But what was the Kohen Gadol doing in the marketplace on what appears to have been erev Yom Kippur, and some say it was the holy day itself?

The Shem Mi Shmuel, zt”l, explains that the Kohen Gadol was the spiritual heir of Aharon HaKohen, who spent his time and energy working to endear the Jewish people to their Father in Heaven. Aharon HaKohen had an unusual method of offering rebuke; he would greet the sinner and act in a completely friendly and unimposing manner. This person would then feel ashamed, and say to himself, “If Aharon HaKohen only knew what a sinner I am, he wouldn’t even deign to look at me!” This shame would spark a genuine repentance.

16

We see that when Rabbi Yishmael singled out the Arab in the marketplace, it caused the gentile to He did this intentionally to highlight before Hashem the. פמ י ו צ י נ ו אר תנ ז ה :literally burst with pride chasm between the gentile and Jewish reactions to this bestowal of attention. It would help to swing judgment in the favor of the Jewish people, because every Jew is in his innermost being is holy and pure, and really does want to improve himself.

The Alter of Slobodka, Rav Noson Tzvi Finkel, zt”l, was once traveling with a group of students by train. As they pulled into one of the local stations along their journey, a rowdy group of gentiles collected around their car, and taunted the Alter and his talmidim with anti-Semitic slurs. Although the students held themselves aloof from the abuse, imbued with the sense of their own human dignity—the gadlus ha’adam—the Alter himself appeared distressed.

As the train pulled away from the jeering crowd of drunken peasants, the Alter gestured out the window. “What a pity!” he cried. “If only they had the heart to listen, I could teach even these peasants the greatness of what it means to be a human being!”

Raising Great Children

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:8

8 https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/yoma-47-raising-great-children

17 There is nothing more challenging and important, for a parent and for a community, than raising children. There is no formula for producing wonderful children, and siblings can be so different that it makes us wonder how they came from the same home. The fact that our founding families had great difficulties with their own children should be both frightening and comforting. If Abraham, the paragon of loving kindness, could only inspire one of his eight children to follow in his path, should we be shocked that so many Jewish children throughout the ages have rejected Judaism? While there are no guarantees that our children will turn out as we desire, the actions of parents are still the most important factor and greatest influence on children. "They said about Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Kimchit, that he could take four kabim[1] with his two hands; and he would say, 'All women received zarid[2], but my mother's zarid went up to the roof'" (Yoma 47a). The Talmud then relates how, on two separate occasions, Rav Yishmael ben Kimchit was conversing, first with an Arab and then an adon, an important person, in the marketplace; and their saliva landed on his clothes, rendering him impure. On both occasions, one of his brothers filled in as the kohen gadol, so that "his mother saw two [sons as] high priests on one day". The Gemara goes on to record that Kimchit had seven sons, and each one of them served at one time or another as the kohen gadol. When the rabbis asked her how she merited such, she responded, "All my days, the beams of my house never saw the braids of my hair[3]. They said to her, 'Many did such, and it did not help’". The fact that seven children can merit positions of leadership cannot be a coincidence; it is the result of great parenting. Fascinatingly, there is no direct mention of Rabbi Yishmael's father— Kimchit's husband. If seven sons turn out to be wonderful children, it is the mother who must get the lion's share of the credit, and it is not by chance that Rabbi Yishmael gave credit to his mother, not his father. The Talmud tells us that Rabbi Yishmael became tameh through conversing in the marketplace. While the kohen gadol is responsible for the functioning of the Temple—"and from the Temple he shall not depart" (Vayikra 21:12)—he is the servant of the people at large. The marketplace is where all come together, and it is only through a functioning marketplace that society can prosper. And even if it meant risking his ability to function in the Temple, Rabbi Yishmael was there to talk to the people—even non-Jews[4][4]. While one might explain that, as a reward for her modesty, Kimchit merited the high priesthood for her children, the link between the two needs clarification. It could be argued that there is, in fact, little connection. She was very pious and was rewarded with great honour. Hence, the concluding words of the Gemara that "many did so, but it did not help", inform us that this was not a formula meant as a general idea. Perhaps, though, this is more than a random reward. The kohen gadol must cut his hair on a weekly basis, "from erev Shabbat to erev Shabbat" (Sanhedrin 22b). As the Sefer HaChinuch (#149) explains, unkempt hair is a sign of mourning reflecting our distance from G-d, and is most inappropriate in the Temple, which is the place where the Divine presence is most manifest. Hair represents the private beauty that, for a married woman, is to be hidden from others. The kohen gadol dressed in his regal clothing signals the glory of Divine service in the most public of ways. The two are opposites side of the same coin.

18 There are times, most times, when mitzvah observance is to be kept private, reflecting the crucial trait of modesty. To do otherwise will often violate the notion of yehura, arrogance in mitzvah performance. On rare occasions, we must publicize mitzvoth--generally as a way to motivate others to do the same. Kimchit was rewarded for her modesty. But the many who did like her were not truly modest; they saw mitzvoth as a means to be rewarded, and hence, "it did not help".

[1] The ketoret, the daily offering of incense, required the kohen to scoop the spices with his hand. The details of this law are the subject matter of the fifth chapter of Yoma. Rabbi Yishmael was able to take much more than the average kohen. [2] The Gemara gives two explanations for zarid; either some form of grain she ate while pregnant, or semen. Rabbi Yishmael claimed his mother had better zarid, giving him his physical prowess. His mother's name, Kimchit, seems related to the word kemach, flour. [3] Tosafot Yesheneem notes that the Gemara means that whenever it was practical to do so, she kept it covered. To interpret the Gemara literally would cause both impractical and abnormal behavior. [4] Some claim the adon was actually a non-Jewish king, and Rabbi Yishmael went to show his respect--on Yom Kippur, no less. In any event, the Gemara twice notes the presence of the kohen gadol in the marketplace.

Head Covering9

Laurie Novick writes:10

How to Cover

Now that we have discussed the “why” and “who” of head-covering, we can address the question of how the head should be covered. We have seen two major rationales for the importance of a woman's head covering in general: as a mark of her dignity, and as an act of modesty. Though these are related concepts, they have different emphases that lead to practical halachic differences.[1]

9 Guided, source-based study of halachot pertaining to women, from a woman's perspective. This series is presented in conjunction with Deracheha: Women and Mitzvot, a halachic education website sponsored by Yeshivat Har Etzion in partnership with the VBM and Beit Midrash Migdal Oz 10 Rav Ezra Bick, Ilana Elzufon, Shayna Goldberg, and Rav Da’vid Sperling, eds. https://www.etzion.org.il/en/halakha/studies- halakha/women-and-mitzvot/head-covering-iv-how

19 If we focus on the obligation of head-covering as rooted in the concept of dignity or proper dress, then a woman's head-covering is a form of dress for the head. Some hair showing outside the head-covering would not necessarily compromise the head being well-attired.

If we focus on the modesty elements of head-covering, then a woman is not so much dressing her head as covering it, and having hair show becomes more of a halachic concern.

Let's explore the range of opinion on these issues, noting when the emphasis is on dignified head-covering and when it is on modest hair-covering.

Dignified Head-Covering and Torah Law

Rav Moshe Feinstein clarifies what kind of coverage is obligatory by Torah law, noting that the Torah-level obligation is learned from the uncovering of the sota's head, not her hair.

Responsa Iggerot Moshe EH I:58 The fundamental prohibition was said in Ketubot 72b, as was taught in the beit midrash of Rabbi Yishmael from the verse "and he uncovered the head of the woman" –"an admonition to the daughters of Israel that they not go out with head uncovered [emphasis added]" and it is not said, "an admonition that they not go out with hair uncovered " This implies that [the prohibition of going uncovered] depends on what is considered uncovering the head overall….It is also clear that one should only derive from the verse a prohibition [of uncovering] what the kohen needed to uncover of the head of the sota…for one could also say that [uncovering] less than that would not be a disgrace [to the sota] at all…Even if we say that we don't need all of it [the head uncovered as part of the sota ordeal, and covered beforehand], in any case at least a large part of the head needed to be uncovered [during the ordeal, and covered beforehand]…This is the majority of the head or, at the very least, close to a majority of the head.

The Torah specifically commands uncovering the sota's head. That means that the sota must have arrived at the ordeal with the majority of her head covered. Therefore, to fulfill the Torah-level requirement of head-covering, a woman's head must be mostly covered.

Exposing a significant portion of the sota’s head is required in order to disgrace her. Conversely, a substantial head-covering over most of the head is necessary to maintain a married woman's dignity, as a matter of Torah law.

Head, Hair, and Dat Yehudit

The Talmud notes that a woman can fulfill the Torah-level obligation of head covering by placing a kalata, a basket or simple cap, on her head. But dat Yehudit, which usually encompasses behavior in line with customs of modesty, demands better coverage:

Ketubot 72a-b On a Torah level, a kalata [basket or simple cap] suffices; for dat Yehudit, even [covering with] a kalata remains prohibited [as inadequately covered]

The Talmud does not explain what makes the kalata insufficient. One approach to this question emphasizes dignity, and the other modesty. Both are possible rationales for dat Yehudit.[2]

I. Insufficiently Dignified Meiri writes that a kalata is a sort of nightcap, not worn in public:

20 Meiri, Beit Ha-bechira, Ketubot 72a Even though in most places its [kalata's] meaning is a small basket in which she places her spindle, here it seems to mean a sort of cap of rough fabric that she dons at night.

On this view, perhaps the kalata is insufficient to satisfy dat Yehudit because it is not dignified enough. A dignified person does not go about in public wearing pajamas, or a nightcap or other informal covering for a headdress. Dat Yehudit, like the Torah-level obligation, is primarily concerned with the head.

II. Insufficiently Modest Rashi explains that a kalata was in fact a woven basket:

Rashi Ketubot 72b s.v. Kalata A basket that has an indentation on its underside to fit on one’s head and a receptacle above in which to put a spindle and flax

A version of Rashi brought in Shita Mekubetzet, a medieval anthology of commentaries, explains that a kalata may provide an inadequate amount of head covering:

Rashi, Old Version, Shita Mekubetzet, Ketubot 72a Even a kalata also is not [sufficient] because of modesty, for it is impossible that her hair not be seen between the strips [of the basket].

According to this comment, a kalata cannot serve as a proper covering because it leaves too much hair showing, which is insufficiently modest.[3]

While the obligation learned from the sota mentions covering the head, this version of Rashi argues that dat Yehudit is also concerned with concealing hair.[4]

Modesty concerns about covering hair, then, may derive from the obligation of dat Yehudit. They also arise in the related discussion of whether hair is considered erva, which can provide additional reason for a woman to cover her hair.

Full Hair-Covering

The Talmudic account of a woman named Kimchit takes the idea of covering hair out of modesty to an extreme. Kimchit states that the beams of her house never saw the braids of her hair, which implies that she kept her hair fully covered at all times, even at home.

