Fishing 2009 Safety Digest Front cover photograph courtesy of the Irish Coastguard The Marine Accident Investigation Branch is an independent part of the Department for Transport, (DfT) and is completely separate from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents is responsible to the Secretary of State for Transport. The offices of the Branch are presently located at Carlton House, Carlton Place, Southampton, SO15 2DZ. We will relocate to Mountbatten House, Grosvenor Square, Southampton SO15 2JU in August 2009. This Safety Digest draws the attention of the marine community to some of the lessons arising from investigations into recent accidents. This information is published to inform the fishing industry and the public of the general circumstances of marine accidents and to draw out the lessons to be learned. The sole purpose of the Safety Digest is to prevent similar accidents happening again. The content must necessarily be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration if additional evidence becomes available. The articles do not assign fault or blame nor do they determine liability. The lessons often extend beyond the events of the incidents themselves to ensure the maximum value can be achieved. Extracts can be published without specific permission providing the source is duly acknowledged. The Safety Digest and other publications are available free of charge to anyone by contacting the MAIB. Contact details are provided below.
The telephone number for general use is 023 8039 5500
The Branch fax number is 023 8023 2459
The e-mail address is [email protected]
Safety Digests are available on the Internet: www.maib.gov.uk
If you wish to report an accident please call our 24 hour reporting line 023 8023 2527 The role of the MAIB is to contribute to safety at sea by determining the causes and circumstances of accidents, and working with others to reduce the likelihood of such causes and circumstances recurring in the future.
Extract from The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005
The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these regulations is to determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame. Contents
Chief Inspector’s Foreword 4
1 Brief Visit to Deck Costs Life 6 2 Look Out or Lose Out 8 3 Sea Survival Training – Payback Time 10 4 The Flames Were Supposed to Stay Inside the Heater 12 5 Eyes Available But Not Used 14 6 Unguarded Machinery is a Riddle 15 7 Small Hole – Costs a Life 18 8 Complacency Kills 20 9 Even a Short Time in the Sea Can be Fatal 22 10 Mystery Fire Sinks Potter 24 11 Insecure Fiddle Leaves Crewman in Hot Water 26 12 Double Tragedy 28 13 Water in Fuel – A Recipe for Expensive Problems 30 14 Between a Rock and a Hard Place 32 15 When Making a Cup of Tea Wrecks a Crabber 34 16 Wooden You Know 36
Fishing Vessel Accident Statistics 38 Major Accident Locations Chart 40 MAIB Published Reports 41 Glossary 42 MAIB Report Request Form 43 Chief Inspector’s
20 Fishing vessels were lost and 8 Fishermen died in onboard accidents in 2008
4 Foreword
You don’t need me to tell you how dangerous fishing can be. However, the usual justification – “it is a dangerous industry, and the sea is an unforgiving environment” – is no longer valid. Almost none of the recent deaths and fishing vessel losses were unavoidable; few were as a result of vessels being overwhelmed by the sea. Awareness of the risks, safe practices, good maintenance, sensible safety equipment and trained crews would have prevented nearly all recent accidents.
It is telling that accidents often happen to the most experienced fishermen. When you are new to a job, you are very aware of the risks, and you are cautious in everything that you do. When you have done something for a thousand times without problems, you have lost that sense of danger, and no longer take the same precautions. When we talk to fishermen after accidents, particularly when a fellow fisherman has died, they nearly always have identified what they could have done more safely, and berate themselves for not having some simple safety measures. If you take 10 minutes or so every week just to think through how you do your work – and to discuss it with your crew – you could save yourselves the dreadful self- recriminations that always come after accidents.
The tragic loss of 3 crew in a fire onboard Vision II last August, brought into focus a new hazard developing in the fishing industry. With the advent of more fishermen from overseas, more crew are sleeping onboard their vessel in their home port. Many vessels are not suited to this, lacking even the most basic safety requirements. Alarms are normally fitted to sound in the wheelhouse, with the result that fishermen sleeping below cannot hear them. More worrying still, many alarms are disabled when alongside due to limitations in shore power. Emergency escape routes are often locked when alongside for security reasons. Access to the vessel is often dangerous, particularly at night, and perhaps when returning from having a few drinks. If you are going to have crew members living onboard, please think through the dangers and put in place appropriate safety measures.
5 Brief Visit to Deck Costs Life
Narrative
A man was lost overboard from on board, and during a second sweep ease of access to the salmon cages) an 18m fish farming vessel while of the area he was found in the chilly which had no means of closure when returning to port, following a day’s water. His lifeless body was brought not in use. Also, large fish pumping harvesting. back ashore, where extensive CPR hoses created a serious trip hazard During the return passage, most failed to revive him. in way of these gaps. Directly inboard of the crew were in the wheelhouse It was customary for the casualty of one such gap a damaged salmon, and were unaware that one of their to wear a lifejacket while working on which had been kept aside by the colleagues had gone on deck and deck, but unfortunately at the time deceased, was discovered away from fallen overboard, until they moored of the accident he was wearing no where the crew had seen him place up alongside. There, they searched lifejacket or any other form of thermal it earlier. It is highly probable that the the boat and surrounding area, but flotation suit. crewman left the wheelhouse and were unable to find him. A fast mussel Subsequent examination of the fell overboard through the gap in the farming boat searched the area vessel highlighted two large gaps in adjacent guardrail while recovering where the man was last known1 to be its side guardrails (placed there for the fish from where he had left it.
6 The Lessons
The deceased crewman was recognised as This vessel had missed two annual Load Line 1 being very safety conscious, and regularly wore 3 Exemption surveys. It is the owner’s obligation to an inflatable lifejacket when working on deck. On this present vessels for survey at the appropriate time. Had occasion, however, he had gone on deck for only a brief the required surveys been carried out on this vessel, the period, while the vessel returned to port, and had not put unprotected gaps in the guard rails would likely have been on his lifejacket. identified, and the necessary actions carried out to make No matter how brief the trip to deck, the short time them safe. taken to slip on a lifejacket may prevent an unfortunate accident from becoming fatal. Aquaculture is not just a “close to shore” farming 4 business; it is a marine industry which uses vessels The vessel had been operating with unguarded for various activities. Just because these vessels are 2 openings for several years. These openings were operating “close to shore” does not make the risks any accepted by the crew and unrecognised by the company lower than on vessels going further out to sea. This managers. Crewmen should not accept unnecessary particular company owned many vessels, of various sizes, hazards which, if ignored, can very soon become the norm yet had no proper marine superintendent to monitor their – until an accident occurs. If you suspect something is vessels’ condition and operation. Any vessel operator dangerous, bring it to the attention of crewmates and the should ensure that a suitably trained and qualified person vessel operators. It is possible that others have simply not is either employed or available to them, to ensure their noticed the potential danger, and if alerted would be more vessels comply with all the required safety standards and than happy to carry out improvements or change the way regulatory requirements, at all times. of working.
7 Look Out or Lose Out
Narrative On a dark winter’s evening, with everything to be in order he then returning to its home port, and he did good visibility and calm seas, two decided to go below to make a drink. not look for the vessel again. During vessels underway off the south coast Due to the layout of the wheelhouse, recovery and stowage of the trawl of England were in collision, even the skipper was unable to see out of net the fishing vessel maintained a though each had seen the other the forward windows once he had left relatively steady course and speed 30 minutes earlier. As a result of the the wheel position, and he therefore which, unrecognised by either accident, the fishermen lost over had not rechecked the position of the vessel, meant that they were on a 2 weeks’ income at a time when the fishing vessel before going below. collision course. With the net safely catches had been excellent. While the skipper was below, stowed, the skipper returned to the The two vessels involved were the deckhand saw the fishing wheelhouse and increased to full a small commercial vessel and a vessel coming very close on the speed on the engine. Unfortunately, fishing vessel. The commercial starboard side, and he called out he did this without looking out, and vessel observed the fishing vessel for assistance. The skipper returned thus failed to see the other vessel on its starboard bow, and was thus to the wheelhouse, but only had very close on the port bow. The the give way vessel. However, after time to stop the engines before a collision occurred within a minute only a cursory glance the assumption collision occurred. of the skipper returning to the was made that the fishing vessel On the fishing vessel, during the wheelhouse. would in fact pass clear to starboard. time leading up to the collision, the As a result of the collision, The vessel was equipped with a crew of three were preparing to haul the fishing boat suffered extensive combined track plotter/radar set and the trawl; everyone was on deck for damage to its bow area and the a young, inexperienced deckhand this task. The vessel’s floodlights repairs took more than 2 weeks; had just taken the wheel and was were all switched on. At the start of this represented a significant loss steering by reference to the track the operation the skipper, who was of income for the skipper and plotter. Thus, the radar was not in on the foredeck, glanced around crew at a time when the catches use and no distance off the fishing and saw the navigation lights of the had been particularly good. The vessel was obtained. The skipper other vessel: a green sidelight and commercial vessel was also damaged initially remained in the vicinity of single white masthead light on the by the collision, and was off charter the wheelhouse to supervise the port bow. He assumed, incorrectly, for a day, with a consequential loss deckhand. However, assuming2 that this was another fishing vessel of revenue.
