THE QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA

Yutaka HORII*

Introduction In the history of trade engaged in by European merchants in the Levantine Islamic states, the first half of the sixteenth century is noteworthy as the period of the shift from the Later Middle Ages to the Early Modern Age. The spice trade connecting the and the via and Syria was one of major fields of the Levant trade in the Middle Ages and also one of the foundations of the prosperity of the (1250-1517) and the European trading nations, especially Venice. The spice trade stagnated at the beginning of the sixteenth century when the quantity brought into the Levant diminished due to the activities of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. However, Syria and Egypt were conquered by the Ottomans (1299-1922) in 1516-17, and it revived by the middle of the century; thus the Levant trade kept its life. It is well known that the Ottoman policy of counterattack against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, which led to the revival of the flow of spices into the Levant, contributed to that phenomenon1. Many studies have been done on the Levant trade in the Later Middle Ages. Although the classic work of W. Heyd treating the field comprehensively using European sources is still useful to a certain extent, it has been greatly superseded, especially by S. Labib's work treating Egyptian commerce using Muslim sources and by E. Ashtor's work treating the trade in Egypt and Syria using both Muslim and European sources. However, for the beginning of the sixteenth century, Labib discusses insufficiently the European commerce in the Levant and emphasizes the Portuguese influence; Ashtor's discussion ends at 14982. The price of spices dealt in by the Venetians in Egypt from the end of the fifteenth century to the 1530's and the quantity transported by them from Egypt and Syria in the same period were clarified by V. Magalhaes-Godinho, E. Ashtor, and C. H. H. Wake3. However, the dealing process and the relations between the Venetians and the local society still has not been clarified. In the field of

* Lecturer , Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo

178 ORIENT THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA Mamluk study, C. F. Petry published a work treating comprehensively the ruling policy of Sultan al-Ashraf Qaytbay (ruled 1468-96) and Sultan al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri (1501-16); however, the discussion on foreign trade does not mention the forced purchase of pepper, a matter which caused serious friction between al-Ghawri and the Venetians4. P. Brummett's recent work treating the expansion of Ottoman seapower and its effect on trade discusses the trends of trade in the midst of competition among the Ottomans, Mamluks, Safavids, and Venice5; but there has been no study observing closely what was happening at the actual place of trade. The present paper treats the period of the reign of the Mamluk sultan al- Ghawri, a period when the trade turned stagnant, and focuses on Alexandria, the major seaport in Egypt. The paper's aim is to clarify the changing process of administrative and commercial relations between Venetians engaging in commerce there and the sultan's government. Thus, this paper may be able to make some original contributions to the studies of Levant trade and Mamluk history.

I Basic Features of Administration and Commerce (1) Defence and Trade Control The Mamluk administration in Alexandria concerning relations with Europeans can be classified into two categories: defence and trade control. Though closely related, they were executed through different administrative systems connecting and the seaport. The sultan ruled the seaport through an amir (commander of Mamluk army) who was appointed as governor (wall, later na 'ib); the governor administered there according to the sultan's edicts (marsum). When the danger of Christian attack from the sea heightened, the governor's main task became strengthening defence. When necessary, the sultan issued edicts to take Europeans living in the seaport into custody; execution of such edicts was also the governor's role. The governorship became connected closely with the defence of seaport in 1365 when Pierre de Lusignan of , following the ideal of the Crusade, attacked Alexandria and conquered it temporarily. The governor's title was changed from wall, which was same as the governors of the other Egyptian provinces, to na 'ib, which was regarded as a substantial deputy of the sultan's power like the nuwwab of the Syrian provinces. During this critical period, the rank of the amir appointed to the office also changed from an amir of forty (amir tablkhandh) to an amir of one hundred (amir mi'a wa-muqaddam alf),

