NIE 63.1-55

Pr~bable Developments in North Vietnam to

19 July 1955 This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault

The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

:.,' ;,', I," ....:

'''1. ' ..-: ': !.~. . , .":"',>.' . ~"',~::, ~/., i.~·,~·);;~',

73 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July ·1955

(Continued ... )

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM TO JULY 1956

(Supersedes Portions of NIE 63-7-54 on North Vietnam)

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of North Vietnam and to esti­ mate probable future developments and trends to July 1956.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The immediate concern of the "Demo­ sary imports. However, the Sino-Soviet cratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) is to Bloc will almost certainly provide suffi­ consolidate its control in the area north Cient economic and technical assistance of the 17th Parallel and to gain control to meet minimum requirements for sta­ of . (Para. 14) bility and control. With such assistance 2. We believe that the DRV will experi­ the DRV will probably make gradual ence no great difficulty in maintaining progress in gaining control of the econ­ effective control of North Vietnam during omy and in rehabilitating transporta­ the period of this estimate and will prob­ tion, irrigation, and industrial facilities. ably retain a considerable measure of (Paras. 24-30) prestige and general acceptance. How­ 4. Since the· Geneva Conference, the ever, passive resistance and discontent strength of the DRV regular army has resulting from harsh control measures been increased substantially by drawing and poor economic conditions may in­ on regional forces to form new units and crease toward the end of the period. If by the re~eipt of new and heavier mili­ the situation in the South does not de­ tary equipment from Communist China. teriorate, the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi DRV forces are capable of defeating all Minh and the DRV will probably be re­ military forces, including the French, duced throughout Vietnam. (Para. 23) now located in South Vietnam, Laos, and 3. The DRV is confronted by serious eco-. Cambodia. (Paras. 31-35) nomic problems of which the current rice 5. The present DRV tactic with respect shortage is the most critical. Its present to South Vietnam is to pose as the export potential falls far short of pro­ champion of Vietnamese independence viding sufficient funds to pay for neces- and unification, and as the defender of

1

74 N I E 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

~ 2 the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.1 only by force. Such a conclusion would The DRV probably still believes that it become more likely should the Diem gov­ could emerge from free nationwide elec- ernment persist in refusing to enter the tions with control of all Vietnam. It will election discussions, should election dis­ attempt to appear reasonable in any ne- cussions not proceed favorably for the gotiations concerning procedures for elec- DRV, or should the Diem government tions. While the Communists almost succeed, with US assistance, in consoli­ certainly would not agree to complex ami dating its strength to the point of be­ elaborate safeguards and guarantees, coming a nationalist alternative to the they probably would agree to some form Ho reg~me. Moreover, if during the of "neutral" (but not UN) supervision. period of this estimate little progress is They would probably estimate that such made towards relaxing tensions, Peiping election controls would work to their ad- and Moscow might permit the DRV vantage in the South and, as manipu- greater freedom of action. Should the lated, would not. adversely affect their DRV decide to use force short of open position in the North. (Paras. 44-45) invasion, it would probably attempt to 6. In the meantime, the DRV will con­ undermine the Saigon government by tinue its efforts, through subversion, in­ initiating a campaign of sabotage and timidation, and propaganda, to weaken terror, seeking to~ormation of a new gov­ the Diem government, and to bring to ernment more

1 For an estimate of probable developments in • For an estimate of probable developments in South Vietnam, see NIE 63.1-3-55, "Probable Laos, see NIE 63.3-55, "Probable Developments Developments in South Vietnam Through July in Laos Through July 1956," to be published in 1956," to be published in . July 1955.

