THEGULFTANKER WAR the Gulf Tanker War Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay

THEGULFTANKER WAR The Gulf Tanker War Iran and Iraq's Maritime Swordplay

Nadia El-Sayed El-Shazly First published in Great Britain 1998 by MACMILLAN PRESS LID Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

A eatalogue reeord for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-26306-6 ISBN 978-1-349-26304-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-26304-2

First published in the United States of Ameriea 1998 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Seholarly and Referenee Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-21116-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publieation Data EI-Shazly, Nadia EI-Sayed, 1936- The Gulftanker war: Iran and lraq's maritime swordplay / Nadia EI-Sayed EI-Shazly. p. em. Includes bibliographical referenees (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-0-312-21116-5 I. Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988-Naval operations. 2. Sea-power -Iran. 3. Persian GulfRegion-Defenses. 4. Persian GulfRegion- -Strategie aspeets. I. Title. DS318.85.E4 1997 955.05'42-DC21 97-35534 CIP

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This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sourees. 10987654321 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 'Historians of diplomacy will find in the recent Iraqi decision to continue diplomacy by other means the failure of the 1975 Algiers agreement, an accord which was to have rectified what the Iranians saw as the in tolerable one-sidedness of the treaty of 1937, which the Iranians had agitated for to adjust what they claimed was the patent unfairness of the 1914 border de marcations, which were called for in the protocols of 1911 and 1913, which were to implement an 1847 treaty, which was ne gotiated to amplify certain articles of an 1823 treaty, which confirmed a 1746 treaty, which confirmed the 1639 treaty of Zhigad, which left basically intact the 1555 treaty of Constantinople, an Ottoman-Safavid treaty which roughly defined what is the international if somewhat violated border between Iraq and Iran.'

(Dr Bruce Hardcastle, address at the 1980 Middle East Studies Association Conference, in Ghareeb, 1983, p. 60)

'Nonbelligerent powers may wring their hands at this latest spectacle of slaughter, but in most cases their grief lacks con viction. The unpleasant fact is that this war suits almost every one except those actually being killed, wounded or bereaved. It is probably true that both belligerents can be more confident of staying in power while the war lasts than after it finishes. It is certainly true that Kurds claiming autonomy on both sides of the border, aided by each other's governments, are able to hold their own much better than they could hope to if peace came. True, too, Turkey is doing excellent business with both sides; that Syria and Israel can confront each other with relative serenity so long as Iraq is occupied to the East; that the small Gulf states feel more threatened by the victory of either side than by the war's continuation; that OPEC would find it even more difficult to hold the present oil price if Iran and Iraq resumed full production; and that the United States can enjoy better relations with moderate Arab states so long as the latter are more worried about Iran than about Israel.'

(Times in International Herald Tribune, 'GulfWar: Unconvincing Grief, 19 March 1985) 'There are 22 million Kurds, by far the largest stateless nation in the world. They were among the greatest losers from the early 20th-century European taste for drawing lines, through sand and mountains, where no borders had existed before. As imperial Britain and France contended for political influence, and oil, they created aMiddie East map wh ich dismembered the Kurdish-populated territory into four main chunks: Iraqi, Iranian, Syrian and Turkish. Britain, in particular, insisted on millions of Kurds being joined to Iraq against their will, because Britain controlled Iraq and the Kurdish area con tained the Mosul oil wells. Intermittently, ever since, as it has suited us, the West has encouraged the Kurds to rebel, or ex horted them to remain quiet.'

('The West must be ready to confront Saddam', editorial in Independent, 3 September 1996) Contents

List ofTables x ListofMaps xi List of Charts xii heface and Acknowledgements xiii List ofAcronyms xvii

Introducuon: The War Iraq Started and Could Not End 1

1 The Tanker War: An Empirical Survey 18

2 The Main Protagonist: Saddam Hussein's Iraq Facing Khomeini's Iran 45 2.1 Iraq's Geopolitical Profile 45 2.2 Iraq's Political Parties and the Opposition-in-Exile 59 2.3 Saddam's Assessment ofKhomeini's Iran 73

3 The Enduring Contest of WiIls 82 3.1 Were there Options other than War? 82 3.2 The Iraqis Plunge into Deep Waters 87 3.3 Tourd'Horizon 88 3.4 Iraq's Strategy 93 3.5 A Review ofIraq's Groundwork for War 95 3.6 In Pain with no Gain: 1981 to 1984 104