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 179 which was the highest rank6. Although after the 1380's the appointees were mostly umarea' of forty or umara' of ten (amir 'ashara)7 , there were some cases where an amir of one hundred held the governorship again during periods when Mamluk-European relations were tense and importance of defence increased. For example, during the reign of Qaytbay, Europeans attacked Egyptian coast frequently during 1471-738, and Qijmas al-Zahiri, who was appointed governor on 18 January 1471 (25 Rajab 875), was promoted to amir of one hundred in November/December 1472 (Jumada al-Akhira 877) and carried out the construction of a fortress (burj) there until February/March 1478 (Dhu al- Qa'da 882), when he was removed from office9. During the Mamluk period, from a financial point of view, the revenue of Alexandria had been included in the sultan's privy funds (khass) since 1298, when Sultan al-Mansur (1296-99) carried out a cadastral survey (al-rawk . Therefore, the finances in the seaport were under the control of the nazir al-khass (controller of privy funds), a civil official who was the head of the diwan al-khass (bureau of privy funds) in Cairo. The main financial work in the seaport was control of trade. Its purpose was to obtain a certain amount of revenue from the process by which foreign merchantsbrought goods into the seaport, sold them, and took out goods they purchased.Concretely, the revenue came from levying customsand dealing in spices. Al-Zahiri (d. 1468), in his description of the outline of Mamluk administration,lists the funds under the control of the nazir se; the first item on it is the "[customs]revenue in the God-guardedseaport of Alexandria [gained]from the arrivals of Europeans" 12. The list also mentionsthe important points in the spice distributionchannel from the coast of the to Cairo and Alexandria:"tax (rasm) on spices arriving from Jidda to al-Tur," "rent of Funduq al-Karim in God-guarded Cairo," "rent of camels in Alexandria," "revenue from dealing in spices ." The "revenue from dealing in spices" must mean mainly the profit which the sultan gained through direct dealing with European merchants. From the beginning of the fifteenth century successive forced the Europeans, mainly Venetians, to purchase a certain quantity of pepper at a fixed official price. At least in the case of the Venetians, the forced purchases were paid for by precious metal and supported the coin supply in Egypt13. The nazir al-khass controlled the management and profit of the mint (dar al-garb) in Cairo 14; therefore control of trading sultan's spices for precious metal was one of his most important duties. Dealing in the sultan's spices was carried out by sultan's merchants (tujjar

180 ORIENT THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA

al-sultan), who were also known as "merchants of the royal storehouse (tujjar

al-dhakhirat al-sharĂfa)." Sultan's merchants first appeared in the late fourteenth

century when financial problems became serious because of socioeconomic

stagnation and political disorder. To increase his revenue, Sultan al-Zahir

(1382-89, 1390-99) on the one hand intensified the confiscation of property from Karimi merchants and on the other entered into the spice trade through

some of them. During the reign of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh (1412-21), the forced

purchase of pepper began to be imposed on the Venetians. Al-Ashraf

(1422-38) made the pepper trade a monopoly in 1426, and in 1428 he applied this policy to all spices. Thus the sultan's merchants came to carry out all of the

distribution and transactions; so most of Karimi merchants were ruined. The

monopoly was abandoned in 1449 because of the Venetians' opposition. Even

after that, however, the practice of forcing the European merchants to purchase

the sultan's pepper continued, and the sultan's merchants continued having considerable influence on the spice trade15.

(2) The Venetian Colony and its Trading Activities At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Venetians gained permission from the Ayyubid sultan to have a factory (funduq, fondaco) in Alexandria. Their consul started residing there before 123816. They got a second factory during the same century. They still held two factories in the late fifteenth century17. The fundamental rights which the Venetians had obtained from the sultan in order to engage in trade smoothly became customs ('ada in and consuetudine or usanza in Italian) in the fifteenth century -for example, the consular jurisdiction inside the colony, the consul's right to negotiate with the sultan, the merchants' right to request the sultan's judgement in quarrels with Muslims, and the right not to be imposed with collective responsibility for the debts, etc. of one of their number. Neither could they be imposed with the responsibility for other nations' piracy against Muslims18. The consul of Alexandria represented the Venetians living in Egypt. He was elected in the home country Senate and sent from there. According to the Senate's orders and the decisions of the local Council of Twelve (Consiglio di XII), he provided the colony's administration and legal judgements and also negotiated with the local ruler. If the problem was beyond the consul's negotiating ability, an envoy (oratore) dispatched from the home government negotiated with the sultan. The colony's financial management was supported by the system of a cottimo (common fund). Beside Alexandria, the system existed in

