Nicholas Blanford. Killing Mr. : The Assassination of Rafk Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East. I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2006. 256 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-84511-202-8.

Reviewed by Hannes Baumann

Published on H-Levant (June, 2009)

Commissioned by Amy A. Kallander (Syracuse University)

The investigation into the assassination of with the Americans, and the rivalry with revolu‐ Rafq Hariri, which started in February 2009, is tionary Iran and its Lebanese ally Hizbullah. set to revive interest in Lebanon’s former prime However, Blanford never explores these issues minister. A good starting point to read up on the and the reader is left wondering what exactly it billionaire-politician is Nicholas Blanford's Killing was that Saudi Arabia was trying to achieve in Mr. Lebanon. It is a journalistic introduction to Lebanon and why the Saudi royals used a contrac‐ Lebanese politics from the civil war (1975-1990) to tor as “their man” in the country. 2006 intended for a general audience. The third chapter describes Hariri’s role as In the frst chapter, Blanford gives a minute- prime minister from 1992 to 1998 and the corrup‐ by-minute account of the morning of Hariri’s as‐ tion associated with reconstruction under Syrian sassination. In the second, he describes Hariri’s domination. Blanford contrasts the “mafa-style wartime diplomacy in the 1980s as an envoy of racketeering” of the Syrian regime with the bil‐ Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd. Hariri used money to lionaire’s “bribery and cronyism,” which he con‐ gain a seat at the top table: “For Hariri, money siders to have been essentially harmless (pp. was a tool in negotiation as much as a plumber 60-64).Yet if Hariri used money “like a wrench,” uses a wrench to stop a leak or a sculptor uses a then surely it is important to trace the mecha‐ chisel to fashion a block of wood” (p. 30). Hariri’s nisms by which money was created in the post‐ funds came from Saudi Arabia, either directly war economy, Hariri’s role in this, and how this from the king or from Hariri’s personal wealth ac‐ shaped his politics. Hariri was in control of the in‐ cumulated through his work as a contractor for stitutional levers of the economy. He placed the Saudi royals. Blanford gives some revealing “smart technocratic Lebanese professionals” (p. 4) indications about Saudi’s Lebanon policy, Hariri’s at the head of the Central Bank, the fnance min‐ role in executing or even shaping it, relations istry, and the Council of Development and Recon‐ H-Net Reviews struction (CDR). The government borrowed heavi‐ ence but also the disarmament of Hizbullah and ly from domestic commercial banks, thus stabiliz‐ the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. ing the currency by drawing in Lebanese-pound Blanford maintains that Hariri opposed the latter deposits.[1] However, very little of this money two clauses but the Syrian regime accused Hariri went into reconstruction; instead the policy repre‐ of using his international connections--particular‐ sented a massive transfer of wealth to commercial ly with French President Jacques Chirac--to pres‐ banks and their depositors, and bank lending to sure Syria. Blanford writes that Hariri sought rec‐ private business was “crowded out.” Blanford onciliation with the Syrian regime through secret mentions this process in passing (p. 48). Hariri's late-night meetings with Hizbullah secretary-gen‐ role in the reconstruction of ’s city center--a eral Hassan Nasrallah. Moreover, Hariri refused scheme heavily driven by proft maximization--is to openly align himself with Lebanon’s anti-Syrian also somewhat glossed over. By eschewing a de‐ opposition. According to Blanford, Hariri’s assassi‐ tailed analysis of these two rent-creation mecha‐ nation is tragic because his eforts at reconcilia‐ nisms, Blanford misses a chance to examine how tion went unheeded. the billionaire-politician continued to use money Chapters 6 and 7 deal with Hariri's assassina‐ “like a wrench” in the postwar era. While Hariri tion in February 2005 and its aftermath. Blanford was in charge of government fnance and recon‐ holds Syria’s “Alawite faction” and Lebanon’s se‐ struction, former militia leaders, Syrian allies, curity agencies responsible. U.S. neoconservatives and the prewar political elite used “service min‐ used the international investigation into the as‐ istries” (e.g., education, health, or refugees) as pa‐ sassination to pressure Syria but Blanford does tronage resources. Close Syrian allies controlled not discuss the potentially problematic nature of foreign afairs and security agencies. Lebanon’s this type of politicized international justice. postwar institutions were thus divided up among Hariri’s son Saad assumed political leadership of diferent groups and Hariri was a central actor the Sunni community and joined the predomi‐ both in the carving up and in claiming his share nantly Christian and Druze anti-Syrian coalition of the pie. Blanford’s contention that Hariri was in organizing large-scale demonstrations. The big‐ merely a hapless victim of Syrian racketeering-- gest protest happened on March 14, 2005, earning which certainly did exist--should therefore be the coalition the name “March 14.” They confront‐ treated with caution. ed “March 8,” led by the Shiite Hizbullah, which Chapters 4 and 5 track the decline of Hariri’s relied on an alliance with Syria to continue its infuence in Syria due to the rise of a young armed struggle against Israel. Blanford laments “Alawite faction” (p. 55) around president-to-be the rising sectarianism among the two camps, yet Bashar al-Assad, which sidelined Hariri’s primari‐ he does not fully explore Rafq Hariri’s own role ly Sunni allies, all from an older generation. This in sectarian politics: “Although he was the undis‐ led to the election of pro-Syrian president Emile puted leader of Lebanon’s Sunnis, his talent, Lahoud as a counterweight to the prime minister charm and muscle resonated across the confes‐ in 1998. The eventual “showdown” between the sional divide, making him a national fgure capa‐ “Hariri camp” and the “Alawite faction” occurred ble of transcending Lebanon’s sectarian hurdles in 2004, when the Syrian regime sought an uncon‐ to steer the country independently from the stitutional extension of Lahoud’s term against clutches of Syria” (p. 210). This characterization Hariri’s opposition. In September 2004 the United does little justice to the complexities of sectarian Nations Security Council passed the U.S.-French leadership. Blanford does not examine how the sponsored resolution 1559, demanding presiden‐ Saudi billionaire became the “undisputed leader” tial elections without foreign (i.e., Syrian) interfer‐ of his community, what role his charities played,