Yoma 47a Our rabbis taught: Kimchit had seven sons, and all of them served as Kohen Gadol [each would substitute for his brothers at times when ritual impurity disqualified them from Temple service (Tosefta Yoma 3:20)]. The sages said to her, 'What did you do that you merited thus?' She said to them, 'In all my days, the beams of my house never saw the braids of my hair.' They said to her, 'Many have done so, and did not achieve an effect.’

Kimchit is clearly a meritorious woman who believes her merit stems from the care she takes always to cover her head. The sages, however, question her conclusion.[5] That "many have done so, and did not achieve an effect" raises the possibility that Kimchit is mistaken as to the source of her merit.

Additionally, this passage implies that Kimchit's act was unusual, and not to be expected. She sees her conduct as uniquely meritorious, and the sages say "many others" have done it. Not all women shared this

21 practice, or were obligated to, which suggests a woman could meet standards of modesty without full coverage.

Mystical Approach

The Zohar draws on the Kimchit dialogue to present covering every strand of hair, even within the house, as essential for all married women:

Zohar III Naso 125b-126a A woman for whom hair of her head emerges from its covering causes sorrow to her home and causes her children not to be counted in the city and causes evil forces to dwell in the home. Who causes this? That hair of her head that is seen outside. ..For this reason, it is required of a woman that even the walls of her home not see a single hair of the head, how much more so outside [the home].

According to the Zohar, misfortune befalls a home as a consequence of a woman's hair being at all uncovered within it. The mystical implications of keeping each hair uncovered go beyond ordinary considerations of modesty. The Zohar's position connects to broader kabbalistic ideas according to which hair is associated with judgment, and thus uniquely vulnerable to evil. This passage indicates that keeping all hair covered at all times and in all settings is praiseworthy.

Even among rationalists, the Zohar can have halachic influence. Although he does not say it is fully obligatory, Magen Avraham follows the Zohar to urge women to cover every strand of hair. Mishna Berura quotes him.[6]

Magen Avraham 75:4 But in the Zohar Naso p. 239 he was very stringent that not a single hair of a woman should be seen and thus is it fitting to practice.

This practice is followed in many communities, especially in Chassidic circles.

Double Covering

Closer to our day, Chatam Sofer rules that a woman outside her home should wear two coverings, one atop the other, to ensure that not a single hair be seen, following the Zohar:

Responsa Chatam Sofer I:36 Indeed in our lands, where the other nations go out with heads uncovered and our mothers did not go out [that way] and were very careful and were concerned for the words of the Zohar…The rule that emerges is that any single hair in any place on the head and the forehead of a married woman, even in her room, is erva if she does not have a scarf on her head, and in the marketplace and public courtyard also a hat.

Chatam Sofer's approach is an important source for the practice in some communities of wearing a hat atop a wig. A similar line of thought informs those communities in which women shave their heads, lest a single hair emerge from covering.[7] Chatam Sofer's reference to erva indicates that

22 his foremost concern is modesty, though he notes that custom has played a role in defining what is modest here.

Partial Hair-Covering

As opposed to the Zohar, some early rabbinic authorities do allow for a woman to let some hair emerge from her head-covering, without seeing this as immodest or erva.

In his discussion of erva and recitation of Shema, Rashba (citing a Ra'avad we do not have) mentions hair that emerges from a woman's head covering:

Rashba Berachot 24a Her face and hands and feet… and her hair outside of her hair-binding, which isn't covered—we aren't concerned about them [during the recitation of Shema]

Rashba seems to indicate that there is no problem whatsoever with a woman leaving some hair exposed. Assuming that Rashba has in mind even a married woman outside of her home setting, this would mean that not every hair need be covered.

Rashba may mean to suggest that a woman may deliberately leave some hair uncovered, as she does her face and her hands (Rav Moshe Feinstein).[8] Alternatively, he may mean only that fly- away hairs that escape the covering are acceptable (Chatam Sofer). [9]

Rema rules like Rashba:

Shulchan Aruch OC 75:2 Rema This [permissibility of reciting Shema] applies [when a man can see] women’s hair that typically emerges from their hair-binding

According to Rema, a man may recite Shema in the presence of a woman's hair that emerges from her head covering. He makes no negative statement about the hair being shown, implying that a woman may freely leave such hair uncovered without concern for immodesty or erva.

Maharam Alashkar makes this point explicitly. He describes the hair between ear and forehead, such as that around the temples, as being regularly exposed and not a form of erva:

Responsa Maharam Alashkar 35 This statement that "the hair of a woman is erva" only deals with hair that a woman's practice is to cover…In the [Talmud] chapter Chezkat Ha-batim, we say, "a woman does all her adornments and leaves out a little bit." What is it [that she leaves out]? Rav says 'bat tzida'" …This is the very custom of women today, that the woman binds all her hair and leaves out hair at the temples going down beside her face and this is called in the language of our sages 'bat tzida,' as was explained…Our sages were lenient in many matters, so that a woman would not become unappealing to her husband.

23 For Maharam Alashkar, it is not necessary or even desirable to cover every strand of hair. Leaving some hair exposed at the temples or perhaps even a fringe (i.e., bangs), is a longstanding custom in conformity with standards of modesty.

Maharam Alashkar argues that modest practice should not come at the expense of a woman's attractiveness to her husband, which is part of the bond between husband and wife. A woman today might add that letting some hair show at the temples or in front, so that she doesn’t look bald, helps her maintain her own sense of attractiveness as well.

Basing himself on Maharam Alashkar's ruling and on common custom, Rav Ovadia Yosef justifies the practice of revealing up to two etzba'ot, finger-widths (4-4.8cm total), of hair:

Letter, Rav Ovadya Yosef, Otzar Dinim 37:15, note 15 That which some say, that even one hair from the hair of her head that is visible entails a Torah level prohibition, is incorrect, for the custom of Sefardi women is to show a fingerbreadth or two from the hair of the head in the front, and Maharam Alashkar, who was a world-class scholar in the time of Beit Yosef, ruled to permit it.

According to his approach, a small amount of hair showing at the front of the head does not change the overall modest effect of a woman's head-covering.

Rav Moshe's Ruling

As we have learned, Rav Moshe Feinstein rules that the Torah-level obligation is to cover at least most of the head. That leaves the amount of hair that can be left uncovered undefined.

In order to define how much hair can be left uncovered, Rav Moshe turns to the Talmud's discussion of hair as erva! This is surprising, because Rav Moshe usually takes care to distinguish between the matter of erva and the obligation to cover one's head, and does not consider women's hair nowadays to be erva.[10]

How does the argument work? According to Rav Moshe, a married woman's head is considered typically-covered because of her obligation to cover most of it. Married women's hair can be considered erva both because of its attractiveness and because it is typically-covered along with the head. Now, the Talmud teaches that a certain amount of hair can be exposed without being considered erva. Rav Moshe infers that a woman is allowed to leave that same amount of hair uncovered, without violating the obligation of head-covering.

Responsa Iggerot Moshe EH I:58 Since the entire head is [defined as] a typically-covered area [which can give it erva status], one should prohibit [a man's seeing it during Shema etc.] due to erva like [other] typically-covered body parts…Therefore, since in the law of typically-covered areas there is a distinction between a tefach and less…this distinction also applies to hair…Therefore one should not prohibit if she wants to reveal [hair]…but only two [etzba'ot] fingerbreadths in height, since the face is about two tefachim wide so that altogether it will be less than a [square] tefach. More than that is prohibited.

24

Since a man may recite Shema in the presence of up to a tefach, a handbreadth (8-9.6 cm), of exposed erva, Rav Moshe argues that up to a tefach of exposed hair is a reasonable maximal measure for a woman to leave uncovered.

This innovative ruling provides a halachic basis for women to leave up to a square tefach of hair uncovered, an area roughly 64-92 cm2.[11] Rav Moshe assumes most women who leave hair uncovered will do so across the front or back of the head, and that this will mean an area of uncovered hair 4-4.8 cm in depth (in this case, like Rav Ovadya's measure). He does not, however, limit his ruling to a specific configuration, which leaves room for a woman to leave some hair exposed in the middle of her head.

Rav Moshe's ruling has been widely accepted in some circles. Others emphasize that Rav Moshe presents covering more hair as praiseworthy, and question how freely he intended women to rely upon his ruling. A look at his words indicates that full covering is commendable, but relying on his lenient ruling fully acceptable.

Responsa Iggerot Moshe EH I:58 Therefore according to halacha, even though it is proper for women to be stringent and cover [fully]…It is clear that those who wish to be lenient… should not be considered in violation of dat Yehudit God forbid, and even a talmid chacham and fearer of Heaven should not refrain from marrying such a woman if she fears Heaven and is careful about mitzvot and is of good character.

Head-Covering

Rav Nahum Rabinovitch follows the approach that a married woman’s chief obligation is to cover her head, and that erva is not the source of obligation. He therefore maintains that there is no reason to apply the tefach measure to a woman's head-covering, since the tefach applies specifically to the law of erva.

Responsa Si’ach Nachum 105 But also when a covering is required, if a small amount of the hair emerges outside the covering, that’s also fine, …and in Beit Yosef there he cites the Rashba in the name of Ra'avad: " Her face and hands and feet… and her hair outside of her hair-binding, which isn't covered—we aren't concerned about them” ….In summary, according to basic halacha one must cover most of the hair of the head, but it is permissible to leave out a bit of hair, and not specifically a certain amount of hair, but as is customary in the community of those who keep Torah and mitzvot to which she belongs.

Although Rav Rabinovitch does not provide a specific measurement, he does refer to the hair left out "ketzat" ("a small amount" or "a bit"), which would suggest that more than a tefach out would be acceptable as long as it is not the majority of the hair on a woman's head.

Rav Aharon Lichtenstein reportedly took a similar overall approach. He rejected the tefach measurement and instead formulated the requirement as conveying the overall impression, from every angle, that one’s hair is covered.[12]

25

It is possible that Rav Rabinovitch's statement that “one must cover most of the hair of the head” has led to the increasingly common practice of women covering just the top of the head while leaving a good amount of hair flowing beyond the covering, something that Rav Lichtenstein did not support.

As Rav Yehuda H. Henkin has pointed out,[13] the mishna’s description of a bride going to her wedding with her head uncovered presents a difficulty for women leaving this much hair out. Rashi's commentary there describes hair loose to the shoulders, regardless of what's on top, as what is uncovered specifically by a virgin bride:

Rashi Ketubot 15b And her head uncovered—old French esjevalede—her hair on her shoulders

If an uncovered head is defined by having loose hair to the shoulders, then a covered head could not include hair loose to the shoulders. There are limits to how much hair could be left out of a head-covering without eroding its status as dignified or modest head-covering.

● What about covering just with a headband, or a strip of scarf framing the front and back of the head?

Especially in Israel, the practice of wearing only a very narrow headband or thin strip of scarf encircling the head has become popular. A woman with this type of covering is relying on the minority opinion that covering is not obligatory beyond common custom, and is interpreting custom very leniently. This type of justification for this practice is sometimes attributed to Rav Rabinovitch, who has made oral remarks that this might become permissible if it were to become common practice.