8 Damage to the vessel’s bow
The Lessons
Both vessels failed to keep a proper lookout. On the Neither vessel made use of all the means available 1 commercial vessel the one person who could have 3 to them to determine if a risk of collision existed; seen the approaching vessel was inexperienced and was both made assumptions based on scanty information. unable to appreciate the developing situation.
When training new recruits, ensure that they are Both vessels saw each other at a sufficiently early 4 never left unsupervised. 2 stage to have taken appropriate action in ample time to avoid a collision. However, both had assumed, at a glance, that no risk of collision existed, and neither vessel then continued to monitor the situation.
9 Sea Survival Training – Payback Time
Narrative After 4 days of poor catches, the the situation was made worse by and lay flat on her starboard side. skipper of a 9.8 metre fishing vessel the electric bilge pump operating Water flooded along the deck and decided that the time was right to well below maximum capacity. entered the open hatch of the engine return to his home port, a passage The crew examined the pump but compartment. Both deckhands, that would take about 2 days. could find nothing untoward, and one of whom was in the engine On board the vessel was the commenced bailing by hand. The compartment, managed to escape skipper, who had about 30 years engine room hatch had been opened, by moving aft under the shelter, and fishing experience, and two young and it remained open while bailing they abandoned the vessel over the deckhands, each with 3 years continued. port side. The skipper remained in the fishing experience. The skipper About 2 hours later, the skipper wheelhouse. held a Fishing Class 2 certificate of heard an update to the weather It was estimated that the vessel competency, and both he and the forecast, which predicted south- foundered within 2 minutes of the two deckhands had undertaken the westerly winds force 5 to 7, gale 8 wave striking, only 0.5 mile from the mandatory safety training courses: later. With an ineffective pump, water nearest land. It was dark, cold, and sea survival, fire-fighting, first-aid ingress, and a forecast gale, he both deckhands were dressed in no and safety awareness. Four months chose to divert to the nearest port to more than jeans and tee-shirts. After before the accident, the skipper effect repairs and take shelter. 10 to 15 minutes in the water, they had purchased a new liferaft for the These were not the skipper’s spotted the white canister of the liferaft vessel, fitted it with a hydrostatic local fishing grounds, and he did not with the inflated liferaft attached, release unit (HRU) and, thankfully, have paper or electronic charts of the albeit upside down. They managed decided that the crew would benefit area. Consequently, when he chose to right the raft, board it, bale it out, from attending another sea survival to divert he was navigating using administer sea sickness tablets and course, which they subsequently did. a basic track plotter, echo sounder release one red hand-held flare, When the vessel sailed from and GPS. He was unaware that which was immediately spotted by a the fishing grounds the weather was his diversion would take his vessel member of the public who contacted forecast as south-westerly force 3 to through two areas of renowned the coastguard. A deckhand released 4. About 4 hours into the passage, the confused and steep seas, made a second flare when they spotted alarm on the automatic bilge pump worse by the onset of bad weather the blue flashing lights of emergency alerted the skipper to unexpected against the tide. service vehicles on the shore, and a water in the bilge. Investigation Shortly after the skipper altered third flare on hearing the approach of showed that water was entering course toward land, he reduced the local lifeboat. through the stern gland, which had speed because of reduced soundings Both deckhands were been re-packed the previous day. It and, at the same time, the vessel successfully rescued and later was estimated that about 2.5 gallons entered an area of turbulent seas. airlifted to hospital. Regrettably, of sea water were entering the bilge A large wave struck the port quarter, despite an extensive search, the every 15 minutes. Unfortunately,3 causing the vessel to roll heavily skipper was not found.
10 Figure 1: Vessel before alterations
Figure 2: Vessel after alterations (right) The Lessons
The vessel had been Insufficient charts led the On the positive side: 1 significantly modified by 3 skipper to stray into dangerous the current skipper. The structural waters. Make sure that before modifications included a considerable setting sail, full chart coverage and The new liferaft had been amount of additional top weight, associated publications for the 5 fitted using an HRU, which which probably had the effect of intended passage are held on board. undoubtedly saved two young reducing the vessel’s intact stability lives. And importantly, the training and her ability to return to the upright undertaken only months before, condition. Before making alterations, New lifejackets were available ensured that ALL the correct actions or adding additional weight, seek 4 on board, but were not being were taken by the crew, from the guidance from a qualified naval worn, nor were they in a location time they saw the raft until they were architect and, if necessary, have where they were readily available for rescued by the lifeboat. If a liferaft is the vessel inclined to confirm the escape. Look around your vessel; carried, make sure that it is properly condition of the stability. identify a readily accessible place fitted with an appropriate HRU, and for stowing lifejackets and label it; that it is carried in a position where and, if appropriate, place a ‘grab it can float free without interference The open engine room bag’ containing other emergency from obstructions. Finally, ensure that 2 hatch allowed immediate equipment close by. If you do not everyone on board is properly trained downflooding into the engine wear lifejackets the whole time, in sea survival. compartment. Had a second bilge which is the safest option, at least pump been available, the crew could put them on as soon as things have pumped out the water without start going wrong. keeping the engine room hatch open.
11 The Flames Were Supposed to Stay Inside the Heater
Narrative
A fishing vessel was hauling a catch It was apparent that the seat of the Fuel for the heater was of scallops when her watchkeeper fire was around a diesel-fired heater supplied from a tank in the engine noticed that the radar had stopped fitted to a bulkhead in the room, this came through the working. He called the skipper, who accommodation area. The weather was bulkhead to a shut off valve and a realised that the battery voltage was cold, and the heater had been running thermostatically controlled flow valve, lower than normal. The skipper went to keep the boat warm. A cheap, to maintain a set temperature in the to the engine room to have a look domestic smoke detector fastened to accommodation. The flow rate of at the batteries and noticed a loose the deckhead had activated and this fuel could be checked as it passed terminal connection. As he tightened had alerted the crew to the emergency. through a sight glass. the connection, he heard an alarm The coastguard was informed The exact cause of the fire was coming from the accommodation area by VHF radio and the two crew not determined, but it was thought smoke detector. members prepared a fire hose. The most likely that the thermostatically The skipper opened the engine skipper took an extinguisher from controlled valve had failed, possibly room door, with the intention of the wheelhouse and operated it because of the high levels of vibration entering the accommodation area to through the emergency escape hatch. on the boat when the catch was investigate. Flames, at ankle level, Foam from the extinguisher put the hauled. Too much fuel had been able came through the open door, so fire out and, as the smoke cleared, to flow and spill from the glass part of the skipper closed it again rapidly. the skipper was able to turn off the the sight glass and down the outside Despite the flames, the skipper heater’s fuel supply. of the pipe, until it was ignited by the opened the door again and ran Once the vessel was safely flame in the furnace. The fire had across the accommodation area to alongside, the crew and local then spread as the fuel leaked down the emergency escape hatch in the surveyors started to look for the the bulkhead and onto the carpet. opposite corner, where the other two cause of the fire. The diesel heater crew members were4 able to help him was relatively new and had been climb out. fitted only 8 months before.
12 Damage around the diesel-fired heater
The Lessons
This was a “good news” incident, where the cheap, domestic smoke detector which the crew had stuck 1 forethought of the skipper and crew, and their to the deckhead in the accommodation area. It was this actions on board, saved the day. A cheap smoke detector, detector which alerted them to the fire. Engine room fumes effective fire-fighting and early alerting of the coastguard and deodorant sprays had caused a number of false proved invaluable. alarms, but with hindsight, the crew were very glad that they had not removed the batteries.
Early detection and response to fires are vital. 2 This incident was dealt with extremely quickly; less Quick responses rely on everyone knowing what to than 5 minutes from the alarm sounding to the fire being 4 do, and working together. The best way to achieve extinguished. This undoubtedly limited the damage caused this is for crew to practice realistic fire drills regularly. by the fire, and once the heater was removed, the boat was back fishing the following day. Some vibration is inevitable on all boats, but high 5 levels put a greater strain on people and equipment. Although this vessel was fitted with a fixed fire Where this cannot be avoided, crew should be vigilant of 3 detection system, there was no sensor in the not only the effect on themselves, but also on electrical accommodation area, so the owner had purchased a equipment, pipework and heating systems.