2 H-Net Reviews or how Hariri sidelined the established Sunni elite Blanford should be applauded for digging up who resented “this immensely wealthy Saudi- a lot of interesting material about Hariri. He con‐ backed newcomer” (p. 46). By considering these structs the most coherent account of Hariri’s life questions, Blanford could have examined the role in the English language thus far, which is no that Lebanese political leaders play in reproduc‐ mean feat. However, Blanford fails to evaluate his ing sectarian and clientelist discourses and prac‐ sources properly and he leaves many questions tices. Blanford mentions the growing sectarian unasked. The book can be useful for researchers tension between Sunnis and Shiites and accusa‐ interested in the billionaire-politician or in tions against of pandering to sectari‐ Lebanese politics since the 1980s but they will an prejudice in the parliamentary elections of have to evaluate the interview material that Blan‐ 2005 (pp. 172-173), but fails to follow up on these ford presents with a more dispassionate eye. accusations. Finally, an epilogue describes the au‐ Note thor’s experience of the Israeli-Lebanese war of [1]. For an account of Hariri protégés heading 2006, and concludes that Hariri could have helped government agencies, see Guilain Denoeux and contain the war had he been alive. Robert Springborg, “Hariri’s Lebanon: Singapore Blanford relies almost exclusively on inter‐ of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant?” Mid‐ views conducted after Hariri’s assassination. His dle East Policy 2 (1998): 162. The following ac‐ choice of interviewees is strongly tilted towards count of postwar government fnance policy is former allies, advisors, and protégés of Rafq based on Toufk K. Gaspard, A Political Economy Hariri such as Johnny Abdo, Nohad Mashnouq, of Lebanon, 1948 – 2002 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), , and Abdel-Halim Khaddam. Many 210-221; and Samir Makdisi, The Lessons of of these individuals are now close to Hariri’s son. Lebanon: The Economics of War and Development Almost all the interviews were conducted in the (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 90-159. midst of the political struggle between members of March 14 and March 8. Blanford does not tribunal investigating pause to refect what efect this may have had on the narratives of his interlocutors. Actually, some Using of the most interesting insights of the book come K from those interviewees who were not an integral through part of the “Hariri camp.” Blanford describes members of March 14 in highly positive terms: , or Nayla Mouawad is “an energetic and attractive period woman” (p. 143), Saad Hariri is “tall and well- borrowing built” (p. 168), the late Gibran Tueni had “dark , 1930s-matinee-idol looks” (p. 182). In contrast, Hariri’s opponents are described as physically cake unattractive and socially inept: is a , which was “short, egotistical army general” (p. 170) while ing Omar Karami is “colorless” (p. 41). ’s P surprisingly positive image has been created by a public relations campaign (p. 68). These charac‐ , terizations stand in the way of dispassionate anal‐ tact ysis. had gone

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Citation: Hannes Baumann. Review of Blanford, Nicholas. Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafk Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East. H-Levant, H-Net Reviews. June, 2009.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24380

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