However, as we have seen, the prevalent view among halachic authorities is that there is a Torah-level obligation in head-covering, as well as a dat Yehudit obligation. A lenient view of fulfilling just the Torah-level obligation is that at least the majority of the head should be covered. Anything less risks violating Torah law.

How, then, has the practice to cover less taken off? A woman may be unaware of the halachic significance of covering the majority of the head. She may have the misconception that there is nothing more to the obligation of head-covering than signifying that she is married, or may view head-covering through more of a social than religious lens, as a way to identify with the halachically observant community.

Indeed, although wearing only a headband does not satisfy the obligation of head-covering as widely understood, it is preferable to leaving the head fully uncovered, because it does accomplish those social goals. For many women, especially those new to observance, this type of gesture toward head-covering is itself a significant effort.

Wigs

26 Many women observe the mitzva of head-covering by wearing wigs. From the perspective of modesty, a wig's effect is mixed. On the one hand, the wig provides full hair coverage, and in that way may be preferable to other options. On the other hand, a wig can look so natural and attractive that it is unclear how it satisfies the dictates of modesty.

Precedent for wearing wigs can be found in the Mishna's discussion of carrying on Shabbat. Articles seen as adornments unlikely to be removed and carried may be worn on Shabbat, even in the absence of an eiruv. The Mishna teaches:

Mishna Shabbat 6:5 A woman [is permitted to] go out [on Shabbat]... with foreign hair to the courtyard

Rashi explains that this "pe'a nochrit", foreign hair, is a type of hair extension.[14] The Talmudic discussion of this Mishna applies it to married women attempting to be attractive for their husbands.[15] If the Mishna explicitly permits a married woman to go out on Shabbat wearing hair extensions, then it stands to reason that wearing a wig is a permissible form of head-covering, since it looks even less like a woman's own hair.[16] Shiltei Gibborim makes this inference:

Shiltei Gibborim to the Rif, Shabbat 29a in Rif pagination It seems one can bring proof and support from this for women who go out with their own hair covered when they are married, but instead of the braid of their hair they wear the hair of other women…It clearly implies that the daughters of Israel are permitted to adorn themselves with these. For the statement 'a woman’s hair is erva' refers only to the hair that is really attached to her scalp, when her scalp is visible with the hair. But with hair that covers her hair, there is no problem of 'a woman’s hair is erva' here and also no [concern] of an uncovered head…even though it is an adornment for her in order to look like [she has a lot of] hair, there is no [halachic objection] to it…

According to Shiltei Gibborim, this Mishna, coupled with common custom of his day, provides justification for wigs as a form of head covering. He adds that hair growing from the scalp appears significantly different from hair that is not naturally attached. This last argument may have been more applicable to wigs of his day than to some of the more upscale wigs of today, which are attached to a false scalp and thus do appear to grow from the scalp.

It is also possible to explain pe'a nochrit differently, as hair used to fill out head coverings from the inside, much like today's ”boubou” or “shaper,” worn by some women under a headscarf.[17] In that case, the mentions of pe'a nochrit in rabbinic literature would not support wearing a wig without a hat on top.

Rema rules like Shiltei Gibborim, permitting men to recite Shema in view of a wig:

Shulchan Aruch OC 75:2 Rema This [permissibility of reciting Shema] applies [when a man can see] women’s hair that typically emerges from their hair-binding, and how much more so foreign hair [a wig]

27 Common Ashkenazi practice is to permit wigs as a form of head-covering. This raises questions about dignity. In Talmudic times, it seems that dignified dress in public required a significant, visible head-covering. From that standpoint, it would seem that a wig should not qualify as a head- covering. Nowadays, in some religious communities, wigs are considered more dignified than other head- coverings, in the sense that women would not wear anything other than a wig to a formal event. What constitutes a standard for modesty in wigs also varies from community to community.

What about mar'it ayin, conveying a false impression that one is violating Halacha? Can’t a good wig be mistaken for a woman’s real hair? Some authorities mandate that a wig be worn only in places in which wig covering is common (or if it is obviously a wig).[18] Others, including Rav Moshe Feinstein, are less troubled by this concern, since there is general awareness that halachically observant women sometimes cover their hair with wigs.[19]

By placing a hat atop a wig, a woman both ensures all her hair is covered for modesty purposes, and has a hat to add dignity.

It is important to note that the rulings of Sefardi halachic authorities on wigs as head-coverings are mixed. Some Sefardi authorities, such as Kaf Ha-chayyim, freely permit them:

Kaf Ha-chayyim OC 75:19 Thus is the consensus of the later halachic authorities to permit [wigs] like the words of the Rem"a.

Others, such as Rav Ovadia Yosef, do not generally permit wigs as head covering:

Responsa Yabi'a Omer EH 5:5 For in past generations, the wigs were very visibly recognizable, and there was no concern of mar'it ayin [appearing to violate a prohibition], since they resemble natural hair. But the new wigs today, not only do they resemble natural hair, but they even exceed it in beauty and form and appearance, until even immodest women use them for adornment and beautification. And since there is no recognizable difference between these wigs and natural hair, certainly there is a concern of mar'it ayin …And the basic halacha is like the words of most if not all the later halachic authorities cited above to prohibit this, and it is a great mitzva to publicize the prohibition in public, especially for Sefardi women who have always been accustomed to prohibit…

Rav Yosef opposes wigs because they raise questions about modesty, and because they could give the false impression that a woman's head is uncovered. Additionally, he does not think wearing wigs is supported by Sefardi custom. Even Rav Yosef, however, permits wigs in special cases, such as following divorce.

● Why is it accepted for a woman to wear a wig that is nicer than her hair?

Modesty should be a consideration in choosing a head covering. That being said, different women and communities have different conceptions of modesty. When it comes to satisfying the technical obligation to cover the head, wigs are often very effective. In some communities, wigs have become the gold standard of head-covering for precisely this reason. How well wigs reflect a

28 woman's sense of modesty is a more subjective question. Rav Ovadya Yosef prohibits wigs due to concern in this area, while others do not find the average wig to be lacking in modesty.

Often when choosing a head-covering, and not only with wigs, a woman may experience tension between feeling positive about how she looks and the quality of coverage she thinks Halacha demands. The mitzva of head- covering, with its effects on self-image and self-expression, can be challenging. It is important to find ways to make it accessible to as many women as possible, and to respect the more lenient voices in different directions that enable a woman to keep Halacha while also feeling satisfied with how she presents herself. For many women, wigs present a halachically- acceptable opportunity to maintain modesty and dignity in a way that feels positive.

In general, the option to use a wig for head-covering is important in situations where an obvious head-covering could be problematic, as in certain professional settings. Today, with the rise of multiculturalism, many people proudly wear distinctive religious garb. In a society where our Muslim sisters do not hesitate to wear a hijab, perhaps Jewish women should feel more comfortable wearing an obvious hair-covering. On the other hand, there has also been a backlash against multiculturalism, even extending to physical attacks against clearly identifiable Jews and other minorities. In societies where this is a concern, using a wig might be advisable.

In many communities in which wigs are traditional, they are viewed as, at best, equal to other full coverings. In contrast, Chabad insists women wear only wigs, as preferable to other coverings.[20] As Rav Schneerson wrote:[21]

Rav Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Likutei Sichot 13, p 189 A woman who wears a scarf on her head will tend to take it off in certain cases because of discomfort. As opposed to a woman who dons a wig, even if President Eisenhower himself walks in, she will not remove it.

Since a woman is unlikely to remove her wig or feel otherwise self-conscious when wearing it, the Rebbe considered wigs preferable to other forms of head-covering.

In recent decades, it has become increasingly prevalent for rabbis of some communities to endorse wigs as preferred head-covering, because they provide fuller coverage than many scarves.

In general, styles of head-covering tend to vary from community to community, influenced both by Halacha and social and cultural trends.

In our next and last installment of this series, we discuss in what settings the obligation of head- covering applies.

● How should a woman cover her head— and hair?

While some authorities consider it obligatory for a woman to cover all of her hair, and others consider it praiseworthy, there are still others who permit leaving some hair uncovered, even deliberately. Their opinions range from a few fly-away hairs, to hair at the temples or a fringe, to two etzba'ot, to a tefach. Other opinions permit uncovering even more.

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Deciding how to cover one's hair and how much to cover involves halachic, personal, and communal elements. A woman should seek to make a decision that both has halachic support and allows her to perform the mitzva in a way that is comfortable for her (or at least does not cause her resentment). The challenge is to find a way to fulfill the obligation in head-covering that is consistent with one's overall approach to halachic decision-making, and at the same time feels right on the head.

Even after learning through the range of opinions in the sources and taking personal feelings into account, it is critical also to consider communal factors. Because each individual woman’s head- covering is part of her public presentation, it often becomes a statement of personal and religious commitments and communal affiliation. For better or worse, all head-covering choices come with associations in the observant community, and those affect personal decisions and halachic discussion.

Many women take pride in head-covering as an opportunity to make a statement about religious commitments and to demonstrate belonging to a given community. For precisely the same reason, though, many other women can find this mitzva especially difficult, especially when personal preference does not align with community norms.

Psychologist Khaya Eisenberg explains how challenging it can be for her to choose between a snood, which she prefers, and a wig, which is her community's norm:

Khaya Eisenberg, "Halachah, Society, and the Snood,” in Hide & Seek, ed. Lynne Schreiber (Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2006), pp. 102-3 A snood may be less socially acceptable, but it is no less modest…. I am fulfilling the law….I find a sheitel bothersome to put on and wear, but it's always a safe bet for fitting in in any situation…Perhaps pretenses and social conformity are valuable motivating forces for adhering to Halachah.

In making these decisions, it can be helpful to talk out concerns with a mentor. The decision- making process is itself of great importance. Over a lifetime, a woman may find that she revisits her decision, more than once.

A woman's head-covering should make a statement that she feels honors Halacha, her community, and herself.

Further Reading

• Ellinson, Rabbi Elyakim Getsel. Woman and the Mitzvot: Guide to the Rabbinic Sources Vol. 2, The Modest Way, trans. Raphael Blumberg. Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization Department for Torah Education and Culture in the Diaspora, 1992. • Henkin, Rav Yehuda. Understanding Tzniut. Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2008. • Haber, Rav Shemuel. Et Tzenu’im Chochma, Vol. 1. Karnei Shomron, 2007.