75 N I E 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

3

Pathet Lao position in the northern prov­ friendly relations and to secure Cambodia inces. (Paras. 48-49) neutrality. (Para. 50) 9. The Communists now have few assets 10. We believe the DRV will be willing to in Cambodia and will probably be unable continue political and economic contacts to develop a significant internal threat in with the French. However, it almost certainly will be unwilling to make any thut country until their position is great­ agreement which in fact would permit ly st.rengthened in Laos or South Viet­ the French to retain an economic and cul­ nam.:! In the meantime, the DRV will tural position in North Vietnam. (Paras. probably continue its efforts to promote 51-56)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION no external assistance and under conditions of severe physical hardship and Jmsterity, the 11. Under the terms of the Geneva Accords, and with the final withdrawal of French forces DRV leadership was able to weed out the weak and timid, build an effective army, train a sub­ from the Haiphong area on 18 , a stantial number of experienced cadres and Communist regime known as the "Demo­ local administators, and obtain considerable cratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) has as­ experience in the techniques of political con­ sumed full responsibility for the administra­ trol. Thus, when the DRV assumed control tion of the territory of Vietnam north of the of all North Vietnam in 1954, it possessed con­ 17th Parallel, pending a political settlement siderable advantages over the Diem govern­ "and the unification of the country. ment in terms of military strength and ex­ 12. The DRV, known also as the Viet Minh perience, organization and sense of unity and was established at the end of the Second World purpose. I War when a coalition of Vietnamese of all political leanings drew tog'ether under the 14. While the immediate concern of the DRV leadership of the veteran Communist, Ho Chi is to consolidate its control in the North and to Minh, and proclaimed Vietnamese independ­ gain control of South Vietnam, its longer run ence. The DRV openly and frequently pro­ objectives almost certainly are to build a fessed its solidarity with the Sino-Soviet Bloc strong Communist state in all Vietnam and to after 1949. Since then any loss by the DRV of assist in the extension of Communist control its Vietnamese support has been offset by a throughout Southeast Asia. considerable increase in organizational and material strength and by the prestige of vic- II. INTERNAL SITUATION AND TRENDS tories over French forces. . Stability and Effectiveness of the Regime 13. Although the recent assumption of re­ sponsibility over 13 million people and several 15. The DRV is organized on the normal pat­ large cities has confronted the DRV with tern of all Communist "peoples democracies." major problems, these problems are not en­ Although the government of the DRV ostensi­ tirely new or unrelated to previous DRV ex­ bly represents all elements in a "united front" perience. During its years of resistance grouping (the Lien Viet), actual power resides which was conducted until 1950 with little 0; in the Communist party (the Lao Dong or Workers Party). Out of a total population in 3 For an estimate of probable developments in North Vietnam of some 13 million, the Lien Cambodia, see NIE 63.2-55, "Probable Develop­ Viet is estimated to have approximately 8 mil­ men~s in Cambodia Through July 1956," to be publIshed in August 1955. r lion members, including the Lao Dong, which

76

/ NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

4

claims a membership of approximately one present within the top leadership and there million. exists a potential for disputes over such mat­ ters as internal domestic policy, courses of 16. The regime is undergoing many admin­ action with respect to South Vietnam, and re­ istrative modifications in order to cope with lations with Communist China. The DRV . the changed situation resulting from the end­ leadership will probably remain unified ing of the war. The clandestine shadow gov­ throughout the period of this estimate. ernment in the Red River delta region, whose organization was probably begun in1946 fol­ lowing the collapse of French-Viet Minh ne­ Control Policies and Popular Appeal gotiations, is being converted into a normal 20. Since the Geneva Conference the regime bureaucracy with overt lines of authority and has been generally successful in imposing its channels of communication. Although still authority throughout North Vietnam. It has rather primitive in a technological sense, the employed well-known Communist control government appears effective. Its operations methods, including secret pOlice operations, are characterized by close copying of typical "peoples courts," and large-scale indoctrina­ Communist planning and organization. tion. DRV armed forces are far larger than necessary to maintain order and they are sup­ DRV Leadership plemented by experienced internal security and intelligence organizations. 17. The DRV owes its success to date in large measure to a cohesive, adaptable, and skilled 21. Extension of the DRV's control has prob­ leadership possessing long experie!l:f!~_ !!l:_~he ably been facilitated by the prestige and pop­ Communist movement and to the prestige ular support which accrued to the regime from acquired-in its early years as the focus of the its victories over the French and by its prom­ anticolonialist struggle. The greatest de­ ises of an improved life for the people in the ficiencies in the leadership, as in the popula­ future. The flight of over 600,000 civilians tIon at large, are in technological and manage­ - mainly Roman Catholics - to the south ment skills. removed a large portion of those people most 18. Ho Chi Minh, President of the DRV, is inclined to resist Communist indoctrination. probably the ultimate authority within the re­ Despite shortages of food and consumer goods, ,gime. No other Vietnamese currently pos­ the general attitude among the population is sesses his great popular appeal among the probably one of relief that the war is over and Vietnamese as the symbol of nationalism. He of passive acceptance of stern DRV control as also has considerable prestige in Asia and long the normal pattern of existence. years of contact with European as well as 22. However, the regime will probably face dif­ Asian Communist movements. The other ficulties in obtaining the cooperation of some principal DRV leaders appear to be: Vo segments of the population. The remaining Nguyen Giap, the capable Commander-in­ Catholic population of approximately 1,000,- Chief of the "Vietnam People's Army," ap­ 000 may resist DRV efforts to "nationalize" parently second to Ho Chi Minh in national the church. The substantial ethnic minor­ popularity; Truong Chinh, party secretary-' ities, who live outside the river deltas, have an general, leading theoretician, and probably ingrained dislike for all Vietnamese. In ad­ second to Ho in the party hierarchy; and dition, landlords and merchants resent the Pham Van Dong, DRV Vice-President and Communist regime. Foreign Minister. All of these individuals are members of the Central Committee of the Lao 23. Nevertheless, we believe that the regime Dong Party. will experience no great difficulty in maintain­ ing effective control in North Vietnam during 19. There is no reliable evidence of factional- the period of the estimate, and will probably ism at present. However, "norma.l" competi- retain a considerable measure of prestige and tion for personal power is almost certainly general acceptance. Although the DRV will ~