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 181 also. Its source of revenue was a tax imposed on the goods which the Venetian merchants dealt in. It covered the salary of consul and the expenditures relating to the colony as a whole, such as the payments extorted by the local officials and expenses required for negotiations made by the consul or an envoy19. The main goods dealt in by the Venetians in Egypt in the late fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century were as follows20: The main goods they brought in were woolen stuff, silk fabrics, and metal which was used for Mamluk coinage. Most of metal was in copper ingots; silver and gold ingots and coins (contanti, monede) were very few. They sold these goods according to the price converted into ducats, a unit of their gold coin. The main goods they purchased and took out from Egypt were spices such as pepper, ginger, clove, nutmeg, mace, cinnamon, and cassia; these had travelled from the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea. Egyptian grain such as wheat and broad beans were occasionally purchased and transported to the homeland or dependencies such as Cyprus, Crete and Corfu21. The Venetian spice trade was characterized by the system of muda, which means a state-controlled convoy or a fixed loading period at its destination. From the middle of the fourteenth century, the Venetians sent state-controlled galleys once a year generally to Alexandria, to Beirut and Tripoli on the Syrian coast, to Tana and Trebizond on the coast, and to Flanders22. In 1436, galleys began to be sent to Barbary (Maghrib); in 1490, the fleet called "al trafego" began sailing from Venice to Tunis and then to Alexandria or Beirut23. The Senate controlled the management of these galleys through deciding on the freight rates by auction, electing the commander of galleys (capitanio), and deciding the schedule of sailing. A major purpose of sending galleys to Alexandria and Syria was to import spices. The ideal loading period at their destinations was autumn because the wind would be favorable on their way back. The galleys of Alexandria had to stop loading twenty days after their arrival or on the twentieth of November; they were given priority over other Venetian in loading spices24. The Venetians in Alexandria and Damascus were generally forced to purchase the sultan's pepper in the autumn, the season of the arrival of the Venetian galleys. They had to complete the dealings before the galleys' arrival. Only after the completion, were they able to purchase other pepper freely25. The official price in Alexandria during the reign of Qaytbay was generally set at a little higher than the market price; for example, the market and the official prices in 1472 were 70-70.5 ducats and 77 ducats per sporta respectively, and in 1474, 58-75 ducats and 75 ducats26. By 1498, the quantity of 210 sporte at one

182 ORIENT THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA muda and an official price of 80 ducats/sporta had become customary27. The above-mentioned system of the cottimo (common fund) played a role in stabilizing the forced purchasing within a certain range and characterized the Venetian spice trade as well as the muda system. The pepper was all purchased by the consul and, after the Council of Twelve fixed a minimum price, was sold to the merchants through auction. If the sum yielded by auction was smaller than that paid to the sultan's side, the difference was imposed upon all merchants as "pepper loss (danno del pepe) ," a kind of tax. If still it was impossible to cover all, the arrears became the cottimo's debt. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the Venetian Levant trade of the Middle Ages reached at its height, but on the other hand the debt of two cottimi of Alexandria and Damascus continued to increase, and the taxes upon the merchants oppressed their profit28. Thus, in 1499, to increase the control on the cottimi, the Senate established two supervisors (provveditori) for each city29. However, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the sultan increased his demands in his policy of forced purchases, and the debt of the cottimo of Alexandria became so serious that the sending of galleys there often had to be suspended.