4 Power-Play in the Gulf 114 4.1 The Choked Aorta 114 4.2 Hormuz: The Chokepoint 119 4.3 Iraq's Geopolitical and Geostrategic Predicament 123 4.3.1 The geopolitical issue 124 4.3.2 The geostrategic question 133

vii viii Contents 4.4 Competition for Privilege and Power 137 4.5 Alien Flags over the GulfWaters 144 4.6 The Gulf - Boon or Doom? 153

5 The Actors, The Plot, The Props 162 5.1 The Quest for Native Fleets 162 5.2 Navies of the Cast 170 5.3 Early Fires over the GulfWaters 183 5.4 Iraq's Tanker War Strategy 190 5.5 Baghdad's Rationale 194 5.6 Saddam's Panaeea 196

6 The Ledger: A Chronological Survey of the Conflict 201 6.1 1984 - The Curtain Rises on the Tanker War 201 6.1.1 January 1984 201 6.1.2 February 1984 202 6.1.3 March 1984 204 6.1.4 April-May 1984 207 6.1.5 June-July 1984 211 6.1.6 August-Oetober 1984 212 6.1.7 November-Deeember 1984 213 6.2 1985 - On Stage and Backstage Tug-of-War 215 6.2.1 January-February 1985 215 6.2.2 March 1985 216 6.2.3 April-June 1985 218 6.2.4 July-August 1985 218 6.2.5 September 1985 219 6.2.6 Oetober-Deeember 1985 220 6.3 1986 - Warfare Over Stardom in the Gulf 222 6.3.1 January 1986 222 6.3.2 February 1986 223 6.3.3 March 1986 224 6.3.4 April-May 1986 225 6.3.5 June-July 1986 227 6.3.6 August 1986 228 6.3.7 September 1986 230 6.3.8 Oetober-November 1986 231 6.3.9 Deeember 1986 232 Contents ix 6.4 1987 - The Inflamed GulfWaters 234 6.4.1 January 1987 234 6.4.2 February-March 1987 236 6.4.3 April-May 1987 238 6.4.4 June-July 1987 241 6.4.5 August 1987 243 6.4.6 September-October 1987 246 6.4.7 November-December 1987 249 6.5 1988 - Iran Sails into a Sea ofTroubles 252 6.5.1 January-March 1988 252 6.5.2 April-August 1988 255

7 Iran's Silent Force and the US Navy Take Centre Stage 260 7.1 Kitman Va Makr 260 7.2 The Issue of Protecting Kuwaiti Tankers 271 7.3 What was the Stam Reality? 282 7.4 Operation Earnest Will 292

Conclusion: The War Iraq could not Win and Iran could not Lose 305

Appendices 343

Bibliography 363

Index 375 List of Tables

1.1 Ships hit by nationality and type, 1984 19 1.2 Ships hit by nationality and type, 1985 20 1.3 Ships hit by nationality and type, 1986 21 1.4 Ships hit by nationality and type, 1987 22 1.5 Ships hit by nationality and type, 1988 23 1.6 Ships and tankers hit (by flag), 1984 24 1.7 Ships and tankers hit (by flag), 1985 26 1.8 Ships and tankers hit (by flag), 1986 27 1.9 Ships and tankers hit (by flag), 1987 28 1.10 Ships and tankers hit (by flag) , 1988 30 1.11 Iraqi and Iranian hits per month, 1984-8 36 1.12 Weapons used in attacks against ships, 1984-8 38 1.13 Ships hit by flag by belligerent, 1984-8 40 2.1 Iraqi opposition organizations and parties 65 5.1 Iranian naval order ofbattle 174 5.2 Iraqi naval order of battle 177 Al Ships hit, 1980-4 343 A2 Ships hit, 1984 343 A3 Ships hit, 1984-8 344 A4 Chronology of ships hit, 1980-3 344 A5 Safety record ofmerchant fleets, 1987-91 346 A6 Tanker war charts 347 A7 Chronology ofKuwaiti Shipping Issue 356 A8 Readiness conditions (USN) 358 A9 Rules of engagement (ROE) 358 AI0 Armilla Patrol Gulf Missions 359 All Iraqi Islamic parties 360

x List ofMaps

1.1 Shipping channels in the Gulf 32 5.1 Gulf navies 179 6.1 Foreign naval presence and facilities in the Gulf (Winter 1987) 239 6.2 Foreign naval presence and facilities in the Gulf (Summer 1988) 256 7.1 Iranian naval and air facilities and Silkworm sites 267 7.2 Naval mine attacks 297 7.3 US-IRI naval engagements 299

