STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 3 March 2017.

Images © by Reuters

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-58-5 Center for Security Studies

STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson, Martin Zapfe

CSS ETH Zurich

Contents

Acknowledgments...... 5

A Castle in the Air?...... 7

CHAPTER 1 Contested History: Rebuilding Trust in European Security...... 11 Christian Nünlist

CHAPTER 2 Looking Beyond Trump...... 35 Jack Thompson

CHAPTER 3 Brexit and European Insecurity...... 55 Daniel Keohane

CHAPTER 4 Threatened from Within? NATO, Trump and Institutional Adaptation...... 73 Martin Zapfe

Acknowledgments

Strategic Trends is an annual publication of the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. It aims to offer a concise analysis of major developments in world affairs, with a primary focus on international security. Providing interpretations of key trends rather than a comprehensive survey of events, Strategic Trends targets a broad audience ranging from policy-makers to the media, academics, and the general public. Strategic Trends 2017 is the eigth issue in the series.

The publication series is available for download at the website of the Center for Security Studies (www.css.ethz.ch/publikationen/strategic-trends.html).

As always, we would like to thank this year’s authors, Christian Nünlist, Daniel Keohane, and Jack Thompson. Whereas they provided the content and excellent texts, a large part of the burden fell on the CSS’ Miriam Dahinden-Ganzoni (graphic design and layout) and Céline Barmet (data collection, graphic design and proofreading). They worked independently, always on time and with an exemplary work ethos. In addition, Chris Findlay made sure the texts fulfill the CSS’ formal standards.

We hope you enjoy reading Strategic Trends 2017.

Should you have any feedback, please do not hesitate to contact us at [email protected] and [email protected].

With best regards from Zurich,

Oliver Thränert Martin Zapfe Head of Think Tank at CSS Head of the Global Security Team

A Castle in the Air? Fragility and Self-Doubt in European and International Security

“The people of the time scornfully looked down on earlier epochs with their wars, famines and revolutions as periods when mankind had not yet come of age and was insufficiently enlightened … that century basked in its own sense of achievement and regarded every decade, as it drew to a close, as the prelude to an even better one. People no more believed in the possibility of barbaric relapses, such as wars between the nations of Eu- rope, than they believed in ghosts and witches; our fathers were doggedly convinced of the infallibly binding power of tolerance and conciliation. They honestly thought that divergences between nations and religious faiths would gradually flow into a sense of common humanity, so that peace and security, the greatest of goods, would come to all mankind.” Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday: Memoirs of a European (1942)

In his autobiography Stefan Zweig, the Austrian writer who fled Central Eu- rope amidst the rise of Fascism, wrote perceptively of the illusions that many harbored prior to the upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century. He called the optimism and sense of security that accompanied Europe’s long peace between 1815 and 1914 “a castle in the air” – a mirage that seemed permanent but which in reality simply masked “the destructive forces of the underworld” which “could break through at any moment”.

It pains us to introduce the 2017 edition of Strategic Trends with such a gloomy historical reference. However, Zweig’s rueful account of what he called the “liberal idealism” of the pre-World War One era seems appropriate, given the seismic changes that have rocked the establishment in recent months. At the

7 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 systemic level, the liberal world order appears to be under threat. The longstanding liberal hegemon, the United States, appears to be in decline relative to rising illiberal powers, such as China, and resurgent ones, such as Russia. Americans are now openly questioning the value of an internationalist foreign policy and even, it seems with the election of Donald Trump, the desirability of liberal democratic institutions.

Things are even bleaker when we narrow the focus to Europe. Radical rightwing populism is on the march in many European countries, with potentially fateful elections looming in France. Indeed, the entire European project appears to be under threat. The unresolved problems of the Eurozone continue to weaken and divide member states. Instability on Europe’s periphery has led to an inflow of migrants and refugees from poorer and/or war-torn regions, testing – and often surpassing – the limits of European toleration. The magnitude of this challenge is increased considerably by the ever-present threat of terrorism. Meanwhile, Britain has decided to withdraw from the European Union and insurgent parties around Europe are clamoring for the opportunity to follow in its footsteps.

It seems to us, as we survey the security landscape in early 2017, that fragility is pervasive. It imbues the key facets of public life. Political institutions are threatened by the forces of anti-Europeanism and illiberalism. Economic institutions are being undermined by globalization, inequality, and the shortcomings of the common European currency. Security institutions such as NATO are wobbling in the face of the potential unilateralism of the United States, a newly assertive Russia, and an inability to forge a genuine and effective set of European foreign policies.

Events such as “Brexit” and the election of Donald Trump in the US have shocked the liberal system, not only because of their specific impact on Euro- pean and global order, but also because of the sudden speed with which these fundamental changes are occurring. These events have accelerated the emergence of underlying trends, such as nationalist populism, feeding into a growing sense of powerlessness amongst political elites and a desire to “take back control” among populaces.

The four chapters in this volume offer early, but informed analyses on the current state and future direction of a very fluid Euro-Atlantic security system.

8 A CASTLE IN THE AIR?

While the foci of the chapters vary and address today’s security challenges from various perspectives – from the OSCE world, Trump’s America, European defense onto NATO – there are some common themes.

While analyzing current trends, all authors emphasize, albeit to differing degrees, historical processes and old problems that have been gestating for years. Seen through this prism, the Ukraine Crisis and the election of Donald Trump are both a symptom rather than a cause of European insecurity and American disengagement from liberal internationalism. Concurrently, the presidency of Donald Trump and the “Brexit” referendum, though the result of razor-thin margins at the voting booths, represent long-standing movements in the two countries (and others in Europe, for that matter).

This is why the impact on the security policies of European states, ofNATO and the EU has been so immense: discussions about marginal modifications of the existing architecture are no longer sufficient. The same holds for a debate about burden sharing. President Trump and “Brexit” cause and demand radical change and courageous leadership – at a time when, as we see it, fragility and self-doubt appear overwhelming.

While there have been serious crises and challenges to the post-Cold War Euro- Atlantic security architecture before, what most worries the authors of “Stra- tegic Trends 2017” is the unprecedented concurrence of today’s challenges. If experienced Western leaders underline that they have never experienced such a confluence of crises at the same time, and that they think that the EU could crumble away – than this should give analysts pause. With that in mind we hope that the essays collected in this year’s volume of “Strategic Trends” offer some thought-provoking reflections and ideas how to deal with this new and uncomfortable situation.

To be sure, the state of affairs in 2017 is nowhere near as bad as in 1914. In fact, we would argue that, though fragility is rife, it is also reversible. In other words, we should not despair like Zweig – who committed suicide after completing his memoirs – and hold fast in the belief that, with the right attitude and better policies, the tide can be turned.

Daniel Keohane, Christian Nünlist, Jack Thompson & Martin Zapfe

CHAPTER 1 Contested History: Rebuilding Trust in European Security Christian Nünlist

Different interpretations of the recent past still cast a negative shadow on the relations between Russia and the West. The Ukraine Crisis was a symptom, but not the deeper cause of Russia’s disengagement from the European peace order of 1990. While the current situation is far from a “new Cold War”, reconstructing contested history and debating missed opportunities are needed today to create trust and overcome European insecurity.

US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev shake hands at the end of a press conference in Moscow on 31 July 1991.

11 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

History is back. Recent developments speak of a “new Cold War” and recom- have made clear that ghosts from the mend a return to a strategy of contain- past still cast a negative shadow on ment, echoing the ghost of US Cold the current political dialogue between War diplomat George F. Kennan.2 Russia and the West. In addition to Others even invoke the image of a tensions arising from the present, the “Second Versailles”,3 criticizing the al- fact that Russia and the West subscribe leged humiliation of Russia after 1991 to diametrically opposed narratives on and the absence of a “new Marshall the evolution of the European security Plan” for Russia in the 1990s.4 On the order after 1990 prevents a common other hand, commentators complain view on the causes and origins of to- about Russia’s neo-imperialist appear- day’s problems. These different inter- ance, the claim for special treatment, pretations of the recent past continue the references to its unique civilization, to shape the world today. and exclusive spheres of influence.5

The Ukraine Crisis was a symptom, These are not purely academic discus- but not the deeper cause of Russia’s sions. The Western narrative is also disengagement from the European contested by the sitting Russian lead- peace order of 1990. The collapse of er. President Vladimir Putin has often a common perspective on European complained that the West promised security originated much earlier. The Moscow it would not accept any of current confrontation between Russia the former Warsaw Pact members and the political West and the broken into NATO in 1990. He therefore re- European security architecture must gards NATO’s expansion as a Western be understood as a crisis foretold. In betrayal. 2014, the “cold peace” between Russia and the West after 1989 turned into a Radically different interpretations of “little Cold War”.1 the steps that led from cooperation to confrontation complicate a return This burden of the past bedevils the back to dialogue, trust, and coopera- current debate about Russia’s role in tion. A high-level Panel of Eminent Europe. Historical analogies are often Persons (PEP) launched by Switzer- invoked in discussions over the nature land, Serbia, and Germany identified of the current state of affairs, or in try- these divergent narratives about the ing to explain how we arrived from the recent past as “a main problem of to- high hopes of 1989 at the hostilities of day’s relations between Russia and the today. On the one hand, some observers West”. Its report “Back to Diplomacy”

12 CONTESTED HISTORY

(2015) called for a research project for the descent from cooperation to that would systematically analyze the confrontation. Rather, the newly different views on the history of Euro- available documentary evidence al- pean security since 1990 and examine lows us to better understand ana- how and why they developed.6 lytically the motives, behavior, and actions on all sides and to provide In this sense, the present chapter aims a more nuanced version with more to make a modest contribution to- clarity of what really happened be- wards placing post-1989 events in hind closed doors from the fall of the their proper historical context – with Berlin Wall to the disintegration of a view to the confrontation of our day the Soviet Union. and possible future ways out of the current stalemate. Naturally, the first This chapter is structured around pre- drafts of history are always based on senting three central arguments: First, little empirical evidence. As long as the often-heard historical analogy, official documents are classified (usu- suggesting that the current situation ally 25 – 30 years), studies have to rely should be labeled a “new cold war” is largely on memoirs and testimonies of scrutinized, but ultimately rejected as eyewitnesses. This first phase of his- an inaccurate metaphor which is also toriography often promotes a politi- misleading for shaping current politicized history, with former policymak- cal decisions in the West. Second, I ar- ers wanting to put their actions in the gue that the crux of Russia’s sense of best possible light. Recently, however, marginalization within the European archives in the US, Russia, Germany, peace order lies in the failure to im- and elsewhere have been opened, al- plement the Cold War settlement and lowing solid historiographical inter- the common vision of a pan-Europe- pretations of what was going on be- an, inclusive security architecture – hind the scenes in the early post-Cold and in misunderstandings about what War period. Contemporary historians had been agreed upon in the high-lev- can now provide valuable corrections el diplomatic talks between the West to early myth-making (whether inten- and the Soviet Union that ended the tional or unintentional) by adding new Cold War in 1990. Third, I argue empirical, archival evidence and a well- that any renewed effort to deal con- founded historical view to the debate.7 structively with the other side needs to start with understanding previous The aim of this chapter is not to place missed opportunities and learning blame on one side as the main culprit from the past. The deeper causes of

13 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Russia’s current disengagement from the roots of the current confrontation Europe must be discussed and clari- between Russia and the West. The fied. By exposing myths, reconstruct- missed opportunity for a successful ing contested history may contribute integration of Russia into European towards tearing down the currently security structures after 1989 puts poisoned propagandistic echo cham- into perspective the Western nar- bers and creating trust and confidence rative of the end of the Cold War, in the present situation. An open, in- hitherto often portrayed as a success clusive dialogue similar to the historic story. While the enlargement rounds Helsinki process could be a viable way of NATO and the EU have provided out of today’s crisis. security and prosperity to Central and Eastern European countries, the If it was possible to create the basis failure to find an acceptable place for for peaceful coexistence in Europe in Russia within the European security a cumbersome, multilateral negotia- framework contributed to a new di- tion marathon during the Cold War, viding line in Europe and instability. this should also be possible in the 21st century – despite, or precisely because A more nuanced understanding of the of, the currently difficult conditions. recent past, as advanced in this chap- However, it should also be remem- ter, is in no way meant to justify Rus- bered that the historic Helsinki pro- sia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. But cess could only be launched ten years it should serve as a reminder that the after the Berlin Wall had been built West and Russia have not yet found a and after West and East had accepted solution to overcome European inse- their respective spheres of influences curity and have yet to realize the vi- in Europe. Today, patience is needed sion of indivisible European security. for setting up a similar multilateral Or in the words of Italian philosopher exercise within the framework of the George Santayana (1863 – 1952): Organization for Security and Coop- “Those who cannot remember the eration in Europe (OSCE). Disputed past are condemned to repeat it.”8 territories and overlapping spheres of influence make the situation today A New Cold War? Characteristics much more complicate. of the Current Confrontation Russia’s land grab of Crimea and its It is opportune now to critically review (initially denied) military interven- the terms of the Cold War settlement tion in Eastern Ukraine brought back in Europe in 1990 to better understand memories of the original East-West

14 CONTESTED HISTORY

Cold War versus Today Population in millions USSR Russia USA 1984 274.9 236.4

2016 143.4 324.1

Real GDP per capita in USD

1984 6,700 30,816

2015 11,039 51,054

Defense spending in billion USD

1988 246 293

2015 66 596

Nuclear arsenal

1984 36,825 23,459

2017 7,000 6,800

Sources: The CIA World Factbook 1984; Worldometers; Allen, Robert C., “The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy”, in: The Cana- dian Journal of Economics 34, no. 4 (2001); fred.stlouisfed.org; SIPRI; ourworldindata.org; Arms Control Association; multpl.com

15 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 confrontation in Europe. Russian US-Russian confrontation. Today’s Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev said international system is radically dif- in February 2016 in Munich: “We ferent from Cold War bipolarity and have slid into a time of a new Cold rather marked by a transition from War.”9 The cognitive recourse to the unipolarity under Western dominance term “Cold War” has been experienc- towards multipolarity and the emer- ing a revival since 2014,10 but in fact gence of new power centers in Asia the label had already been used in the and the global South. TheUS and media and scholarly publications in Western Europe will remain influen- the aftermath of both the Russian- tial, but they will lose power relative Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 and the to the emerging powers like China or Russian-Georgian War in 2008.11 India. Russia will also play a more active role in Europe than in the 1990s The historical analogy, however, is in such a multipolar global order, but misleading when it comes to the char- it is currently stagnating economically. acterization of the current relationship between Russia and the West. Ulti- In contrast to the Cold War era, Eu- mately, it is also dangerous, because it rope is no longer the center of US at- implies that the West should respond tention – US grand strategy is increas- to the alleged “Cold War II” with well- ingly geared towards a strategic rivalry tried strategies of the past. The original with rising China. Russia is a regional Cold War was a global confrontation spoiler, but no longer constitutes the between two ideologically antagonis- principal global challenge for the tic power centers in Washington and US and its allies as the Soviet Union Moscow. The Communist Soviet Un- did during the Cold War. Russia is ion and the democratic, liberal West no longer the hegemon of a strong dominated the international system military pact. In fact, Belarus and Ka- between 1945 and 1990 and divided zakhstan even drew the lesson from the world into two camps. None of the Ukraine Crisis to strengthen their three key attributes – orderly camps, independence from Moscow. Increas- ideological superpower contest, global ingly, these two countries see them- character – apply to the current con- selves not so much as partners of Rus- frontation between Russia and the sia, but rather as mediators between West. the West and Moscow.12 Finally, the current confrontation is more limited First, the current global order is no in geographical scope and mainly fo- longer exclusively shaped by the cused on Greater Europe.

16 CONTESTED HISTORY

Second, today, there is no risk of a re- China.16 In the last few years, Russia’s make of an ideological competitive economy has suffered primarily as a global struggle between communism result of falling global oil prizes as well and capitalism – modern Russia is as due to Western sanctions.17 Rus- capitalist as well. Russia is not leading sia’s significant overall inferiority to a global anti-Western camp, although the US and the West is compensated Putin poses as the leader of a Slavic- by its possession of nuclear weapons Orthodox world and likes to speak of and its veto power in the UN Security a war of the “West against the rest.”13 Council, as well as economic strength He sees in Russia the true heritage of in individual sectors such as gas, oil, a conservative European civilization coal, and timber.18 shaped by Christianity.14 Third, many parts of the globe are In addition, Russia is significantly not affected by the current Russian- weaker than the Soviet Union was. Western confrontation. China, India, Compared with the territory and Brazil and others have so far refused population of the Soviet Union, Rus- to take sides in the conflict between sia “lost” 5.2 million square kilom- Russia and the West. After 2014, eters and about 140 million inhabit- Russia and the US continued to coop- ants after 1991. Russia’s armed forces erate when their interests overlap, for were reduced to about a fifth of the example in the containment of Iran’s Red Army’s strength during the Cold nuclear program, the stabilization of War. Russia’s defense budget (2017: Afghanistan, the Middle East peace USD 45.15 bn) is over 17 times process, the fight against jihadist ter- smaller than the US defense budget rorism, or climate change. However, (USD 773.5 bn).15 In addition, Rus- the poisoned relations between the sia’s economic power also contradicts US and Russia have already negatively talk of a renaissance of a superpower impacted the international communi- rivalry – even if the US always had a ty’s response to the Syria War. clear upper hand in economy during the Cold War. But the gap widened Structurally, therefore, the current dramatically after 1991. Currently, conflict differs greatly from the Cold Russia is only the 12th-largest econom- War – and might be described rather ic power (USD 1.3 bn), even behind as a regional contest over European Canada and South Korea, while the integration models rather than a glob- United States (USD 18 bn) is still the al ideological and military rivalry. In world’s top economic power, ahead of contrast to the original Cold War, the

17 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 current conflict between Russia and and the West are becoming more and the West is not yet predominantly mil- more similar to the Cold War era. In itarized, despite Moscow’s occasional the dominant Russian and Western nuclear saber-rattling. It is true that narratives, the other side is blamed for Russia is implementing a multi-year everything and all, and is held respon- modernization program of its armed sible for the erosion of the post-Cold forces, and the West has strengthened War peace order in Europe. A solu- NATO’s eastern flank military. But tion to the conflict is therefore only neither side has the military capacity considered to be possible if the other any longer for launching a major mili- side capitulates or radically changes tary offensive in Europe (on the scale its behavior.21 of Cold War scenarios for a war in Central Europe), and no new military The common vision of an undivided, arms race has yet been observed. Mili- inclusive, and cooperative Europe tary scenarios mostly focus on the Bal- seems to be an aspiration from a very tic States, where Russian forces could distant past. However, the renewed embarrass Western forces should Pu- security dilemma actually already tin decide to ignore NATO’s Article 5 originated in the aftermath of the end commitment – which would be a very of the Cold War, when Russia and risky gamble.19 the West failed to implement a mutually acceptable European security The current situation can be best char- arrangement. acterized as a fragile and uneasy mix of conflictual elements (dominant The “Western Betrayal of 1990” since 2014), confrontational elements Revisited (not yet dominant), and cooperative The current crisis in European securi- elements (occasional, isolated events). ty needs to be contextualized within a Isolated cooperative events, however, complex historical process that started are only transactional and no longer at the end of the Cold War. In recent transformative. Currently, both sides studies revisiting the descent from co- favor deterrence over cooperative se- operation into confrontation, the fol- curity, and most formal communica- lowing scholarly consensus is slowly tion channels were closed in 2014.20 emerging, based on newly available archival evidence: Both sides are re- And yet, as Robert Legvold has point- sponsible for the fact that the com- ed out in his book “Return to Cold mon strategic vision of 1990 could War”, the behavioral patterns of Russia not be implemented in a sustainable