13 Eyes Available But Not Used
Narrative
An angling boat was on a pleasure exhibiting a masthead light, port and The angling boat watchkeeper did trip, heading north. It was dark with starboard sidelights and a stern light. not see the lights of the approaching clear visibility, and she was following A radar was operational and a junior fishing vessel, with the result that close behind another boat. Both crew member was alone on watch. his boat then ran into the side of the were on passage and intent on a The fishing vessel watchkeeper fishing vessel, damaging the angling good day’s fishing. The owner was did not detect the two angling boats boat’s port side but, fortunately, alone on watch, steering and keeping on radar, but saw the lights of the insufficiently seriously to cause the a lookout by sight. The boat was leading boat to starboard and altered intended day’s fishing to be cancelled. displaying a masthead light, port and course to pass around her stern. No damage was sustained to the starboard sidelights and a stern light. However, he did not see the lights fishing vessel, but the watchkeepers Meanwhile, a fishing vessel was of the second angling boat, and the of both vessels were later left to steaming east-north-east on passage alteration of heading put his vessel reflect on what the consequences of towards fishing grounds. She was on a collision course with her. such a collision might have been.
The Lessons5
Action can’t be taken to avoid collision if a risk of Navigation and collision avoidance aids are there 1 collision hasn’t been determined. Likewise, a risk 3 to do just that – aid. They are not there to replace of collision can’t be determined if an approaching vessel conventional methods; they are there to enhance them. hasn’t been detected. Vessels are required to display Consequently, Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations still lights at night so that they can be detected. All that is then requires every vessel to – at all times – maintain a proper required is a pair of eyes to do the detecting. A pair of eyes lookout by sight and hearing, as well as by all available was available on both the angling boat and the fishing means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and vessel – the problem was that they weren’t used! conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. In this case, the radar gain control was set too low for the angling boats to be Why weren’t they used? Because neither displayed on the screen. 2 watchkeeper recognized the extent to which they needed to maintain an all round lookout by sight. On board the angling boat, the owner was steering, eyes ahead and focused on the boat he was following, and thinking about his intended day’s fishing. In his mind, anything astern was either going the other way or, if overtaking, had the obligation of keeping out of the way. The fishing vessel watchkeeper, on the other hand, had sighted the lights of the leading angling boat but his attention was then focused on avoiding her in the knowledge that the radar was indicating no vessels in the immediate vicinity.
14 Unguarded Machinery is a Riddle
Narrative
The skipper of a 14m purpose- The vessel, with its three man sorted from the water and mud by built, shell fishing vessel (Figure 1) crew, left harbour for the cockle beds a riddle, a hydraulically powered took on a 17 year school leaver to in the early evening. The cockle rotating perforated drum, before assist with the busy cockle dredging dredging went as expected. The being transferred via a chute into season. The young man joined on skipper manoeuvred the vessel from bags stowed in the hold or on deck a trial basis to see if he would like the wheelhouse, turning her in tight (Figure 2). the job. The skipper told the new circles over the cockle bed, directing Later that evening, loaded with crewman what his job entailed, and the dredge pipe to the cockle ‘hot the bagged cockles, the fishing issued him with wet weather gear spots’. The cockles were suction vessel anchored, to wait for the next and gloves. dredged from the seabed6 and then rising tide to enable her to return
Figure 1 15 Figure 2
to harbour. The skipper and senior As the senior crewman directed clear of the rotating inner drum. There crewman slept in the bunks in the the cockles from the end of the chute was not (Figure 3). The riddle’s forward cabin and the new crewman into the hold bags, the new crewman rotating drum caught his thumb, slept in the wheelhouse chair. Early ensured the cockles ran freely from the fractured his wrist and pulled his arm the following morning, after a short end of the riddle by scraping the chute into the riddle when his left elbow passage, they arrived alongside to clear by hand. This was a right-handed fractured and the skin was removed land the catch. job and the young crewman knew that, from his inner arm. Usually the cockle dredger if necessary, he could safely rest his The skipper heard a shout remained alongside for a tide unless, left hand on the hydraulic motor that from deck and, seeing the injured due to the changing tide times, an drove the riddle (Figure 2). crewman, he quickly stopped the additional trip to the cockle beds After an hour of hectic work hydraulic power from the wheelhouse. was possible. This was such a day, the new crewman was still scraping The injured youth was quickly and so, on this morning, the cockle the cockles from the chute. He then released from the riddle and dredger returned to sea. moved his left hand to the structural the skipper contacted the local The boat arrived back at the cross member of the riddle to coastguard for medical assistance. cockle beds mid-morning and fishing give himself a change of position, The injured crewman was transferred started; it was a partly cloudy day, believing there was enough space for ashore by the local lifeboat and on to with light winds. his hand to grip the support and be hospital by ambulance.
16 6 Figure 3
The Lessons
Dangerous machinery like this must have protective The new crewman was, by legal definition, a “young 1 guards in place to stop operators unintentionally 3 person”, and there are specific regulations in place getting caught in the moving parts. This is particularly to ensure that his working environment is safe. Owners important at sea, where the movement of the vessel and skippers should take into account the inexperience, may unbalance the crewman and cause him to fall into immaturity and age of young employees, and also their the machinery. possible lack of awareness of the possible dangers, in deciding whether their allocated jobs are suitable. In particular, they should be aware that new, young crew The construction and location of the riddle created might not have completed all the Seafish training courses, 2 a significant “shear trap” risk to the crew working and so ensure that briefings and familiarisation, especially adjacent to this unguarded machinery. The usual crew on safety equipment, is thorough. accommodated the risk of personal injury when working close to the riddle in their normal operations, but they had not identified that the shear trap posed a significant danger to an inexperienced crewman on board. While the dangers associated with fishing may be blatantly obvious to experienced hands, they might not be recognised by new crewmen. A risk assessment would have identified the hazard from the riddle earlier, and the machine could have been guarded properly, thus protecting all the crew from the shear trap risk.
17 Small Hole – Costs a Life
Narrative The skipper of a 9 metre steel hulled coming onto deck through the freeing the exhaust trunking created ideal fishing vessel lost his life when his ports when the vessel was underway. conditions for corrosion to take vessel sank while trawling off the east The skipper had also previously place, which would have led to water coast of Scotland. reported having problems with his entering the below deck space. While in port after the previous engine exhaust. The exhaust system Analysis of previous accidents to trip the skipper, who fished single- was a dry exhaust, which vented to similar vessels shows that water can handed, had told some other atmosphere via an outlet at the top of flow through relatively small holes fishermen that a significant amount the stern gallows. The exhaust gases at a surprisingly high rate, and that of water had entered the vessel’s flowed through the steel box section a relatively small amount of water under deck area, and that he had of the gallows, with no internal flue entering the hull area can adversely experienced some problems with liner fitted. affect the stability to such an extent a bilge pump. One of the major components that very rapid downflooding can The vessel had a single of engine exhaust gas is sulphur occur. For example: 0.5 tonne of undivided space under deck from the oxide which, when in contact with water per hour will flow through wheelhouse to the transom, and had water, combines to produce sulphuric a hole of just 18mm in diameter a low freeboard, resulting in water acid. In this case, the location of assuming a constant head of 25mm.
18 7 The Lessons
This tragic case illustrates the While there are no statutory Never underestimate how much 1 vital importance of having – and 2 requirements for fishing vessels 3 water can flow though relatively maintaining – an adequate freeboard of less than 15 metres in length to small holes, and make sure you have and keeping your vessel watertight. undertake stability tests, it is prudent an operational bilge alarm and bilge for all skippers to be aware of the pump system. stability condition of their vessel at all times.