II Frictions and Negotiations (1) The Main Causes of Friction Qansuh al-Ghawri ascended the throne on 20 April 1501 (1 Shawwal 906) and held his sultanate until 24 August 1516 (25 Rajab 922) when he died in battle with the Ottoman army at Marj Dabiq. Friction between al-Ghawri and the Venetians in that period arose mainly over three matters: the insufficiency of the tribute from Venetian Cyprus to the sultan; the tension in relations between the Mamluks and the European powers; and the terms of purchase of the sultan's pepper. Cyprus had been sending tribute to Cairo annually since 1426 when Sultan Barsbay sent an expedition there and became nominally dominant; the practice continued even after 1489 when the island was annexed to Venetian territory. When Sultan al-Ashraf Jan Bulk (1500) ascended the throne, the tribute was in arrears; the sultan issued an edict imposing the outstanding amount on the Venetian consul and merchants30. Similarly, during the reign of al-Ghawri, when an envoy from Cyprus brought three years' tribute to Cairo in 1501, the sultan, saying one other year's was outstanding, took the envoy into custody temporarily31. The matter of tribute, however, did not develop into a matter of serious diplomatic negotiation during the reign of al-Ghawri. The Mamluk-European relations were tense from 1510 to 1512 due to the

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 183 military action of the Hospitallers of Rhodes. Al-Ghawri, as a means of negotiating with the European powers, took the Europeans, including the Venetians, living in his dominion into custody. Venetians at the time were treated as the sultan's enemies and were compelled to make an effort to have sultan agree that it was misunderstanding. However, the most important matter of negotiation during the reign of al-Ghawri was the conditions of purchase of the sultan's pepper. One of the reasons which made this matter difficult was the rise in market price; but a rather more direct reason was the conflicting interests of the two sides. These two matters directly concerned the Mamluk defence and control of trade in the seaport. The same kind of problems had frequently caused friction between the sultan and the European trading nations during the fifteenth century32. Compared to the reign of Qaytbay, notable features in the reign of al- Ghawri were as follows: the sultan's policies on the seaport became more aggressive due to difficult foreign and financial circumstances; however the effects of such policies were quite limited; and both the aggressiveness and the limitedness made the friction with the Venetians serious. Its course was as follows.

(2) On the Conditions of Dealing in Pepper: 1501-10 The Mamluks in the second half of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century were in a state of chronic financial crisis because of socioeconomic stagnation, increasing expenditure for the salary of mamluks and officials, the needs of defence on the Syrian frontier and Mediterranean coast, the expedition against the Ottomans, etc. Thus securing new sources of revenue was a critical matter for the state; during the reign of Qaytbdy, new taxes on the property of citizens and waqf endowments were created and confiscation (musiidara) of citizens' property came to be done constantly33. In Alexandria, in February/March 1491 (Rabi` al-Thani 896), just before the end of war with the Ottomans that started in 1485, Qaytbay sent a messenger (qasid) to levy five months' rent from real properties such as waqfs; in March/April (Jumada al-Ula 896), he issued edicts ordering levies on big merchants (a'yan al-tujjar) and other citizens. These were linked with taxation in Cairo, and such taxation was carried out in Damascus and Damietta at the same time34. Al-Ghawri, just after his enthronement, executed this policy even more aggressively. In July/August 1501 (al-Muharram 907), he decided in royal council (majlis) to levy one year of revenue from waqfs which were still intact and the rent of ten months from real properties and ships in Cairo; he also sent