18 CONTESTED HISTORY matter.22 Mistakes were made on both Russian revanchism in Europe. The sides, but some of the more fatal long- West also felt an obligation to sup- term developments largely resulted port their transition into full-fledged from unintended side-effects of crucial members of the Western security in- decisions that seemed to make perfect stitutions. After the dissolution of the sense for the respective side at the time USSR and the Warsaw Pact, a danger- – for example, the Western desire to ous security vacuum had opened up expand the area of liberal democracy in Europe. and market economy to the East to increase international stability. Not The US and the West still supported unlike to the similarly complex his- Russia in its reform efforts towards a torical process of the transition from Western market economy and democ- World War II cooperation to Cold racy. But there was “no new Marshall War antagonism between the US and Plan”.23 Western support for Russia the Soviet Union after 1945, misper- in the 1990s was “too little, too late”, ceptions, misunderstandings, and self- even if Russia was allowed to join the delusions on both sides complicated G7 in 1997, thus transforming this Russian-Western relations after 1989. exclusive club of the world’s leading industrial powers into the G8.24 In On the one hand, doubts emerged addition, Russia also claimed a spe- early on in the West as to whether Bo- cial status in its relations with NATO ris Yeltsin’s desire to transform Russia and the EU compared to other post- into a democratic market economy Communist states, due to its size, ge- that was integrated into the West ographical extension, nuclear super- could really be fulfilled. Western power standing, and its permanent hopes were dashed by Yeltsin’s military UN Security Council seat. The case assault on the Russian parliament in for Russian membership in NATO or October 1993 and Moscow’s brutal the EU was occasionally put forward, action in the Chechen War in 1994. but Russia was always considered too The parliamentary elections of De- powerful, too special, and too differ- cember 1993 gave evidence of rather ent to be successfully integrated into massive domestic resistance in Russia Western organizations.25 to Yeltsin’s pro-Western reform course. As a result, NATO security guarantees On the other hand, the US could not moved up on the political agenda of resist the temptation to take advan- Central and East European countries, tage of the Soviet Union’s strategic as a safeguard against possible future withdrawal from Central and Eastern

19 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Europe after 1989. The essence of A close reading of the 1990 state- Russian grievances against the West ments by US President George H. W. is the alleged “betrayal of 1990”: At Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, that time, as Putin underlines to this and German Foreign Minister Hans- day,26 the US had promised in high- Dietrich Genscher, based on recently level negotiations leading to German declassified governmental documents, reunification not to expandNATO however, suggests that NATO’s later further to the East – “not an inch”, in Eastern enlargement indeed “broke” US Secretary of State James Baker’s fa- at least the cooperative spirit of the mous words addressed to Gorbachev Cold War settlement. in February 1990. Therefore, Russia regards NATO’s Eastern enlargement In 1990, Bush and Baker promised as a Western betrayal. The minutes of Gorbachev they would transform the respective bilateral meetings be- NATO from a military alliance into tween US, West German, and Soviet a political organization and reform leaders can now be accessed in archives the CSCE into the main European in Washington, Berlin, and Moscow. security forum. Genscher also prom- They reveal that the West did not of- ised to transform the CSCE into the fer a clear, legally binding promise to dominant security alliance in Europe, Moscow not to expand NATO east- replacing the Cold War military al- wards. These talks focused on German liances NATO and the Warsaw Pact. reunification and the territory of the In 1990, Genscher (and his advi- German Democratic Republic (GDR) sors such as Dieter Kastrup, head of in 1990. A future NATO membership the Political Department, and State of Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslova- Secretary Jürgen Sudhoff) earnestly kia was not discussed. A dissolution of wished to establish a new security the Warsaw Pact was still unthinkable order in Europe, modeled after the at that time. CSCE. To honor Western partnership with Moscow, Genscher was even Later Russian criticism about a “bro- ready to dissolve NATO together ken promise” is thus based on a myth with the Warsaw Pact. His “prom- and not on verifiable documentary ev- ises” to his Soviet counterparts were idence. Non-expansion promises were therefore meant sincerely. Neverthe- only given with regard to the GDR, less, Genscher could speak neither which as part of reunified Germany for Chancellor Helmut Kohl nor for would become a member of NATO, NATO, let alone for Warsaw, Prague, but with a special military status.27 or Budapest.28

20 CONTESTED HISTORY

French President François Mitterrand organization based on the CSCE. For on 31 December 1989 also offered Washington, the exclusive NATO East Europeans a “Confederation for (without Russian membership and Europe” under France’s auspices as an without a Russian veto) should be alternative to eventually joining the preserved as the most important in- European Community. Mitterrand’s strument for stability and peace in project intended to include the Soviet Europe – and for continued US dom- Union, but to exclude the US.29 In inance in European security. addition, Eastern European countries initially also pointed to the CSCE as Already in the summer of 1990, the the preferred structural design for the possibility of a NATO membership future European security architec- of Eastern European states began to ture. In February 1990, for example, play a role in internal planning and Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel debates in Washington. Bush’s advi- called for all foreign troops to leave sors emphasized that strengthening Eastern Europe and favored the re- the CSCE at the expense of NATO placement of NATO and the Warsaw was out of the question. In July 1990, Pact with a pan-European organiza- Baker bluntly warned Bush that “the tion along CSCE lines. At that time, real risk to NATO is CSCE”.31 Rather Poland also thought a new European than to create a truly new interna- security structure would supersede tional order, the US instead preferred both Cold War alliances – and agreed to perpetuate Cold War institutions with Gorbachev’s plea that the Warsaw that it already dominated.32 Pact should be preserved, since it was needed, in Poland’s view, to guarantee In its diplomacy with Moscow, Wash- its borders.30 ington still assured Gorbachev that the West would limit NATO’s influ- The US, however, resisted these calls ence and instead strengthen the pan- for pan-Europeanism by Gorbachev, European CSCE. In several public Genscher, Mitterrand, Havel, and speeches and in meetings with their others. The Bush administration in- Soviet counterparts, US leaders prom- ternally decided in early 1990 that the ised that European security would new security order in Europe should become more integrative and more not be completely different from the cooperative – and NATO less impor- Cold War order. The future security tant. Talking to Soviet Foreign Min- architecture should not be centered ister Eduard Shevardnadze on 5 May around a new, pan-European security 1990, for example, Baker promised

21 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 to build a “new legitimate European After the collapse of the Soviet Union structure – one that would be inclu- and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact sive, not exclusive.”33 and after war had broken out in the Balkans, the planned transformation From a Western perspective, hopes of NATO from a military pact into a were still high in the early 1990s that political organization was put on hold. Russia could be integrated into the Fear of a return of Russian imperialism emerging European security system. and expansionism led Eastern Euro- Russia was no longer treated as an ad- peans in particular to push for NATO versary. At NATO summits in London enlargement. NATO was preserved as (1990) and Rome (1991), the vision an insurance policy against a future of Russia’s future integration into the resurgent Russia. The administration Euro-Atlantic security community of US President Bill Clinton worked was still upheld. Under the label “new hard to have Russia support the West- world order”, the new cooperative ern military intervention and peace- spirit between the former Cold War keeping mission in Bosnia (IFOR) in rivals was successfully implemented in 1995 – 6. Russia joined UN sanctions the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein against Serbia and Montenegro and in 1991. agreed to suspend the OSCE membership of these two countries in 1993. In The informal Cold War settlement the spirit of cooperative security, the reached in 1990, however, did not Kremlin also gave a green light to the last very long. Actually, it collapsed OSCE’s deployment of an assistance already one year later. Instead of the group to Chechnya in 1995.35 Soviet Union, the West was now facing a much weaker Russia. After the NATO’s eastern enlargement was disintegration of the USSR, Moscow sold to Russia as a win-win solution, was no longer an equal partner in the since extending NATO membership debates about shaping the future secu- to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech rity order in Europe.34 In the 1990s, Republic would also increase stabil- the US no longer perceived Russia as ity on Russia’s western border. NATO an ideological or military rival. The expansion, desired by Central and emerging European security architec- Eastern European governments and ture became US-dominated and was strongly supported by the US and largely based on the status quo with Germany, was compensated with a NATO as its central pillar (as desired special NATO-Russia partnership for- by Bush’s advisors in mid-1990). mat – the NATO-Russia Permanent

22 CONTESTED HISTORY

Go East: Stages of NATO’s Enlargement, 1952 – 2016

Canada

USA

Member since: 1949 1952 1955 (incl. territory of former GDR, added in 1990) 1982 1999 2004 2009 Signed but not ratified: 2016 NATO aspirant countries

Iceland

Norway

Estonia

Latvia Denmark Lithuania United Kingdom

Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Lux. Czech Rep. Slovakia France Hungary

Slovenia Romania Italy Croatia Portugal Bosnia & Georgia Herz.

Spain Mont. Bulgaria

Mac. Albania Turkey Greece

Source: NATO

23 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Joint Council (PJC), established in towards NATO membership for some 1997 – as well as with a Western invi- in 1994. As a recently declassified tation for Russia to join the exclusive memorandum of conversation makes G7 club (1997). clear, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher promised Yeltsin on 23 From a Russian perspective, NATO October 1993 in Moscow that noth- expansion led to a European security ing would be done to exclude Russia architecture that was increasingly built from “full participation in the future against, rather than with, Russia – de- security of Europe”. Presenting US spite Western good intentions to sta- plans for a NATO Partnership for bilize Mitteleuropa and despite the es- Peace (PfP), Christopher emphasized tablishment of privileged partnership that PfP would be open for all for- formats between NATO and Russia. mer Soviet and Warsaw Pact states, With each further NATO expansion including Russia, and “there would round, the 1989 vision of a “Europe be no effort to exclude anyone and whole and free” (George H.W. Bush there would be no step taken at this in Mainz) contrasted with the iso- time to push anyone ahead of others”. lated position of Russia. Moscow had When a relieved Yeltsin learned that a voice in European security, but no the US would only offer partnership veto. While Central and Eastern Eu- rather than membership or an asso- ropean states joined NATO and the ciate status to Central and Eastern EU, Russia was left outside of these European countries, he told Christo- security institutions. Europe appeared pher that this was a “really great idea” to be divided again between East and and a “brilliant stroke” that would re- West, with a new demarcation line move all the tension that had existed moved further to the east than the in Russia regarding NATO’s response original Iron Curtain – now running to Central and Eastern European alli- from Narva in the Baltic to Mariupol ance aspirations.36 on the Sea of Azov. When Clinton told Yeltsin in Sep- Increasingly, the Kremlin perceived tember 1994 that NATO would soon the evolution of European security as expand, Yeltsin felt betrayed, having zero-sum-game rather than a coopera- been given the promise of “partner- tive undertaking. Russia felt particu- ship for all, not NATO for some” by larly betrayed by the Clinton adminis- Christopher less than a year earlier. tration’s move from a policy of NATO He used a CSCE meeting in Buda- partnership for all (including Russia) pest in December 1994 to warn his

24 CONTESTED HISTORY

Western colleagues that Europe was international contact group with the “risking encumbering itself with a cold US, France, Britain, Germany, and peace”. Emphasizing that Russia and Italy trying to mediate a diplomatic the West were no longer adversaries, solution. Moscow accused the West but partners, he emphasized that the of breaching the Helsinki principles plans to expand NATO were contrary of territorial integrity and inviolabil- to the logic not to create new divi- ity of borders.40 sions, but promote European unity.37 After “color revolutions” in Georgia Throughout the 1990s, Russia ad- (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyr- vanced proposals and ideas for a gyzstan (2005) and under the im- transformation of the CSCE/OSCE pression of George W. Bush’s “free- into a regional security organization dom agenda”, in a speech delivered that was legally incorporated, with a in early 2007 at the Munich Security legally binding charter, and a Europe- Forum, Putin stigmatized the OSCE an Security Council based on the UN as a “vulgar instrument” of the West, model. From the Russian perspec- aiming at advancing Western inter- tive, weakening NATO and the US ests at Russia’s expense. He meant the role in Europe was part of the think- OSCE’s election monitoring missions ing.38 These Russian reform propos- and field missions to verify compli- als were all rejected by the West and ance with human and civil right disappointed Russian hopes that the commitments. These missions were CSCE/OSCE would become the cent- increasingly criticized by Moscow as er of the European security system as an unacceptable interference in in- promised by the West in 1990. The ternal affairs and as violations of state emergence of the weakly-institution- sovereignty.41 The Arab rebellions alized OSCE in 1995 also dashed Rus- and Western military intervention in sian hopes for a new pan-European Libya in 2011 marked another step, security organization.39 in Russian eyes, from cooperation to confrontation. The worldviews of Russia and the West visibly collided in the spring of Then again, Putin’s anti-Western 1999. Yeltsin strongly criticized the volte-face in 2011 – 2 can maybe best unilateral military action of the West – be explained in terms of domestic without a UN Security Council man- policy. Renewed emphasis on Russia’s date – against Serbia in the Kosovo identity as a Eurasian, Slavic, Ortho- War. Russia had been a member of an dox power was an important element

25 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 in Putin’s presidential election cam- the end, the key question of Russia’s paign.42 To avoid mass-protests and a role in European security was avoided regime change in Moscow, Putin ad- and not seriously discussed. By 2008, vanced anti-Western rhetoric for a ral- Russia had given up hope of playing ly-around-the-flag effect and to deflect an active, equal role in Euro-Atlantic domestic attention from structural Security. Putin began looking for economic problems in Russia. Thus, an alternative project where Russia many Russia experts are convinced would be a regional hegemon in the that Putin’s fear of a “color revolution” post-Soviet space.45 Since 2014, the in Moscow, inspired by the “Maidan issue of how to deal with Russia has protests” in Kiyv, was an important returned to the political agendas of motive for intervening militarily in the West in a most dramatic fashion. Ukraine.43 The strengthening of authoritarian rule in Russia under Putin, Rebuilding Trust: Thoughts on the in contrast to the values of the Charter Future of European Security of Paris, contributed to the mounting A look back can help us to under- crisis between Russia and the West. stand Russia’s present and future role in Europe. The history of the Hel- In retrospect, the window of oppor- sinki Process and the Conference on tunity for truly cooperative security Security and Cooperation in Europe between Russia and West had already (CSCE, 1972 – 94) encourages hope closed by early 1992, after the Soviet that a new transformation from con- Union had collapsed. European se- flict to cooperation might again be curity now became US-dominated possible in a peaceful way and in an and NATO-centered. The Cold War inclusive, multilateral diplomatic set- settlement of 1990 and the vision of ting – just as it was in the 1970s and an inclusive, pan-European new secu- 1980s, when East and West, despite rity architecture, as promised by the their intense strategic rivalry, were George H.W. Bush administration able to conduct a pragmatic dialogue and German Foreign Minister Hans- to reach consensus on the most im- Dietrich Genscher, never materialized. portant security issues in Europe. No The relations between Russia and the side benefits from a permanent state West deteriorated in stages, and tense of confrontation. Communication relations were interrupted by at least is important for de-escalation, and four “resets” and fresh starts to im- dialogue is an important prerequisite prove cooperation.44 But these “hon- for détente. It needs to be empha- eymoons” never lasted long – and in sized that dialogue is not the same as

26 CONTESTED HISTORY

From Cooperation to Confrontation American opinions of Russia and Russian opinions of the United States, 1989 – 2016

% Fall of the BerlinCollapse Wall of the USSR Dayton Agreement Kosovo War 9/11 Invasion ofOrange Iraq Revolution Russo-Georgian WarArab Spring Invasion of the 100 in Ukraine Crimea 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2011 1991 2015 2013 2012 1997 1995 2014 2016 1993 1992 2010 2001 1994 1998 1989 1996 1999 1990 2007 2005 2003 2002 2004 2008 2006 2009 2000 Favorable view of the United States by Russians Favorable view of Russia by Americans

Sources: Gallup; Levada-Center appeasement, and that listening to and of mutual mistrust between Russia trying to understand the other side’s and the West need to be discussed grievances is not the same as taking and clarified. It is essential to under- them at face value. stand the precise reasons for Russia’s long-standing adversarial relationship Much like the CSCE in the Cold War, with the West. The Helsinki Process the OSCE today seems to be the best- – an open, inclusive dialogue among suited forum for such a sustainable, all parties of a conflict – is an interest- permanent exploration of practical ing model for slowly rebuilding trust ways for carefully managing the cur- that was destroyed in the last two dec- rent volatile confrontation with Rus- ades and for returning to a more con- sia, while defending firmly Western structive Western-Russian relation- interests and values.46 The deep causes ship. Such a reconciliation process,

27 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 however, is lengthy and requires pa- again and the initial euphoria in Mos- tience. Instead of ignoring or deriding cow with Trump’s victory is already alternative narratives, they should be evaporating.48 actively tackled and changed. Insights into mistakes made in the past and Achieving consensus among OSCE missed opportunities might help us re- participating States on a new nego- discover a mutually acceptable vision tiation process aimed at formulating for peaceful coexistence in Europe. a “Helsinki II” is currently also unrealistic. After all, the principles of the At the same time, supposedly attractive 1975 Helsinki Final Act have been alternatives to multilateral, coopera- negotiated between East and West tive security such as a “Yalta II” agree- and are thus universal, not Western ment must be unmasked as mislead- principles. The “Helsinki Decalogue” ing historical analogies. A “Yalta II”, has served its purpose well for over a new great-power agreement like the four decades. In this respect, the Pan- one reached on Crimea in 1945 be- el of Eminent Persons (PEP) report of tween the “Big Three” (Joseph Stalin, 2015 – employing an apt metaphor Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston – argues that the rules of traffic don’t Churchill) to define and recognize have to be changed just because one boundaries and spheres of interest, driver ran a red light.49 seems an impractical notion. Anyone seriously entertaining the historical However, there is a need to discuss analogy would soon remember that a the different views as to how these new Yalta pact first requires another principles (e.g., non-use of force or world war, and that a new Yalta pact self-determination) must be inter- would be diametrically opposed to the preted in the current situation. Their 1975 Helsinki principles and the spirit interpretation as substantiated in the of the OSCE.47 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe has been overtaken by events. An in- Recently, the idea that US President formal dialogue in the OSCE could Donald Trump might be open to the aim at drafting substantiation of the idea of a “Big Two” deal with Putin – Helsinki principles for the 21st centu- much to the consternation of Amer- ry, a “Paris II”, so to speak, to be for- ica’s (Eastern) European allies, who mally codified again at future OSCE fear an arrangement concluded with- summit, maybe in 2020, celebrating out their participation and at their the 45th anniversary of the Helsinki expense – was put into perspective Final Act.