19 Complacency Kills
Narrative A small fishing vessel and her Hauling continued for about appeared to be still in the wheelhouse skipper had been chartered for the 5 minutes until the trawl doors or cabin, but the other two managed day to catch small fish for display were hanging from their chains to swim clear. The vessel sank purposes. To achieve this, the boat on the stern gantry. By this time, shortly afterwards. The skipper was had a fine mesh trawl net, a small the amount of water on deck had not seen again. rectangular tank for sorting the catch become substantial and the skipper The two people in the water held and two circular tanks for storing released the clutches on the winch, onto the single lifejacket for about the fish. On board were the skipper, allowing the fishing gear to return to 45 minutes before being rescued, as the charterer’s representative and a the seabed. the search for them had commenced passenger who was along for the ride. The skipper checked below deck in the wrong position. Fortunately, Shortly after clearing the harbour and found water in the aft void and they were found as the search area entrance, the net was shot over the the engine space. He then took one expanded, were winched from the stern and the skipper set an easterly of the electric pumps being used to sea and transferred to hospital, course for a tow across the bay. The top up the tanks, and used it as a where they were treated for mild two circular tanks were positioned bilge pump. However, the depth of hypothermia. Divers later recovered just aft of the engine casing on deck, water on deck was increasing, so the skipper’s body from the vessel. and once the nets were shot these while the passengers started bailing, The vessel was raised so tanks were filled with water using two the skipper went to the wheelhouse that the cause of sinking could be electric ‘bilge’ pumps immersed in the to call for help. Using VHF Channel established. It was found that her sea at the stern. Each pump had a 16, he called the coastguard, stating starboard quarter was damaged such discharge hose passing through the his vessel was taking in water and that water could enter the hull under port side freeing port leading to one requesting a lifeboat. He gave a local conditions of limited freeboard or of the tanks. The pumps discharged position, but did not include a latitude poor weather. At the time of her loss, continuously into these tanks, which and longitude. The coastguard she had additional weight on deck in then overflowed through holes about responded by broadcasting a “Pan the form of water tanks which held 60cm from the bottom of them into Pan” message and alerting air and live catch. This weight reduced the buckets and then onto the deck. surface search and rescue units. freeboard sufficiently to allow flooding The first tow lasted 45 minutes, Bailing appeared to be achieving through the damaged area of the hull. after which about 40 minutes were little, and the level of water had To complicate matters further, the spent sorting the catch into the tanks reached the top of the bulwark at skipper had removed the electrical before the net was shot again. The the stern. One person went to the bilge pump to use it to provide a flow second tow was uneventful, until wheelhouse to join the skipper of sea water to the holding tanks, and several centimetres of standing water who, having raised the alarm, was there was no bilge alarm. were noticed on the starboard side collecting lifejackets from the cabin. It is not certain when the of the deck, with water coming8 on One lifejacket was passed out on hull damage occurred. Because deck through the starboard freeing deck, by which time the stern was protective rubber matting largely port in the stern. The skipper’s completely submerged. covered the area of damage, it was attention was drawn to this water, but Before any more lifejackets could obscured to the casual observer he gave no sign of being concerned be gathered, the vessel rolled to and might have been present for and told the others not to worry. The starboard and her stern completely some time, becoming critical only tow continued as intended until the submerged, leaving only the bows when the freeboard was reduced by skipper began to haul in the gear. above the surface. The skipper extra weight.
20 Vessel after recovery
The Lessons
The skipper was unaware that the hull of his vessel The two survivors were lucky, they had only one 1 was breached above the waterline and would let in 3 lifejacket between them, and the position given water in a moderate sea or when heavily loaded. Check to the rescuers was inaccurate. Think through what your hull regularly, especially the areas that are not easy to you would do in an emergency: how you would pass a see, such as under matting or fenders. “Mayday” message; where your lifejackets are stowed; whether your flares are accessible, and so on; and talk the drill through with your crew. During this trip, the vessel was unsafe. Although the 2 skipper was unaware of the hull damage, he further compromised the safety of his vessel by heavily loading the deck with tanks, removing the only working bilge pump to fill those tanks, and not having a working bilge alarm. Individually, these deficiencies could have been coped with; put together they proved fatal. Sometimes compromises are necessary, but always keep an eye on their cumulative effect: complacency kills.
21 Even a Short Time in the Sea Can be Fatal
Narrative A crewman died after being dragged enable fish in the bag to drop into the colleagues went down the ladder, overboard by a trawl net during cod end. As the net was veered, it into the sea, to assist and support his routine hauling operations. also carried the casualty overboard. head out of the water. A crane was The crewman had assumed The alarm was raised then used to lift him from the sea onto that the cod ends were ready to be immediately. However, because the the deck, where cardio pulmonary lifted on board, and had lain across stern trawler was being hampered resuscitation (CPR) was attempted. the net while clearing the dog rope by her nets, it was impossible for He could not be revived. (which had become twisted around the skipper to come astern to the The crewman regularly the bag). The net drum operator was casualty without fouling the propeller, wore a flotation jacket on deck, usually informed when it became which would have disabled the but unfortunately he was not necessary to clear twists from the vessel and prevented further wearing one on this occasion. dog rope; unfortunately, on this endeavours at rescue. It was estimated that he was occasion he was not. The net drum After several attempts, a life back alongside the boat within operator’s view was restricted by the ring was thrown, and was grabbed 10 minutes of going overboard, physical size of the net drum, and he by the crewman, allowing the and was immersed in the 14° C was unaware that the crewman was other crew to haul him alongside a sea water for probably fewer than working with the dog rope when9 he ladder. The crewman was rapidly 15 minutes in total before being veered the net back into the sea to losing consciousness, so two of his recovered to the deck.
Operator’s view towards net drums (casualty obscured behind drum)
22 Position of the casualty before going overboard
The Lessons
Ideally, deck machinery controls Carrying out tasks on board a If it is absolutely necessary 1 should be placed where the 4 fishing vessel will sometimes 6 to send anyone into the operator has an unrestricted view necessitate leaning overboard. The water to assist during a recovery, of the surrounding area. However, if simple precaution of wearing some ensure they are properly dressed the view is restricted, communication sort of flotation aid will help mitigate in thermal clothing and wearing between parties is essential before the obvious risks and will increase a flotation device. controls are operated. Communication your chances of survival if you fall is a two way thing: it should be given, overboard. The casualty involved in and should then be acknowledged this case had been a fit and healthy Life rings are cumbersome to by the recipient to prevent any man, yet after just a few minutes of 7 throw at any great distance, misunderstanding. being immersed in the cold water, but they do give a swimmer support. the debilitating effect of cold shock There are various line throwing rendered him unconscious. devices available (not necessarily Beware the dangers of routine. mechanical) which could be used to 2 It can foster complacency good effect in recovery situations. due to the repetitive nature of the In this case, it was possible to work, and will sometimes cause 5 lift the casualty from the sea lapses in vigilance. using a deck crane. In the process, crewmates were required to go into the sea to assist. Not every vessel Always assess the possible has the benefit of a convenient 3 dangers involved in any crane; serious thought should be tasks, no matter how routine, and given by all seamen on how a man ask yourself, “is this really safe, or is can be recovered from the sea on there a safer way to do it?” their particular boat. Bear in mind, the medically safest way to recover someone from the water is to keep their body horizontal rather than attempting to lift it vertically. 23 Mystery Fire Sinks Potter Narrative During the early morning, a skipper power for the pump and float switch the local inshore RIB lifeboat arrived and his single crewman took out their was derived from the battery side of a short time later. Unfortunately, they Cygnus 26 potter to recover and shoot the battery isolating switch. were unable to get close to the boat their lobster and langoustine pots. As At about 1730, the skipper saw because of the ferocity of the fire. It the weather deteriorated, they decided the boat riding easily at its mooring, was then decided to allow the boat to return to their mooring which was with no signs of the impending to drift, and a couple of hours later about 40 metres from the shore. disaster. it was headed towards rocks in an The skipper was acutely aware of Just after midnight, a friend of isolated inlet, still burning. the risks of fire and flood, so he shut the skipper was walking along a road In the morning, the skipper and the gas supply valve from the gas high above the small harbour when his crew tried to locate the boat, but bottle to the stove, and isolated the he noticed that the boat was fiercely were unable to do so. They believed electrical supplies at the main battery ablaze, but still at its mooring. He that it was probably dragged out isolating switches just before leaving immediately roused the skipper, who to sea by the tides and had sunk. the boat at about 1300. As usual, the lived nearby. They both went to the However, they continued to search bilge pump control was switched to foreshore to see the boat drifting the inlets and eventually found it the “auto” position to cope with any away towards a headland as the fire at low tide resting on rocks. The unexpected water ingress sensed by burnt through the mooring lines. The wheelhouse, deck and most of the 10the high bilge level float switch. The skipper notified the coastguard, and hull had been consumed by the fire.
Figure 1 24 Figure 2
The Lessons
Discussions with the local authorities Make sure that electrical Always properly isolate and confirmed that the boat was well 1 circuits are maintained in good 5 use correct terminations for maintained, and that the skipper took condition, that connections are tight redundant circuits. good care of it and of his fishing gear. and corrosion free, and that insulation There was no suggestion of arson or is in good order. foul play. All the indications suggest Makeshift plugs, sockets and that the fire was probably caused by 6 fuses should not be used. an electrical fault on the bilge pump Attend to electrical defects or high bilge level float switch circuit 2 promptly. The constantly which were the only circuits that were flickering light or intermittent power When in doubt, seek live while the boat was at the mooring. supplies are sure indications of 7 professional advice/assistance It is not possible to identify potential problems. from a qualified electrician. specific lessons associated with this case because the exact cause General advice on electrical safety can only be a matter of speculation. Do not install additional can be found in MCA’s Code of Safe Although they would not have helped 3 electrical equipment until you Working Practices for Merchant this safety-conscious skipper, it is are certain that the cable carrying Seamen, which is available on the timely to highlight the following areas capacity and fuse ratings are MCA’s website at www.mcga.gov.uk. of good electrical practice: adequate.