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[1] We plan to discuss the concept of modesty in a future piece on Deracheha. [2]This analysis is adapted from Rav Yehuda H. Henkin's in Understanding Tzniut: Modern Controversies in the Jewish Community (Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2008), 34-35. [3]:.See also Rabbeinu Yehonatan on the Rif Ketubot 32b Dat Yehudit, even a kalata is not [sufficient], because of tzeni'ut. [4] In his ruling on dat Yehudit, Rambam does not clarify whether his chief concern is style or quantity, dignity or modesty. (See Yabi'a Omer IV EH 3, who entertains both possibilities.) Rambam writes that a scarf would not suffice for dat Yehudit, and that a woman should wear a redid, a broader cloak or wrap. It is possible that Rambam prefers the redid because it is a more dignified garment. Given that he lists it as dat Yehudit, which he identifies with modest practice, it is also possible that the redid is there to address modesty concerns and provide more coverage of the hair. Rambam may even be advocating a double covering, a redid on top of a scarf, which could theoretically serve either purpose. Mishneh Torah Ishut 24:12 These are the things that if she does one of them she transgresses dat Yehudit: She goes out to the marketplace or to an open alleyway with her head uncovered and not wearing a redid [cloak] like all the women, even though her hair is covered with a scarf. Rambam's position seems to apply only where "all the women" go out with a redid (as in the Middle East of his era), in which case it would be essential to a woman's dignified and modest appearance. That limits the applicability of the redid to our day. [5] In contrast, the Yerushalmi praises Kimchit unambiguously. Yerushalmi Yoma 1:1 The sages sent and said to her: What good deeds are in your hand? She said to them: May it come upon me if the beams of my house saw the hair of my head or the hem of my robe in all my days. They said …the flour [kimcha] of Kimchit is the finest flour, and applied the verse to her: All the glory of a king’s daughter is within (Tehillim 45:14)…. [6] Mishna Berura 75:14 [7] See, for example, Rav Yitzchak Tzvi Leibowitz, in Shulchan Ha-ezer: Shulchan Ha-ezer II:9:10:1 See Zohar Naso, that a woman needs to cut her hair when she comes to have relations…The custom of Ashkenaz is that they shave their hair altogether. The reason for this custom is several concerns of modest women: One, lest a hair remain floating above the water at the time of her immersion…They were further concerned for it is impossible to be careful that a few hairs don’t emerge from the covering, which is erva, and it is prohibited to recite sacred matters or blessings in front of it…They were further concerned by what is written in Zohar Naso [about the dangers of letting a single hair show] Available here: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=8556&st=&pgnum=166 [8] Iggerot Moshe EH I:58 Behold one should explain that they [the hairs] emerge from the binding up to a tefach and even more. [9] Chatam Sofer I OC 36 In any case those few [hairs] that it is impossible to gather, Rashba wrote [regarding them] that hairs that emerge from the bindings are not erva. [10] See Responsa Iggerot Moshe OC I:42, quoted here. [11] Rav Yehuda Henkin has argued that one could define a tefach leniently for these purposes, as an area where both length and width are at least a tefach. On this logic, a woman could expose a strip of hair across her head up to 8-9.6 cm deep. Understanding Tzniut, 16. [12] In oral communication with his daughter, Rabbanit Esti Rosenberg. Our understanding is that, while Rav Lichtenstein viewed the obligation as primarily one of head-covering, he was also concerned with hair based on his understanding of dat Yehudit. [13] Rav Henkin makes this point in Understanding Tzniut, 42. [14] Rashi Shabbat 64a Pe'a nochrit: a braid of detached hair that she joins to her hair with her braid so that she will appear to have [a lot of] hair. Rashi Arachin 7b With a pe'a nochrit: This does not refer to her real hair, rather a lock of another woman's hair fastened to her hair. For women with little hair were accustomed to fasten other women's hair to their hair and this is a pe'a nochrit. [15] Shabbat 64a Ulla said: In order that she not become unattractive to her husband. [16] The courtyard is likely specified as part of the discussion of where something can be worn that may come to be carried. A counter-argument to this reading would be that a wig is only permissible in a woman's chatzer, and not in public. See, for example, Ya'avetz: She'eilat Ya'avetz I:9 She is prohibited in it [a wig] in the public domain. The Mishna does not have to teach us that she not go out in one on Shabbat [to the public domain], but in the end of the Mishna [it does need to make a new point] that in the courtyard it [the wig] is permissible. [17] Responsa Be’er Sheva 18 I found written in the manuscripts of the great Rabbi, Rav Yehuda Katzenellenbogen z”l, who wrote about this, that this is not the way and not the city that our ancestors, the sages of the Mishna and Gemara and the commentators and halachic decisors, bequeathed to us. For this is even more obvious than eating eggs with dairy, for the leniency to adorn oneself and go out with a pe’a

31 nochrit in the gemara applies specifically to a pe’a nochrit that is covered under her cap, with a shawl over her head, like the hair that is really attached to her scalp. For only women who had little hair were accustomed to wear a pe’a nochrit, in order that their husbands would not sense how little hair they had, for it is demeaning to women – they would fasten a pe’a nochrit to their hair in order to appear to have a lot of hair. [18] Mishna Berura 75 In the book Magen Gibborim he was stringent in this matter, see there. He wrote further there that if the custom of the place is not that women should wear wigs, the law is certainly in accordance with those who are stringent in this matter because of marit ayin. [19]Iggerot Moshe EH II:12 …The rationale is simple – since we do not find in the Talmud that they prohibited it, one should not infer from other cases where they did prohibit due to mar'it ayin, for one should not derive one [case] from another. Further, because it is usually recognizable that the hair is a wig, and even if it is not recognizable to men who don’t look so much at women until they would recognize it, in any case it is certainly recognizable to women in the vast majority of cases, and perhaps even all of them are recognizable. Therefore because of that which might happen rarely that it wouldn’t be recognizable, they did not prohibit…Since she is presumed to be a Torah-observant woman, and we know that from up close one can certainly recognize that it is not her hair … [20]Iggerot Kodesh Translated, p. 146 http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=15897&st=%D7%A4%D7%90%D7%94&pgnum=167 [21] http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=15826&st=&pgnum=195 http://www.chabad.org/theJewishWoman/article _cdo/aid/840202/jewish/The-Lubavitcher-Rebbe-on-Hair-Covering.htm

Where to Cover11

If head-covering primarily signifies dignity and modesty, then it stands to reason that the amount of privacy of any given setting should affect the requirement. Standards of appropriate dress vary in different types of spaces. Most people feel less constrained in the privacy of their homes than in public.

Indeed, the Talmudic and Mishnaic passages that discuss a woman's obligation to cover her head suggest that head-covering is not required in all settings.

Mishnah Ketubot 7:6 She goes out with her head uncovered.

Ketubot 72a "And he uncovers the head of the woman" and [he] taught from the beit midrash of Rabbi Yishmael: [It is] an admonishment [azhara] to the daughters of Israel that they not go out with head uncovered!

The daughters of Israel must not "go out" with uncovered heads. A woman violates dat Yehudit specifically when she "goes out" with her head uncovered. These sources imply that a woman does not need to cover her head at all within her private domain.

According to the continuation of this Talmudic passage, the more private the location, the less obligation to cover the head. The head-covering requirement of the marketplace does not apply to the chatzer, the courtyard.

Ketubot 72b

11 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/halakha/studies-halakha/women-and-mitzvot/head-covering-v-where

32 Rabbi Yochanan said: [If she is wearing] a kalata [a basket or simple cap], there is no issue of an uncovered head. Rabbi Zeira discussed this: Where? If one says in the marketplace, it is dat Yehudit [for her to wear more than a kalata]. Rather, in the courtyard [a kalata is sufficient]. If [you argue] thus, you have not left a daughter to Avraham Avinu settled with her husband! [Because they do not do this.] Abbaye said, or possibly Rav Kahana: From courtyard to courtyard by means of an alleyway [a kalata is sufficient coverage].

In public settings, the full dat Yehudit norms of coverage apply. But in an intermediate space, like an alleyway or an apartment building's laundry room, a kalata is good enough, even though it provides lesser coverage. An analogue might be wearing slippers or a house robe to the laundry room, clothes one would not ordinarily wear when going out in public. (See more here.)

In our next two sections, we explore the Halacha of head-covering in the chatzer – courtyard. In the days of the Talmud, a courtyard could be shared by a few families, so it was not totally private. A modern-day equivalent might be the area outside one's door in an apartment building or the common yard shared by a group of garden apartments.

Is the courtyard treated like a private space or more of an intermediate space? What are the halachic consequences? Let’s explore a few different approaches.

Not Required in the Courtyard

One approach – that a woman need not cover her head in her courtyard – follows from a straightforward reading of the Talmudic passage cited above. The gemara argues that, if one defines the violation of dat Yehudit as going completely bare-headed in the courtyard, then almost every Jewish woman is in violation of Halacha and her marriage at risk, because Jewish women generally did not cover their heads in the courtyard. Hence it must be that a woman has no obligation to cover her heads at all in her courtyard.

Both Rashi[1] and Tosafot understand the passage this way. Public standards of dignity and modesty do not extend that far into the private domain.

Tosafot Ketubot 72b But rather in the courtyard: Meaning, even without a kalata [minimal head covering], there is no issue of an uncovered head. For if that is not the case, you have not left a daughter of Avraham Avinu [settled with her husband].

● Does common practice matter to halachic discussion?

In Talmudic times, it seems that Jewish women were widely compliant with Halacha, including the obligation to cover the head. Our sages understood, based in part on the common practice in their day for women to go bare-headed at home and in private courtyards, that this was permissible. Head-covering was clearly not required in private.

In this case, as often, Halacha is transmitted through an interplay of text and lived tradition. Naturally, we learn the details of the halachot of head-covering not just from texts, but also by

33 seeing what pious women do. The term dat Yehudit itself reflects the halachic significance of the practice of modest women. As long as a woman covers her head in more public settings, there is room for differing interpretations of what is required in the privacy of one's home or courtyard, where standards for dignified and modest dress are not the same as in public.

Shulchan Aruch seems to hold this view as well:

Shulchan Aruch EH 21:2 The daughters of Israel should not go [with] heads uncovered in the marketplace…

Shulchan Aruch specifies that this halacha applies "in the marketplace." Later, when discussing the requirements of dat Yehudit, Jewish women's modest practice, Shulchan Aruch, following Tur, again specifically refers to public settings:

Shulchan Aruch EH 115:4 These are the things that if she did one of them she has transgressed dat Yehudit: She goes out to the marketplace or to an open alleyway or to a courtyard through which the public crosses, and her head is uncovered…

Since Shulchan Aruch mentions only public settings, we can infer that he permits a woman to go completely bare-headed in more private settings such as her courtyard.

Terumat Ha-deshen explicitly rules this way:

Terumat Ha-deshen 10 Where a lot of people are not normally found, as in the courtyard, there is no objection [regarding head-covering].

On these views, head-covering is obligatory only in a public or semi-public space, and the courtyard is treated like a private space.

Obligatory in the Courtyard

The Talmud Yerushalmi obligates women in a partial head-covering (kapaltin) even in the courtyard:

Yerushalmi Ketubot 7 "And her head is uncovered" – They said it regarding the courtyard, how much more so regarding the alleyway. Rabbi Chiyya in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One who goes out in her kapaltin [minimal head covering] has no issue of an uncovered head. That is what you say for a courtyard, but for an alleyway, there is an issue of "she goes out and her head is uncovered."

34 According to the Yerushalmi, a woman is obligated in the minimum head-covering in the courtyard, presumably because it is not completely private. This differs from an open alleyway (mavoy), where more is required because it is more public.