184 ORIENT THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA edicts ordering the same taxation to Alexandria, Damietta, Damascus, and other Syrian provinces35. Moreover, he confiscated property from merchants on a large-scale in Alexandria, Damietta, Jidda, and other seaports through a person named 'Ali b. Abi al-kid, who was appointed controller of waqfs (neizir al-awqaf) on 2 November 1502 (1 Jumada- al-Uld 908), held the concurrent offices of agent of the exchequer (wakil bays al-ma1) and bailiff of the sultan (bardadar al-sultan) and lead the management of the "bureau of the vizier and majordomo (diwan al-wizara wa-al-ustadariya, it means the diwan al-mufrad probably)" and the bureau of the privy fund (diwan al-khass)36. The greatest reason why al-Ghawri made his financial policy so aggressive just after his enthronement may be that he had to pay the Mamluk armies ('askar or jund) generous extra benefits (nafaqa) to obtain their homage (bay`a)37 . After Ibn Abi al-Jud's downfall in April 1503 (Shawwal 908)38, no record of extra taxation and confiscation in Alexandria can be found. Al-Ghawri's aggressive financial policy at the beginning of his reign was obviously related to his policy in dealing in pepper with the Venetians. According to letters reaching Venice on 4 March 1502 from the consul of Alexandria, Alvise Arimondo, and the capitanio of the galleys of Alexandria39, when the galleys arrived at Alexandria on 23 December of the previous year, al- Ghawri had demanded 150 ducats/sporta as the official price of pepper. As the market price in September of the same year had been 90 ducats40, this official price was extremely high. Al-Ghawri detained the galleys even after the fixed loading period passed and, to make the Venetians make payment in silver, delayed supplying pepper to the seaport. Finally, the pepper was purchased at the price of 112-128 ducats; the galleys departed on 13 April 150241. In 1503, pepper's market price rose from 72 ducats/sporta in March to 86 ducats in July and 100 ducats in December42. The galleys sent in the summer were forced to purchase the sultan's pepper at 105 ducats/sporta. Compared with the market price, this official price was not very high; but the imposed quantity was 300 sporte, one and a half times the customary quantity43. The sum paid for the sultan's pepper this time was 31,500 ducats (105 ducats x 300 sporte); it is precisely the sum which al-Ghawri had first demanded of the muda in 1502 (150 ducats x 210 sporte = 31,500 ducats). Such an aggressive policy of dealing in pepper obviously had a serious influence upon the management of the cottimo; its debt rose from 10,000 ducats in 1498 to 16,000 ducats in 1501 and to 27,000 ducats in 150344. In June 1504, the market price of pepper jumped to 140 ducats/sporta45. The official price imposed the galleys sent at the end of same year was 192

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 185 ducats/sporta; it was far higher than the market price. Moreover, not only the customary 210 sporte but also an additional 250 sporte, the stock remaining in the royal storehouse (dachieri = dhakhira); the total quantity was 460 sporte and the sum reached "84,000 (sic) ducats." Al-Ghawri detained the galleys, forced the consul and merchants to come to Cairo, chained and imprisoned them, and pressed payment. The capitanio of the galleys departed without the sultan's clearance (licenza) and with no cargo, evaded bombardment from the fortress of Qaytbay, and returned Venice in May 150546. After this event, trade between the Mamluks and the Venetians was interrupted until 1507 when the negotiations between them reached a settlement. First, on 19 July 1505, to reopen the trade, the Venetian Senate decided to send the secretario Alvise Sagundino to negotiate with al-Ghawri47. The instructions (commissione) given to him48 recount the course of the development of the friction and then order him to ask al-Ghawri to issue an edict (co[mmandame]nto maraba = marsum murabba'a) containing certain provisions, which were "very necessary for the conservation of our merchants and were also the benefit of the sultan." One of the interesting statements in these instructions is a list of the Venetians' "friends (amici)" and "enemies (nemici)" among persons inside or close to the Mamluk power center. The former are "Corcomas, who is now a grand amir (armiraglio grando = amir kabir)," "Osdomur, executive secretary (diodar grando = dawadar kabir)," the "confidential secretary (catibiser = katib sirr)," "el lueli named Alam who was signor in Alexandria" (neither office nor person can be identified), and "those others our merchants will tell you (Sagundino) of." Qurqmas min Walt al-Din and Uzdamir min 'Ali By were named amir of one hundred by al-Ghawri in June/July 1501 (Dhu al-Hijja 906)49. Uzdamir was appointed executive secretary, one of the principal military offices, on 30 July 1501 (14 al-Muharram 907); and Qurqmas was appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of Egypt (atabak al-'asakir bi-Misr), the highest military office, on 4 January 1505 (30 Rajab 910)5°. At the time, a person named Ibn Aja was holder of the office of confidential secretary, one of the principal civil offices51. The reason why they were regarded as "friends" by the Venetians is unclear; no evidence can be found that they played important roles in the actual negotiations. At least, however, it is certain that persons favorable to the Venetians existed in the center of Mamluk power. On the other hand, the Venetians' "enemies" are "the present nadracas (nazir al-khass)," "one called Ebenebusba," "the coza (khawdja, a title of the sultan's merchant) who was (sic) in Alexandria named Ameto Bubacho," "one