Isolate as many electrical 4 circuits as you can before you leave your boat.
25 Insecure Fiddle Leaves Crewman in Hot Water
Narrative A small fishing boat was rolling easily the stove, tipping hot water onto The skipper later inspected while trawling in a moderate beam the crewman and scalding him. The the fiddle to establish why the sea. The skipper and crewman were skipper reacted quickly by drenching kettle had been able to fall from the in the wheelhouse together and his colleague with cold sea water from stove. He found that the fiddle had decided to have a hot drink. the deck wash hose before calling the not been properly adjusted to suit A kettle of water was placed in coastguard to ask for assistance. the kettle which had been recently the fiddle on the stove which was The crewman was transferred supplied to replace an older and located in the wheelhouse. The by lifeboat to a local hospital where different sized model. crewman sat down beside the stove, he was treated for his injuries. The skipper ensured that the waiting for the water to boil, while the Fortunately, thanks to the prompt fiddle was properly adjusted to fit skipper remained at the wheel. action taken by the skipper, his the kettle before the stove was As the water began to boil the injuries were not too severe and he used again. boat took a heavy roll. The kettle was able to leave hospital after a came free of the fiddle and fell from short stay.
26 11 Cooker with old fiddle and kettle
New fiddle
The Lessons
The supply of hot drinks is one Fishing boats can be expected Galley equipment should not 1 of the key requirements on any 2 to roll, especially when trawling 3 be overlooked when securing vessel. However, as with any other in a beam sea. The skipper had taken for adverse weather, especially on a items of equipment, it is essential that the precaution of securing various small boat. the kettle can be used safely in all items of working gear but had not weather conditions. foreseen the hazard caused by a defective fiddle.
27 Double Tragedy Narrative After the last haul of the trip, the engine room to start the auxiliary by her head, and as soon as the skipper of a 20m trawler set the engine and the secondary bilge skipper released the slip holding the autopilot to return to port at a speed pump. This took only a few seconds, liferaft in its cradle, she sank. of about 7 knots. During the 18 mile during which time the skipper saw The three men initially clung passage, he assisted the boat’s two water entering the engine room on to the liferaft canister until the deckhands in the shelter deck to bilge through gaps around pipework skipper managed to inflate the help prepare the catch for market, penetrating its forward bulkhead. liferaft by pulling on its painter. but returned to the wheelhouse When the skipper returned to Unfortunately, it inflated upside periodically to check the boat’s the wheelhouse, the high-level bilge down, and by the time the skipper position and adjust the autopilot. alarm was also sounding, and the managed to right it, the deckhands Several minutes after the skipper’s boat had stopped answering the had disappeared. The local lifeboat last visit to the wheelhouse, when helm. The skipper was then informed was activated after the coastguard he had estimated by eye that the that the forepeak was almost full of had been alerted by the boat’s boat was about 1nm from the port water and the fish room was half full. EPIRB, and spotted the liferaft about entrance, the boat struck the rocky The deckhands were instructed to 5 cables from the port entrance. shore further south. take off their oilskins and prepare The skipper was rescued about 1½ The skipper ran straight to the the liferaft on the galley roof while hours after the boat sank. The body wheelhouse and put the engine full the skipper fetched the lifejackets of one of the deckhands was later astern. Once clear of the rocks, he from the accommodation. However, recovered from the seabed close put the engine ahead and turned he was unable to get into the to the wreck, but the body of the towards the port, which was only 3 accommodation because its access second deckhand was not found. cables away. By now, the low-level was flooded and the accommodation An underwater survey of the bilge alarm was sounding, so the lighting had gone out, so he joined wreck showed that the vessel was skipper told one of the deckhands the deckhands on the galley roof. The badly holed below the waterline on to steer while he went below to the boat was now trimmed considerably her bow. 28 12 The Lessons
Leaving a wheelhouse Watertight bulkheads save Many older vessels pre- 1 unattended is risky at the best 3 boats and save lives. Where 6 date the requirements of times. To do so when approaching penetrations in these bulkheads for generators, batteries and the shore at night, and not keeping cannot be avoided, they can still be switchboards to be protected any form of lookout, is asking for kept reasonably watertight providing against water ingress and a trouble. Balancing the various the gaps around pipes and conduits separate, emergency power source. demands of a fishing vessel crew are adequately packed. Where this occurs, the provision can be difficult, and keeping the of additional torches and portable wheelhouse manned when there’s VHF radios, which would be of plenty to do on deck is not always In an emergency, it takes benefit in an emergency situation, popular. However, whereas such 4 seconds to press the DSC should be considered. unpopularity will usually be short- button or to send a “Mayday” call. Not lived, the grief following a fatal only does this alert the coastguard, accident will potentially last a lifetime. but it also alerts all other vessels in Storing lifejackets and other the area, including nearby vessels 7 equipment such as flares, alongside if their equipment is in the accommodation, when Deciding on the right course switched on. The sooner this action is alongside, keeps them secure. 2 of action to take following a taken, the sooner help will be at hand. Keeping them there at sea might grounding is not always easy, and result in them being inaccessible requires a skipper to think on his when they are needed. feet to quickly consider a number of There are two main types factors. Although moving into safe 5 of EPIRB, both of which water as quickly as possible is an are extremely useful in alerting Ideally a liferaft will have been instinctive response, it might not the coastguard. However, the first 8 inflated either manually before be the best action to take without transmits a vessel’s GPS position an evacuation, or automatically as first obtaining a quick assessment when activated; the second relies on a vessel sinks. However, if a liferaft of the damage sustained. In any Doppler techniques to establish the has to be inflated by persons already event, driving ahead when holed beacon’s location, which takes time in the water, great care needs to be below the waterline forward not only and is not as accurate. Although the exercised as the forces generated increases the rate of flooding, but it GPS version might be a little more during inflation are potentially also increases the chances of making expensive, it is potentially a sound hazardous to those near its canister. the damage worse. investment.
29 Water in Fuel – A Recipe for Expensive Problems
Narrative A skipper and his five crew sailed from deteriorated and the boat started being generated from the “on engine” a south coast port to deliver his recently to regularly ship heavy green alternator, all electrical power was purchased 23 metre trawler to its new seas. At about 2300, the engineer also lost. Scottish home port. Before sailing, reported to the skipper that he Unable to restart the engine the 13000 litres of marine gas oil were had transferred fuel from the port skipper instructed that the electrical bunkered. As the weather was fine the and starboard service tanks to the generators be started. Almost skipper decided to familiarise himself day tank from which both the main immediately after starting, these also with the trawling equipment, so he engine and the two generators stopped and could not be restarted. spent a couple of days fishing before took their fuel supplies. About 10 The engineer was unable to identify resuming his passage to Scotland. minutes afterwards, the main engine the cause of the failures so the The wind was west-south-west revolutions dropped from 1400 rpm to skipper had no option but to notify force 4. The trawler handled well about 1100 rpm. After a short period the coastguard of his problems. They, in the seaway and the skipper was of stability the revolutions continued in turn, arranged for the vessel to satisfied with the boat. The fishing to fall. At the same time, the skipper be towed into port by the local RNLI was successful and life seemed, on noticed white smoke coming from lifeboat. The tow was connected at the whole, to be pretty good. the main engine exhaust, and soon about 0230 but parted twice before Over the next 30 hours the afterwards the engine stopped. final arrival at 1125. weather13 and the sea state slowly Because the electrical power was
Ensure filling connections are correctly identified
Figure 1 30 Consider fill cap security
Figure 2
The Lessons
On investigation, it was found that after bunkering the Make sure that fuel deck cap tightening keys match vessel, the fuel deck filling caps had not been properly 3 the cap recess or stub and are in good condition so tightened. This allowed water to pass into the fuel that the cap can be fully tightened. service tanks during the rough weather. The water was subsequently transferred to the day tank from which both the engine and generators took their fuel supplies. Some types of filling caps are arranged so The water-contaminated fuel caused the engine and 4 that a lock can be fitted to prevent intentional generator failures. contamination. A lock or other device, a plastic cable tie in The failure to observe the most basic of procedures the case of Figure 2, can be fitted to prevent the cap from – the tightening of the filling caps to prevent the ingress rotating through vibration which can easily lead to potential of water – led to the contamination of the complete sea water contamination of the fuel system. fuel system. This resulted in considerable expense for cleaning/changing of fuel tanks, pipe work, pumps, strainers and filters. It is good practice, where possible, to check fuel 5 quality before transferring between tanks so that contaminated fuel is not passed around the system. Ensure that deck fuel filling connections 1 are properly marked (Figure 1) to prevent inexperienced crew putting water or other fluids into Where fitted, always use fuel purifying systems the system – it has happened! 6 to “polish” the fuel to remove impurities, including water.