77 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

5

use harsh measures where necessary, it will Agreements when annual imports into the probably place emphasis on subtle and widely area now held by the Communists totaled advertised appeals for public support through about US $100,000,000. The DRV, however, the activities of the National United Front, is incapable of financing large-scale imports "patriotic" religious conferences, "autono­ from its own resources. Maximum exports - mous area" governments, and other programs .. including possible 500,000 metric tons of coal, composed primarily of nationalist slogans lesser amounts of cement and raw materials and appeals. However, passive resistance and - could earn only about US $20,000,000 in discontent due to harsh control measures and 1955. poor economic conditions may increase toward 26. To assist in meeting this problem, the the end of the period. Providing the situation DRV has been negotiating with the Sino­ in the South has not deteriorated, the Na­ Soviet Bloc for technical and economic assist­ tionalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV ance. In , Communist China will probably be reduced throughout Vietnam. agreed to supply the necessary eqUipment and trained personnel to assist in the restoration Economic Policies and Courses of Action of railroads, highways, telecommunications, 24. The DRV is confronted by serious eco­ meteorological services, and water conserva­ nomic problems of which the current rice tion projects. Transportation, manufacturing, shortage is the most critical. Prior to 1954, and other fields of activity in North Vietnam the annual rice deficit of North Vietnam aver­ will probably receive long-term support from aged about 200,000 metric tons. As a result Communist China. The Chinese Communists of serious crop failures the shortfall of rice have recenty announced a grant of roughly US in the crop year 1954-1955 increased to an $300,000,000 although a portion of this may estimated 700,000 metric tons. The DRV has cover assistance already provided. East Ger­ obtained only a few small Shipments of rice many, Poland, and the Soviet Union have also from South Vietnam, formerly its prinCipal promised to send needed equipment, machin­ source of supplementary supply, and at least ery, and technicians to assist in training DRV 10,000 tons from Communist China. Despite personnel. The USSR has negotiated with rationing and other control measures, rice Burma for surplus rice which may be shipped prices in Hanoi have doubled since the Com­ to the DRV. We believe that the Bloc will, munist occupation, and current reserves are in any event, provide emergency economic low. Since the spring harvest appears to have assistance sufficient to avert any serious been poor, a large portion of the population threat to the stability of the DRV. in North Vietnam may face conditions ap­ 27. Although the DRV appears to be develop­ proaching famine this summer and fall unless ing its trading relations mainly with the Bloc, substantial quantities of rice are imported. it has made overtures to South Vietnam for the resumption of economic relations and has 25. The DRV must also deal with a deficit in attempted to convince the French that mutu­ its balance of payments position, a situation ally profitable trade is possible. Although which has been chronic to the North Vietnam political considerations predominated in these area. The reg"ime must import substantial instances, the DRV certainly realized that it quantities of textiles, capital goods, military could obtain economic benefits from trade equipment, and petroleum. Supplies of local­ with South Vietnam and France. ly manufactured goods will probably be less than in 1954 because the regime lacks trained 28. The rapid rehabilitation of transportation manpower to operate efficiently the textile and irrigation facilities, which has been the mills at Nam Dinh and Haiphong, the cement principal accomplishments of the regime in plant at Haiphong, and other enterprises for- recent months, demonstrated the DRV's abil- merly operated by the French. In view of re- ity to mobilize large pools of unskilled man- habilitation requirements import needs are power. It also indicates the receipt of fairly unlikely to be less than before the Geneva substantial economic and technical assistance ~