xi List of Charts

A6.1 Tanker War (January-June 1984) 347 A6.2 Tanker War (July-December 1984) 348 A6.3 Tanker War (January-June 1985) 349 A6.4 Tanker War (July-December 1985) 350 A6.5 Tanker War (January-June 1986) 351 A6.6 Tanker War (July-December 1986) 352 A6.7 Tanker War (January-June 1987) 353 A6.8 Tanker War (July-December 1987) 354 A6.9 Tanker War (January-June 1988) 355 A6.10 Tanker War (July-December 1988) 356

xii Preface and Acknowledgements

The subject of this text could benefit anyone with an interest in the Middle East at large, and the Gulf area in particular, where conditions and events in one country echo across the region and even beyond. It is written in the English language, the vehicle that would attract as large areadership as possible amongst Western intellectuals, but in this case from the vantage point of someone who was associated for most of her life with diplomatie, military and politieal circles in Egypt and elsewhere, and strove to have an understanding of the rationale and dynamies of poliey-making in our part of the world. In writing it I had in mind to answer some of what was published in the West, and while now and then the themes were meant to be thought-provoking, I tried my best to be dis passionate, though it was said that it is almost impossible to pretend to be neutral. The groundwork for this book was launched in Egypt. Among the first helmsmen who assisted me with constructive suggestions were my next-door neighbour, H. E. Muhammad Hafez Ismail, the elder statesman and iminence grise of diplo macy, who headed National Security, Central Intelligence and Foreign Mfairs at critieal tim es in contemporary Middle Eastern history; Professor 'Ali-Eddin Hilal Dessouky, Dean of the Faculty of Political and Economie Sciences, Cairo University; Admiral Adel Ayad, Head of Maritime Studies and Deputy Director, Nasser Higher Military Academy; Admiral Yousry Qandeel; General Tal'at MusalIam, Director ofMilitary Studies, Centre for Strategie Studies, Al-Ahram daily; and Professor Raymond Baker at the American University in Cairo. Chief among those who navigated with me the mined waters of the topie was Professor Earl (Tim) Sullivan, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, American University in Cairo, who spent endless weeks on the project. During these preliminary phases, their advice was a valuable contribution, and I am fully indebted to each of them.