Threads and caps should be in good condition, and 2 cap seals intact. If leather seals are used, they can Remember – fuel hygiene discipline is part and become brittle, and should be regularly inspected and 7 parcel of good engineering practice; look after your changed if damaged or if they become hardened. fuel and it shouldn’t let you down.
31 Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Narrative A deep sea fishing vessel’s main unable to get close enough to pass clothing and lifejackets. The skipper engine stopped at a critical moment tow lines. realised any attempt to abandon after she had been sheltering from DSC alerts transmitted by the by liferaft or scale the nearby cliffs severe weather for almost 2 days stricken vessel before she lost would be futile, so motivated his in the lee of an island. Initial close electrical power were picked up by crew and ensured they remained in proximity to the shore, tidal effects, the coastguard, who immediately the relative safety of the wheelhouse and violent unpredictable changes put in place a full scale search and until help arrived. in wind direction caused the vessel rescue mission involving helicopters The rescue helicopter had to to drift towards rocks after losing and a lifeboat. abort an early attempt at rescue due power. Repeated attempts to restart Due to the weather conditions to the darkness and extreme weather the engine failed, and the vessel and distance from the rescue conditions. However, on a subsequent grounded. facilities, the crew sheltered for over attempt, a winchman was successfully The skipper transmitted a 2 ½ hours in the vessel’s wheelhouse lowered to the vessel and all the crew distress call on VHF radio, which as she lay crashing against a cliff were airlifted to safety. was answered by other vessels also face in darkness. During this time, On arrival ashore, several sheltering in the bay. Unfortunately, waves stove open a wheelhouse survivors were suffering from the due to shallow water and over 6m door, soaking the occupants, who effects of hypothermia and required swell,14 these other vessels were were wearing little more than normal treatment in hospital.
32 The Lessons
It is not known why the vessel’s engine stopped. The vessel was not equipped with immersion suits, 1 However, it had been idling for a prolonged period, 3 and there is no statutory obligation for vessels which could have led to poor combustion and inefficient of less than 45m in length to do so. The absence of running. It is not unusual in such conditions for an engine regulation should not prevent responsible owners from to stop when load, such as engaging gear, is applied. ensuring some means of thermal protective clothing Diesel engines need to be “worked” to maintain optimum is available to crew members. If all else fails, oilskins performance and reduce coking. Even occasional revving secured around cuffs, waist and ankles can reduce heat up out of gear during periods of prolonged idling will help loss in immersion situations, and reduce the early onset “clear” an engine and reduce the chances of it stalling. of hypothermia.
Anchoring was not attempted to slow the vessel’s The skipper recognised the dangers of abandoning 2 drift; had it been, it might not have been effective in 4 by liferaft on the wave-battered rocks, and also the the sharp, steep swell anyway. Nevertheless, in close to dangers of attempting to scale the cliff face. The vessel shore situations anchors should always be prepared and was not breaking up beneath them and he knew that be ready for use; if nothing else this can buy time. remaining on board provided their best means of survival. This reinforces the old adage, “Don’t leave the ship until the ship leaves you!” The skipper motivated his crew and kept morale high for several hours while awaiting rescue, emphasising the benefit of strong leadership in such arduous circumstances.
33 When Making a Cup of Tea Wrecks a Crabber
Narrative During the evening, a 15m crabber reached the southern end of the The crew prepared the liferaft, sailed for her fishing grounds. At about box, the deckhand selected a new but before launching it they threw a 0200, one of the deckhands was course from the electronic chart and lifebuoy into the water to see where woken to take over the navigational is reported to have dialled it into the it drifted. The swell drove the lifebuoy watch. At this time the vessel was automatic helm, expecting the vessel further into the cove, so the skipper dodging inside a wide and deep sea to turn onto a northerly heading. He decided it would be safer to remain loch, waiting for the weather to abate. then left the wheelhouse unattended on board the vessel. When the The deckhand had transferred and went to the galley to make a lifeboats arrived, they were unable from a sister vessel that evening cup of tea and a sandwich, returning to approach the stricken vessel to and had only had sporadic and short briefly to cancel the watch alarm. evacuate the crew because of rocks periods of sleep over the previous During his absence, the vessel located astern and the swell waves 48 hours (see diagram below). ran aground in a deep cove to breaking over them. The engine was ticking over, the south of the box drawn on the When the rescue helicopter giving a speed of about 4 knots, and electronic chart. The skipper awoke, arrived, the winchman was lowered the vessel was dodging north/south and broadcast a “Mayday”, which down by the side of the cliff and onto in a box that the skipper had drawn was received by the coastguard. the vessel. The 7-man crew were on the electronic chart. The watch Two lifeboats and a rescue helicopter then airlifted to hospital and treated alarm15 was in operation. As the vessel were then tasked to the scene. for hypothermia and shock.
Deckhand’s sleep patterns prior to the accident
34 The Lessons
The vessel did not turn as expected. This might It is essential that skippers take full account of a 1 have been as a result of environmental influences 3 deckhand’s work and rest pattern before allocating and the vessel’s slow speed. Alternatively, it is likely that him to a navigational watch. This will ensure that he can the deckhand’s performance was affected by fatigue, and perform his duties safely. he might have either not altered course at all, or dialled an incorrect course into the automatic helm. The skipper was wise to use a lifebuoy to test where 4 the liferaft would drift before launching it. It is often Never leave the wheelhouse unattended, and safer to stay on board a vessel than to rashly abandon it at 2 always monitor alterations of course to ensure the the first opportunity. vessel turns as expected. Sensible advice on keeping a safe navigational watch can be found in the Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s Marine Guidance Note MGN 313(F).
35 Wooden You Know Narrative
After a couple of weeks’ layover during the Christmas period, a 20m fishing vessel sailed to the next port along the coast to pick up ice and to have a minor repair carried out to the fish-finder display in the wheelhouse. She sailed at 2035. As she was leaving the port, she made contact with the breakwater. However, she continued the voyage with no attempt having been made to check for damage to the vessel. Overnight the passage progressed without further incident, but at about 0330 the watchkeeper called the skipper, having noticed that the engine revolutions were dropping and that the engine was making a strange noise. The skipper decided this needed further investigation, so turned back to port. At about 0700, the fish hold bilge alarm sounded. This was set to sound once the well was full. Again the skipper was called, and he started the Images courtesy of RAF rescue helicopter footage main bilge pump which was driven by the auxiliary engine. The suction for point that the skipper went to the fish the DSC alert button on his radio. this pump ran along the port side of hold. The water was now about 10cm The coastguard replied, and started the keel into the well, and was fitted above the level of the well, and could to organise a rescue attempt. By with a coarse strainer in the well, and be seen running from forward through this time, the crew had used the a finer strainer at the valve chest in a redundant cable gland opening in power block to lift the liferaft from the engine room. the forward bulkhead. the roof of the wheelhouse and After about 10 minutes, the Checking the forecastle space, put it on the poop, and had put on skipper checked to see that the the skipper noticed that the water their lifejackets. However, they had pump was still discharging; it was level there was higher than that in failed to start the emergency pump not. He therefore went to the engine the fish hold, but he could not see because the engine was found to be room and dismantled the valve and the source of the water ingress. He seized. It was at about this time that strainer. Removing a small amount returned to the wheelhouse and one of the crew members, who was of debris, he reassembled the valve, called the rest of the crew, telling making his way forward, slipped and but could still not gain suction. He them the boat was filling with water fell against the fish hatch coaming, then started the bilge pump driven and that they should don lifejackets, breaking his ribs. from the main engine. This suction prepare the liferaft, and retrieve the An RAF helicopter was ran up the starboard side of the keel, emergency pump from the cabin launched to assist, and a number and was fitted with similar strainers and rig it to pump out the fish hold. of oil rig supply vessels responded to the port side suction. Again this He tried to raise the alarm, firstly by to the “Mayday Relay” broadcast ran for about 10 minutes before the VHF radio channel 16, then on MF by the coastguard. Approximately discharge stopped. It was at this 2182 kHz, and finally by pressing 40 minutes later, the first oil rig 1636 supply vessel was on scene, and holes in the bulkhead between the It is not possible to be certain the master gave orders for the FRC fish hold and the engine room used about where the water was entering to be launched. In discussion with the for cable runs were submerged, and the hull. There were three possible fishing boat skipper, he decided to the engine room had also started sources: the first – and most likely take three of the crew off, including to fill. The pumps were not keeping – source was as a result of damage the injured man, and take them pace with the water ingress, so it was sustained when the boat contacted on board his own vessel, which decided to take them back on board the breakwater when she left the remained close to the sinking fishing the aircraft and have the FRC take port, and possibly holing her. The boat as the RAF rescue helicopter the remaining two crew members off. second was as a result of a fractured arrived. Two salvage pumps were The fishing boat sank at 1108. pipe supplying water to the freezer lowered onto the fishing boat, and The injured crew member was plant condenser in the forecastle. one was started without problem. transferred to the helicopter, and then However, the pipes were fairly high The second initially failed to prime, on to hospital, and the remaining in the space, and it is likely that the and was moved to a position on crew members returned to port on skipper would have seen water being the main deck, where it operated board the oil rig supply vessel. Before pumped into the space through a pipe effectively. leaving the scene, the FRC was fracture. The third possible source By now, the water level in the launched again to pick up floating was from a redundant skin fitting fish hold was such that a number of debris and the fishing boat’s EPIRB. which had not been maintained.