78 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

6

from Bloc countries. The most significant have been activated since the summer of 1954. achievement was the restoration in only four Although regular army strength has increased months of the 150 mile Hanoi-Dong Dang some 60,000 over the total of a year ago, the narrow-gauge railroad line which connects . over-all strength of the armed forces remains with the Chinese Communist rail net. Re­ about the same, since the regular forces were habilitation of the Hanoi-Lao Kay and Hanoi­ built up by drawing men from Regional and Nam Dinh lines, now underway and scheduled Popular units. Regional and Popular troop for completion in 1955, will further facilitate strengths are estimated to be 37,000 and 75,000 the distribution of military and economic sup­ respectively, a decline of some 35 percent from plies received from Communist China. If the pre-Geneva strengths of each organization. relatively rapid rehabilitation of irrigation fa­ 32. The substantial increase in firepower and cilities is sustained, food output should be mobility of DRV units is primarily the result substantially raised within a few years. of large-scale shipments of new arms, am­ 29. The DRV has instituted a series of eco­ munition, and other military equipment from nomic measures designed to enhance its over­ Communist China. The volume of these ship­ all control. To increase peasant support for ments increased markedly in and the regime, the DRV has pressed its program .continued at a high rate until last November. of land confiscation and rent reductions. Little information is available on the flow of Nevertheless, paddy taxes have not been supplies since November. Since , lowered arid continue to absorb about 40 per­ many of the shipments have violated the cent of the output. Heavy new sales and in­ Geneva Agreements. There is no firm evi­ ventory taxes have been levied on merchants. dence that the Viet Minh have received The scope of private trade has also been armored vehicles. diminished through the establishment of 33. There is no evidence that the DRV has wholesale and retail oU.tlets operated by the developed a navy or an air force. At present, regime, and further limitations are in pros­ pect. the DRV "navy" consists of some 100 men' with 3 to 5 motorboats operating as a com­ 30. The DRV probably will continue to make ponent of the army. There are unconfirmed gradual economic progress. during the period reports that the Chinese Communists are of this estimate. With continued assistance training DRV personnel preliminary to the .from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, which will almost creation of a DRV air force, but we have no certainly be forthcoming the DRV will prob­ evidence that the DRV possesses any aircraft ably be able to meet minimum reqUirements or air organization. for foodstuffs and cloth. They will also be able to rehabilitate further their transporta­ 34. Since the cessation of hostilities, the DRV has embarked on an extensive training pro­ tion and industrial facilities. Therefore, we believe that economic deficiencies will not gram designed to improve the ~i1itary effec­ seriously threaten the stability of the DRV tiveness of units and individuals, and to assure during the period of this estimate. their loyalty to the regime. Although there have been occasional desertions and defec­ Trends; in Military Strength tions, these have not assumed significant pro­ portions. 31. Since Geneva, the Viet Minh army has undergone considerable reorganization and its 35. DRV armed forces currently are capable firepower has been greatly increased. The of maintaining control over the area north regular army is estimated to total 240,000 of the 17th Parallel, and of defeating the mili­ troops, the bulk of which are organized into tary forces, including the French, now located 10 infantry divisions, 2 artillery divisions, 1 south of the 17th Parallel. They are also AAA gToupment, and 25 infantry regiments. capable of overrunning Laos in a conventional Of these at least 4 infantry diVisions, 1 military operation or of providing sufficient artillery division, and 15 infantry regiments logistic support and guerrilla units to enable