xiii xiv PreJace and Acknowledgements Research was also started in Egypt, where I was allowed access to a number of semi-public libraries, and where the as sistance gran ted to me was beyond the customary service pro vided to others. I am thankful to each and every one of their staff - in partieular to Mona 'Essawy, Omneya Sirry, and Ivonne Luxor at the Ameriean Cultural Center in Alexandria. But first and foremost my gratitude go es to Admiral 'A1i Gad, Navy Commander-in-Chief, who honoured me with the only membership offered to a female civilian at the navy's Central Library. My thanks also to Admiral Galal Yasseen, Deputy Director of Egypt's Military Intelligence, who facilitated my entry into the library of the Nasser Higher Military Academy, and also enabled me to attend a symposium on the Iran-Iraq War at its Defence College - the only woman permitted to do so since its creation; to my favourite cousin, Ambassador Ahmad Aboul-Gheit, CheJ de Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Mfairs, who supplied me with published documents and bul letins, as weIl as details on the evolution of Security Council Resolution 598, whieh entailed a year of diplomatie efforts behind the scenes at the United Nations, during his service with the Egyptian Mission there, at the time of the Iran-lraq War; to General Ahmad 'AbdeI-Halim, Deputy Director of the Centre for Strategie Studies, Egyptian Ministry ofDefence, for helpful data; to General Samir Barakat, for references from his private collection; and to Ambassador 'Abdel-Rehim Shalabi, Deputy Director of the Institute for Diplomatie Studies, Ministry of Foreign Mfairs, who allowed me to re search at the library. Making a most appreciated exception, the London Head Office of Lloyd's Register for Shipping provided me with doc uments whieh were not available to the general public. The statistical information, whieh contained a complete record of ships damaged in the Gulf during the lran-Iraq War, was of immense value and became the empirical foundation of the book. In recognition, my thanks to Mr R. Gregory, Principal Surveyor, North Mrican Area; to Mr O. H. A. Hamdy, adminis trator ofLloyd's Alexandria Office; and to Mr DavidJ. Turner, Regional Manager. Throughout the project, my brother, Ismail EI-Shazly, was wholeheartedly dedieated to my support in every possible way. Among other contributions, I owe hirn the creation of the set heface and Acknowledgements xv of charts - the cornerstone of this work and pivotal to the analysis. My appreciation also to Dr Muhammad I Awad and Dr Noha I Adli for their technical assistance in the layout and production of maps, charts and tables. I subsequently moved to London where, from the start, I had the privilege of continuous encouragement and moral support from Sir Anthony Parsons, the distinguished British diplomat and renowned authority on Gulf affairs. During the most crucial phases of the project, I had the benefit of con structive recommendations from Dr Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Director of Graduate Studies, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University ofDurham. My sincere gratitude to both. For his contribution to focus and finesse of the final work, my thanks to Professor Charles Tripp, Chairman of the Centre of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Oriental and Mrican Studies, University of London. Research was facilitated in Britain by the fact that its unfet tered media allow Middle Easterners to have access to news of their area more rapidly than if they lived in their own country; beside the national press, numerous Arabic-Ianguage publica tions appear. London also enjoys a large diplomatie presence, sizeable Iraqi and Iranian communities, and constantly hosts Middle Eastern and other foreign dignitaries, business people, scholars and journalists. Furthermore, as an old colonial power, Britain houses several specialized libraries, and has many experts among academia and in the Foreign Office, with profound insight and valuable information on the Middle East. Warm thanks are due to those who generously gave of their time, in the course of long interviews, and entrusted me with their thoughts or participated with valuable suggestions. During the course of my research, interviews and discus sion-meetings gave me an opportunity to meet members of the Iraqi and Iranian expatriate community, including Iraqi opposition politicians. This enabled me to observe the nuances of details between the various Iraqi opposition parties and groupings, which gave me added insight into the points of fric tion or agreement between them, rooted in either ethnic and/or religious loyalties, or brought about by different politi cal ideologies and/or agendas. They also provided me with vital information on Iraq's domestic conditions over the past two to three decades - whether political, military, social or xvi Preface and Acknowledgements economie - in addition to relations with neighbouring coun tries. Some of this information was not published hitherto, except maybe in some of their party newspapers. A personal debt of gratitude is owed to those Iraqis and Iranians who decided to talk despite fear for their safety, and helped to place earlier findings and recent occurrences into their context with more preeision. By unveiling confidential infor mation, they had less to gain and more to lose than me. And by allowing the viewing of their unique audio-visual, photo graphie and documentary material, they demonstrated a great measure of courage, risking retribution abroad or persecution of relatives left behind. However, I alone bear responsibility for the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached in the text. Footnoting was based on the Harvard Method for Soeial Seiences, and names were transliterated according to the way they are pronounced in Arabie, and not how such names usually appear in English-Ianguage texts, having in mind to preserve their meaning, except for names of eities and coun tries, where I used English names, such as Cairo, not Al-Qahira, Jordan, not Al-Urdun. For example, the words Tariq (proper name, as in Tariq 'Aziz, and also meaning 'knocker') and tareeq (path or road) , should not be written in the same mann er, as this would distort their meaning; and Rasheed, Hameed, Rashid and Hamid are four different names. Finally, I dedieate this book to the memory of my father, Professor EI-Sayed EI-Shazly, who imperiled his life when he consented to become the prosecution's main witness in the 1948 Arms Scandal Trial, and instilled in me a strongly rooted sense of justice, inspiring me to pursue truth and challenge prejudiee everywhere; and to my mother, who kept his flag flying and navigated his ship after his premature passing. I dedicate it equally to the memory of my husband, Admiral Fouad Abou-Zikry, twice Commander-in-Chief, whose second cherished family, the navy, became mine as weIl. My gratitude also to my beloved brothers and children, and many dear friends, without whose enthusiastie and unwavering support this work would not have been possible.

NADIA EL-SAYED EL-SHAZLY List of Acronyms

AAA anti-aircraft artillery (also tripIe A) AAM air-to-air missile AAW an ti-aircraft warfare AIFV armoured infantry fighting vehicle AIPAC American Israel Public Mfairs Committee APC armoured personnel carrier ARE Arab Republic of Egypt ASM air-to-surface missile ASW anti-submarine warfare AWACS Airborne Warning And Control System BCCI Bank of Commerce and Credit International bd barrels per day BKO Babak Khoramdin Organization (Iranian) BNL Banca Nazionale del Lavoro CAP combat air patrol CARDRI Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq CBM confidence-building measures CENTCOM Central Command (USA) CENTO Central Treaty Organization CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA) CIC Combat Information Centre (USN) Cin-C Commander-in-Chief CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CIWS close-in-weapon system CJTFME Commander,Joint Task Force Middle East (USN) CW chemical weapons DAMP docking and assisted maintenance period DWf dead weight tonnage EC European Community ECC European Economic Community ECM electronic counter measures FAC fast attack craft FFG guided missile frigate FGA fighter ground attack