The Lessons
MGN 165(F) Fishing Vessels: the Risk of Flooding, Although the owners had followed the advice in 1 provides guidance on bilge systems and their 5 the MGN concerning the provision of emergency construction and operation, as well as recommending pumps, they had not ensured that the pump was ready for the consideration of additional pumping arrangements to use. No routine had been established to start and maintain reduce the risk of catastrophic flooding. the engine, and when it was required in an emergency it In particular, it includes advice on the need to keep could not be started. Make emergency pump testing part bilge suction strainers and the fish hold bilge free of of your pre-sailing checks. rubbish, and to position bilge alarms low enough to provide early warning of flooding. Further advice is given concerning the need to maintain bulkhead watertight Following contact with the breakwater, no check integrity, the carriage of portable pumps and their regular 6 was carried out to see if any damage had been testing, and ensuring that crew members are familiar with caused to the vessel. While it is unlikely that the water the bilge system. ingress would have been immediately apparent, since it Much of this advice was not followed. was almost 11 hours until the bilge alarm sounded, any damage with the potential to cause flooding would have been noted, and the vessel returned to port for repairs. Only the skipper was familiar with the bilge pumping 2 arrangements. None of the rest of the crew was able to assist him during this emergency. The hull fittings in the forecastle included a 7 redundant sea water suction valve, and a disused echo-sounder transducer. Both of these were situated The bilge alarm was set to sound when the fish underneath the water tank, which filled the lower part of 3 hold bilge well was full. This meant that the end of the forecastle. It was not possible to see these fittings the suction pipe was under approximately 80cm of water from inside the boat, and they were not maintained when when it first activated. Had the bilge alarm been adjusted the boat was slipped. The condition of these fittings was to sound at a lower level (as recommended by the MGN), therefore unknown. it would have given an earlier warning of the problem, and allowed ready access to the strainer at that time. Attempts to raise the alarm by VHF and MF radio 8 were initially unsuccessful because the frequencies It was not until the second pump suction strainer used are no longer allocated for distress alerting. It was 4 had become choked that the skipper entered the only when the correct procedure was followed, by using fish hold. By then, the water level rendered the strainer the DSC alert button, that a response was obtained. Are difficult to access. No attempt was made to stop water your emergency calling procedures up to date? flowing into the fish hold from the forecastle through the redundant cable gland opening. Doing so, might have allowed the skipper enough time to clear the strainer and start to pump out the hold.
37 ent statistics
Fishing Vessel Accident statistics 1999 – 2008
YEAR LOSS OF LIFE PERSONAL VESSELS Lost with Fell Involved Onboard ACCIDENTS LOST Total vessel overboard Machinery Accidents
1999 34 0 29 7233
2000 21 6 2 3 32 73 40
2001 1 6 0 3 10 77 34
2002 44 0 08 4718
2003 4 5 1 1 11 59 28
2004 7 3 0 0 10 60 25
2005 16 0 29 5334
2006 10 4 1 1 16 53 19
2007 35 0 08 5621
2008* 44 0 08 5320
Total 58 47 4 12 121 603 272
*Figures for 2008 are provisional at time of publication. (May 2009)
39 Major accident locations
UK Fishing Vessels 2008 (PROVISIONAL FIGURES)
1 Fatal accidents (showing number of deaths) Vessels lost Note: 1 further vessel loss was recorded in 2008 with a location outside the area shown on this chart
40 MAIB published reports
List of fishing vessel fv Beverley Ann II/Cypress Constancy – sinking of a Fishing Vessel Safety Study accident reports Pass – collision between fishing vessel on 30 July 1998 1992 – 2006 – Analysis of UK vessels on 9 March 1999. with the loss of one life. Fishing Vessel safety published since 1999 Blue Hooker – loss of a Constant Faith – loss of a Flamingo – capsize of a Alma C – report on the death fishing vessel with two lives fishing vessel about 100 miles fishing vessel east of Harwich of Michael John Beedie, a off Blackchurch Rock, North north-north-east of Peterhead on 7 July 2002. fisherman from the fishing Devon on 12 November 1998. on 30 June 2001. vessel Alma C, on Turbot Bank Fleur de Lys – explosion about 55 miles west-by-south Blue Sinata – foundering of Crimond II – loss of a fishing on board vessel which then of Thyboron in Denmark on fishing vessel in Weymouth vessel 30 miles north-east of foundered 18 miles south- 25 January 2001. Bay on 8 September 2005 Scarborough on 24 April 2001. east of Portland Bill on with loss of one life. 16 April 2000. Amber – loss of a fishing Danielle – investigation of vessel in the Firth of Forth on Bounty – loss of fishing the major injuries sustained Fraoch Ban – capsize of a 6 January 2003. vessel off Portavogie, Northern by a deckhand on board fv fishing vessel off the coast Ireland on 30 June 2005. Danielle BM478 17 miles of the Shetland Islands on Amber Rose – foundering of a south-south-east of Falmouth 15 August 1999. fishing vessel with the loss of Bro Axel/fv Noordhinder – on 6 June 2006. one life off the Isle of Man on near miss between Bro Axel Geeske – death of one person 15 October 1998. and fv Noordhinder and the De Kaper – fire on while fishing off Beachy Head subsequent grounding of board a trawler off on 9 December 1998. Angela – capsize and Bro Axel at Milford Haven Hanstholm, Denmark on Gemma Fidelis – fatal foundering of a fishing 5 December 2002. 12 February 1999. vessel in the North Sea on accident on board 6 February 2000. Brothers – investigation of Donna M – capsize of a Gemma Fidelis 9 miles the grounding of vessel with fishing vessel off the Orkney east of the River Tees on Annandale – flooding and the loss of two lives off Eilean Islands with the loss of two 23 October 2001. foundering of a fishing vessel Trodday on 1 June 2006. lives on 31 August 1999. 16 miles north-north-east Girl Alice – loss of skipper of the Shetland Islands on Catrina – capsize of a UK Dunan Star – fatal accident from vessel 1.5 miles 23 March 2000. registered fishing vessel on board a fishing vessel 1.5 south-east of Burnmouth on south of Newhaven on miles south-west of the Isle of 19 November 2000. Arosa – grounding and total 13 October 1998. Arran on 10 August 2000. loss of UK fishing vessel Gradeley – manoverboard on Doonguddle rock off the Celtic King/De Bounty Elegance – investigation into 2 fatality off the west coast west coast of Ireland with the – collision between UK engine room fires, subsequent of the Island of Mull on loss of 12 crew members on registered feeder container flooding and foundering of the 28 October 1999. 3 October 2000. ship Celtic King and Belgian fishing vessel Elegance 30 Greenhill – grounding and registered fv De Bounty to miles north-west of Shetland subsequent foundering Astra II – loss of two crewmen the south of The Smalls traffic on 30 January 2004 and 8.5 of fv Greenhill off attempting to board the vessel separation scheme off the miles west of Shapinsay on Ardglass, Northern Ireland while berthed at Carbost pier, south-west coast of Wales on 5 March 2004. Loch Harport, Isle of Skye on 19 March 2000. 19 January 2006. 2 April 2000. Elhanan T – flooding and Gudermes and Saint Charisma – capsize of the foundering of the fishing Jacques II – collision between Atlantic Princess – man fishing vessel Charisma vessel Elhanan T on vessels in the Dover Strait on overboard incident from vessel (OB588) with the loss of one 14 August 2003. in the English Channel on crew member in Carlingford 23 April 2001. 