79 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

7

the Communist military forces in Laos to con­ returned Nehru's visit in . In late trol the northern provinces and other parts Novembcr 1954, Prime Minister U Nu of of the country remote from main lines of Burma made a goodwill trip to the DRV. communication. DRV participation in the Bandung Conference was further evidence of its status as an inde­ 36. The DRV almost certainly will maintain pendent state. the superiority of its armed forces in Indo­ china during the period of this estimate. Relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc There will probably be no significant increase in DRV armed numerical strength during the 40. We believe that the DRV is firmly com­ next 12 months, but continuation of the re­ mitted to the policies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, organization and tl'ainifig program will in­ even to the extent of subordinating or post­ crease its over-all military potential. poning the pursuit of its local or regional ob­ jectives in the interest of over-all. Bloc tactics 37. We believe that there may be as many as and strategy. The attitude of DRV leader­ 10,000 armed Viet Minh personnel remaining ship follaws from its Communist world out­ in South Vietnam. They are probably organ­ look and from the fact that DRV objectives ized as cadres and skeletal units. The effec­ can only be realized with Sino"Soviet Bloc tiveness of these units and their ability to support. expand through local recruitment will depend in large measure on the political appeal of 41. To date both Peiping and Moscow have Diem and the effectiveness of his government. participated in formulating DRV pOlicies. The DRV has publicly acknowledged that the Ill. EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND POLICIES Soviet Union is the leading power in the inter­ national Communist movement. Official dec­ 38. Since thc 1954 Geneva Conference, the larations have also acknowledged dependence DRV's foreign policy appears to have had on the Chinese Communists in the flelds of the following major objectives: (a) increas­ ideology and military strategy. Important ing the international stature of the DRV; DRV legislation such as. the basic agrarian (b) strengthening ties with the World Com­ reform law is modeled closely after early Chi­ munist Bloc; (c) accomplishing the unifica­ nese Communist measures. DRV leaders tion of South and North Vietnam; (d) retain­ have frequently compared their own progress ing the Pathet Lao strongholds in two Laotian with various stages in Communist China's provinces, and expanding Communist influ­ development. ence in both Laos and Cambodia with the eventual aim of absorbing both these coun­ 42. Contacts between the DRV and the Chi­ tries into the Communist Bloc; and (e) estab­ nese Communists have become significant lishing friendly relations with the Asian "neu­ only since the Communist Chinese troops tralist" nations on the basis of the "Five reached the Indochinese border in December Principles" of peaceful coexistence. 1949. Beginning in 1950, the Chinese Com­ 39. In the past few months, the DRV has in­ munists assisted the Viet Minh by furnishing creased its international stature in the non­ military supplies in increasing quantities, Communist world. Three non-Communist training thousands of military personnel in nations - India, Indonesia, and Pakistan­ South China, and providing advisors on mili­ have g-ranted it de facto diplomatic recogni­ tary, political, and economic matters. At the tion. In addition, since mid-1954, the French present time, large numbers of Chinese Com­ have maintained Jean Sainteny as "special munist technicians are in North Vietnam to representative" to the DRV, and India and assist the DRV in improving transportation Great Britain have established consulates in and communication facilities. It is probable Hanoi. Prime Minister Nehru of India made that economic assistance from both the Soviet a goodwill stop in Hanoi in , and Union and Communist China will be main­ Vice President Pham Van Dong· of the DRV tainedand perhaps increased.

80 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

8

43. Despite its close ties with and dependence with control of all Vietnam. The DRV, with on Peiping and Moscow, the DRV appears to Bloc support, has been insisting that con­ have greater latitude in its actions tha~ the sultations concerning elections begin on 20 European Satellites. A number of consIde~a­ July as specified in the Geneva Agreement. tions account for this special status. The VIet If the consultations get underway the DRV Minh fought its own fight against French will attempt to appear reasonable with respect colonialism. The DRV possesses an army and to election procedures. It will seek to develop security organization developed independently Indian, French, and UK pressures for holding of Sino-Soviet material assistance prior to elections. The Communists almost certainly 1950. Finally, the DRV can play an impor­ would not agree to complex and elaborate safe­ tant role in furthering Bloc interests in SEA, guards and guarantees, including neutral su­ particularly if permitted the appearance of pervision over the movements of police and independence. military forces for a considerable time prior to and after the elections. Nevertheless, they Policies Toward Vietnam probably would agree to some form of "free elections" under "neutral" but not UN super- 44. Since the Geneva Agreement, DRV policy VISIon. Their willingness to consent to some toward South Vietnam has aimed primarily at guarantees for "free elections"would prob- preventing the formation of an effective na- ably be reinforced by an estimate that such tionalisL~ietnamese_ government and at_ex~_ -- controls would work to-th-e1r -advantage in the tending Communist control through "coali- South and, as manipulated, would not ad- tion," elections, subversion, or other means versely affect their position in the North. short of open invasion. The DRV is attempt- ing to pose as the champion of Vietnamese in- 46. The DRV's ostensibly peaceful role prob- dependence and unification. It has made a ably will not prevent continued efforts to in- show of adhering to the Geneva Agreement, - filtrate and subvert the Vietnamese govern- and has attempted in various ways to insure ment, political organizations, and sects. The French support for the election provisions of Communists will seek to bring to power in the Agreement. The DRV endorsed the ac- South Vietnam a government which would be tions of the Binh Xuyen-controlled "United willing to join with the North in establishing Front of the Sects" which the Viet Minh radio a national government prior to general elec- blessed as "working with the people" for the tions. Failing this, they will seek to prevent overthrow of Diem. In addition, the DRV the development of a strong and effective has called for the resumption of "normal and government in the South which could offer the peaceful" relations between the two zones of Vietnamese people an attractive nationalist Vietnam as rapidly as possible. This cam- alternative to the Ho regime. paign for normal relations, which the DRV 47. The Communists in their propaganda robably hope will lead to a coalition govern- P have revealed sensitivity to the implication of ment for the whole of Vietnam even prior to elections in 1956, was intensified in March the Manila Pact which incorporated Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in its area of protection. and April with repeated concrete proposals to We believe that concern for Western, and par- the Vietnamese government for economic and cultural exchanges. ticularly US reactions, together with general considerations arising from over-all Bloc poli- 45. Throughout the period of this estimate cy, will prevent the DRV from openly invading DRV policies with respect to South Vietnam the South during the period of this estimate. and national elections will be conditioned by Similarly the resumption of widespread guer- the requirements of Bloc strategy in Asia and rilla activities appears unlikely prior to the by DRV estimates of the prospects for peaceful election deadline, unless the DRV should unification under a Communist~controlled re- come to the conclusion that South Vietnam gime. The DRV probably still believes that can be won only by force. Such a conclusion it could emerge from free nationwide elections would become more likely should the Diem