Sefer Ha-Aruch, an eleventh-century reference work, presents a similar view in its discussion of kalata.

Sefer Ha-Aruch, s.v. Kalat In a courtyard, with a kalata there is no [concern] of [violating the prohibition] of uncovering the head.

Bach, basing himself on the Yerushalmi and Ha-Aruch,

Bach, basing himself on the Yerushalmi and Ha-Aruch, maintains that some head-covering is fully required both in the public domain and more private courtyard, regardless of who is present.

Bach EH 115 When she remains in her courtyard, it is proper that she is covered with a scarf. But [for her] head to be totally uncovered is prohibited even if she remains in her courtyard. This is the opinion of Rambam and Rabbeinu [Tur]...And thus is practiced in every domain of Israel, that even in front of members of her household she does not remain with her head uncovered without a scarf and cap on her head – and this is not according to the interpretation of Rashi, Tosafot, and Ran…

Reading the Talmud Bavli in light of the Yerushalmi,[2] Bach writes that a woman is prohibited from having her head fully uncovered in her courtyard even if only her own family is there!

Beit Shemuel rules accordingly.

Beit Shemuel EH 115:4 In a courtyard that the public do not cross, Rashi and Tosafot explain that there is no prohibition even if [the head is] fully uncovered…It is possible that we rule according to our passage [in the Talmud Bavli] specifically regarding the matter of the ketuba, but regarding prohibition, one could say that even our [the Talmud Bavli’s] passage considers it prohibited. The question “you have not left a daughter of Avraham …” is as explained by Bach.

Beit Shemuel writes that a woman does not forfeit her ketuba if she uncovers her head fully in a courtyard, but it is still prohibited.

From Courtyard to Home

Given that there is debate about whether head-covering is obligatory in the courtyard, one might think it clear that a woman need not cover her head in the privacy of her home.

This issue is complicated, however, by the Talmudic story of Kimchit, who covers every strand of her hair, even at home, introducing a new standard of modesty for hair that does not depend on the presence of other people:

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Yoma 47a Our rabbis taught: Kimchit had seven sons, and all of them served as Kohen Gadol [each would substitute for his brothers at times when ritual impurity disqualified them from Temple service (Tosefta Yoma 3:20)]. The sages said to her, 'What did you do that you merited thus?' She said to them, 'In all my days, the beams of my house never saw the braids of my hair.' They said to her, 'Many have done so, and did not achieve an effect.’

As we've noted previously, Kimchit believes her merit stems from the care she takes to always cover her head, while the sages' response is more ambiguous. The passage implies that her behavior was not normative for all Jewish women.

Required The Zohar goes so far as to write that full head-covering at home is demanded of the married woman:

Zohar III Naso 125b-126a …For this reason, it is required of a woman that even the walls of her home not see a single hair of the head, how much more so outside [the home].

According to the Zohar, the requirement to cover is absolute and unchanging from place to place. This goes beyond the normal bounds of modesty and enters the realm of mysticism.

Chatam Sofer argues that women have adopted the halachic approach of the Zohar, so head- covering is in fact required, even in a private chamber like a bedroom:

Responsa Chatam Sofer I:36 Our forefathers already accepted upon themselves to prohibit [her head being uncovered] in her courtyard in every locale that we have heard of Jews reaching. …Since they [women] have adopted the custom of the Zohar on this…and it has become a widespread halacha in Israel …even in her room it is [considered] erva if she does not have a scarf on her head, and in the marketplace and public courtyard also a hat…

Note that, while he mandates head-covering in the privacy of one's home or room, Chatam Sofer concedes that this is not the simple meaning of the main halachic texts, but rather developed as a binding custom. Thus, he allows for less thorough coverage in private. A hat on top of a scarf is necessary in public, but a headscarf alone suffices at home, since the concern there is only modesty, and not dignity. In other words, even on the most stringent view, there are grounds for being less particular about head-covering in the home than in public.

Meritorious Rema, in his commentary to Tur, admits that a woman with head uncovered in a private courtyard is not in violation of dat Moshe or dat Yehudit, but asserts that for her to cover her head even at home is still proper, modest behavior:[3]

Darchei Moshe EH 115

36 For the prohibition to go with head uncovered only applies specifically in the marketplace…nevertheless, there are [concerns of] modesty, that no woman should show her hair at all, even at home, as we find in the story of Kimchit.

Rav Moshe Feinstein similarly maintains that there is no requirement for a woman's head to be covered in a private setting like her bedroom, but doing so is meritorious.[4]

Iggerot Moshe EH I:58 Also regarding Chatam Sofer being stringent to prohibit on account of dat Yehudit even in her room without a scarf…Chatam Sofer's position in this is astonishing. Therefore, in practice, even though it is fitting for women to be stringent to cover as Chatam Sofer thought, since it came from the mouth of a great genius like him….But it is clear that those who wish to be lenient… should not be considered as violating dat Yehudit, Heaven forbid.

Rav Moshe considers Chatam Sofer's position "astonishing" and not obligatory. A woman need not wear a head-covering in private.

How might the public-private distinction in this halacha affect women?

Many women follow the cautions of the Zohar and aspire to emulate the model of Kimchit, making no distinction between the quantity of coverage in public and in private. Even these women may still wear a less formal head-covering at home.

Many other women appreciate the opportunity to remove head-covering at home, while connecting deeply to the mitzva and taking pride in observing it in public. In this context, we can revisit the words of Rabbanit Oriya Mevorach:

Rabbanit Oriya Mevorach, "Why Do I Love my Head-Covering?" Covering the head every day anew creates a healthy distinction for me between home and outside, between private and public, between mine and everyone’s.

For some women, though, head-covering is difficult or uncomfortable, and not worrying about it at home can be an important way to ease observance of this halacha.

In either case, removing the head-covering immediately upon reaching home might highlight and reinforce complex or even difficult feelings surrounding this mitzva. In response to this concern, it might help for a woman who uncovers at home to take her time after arriving home before removing her head-covering.

Each individual woman needs to find her own path with head-covering in more private settings. Because this mitzva is so personal and demanding, it is important that a woman observe it in a way that feels as good as possible to her while also respecting her commitment to Halacha.

What is Private?

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The Talmud Yerushalmi introduces another parameter in determining where head-covering is obligatory:

Yerushalmi Ketubot 7 There is a courtyard that is like an alleyway, and there is an alleyway that is like a courtyard. A courtyard that the public crosses is like an alleyway, and an alleyway that the public does not cross is like a courtyard.

Here, the Yerushalmi notes that the obligation in a courtyard or alleyway depends on how private the setting is, and that is a function of how many people pass through them. A courtyard might be private or shared; it may be used only by the nearby households or serve as a shortcut for strangers. The public or private nature of a domain is as much a function of who tends to be there as of geography and architecture. So, for example, the stairwell of one apartment building might be like a courtyard, but of that another might be more like an alleyway.

Do those who maintain that women may go bareheaded in the courtyard or home apply that ruling even in the presence of people from outside the household?

Maharit indicates that they do:

Maharit I:76 The Tosafot wrote that in a courtyard, even without a kalata, there is no issue of uncovering the head and similarly there is also no issue of dat Yehudit …For a courtyard that the public crosses [treated like an alleyway, with a requirement of minimal head-covering] is one where many of the people of the town who do not live in the courtyard need to cross, as when there are stores there for which they come in and out. But wherever the only people who cross it are the denizens of the courtyard, even if they are many, and other people only come in as necessary when they have dealings with the residents of the courtyard, it is not called a courtyard that the public crosses…

Maharit explains that the obligation of head-covering does not apply in a woman's courtyard, even if her neighbors or occasional visitors are there, unless it is really a public thoroughfare.

Ritva suggests otherwise:

Ritva Ketubot 72b "You have not left a daughter to Avraham Avinu settled with her husband." For most of them go with head uncovered in their courtyards since there are no [people] seeing them there.

From Ritva’s statement that most women go without a head-covering in the courtyard because others don't see them there, we can infer that the head should be covered in such a space when others are actually present.

Taz takes this idea a step further. He rules that the halacha in a given space varies depending on how many people tend to be around, whether or not they are around.

38 Taz EH 115 For in a courtyard where the public are not found, but a few cross through, there she does not exit [her marriage without a ketuba] since she is wearing a kalata, as we said. But in a totally private courtyard there is no prohibition even in totally uncovering [her head], and if other people live there, then it is also in the category of a closed alleyway, where it is permitted only with [at least] a kalata.

In Practice We have seen that some early authorities consider head-covering at home to be obligatory and that others recommend it. Among those who permit going fully uncovered in the courtyard or even at home, some extend that to cases when male guests are present, some do not, and others do not address the issue.

Today, some women wear head-covering outside of the home, but uncover at home, even in front of male guests. Rav Ovadya Yosef reportedly defended this practice in an oral question and answer.

Rav Ovadya Yosef, Quoted in Ma'ayan Omer 11 EH 15 Answer: Maran [Rav Yosef Karo] wrote in Shulchan Aruch that she is permitted to go thus [bareheaded] within her home. Question: I said that I asked if the simple meaning is even in front of other [not household member] men? Our Master [Rav Ovadya] answered: Maran [Rav Yosef Karo] wrote that it is permitted, and that's it.

Prevailing practice, however, is that even women who go bareheaded at home do cover in the presence of men who are not members of the household. Rav Moshe Feinstein writes that this is required as a matter of modesty:

Responsa Iggerot Moshe YD I:75 For those women who are not stringent to act like Kimchit, but rather in accordance with her obligation, that in her home, when there are no other people there [non household members], she does not cover her hair…. when they go in the marketplace or in front of other men, they need to go [in those situations] with greater modesty...

Rav Feinstein compares a setting "in front of other men" to the marketplace. Rav Nachum Rabinovitch, who generally takes a lenient stance regarding head-covering, also rules that a woman should be careful in this regard:

Siach Nachum 105 One may not be lenient in uncovering the head at home in the presence of non-household members.

A woman who follows the view that she should don a head-covering at home specifically when there is a male guest, still has a halachic basis to be less particular about the quality of the coverage in that setting than she would be in public.

39 Similarly, there is halachic support to don a less complete or more informal covering in the modern equivalent of a courtyard, like the area right outside one’s door, if not facing a busy street.

Rav Yehuda Henkin adds the caveat that leniency should not extend to someone else's private domain or courtyard:

Responsa Benei Banim 4:10 But it makes sense that also this permission is only for a woman inside her home and not when she visits the homes of others… The custom of Jewish women is to cover their hair in front of strangers, even within the home…This is the custom of most observant women today, and how much more so in the courtyard, and only in the home or in a private yard that is not visible to strangers do they go bare-headed.

Since dignity and modesty standards are often more relaxed in front of other women, common practice is not to cover in a women-only space, like a gathering of girlfriends, even outside of one's home, and certainly not to cover in spaces where standards are even more relaxed, like a women's exercise class or a women’s pool or beach.