XVII xviii List ofAcronyms FLIR forward-Iooking infrared radar (night-vision gear) FO Foreign Office (UK) FPSO Floating, Production, Storage, Offloading system (tanker turned oil-rig) G7 Group of seven most industrialized countries G77 Group of less developed countries GATI' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product Harm high speed anti-radiation missile HASC House Armed Services Committee (USA) HFAC House Foreign Mfairs Committee (USA) HMS Her Majesty's ship (RN) HoC House of Commons (UK) ICJ International Court ofJustice ICO Islamie Conference Organization ICP Iraqi Communist Party IFF identification friend or foe llAF Imperial Iranian Air Force DN Imperial Iranian Navy DSS International Institute for Strategie Studies IKDP Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party IMO International Maritime Organization (formerly IMCO) INA Iraqi News Agency INC Iraqi National Congress IPC Iraqi Petroleum Company IR infrared (missiles or radars) IRC Islamie Revolutionary Council (Iran) IRGC Islamie Revolution Guards Corps (Pasdaran) IRGCN Islamie Revolution Guards Corps Navy IRI Islamie Republic of Iran IRIN Islamie Republic of Iran Navy IRNA Islamic Republic News Agency IRP Islamie Republican Party (Iran) JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (USA) JTFME Joint Task Force Middle East (USN) KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party (Iraq) KDPI Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran List 01 Acronyms xix KOTC Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company LCT tank-Ianding craft LDC less developed country LGB laser-guided bomb LSL landing ship logistics (stores) LSM landing ship men mbd million barrels per day MBT main batde tank MCM mine counter measure MCMV mine counter measure vessel MEED Middle East Eeonomie Digest MERIP Middle East &seareh and Information Projeet METF Middle East Task Force (USN) (also MIDEASTFOR) MKO Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (Iran) MoD Ministry of Defence MP Member ofParliament MRL multiple rocket launcher MSO minesweeper operation NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Adantic Treaty Organization NBC nuclear, biological and chemical NIC newly industrialized country NLA National Liberation Army (Iranian in Iraq) NM nautical mile NPT (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty NSPG National Security Planning Group (USA) OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OpOrder Operations Order (USN) PS UNSC 5 permanent members PB patrol boat, also PC patrol craft perm3 US-UK-France (inner group in UNSC) PFP Partnership for Peace PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party (Turkey) PLO Palestine Liberation Organization POW prisoner ofwar PRC People's Republic of China xx List 0/ Acronyms PUK Patriotic Union ofKurdistan RAF Royal Air Force (Britain) RC Regional Command (Ba'th Party, Iraq) RCC Revolutionary Command Council (Ba'th Party, Iraq) R&D research and development RDJTF Rapid DeploymentJoint Task Force (also RDF, USAand GCC) RGC Republican Guard Corps (Iraq) RICER Radar and Combat Information Centre Equipment Room (USN) RN Royal Navy (Britain) ROE Rules of Engagement Ro/Ro Roll on/Roll off RPG rocket-propelled grenade SAIRI Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Iraqi) SAM surface-to-air missile Sat-Int satellite intelligence (USA) SCR (UN) Security Council Resolution SDC Supreme Defence Council (Iran) SEAL sea, air and land commandos (USN) SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLOC Sea Lines of Communication 5MB submersible buoy SOSUS acoustic surveillance system SSM surface-to-surface missile SUCAP surface combat air patrol TacAir tactical air (contingency or plan) TAO Tactical Action Offker (USN) TBM tactical ballistic missile TIC tactical information coordinator (USN) TOW tube-Iaunched optically-tracked wire-guided UAE Uni ted Arab Emirates UAR United Arab Republic UNCLOS Uni ted Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNSC United Nations Security Council USAF United States Air Force USCG United States Coast Guards List 0/ Acronyms XXI USG United States Government USMC United States Marine Corps USN United States Navy USS United States Ship VLCC very large cargo carrier VTOL vertical takeoff and landing (fixed-wing, other than helicopter) WMD weapons of mass destruction