81 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

9

government persist in 'refusing to enter the 49. During the period of this estimate, the election discussions, should election discuss­ Viet Minh will probably continue their present ions not proceed favorably for the DRV, or tactics of officially seeking to develop friendly should the Diem government succeed with US relations with the Royal Laotian government assistance, in consolidating its strength to the while continuing their covert efforts to point of becoming a nationalist alternative to strengthen the Pathet Lao. The DRV almost the Ho regime. Moreover, if during the period certainly will not launch an attack with its of this estimate little progress is made towards own forces to seize Laos, and it probably will relaxing tensions, Peiping and Moscow might not initiate a major Pathet Lao guerrilla of­ permit the DRV greater freedom of action. fensive against the Laotian government. Should the DRV decide to use force short of However, if the Royal Laotian government open invasion, it would probably attempt to should undertake military action which seri­ undermine the Saigon government by initiat­ ously threatened the position of the Pathet ing a campaign of sabotage and terror, seeking Lao in the two northern provinces the DRV the formation of a new government more would probably infiltrate Viet Minh units to amenable to demands for a national coalition. assist the Pathet Lao. These tactics are likely to include the activa­ tion of DRV guerrilla units now in South Viet­ Policies Toward Cambodia nam and their reinforcement by the infiltra­ 50. Pending the achievement of objectives in tion in small units of regulars from the North. Vietnam and Laos and pending the develop­ ment of a stronger Communist brganization Policies Toward laos in Cambodia, the Viet Minh will probably con­ 48. High on the list of DRV objectives is the centrate on fostering Cambodian neutrality. establishment of a Communist government in The DRV has professed friendship for the Laos. Control of this area would greatly Royal Cambodian government. and has facilitate Communist penetrations of South claimed to have withdrawn all DRV armed Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. DRV forces from Cambodia. It has ceased its prop­ operations in Laos are facilitated by the pres­ aganda attacks against the Royal government, ence of a Communist movement, the Pathet and apparently has sought a mutual declara­ Lao, which is largely the creation and puppet tion of support of the "Five Principles" by the of the Viet Minh. The DRV has covertly con­ two governments. Nevertheless, the DRV is tributed material and technical assistance to probably continuing its efforts to develop Com­ the Pathet Lao "regime." It has supported munist strength in Cambodia, although to the Pathet Lao claim that the Geneva Agree­ date it appears to have made little progress. ments granted it administrative control over the Laotian provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Relations with France Saly. It has also supported the Pathet Lao proposal for the establishment of a "joint con­ 51. DRV policy towards France has apparently sultative council" composed of representatives been designed to encourag'e the French to give of the Royal Laotian government and of the full support for holding elections in 1956, to . Pathet Lao "regime." Its objective probably reduce French support for a non-Communist is the 'creation of a coalition government un­ government in Vietnam, and to create con­ der terms favorable to the Pathet Lao. At flicts between French and US policy. The the same time, the DRV has sought to con­ DRV, while almost certainly aiming at the vince the Royal Laotian government that the eventual elimination of French influence in Pathet Lao is not a puppet of the Viet Minh. all of Vietnam, has played upon the French To this end, DRV Foreign Minister Dong as­ desire to retain an economic and cultural role sured the Laotian Prime Minister, while at in that area; Bandung, that the DRV considered the Pathet Lao an internal Laotian problem which should 52. The Communist apparently impressed be settled by the Laotians themselves. the French at the Geneva Conference by