23 November 2000. mv Elm/mfv Suzanne Lough on 30 January 2002. Harbour Lights – loss of a – near miss incident on fishing vessel off Polperro, Aqua-boy – Report of the Chelaris J – capsize and 11 February 1999. investigation of the grounding sinking of the fishing vessel Cornwall on 8 January 2000 of Aqua-boy, Sound of Mull on Chelaris J (GU323) and loss Emerald Dawn (one of trilogy) with the loss of one life. 11 November 2006. – capsize and foundering of all crew members Banc Harvest Hope – capsize and of fishing vessel off Kilkeel de la Schôle (near Alderney) foundering of the fv Harvest Auriga – loss of fishing vessel with the loss of one life on 1 October 2003. Hope 40 miles north-east of off Portavogie, Northern 10 November 2004. Ireland on 30 June 2005. Chelaris J – le chavirement Peterhead on 28 August 2005. Emerald Star – investigation et le naufrage du bateau de Harvester/Strilmoy – collision Aurelia – flooding and loss of Emerald Star making pêche Chelaris J (GU323) between fv Harvester and mv of fishing vessel Aurelia, contact with Chevron Texaco avec la perte de tous les Strilmoy in the North Sea on 78 miles west of St Kilda on Number 6 berth at Milford 13 August 2001. membres de l’équipage, Banc 4 November 2005. de la Schôle (près d’Alderney), Haven on the evening of 18 January 2006. Be Ready – fire on board the 1er octobre 2003. Horizonte Claro – grounding of a fishing vessel on Soyea fishing vessel while fishing 30 European Tideway and Christine Nielsen – flooding Island, Loch Inver, on miles north-west of the Orkney Vrouw Grietje – collision and foundering of a fishing 21 October 2000. Islands on 22 January 2000. between vessels In the North vessel 120 miles north- Sea on 16 October 2000. Betty James – grounding and east of the River Tyne on Jann Denise II (one of trilogy) – foundering of fishing vessel subsequent loss of a fishing 18 March 2001. Fishing Vessel Safety Study 5 miles SSE of the River Tyne vessel off Isle of Rhum on 1/2002 – report on the analysis 17 November 2004 with the 10 July 2000. of fishing vessel accident data loss of her two crew. 1992 to 2000. 41 Jasper III – foundering Meridian – Report on the Rachel Harvey – grounding Silvery Sea/Merkur – collision of vessel 90 miles north- investigation of the loss of the and loss of fishing vessel between Merkur/Silvery Sea east of Fraserburgh on fishing vessel Meridian KY 147 off Peninnis Head on which then foundered about 10 September 1999. with the loss of four crew 160 1 October 1999. 35 miles west of Esbjerg, nm due east of Aberdeen on Denmark with the loss of five Kathryn Jane (one of trilogy) Radiant – capsize and 26 October 2006. lives on 14 June 1998. – foundering of fishing vessel foundering of a fishing vessel 4.6nm west of Skye on or Noordster – investigation about 45 miles north-west of Solstice II – investigation about 28 July 2004 with the of the capsize of the fishing the Isle of Lewis with the loss of a fatal accident to a crew loss of the skipper and one vessel Noordster Z122 with of one life on 10 April 2002. member, 25 miles south-west possible crew member. the loss of three crew 11.5nm of Rockall on 13 May 2000. south of Beachy Head on Radiant Star III – foundering Kingfisher II – investigation 13 December 2005. of a fishing vessel 60 miles Solway Harvester – summary of the fire on board the fishing northeast of Fraserburgh on report on the investigation of vessel Kingfisher II whilst on Ocean Star – failure of a 6 August 1999. the capsize and sinking of fv passage to recover creels, warp block on board a UK Solway Harvester 11 miles east Random Harvest – flooding of 5 miles east of North Uist on registered fishing vessel of the Isle of Man on 11 January a fishing vessel south-west of 26 April 2004. north of the Shetland Islands 2000 with the loss of 7 lives. resulting in one fatality on Brighton on 3 July 1999. Kirsteen Anne – loss of a Solway Harvester – capsize 26 November 2001. Rebecca Kay – loss of a fishing vessel in the Firth of and sinking of fishing vessel, fishing vessel off Bideford Bar Lorn on 31 December 2002 Opportune – man overboard 11 miles east of the Isle of Buoy on 20 April 2001. with the loss of her two crew. fatality from a fishing vessel Man on 11 January 2000 with 35 miles east of Wick on the loss of seven lives. Lady Hamilton/Blithe Spirit Reno and Ocean Rose – 23 February 2000. collision between Reno and – Report on the investigation Sundance – capsize and Ocean Rose off Whitby, North of the collision between fishing Osprey – fatal accident to a foundering of a fishing vessel Sea 6 March 2004. vessels Lady Hamilton of man overboard from a fishing off Gilkicker Point, East Solent Helford and Blithe Spirit in vessel in Lochinver Harbour Resplendent – grounding of with the loss of one life on Falmouth Bay, Cornwall on on 20 April 2002. a fishing vessel in Bluemull 10 September 2001. 3 October 2007. Sound Shetland Islands on Our Nicholas – grounding Suzanne – see Elm. Lomur – grounding of a fishing and loss of the crabber Our 13 June 2001. Tullaghmurry Lass – sinking vessel in the approaches to Nicholas near the entrance Ross Alcedo – fire on board of a fishing vessel with the loss Scalloway, Shetland Islands to Stornoway Harbour on vessel while underway about of three lives in the Irish Sea on 14 June 2001. 24 July 2001. 32 miles north-west of the Isles on 14 February 2002. Luc and Toisa Puffin – fv Our Sarah Jayne/Thelisis of Scilly on 16 January 2000. Union Arbo/Philomena – collision between two vessels – collision between vessels Sally Jane – capsize collision between Bahamian 8.5 miles due east of the river in the Thames Estuary on alongside in Shoreham cargo ship Union Arbo and UK Tyne on 13 June 1999. 20 June 2001. Harbour on 27 July 1998. fv Philomena about 10 miles Lysfoss – grounding of a Pamela S – capsize and mv Sand Heron and fv Celtit south of Newlyn, Cornwall on fishing vessel in the Sound of foundering of fv Pamela S – collision between vessels 2 September 1999. Mull, Scotland on 7 May 2001 IH308 in Carmarthen Bay NE Traffic Lane, Dover TSS on on 17 June 2006 with the Van Dijck – loss overboard Marbella/Bravo Delta offshore 30 July 2001. loss of one life. of a fisherman from fishing platform – collision between UK Shark & Royalist dual vessel while fishing 30 miles registered fishing vessel and Pescalanza – sinking of a investigation report – Dual south-west of Guernsey on offshore platform in the Rough fishing vessel with the loss of investigation report into the 16 April 2001. Gas Field about 25 miles six lives on 2 November 1998. fire on board fv Shark on Vertrauen – investigation south-east of Flamborough 19 January 2008 and the Philomena – fatal accident on of the loss of Vertrauen Head on 8 May 2002. foundering of fv Royalist on board vessel in the Moray Firth about 75 miles north-east of 23 January 2008. Mariama K – carbon on 6 March 2001. Peterhead on 19 July 2001. monoxide poisoning on Sharona – flooding and Primrose – grounding of Vision II – Report on the board a fishing vessel in foundering of a fishing vessel on the Island of Rhum investigation of the fire on Douarnenez, France on vessel 80 miles north-east of on 15 June 2001. board the fishing vessel Vision 10 June 2000 – one fatality. Peterhead on 3 August 1999. II alongside at Fraserburgh Purbeck II – injury of Mathilda and fv Lady on 1 August 2008 resulting in crew member on board on Sian Elizabeth – investigation Hamilton of Helford – near three fatalities. 7 June 1999. of the injury to a member miss incident between of the crew on board the Wakil II – investigation of an Mathilda and fv Lady Hamilton Purdy – man overboard fishing vessel Sian Elizabeth accident to the skipper of a of Helford, 7 miles east-south- fatality from angling boat at 3 miles north of Kings Lynn fishing vessel 3.5 miles south- east of Lizard Point, Cornwall Shipwash Bank off Harwich, on 14 September 2006. west of St Bees Head on on 28 June 2001. on 17 July 1999. 10 April 2000.
GLOSSARY of abbreviations CPR Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency DSC Digital Selective Calling MGN Marine Guidance Note EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon Pan-Pan The International urgency signal (spoken) FRC Fast Rescue Craft RAF Royal Air Force GPS Global Positioning System RIB Rigid Inflatable Boat HRU Hydrostatic Release Unit RNLI Royal National Lifeboat Institute kHz kilohertz rpm revolutions per minute “Mayday” The International distress signal (spoken) VHF Very High Frequency 42 Fishing 2009 Safety Digest MAIB published reports are free of charge
SAFETY DIGEST MAIB Safety Digest 1/2008 – Published April 2008 MAIB Safety Digest 2/2008 – Published August 2008 MAIB Safety Digest 3/2008 – Published December 2008 Copies of the Safety Digest publication can be obtained, free of charge, on application to the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (Mrs Jan Hawes – 023 8039 5523). 43
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