Defining Spaces

The Talmud tells the story of On ben Pelet's wife, whose husband had joined Korach in challenging Moshe’s leadership:

Sanhedrin 109b-110a Rav said: On ben Pelet – his wife saved him. She said to him: What will you get out of it [the rebellion against Moshe]? If the master [Moshe] is the leader, you are a student. And if the master [Korach] is the leader, you are a student. He said to her, 'What shall I do? I was in the [original] counsel and I swore together with them. …She said to him, 'Sit down and I will save you.' She gave him wine to drink and got him drunk and laid him inside [their tent]. She sat herself at the opening and let her hair loose. Whoever came [to call him] and saw her turned back…

From this story, we can infer that, at some stage in Jewish history, women covered their heads in front of other men, even at home. At the same time, On’s wife receives no censure for uncovering at the entrance to her home, which suggests that doing so is, strictly speaking, permissible.

By loosening her hair at the entrance to her tent, On’s wife effectively extends her intimate space with her husband, and her ability to protect it and him. As a married woman, she covers her head as an expression of her relationship with her husband, and she finds a way to use this halacha not just to signal this relationship to others, but to save it.[5] The privacy of a space defines the obligation in head-covering, and, in its own way, head-covering can define the privacy of a space.

This is yet another example of how head-covering can take on as much meaning as we choose to give it.

[1] Rashi Ketubot 72b, s.v. Im Ken

40 If so, that in the courtyard there is any [prohibition] of uncovering. [2] Bach EH 115 When the gemara asks “If [you argue] thus, you have not left a daughter to Avraham Avinu settled with her husband!” – it means as follows: If the statement that a kalata has no issue of an uncovered head refers to a courtyard – that is obvious and there was no reason for Rabbi Yochanan to make such a statement. For if a kalata in a courtyard is improper, you have not left a daughter of Avraham, for in the courtyard they all go with a scarf on their head without a shawl. The statement comes to teach that even from one courtyard to another by way of an alleyway, there is also no issue of an uncovered head. But certainly even in her courtyard without a kalata it is forbidden for the head to be totally uncovered. Rashi and Tosafot read the gemara’s words “If [you argue] thus” – to mean 'if you argue that a kalata is sufficient and required in the courtyard.' Bach reads those words to mean 'if you argue that a kalata is insufficient and more is required in the courtyard.' [3] Rema is explaining why Tur writes that in a place without many people "she does not exit [her marriage without a ketuba]," rather than writing that she is permitted to fully uncover her hair: Tur EH 115 …Specifically when she goes out thus in the public domain…or in a courtyard that the public crosses, but in a closed alleyway or a courtyard that the public does not cross, she does not exit [her marriage without a ketuba] [4] See, for example, Magen Avraham: Magen Avraham 75:4 But in Zohar Naso p. 239 he is very stringent that no hair of a woman should be seen, and this is fitting practice. Mishna Berura adds that a man may not recite Shema in view of his wife's hair, even if it is only partially uncovered, since there are contexts in which it is considered erva. Mishna Berura 75:10 Even if she does not normally cover [her hair] except in the marketplace and not at home or in the courtyard, in any case it is a type of erva according to all opinions, even in her home, and it is prohibited to recite [Shema] there facing her if some of [her hair] is revealed. Such a constraint on a woman's husband could create an indirect obligation on her at home to cover her hair out of modesty concerns whenever her husband is in the vicinity. While Rav Moshe Feinstein agrees that emulating Kimchit is praiseworthy, he disagrees with Mishna Berura on this point. Since following Kimchit is not a halachic requirement, a husband is permitted to see his wife's hair when reciting Shema and berachot, even when she is in nidda. Iggerot Moshe OC 5:37 Head-covering in front of her husband is not necessary. For the prohibition of uncovering the head is only in the marketplace. Even when she is nidda, there is no prohibition in her home in front of her husband and children. There is a praiseworthy practice to act even like Kimchit. But we have not heard of modest women like this, even in earlier generations, and in the time of the Tannaim, women didn't practice this way except for a few like Kimchit. [5] Thanks to Simi Peters for her insights into this midrash.

Could we read these sources in a way that would allow a woman not to cover her hair at all?

In recent history, predominantly under modern European influence, there have been entire communities of Torah-observant Jews in which the women have gone bareheaded. There are also many recent examples of pious, righteous women who have not covered their heads.

Building on the minority opinion that head-covering is not a Torah-level obligation, and on the complexity of the halachic sources regarding head-covering, some rabbis have responded to this situation by crafting a halachic justification for leaving the head completely uncovered. Most prominent of these was Rav Yosef Messas, a Sefardi halachic authority of twentieth century Morocco and Israel.

41 In his responsum on the topic, Rav Messas explains that his position was designed to be melamed zechut, to create a favorable judgment, on the women of Morocco in the 1950's, who did not cover their heads at all:

Rav Yosef Messas, Collected Writings, p. 211

The prohibition of uncovering the head for married women was strict among us here from past practice, and thus in all cities of the Maghreb before the coming of the French, but within a short time of their coming, the daughters of Israel broke this boundary…no reproof was of use…and now all the women go out with head bare, hair uncovered…and therefore I put my mind to teaching about them favorably [le-lamed aleihen zechut], for it is impossible to conceive of returning the matter as it was…and in my approach to seek in the words of the halachic authorities that came before me, I found only stringency upon stringency and prohibition upon prohibition…

Rav Messas acknowledges that arguments to permit women not to cover their heads, his own included, go against the grain of all the major halachic authorities.

His main argument to justify the prevailing practice in his time is to understand head-covering as only a matter of custom. He then suggests that the custom is void once head-covering is dissociated from modesty, which is accomplished when all women in a particular region go with heads uncovered.

Rav Yosef Messas, Collected Writings, p. 211

The prohibition is not from the uncovered hair itself, but rather from the custom of the daughters of Israel who were accustomed to cover their heads, because they thought at their time that this was modesty for a woman, and a woman who uncovered her hair was considered a breaker of the boundary of modesty, and for this reason the Torah warned all daughters of Israel not to do the opposite of the custom of the daughters of Israel in this. If so, now that all daughters of Israel agree that there is no modesty in covering the head...the prohibition has been fundamentally uprooted and has become permissible.

The idea that the obligation becomes moot as soon as common custom changes is highly debatable, especially if we view the obligation of head-covering as more than dat Yehudit. Modern halachic authorities overwhelmingly reject Rav Messas's idea. Additionally, in many of our communities, at least some women still practice head-covering and do associate it with modesty, which undermines his argument.

A recent article (and upcoming book) by American Rabbi Michael Broyde similarly seeks to justify not covering one’s head. He cites rabbis who have made arguments parallel to Rav Messas’s, and suggests readings of other halachic authorities that might potentially line up with those arguments. Rabbi Broyde himself acknowledges that his argument goes against halachic consensus.[11]

Rabbi Michael Broyde, "Hair Covering and Jewish Law: A Response," p. 91

42

The consensus of the Ahronim [late halachic authorities] for the last few centuries has surely been that there is an objective Torah obligation upon married women to cover their hair.

He adds that his article is meant to provide grounds to judge a woman who does not cover her head favorably, not to suggest that a woman should not cover her head.

In an article explaining why she does cover her head, Dr. Meirav Tubul Kahana writes that the weight of halachic consensus is actually the most important factor shaping her personal commitment:[12]

Rabbanit Dr. Meirav (Tubul) Kahana, "At the End of the Day – Submission," from Olam Katan, May 2019

At the end of the day, after all the discussion and clarification of the matter of head-covering, its value and significance, we also need to say simply and with submission that thus the Oral Torah taught us, that the basis of head-covering is a Torah-level obligation. It is so difficult to exercise the muscle of submission regarding matters that are not understood and clear to us. To simply fulfill them because so commanded the Creator of the world. Especially in our generation, thinking and enlightened on the one hand, connecting and feeling on the other -- what isn’t understood or what we don't "feel" remains out of bounds. Indeed, we must look deeply, clarify, investigate and understand; there is great importance in connecting with mitzvot and to fulfilling them in joy. But the beginning and end of all mitzva fulfilment is the aspect of doing the will of one's Creator...

ALIEZA SALZBERG writes:12

In many traditional Jewish communities, women wear head coverings after marriage. This practice takes many different forms: Hats, scarves, and wigs (often referred to as sheitels all cover and reveal different lengths of hair. Many women only don the traditional covering when entering or praying in a synagogue, and still others have rejected hair covering altogether. What is the basis for this Jewish practice, and what are some of the legal and social reasons for its variations? Where This Practice Comes From

The origin of the tradition lies in the Sotah ritual, a ceremony described in the Bible that tests the fidelity of a woman accused of adultery. According to the Torah, the priest uncovers or unbraids the accused woman’s hair as part of the humiliation that precedes the ceremony ( Numbers 5:18 ).

12 https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/hair-coverings-for-married-women/

43 From this, the Talmud (Ketuboth 72) concludes that under normal circumstances hair covering is a biblical requirement for women.

The Mishnah in Ketuboth (7:6), however, implies that hair covering is not an obligation of biblical origin. It discusses behaviors that are grounds for divorce such as, “appearing in public with loose hair, weaving in the marketplace, and talking to any man” and calls these violations of Dat Yehudit, which means Jewish rule, as opposed to Dat Moshe, Mosaic rule. This categorization suggests that hair covering is not an absolute obligation originating from Moses at Sinai, but rather is a standard of modesty that was defined by the Jewish community.

Having first suggested that hair covering is a biblical requirement — rooted in the Sotah ritual — and then proposing that it is actually a product of communal norms, the Talmud (Ketuboth 72) presents a compromise position: Minimal hair covering is a biblical obligation, while further standards of how and when to cover one’s hair are determined by the community.

Elsewhere in the Talmud ( Berakhot 24a ), the rabbis define hair as sexually erotic (ervah) and prohibit men from praying in sight of a woman’s hair. The rabbis base this estimation on a biblical verse: “Your hair is like a flock of goats” ( Song of Songs 4:1 ), suggesting that this praise reflects the sensual nature of hair. However, it is significant to note that in this biblical context the lover also praises his beloved’s face, which the rabbis do not obligate women to cover. Though not all would agree, the late medieval German commentator Mordecai Ben Hillel Hakohen, known as the Mordecai, explains that these rabbinic definitions of modesty — even though they are derived from a biblical verse — are based on subjective communal norms that may change with time.

Historically speaking, women in the talmudic period likely did cover their hair, as is attested in several anecdotes in rabbinic literature. For example, Bava Kama (90a) relates an anecdote of a woman who brings a civil suit against a man who caused her to uncover her hair in public. The judge appears to side with the woman because the man violated a social norm. Another vignette in the Talmud describes a woman whose seven sons all served as High Priest. When asked how she merited such sons, she explained that even the walls of her home never saw her hair ( Yoma 47a ). The latter story is a story of extreme piety, surpassing any law or communal consensus; the former case may also relay a historical fact of practice and similarly does not necessarily reflect religious obligation.