82 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956, 19 July 1955

(Continued ... )

10

their moderation. In an exchange of letters should relinquish the assignment. Neverthe­ between Viet Minh Prime Minister Pham Van less, it has felt compelled to continue negotia­ Dong and Premier Mendes-France, the DRV . tions with the DRV because of domestic polit­ indicated agreement in principle to the main­ ical pressures and because it believes that such tenance of French economic and cultural es­ a course offers additional guarantees against tablishments north of the 17th Parallel. the recurrence of hostilities while the French Many French believed that the DRV, because Expeditionary Forces are still in Indochina. of its difficult economic situation and its sup­ 55. However, in their dealings with the DRV, posed reluctance to rely solely on China, might the French have been careful to avoid giving be sincere in its desire to see the French main­ the appearance of political support to the tain their economic and cultural institutions regime. They appear to have resisted DRV in the country. Some French officials also attempts to accredit a delegate-general to believed that a conciliatory policy would lead Paris. They have worked to facilitate the the Viet Minh to loosen its ties with the Sino­ emigration of non-Communist .elements to Soviet Bloc. South Vietnam and have supported requests 53. However, the French have had little suc­ for an extension of the time limit allowed for cess in retaining their economic position in North Vietnam refugees to move to the South. North Vietnam and there are no indications Finally, they have been careful to avoid al­ of any significant expansion of trade between ienating the US and in such matters as the France and North Vietnam. French business removal of US equipment from the Char­ enterprises were reluctant to maintain their bonnages du Tonkin and abandonment of capital investment in the area without guar­ plans for government participation in mixed antees from their government. Saintenyand companies, and they have placed greater em­ his government endeavored to push through phasis on maintaining their ties with the US a plan for the establishment of jointly owned than on supporting their economic ambitions companies in which the French government in North Vietnam. would provide capital and control of manage­ ment. This plan was subsequently abandoned 56. The DRV almost certainly will be willing because of strong US opposition and probably to continue to negotiate with France, hoping because of the DRV's refusal to leave manage­ thereby to exacerbate US-French relations ment in French hands. As a result, the and to prevent all-out French support for the Charbonnages du Tonkin, which was being non-Communist Vietnamese government in used as a test case, was sold to the DRV for one the South. However, the DRV almost cer­ million tons of coal, (presently worth about 5 tainly will be unwilling to make any agree­ billion francs) payable over 15 years by annual ment which in fact would permit the French allocations. The French, moreover, agreed to to retain an economic and cultural position in maintain 30 or 40 technicians in the DRV­ North Vietnam. owned company to assist production. 57. In regard to elections, the primary concern 54. The French now appear aware that there of the French government will be to avoid the is little possibility of maintaining investments development of an impasse that would result and cultural estabiishments in North Vietnam. in renewed hostilities and the involvement of The French government has expressed disap­ its forces. It will probably insist that elections pointment with the results of the Sainteny be held as scheduled but is likely to strive for mission and have hinted that it will be dis­ arrangements that will at least delay direct continued in the event that Sainteny himself DRV control over the South.

83 NIE 63.1-55 Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956,19 July 1955

--,-S1(1(1 _____• ____ ._ •• ______~"_--,__--o==""-----,------~,------T------I( ? /l.z .I i '( ...... ·· ...... ··1' . I", t \ I

{!:{\\;'~:i': Viet Minh

I{;,i,/~; Pathet Lao

_,,_ InterncitlollC'lI uoundllry

® Nlillianal caplla' ., Scleclrd fiHlrOild

Selectc(1 road

<;'t;(I,~ 1 7,!i~J,OOO

9 "0 .IU 80 120 Mllc~ illS DE .. ,POUlO CONOOR( o 204() lI'O 120 KilolJlelcrs

13906 7·55

84