28 CONTESTED HISTORY

In the meantime, cooperation between in December 2016 at the OSCE the West and Russia will be limited to Ministerial Council with the “man- selective, interest-based, transactional date of Hamburg”.53 Now, in 2017, cooperation. A return to broader co- the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship operation is dependent on a consensus is tasked with organizing an infor- in the Ukraine Crisis and a face-saving mal, structured dialogue on differ- exit strategy for Russia from Ukraine. ent threat perceptions and security This seems to be unrealistic for the issues in Europe. Another innovative time being, because neither the newly possible step for a return to dialogue appointed US President Trump nor was recently proposed by the Panel of Russian President Putin before his re- Eminent Persons (PEP), a wise men election in 2018 can afford to be ac- committee tasked by the OSCE Tro i - cused of weakness or appeasement.50 ka of Switzerland, Serbia, and Ger- The fact that the West insists on penal- many in 2015 to draw lessons from izing Russia for annexing Crimea and the Ukraine Crisis for the OSCE and breaking international law and the European security. In its follow-up Helsinki principles is understandable. report, the PEP in December 2016 However, in the long run, it is more suggested that the OSCE Strategy to important that the Russian annexa- Address Threats to Security and Sta- tion of Crimea (similarly to Kosovo’s bility from 2003 be updated to reflect unilateral declaration of independence the changes in international security – despite all important differences be- since then.54 tween the two cases)51 are regarded as disputed exceptions to the still gener- The aims of such a multilateral dia- ally accepted principle that borders in logue should include a better under- Europe can only be changed by mu- standing of the past grievances of the tual consent of the motherland and other side, i.e., the different views and the regional population, and only interpretations of events in Europe peacefully.52 It is better to have two in- since 1990 and the different views on dividual cases of disputed exceptions the causes of the breakdown of trust. than a generally ignored and violated In learning from the past, a return to core principle. the vision of a commonly shared security community in Europe also re- A first trust-building step on the quires tackling the difficult question lengthy road back from conflict to of Russia’s role in European security. cooperation beyond interest-based A sustainable and stable peaceful Eu- transactional cooperation was made ropean security order should be based

29 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 on the original rationale and spirit of the 19th and 20th century.56 Patiently the Cold War settlement, namely that bringing back Russia to the rules- indivisible security in Europe needs based Helsinki order will not be pos- to be built together with Russia – sible overnight – and it might in fact and not against Russia. In retrospect, only be realized after the Putin and moving up the timetable for exclu- the Trump years. sive NATO enlargement (which upset Russia) rather than sticking to the in- Respectful discussion of facts while clusive Partnership for Peace strategy maintaining divergent opinions has (which was welcomed in Moscow in become more difficult in the world 1993) might not have been the wisest today. In an increasingly fragmented, strategy of the West in the mid-1990s polarized, and politicized media land- – as historians like George F. Kennan scape, facts seem to matter less and cautioned at the time. In 1996 – 7, less, as fake news, the use of trolls, or the 92-year old Kennan warned that automated social media bots prolifer- NATO’s expansion into former Soviet ate. It may seem naïve to hope that territory was the “most fateful error scholarly discourse over the recent of American policy in the entire post- past will contribute to overcoming cold-war era” and a “strategic blunder grievances over the evolution of Eu- of potentially epic proportions”.55 ropean security after 1990. However, particularly to avoid slipping into a History can be a guide towards a “post-truth” world influenced by “al- richer understanding of past policy ternative facts”, European societies decisions; but it should not serve as need to invest in education and media an excuse for Putin’s illegal military literacy.57 A historical understanding intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Rus- of Western policy after 1989, based sia needs to recognize that the notion on available and valuable archival of spheres of influence, demarcated sources, is also highly relevant for to end any further NATO enlarge- Western relations with Russia today ment into the former Soviet space and – to counter harmful propaganda and (semi-)autocratic regimes, contradicts hostile rhetoric on both sides with fundamental, universally accepted realistic judgment, based on a sound ideas of sovereignty, equality, and the understanding of empirical historical freedom of states to choose their alli- facts. ances. Great-power politics and Yalta deals are ghosts from the past that The history of the Helsinki Pro- should remain in history books about cess impressively demonstrates that

30 CONTESTED HISTORY

positive change is possible in the long 5 See e.g. Anne Applebaum, “The Myth of Russian Humiliation”, in: The Washington Post, run, if dialogue with rivals and inclu- 17.10.2014; Michael McFaul, “The Myth of sive, multilateral diplomacy are kept Putin’s Strategic Genius”, in: The New York alive also in times of crisis and tension. Times, 23.10.2015. In addition, Western governments and 6 Panel of Eminent Persons, Back to Diplomacy societies need to be more self-confi- (Vienna: OSCE, 2015), 2. dent in the superiority of their liberal, 7 See e.g. Frédéric Bozo et al., “On the Politics of History, the Making of Deals, and the Way the rules-based international model over Old Becomes the New”, in: Fréderic Bozo et al. illiberal alternatives that envisage a (eds.), German Reunification: A Multinational History (London: Routledge, 2016), 1 – 11, return to the concert of great powers. here at 1ff. If the past is indeed the prologue of 8 George Santayana, The Life of Reason: Reason the future, this is the most important in Common Sense (New York: Scribner’s Sons, lesson today’s policymakers should 1905), 284. draw from the complicated history of 9 Henry Meyer et al., Russia’s Medvedev: We are how the Cold War was overcome in a in ‘a New Cold War, in: Bloomberg Business, peaceful way. 13.02.2016. 10 See Dmitri Trenin, “Welcome to Cold War II”, in: Foreign Policy, 04.03.2014; “The New Cold War”, in: The Guardian, 19.11.2014; Robert Legvold, Return to Cold War (Cambridge: Pol- 1 Richard Sakwa, “Reflections on Post-Cold War icy, 2016). Trenin later changed his mind and Order”, in: Thomas Frear and Lukasz Kulesa now emphasizes that he does not find the Cold (eds.), Competing Western and Russian Narratives War analogy very useful. See Dmitri Trenin, on the European Order: Is there Common Ground? Should We Fear Russia? (Cambridge: Polity, (London/Moscow: ELN/RIAC, 2016). 2016), 2.

2 See e.g. Alexander J. Motyl, “The Sources of 11 See “Putin’s Cold War: Using Russian En- Russian Conduct: The New Case for Contain- ergy as a Political Weapon”, in: Der Spiegel, ment”, in: Foreign Affairs Blog, 16.11.2014; 09.01.2006; Edward Lucas, The New Cold War Matthew Rojansky, “George Kennan Is Still (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). the Russia Expert America Needs”, in: Foreign Policy Blog, 22.12.2016; Stephen Kotkin, “What 12 Pal Dunay, “The Future in the Past: Lessons would Kennan do?”, in: Princeton Alumni Week- from Ukraine for the Future”, in: Samuel Goda ly, 02.03.2016. et. al. (eds.), International Crisis Management (Amsterdam: IOS, 2016), 162 – 172. 3 Sergey Karaganov, “Time to End the Cold War in Europe”, in: Russia in Global Affairs, 13 See Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and 28.04.2014. For a critical discussion, see the Rest (London: Allen Lane, 2011). Patrick Nopens, “Beyond Russia’s ‘Versailles Syndrome’”, in: Egmont Security Policy Brief, 14 Andrew Monaghan, “A New Cold War?”, 25.11.2014. Chatham House Research Paper, 05.2015, 5f.

4 Dmitry Suslov, The Russian Perception of the Post-Cold War Era and Relations with the West, Lecture given at Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 09.11.2016.

31 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

15 “U.S. Military Budget: Components, Chal- 25 Andrey Kortunov, “Russia and the West: What lenges, Growth”, in: The Balance, 26.10.2016. Does ‘Equality’ Mean?”, in: Andris Spruds and However, the GDP share of defense in Russia Diana Potjomkina (eds.), Coping with Complex- (budget 2017: 3.3 percent) is comparable with ity in the Euro-Atlantic Community and Beyond the situation in the US. See “Russian military (Riga: LIIA, 2016), 83 – 90, here at 85f. spending cut significantly”, in: Russia & India Report, 02.11.2016. 26 Vladimir Putin, Address by President of the Rus- sian Federation, 18.03.2014; Vladimir Putin, 16 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion 04.10.2016. Club, 14.10.2014.

17 World Bank, Russia Economic Report 36, 27 Mark Kramer, “The Myth of a No-NATO-En- 09.11.2016. largement Pledge to Russia”, in: Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009), 39 – 61. 18 Globally, Russia commands over 45 percent of gas reserves, 23 percent of coal reserves, and 28 Kristina Spohr, “Precluded or Precedent-set- 13 percent of oil reserves. Quoted in Levgold, ting? The NATO Enlargement Question in the Return to Cold War, 5. Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplo- macy of 1990/1991 and Beyond”, in: Journal 19 David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, of Cold War Studies 14, no. 4 (2012), 4 – 54. “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern In the German political system, the Federal Flank”, in: RAND Research Report no. 1253 Chancellor has the power to determine policy (2016). In all of the invasion scenarios used in guidelines (“Richtlinienkompetenz”), including war gaming the defense of the Baltics, Russian on foreign policy. forces reached Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours, leaving NATO with only bad options. The study 29 Liana Fix, European Security and the End of recommends increasing NATO forces by up to the Cold War: Gorbachev’s Common European seven brigades. Home Concept and its Perception in the West (unpublished manuscript, London School of 20 Wolfgang Zellner et al., European Security: Chal- Economics, 2012), 24. lenges at the Societal Level (Vienna: OSCE, 2016), 18f. See also Dmitri Trenin, The Ukrainian Crisis 30 Vojtech Mastny, “Germany’s Unification, Its and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry (Mos- Eastern Neighbors, and European Security”, in: cow: Carnegie, 2014), 3. Frédéric Bozo et al. (eds.), German Reuni- fication: A Multinational History (London: 21 Legvold, Return to Cold War, 28ff. Routledge, 2016), 202 – 226, here at 210 – 213.

22 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The 31 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement”, in: Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Survival 51, no. 6 (2009 – 10), 39 – 62; Samuel Offer to Limit NATO Expansion”, in: Interna- Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, “How to Avoid tional Security 40, no. 4 (2016), 7 – 44 and 31. a New Cold War”, in: Current History 113, Similarly, Bush warned Kohl on 24 February no. 765 (2014), 265 – 271; Levgold, Return to 1990 that if the CSCE would replace NATO, Cold War, 6; Andrew C. Kuchins, Elevation and “we will have a real problem”. Quoted in Mary Calibration (CGI, December 2016). This view is Elise Sarotte, “‘His East European Allies Say also shared by former political leaders and senior They Want to Be in NATO’: U.S. Foreign Pol- officials including Mikhail Gorbachev, Robert icy, German Reunification, and NATO’s Role Gates, and Henry Kissinger. in European Security, 1989 – 90”, in: Frédéric Bozo et al. (eds.), German Reunification: A Mul- 23 Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: tinational History (London: Routledge, 2016), U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First 69 – 87 and 81. Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 11.

24 Kuchins, Elevation and Calibration, 13.

32 CONTESTED HISTORY

32 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create 43 Hanns Maull,“Die Ukraine-Krise und die Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton Zukunft Europäischer Sicherheit”, Lecture, University Press, 2009). For a similar view, see CSS/ETH, 30.06.2015. See also Nicolas Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Bouchet, “Russia’s ‘Militarization’ of Colour Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Revolutions”, in: CSS Policy Perspectives 4, no. 2 Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), (2016); Dmitry Gorenburg, “Putin Isn’t Chas- 279 – 298. ing After Empire in Ukraine; He Fears a Color Revolution at Home”, in: The Moscow Times, 33 These promises were part of the so-called “Nine 25.09.2014. Assurances” that James Baker delivered to Gorbachev in May 1990 to get Soviet consent 44 As chronicled in Angela Stent’s volume, the to NATO membership of a reunified Germany. first reset was in 1992 between Bush sen. and Shifrinson, Deal or No Deal, 29f. Yeltsin; the second reset (“The Bill and Boris Show”) between Clinton and Yeltsin in 1993; 34 Kuchins, Elevation and Calibration, 13. the third reset between Bush jr. and Putin after 11 September 2001; and the fourth reset 35 James Headley, Russia and the Balkans: Foreign between Obama and Putin in 2009. Periods of Policy from Yeltsin to Putin (London: Hurst, dialogue and partnership always ended in tense 2008). relations and mutual criticism. Stent, Limits of Partnership. 36 James Goldgeier, “Promises Made, Promises Broken? What Yeltsin Was Told About NATO 45 Nopens, Beyond Russia’s ‘Versailles Syndrome’, 3. in 1993 and Why It Matters”, in: War on the Rocks, 12.09.2016. 46 Petri Hakkarainen and Christian Nünlist, “Trust and Realpolitik: The OSCE in 2016”, 37 Ibid. in: CSS Policy Perspectives 4, no. 1 (2016).

38 Elena Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s 47 Christian Nünlist, “The OSCE and the Future OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the of European Security”, in: CSS Analysis in Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis”, in: Security Policy, no. 202 (2017). Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (2015), 6 – 24. On Gorbachev’s vision of 48 Timothy Garton Ash, “Putin’s Investment in a “common European home”, see Marie-Pierre Trump Backfires”, in: Kyiv Post, 17.02.2017. Rey, “European is Our Common Home: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept”, in: 49 PEP, Back to Diplomacy, 5. Cold War History 4, no. 2 (2004), 33 – 65. 50 Matthew Rojansky, “The Geopolitics of 39 Kropatcheva, Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Poli- European Security and Cooperation: The Con- cy, 11. sequences of U.S.-Russia Tension”, in: Security and Human Rights 25 (2014), 169 – 179. 40 Heinz Loquai, “Kosovo: A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?”, in: 51 For a discussion of why Kosovo’s declaration of OSCE Yearbook (1999), 79 – 92. independence in 2008 cannot serve as a precedent for Russia’s invasion and annexation of 41 Vladimir Putin, “Monopolare Welt ist Crimea in 2014, see, e.g., Christian Weisflog, undemokratisch und gefährlich”, Sputnik “Warum die Krim nicht Kosovo ist”, in: Neue Deutschland, 10.02.2007. On Putin’s “coun- Zürcher Zeitung, 18.11.2014. terrevolutionary obsession”, see Mark Kramer, “Why Russia Intervenes”, in: Carnegie Forum on 52 Rojansky, Geopolitics of European Security, Rebuilding U.S.-Russia Relations, 08.2014. 176.

42 Kuchins, Elevation and Calibration, 19 and 27. 53 OSCE, From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control, 09.12.2016.

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54 Panel of Eminent Persons, Renewing Dialogue on European Security: A Way Forward, 23.11.2016.

55 George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error”, in: The New York Times, 05.02.1997; Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoire of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002), 220.

56 See Liana Fix, “Time for a Helsinki 2.0?”, in: Intersection, 09.2015.

57 See Munich Security Report 2017 (Munich: MSC, 2017), 42.

34 CHAPTER 2 Looking Beyond Trump Jack Thompson

Support in the United States for the liberal world order is under threat from a combination of profound economic, cultural, and political changes. The election of Donald Trump, and the emergence of his America First credo, underscores the fact that the world can no longer depend upon the US to pursue an internationalist foreign policy. Europe, in particular, would do well to begin planning for a future in which the US is more skeptical of alliances and trade agreements and less willing to provide leadership in addressing international challenges.

US President-elect Donald Trump speaks during a “USA Thank You Tour” event at Giant Center in Hershey, Pennsylvania, 15 December 2016.

35 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

For decades, Americans benefited institutionalized the role of the US as greatly from the liberal international an economic and military superpow- order that the United States has pro- er. For decades, it also contributed to moted ever since the end of World War a steadily improving quality of life for Two. This includes formal security alli- most Americans and optimism about ances with Europe, in the form of the the future. Not surprisingly, this ar- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, rangement faced little opposition for and with nations such as Australia, Ja- many years and a bipartisan consen- pan, and South Korea. It is also based sus coalesced around international- upon a set of financial, monetary, and ism as the cornerstone of US foreign trade institutions that have encour- policy. Seminal advice from leaders in aged international trade, placed the US the early 19th century, such as Thomas dollar at the heart of the international Jefferson and John Quincy Adams, economy – first as part of the Bretton about avoiding “entangling allianc- Woods System and after 1971 as the es” and not going abroad “in search world’s foremost reserve currency – of monsters to destroy”, no longer and made New York City the world’s seemed relevant. leading financial center. Key financial and monetary institutions, such as Recently however, and especially the World Bank and the International since the Great Recession of 2008, it Monetary Fund, are located in Wash- has become clear that many Ameri- ington DC. In addition, the liberal or- cans no longer see the liberal inter- der relies upon respect for a shared set national order as a beneficial arrange- of values. These include administering ment. This means that the election of democratic elections, protecting the Donald Trump, and the embrace by rights of religious and ethnic minori- many of his “America First” credo, is a ties, a commitment to human rights, symptom, not the cause, of an under- and upholding the rule of law. lying evolution in the political fun- damentals – namely, that US foreign Maintaining this web of alliances, policy is undergoing its most dramatic economic structures, and values has transformation since the onset of the not come without challenges. These Cold War. Three interrelated types of included the collapse of the Bretton problems that, it is clear with hind- Woods System in 1971 and longstand- sight, have been gestating for years ing imbalances in military spending are driving this: globalization fatigue between the US and its allies. Over- and other economic crises; increasing all, however, it has reinforced and multiculturalism and a corresponding

36 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP backlash among cultural conserva- in crisis for some time. The overarch- tives; and political dysfunction. ing problem is often characterized as globalization fatigue (a term which The upshot is that internationalism is cannot convey the massive trans- no longer the default American world- formation that has taken place for view. This should worry the rest of the many Americans): discontent with world. Europe, in particular, should the upheavals that usually accompany think carefully about its longstanding deeper integration with the global partnership with the US, especially economy, such as loosened capital when it comes to European goals and controls, lowered barriers to trade, values, trade, security cooperation, and reducing obstacles to foreign di- and the rise of right-wing populism. rect investment.

Globalization Fatigue and The problem Americans most fre- Interlinked Economic Crises quently attribute to globalization is Recent headlines would seem to indi- the loss of manufacturing jobs to low- cate that the US economy is relatively er-income countries (though many strong. After contracting by 2.8 per economists consider technology to cent in the wake of the global eco- have had a much larger effect in this nomic crisis, gross domestic product respect). The conventional argument grew steadily between 2010 and 2015 in favor of free trade holds that, al- and appears to have been at least as though some sectors of the economy strong in 2016. The unemployment will see job losses due to competition rate, after reaching a peak of 10 per from cheaper imports, workers in cent in October of 2010 – which is these industries will find employment very high by US standards – has been in more efficient areas and the over- steadily dropping. It reached a low all economy will benefit. However, of 4.6 per cent in November 2016, as the authors of a recent paper on which constitutes full employment in trade with China argue, the reality the US context. Perhaps most impres- has been more complicated. Job losses sively, household income rose by more in industries exposed to import com- than 5 per cent in 2015, breaking a petition have been significant, as ex- pattern of years of stagnation.1 pected, but new jobs for these workers in other industries have mostly However, a closer look indicates that not emerged. To make matters worse, important sectors of the economy, and areas of the country where the worst- many parts of the country, have been affected industries are located, such as

37 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 parts of the Midwest and Southeast, – is higher still: nearly 15 per cent for have also experienced rising unem- college graduates and 37 per cent for ployment rates overall, as the depar- those with only a high school diplo- ture of the manufacturing base under- ma. These numbers are even worse for mines the rest of the local economy African-Americans and Hispanics.3 (and as Americans, once famously peripatetic, become less willing and/ Even for those that manage to en- or able to relocate). This has literally ter university, formidable challenges become a matter of life and death. Re- await that are further reducing social gions disproportionately exposed to mobility and increasing income ine- trade liberalization have higher rates quality. The cost of attending univer- of mortality, due to suicide and other sity in the US has risen dramatically causes of death that have been linked over the last few decades, at a rate far to reduced income and employment. higher than inflation, from an average This has been particularly true for of just under USD 11,000 in 1983 – 4, working-class white Americans.2 for four-year institutions, to more than USD 36,000 in 2013 – 4. This Those working in traditional manu- has made higher education much less facturing jobs are not the only ones affordable for the middle and working to have suffered in recent years. Young classes and, not surprisingly, led to an Americans also face significant eco- explosion in student debt levels. As of nomic challenges. The extent to which September 2016, borrowers no longer these can be directly attributed to glo- in school owed almost USD 1.4 tril- balization is debatable, but the end lion in loans. Many of these former result – pervasive resentment of the students – about one quarter – are be- status quo – is not. The official unem- hind in their loan payments or are in ployment rate for those under the age default. This has prompted warnings of 25 was 11.5 per cent in July 2016. from some observers of a student debt However, that number understates “bubble” reminiscent of the housing the problem, perhaps by a significant bubble prior to the 2008 financial margin. A report by the Economic crisis.4 Policy Institute in 2015 found that the unemployment rate for recent high At the same time that many sectors of school graduates is almost 20 per cent. the traditional manufacturing econ- The underemployment rate – which omy contract, and young Americans tracks part-time work undertaken by endure a prolonged economic crisis, those who would prefer full-time jobs other concerns have emerged. One

38 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP

The Rich Getting Richer Family income growth, by income group, 1957 – 2013 200 Lowest fifth Second fifth Middle fifth 150 Fourth fifth 80th – 95th percentile Top 5 percent 100

0 1975 1955 2015 1985 1965 1970 1995 1950 2010 1980 1960 1990 2005 2000

Source: Economic Policy Institute worrisome trend is the disconnect be- It is true that many communities tween labor force productivity and in- in the US have benefited consider- come. The share of economic output ably from adapting to the globalized that workers collect in wages is at the economy. And a plausible argument lowest level on record. In fact, since can be made that overall the US is the early 1970s, even as the productiv- in a stronger position because of its ity of the workforce has increased by willingness to embrace the transfor- more than 70 per cent, pay levels have mation induced by globalization. But been stagnant, rising only 8.7 per cent the process has taken a profound toll over a span of three decades. A second on many parts of the country. problem is rapidly growing inequality, to perhaps the highest level in US his- This is not only a matter of eco- tory. Since 1979, the wages of the top nomic concern; it is also clear that 1 per cent of earners have increased globalization has become difficult 138 per cent, whereas the income of to sustain politically. Even if we set the bottom 90 per cent has only risen aside as a fluke the election of Don- 15 per cent. Hence, by 2013 families ald Trump – who ran for president in the top ten per cent controlled more on a staunch anti-globalization plat- than 75 per cent of all family wealth.5 form – his worldview is increasingly