186 ORIENT THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA

[named] All Meseleti," "one [named] Radeidin of the customhouse (doana = diwan)," "Filipo da Pareto, consul of the Catalonians." The fact that the nazir al- khass , two sultan's merchants and a customs officer are listed here means that the whole Mamluk trade control in the seaport at the time was considered an obstacle for the Venetian trading activities. The nazir al-khass at the time was 'Ala al-Din b. Imam, who took this office in March/April 1501 (Ramadan 906). He was dismissed just after al- Ghawri's enthronement but was soon reinstated and began to hold the concurrent office of controller of waqfs (nazir al-awqaf) on 17 April 1503 (19 Shawwal 908)52. Al-khawaja Shihab al-Din Ahmad b. Abi Bakr al-Skandari became a sultan's merchant before 150353. According to the instructions to Sagundino, All Meseleti was also a sultan's merchant. Al-khawaja Ahmad and al-khawaja 'Ali were cited as "having no will to keep the ancient customs, seeking with infinite force to sell this pepper at an unbearable price, refusing our merchants and consul with all of their possible power, and finally they threw the pepper into our factory by force"54. Sagundino, arriving at Cairo on 6 December 1505, was granted an audience by al-Ghawri, but the negotiations for restoring the pepper trade to the customary conditions did not progress; and he died of illness on 28 February 150655. Next, al-Ghawri, to continue negotiations, dispatched his interpreter (turjuman) Taghri Birdi to Venice with a retinue of twenty, including four sultan's pages (caschi = khassaki) and two mace bearers (mazieri = jumaqdar); the party's expenses were covered by the cottimo56. Taghri Birdi's sojourn and negotiations in Venice were described in detail by J. Wansbrough57. Its outline was as follows: Taghri Birch, arriving at Venice in September 1506, was granted an audience by the doge and submitted the letters from al-Ghawri and then entered into negotiation with the three supervisors of the cottimo. The negotiations did not progress; the Senate decided in October to send a person named Francesco da Monte with one khassaki to Cairo to make known to al-Ghawri the demands of the Venetian side again. They returned to Venice with al-Ghawri's reply in May 1507. Finally, the two sides reached an agreement and, on 31 May, drew up a mutually agreed-upon document which Taghri Birdi signed. The noteworthy point in the process of negotiation is that though both sides based their arguments on "customs," they opposed each other completely. Al- Ghawri, in his letter (dated "4 mazo 911" = 4 May 1506) which Taghri Birdi submitted to the doge58, justified his actions as follows: the bombardment by the fortress of Qaytbay of the galleys which departed without clearance was a