Throughout the Middle Ages, Jewish authorities reinforced the practice of covering women’s hair, based on the obligation derived from the Sotah story. Maimonides does not include hair covering in his list of the 613 commandments, but he does rule that leaving the house without a chador, the communal standard of modesty in Arabic countries, is grounds for divorce (Laws of Marriage 24:12). The Shulchan Aruch records that both married and unmarried women should cover their hair in public ( Even Haezer 21:2 ), yet the Ashkenazic rulings emphasize that this obligation relates only to married women. The Zohar further entrenches the tradition by describing the mystical importance of women making sure that not a single hair is exposed.

Varying Interpretation in the Modern Era

44 Today, in most Conservative and Reform communities, women do not cover their hair on a daily basis, though in some synagogues women still cover their heads during prayer. A Reform responsum (1990) declares: “We Reform Jews object vigorously to this requirement for women, which places them in an inferior position and sees them primarily in a sexual role.”

Both the Conservative and Reform movements allow, and in some cases encourage, women to cover their heads when praying or learning Torah, because of the requirement to wear a kippah. These rulings take head covering out of the realm of female sexual modesty, and instead define it as a ritual practice — for men and women alike — that signifies respect and awareness of God above.

In the contemporary Orthodox world, most rabbis consider hair covering an obligation incumbent upon all married women; however, there is variation in the form this takes. Some maintain that women must cover all their hair, for example the Mishnah Berurah forbids a man from praying in front of his wife if any of her hair is showing.

Other Orthodox rabbinic figures have suggested that hair is no longer defined as erotic in our day and age, because most women in society do not cover their hair in public. Based on this logic, the Arukh HaShulchan concludes that men are no longer prohibited from praying in the presence of a woman’s hair, and Rav Moshe Feinstein ruled that women may show a hand’s-breadth of hair.

A few Orthodox rabbis in the early 20th century justified women’s decisions not to cover their hair at all, including the Moroccan chief rabbi in the 1960s, Harav Mashash, and the lesser known American Modern Orthodox rabbi, Isaac Hurwitz — though they drew criticism for this opinion. In their writings, they systematically review the sources surveyed above and demonstrate that those sources describe a social norm of modest dress, but not a legal requirement.

“Now that all women agree,” Rabbi Mashash wrote, “that covering one’s hair is not an issue of modesty and going bare-headed is not a form of disrespect — in fact, the opposite is true: Uncovered hair is the woman’s splendor, glory, beauty, and magnificence, and with uncovered hair she is proud before her husband, her lover — the prohibition is uprooted on principle and is made permissible. What Women Do

45

Yves Mozelsio/Magnes Collection of Jewish Art, University of California, Berkeley

While only a few traditional rabbis have reinterpreted the law of hair covering, throughout the generations women have acted on their own initiative. The first sparks of rebellion occurred in the 1600s, when French women began wearing wigs to cover their hair. Rabbis rejected this practice, both because it resembled the contemporary non-Jewish style and because it was immodest, in their eyes, for a woman to sport a beautiful head of hair, even if it was a wig. However, the wig practice took hold and, perhaps ironically, it is common today in many Hasidic and ultra-Orthodox communities. In some of these communities the custom is for women to wear an additional covering over their wig, to ensure that no one mistakes it for natural hair.

As the general practice of covering one’s head in public faded in Western culture in the past century, many Orthodox women also began to go bare-headed. Despite rabbinic opinions to the contrary, these women thought of hair covering as a matter of custom and culture.

Many women who continue to cover their hair do not do so for the traditional reason of modesty. For example some women view head covering as a sign of their marital status and therefore do not cover their hair in their own home. Others wear only a small symbolic head covering while showing much of their hair. Also in many communities, women have persisted in covering their hair only in synagogue.

In recent decades, there is an interesting trend among women who have learned the Jewish legal sources for themselves, due to advances in women’s education, and have decided to adopt a stringent stance toward hair covering, rather than following the more permissive norms of their parents’ communities. An entire book, Hide and Seek (2005), tells these women’s stories.

46 Modesty, as a Jewish value, is continually being refined and redefined by Jewish women and their communities. Just as some women have chosen to deemphasize hair covering as a marker of modesty, in other communities women may choose to embrace it, developing and reinforcing a more traditional communal norm. As modesty is subjectively defined, the community to which one wishes to belong may play a large role in determining practice. The decision to cover one’s hair rests at the crossroads between law and custom, personal choice and community identification.

Hair, O Israel: Jewish Wig Laws

SUSAN SCHNUR WRITES:13

What does halakha [Jewish law] say about women being required to cover their hair? According to Haviva Krasner-Davidson (a woman with special expertise in this matter) the answer begins with the Bible, which gives us but two relevant hair passages:

First, Deuteronomy (21:10-14) tells us that when a woman is taken captive during war, it is mandatory that her captor cut off her hair. One month later, “after she has mourned her mother and father,” to quote the Bible, her captor can marry her. The hair principle extracted from this, explains Krasner-Davidson, “is that hair is sexually alluring, which is why the captor must cut his captive’s hair—so that he won’t be attracted to her during the month that she is not yet his wife.” [Most male halakhic scholars have a special gene that allows them to stay focused during discussions like this, and not get waylaid by random umbrage.]

Second, Numbers (5:11-31) discusses the infamous sotah, she who is accused of adultery, and is brought before the high priest who “parah“s her hair. Krasner-Davidson explains that the meaning of parah is murky—is it “loosen” or “uncover?” In either case, she says, later generations (of hairsplitters) use this reference as the source which conveys that “having one’s hair exposed was shameful during biblical times.”

Next the Mishna (Ketuvot 7) comes up with a surprisingly severe Q and A: Is there any instance in which a woman, divorced by her husband, does not receive compensatory financial support [ketubah dues]? Answer: Yes—the woman who goes out in public with her hair uncovered does not receive support. However, adds Krasner-Davidson, despite this harsh Mishnaic view of the hairy woman, the rabbis here understand hair covering to be more a matter of custom than law.

The Gemarrah, though (Ketuvot 72A-B), disagrees. Hair covering, it maintains, is law, not custom. Moreover, it’s a “practice of biblical origin, ‘which makes transgressing it even more serious,” ‘explains Krasner-Davidson. This quarrel—is it law or custom that prescribes hair covering—is important, because I it is the pivot upon which centuries of rotating religious hair ‘injunctions are mounted. (If you’re Mishna-prone. you interpret hair-covering more leniently; if you’re Gemarrah-prone. more stringently.)

13 https://lilith.org/articles/hair-o-israel-jewish-wig-laws/

47 During the Middle Ages, married Jewish women in Europe covered their hair with scarves [tikhlach]—but then again so did non-Jewish women. Halakhic headhunters, then, find it hairy teasing out whether medieval scarf-wearing had more to do with Jewish injunctions or with conformity to larger, non-Jewish standards of “female modesty.” This becomes significant to later hair arbiters whose rulings distinguish between general custom vs. Jewish law.

By the 16th century, wigs were on the scene. They were fashionable in [Christian] France, and Jewish women throughout Europe (presumably those who were more well to-do) jumped on the bandwagon. Shaytlach [wigs] were considered more toothsome than tikhlach [head scarves], so Jewish women’s embrace of them represented a kind of feminist revolt. Indeed, says Krasner- Davidson, “Most rabbinic authorities denounced shaytl-wearing as tantamount to going with one’s head uncovered, since a shaytl looked just as sexually alluring (if not more so) than a woman’s own hair.”

“Rabbi Moshe Isserles ruled in the 16th century, however,” continues Krasner-Davidson, “that a wig is admissible, and it’s his opinion that was accepted by the Ashkenazi community.” (A recent exhibit at the Jewish Museum included European shaytlach that looked like cottony Raggedy Ann mops—it’s hard to imagine them as a step up from anything.)

In one of those paradoxical reversals that define tonsorial social history, ultra-Orthodox communities today consider wigs—not scarves—to be the more stringent practice. Even though a wig can cost well over $1000 and look positively sirenic, a woman who ties up all her hair and covers it with a hat or scarf will receive, says Krasner-Davidson, “disapproving looks.” She adds: “Recently, in some ultra-Orthodox communities, rabbis have issued proclamations telling women that they must wear hats on top of their shaytlach.”

Finally we have the question of whether hair is ervah [a part of the body that, in Orthodox practice, must always be covered in public—like breasts, thighs, shoulders], or is it something that, when covered, simply serves to state that a woman is married and thus not available to other men. Some hold that hair is not ervah (since a man is permitted to see his wife’s hair even when she’s sexually off-limits to him); others see hair as “straight ervah, so that a woman who does not cover her hair is seen as promiscuous (as if you had your breasts showing), not just immodest,” says Krasner- Davidson.

Must women halahkically keep their hair covered even in their own homes? Some say yes, explains Krasner-Davidson. “They base this on the story in the Talmud [Yoma 47A] about a woman named Kimhit who had seven sons all of whom became high priests. When the rabbis asked her how she merited this, she answered that in her whole life, even the walls of her house never saw a strand of her hair.” (Krasner-Davidson adds; “This story is also the source of the custom in some ultra-Orthodox communities for married women to keep their heads shaved.”)

The most common at-home custom for very religious women, continues Krasner-Davidson, “is to keep their hair covered in public, but not when they are alone with their families.” This practice is based on the most widely accepted current interpretation of hair; that .showing it does not constitute ervah; just “female immodesty.”

48 On one of the many other hands, however, some women will show their hair in their homes even in front of male non-relatives. This is because “some consider this mitzvah as connected to place and not to the woman herself,” explains Krasner- Davidson. “Therefore, if she is in her home, she does not need to wear her covering. The Talmudic source for this practice is striking; ‘If the fact that women must cover their hair even in their own courtyard is true, then no daughter would have married even Abraham our Forefather.’ The implication is that this is too much to ask of any woman.”

In our century, “covering hair has fallen out of practice in many observant communities,” concludes Krasner-Davidson. “Some wives of well-respected rabbis—even those considered ‘giants’ of their generations—did not or do not cover their hair. Those who say that hair-covering is more a matter of custom (rather than law) point to the social mores of our times, arguing that since it is not considered immodest for women in general society to keep their heads uncovered, then head-covering no longer applies.”

Though this author’s head was giving off steam through a good part of this halakhic discussion, Krasner-Davidson’s head stayed cool. “I agree with hats on top of shaytls” she says. “Gorgeous wigs defeat the whole purpose of ‘modesty,’ meeting the letter of the law, but not its spirit. I get upset when halakhic loopholes, become the highest standard. With wigs, you’ve defeated the idea of conveying whether you’re married, since they often look so perfect you don’t know they are wigs. I like to dress modestly, and to convey that I’m married. It makes men take me and my mind more seriously; they don’t look at me as an object. And that let’s me have an easier time talking with men.”

Chumras Must Be Stage-in-Life Appropriate

Rav Frand writes:14

This week’s parsha (behaalosecha) contains the people’s complaint about their lack of meat. The Almighty’s response was sending of massive quantities of pheasants (Slav), which the people consumed and subsequently died. The Torah tells us “The meat was still between their teeth, not yet gone, when the wrath of Hashem flared against the people, and Hashem struck a very mighty blow against the people.” [Bamidbar 11:33]

The Talmud derives the prohibition of eating dairy foods after meat (milchigs after fleishiks) from the expression “the meat was still between their teeth”. One of the reasons for this prohibition is that we see from this pasuk [verse] that meat remains between a person’s teeth after he has consumed it and thereby, he will in effect be eating meat and milk together if he eats milk products following the eating of meat.