39 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 representative of the Grand Old Party majority of children under one year of (GOP). A majority of Republican vot- age were racial or ethnic minorities.7 ers now consider global economic ties to be, on the whole, bad for the US. Many observers – especially those in What is more, although Democrats the media and academic elite – have still consider engagement with the celebrated this fact, or at least por- global economy to be worthwhile (al- trayed it as a normal and mostly ad- beit by a narrow margin), a majority of vantageous consequence of living in Americans now consider it to be bad a globalized era. There is much to be for employment and wage levels.6 said for this viewpoint: the newcom- ers prevent population loss – a criti- Given the longstanding commitment cal problem facing some advanced to internationalism among elites in economies, such as Germany and Ja- both parties, it was always likely that pan – and bring new ideas, skills, and those most concerned about the ef- customs with them when they arrive. fects of globalization would become However, the arrival of large numbers disenchanted with the status quo. In of immigrants also dilutes the pri- addition, in a country where many macy of the White Anglo-Saxon Prot- view immigration and multicultural- estant tradition that has dominated ism as being closely linked to globali- American culture since the founding zation, it was inevitable that cultural of the nation. There is considerable resentment would constitute part of unease about this among culturally the revolt against elites. conservative white Americans, many of whom have – especially in the years Multiculturalism, Immigration, and since the election of the nation’s first the Conservative Backlash non-white president, Barack Obama The US is becoming more diverse. – fiercely criticized the notion that Sometimes referred to as the “brown- immigration, diversity, and multicul- ing of America,” this trend is driven turalism are good for the country. by two factors. One is a relatively high rate of immigration – 14 per This perspective comprises several el- cent of the population is foreign-born ements. One is an urgent sense that – especially from Latin America and the country is changing rapidly, and Asia. The other is a lower fertility rate for the worse. Long before Donald among non-Hispanic whites than is Trump crafted a successful presidential the case among most minority groups. campaign around the theme of mak- For the first time in history, in 2015, a ing America great again, prominent

40 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP

The Changing Demographics of America, 1965–2065 In % of the total population

100

20 Actual Projected 0 1975 2015 1985 1965 1995 2055 2035 2025 2045 2065 2005

White Black Hispanic Asian All other

Source: Pew Research Center voices have been warning that, absent fatally, by economic globalization and dramatic changes, the nation faces an immigration from Latin America. A unpleasant future. Patrick Buchanan, focus group conducted in 2013 con- the former speechwriter for Richard cluded that self-identified Tea Party Nixon, ran for president on this plat- (essentially anti-establishment conform in the 1990s and has published servative) voters “want to return to a books with titles such as Suicide of a time when they believe government Superpower: Will America Survive to was small, people lived largely free of 2025? In Who Are We? The Challenges the government, and Americans took to America’s National Identity Samuel responsibility for themselves.”8 Huntington, the eminent political sci- entist, argued that the unique Ameri- Closely related to this notion – that can sense of identity – based upon the the country has lost touch with a Anglo-Protestant “principles of liberty, more virtuous past – is the belief that equality, individualism, representative minorities, especially African-Ameri- government, and private property” cans and Hispanics, are less likely to – was being undermined, perhaps embrace traditional values. Instead of

41 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 working hard like other Americans, Similarly, studies demonstrate that goes the argument, they are more like- whites increasingly view gains for ly to rely on the government for sup- African-Americans as coming at their port. A member of the Oklahoma state expense and view reverse racism as a legislature, for instance, argued during more significant problem than tradi- a debate about affirmative action in tional racism.10 2011, “I’ve taught school, and I saw a lot of people of color who didn’t study Working-class whites are at the heart hard because they said the govern- of the conservative cultural backlash. ment would take care of them.” One This group is confronted by multiple study found that Tea Party adherents crises. In many parts of the country, it placed considerable emphasis on their has been devastated by the loss of tra- perception of “workers” and “people ditional manufacturing jobs and stag- who don’t work.” Included in the sec- nant wage levels. In numerical terms, ond category were unauthorized im- the white working class is shrinking migrants “who may try to freeload at as a per centage of the electorate, the expense of hardworking American from nearly three quarters of eligible taxpayers.”9 voters in the mid-1970s to less than half today. They are also less healthy Indeed, a key finding of scholars who than the rest of the population. One have examined white resentment is study found that middle-aged white that, in spite of the fact that conserva- men and women suffered an increase tive intellectuals champion limited in mortality rates in recent years that government, there is actually little op- was not seen in other ethnic groups position to federally funded social in- or in other countries. The biggest insurance, among the rank and file, as creases were seen among whites with such. Instead, there is more selective lower education levels. Not surpris- anger that those who have worked ingly, scholars have documented a hard and thereby earned such assis- strong sense of unhappiness and pes- tance are being crowded out by mi- simism among suburban and rural norities who, it is believed, do not de- uneducated whites that is not found serve it. As one man in Wisconsin told among minority groups in similar a journalist, “Free services for illegal circumstances.11 immigrants? I had to fight six months to get food stamps after my back in- The white working class is all too jury ... I’m from here, my whole life aware of its diminished status, as … And this is the way we get treated.” one scholar notes, and he argues that

42 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP recognition of this – in other words, 40 per cent of whom retain faith in awareness of the fact that they no the US system.13 longer occupy a central and influential role in American life – is a key factor To be sure, the growing lack of trust in their radicalization. This process has in Washington DC cannot be attrib- played a crucial role in the emergence uted solely to the spread of illiberal (or re-emergence) of extremist po- ideas. Many Americans who embrace litical behavior in recent years. It has democratic norms are nevertheless taken several forms. One is a strong deeply pessimistic about their system correlation between white working- of government. That is because, in re- class disaffection and the renewed im- cent years, it has become increasingly portance of outright racism – as op- dysfunctional. posed to more subtle coded language – in shaping political behavior (the Political Dysfunction election of Barack Obama also played There is little common ground in US a central role in this process).12 politics these days, but voters across the spectrum agree that the govern- Another worrying manifestation of ment is broken. For the second year in radical political behavior is renewed a row, according to Gallup, respond- enthusiasm among white nationalists. ents named the government as the This includes the emergence of the so- biggest challenge facing the country. called alternative right, or alt-right, a This result reflects a number of con- loose grouping of men that, mostly cerns. Congressional job approval, for online, organizes and promotes a va- example, stands somewhere in the low riety of fringe ideas. Traditional white to mid-teens and has rarely reached supremacists have also been reinvig- 50 per cent over the last 40 years. In orated and view Donald Trump as addition, according to a recent sur- the first president in the modern era vey by the Associated Press-GfK, a who is sympathetic to some of their large majority believe that the federal objectives. government mainly benefits corpora- tions, lobbyists, and other special in- Equally disquieting is the increase in terests. Not surprisingly, nearly three illiberal political views. These numbers in four respondents believe that the are particularly high among young country is heading in the wrong di- people – only 30 per cent consider rection.14 A growing body of scholar- it “essential” to live in a democracy – ship also lends credence to the notion and among supporters of Trump, just that the government is dysfunctional.

43 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

American Trust in Government Near an all-time low 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1975 2015 1985 1965 1970 1995 2010 1980 1990 2005 2000

Source: Pew Research Center

Why is this? And why have politicians in particular, is potentially dangerous. failed to fix a set of problems that have It is an enormously powerful position been obvious for years? One explana- – if not in the original conception of tion is that these shortcomings are an the framers of the Constitution, then inevitable result of the design of the certainly in its modern, “imperial” in- US Constitution. Some scholars, for carnation – especially when it comes instance, note that presidential sys- to foreign policy. And because of the tems have, on the whole, been less sta- dissatisfaction that most voters express ble than parliamentary systems. Hold- when it comes to the government, ing separate elections for the executive there is a temptation for candidates to and legislative branches, they contend, craft personalized – even demagogic is inherently problematic because it – platforms in which they promise to inevitably leads to a fight for power. radically transform Washington DC. In fact, the US struggles across the It has also been suggested that a sys- board when it comes to running free tem conceptualized in the late 18th and fair elections. Experts found that century for a geopolitically marginal out of 22 industrialized democracies, nation with a few million inhabitants, the US ranked last in terms of electoral and which limited suffrage to a frac- integrity. The office of the presidency, tion of the populace, cannot possibly

44 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP cope with the challenges of governing (and still are in other modern democ- a democratic superpower with a glo- racies) are now overseen by Congress balized economy and a population of and the courts, much as they were in more than 320 million.15 the 19th century. The quality of government has steadily declined in re- Even those that consider the Constitu- cent decades, he contends, as the bu- tion to be of sound design tend to agree reaucracy becomes less meritocratic, that the US system of government no policymaking gets captured by special longer functions as it should. Con- interests, and the enforcement of laws servative intellectuals, for instance, becomes increasingly litigious and believe that the federal government less predictable.17 has grown too large to be effective or democratically accountable and, as a Another explanation for political result, is rife with rent-seeking behav- dysfunction is that one of the two ior by special interests. In addition, main parties has been radicalized to they contend, the president and the such an extent that it is sabotaging courts have usurped powers that the the system. For close observers of framers of the Constitution intended politics in the US, it has been clear to be exercised by Congress.16 for some time that the Republican Party – in spite of the fact that it Though few outside of the movement now controls the White House, both would agree with the conservative pre- chambers of Congress, and a major- scription for this problem – to shrink ity of governments at the state level dramatically the size of the federal – is in crisis. Most of the increase in government – the view that Washing- political polarization in recent years ton DC is more responsive to elites is the result of the GOP moving than to ordinary people is widespread. rightward, transforming from a cent- One study found, for instance, that er-right party into one that is very business groups and their political al- conservative. It is increasingly dis- lies have far more influence on public dainful of expertise and evidence and policy than do voters or civic groups. is resistant to information that does Francis Fukyama, the political scien- not originate from within the move- tist, has characterized this as part of ment (a phenomenon that has been a broader process of “political decay.” called “epistemic closure”). The result He argues that functions that, for is that, as two political scientists put much of the post-New Deal era, were it, conservatives today “show less in- the preserve of a skilled bureaucracy terest in policy details or execution

45 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 than they do in upholding the sym- in government and corporate Ameri- bolic ideals of limited government, ca. The massive bailout packages that American nationalism and cultural the financial industry and General traditionalism.”18 Motors received during the recession heightened this sense of betrayal. One consequence of this ideology is Trump’s presidential campaign plat- that, over the past two decades, Re- form was astutely designed to take publicans have shown a striking dis- advantage of such concerns. regard for the norms that are essential for the proper functioning of the Perhaps most troubling, in recent federal government. Beginning with years, is the embrace of non-dem- Newt Gingrich’s tenure as Speaker of ocratic norms in the GOP. Some the House of Representatives in the scholars have found, for instance, 1990s, they have frequently threat- that the single most reliable factor in ened to shut down the government, to predicting support for Donald Trump instigate a default on the government’s in 2016 was the degree to which vot- debt, or to eliminate vital government ers held views that correlate with programs in order to extract conces- authoritarianism (which can be de- sions from Democrats. The same is fined as a desire for order and a fear true for their growing inclination to of outsiders). It is tempting to dismiss block judicial and executive branch the party’s nomination of, and strong nominees by Democratic presidents, support in the general election for, regardless of qualifications.19 Trump – 90 per cent of Republicans voted for him – as an aberration. But This radicalization is intensified by his worldview – with his admiration unceasing pressure from the grassroots for dictators, his penchant for con- of the GOP, which is deeply suspi- spiracy theories, his suggestion that cious of party elites. One reason for he might not respect the election re- this distrust is the belief among con- sults if he lost, and his threat to put servative voters that their principal Hillary Clinton in “jail” – actually concerns – immigration, the negative dovetails nicely with conservative po- effects of globalization, and a general- litical culture. After all this is a party ized fear that the country is changing that has, in recent years, passed laws for the worse – have been ignored by designed to depress the turnout of their elected representatives, who have minority voters. Nearly three quarters prioritized tax cuts for the wealthy and of its supporters still doubt that Ba- favors for their friends and colleagues rack Obama is a US citizen.20

46 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP

That so many Republicans are suscep- last eight years in particular, whether tible to such conspiracy theories un- it relates to Barack Obama’s citizen- derscores another set of problems: the ship or global warming, false infor- fragmentation and polarization of the mation can be attractive to many media landscape. With the onset of the people if it reinforces their worldview. information age and the rise of social This is one reason that fake news has media, the choice of news providers is become such a problem. larger than ever. In contrast to most of the post-World War Two era, when In fact, fake news is now an interna- a relatively small number of newspa- tional business. In the Macedonian pers and television stations furnished town of Veles, for instance, locals the vast majority of daily news, vot- developed a thriving industry of web- ers today can consult (often partisan) sites aimed mostly at Trump voters. sources of information that conform It is also a national security problem. most closely to their preconceptions. Russia, which has developed a sophis- ticated apparatus for disseminating This has a number of consequences for propaganda abroad, takes advantage political life. The new, more diverse of the American appetite for fake media landscape paradoxically intensi- news, according to intelligence offi- fies polarization (and hinders plural- cials, and skillfully used the US media ism) as voters, especially those that are in its campaign to ensure the election most engaged with the political pro- of its preferred candidate, Trump. cess, become less open to information that contradicts their views. It also The Future of Transatlantic decreases the influence of traditional Relations authority figures in the media – such The resurgence of Russia, and its as The New York Times or the nightly willingness to manipulate Western news broadcasts on the major net- elections, highlights the indispensa- works – and those that have custom- bility of a robust US-European rela- arily used the media to communicate tionship. However the bond, as it has with potential voters, such as public existed since the end of World War officials.21 Two, is at risk. Perhaps most alarming is the fact that public support for the This means that it is increasingly diffi- transatlantic project is on the wane. cult for accurate information to reach There is profound anger at elites in the public, let alone for people to be both parties and this has affected, in persuaded. As we have seen over the particular, the traditional autonomy

47 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 of foreign policy insiders and officials. no international experience – for am- This would have been true even if bassador to the UN, and the over- Hillary Clinton had won the election. whelming support among Republi- Clinton, for instance, felt compelled cans in Congress for cutting funding to withdraw her support for the Trans- to the body do not bode well for his Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement administration’s view of the impor- when she decided to run for president. tance of international law and multi- There is no question, though, that lateral institutions. Trump’s victory has intensified the challenge facing internationalists on Moving from the systemic to the spe- both sides of the Atlantic. cific, further liberalization of trade between the US and Europe will At the systemic level, the question likely cease for the foreseeable future. from the European standpoint is: to Given Trump’s strong opposition to what degree will the US continue to be such deals, the Transatlantic Trade a viable partner for pursuing strategic and Investment Partnership (TTIP) goals and upholding values? Many of negotiations, which were already fac- the initial indications from the Trump ing potentially fatal opposition on administration are not promising in both sides, are already effectively over. this respect. Trump’s indifference to This dovetails with the president’s democratic norms – and the willing- withdrawal from the TPP agreement, ness of many Americans to overlook his promise to crack down on what he this disturbing trait – is unsettling has called unfair trading practices and for most (with the obvious exception currency manipulation by China, and of the European populist and illiberal to renegotiate the North American right). His characterization of the Eu- Free Trade Agreement. ropean Union as little more than an instrument that Germany uses against Taken as a whole Trump’s trade agen- the US in the competition for exports da could destabilize the international indicates that he has little sympathy economic system. It could also have for, or understanding of, the seminal profound strategic implications. The role the European project has played Obama administration viewed TTIP in promoting peace and stability. His and TPP as companion agreements dismissal of the United Nations as that were intended to increase trade “just a club for people to get together, and prosperity and to promote stabil- talk and have a good time,” his choice ity and the development of a rules- of Governor Nikki Haley – who has based international system, especially

48 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP in East Asia. China, which was not rhetoric rarely leads to dramatic shifts included in TPP, has moved quickly in public opinion, it can set the agen- to replace it by suggesting a Free Trade da for public discussion, especially Area of the Asia-Pacific. Success in this among voters in the same party. Also, endeavor would boost Beijing’s goal of when it comes to foreign policy many regional leadership and be a significant voters are relatively unengaged with blow to the US. the issues and frequently follow the cues of party elites.23 The magnitude of these setbacks in East Asia is compounded by the fact In other words, even though many that Trump presents transatlantic secu- Republican officials disagree with rity cooperation with its gravest chal- him, Trump has used his rise to power lenge since the inception of NATO. to inculcate skepticism of NATO into He is the first president to publicly the mainstream of Republican for- voice skepticism about the value of the eign policy thought. In this light, it alliance. It should be noted that more is worth recalling Lord Ismay’s witti- than three-quarters of Americans still cism about NATO being designed “to believe that it is beneficial and Europe keep the Russians out, the Americans continues to enjoy a positive image in in, and the Germans down”. Without the US. However, the share of voters the enthusiastic participation of the (37 per cent) who think that NATO US, which spends more than twice as benefits other countries more is almost much on defense as all other mem- as large as those (41 per cent) that be- ber countries combined, the alliance lieve it is equally important to the US. would quickly collapse and the foun- Also, a large minority of Trump’s sup- dation for European security would porters are skeptical about NATO.22 disappear.

What these numbers suggest is that, al- Ismay’s bon mot has bearing on an- though US-European security cooper- other issue: relations with Moscow. ation still enjoys broad support, it is no The president’s ambivalence about longer a political liability, as it would NATO, when seen against the back- have surely been even a decade ago, to drop of his statements about Russia, suggest that the US should reconsider suggests that there could be a signifi- its participation in NATO. Trump did cant shift in the US-European-Rus- not create this skepticism but he has sian relationship, especially as it relates used it more effectively than any pre- to the alliance’s eastern flank. It is too vious politician. Although presidential early to predict with any confidence

49 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Trump Voters During Presidential Primaries Shaky support for liberal international norms

NATO membership is bad for the US 30%

Support for building a wall on border 84% with Mexico

Immigrants are a burden to the 69% country

Muslims should be subject to more 64% scrutiny than people in other religious groups Free trade agreements have been bad 67% for the US

Free trade agreements have 60% definitely/probably hurt personal financial situation Involvement in the global economy is 65% bad for the US

In terms of solving world problems, 54% the US does too much

Support for Trump among Republican 52% voters with very high authoritarian tendencies* 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

* Scholars have found that authoritarianism was the single best predictor of support for Trump during the Republican primaries.

Sources: Pew Research Center; Vox how he would react to a conflict and it – indicate that, at a minimum, he is is possible that, sooner or later, Trump untroubled by the nature of Russian and Vladimir Putin will clash as a foreign policy. Furthermore, Trump result of their nationalistic agendas. is unenthusiastic about restraining Nonetheless, there is ample reason for Russian revanchism in Eastern Eu- concern. The nature of Trump’s com- rope. His team – which was otherwise ments – he has praised President Putin unengaged with the drafting process and called for closer ties with Moscow – intervened to ensure the removal of

50 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP a line in the Republican Party’s plat- website Breitbart News, suggest that form that called for providing lethal his praise of European nationalists is defensive weapons to Ukraine. He is more than mere rhetoric: he is look- also unwilling to commit to defending ing for ways to cooperate with them. the Baltic nations in the event of an In other words, in spite of the dif- attack. This suggests that, at a mini- ferences between Trumpism and the mum, the President cares more about agendas of these groups, there is now the relationship with Moscow than he a loose but identifiable transatlantic does about allies in Eastern Europe. It coalition of right-wing populist paris no wonder that many observers have ties that is eager to collaborate and ex- begun to speculate about a second Yal- change ideas that are hostile to liberal ta, wherein Trump and Putin would internationalism. agree to carve out spheres of influence at the expense of other nations. The Need for a More Assertive Europe This unsettling relationship, between Europe should not give up on the US. the autocrat Putin and the democrat- A majority of Americans still consider ically-elected but illiberally-inclined the transatlantic relationship to be of Trump, underscores another reason value and most members of the eco- why European policymakers should nomic and political elite believe it is take stock of their ties to the US. The imperative that the US continue to election of a radical right-wing popu- uphold the liberal international order. list to the presidency has provided These facts will not change anytime an enormous boost of confidence to soon. What is more, there is a good parallel movements in Europe. Nigel chance that Trump’s successor will be Farage campaigned for Trump (who a more desirable interlocutor. then brazenly suggested that the former UKIP leader be appointed as However, even if Trump is not re- ambassador to the US), Marine Le elected in 2020 and is replaced by a Pen has been spotted at Trump Tow- committed internationalist, the na- er, and Geert Wilders predicted that ture of US-European relations has Trump’s victory foreshadowed similar already been permanently altered. outcomes in Europe. But the links go Too much has changed for the US beyond mere favor-trading and moral to fully return to its previous role of support. Those close to Steve Bannon, unflagging leader of the free world. Trump’s chief strategist and former The allure of the nation’s approach executive chairman of the far-right to foreign policy in the 19th century,

51 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 when Americans believed that the best with the UN in particular emerging way to safeguard liberty and prosper- as a target for criticism. ity at home was to avoid involvement in problems abroad, is greater than at In sum, if it cares about the mainte- any point since 1945. nance of the liberal international order Europe will have to carry more of In concrete terms, Europe should ex- the burden in the future. If one looks pect little from the new administra- for silver linings in the current state tion. Sympathy for the many chal- of affairs, the genesis of a more vig- lenges facing Europe will be in short orous European foreign policy would supply. When it comes to collaborat- certainly qualify. ing to address the problems in Europe’s backyard, à la the joint intervention in Libya in 2011, the Trump administra- 1 World Bank, GDP Growth (annual %), United tion is unlikely to be as agreeable as its States; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National predecessors. For instance, it would be Income and Product Accounts: Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter and Annual 2016 surprising if the president were will- (Second Estimate), 22.12.2016; Bureau of Labor ing to cooperate vis-à-vis the conflict Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 04.01.2017; Binyamin Ap- in the Ukraine. Indeed, though he has pelbaum, “U.S. Household Income Grew 5.2 sent mixed signals on this issue, there Percent in 2015, Breaking Pattern of Stagna- is reason to believe that he will lift US tion”, in: The New York Times, 13.09.2016. sanctions on Russia. 2 David H. Autor / David Dorn / Gordon H. Hanson, “The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes Instead of seeking partnership with in Trade”, in: NBER Working Paper no. 21906 (2016), 37; Justin R. Pierce / Peter K. Schott, Europe, we can expect the US to em- “Trade Liberalization and Mortality: Evidence phasize unilateral action – with the from U.S. Counties”, in: NBER Working Paper fight against ISIS as a chief priority no. 22849 (2016), 1. – and relationships with other signifi- 3 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Unemployment among Youth Summary, cant powers such as Russia and China. 17.08.2016; Alyssa Davis / Will Kimball / Elise (The potential exceptions in this con- Gould, “The Class of 2015: Despite an Improv- ing Economy, Young Grads Still Face an Uphill text are collaboration with Moscow in Climb”, in: Economic Policy Institute, Briefing combating ISIS and perhaps employ- Paper 401, 27.05.2015. ing the United Kingdom as a very jun- 4 National Center for Education Statistics, Tui- ior partner.) Also, the president’s team tion Costs of Colleges and Universities; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Con- and Republicans in Congress have little sumer Credit, G.19 (2016); Shahien Nasiripour, appetite for cooperating with interna- “Student Loan Defaults Drop, but the Num- tional institutions and organizations, bers Are Rigged”, in: Bloomberg, 28.09.2016.

52 LOOKING BEYOND TRUMP

5 Derek Thompson, “A World Without Work”, 11 Ruy Teixeira / William H. Frey / Robert Grif- in: The Atlantic (July/August 2015); Josh fin,States of Change: The Demographic Evolution Bivens / Lawrence Mishel, “Understanding the of the American Electorate, 1974 – 2060 (2015), Historic Divergence Between Productivity and 14 – 15; Anne Case / Angus Deaton, “Rising a Typical Worker’s Pay: Why it Matters and morbidity and mortality in midlife among Why it’s Real”, in: Economic Policy Institute, white non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st cen- Briefing Paper 406 (2015), 3; Lawrence Mishel tury”, in: Proceedings of the National Academy / Elise Gould / Josh Bivens, “Wage Stagnation of Sciences 112, 08.12.2015, 15078 – 15083; in Nine Charts”, in: Economic Policy Institute, Carol Graham / Sergio Pinto, Unhappiness in 06.01.2015; Peter H. Lindert / Jeffrey G. America: Desperation in white towns, resilience Williamson, Unequal Gains: American Growth and diversity in the cities, Brookings Institution and Inequality since 1700 (Princeton: Princeton Report, 29.09.2016. University Press, 2016); Congressional Budget Office,Trends in Family Wealth 1989 – 2013, 12 Justin Gest, The New Minority: White Working 18.08.2016. Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 6 Pew Research Center, Public Uncertain, Divided 2016), 16 – 17 and 21 – 22; Michael Tesler, over America’s Place in the World, 05.05.2016, “How racially resentful working-class whites 19. fled the Democratic Party – before Donald Trump”, in: The Washington Post, 21.11.2016. 7 Pew Research Center, Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population 13 Roberto Stefan Foa / Yascha Mounk, “The Growth and Change Through 2065: Views of Signs of Deconsolidation”, in: Journal of Immigration’s Impact on U.S. Society Mixed, Sep- Democracy 28 (2017), 5 – 15; Nathaniel Persily tember 2015; D’Vera Cohn, It’s official: Minority / Jon Cohen, “Americans are losing faith in babies are the majority among the nation’s infants, democracy – and in each other” in: The Wash- but only just, Pew Research Center, 23.06.2016. ington Post, 14.10.2016.

8 Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Chal- 14 Lydia Saad, Government Named Top U.S. lenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Problem for Second Straight Year, Gal- Simon and Schuster, 2004), 41; Stan Greenberg lup, 04.01.2016; Gallup, Congress and the / James Carville / Erica Seifert, Inside the GOP: Public; Tammy Weber / Emily Swanson, “Poll: Report on focus groups with Evangelical, Tea Party, Americans happy at home, upset with federal and moderate Republicans, 03.10.2013, 18. government”, in: Associated Press, 16.04.2016.

9 Randy Krehbiel, “State House sends af- 15 Juan J. Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism”, in: firmative action ban to voters”, in: Tulsa World, Journal of Democracy 1 (1990), 51 – 69; Pippa 27.04.2011; Vanessa Williamson / Theda Norris, “Why American elections are flawed Skocpol / John Coggin, “The Tea Party and the (and how to fix them)”, in:Harvard Kennedy Remaking of Republican Conservatism”, in: School Research Working Paper Series (2016), Perspectives on Politics 9 (2011), 32 – 35. 12 – 13; Sanford V. Levinson, “America’s founders screwed up when they designed the 10 Alexander Zaitchik, The Gilded Rage: a Wild presidency. Donald Trump is exhibit A”, in: Ride through Donald Trump’s America, 37; Mi- Vox, 08.11.2016; Christian Caryl, “Let’s Face chael I. Norton / Samuel R. Sommers, “Whites It: The U.S. Constitution Needs a Makeover”, See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are in: Foreign Policy, 11.11.2016. Now Losing”, in: Perspectives on Psychological Science 6 (2011), 215 – 218. 16 YG Network, Room to Grow: Conservative Re- forms for a Limited Government and a Thriving Middle Class (2014), 107 – 112.

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17 Martin Gilens / Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, in: Perspectives on Politics 12 (2014), 564 – 581; Francis Fukuy- ama, “America in Decay”, in: Foreign Affairs 93 (2014), 5 – 26.

18 Michael Barber / Nolan McCarty, “Causes and Consequences of Polarization”, in: Jane Mansbridge / Cathie Jo Martin (eds.), Negotiat- ing Agreement in Politics (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 2013), 21; Matt Grossmann / David A. Hopkins, “How different are the Democratic and Republi- can parties? Too different to compare”, in: The Washington Post, 08.09.2016,

19 Norman J. Ornstein / Thomas E. Mann, “The Republicans waged a 3-decade war on government. They got Trump”, in: Vox, 18.07.2016.

20 Amanda Taub, “The Rise of American Authori- tarianism”, in: Vox, 01.03.2016; Josh Clinton / Carrie Roush, “Poll: Persistent Partisan Divide Over ‘Birther’ Question”, in: NBC News, 10.08.2016.

21 W. Lance Bennett / Shanto Iyengar, “A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing Foundations of Political Communication”, in: Journal of Communication 58, no. 4 (2008), 707 – 731.

22 Pew Research Center, Public Uncertain, Divided over America’s Place in the World (2016), 47 – 48.

23 George Edwards III, “Persuasion is not Power: the Nature of Presidential Leadership”, Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chi- cago, Illinois, 29.08.2013 – 01.09.2013, 21 – 26; John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

54 CHAPTER 3 Brexit and European Insecurity Daniel Keohane

The British exit from the EU is feeding into a general sense of uncertainty about the EU’s future. This uncertainty may be further exacerbated by US President Donald Trump, who has called into question both NATO’s and the EU’s viability. But irrespective of Brexit or the Trump administration’s actions, it is vital that France, Germany, and the UK continue to work closely together on European defense post-Brexit.

British Prime Minister Theresa May passes tanks at Bulford Camp on 29 September 2016 near Salisbury, England.

55 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

The British exit from theEU – “Brex- remain in the EU in the June 2016 it” – is occurring while European gov- referendum: Northern Ireland and ernments face an unprecedented con- Scotland. Depending on the econom- fluence of security crises. These range ic consequences of the UK’s Brexit from an unpredictable Russia to con- deal with the EU, instability could flicts across the Middle East, which are easily return to Northern Ireland, generating internal security tests such while Scotland (where UK nuclear as terrorist attacks and refugee flows. weapons are currently located) may The US is ambiguous about putting hold another independence referen- out all of Europe’s fires and expects dum. Both Unions – the EU and the allies to take on more of the military UK – have reasons to feel insecure be- burden. And no European country cause of Brexit. can cope alone. More specifically, that Brexit will re- More broadly, Brexit is feeding into duce the potential usefulness of EU a growing sense of European insecu- security and defense policies should rity. The new US president, Donald be self-evident, since the UK is the Trump, supports Brexit and seems largest European military spender nonplussed about the future of the in NATO. Those who believe that EU, adding succor to nationalist because the UK remains a nuclear- movements across the Union. Elec- armed member of NATO, nothing tions during 2017 in the Netherlands, much should change for European France, Germany, and perhaps Italy, defense had better think again. Brexit all founding EU member-states, may might hinder European military co- produce strong results for Brexit-lov- operation because it could greatly ing politicians – such as Marine Le strain political relationships with Pen in France – that further question other European allies, especially with the viability of the EU project. At the the next two leading military powers very least, Trump’s outlook could fur- in NATO-Europe: France and Ger- ther complicate already-difficult Brex- many. But if handled constructively, it negotiations between the UK and its military collaboration could become EU partners. one of the most fruitful areas for cooperation between the UK and the In addition to EU uncertainty, Brexit EU post-Brexit. is causing a distinct sense of self-doubt for the UK, too. Two of the four parts With regard to NATO’s future, the of the United Kingdom voted to election of Donald Trump as US

56 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY president has an even greater poten- In turn, British Defense Secretary tial to transform Europe’s strategic Michael Fallon has occasionally sug- landscape than Brexit if he scales back gested that London would veto any- the US military commitment to Euro- thing that smacked of an “EU army” pean security. But irrespective of what or undermined NATO (such as an EU Trump thinks in theory and what his version of NATO’s military headquar- administration does in practice, Euro- ters, SHAPE).1 Thankfully, this divi- pean defense post-Brexit will require sive rhetoric died down towards the much closer trilateral political and end of 2016, as it has become clear military cooperation between France, that EU security and defense plans Germany, and the UK. will not undermine NATO and that the UK will not use its veto. The Brexit Effect on EU Military Cooperation and NATO With the approval of the UK (which Following the UK vote to leave the retains its veto until it departs the EU in June 2016, the remaining 27 Union), EU heads of governments Union governments have committed approved a package of three plans themselves to improving the perfor- covering aspects of capability devel- mance of EU security and defense pol- opment, operational planning, and icies. Although it is not fair to blame military research, among other issues, the UK alone for the EU’s prior lack at a European Council summit on 15 of progress on defense, cheerleaders December 2016. However, despite for a common defense policy in Ber- their good intentions, the proposals lin, Paris and elsewhere have seized are unlikely to have much immedi- on the Brexit vote as an opportunity ate impact, and whether or not the to strengthen that policy area. In large remaining 27 EU governments will part based on a number of subsequent collectively deliver more on defense practical Franco-German proposals, remains an open question.2 EU foreign and defense ministers approved new plans for EU security and For instance, while Berlin and Paris defense policies in mid-November. agree on much, there are some major differences in their respective strategic Since the Brexit vote, German Defense cultures. For one, France, as a nucle- Minister Ursula von der Leyen had at ar-armed permanent member of the times accused the UK of paralyzing UN Security Council, has a special progress on EU defense in the past, sense of responsibility for global secu- and asked it not to veto new plans. rity, and is prepared to act unilaterally

57 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 if necessary. Germany, in contrast, will terrorist attacks. But if acting through only act in coalition with others, and the EU could help ensure more mili- remains much more reluctant than tary support from other EU mem- France to deploy robust military force bers, France would find that prefer- abroad. able to acting alone. The trouble for France has been its awkward position For another, Berlin and Paris do not between a Germany reluctant to use necessarily agree on the end goal of EU robust military force abroad and a UK defense policy. Calls in the 2016 Ger- reluctant to act militarily through the man defense white paper for a “Eu- EU. ropean Security and Defense Union” in the long-term give the impression Post-Brexit, French strategic culture that EU defense is primarily a political will remain closest to that of the Brit- integration project for some in Berlin. ish. TheEU could only develop a defense policy because France and the The French are more interested in a UK agreed that it should, at St. Malo stronger inter-governmental EU de- in 1998. Moreover, London and Paris fense policy today than a symbolic have been prepared to act together, integration project for the future, leading the charge for what became since Paris perceives acting militarily NATO’s intervention in Libya in early through the EU as an important op- 2011. To reinforce the European part tion for those crises in and around Eu- of NATO, the ongoing quiet deepen- rope in which the US does not want ing of bilateral Franco-British mili- to intervene. Because of their different tary cooperation, based on the 2010 strategic cultures, therefore, France Lancaster House treaties, is vitally and Germany may struggle to develop important. a substantially more active EU defense policy than their joint proposals For example, London and Paris con- would suggest.3 ducted a joint military exercise with over 5,000 troops in April 2016, as Moreover, the French do not assume part of their broader ongoing effort that their EU partners will always rush to develop a combined expeditionary to support their military operations. force, and in November 2016 they an- In general, they haven’t robustly sup- nounced that they would deepen their ported France in Africa in recent years, dependence on each other for missile although Germany has enhanced its technology. Indeed, Franco-British presence in Mali since the 2015 Paris cooperation is much more militarily

58 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY significant for European security than they do not defend themselves, they the recent developments trumpeted will no longer be defended […] the by the EU, which have produced little USA is no longer in the same mindset of concrete military value so far. Fur- of protection and defense.” Hollande thermore, Anglo-French military col- added that “Europeans must be aware laboration could become even more […] they must also be a political important if President Trump were to power with defense capabilities”.5 scale back the US military commitment to European security. If these Franco-British positions were to harden – because of difficult Brexit But bilateral Franco-British military negotiations – and cause a political cooperation may not be immune to rift, it could hinder not only their politics. And it is important to try to bilateral cooperation, but also coop- avoid a spillover effect from the Brexit eration through (and between) both decision onto NATO, especially any NATO and the EU. Strong Franco- political rift between Europe’s two British cooperation is vital for Eu- leading military powers, the tradition- ropean security, not only because ally more “Europeanist” France and of their combined military power, more “Atlanticist” UK. Even before but also because Europeans need to Trump’s election in November 2016, be able both to contribute more to in a speech on 5 September, British NATO (as the UK prioritizes) and Defense Secretary Fallon said: “Given to act autonomously if necessary (as the overlap in NATO and EU mem- France advocates, via the EU, or in bership, it’s surely in all our interests to other ways).6 ensure the EU doesn’t duplicate existing structures. […] Our Trans-Atlan- However, President Trump’s admira- tic alliance works for the UK and for tion of Brexit and declaration that it Europe, making us stronger and better wouldn’t worry him if the EU broke able to meet the threats and challenges up could not only exacerbate Franco- of the future”.4 British divisions during difficult Brex- it negotiations, but could also encour- In contrast, on 6 October 2016, French age a broader divide within NATO (of president Hollande said: “There are which more below) between an An- European countries which believe that glo-sphere and a Euro-sphere. That the USA will always be there to pro- is in nobody’s interest except that of tect them […] We must therefore tell Russian President Vladimir Putin, these European countries […] that if who wishes to destabilize the Atlantic

59 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

The European Army Alphabet Soup Institutions

NATO EU

NAC FNC CSDP PESCO

2016 Proposals + Plans

Schengen Strength- SDIP Letter of Zone for ening Four NATO NATO’s EDAP Schengen “European of Defense Pillar” EUGS ESDU

European Security EU-NATO Compact Joint Declaration

Other Formats

Multi- Bilateral Regional Ad Hoc national

Institutions EDAP European Defense Action Plan: December Proposals to NAC North Atlantic Council: Brings together all of NATO’s 28 augment financing of military research and joint equipment members, decisions are taken by inter-governmental programs, and opening up national defense markets, consensus presented by the European Commission FNC Framework Nations Concept: Forms part of broader idea SDIP Security and Defense Implementation Plan: Follow-on to strengthen the “European Pillar” of NATO, e.g. by pooling document to EUGS focusing on security and defense aspects and sharing military capabilities approved in December, drafted by EU HR/VP Mogherini CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy: Inter-govern- European Security Compact: A June Franco-German call to mental framework for military cooperation housed within beef up the EU’s contribution to international security and EU foreign policy structures, part of broader international improve EU’s ability to tackle internal security threats security policies ESDU European Security and Defense Union: A long-term goal PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation: A legal to create a common defense for the EU, proposed in July mechanism to allow a smaller group of EU countries German White Paper cooperate more closely together on military matters, may be Schengen of Defense: An August Italian proposal for a triggered during 2017 permanent multinational European force outside institutional structures but available to EU/NATO/UN. 2016 Proposals + Plans Letter of Four: An October Franco-German-Italian-Spanish call Freedom of movement for soldiers Schengen Zone for NATO: for exploring the use of the PESCO mechanism in the EU and military equipment across NATO internal borders, an treaties idea supported by US Army Europe & others Strengthening NATO’s “European Pillar”: Europeans to take Other Formats on more of NATO’s military burdens, such as meeting NATO’s Bilateral: Examples include Franco-British, German-Dutch 2% of GDP spending goal – highlighted in July German White Regional: Examples include Nordic, Benelux, Visegrad Paper Multinational: Examples include the European Air Transport EU-NATO Joint Declaration: A cooperation program agreed Command, Eurocorps at the July NATO Warsaw summit, 40+ proposals in 7 areas such as migration, cyber, hybrid threats, exercises etc. Ad Hoc: Examples include military operations like current one against Daesh EUGS EU Global Strategy: A document published in June outlining the objectives of EU foreign and security policies, drafted by EU HR/VP Mogherini