In discussing the laws of waiting between meat and dairy dishes, the Talmud [Chulin 105] quotes Mar Ukva as stating “Regarding this matter, compared to my father, I am like vinegar compared

14 These divrei Torah were adapted from the hashkafa portion of Rabbi Yissocher Frand’s Commuter Chavrusah Tapes on the weekly portion: Tape # 684 – Kissing A Sister. Good Shabbos! https://torah.org/torah-portion/ravfrand-5770-behaaloscha/

49 to wine. My father would wait 24 hours between meat and cheese, and while I would not eat meat and cheese in the same meal, I would eat cheese at the next meal, even the same day.”

This is the basis of the famous dispute among the early commentaries as to the meaning of the phrase “the next meal”. Some Rishonim interpret literally that a person is allowed to say the Birkas HaMazon and begin a new meal (of dairy products) immediately following the conclusion of a meat meal. Others (Rambam and Shulchan Aruch) interpret that a person must wait the amount of time between the morning meal and the evening meal, which is the source of the custom to wait 6 hours between meat and milk.

Be that as it may, Mar Ukva said he was spiritually not in his father’s league. His father waited 24 hours and he merely waited until the next meal. The question should be asked – why in fact did Mar Ukva NOT follow the custom of his father? While there may be some parental stringencies (chumras) to which a son might not realistically aspire, this would not seem to be one of them. All that is involved here is waiting. What is so hard about that?

Perhaps we would understand if his father used to spend a full hour davening Shmoneh Esrei. A son may realistically argue that he is not on his father’s level – and cannot drag out his Shmoneh Esrei for a whole hour! But why couldn’t Mar Ukva wait 24 hours after meat in order to follow his father’s tradition in this area?

We learn from this Gemara that observing stringencies for the sake of doing stringencies, when one is not really on that spiritual level is a very hollow act. A person can adopt a certain practice, but if he is not ready for that ‘chumrah,’ if he is not ready for that spiritual level, then it can become a self-defeating act of piety. It may indeed lead to feelings of emptiness and spiritual regression when one takes on levels of super piety that he is not “ready for”.

This is a very important lesson that people should learn about chumras. I was told that a certain Jewish books store sells baseball caps that have a caption: “I keep chumras that you haven’t even heard of.” A person must know where he is holding in the spiritual world. Halachic chumras are not a one-size-fits all religious expression. They must be appropriate to one’s level of ascent of the ladder of spirituality.

Dovid HaMelech [King David] asks “Who will ascend (mi ya’aleh) the Mountain of Hashem?” [Tehillim 24:3]. Undoubtedly many will say “I can do it!” But then Dovid HaMelech adds “And who will maintain his location (mi yakum) in His holy place?”

It is easy to say that I can jump up there and go where I do not really belong, but who can really stay there and maintain his elevated stature? Only the few good men for whom stringencies are meaningful should embark on the road of ultra-piety. This is not the proper approach for the masses. Many people think they can ascend the Mountain of Hashem, but most of those who jump up there do not succeed in remaining at that elevation on a permanent basis.

This is the lesson of Mar Ukva. It is also the lesson taught on our daf [Yoma 47a] which relates that Kimchis had 7 sons who became High Priests because she was so modest that “the beams of

50 her house never saw the hairs of her head” (She would always keep her hair covered even in the privacy of her own home).

The Gemara comments that “many tried to do what Kimchis did, but they were not successful”.

Why not? Anyone can keep their hair covered at all times. But only Kimchis and a select few like her can keep their hair covered at all times, even in the privacy of their own homes, as the result of an acute sense of the presence of the Ribono shel Olam [Master of the World] and what tznius [modesty] is all about. It is not a chumra that is appropriate for everyone.

Kimchis's Careless Kohanim and the Flashy Princess15

My impression from what I've read and conversations I've had with friends who went to Bais Yaakov is that there are two frequently cited prooftexts for the importance of tznius. Particularly, for the primary importance tznius is given in frum women's religious life.

The first is the story of Kimchis. As the story is told to talmidos, Kimchis was zoche to have all seven of her sons serve as Kohen Gadol. The rabbonim asked her what she had done to merit this honor, and she replied that the beams of her house had never seen her hair. This proves how important tznius is. If you are careful about tznius, the girls are told, you will merit great things. Things like all of your sons serving in the highest religious position.

Unfortunately for those who want to use Kimchis's example as a guide to the ideal way a bas Yisrael should behave, there is more to the story. There are two versions of the story, one in the Yerushalmi[1] and one in the Bavli[2]. They have similar outlines, but different details. In both stories, there is a woman named Kimchis whose son is the Kohen Gadol. He goes for a walk and some spit from a person he is talking to lands on him, making him taamei, and one of his brothers performs the avodah in his place. The names of the sons, the people the Kohen Gadol talks to, and the circumstances of his excursion differ between the two versions of the story.

The differing details, including the name of the Kohen Gadol involved, make it likely that this was a folktale and/or a polemic rather than something that really happened. Both versions are subtly critical of the Kohen Gadol, and the story revolves around an issue of tumah and tahara, which was a point of contention between the Perushim and the Tzedukim[3]. The Tzedukim, the priestly class, thought that the common people didn't need to concern themselves with purity. It you were taamei, don't come to the Beis HaMikdash, but unless you were a cohen who needed to perform the avodah, it wasn't something to be concerned about. The Perushim, who were populists, felt that everyone should try to remain tahar.

In the version of the story in the Bavli, Kimchis's son Rabbi Yishmael was Kohen Gadol[4]. He apparently had a habit of carelessly conversing with people in the market, because twice saliva from a person he was talking with landed on his clothes and made him taamie. In one incident, his

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51 brother Yesheivav performs the avodah for him, and in the other, his brother Yosef. The Gemara quotes a bareisa that says all seven of Kimchis's sons served as Kohen Gadol, implying that Rabbi Yishmael was often invalidated for service and his brothers had to fill in for him.

This story is making fun of the Tzedukim, who claimed to be uniquely concerned about their purity. The Kohen Gadol, who should have been the most careful, became tammei all the time! So much for the Tzeduki claim that tumah and tahara were too much trouble for the commoners, concerns only for the elite. If even the most elite, the Kohen Gadol, couldn't stay tahor, then the Tzedukim could not claim ritual purity as their special concern.

The rabbonim asked Kimchis, "What did you do to merit this?" (Having all of your sons serve as Kohen Gadol.) Their question could be read as sarcastic, but Kimchis takes it at face value and answers that it was because of her exceptional purity, "In all my days, the beams of my house did not see the braids of my hair." The rabbis dismiss her explanation, saying that it was commonplace, nothing special, and none of the other women who had this practice were so rewarded for it. They refute Kimchis's suggestion that her Tzeduki devotion to purity is anything special or praiseworthy.

Kimchis, then, is not an exemplar of tznius who was rewarded for her exceptional modesty, but a foil for the rabbonim in a polemic about purity. Holding her up as a model a pure bas Yisroel should strive to emulate is to not only miss the point, but to mangle it.

The version of the story in the Yerushalmi is kinder to Kimchis, but harder on her son. In this version, the Kohen Gadol is named Shimon. He took a walk with the king on erev Yom Kippur. When a drop of spit from the king's mouth made him taamei, his brother Yehuda performed the avodah in his place. This is a stronger condemnation of Tzeduki claim of being an elite uniquely concerned with purity than is the Bavli version of the story. Not only does the Kohen Gadol, the most elite member of the priestly class, carelessly allow himself to become tammei, he allows it to happen on erev Yom Kippur, when he is supposed to be sequestered to prevent exactly this sort of thing from happening. Nor was this a one-time thing. It happened so often that all of his brothers serve as Kohen Gadol!

The biggest difference between the two versions of the story is that in the Yerushalmi version when Kimchis tells the rabbonim that she merited all of her sons serving as Kohen Gadol because her house never saw her hair (and in this version, her undergarments), they agree with her that this is praiseworthy. They praise her with the pasuk from Tehillim[5], "Kol kevudah bas melech pnimia; Mimishbi'tzos zahav livusha," "All glorious is the princess within the palace; her clothing is of checker work interwoven with gold." Yet even here, the focus seems not to be on tznius, per se, but on reading the pasuk as describing cause and effect. The "princess," Kimchis, kept her "glory" hidden even in the "palace," her house, and therefore she merited "clothing… interwoven with gold," the clothing of the Kohen Gadol which are described as being interwoven with gold. Her care for her purity was the cause of her seven sons wearing the clothing of the Kohen Gadol. Yet even here, in their praise for her, one can detect the rabbonim poking fun at the idea of purity as a priestly concern. Kimchis's obsession with her purity might have merited her seven sons who served as Kohen Gadol, but what of the sons? They failed at keeping themselves pure.

52 The pasuk the rabbonim cite is the second commonly cited prooftext for the central importance of tznius for Jewish women. More accurately, the first half of the pasuk, "Kol kevudah bas melech pnimia," is repeated as a mantra for tznius. It's taken out of context and mistranslated as, "The glory of a princess is inside." A princess doesn't wear flashy clothes or draw attention to herself. She is reserved, and her glory is not in her physical appearance, but her inner attributes. Every bas Yisrael is a bas melech, the girls are told, and should comport themselves appropriately.

There is no small irony in trying to convince women that focusing on their appearance is improper with the first half of a pasuk that goes on to describe magnificent gold-embroidered clothing in its second half. This is not exactly a modest outfit. The pasuk is part of a passage describing the wedding procession of a princess. It is not a prescription of an ideal of modesty for the metaphorical daughters of the King, i.e., Jewish women to whom God is a King and Father. Rather, it is a description of a literal princess as she goes to meet her future husband in his palace.

So it seems that two of the frequently cited sources used to support the centrality of tznius in Jewish women's religious life are misunderstanding or misrepresentations of those sources. The story of Kimchis isn't a morality tale about a paragon of purity we should seek to emulate. It's a farce undercutting the Tzeduki claim that tumah and tahara were a special concern of the priestly elite. And "Kol kevudah bas melech pnimia" isn't a prescription teaching Jewish women that they shouldn't focus on their appearance, but a truncated pasuk about a radiantly attired princess that's been quoted wildly out of context.

[1] Yerushalmi. Yoma 1:1 (38d) [2] Bavli Yoma 47a [3] Schiffman, L.H. (2003), Understanding Second Temple and Rabbinic Judaism. Jersey City, NJ: Ktav Publishing House [4] It's interesting that he's given the title "Rabbi," a Perushi honorific. At the same time the rabbonim are making fun of him in a polemic undermining the elitist attitudes of the Tzedukim, they also give him a title that lets them claim the position of Kohen Gadol for one of their own. [5] Psalms 45

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