60 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY alliance. It is no wonder that other EU procurement markets, and by pro- governments are worried about the fu- viding financial incentives for more ture of European security, not only the efficient multinational equipment effect of Brexit on theEU and NATO. programs. All of this would benefit taxpayers and soldiers alike, as well as Military Cooperation Between the NATO, since 21 countries will remain UK and the EU Post-Brexit members of both the EU and NATO TheUK government should hope that post-Brexit. EU governments do deliver on their defense promises, including after the Third, theEU and NATO are deep- British exit from the EU. There are ening their practical cooperation, and three reasons for this. First, some EU European security can only benefit operations are useful for coping with from these two organizations work- the vast array of security challenges ing together. To tackle terrorism or facing Europe at large. NATO cannot the refugee crisis, between them the – and the US does not want to – be EU and NATO can connect eve- everywhere. This largely explains why rything from internal policing and most EU military operations have tak- intelligence networks to external en place in the broad geographic space military operations. Both bodies are (beyond EU territory) stretching from conducting operations to combat the Western Balkans via the Medi- people-smuggling across the Mediter- terranean and Africa to the Indian ranean, for example. To counter Rus- Ocean, to counter pirates, terrorists, sian hybrid belligerence, they are also and people smugglers, among other trying to improve the coordination of tasks. This emerging strategic necessity their various efforts, from economic helps explain why the British defense sanctions to territorial defense, cyber- secretary has said that after its depar- defense, and countering propaganda. ture, the UK could still contribute to EU operations.7 This is whyNATO Secretary Gen- eral Jens Stoltenberg has welcomed Second, Europeans need to improve the (mainly) Franco–German pro- their military capabilities and spend posals for strengthening EU security their sparse defense monies more ef- and defense policies. At a September fectively. The EU institutions in Brus- 2016 informal meeting of EU defense sels can help the governments with ministers in Bratislava, Stoltenberg funding for defense research, by open- highlighted that there is no contra- ing up protected national military diction between better EU military

61 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 cooperation and a strong NATO, not- foreign or defense policies in return ing that they are mutually reinforcing.8 for alignment with EU foreign policy positions or contributions to EU Because of these three reasons – along- operations. British diplomats would side Britain’s substantial military ca- probably prefer a permanent observer pacity, intelligence assets, and opera- status on EU foreign policy decision- tional experience – it is in everyone’s making committees to an ad-hoc, is- interest to have as close a relationship sue-by-issue approach, which implies as possible between the UK and the “take it or leave it” choices for the EU on military matters after Brexit. UK. But a permanent observer status The UK, for example, may wish to for the UK would prove difficult. continue contributing to useful EU operations. Non-EU European mem- It is true that pre-accession countries, bers of NATO, such as Norway and such as the ten governments that Turkey, have made significant contri- joined the EU in 2004, were able to butions to some EU operations in the enjoy observer status on some inter- past. governmental EU foreign policymaking formats. But the UK is not More broadly, it would make sense for trying to join the EU, it is leaving. the EU and UK to continue to align Plus, other non-EU European mem- their positions on common interna- bers of NATO who will not join the tional challenges, such as sanction- EU for the foreseeable future, par- ing Russia, and to work as closely to- ticularly Norway and Turkey, would gether as possible. Malcolm Rifkind, likely expect similar arrangements. At the former UK foreign secretary, has the same time, the remaining 27 EU suggested that: “What we will need, governments are keen to protect their in future, is a EU+1 forum whenever decision-making autonomy. the countries of Europe are seeking to promote a common foreign policy Instead, London should aim for de- to ensure that global policy is not the facto rather than de-jure influence monopoly of the US, China and Rus- post-Brexit. Beyond ad-hoc observer sia with Europe excluded.”9 status on standing inter-governmental EU decision-making committees, An EU+1 forum might work on an this could also involve selective inclu- ad-hoc basis for specific challenges. sion of the UK in some issue-specific But in general, the UK cannot real- ad-hoc decision-making formats – istically expect a formal say over EU such as steering boards – based on

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London’s willingness to participate in important things to negotiate with its a particular capability project or con- EU partners. The British government tribute to a military operation at hand. should instead wish its EU partners For example, if the UK is willing to well in their endeavors to make EU make a significant contribution to an military cooperation more effective, EU military operation, while some EU safe in the knowledge that the UK members may not wish to participate, can no longer be blamed for any fu- ways should be explored to ensure a ture lack of progress on EU defense formal say for London in how that op- policy. eration is run.10 Brexit Negotiations and the These types of ad-hoc arrangements Trump Card would require a lot of political trust Post-Brexit, European military coop- between the UK and the remaining 27 eration will continue to be pushed governments. But given the UK’s deep more by the convergence of national knowledge of EU procedures and chal- priorities than by the efforts of the EU lenges – alongside its global outlook, and NATO. European military coop- strong military capabilities, operation- eration is mainly bottom-up – driven al experience, and vast international by national governments – not top- networks and knowledge – it is likely down, meaning directed and organ- that London would have consider- ized by the institutions in Brussels. able de-facto influence on other EU European governments are increas- governments if it chose to. Handled ingly picking and choosing which constructively, defense policy could forms of military cooperation they become one of the most fruitful areas wish to pursue, depending on the ca- for cooperation between the UK and pability project, or military operation the EU after Brexit. at hand. Sometimes they act through NATO or the EU, but almost all Eu- As long as it remains an EU member, ropean governments are using other therefore, there is not much point in formats as well, whether regional, bi- London threatening to veto any fu- lateral, or ad-hoc coalitions.11 ture agreements on EU military cooperation, as they would almost certain- Other EU governments will continue ly happen anyway after the UK has to want to work with the UK in bi- left the EU. It would also needlessly lateral or other settings, as well as at antagonize France, Germany, and NATO, just as the UK should work others when the UK has much more with them. British Prime Minister

63 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Theresa May has constructively em- the EU’s single market, since it could phasized that regardless of Brexit, the undermine the mutual confidence UK will remain strongly committed to on which those security guarantees European security: “Britain’s unique depend. Charles Grant of the Center intelligence capabilities will continue for European Reform suggests that to help keep people in Europe safe this approach has already gone down from terrorism […] Britain’s service- badly in some Central and Eastern men and women, based in European EU members: “[TheUK ] recently countries including Estonia, Poland, sent about 1,000 troops to Estonia and Romania, will continue to do and Poland. Given this contribution their duty. We are leaving the Euro- to European security, some govern- pean Union, but we are not leaving ment advisers have suggested, EU Europe.”12 member-states – and especially those in Central Europe – should go the ex- Policy-makers in London are well tra mile to give the UK a generous exit aware that other EU governments will settlement. However […] Some Bal- want to continue working closely with tic and Polish politicians who heard the UK on security matters, to the exit last summer were miffed, saying tent that some see it as strengthening they had thought the UK was send- the UK’s Brexit negotiating position. ing troops because it cared about their Malcolm Chalmers from the Royal security; but now it appeared to be a United Services Institute has de- cynical move to ensure better terms scribed the situation thus: “As concern on a trade deal.”14 over the future terms of a Brexit deal grows, some of those involved in shap- Moreover, although the UK is the ing policy have been tempted by the largest European military spender in argument that the UK should use its NATO, its ability to contribute as ‘security surplus’ – its role as the lead- much as it would wish to European ing Western military and intelligence security may be hampered by the on- power – as a bargaining chip that going impact of Brexit on the British could be ‘traded’ in return for com- economy and the UK government mercial concessions in the post-Brexit budget. The hope is that the impact settlement with the EU.”13 of Brexit on UK military spending and capability will not be as debilitat- Chalmers cautions against taking such ing as the fallout from the economic a path, linking UK security guarantees crisis of 2008 onwards. The 2010 UK to economic interests such as access to defense review led to the reduction of

64 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY

The United Kingdom’s Trade Relations with Selected Countries As of 2014, in billion USD

Trade in Goods (Import) 58.66 64.15 Trade in Goods (Export) Trade in Services (Import) USA Trade in Services (Export)

38.55 83.28

Poland

Germany United 12.64 6.17 Kingdom 2.65 2.63 100.04 52.05

16.1 19.91

France

Iceland 43.39 32.4

19.79 19.27 Italy

28.39 14.42 Norway Spain 7.99 12.15 Estonia 21.81 14.48 Latvia Denmark Lithuania United16.88 9.11 Kingdom

Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Lux. Czech Rep. Ukraine Sources: OECD, OECD Quarterly Internationale Trade Statistics 2016, no.Slovakia 3 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017); OECD, OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services 2016France, no. 2 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016) Hungary Romania

Slovenia Italy Croatia Portugal Bosnia & Georgia Herz. Serbia

Spain Mont. Bulgaria the UK army to its lowest manpower However,Mac. Brexit is already biting into Albania Turkey numbers since the Napoleonic era, theGreece British defense budget to some de- and a number of key capability pro- gree, mainly due the fall in the value jects were scrapped or delayed (such as of the pound sterling: A January 2017 aircraft carriers).15 report from the UK National Audit

65 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Office said that the projected costs sovereigntist world order, not least of funding the UK’s current defense because of a re-booted “special rela- equipment plan, which takes Britain tionship” with the US. Following a from 2016 to 2026, had risen by 7 per meeting with Trump on 9 January cent during 2016, compared with a 2017, British Foreign Secretary Boris rise of 1.2 per cent between 2013 and Johnson said that the then US presi- 2015. This will require British defense dent-elect had “a very exciting agenda officials to find nearly £6 billion of ad- of change”, and that the UK was “first ditional savings from their equipment in line” for a free trade deal with the plan in ten years if they are to remain US after the Trump administration within budget.16 took office (technically, however, this cannot happen for at least two years, In addition, some in London now since the UK cannot formally agree expect that the US will reinforce the a bilateral trade deal with the US or UK’s position in its forthcoming any other non-EU country until after Brexit negotiations. President Trump it has left the EU). has declared his admiration of Brexit, and stated that it wouldn’t worry him Johnson elaborated further at the if the EU broke up. In a joint inter- Munich Security Conference in Feb- view before his inauguration with the ruary 2017, referring to Brexit as British Times and German Bild (con- “liberation” from the EU.18 But the ducted with Michael Gove, a leading UK’s embrace of Trump, combined pro-Brexit UK politician), Trump said with the US president’s nonchalance that not only would Brexit “end up be- towards the EU’s future, could di- ing a great thing”, but also that the EU vide NATO allies, with the US and would continue to break apart. Trump the UK on one side and France, Ger- explained: “People, countries, want many, Italy, and Spain on the other. their own identity and the UK wanted Similar to the bitter splits over the its own identity.”17 2003 Iraq war, this could potentially force other European governments to Some pro-Brexit politicians in the choose sides. In that scenario, every- UK interpret Trump’s November elec- one would lose out. toral victory (and outlook) as addi- tional justification for the British exit Alternatively, in a more optimistic from the EU. The world is changing, scenario, the UK could potentially act so the argument runs, and the UK as a bridge between Europe and the will emerge as a pioneer in the new new US administration on reinforcing

66 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY

NATO, which could play positively altogether re-assuring to most Euro- into the ongoing Brexit negotiations peans: “I said a long time ago that with EU partners. UK Prime Minis- NATO had problems. Number one ter Theresa May did manage during it was obsolete […] Number two the her January visit to Washington to get countries aren’t paying what they’re a public agreement from the new US supposed to pay […] which I think is president that he backs NATO “100 very unfair to the United States. With per cent”. But most other Europeans that being said, NATO is very impor- are less convinced by Trump’s words on tant to me.”21 NATO, they await his actions. Moreo- ver, in stark contrast to Boris Johnson’s The problem with Trump’s general views, the chairman of the Munich approach to world affairs is that it fa- Security Conference, Wolfgang Isch- vors creating an international bazaar inger, summed up how many in the of bilateral deals, centered on what remaining EU-27 countries feel about the president thinks is best for the US, Trump’s views on the EU, calling them over working with more stable global a form of “war without weapons”.19 and regional institutions.22 That the US created the current global system As Charles Grant from the Center for of institutions and rules – for very European Reform has put it: “A related good reasons – seems to be neither card cited by British officials is Donald here nor there for Trump. No wonder Trump. His questionable commitment that many in Brussels and elsewhere to European security, and the increas- worry for the future of both NATO ingly dangerous nature of the world, and the EU. could make partnership with Britain more valuable to continental govern- Much commentary has focused on ments. But the Trump card could eas- the key role Germany will have to ily end up hurting the British. The play to keep the EU together follow- more that British ministers cozy up to ing the UK’s Brexit vote during the Trump, and avoid criticizing his worst Trump era. The departing UK aside, excesses, the more alien the British ap- some other major EU countries may pear to other Europeans, and the more not be so resistant to the US presi- the UK’s soft power erodes.”20 dent’s ideas. The current conservative government in Warsaw shares much New Deals on European Defense? of Trump’s nationalist worldview. Fol- Trump’s views on NATO are more lowing his election, Polish Prime Min- mixed than his views on the EU, if not ister Beata Szydło said: “A certain era

67 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 in world politics ends […] Democracy a course for the UK: “The election won despite the liberal propaganda.”23 of Trump as US president could also lead to further pressure on European Warsaw has been fighting with the states, including the UK, to take a EU institutions in Brussels over the greater share of responsibility for their rule of law in Poland, and meets the own security. Given this, the UK is NATO target of spending 2 per cent of likely to want to further deepen exist- GDP on defense. Sounds like Trump’s ing efforts to improve bilateral defense kind of European ally, a country he cooperation with European NATO might want to tempt to leave the EU members (for example, France).”24 with a bilateral trade deal. Moreover, if Trump continues to be dissatisfied To reinforce the European part of with NATO as a whole, might Poland NATO, the ongoing quiet deepening be tempted to try to cash in and strike of bilateral military cooperation be- a bilateral deal with the US on defense? tween Europe’s two leading military powers, France and the UK, based on Alternatively, if Trump and Putin were the 2010 Lancaster House treaties, to agree a new geopolitical arrange- is vitally important. Germany is also ment over the heads of NATO allies, working on a roadmap for military a kind of updated Yalta conference, cooperation with the UK to ensure would that push Poland towards bet- that tight cooperation on military ter bilateral relationships with Ger- matters survives Britain’s exit from many, France, the UK, and others? In the EU.25 Preserving the EU, and de- some respects, this has already been veloping more effective EU military happening. Since 2015, Germany has cooperation (as outlined above), will placed a battalion of mechanized in- depend to a large degree on stronger fantry under the command of a Polish Franco-German cooperation – al- brigade. In November 2016, Poland though the Berlin-Paris engine is in and the UK announced their ambition dire need of a kick-start. to agree on a bilateral defense treaty. However, deeper bilateralism between As Poland’s potential choices suggest, the major European powers may not deeper bilateralism across Europe may be enough to strengthen Europe’s be the best way to resist the tempta- defenses. No European member of tions and turbulences of Trump. Mal- NATO wants to lose the protection colm Chalmers of the Royal United of the US. But Europeans would be Services Institute has suggested such wise to at least collectively improve

68 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY

Selected Military Capabilities

As of 2016

seas bases)*

Defensein USDbudget billion Active troops Deployed(incl. troops onover their own Main battle tanksCombat aircraft Principalvessels surface Submarines

United Kingdom 52.5 152,350 13,418 227 279 19 11

France 47.2 202,950 18,104 200 351 24 10

Germany 38.3 176,800 3,050 306 217 15 6

Italy 22.3 174,500 4,155 160 268 19 7

Poland 9.1 99,300 583 985 98 2 5

Spain 12.2 123,200 1,086 347 182 11 3

USA 604.0 1,347,300 202,954 2,831 3,628 104 68

* not including naval missions

Source: IISS Military Balance 2017 their own defenses, in case they can no prefer to wage war via hybrid means. longer depend on NATO – meaning In 2016, France, Germany, and the the US – as much as before. Moreover, UK combined spent USD 138 bil- Europeans – in particular the French, lion on defense, whereas Russia spent the Germans, and the British – should USD 58.9 billion.26 But Russia is not probably also consider whether they the only threat to European security. would be able to defend themselves There is a wide range of security chal- collectively if they had to, a question lenges across the EU’s broad neighbor- that has been, until now, a taboo in hood that may require Europeans to European defense discussions. use military means without US help, such as preventing conflicts or helping Currently, the main state-based mili- weak states like Mali fight terrorists. tary threat to European security is Russia. Although it is possible that The elephant in the room for such a Moscow might risk a shooting war European defense plan would be nu- with a European NATO member, that clear deterrence.27 If Trump were to is far from obvious, and Russia may withdraw the US nuclear umbrella

69 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

– which should be very unlikely – French, and German defense policies would France and the UK be willing have been showing some signs of con- and able to provide nuclear-armed vergence in recent years. Each coun- protection for other Europeans?28 try is aiming – to varying degrees – to be able to meet as broad a spectrum In any case, deeper European coop- of tasks as possible, maintain the abil- eration in the defense of Europe could ity to defend their territories, and also not be credibly carried out via the EU, deploy abroad. since the UK will depart, and some EU countries (such as Austria, Ireland, Each of them has promised to in- and Finland) are not yet willing to join crease defense spending in the com- a military alliance. TheEU , unlike ing years, reflecting the difficult secu- NATO, is not an inter-governmental rity crises that Europe faces today. All military alliance (let alone moving to- three have made important contribu- wards creating a federal European army tions to NATO’s reassurance meas- under the political control of Brussels- ures to allies in Eastern Europe, such based EU institutions), and is far from as participating in Baltic air policing. capable of defending its territory from Moreover, all three have deployed attacks by external states like Russia.29 forces to help fight Islamist terrorists in Africa and the Middle East. Depending on the precise nature of any US military scale-back, something It is true that Germany has been re- like a strengthened European pillar of luctant to take on full-blown combat NATO would probably be required.30 roles abroad. But its beefed-up sup- In the worst case, perhaps even a report for the coalition against the so- vived Western European Union – a called “Islamic State”, following the now-defunct military alliance of ten November 2015 terrorist attacks in European governments that preceded Paris, alongside its willingness to lead EU defense policy, separate from the one of NATO’s four new battalions in EU and NATO –, might be needed. 31 Eastern Europe, suggests that Germa- ny realizes that it needs to be prepared In particular, deeper European coop- to contribute more militarily to Euro- eration for defending Europe will re- pean security.32 quire much closer political and military alignment between Berlin, Paris, France has sometimes been suspected and London. One misfortune of Brexit of being too Russia-friendly, but it is that it is occurring just when British, cancelled the delivery of two Mistral

70 BREXIT AND EUROPEAN INSECURITY amphibious assault ships to Moscow 5 François Hollande, France’s European Vision, Jacques Delors Institute, 06.10.2016. after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Britain has long been accused of being 6 Daniel Keohane, “NATO, the EU, and the curse of Suez”, in: Carnegie Europe, anti-EU military cooperation. But the 14.10.2016. EU’s most successful military mission 7 Ben Farmer / Kate McCann, “Britain ‘can still to date, an anti-piracy operation in the join EU military missions after Brexit’”, in: waters off Somalia, has been run from Daily Telegraph, 20.07.2016. a British military headquarters. 8 NATO, NATO Secretary General welcomes discussion on strengthening European defense, 27.09.2016. In essence, European military cooperation – whether through the EU, 9 Malcom Rifkind, “Neither ‘hard’ nor ‘soft’: how a smart Brexit should look”, in: European NATO, or other formats – is a tale of Leadership Network, 18.10.2016. three cities, because it can fully work 10 Nicole Koenig, “EU External Action and only if Berlin, London, and Paris Brexit: Relaunch and Reconnect”, in: Jacques agree. Encouragingly, in November Delors Institut – Berlin, 22.11.2016. 2016 a joint meeting of French, Brit- 11 Daniel Keohane, “The Renationalization of ish, and German defense chiefs took European Defense Cooperation”, in: Strategic Trends (2016), 9 – 28. place in Paris. Regardless of what the Trump administration in the US 12 UK Prime Minister’s Office, The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM does, the minimum challenge now for speech, Lancaster House London, 17.01.2017. France, Germany, and the UK will be 13 Malcolm Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security to ensure that the British exit from the Policy after Brexit”, in: Royal United Services EU will not make political alignments Institute, 01.2017. on European defense more difficult to 14 Charles Grant, “Mrs May’s emerging deal on achieve. Brexit: not just hard, but also difficult”, in: Center for European Reform, 20.02.2017.

15 Daniel Keohane, “Is Britain back? The 2015 UK Defense Review”, in: CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 185 (2016). 1 Daniel Keohane, “An EU HQ? Let them at it”, in: Royal United Services Institute, 11.10.2016. 16 UK National Audit Office, Ministry of Defense: The Equipment Plan 2016 to 2026, 27.01.2017. 2 Sophia Besch, “EU Defense, Brexit and Trump: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, in: Center for 17 Full transcript of interview with Donald European Reform 14.12.2016. Trump, in: The Times, 16.01.2017.

3 Daniel Keohane, “Policy or Project? France, 18 Philip Stephens, “Boris Johnson forgets the Germany, and EU defense” in: Carnegie Europe, message”, in: Financial Times, 21.02.2017. 02.08.2016. 19 Patrick Donahue, “Germany’s Former U.S. En- 4 UK Ministry of Defense, Defense Secretary voy Warns of ‘War Without Weapons’ Between speaks at Université d’été, Paris, 05.09.2016. Trump, EU”, in: Bloomberg, 13.02.2017.

71 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

20 Charles Grant, “Mrs May’s emerging deal on Brexit: not just hard, but also difficult”, in: Center for European Reform 20.02.2017.

21 Full transcript of interview with Donald Trump, in: The Times, 16.01.2017.

22 Thomas Wright, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy”, in: Politico, 20.01.2016.

23 Rick Lyman, “Enthusiasm for Trump in Poland Is Tempered by Distrust of Putin”, in: New York Times, 19.11. 2016.

24 Malcolm Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit”, in: Royal United Services Institute, 01.2017.

25 Patrick Donahue / Matthew Miller, “Germany Forging Post-Brexit Defense ‘Road Map’ With the UK”, in: Bloomberg, 19.02.2017.

26 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (2017).

27 Daniel Keohane, “Make Europe Defend Again?”, in: Carnegie Europe, 18.11.2016.

28 Oliver Thränert, “No Shortcut to a European Deterrent”, in: CSS Policy Perspective 5, no. 2 (2017).

29 Daniel Keohane, “Samuel Beckett’s European Army”, in: Carnegie Europe, 16.12.2016.

30 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Why NATO needs a European pillar”, in: Politico, 11.02.2017.

31 Ann Applebaum, “Europe needs a new defense pact – and Britain can lead it”, in: Financial Times, 15.02.2017.

32 Daniel Keohane, “Constrained Leadership: Ger- many’s New Defense Policy”, in: CSS Analyses in Security Policy no. 201 (2016).

72 CHAPTER 4 Threatened from Within? NATO, Trump and Institutional Adaptation Martin Zapfe

NATO faces an existential challenge by a revanchist Russia. Despite impressive assurance and adaptation measures, its overall defense position remains weak. It will face serious challenges in balancing strategic divergence, both within Europe and in its transatlantic relations. While regionalization and increased European efforts might offer some respite, the stage is set for potentially serious rifts at a critical point in time.

US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg during a NATO defense ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, 15 February 2017.

73 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

The Atlantic alliance is both more rele- alliance. However, it is unlikely that vant, and more threatened by internal NATO can insulate itself from global disturbances, than ever before since US conflicts under a President Don- the end of the Cold War. At least since ald Trump who appears to follow a Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea strictly transactionist understanding and subsequent invasion of eastern of foreign policy. The US could very Ukraine, European states and their well impose conditions on its secu- militaries have had to accept that they rity guarantees, and other alliance have to use the current time of peace members may find that increasing to think potential war. At the same their defense budgets, while necessary time, the Russian challenge goes far and imminent, might not be enough. beyond conventional military threats, Although there are ways for “institu- opting instead for “cross-domain coer- tional NATO” to mitigate the strate- cion”1 from sub-conventional to nu- gic divergences within the alliance, clear means and methods. The target they each come with distinct risks at- is cohesion within NATO – weaken- tached and will not be a substitute for ing the transatlantic link and suprana- US leadership and capabilities. tional European institutions – a policy of constant divide and rule. It is at The Russian Threat and NATO’s this critical point that the presidency Response of Donald Trump appears to threaten A Threat to Cohesion NATO from within. European states are facing many and complex security challenges. Migra- This chapter argues that NATO’s ad- tion pressures, terrorism, and frag- aptation towards countering the Rus- ile states at their periphery demand sian challenge since 2014 is impressive. attention. However, the challenge Nevertheless, although achieved at high posed by Russia under President political cost, it still risks falling short. Vladimir Putin is of a different qual- Further tangible steps are necessary to ity, as it targets the very basis of the deter Moscow, and yet internal strate- order that, after the end of the Second gic divergences within NATO threaten World War, enabled the longest peri- to hamper or block such measures. It od of peace in written European his- is here that the external and internal tory – and a democratic, prosperous threats to NATO converge. peace as well. Both with its aggression against Ukraine and with the largely The US is NATO’s indispensable ally, sub-conventional, “hybrid” nature the political and military core of the of this aggression, Russia has crossed

74 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? lines that only a few years ago were long denied by Russian authorities, considered inviolable. The Russian appears to augur the “new normal” in challenge is existential in that it com- Russian-European relations. Russia’s bines external and internal threats: understanding of interstate relations Russia poses the only credible territo- as a continuum of conflict, where the rial threat to a NATO member while choice of means is not dictated by actively aiming to subverting not only questions of legality, but of practica- the inter- and supranational European bility, is diametrically opposed to the alliances, but the democratic order of conduct of diplomacy and the under- European states per se. standing of interstate relations from the European point of view. Russia’s First, the annexation of Crimea concept of “new-generation warfare” marked the first armed land grab consciously and explicitly denies the in Europe since the end of the Sec- distinction between war and peace ond World War. Six decades of gen- as separate spheres. This overburdens eral peace were partly made possible the West’s ability to formulate policy through the official renunciation of responses.2 In addition, Russia has territorial ambitions and irreden- demonstrated that its understanding tism. Borders, while changeable in of information warfare (IW) as an in- principle, were to be inviolable, as tegral part of cyber-operations aims laid down in the Helsinki Final Act at a soft spot in the West’s defense of 1975 and confirmed in the Paris – its normative and legal distinction Charter of 1990. Even through the between the military and civilian bloody wars of Yugoslav succession, spheres, and its commitment to the this principle was generally upheld. principle of a free press. The influ- Kosovo, for all the debate about it ence operations conducted daily in constituting a precedent for Crimea, Western societies, most prominently was not invaded by any Western state the hack-and-release operation to infor the sake of territorial gains. The fluence the outcome of the US presi- Russian attack against Ukraine to pre- dential election in 2016, aim at weak- vent the nation’s movement towards ening the democratic societies of the Europe was and remains a watershed West and their trust in the democratic predicted by very few within and out- process of governance.3 side of NATO. Adaptation Falls Short Second, the “hybrid”, ostensibly cov- NATO stepped up to the challenge ert nature of the invasion, which was in ways that not too many observers

75 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 had expected. In the mere three years facing an unprecedented – if still since the Wales Summit of 2014, merely symbolic – NATO presence at NATO has implemented the “Readi- its borders and reinforced US troops ness Action Plan” and taken impor- in Europe. tant and far-reaching steps to reassure allies and adapt to the new challenges Compared to where the alliance stood for a credible defense of the exposed when Russia invaded Ukraine – with allies in the east – first and foremost, limited plans, no significant pres- the Baltic states. It has established the ence, and a diminished institutional so-called “Very High Readiness Joint memory of how actually to conduct Task Force” (VJTF) as its spearhead, territorial defense – the progress is it has enhanced the NATO Response impressive. Judging by whether these Force (“eNRF”), it has established measures, by themselves, could cred- eight small headquarters in the east- ibly deter a Russian aggression in the ern member states to facilitate quick most feared scenarios, however, the deployments, and it has adapted its answer appears to be negative. Un- Force and Command Structure. The til it is backed up by credible capa- next, logical step at the alliance’s July bilities, rehearsed contingency plans, 2016 summit in Warsaw was the de- and demonstrated political will, a cision to deploy four multinational symbolic presence in the form of a battalion-sized battlegroups as the trip-wire force remains exactly that “Enhanced Forward Presence” (EFP). – symbolic.

On top of these multilateral measures, For NATO, the order of the day must the US, under the administration of be twofold: politically, to preserve the former US president Barack Obama, cohesion of the alliance and to un- significantly increased its military derline the importance of Article 5, commitment to Europe. In addition and militarily, further to strengthen to the two combat brigades continu- NATO’s posture in the east. This en- ously stationed in Germany and Italy, hanced posture would allow the al- armored brigades will rotate in nine- liance to better resist Russian “new month cycles into eastern Europe to generation war” in peacetime and to train with local forces, and equipment make credible preparations for open for another armored brigade will be hostilities in case of war. The agenda stored in Belgium, the Netherlands, should be set. However, serious stra- and Germany. Three years after the tegic divergences threaten to prevent invasion of Crimea, Russia will be this from happening.

76 THREATENED FROM WITHIN?

NATO’s Conventional Deterrence Posture Key multilateral and US forces, key NATO command and control structure

NATO members NATO members with Force Integration Units (FIU) Iceland HQ NATO and Shape Mons Joint Force Command (JFC) Multinational Corps Northeast (MCNE) NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) Multinational Division South-East (MND S-E) Romanian Multinational Framework Brigade NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) *** enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) * NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) Baltic Air Policing * US Combat Brigades Stored material under the European Activity Set (EAS) Area of operations, rotating USNorway armored brigade

Tallinn UK

Estonia Russia a CA e S

c Riga i Denmark t Latvia l a B Lithuania

GE United Kingdom Vilnius

US Stettin Netherlands Bydgoszcz Poland Brussels Brunssum Mons Belgium Germany Luxembourg * Czech Republic

Slovakia France Bratislava

Hungary

Szekesfehervar * Slovenia Romania Croatia Bucharest

Craiova Spain Se a Black Italy Bulgaria

Sofia

Naples Albania

n Greece Turkey Allied Reaction Forces a * e n a VJTF 2016: ES r r *** * e eNRF VJTF 2017: UK i t * e d VJTF 2018: IT M Sources: NATO; US Army; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; German Ministry of Defence

77 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017

Threats to Cohesion simultaneously experiencing hitherto “If the alliance is to remain the foun- unknown doubts about the US secu- dation of Western security there must rity commitment. be no basic disagreement on the nature of our global objectives and on A Shaky Intra-European Consensus the collective responsibility of the Many allies are preoccupied with oth- West to protect its interests.”4 er serious security threats, and it is in Cyrus Vance, 1983 addition to the existential and therefore common challenge from Russia In the face of these determined Rus- that these other security issues are to sian efforts to undermine it, NATO be seen. Jihadist terrorism, carried out faces a period of not unprecedented, by commandos sent by, or perpetra- yet serious strategic divergence. Of tors inspired by, the so-called “Islamic course, the Cold War did see its share State” (IS) is high on the agenda, es- of strategic divergences and momen- pecially in France in Belgium. At the tous political upheavals seriously af- same time, Italy is struggling with a fecting NATO, such as the Algerian massive movement of refugees and War and the Suez Crisis during the migrants over the Mediterranean, 1950s and Greece and Turkey facing which is largely ignored by its north- off over Cyprus in the 1960s. ern neighbors. Paris, Brussels, and Rome look southwards, not east- What is new in 2017, though, is the wards. France has refused to lead one potentially dangerous combination of of the EFP’s battalions, citing strained an challenge from a revanchist Rus- resources, which proves that this stra- sia on the one hand, and deep inse- tegic divergence has already had im- curity about internal strategic diver- mediate implications for operational gences within NATO on the other. A and politico-military matters. strong and essentially unified alliance would not have to fear the destabi- The “conventional turn” of 2014 has lizing acts of an overall weaker com- not sufficiently strengthenedNATO ’s petitor with growing, but still limited cohesion. Understood as the general military capabilities. However, an al- tendency within the alliance to move liance that struggles with diverse, yet away from troop-intensive stabiliza- subtly linked challenges does have tion operations and back to a general reason for concern. The alliance notion of collective defense, this turn is facing a serious intra-European had already begun with the draw- rift about defense priorities, while down of ISAF and was significantly

78 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? reinforced by the Russian aggression and indiscriminate crackdown against against Ukraine. Contrary to the ex- real and imagined participants of the pectations of many, including this au- failed coup attempt of July 2016 is thor, this did not sufficiently enhance observed with muted suspicion and allied solidarity, nor did it form a solid worry, Turkey’s aims and priorities in basis for the years ahead. The unprec- the Syrian carnage and in the broader edented and unexpected migration Middle East are also partly at odds crisis of 2015 – 6 strained intra-Euro- with those of its allies. On the upside, pean relations to the breaking point, the prospect of direct Turkish-Rus- and the challenge to the south became sian clashes, which had flared up after more prominent as the Syrian war Turkish jets downed a Russian air- escalated further, now with Russian craft in northern Syria in November troops actively supporting Bashir al- 2015, has faded. That fear has now Assad. On top of that, bloody terrorist been replaced by a certain weariness attacks in France and Belgium set the regarding Turkey’s internal develop- agenda and demanded political atten- ments and a rather spectacular rap- tion and bureaucratic resources. prochement with Russia, resulting in a de-facto alliance, at least in the short On top of that, hugely complex and term, in parts of Syria. For decades, potentially bitter negotiations over NATO has included non-democratic the terms of the UK’s departure from states among its members, yet today, the EU (“Brexit”) are to be expected. it will have to ask itself whether it can With the UK being Europe’s most im- permanently endure the tensions aris- portant and resolute military power, it ing from an increasingly authoritar- appears increasingly unlikely that the ian, undemocratic, and Islamist state critical security relationships between in its ranks. For now, the only thing London and its European partners that prevents serious discussions of a will remain unaffected by the Brexit “Turxit” from NATO may be the fear talks. NATO will have to struggle with of what might happen if Turkey were increased uncertainty and acrimoni- not to be an ally, but an antagonist. ous relations between the UK and its partners at the time when it can least NATO and the US afford them. During the Congo Crisis of 1960, NATO’s secretary general, the Belgian Finally, relations between most NATO Paul-Henri Spaak, mused: “Can we, members and Turkey are on a danger- thanks to NATO, maintain a com- ous course. While the heavy-handed mon policy on European questions

79 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 and […] oppose each other on all oth- burden-sharing, this has fed suspicion ers?” That question appears to be more and undermined the alliance. After relevant than ever, with the US under all, Trump’s pressure on allies to in- President Trump appearing liable to crease their defense spending is part entangle the alliance in global conflicts of a decades-old tradition, and comes not of its choosing. only six years after the landmark 2011 speech by then-secretary of de- During the Balkan wars of the 1990s, fense Robert Gates, who issued an US reluctance to intervene stemmed identical threat, raising the specter of not from an urge to abandon Europe, a strategic reassessment by Washing- but from the conviction that, with the ton.5 Moreover, President Trump can Soviet threat gone, Europe should be legitimately point to the commonly able to manage its strategic glacis by agreed 2-per cent target for defense itself. When the US under President spending. Thus, his pressure on allies George W. Bush, in his neo-conserv- to increase defense budgets follows ative first term, split the alliance by the normal playbook and would, in invading Iraq, the basic commitment different times, not constitute a threat to European security was never seri- to NATO. ously questioned. “Old Europe”, and even more “New Europe”, counted on However, the extent to which Trump the US in the event of a still-unlikely has already undermined the US secu- Russian resurgence. That has already rity guarantees, and his surreal and changed. positively grotesque efforts to cast Pu- tin in a positive light, are fueling the With or Against Russia? most basic European fears of a “Yal- At the beginning of 2017, the insecu- ta II”, a grand bargain between Mos- rity within NATO capitals over the fu- cow and Washington over the heads ture relationship between Moscow and of the Europeans. Essentially, Europe Washington is perplexing. During the fears that the US will abandon its US presidential election campaign of long-term allies. Senior administra- 2016, incredulity over the Republican tion officials have so far failed to reas- candidate’s nearly ritualistic admira- sure the allies that their president is tion of Russia, and especially of its au- not serious about what he says. Thus, thoritarian president, mounted by the by increasing their defense spending week; and it has not faded since the – in case of Germany, quite dramati- inauguration. Far more than Trump’s cally – the Europeans are not only threats and demands regarding a fairer alleviating pressure, but also hedging

80 THREATENED FROM WITHIN? their bets against the time when the will not easily accept NATO members US is no longer the continent’s secu- standing aside in US conflicts beyond rity guarantor. the campaign against terrorism – when confronting IS, Iran, or China. Global Allies, Always? In addition to this intra-European dis- At the very least, the alliance faces sent, the alliance faces unprecedented intense discussions about its role in doubts about Washington’s essential the fight against IS, and the broader security guarantees as a NATO mem- Middle East as a whole. President ber. These are compounded by the Trump has made clear that IS con- prospect of potential global turmoil, stitutes his key foreign policy prior- with the US under Trump refusing to ity. Former and current advisors, like allow its allies to stand by and decline former national security advisor Lieu- involvement. In a time of growing tenant General Michael Flynn and doubts about NATO’s security, global White House chief strategist Stephen conflicts far beyond Europe could well Bannon, viewed “radical Islamic ter- contribute to a transatlantic divide. rorism”, if left unchecked, as a potentially existential threat to the US; they The two global theaters most likely to apparently wield strong influence over be at the center of forceful US foreign the president. While Trump has been policy efforts – the Middle East and famously silent on the specifics of his Asia – are liable to see severe disagree- plans, he has hinted that he wants his ments between the US on the one NATO allies to take on a stronger role hand, and most of its NATO allies on in the “fight against terror”. Since the other. While President Trump’s most NATO members are already en- senior officials, namely Secretary of gaged in the US-led coalition against State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of IS, albeit outside of NATO, this could Defense James Mattis, have tried to re- mean either that they would increase assure European allies, Donald Trump their engagement within this coali- made the headlines. During the cam- tion, or that NATO could take over paign, he seemed to qualify US solidar- part of the campaign in what would ity by tying it to the European states’ be a largely symbolical step without defense spending. Furthermore, after too much tangible value being added his inauguration, he added to that by to the campaign. famously calling NATO “obsolete”. Without clarifying what, precisely, he Such wins may not be nearly as easy meant by this, it is clear that the US to achieve when it comes to the other

81 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 potential main effort of the Trump no mere faux-pas, but that he might administration in the Middle East. assume a more confrontational policy Trump and his key advisors have been vis-à-vis Beijing, temporarily chal- outspoken in their criticism of Iran’s lenging the One-China Policy and role in the region and its attacks on attacking the current imbalance in US service members and interests. bilateral trade as unfair. In addition, Washington’s European allies have some of his personnel picks indicate been instrumental in negotiating the a tougher stance on Beijing.6 While Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action one has to be careful – and President (JCPOA) of 2015. They are unani- Trump has already been forced to mous in supporting the agreement, backtrack from his challenge to the and have strong economic interests in One China policy – it appears that expanding trade relations with Tehran. the US under Trump will continue to Should President Trump choose to ab- confront China on many levels, not- rogate the agreement in the absence of withstanding logical inconsistencies unambiguous Iranian violations, he such as the cancellation of the TPP, could not count on European support. which decidedly disfavors Beijing. And should he listen to those voices around him (and in the region) who At the same time, fears emerged con- still demand US attacks on nuclear cerning an early confrontation with and military installations – potential- North Korea. In the face of specula- ly in a combined operation together tions over a test of an intercontinen- with Israel – it appears highly unlikely tal missile that might be capable of that he could count on the active and reaching the US mainland, the pres- unanimous support of NATO and its ident-elect promised via Twitter that member states. North Korea “developing a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of The same applies to potential conflicts the US [...] won’t happen”, leading in the Far East. Asian security chal- to speculation over what he would lenges took center stage even before do, once in office, to prevent the re- the inauguration after president-elect gime of Kim Jong-un from follow- Trump upset the People’s Republic of ing through on its promises. While China by accepting a phone call from the response to the test of a missile Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, with shorter range has been rather who congratulated him on his victo- restrained, North Korea might well ry. In the days that followed, Donald pose the first real test of President Trump made clear that this had been Trump’s foreign policy.

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Few European states have a global stra- purely transactional in nature, might tegic perspective. Only France and the well condition the US security guar- UK, formerly the continent’s preemi- antee for Europe on direct Europe- nent colonial powers, include global an assistance in the Middle East or interventions in their strategic portfo- Asia – and there is no guarantee that lio. While any of the aforementioned NATO would be willing to live up to conflicts would immediately affect his expectations, or indeed capable of European interests, it is far from cer- doing so. tain that the mere possibility of such outcomes could prompt European Mitigating Strategic Divergence NATO members to contribute mili- In the face of these strains on cohe- tarily to any US-Chinese or US-North sion within the alliance, how can Korean conflict. While the Chinese NATO leverage its institutional flex- encroachment in the South China ibility to mitigate the fallout? The Sea, and the challenge this poses to the obvious answer is increased defense global rules-based order, could incite spending, as the US has repeatedly European resistance, no one should demanded. This message appears to count on Berlin, Rome, or Madrid finally have been understood, and Eu- to be willing to confront China over ropean states have pledged to increase their profound economic interests. their defense expenditures, sometimes This would be even more unlikely if, dramatically. That alone, however, from the Europeans’ perspective, the will not suffice. The institution itself US under Trump were to blame for must adapt, as it has always done over any escalation. six decades. Three possible courses of action, which are not mutually ex- Trump, who puts “America First” and clusive, continue to re-appear in the has already stated that NATO has be- debate, but none comes without costs come obsolete by focusing on Rus- and risks attached – and none may be sia as the main threat, is unlikely to easy to implement. accept the simple legal fact that the NATO treaty is limited to “the territory Regionalization as Risk and Chance of any of the Parties in Europe or North The obvious functional answer to such America (and) the Islands under the divergent interests, at least regarding jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the the European allies and their respec- North Atlantic area north of the Tropic tive priorities, would be a regionali- of Cancer.”7 TheUS president, appar- zation of the alliance – meaning the ently viewing international politics as acceptance that certain potentially

83 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 overlapping groups of allies prioritize from the sheer necessity of fighting certain regions or challenges. Such a together to generate the numbers, regionalization is at odds with NATO’s this also had a very strong symbolic historical approach and, while having aspect. Most of the main allies had undisputable benefits, would entail ground troops on the frontline. For the risk of further diminishing unity all practical purposes, it was near im- in case of conflict. possible to opt out of any escalation – an important reassurance for all al- For NATO, this means accepting stra- lies in general, and for the German tegic divergence and nascent regionali- government in particular. Buffeting zation as a given and actively moderat- the increasingly diverse strategic foci ing it to contain the risks and cultivate of NATO members through increased the chances that such a trend entails. regionalization risks weakening the Both the advantages and the disadvan- very cohesive forces that hold NATO tages are potentially significant. Walk- together in times of crises. ing the tightrope between accepting specialization and regionalization to However, if NATO should manage to buffer strategic divergences, while still coordinate and steer that regionaliza- ensuring political and military unity tion, there would be tangible advan- and interoperability across the board, tages. There is a considerable potential appears to be one main challenge in for a distinct east-south specialization the years to come. – a split that, in reality, is already relevant. On the upside, such a strategy NATO has always known a certain de- could sharpen the operational and re- gree of regionalization. Italian troops gional focus of the alliance, increase were focused south of the Alps, while military efficiency and efficacy for Norway guarded the north. Greece relevant contingencies, and allow for looked towards the Mediterranean, better force planning and harmoniza- and Turkey had an eye on the Black tion of capabilities. Sea. However, the bulk of the alliance’s forces was to be fighting at Europe’s The NATO Command Structure central front between the Alps and – still the military centerpiece and the North Sea. Here, British, Dutch, most important asset of the alliance Canadian, Belgian, Danish, US, and – has experienced quasi-constant re- German (and, although of varying form since the end of the Cold War. independence, French) forces were Currently, it is based on functional- positioned to fight side by side. Apart ity, not geography, meaning that no

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The Framework Nations’ Concept Introduced by Germany in 2013, adopded by NATO in 2014

bility Dev y: Capa elopme man orces” nt a er ow-on f generat nd G “foll ion Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Luxemburg Poland Croatia Romania Hungary

Slovakia

t o

a t

z Denmark i a l r i e Albania b J n Latvia a o t e U i s g n Austria* K r t e : Lithuania o c E f C r x o Italy t o p f n Netherlands n e t e l d r a i i Slovenia m t b n Norway p o io u i t o t n i l a o e a n Spain v n r e i y s lt F t D o o y u r t c th li m e e i d ( b n J a a EF ap s ) C n y: io al at It er op

* Non-NATO Member

Sources: Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Framework Nations’ Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?”, in: NATO Defense College Research Paper, no. 132 (2016); Hans Binnendijk, “NATO’s Future: A Tale of Three Summits”, Center for Transatlantic Relations (2016).

headquarters are permanently as- example, while the Joint Force Com- signed to a specific region. It would mand Brunssum could be designated seem imperative, then, for the alliance as “JFC East”, its sister command in to designate a distinct and unambigu- Naples could be modeled as a “JFC ous chain of command for one single South” with permanently subordi- region and to focus all its bureau- nated or assigned forces, tailored to cratic bandwidth on war-planning, specific missions and contingencies. contingencies, and preparations in Recent announcements by NATO the assigned area of operations. For point in that direction.8

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This could imply a regionalization of a group of nations focusing on stabili- the alliance in terms of force genera- zation operations.10 tion as well. With regard to Russia, for example, such a group could form However, any regionalization would a core of nations prepared to go fur- come at potentially prohibitive politi- ther in their military integration and cal and military cost. NATO has al- to pledge certain capabilities with a ways been more than just a military regional focus and much deeper in- organization searching for the most tegration than currently achievable. efficient battle plan. It is also an -or Such a regionalized defense cluster ganization of mutual security that for would need to include the US; the 60 years has protected its member “Big Three”, whose capabilities come states against external enemies and as close to full-spectrum forces as is promoted peaceful conflict resolution realistically possible, namely France, between them, as laid down in Article the UK, and Germany; and the east- 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, ern member states primarily affected political unity, or the acceptance of a by this threat. In addition, a certain single basic contractual and political degree of regionalization could facili- framework, is not just mere symbol- tate the integration of non-members ism, but the foundation for peaceful Finland and Sweden into NATO’s relations between alliance members. contingency planning, if their respec- Regionalization, if unchecked and tive governments should choose that unmoderated, could undermine this course.9 unity and degrade the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to a mere symbolic In the south, where various maritime shell. and coast guard capabilities are in demand, together with stabilization In military terms, overly specialized capabilities, states like Italy, Spain, armed forces that are focused on a Portugal, and Greece would prioritize single scenario risk “preparing for the those missions. last war”, meaning that they cultivate capabilities that are relevant in the This split is already visible in force worst-case scenario, but of little use planning: Within NATO’s “Frame- in other (and, for NATO as a whole, work Nations’ Concept” (FNC), Ger- more relevant) scenarios. For exam- many is leading efforts to generate ple, should the southern states com- viable so-called “follow-on forces” for pletely reorient their armed forces to- the eNRF, while Italy is coordinating wards intervention and stabilization

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Multinational Integration in the Dutch and German Land Forces

*** *** Royal Netherlands German Army Army Command Command

** ** ** 1 AD RFD 10 AD

* * * * * * * * * * * 13 MB 43 MB AB 9 AB 21 MB 41 11 AirB AirB 1 SOF MIB 23 AB 12 MB 37

Dutch German Simplified with focus on ground combat brigades and harmonized designations. AD: Armored Division RFD: Rapid Forces Division MB: Mechanized Brigade / Mechanized Infantry Brigade AB: Armored Brigade MIB: Mountain Infantry Brigade AirB: Airmobile/Airbone Brigade SOF: Special Operations Forces (Kommando Spezialkräfte, KSK) Sources: Deutsches Heer; defensie.nl missions in the south – focusing on increases the danger that a vanguard of infantry-heavy, light and sustained willing nations could embroil NATO low-intensity land operations to the in a war it does not want. The organi- detriment of heavy, armored, high- zational integration of armed forces technology intervention forces with as pursued by some allies might also a priority on high-end air and naval reinforce this dilemma. While right- forces – the day might come when fully hailed as an important symbolic they are not only unwilling, but also move, and with real military poten- essentially unable to support the Baltic tial, integrating the Dutch and Ger- allies against a Russian incursion. man land forces will only make sense if it is accompanied by a harmoniza- That logic also applies conversely. As tion of political decisionmaking be- NATO might find itself fighting wars tween The Hague and Berlin, which with the burden being carried by only would create new power centers that a small number of specialized states, so could mobilize or block NATO.

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The principle of collective decision- within and outside of NATO. In fact, making thus constitutes an effective even for the most basic task of territo- barrier against NATO being dragged rial defense, NATO might have to fall into such a scenario, but a regionalized back on “coalitions of the willing” if it and specialized defense posture invol- does not adequately prepare for what untarily entails informal decisionmak- is still essentially its raison d’être. ing groups of the most affected nations, potentially putting NATO solidarity Again, the concept of a group of na- to the test in a situation where it is far tions resolving to act together and from guaranteed. Furthermore, any to move further, faster, and more ef- such development would immediately ficiently than the alliance as a whole touch off the decades-old question of is not a totally new one. Throughout the alliance’s nuclear deterrence, con- its existence, NATO’s member states trol of relevant assets, and collective have allied or cooperated for specific decisionmaking in nuclear scenarios. wars and operations, independently of It could thus become impossible, on their NATO commitments. Whether purely technical grounds, to uphold it was the French and British during the hugely important principle of “all the Suez Crisis or, naturally, the US for one, one for all”. in all its global entanglements since 1949, no article of the North Atlan- Below and Beyond the Alliance? tic Treaty prohibits its members from ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ and going it alone. However, the current Unilateralism trend towards a variety of ad-hoc coa- A regionalization of NATO entails litions meets a different NATO than risks, and yet it would affect neither during the 1950s; and ad-hoc coali- the institutions nor the logic of NATO. tions under US leadership risk rel- Every foreseeable form of regionaliza- egating NATO to a backseat at a time tion would still involve the symbolic when it needs to be front and center. presence of at least token forces from most member states. It is precisely this Current relevant ad-hoc coalitions can logic that underwrites NATO’s EFP be categorized in three groups. First, in the Baltics and Poland. Neverthe- allies can form ad-hoc coalitions and less, institutions can lose some of their cooperate flexibly as well as in varying integrative force, as illustrated by the coalitions, outside of NATO, and for growing trend towards what former any conceivable scenario. Most prom- US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld inently, the “Counter-Daesh” coali- referred to as “coalitions of the willing” tion fighting the so-called “Islamic

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State” is coordinated by US command coordination-intensive air campaign institutions and brings together a very against Libyan forces. heterogeneous coalition of NATO and non-NATO states. While there For all its short-term successes, “Uni- are good reasons to circumvent the fied Protector” was an interventionist alliance in this fight, this form of ad- operation in NATO’s periphery with- hoc coalition poses the least threat to out a clear and present danger to alli- NATO cohesion. ance – and nevertheless, it may be far- fetched to imagine a coalition of the Second, NATO members can act (pri- willing within NATO operating the marily) within the framework of the machinery of NATO against Russian alliance, using its institutions and forces without the unanimous sup- command structure, while others not port of the NAC. However, if region- only abstain, but oppose the opera- alization is thought through to the tion. The 2011 Libya Campaign is an extreme, it is not unimaginable that a obvious case in point. During “Uni- high-pressure situation could lead to fied Protector”,NATO was far from a wrangling NAC tacitly agreeing that unified. In the United Nations Secu- selected members move the NATO rity Council, Germany abstained from machinery to action while others ab- UNSC Resolution 1973 authorizing stain from the vote without blocking the operation, yet did not block agree- mobilization. The dangers for allied ment in the NAC, allowing NATO cohesion that such a scenario would to command parts of the operation entail needs no further elaboration. through its command structure. How- ever, the German abstention caused Third, NATO members could act not only political, but also tangible outside of NATO’s institutions, yet military problems. While the federal within its basic politico-military logic government distanced itself from the and relevant scenarios. One potential operation, more than 100 German of- scenario that is seldom discussed, but ficers supported it through their work is highly relevant, envisages allies such within NATO’s Command Structure. as the UK and the US intervening in At the same time, Germany prohibit- a Baltic invasion scenario in the face ed the use of German airmen assigned of a divided NAC blocked by hesitant to NATO’s integrated Airborne Early allies. In that case, the nations could Warning and Control (AWACS) wing not use NATO’s Command Struc- at Geilenkirchen, Germany, signifi- ture, but would likely use some of the cantly straining allied resources in a same forces, and only slightly adapted

89 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 operational plans, to act as NATO’s relations with Russia and its NATO “unsanctioned vanguard”. allies, a growing number of voices responded with the familiar call for A theme frequently discussed among a stronger European pillar within central and eastern European NATO NATO – partly to accommodate US members is that NATO’s primary pressure for better “burden-sharing”, designated instruments for deterring and partly to prepare better for a for- Russia – the VJTF and the eNRF be- mal or informal US withdrawal from ing the most prominent among them NATO.11 While such an approach is – are liable to fall short due to politi- undoubtedly important, and never cal and military reasons. Exposed al- more so than today, one has to be lies then point towards nations with clear-eyed as to its limitations: Even strong military capabilities that might in the best-case scenario, Europe is set be willing to go above and beyond to lose with a US withdrawal, at least what has been authorized by a reluc- for years to come. tant NAC and intervene on their own. This envisions US, British, or Danish First, the very political and institution- troops coming to the assistance of the al logic of NATO depends on the US. Baltic and Polish states far quicker and It is, of course, no coincidence that more decisively than the designated Europe has been united and at peace NATO units. for the first time in centuries during the same time in which the US shed Setting aside the implications for NA- its tradition of shunning permanent TO’s credibility of such a non-NATO alliances and engaged with Europe. vanguard countering Russia in a region that dramatically favors the Rus- The political bedrock ofNATO is the sian side, this hope for an anti-Russian US determination to stay engaged, coalition of the willing stands and falls and to help defend its European al- with US resolve. While the UK is Eu- lies. The US is the indispensable bal- rope’s prime military power, and even ancer that brings together the still- some smaller allies have respectable heterogeneous countries of Europe military capabilities, the US is, and re- under one roof – especially the “new” mains, NATO’s indispensable nation. member states of Central Europe, all of whom look to Washington, not Strengthening the European pillar? Berlin, London, or Paris for political After the election of Donald Trump leadership and protection (not only gave rise to fears about Washington’s against Moscow).

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Second, NATO’s prime military as- notice over strategic distances. More- set, its integrated and tested com- over, if we look beyond these ground mand structure, has always been built forces to air and naval capabilities, the around US capabilities and forces. gap between US forces and those of Just as NATO’s supreme commander the other allies is even larger. The fact in Europe (SACEUR) is simultane- that NATO had to rely on US sup- ously the commander of all US forces port, coordination, and supplies for in Europe (COM EUCOM) within a relatively minor air campaign over the US unified command plan, US Libya in 2011 should caution against general officers form the backbone of ambitious expectations in any real NATO’s Command Structure. The US war scenario against Russia. While cannot simply withdraw from NATO’s individual NATO members may add military integration, as France did in relevant capabilities in the area of spe- 1966, without doing the utmost dam- cial operations and cyber-capabilities, age to the alliance’s capability for mili- the US remains on a level of its own tary operations. in these spheres as well.

Third, in addition to the command- Fourth – and re-entering the debate and-control arrangements that are after years of neglect – NATO’s nuclear critical to any military operation, and deterrence still is vitally dependent on even more so for multinational cam- US nuclear weapons and political will. paigns, the US provides the bulk of Through its strategic and tactical nu- critical, mission-relevant, and mission- clear weapons, and through the nucle- ready capabilities and forces. With ar sharing arrangements with selected regard to ground forces, even with European nations, the US provides the generous counting, the major Euro- nuclear umbrella for the continent. pean allies would be hard-pressed to Should that umbrella weaken or even provide one combat-capable brigade disappear, it is far from a given that the at short notice. The US alone is set to two remaining nuclear powers, France have three combat brigades present in and the UK, could step into the void. Europe at all times, plus materiel for a Judging by the political climate that fourth, as well as the relevant ground made Brexit possible, London is liable enablers, including significant artillery to value independence over anything capabilities and national command- else, its public support for NATO not- and-control elements. Added to these withstanding. Paris has always been are high-readiness forces in the US consistent in its insistence on nuclear that can be deployed at relatively short sovereignty. Nevertheless, even if one

91 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 or both of these nations were to agree the alliance. Within only a few years, to extend their nuclear deterrence, this the alliance has found itself facing a would hardly be an equivalent substi- weak but determined strategic com- tute for US forces. The UK only op- petitor, structural insecurity in its erates submarine-based strategic nu- neighborhood, and existential doubts clear weapons and is technologically over the reliability of the indispen- dependent on the US. In addition to sable ally, the US. Increased defense submarines, France relies on tactical spending, while critical, will not suf- aircraft as delivery platforms. These fice. Institutional adaptation might forces are several “steps” below the ca- bring some respite and leverage NA- pabilities that are traditionally – and TO’s strengths, but comes with its increasingly – deemed necessary on the own risks and costs attached. ladder of escalation. Without the US, there is no credible nuclear deterrence Ultimately, the strength and cohe- in NATO.12 sion of NATO as an alliance of sov- ereign nation-states depend on the The bottom line is that the US is and political determination to overcome remains NATO’s indispensable nation. political challenges. Without Wash- While fairer burden-sharing and in- ington acknowledging that, through creased European commitments will all disagreements, NATO is not just a have some effects, there is no cheap means, but an end in itself, the pros- and immediate shortcut for the Euro- pects are bleak. However, for all of peans to strengthen the “European pil- Russia’s determination and the cred- lar” to the point of “strategic autono- ible threat that it poses, NATO is pri- my” or even to substitute a retrenching marily threatened from within – and US. In any scenario, especially regard- can thus be saved from within. ing a revanchist Russia and its Eastern defense, there is no credible deterrence and no realistic defense of Europe, 1 Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Co- within or outside of NATO, without ercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy”, the US – for at least a decade to come. in: Proliferation Papers no. 54 (2015).

2 Mark Galeotti, Hybrid War or Gibridnaya A Thoroughly Political Challenge Voina? Getting Russia’s non-linear military challenge right (Prague: Mayak Intelligence, 2016), NATO is in peril; not because the 77 – 82. challenges are insurmountable, but 3 Thomas Rid, “How Russia Pulled Off the because it is threatened from the out- Biggest Election Hack in U.S. History”, in: side and within, severely hampering Esquire, 20.10.2016.

92 THREATENED FROM WITHIN?

4 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 393 – 394.

5 Robert Gates, Speech on the Future of NATO, 10.06.2011.

6 William Choong, “Trump and the Asia-Pacific: Managing Contradictions”, in: Survival 59, no. 1 (2017), 181 – 187, here 183.

7 Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

8 “So will die Nato islamistischen Terror bekämpfen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.02.2017.

9 Martin Zapfe / Michael Haas, “Access for Allies? NATO, Russia, and the Baltics”, in: The RUSI Journal 161, no. 3, (2016), 34 – 41.

10 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Framework Na- tions’ Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?” in: NATO Defense College Research Paper no. 132 (2016).

11 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Why NATO needs a European pillar”, in: Politico.eu, 11.02.2017.

12 Oliver Thränert, “No shortcut to a European Deterrent”, in: CSS Policy Perspectives 5, no. 2 (2017).

93 CSS ETH Zurich

STRATEGIC TRENDS offers an annual analysis of major developments in world affairs, with a primary focus on international security. Providing interpretations of key trends rather than a comprehensive survey of events, this publication will appeal to analysts, policy-makers, academics, the media and the interested public alike. It is produced by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. Strategic Trends is available both as an e-publication and as a paperback.

STRATEGIC TRENDS 2017 is the eigth issue in the series. It features chapters on rebuilding trust between Russia and the West, the US foreign policy under President Donald Trump and beyond, the effects of the “Brexit” vote on European Security, and strategic divergences within NATO.

The Center for Security Studies (www.css.ethz.ch) at ETH Zurich specializes in research, teaching, and the provision of electronic services in international and Swiss security policy. An academic institute with a major think-tank capacity, it has a wide network of partners.