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 187 customary measure; the reason why the galleys were not supplied foods was because of an outbreak of plague; the problem of pepper was caused by the rise in the market price; the royal storehouse suffered heavy loss because the Venetians refused to purchase the pepper in defiance of customs; and a contract made customarily after obtaining the certificate (polizza) of the weighers (pesatori) cannot be withdrawn from. On the other hand, al-Ghawri states that he ordered an edict issued confirming the old customs; it means he was showing the Venetian side his desire to continue trade. Against al-Ghawri, who argued that the rise in the pepper price was unavoidable, the Venetian side insisted on the customary price. The Senate, on 26 October 1506, just before dispatching Da Monte, decided on a letter demanding that al-Ghawri issue an edict and also on the draft of the edict. Only the text of the letter has been handed down to us59; the concrete demands concerning the contents of the edict are not clear. The pepper price was obviously a most important matter. Al-Ghawri, in his reply to the doge (dated "1 marzo 912" = 1 March 1507)60 which Da Monte and the khassaki brought back to Venice, stressed again the rise in the market price of pepper; he states also that he had issued edicts which were the same as the edicts of past sultans. Al-Ghawri may have shown Da Monte and the khassaki his intention of making concessions to the Venetian side. The second clause of the document agreed to on 31 May 150161 prescribes concerning the quantity and price of pepper that "[the Venetians] must not be obligated to accept [anything] except 210 sporte of pepper; it is customary that the nation accept [it] at the price of 80 ducats per 1 sporta." The first clause prescribes that the copper paid by Venetians in settlement of the debt of the cottimo would be accepted by the creditors of the cottimo at a price higher than the market one. The fact that agreement was reached at conditions favorable to the Venetians means that al- Ghawri gave the highest priority to the reopening of trade. When Taghri Birdi and the new consul, Marino da Molin, arrived at Alexandria on 9 September 1507, al-Ghawri sent letters expressing his welcome62; this fact also shows that he was eager for trade. After that, until 1509, the relation between sultan's government and the Venetians may have been stable. The consul Marino da Molin, in his letter written in June 150863, reported that the Venetians' circumstances were very quiet and the matter of pepper was conducted well, thanks to Taghri Birth. However, it is doubtful whether the official price of pepper was kept at the customary 80 ducats/sporta. We have no data about it between 1507 and 1509, but keeping the customary price may have been difficult because the market

188 ORIENT THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA price at around March 1507 was 120 ducats64. The price of sultan's pepper at around May 1510 was 120 ducats/sporta65; obviously the agreement of 1507 was not being kept at the time. Moreover, the activities of sultan's merchant became aggressive again; according to the letter of the consul Tommaso Contarini, dated 29 May of the same year, al-khawaja Ahmad was Venetians' "worst enemy" and exercised "every insolentness against Venetians" to force them to purchase 500 sporte of pepper66. After a few months later, a problem which occurred in a field other than the pepper dealing caused even more serious friction between al-Ghawri and the Venetians.

(3) Tension in Mamluk-European Relations: 1510-12 During the reign of al-Ghawri, the Mamluks were menaced by the military actions of the Hospitallers in the Eastern Mediterranean, the entry of the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, and the Safavids' attempt to advance westward. Under these severe foreign pressures, al-Ghawri made his military policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean more aggressive than before; in March/April 1508 (Dhu al-Qa'da 913), he appointed members of an expedition toward the "European land (bilad al-Firanj)," which may mean Rhodes, and send the nazir al-khass to Alexandria and Rosetta to begin preparing the fleet67. This attempt, however, came to an end after two years. In August/September of 1510 (Jumada al-Ula 916), a report from the governor of al-Bira in Northern Syria reached al-Ghawri: the governor captured and sent to Cairo a party (jama'a) which was carrying letters written by the Safavid shah Isma'il offering to join the "European kings (muluk al-Firanj)" in a joint confrontation against the sultan of Egypt68. On 14 September (10 Jumada al- Akhira 916), another report from the governor of Tripoli reached al-Ghawri: the Mamluk vessels sent to the Gulf of Alexandretta (al-Jun) to provide timber for fleet construction were attacked near the fortress of Ayas by Europeans (Hospitallers mainly) and wholly plundered69. In this situation, al-Ghawri had no choice but to take traditional countermeasures. The importance of defending Alexandria was obviously high in the second half of his reign; Khudabirdi al-Ashrafi, who had been the governor there since 1504, had been promoted to amir of one hundred before 1510 and held the office until 151670. After receiving the above-mentioned reports, al-Ghawri in September/October 1510 (Jumada al-Akhira 916) ordered the monks (ruhban) of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Kanisat al-Qiyama, lit. Church of the Resurrection) in Jerusalem and all Europeans in Alexandria,

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 189 Damietta, and other towns in the coast to be taken into custody71. Al-Ghawri ordered twenty monks brought to Cairo to write letters to ask the "European kings" for the return of the plundered vessels and arms and, to make them do as he said, put them under the watch of the nazir al-khass72. In Alexandria, approximately fifty European merchants were taken into custody by the governor and sent to Cairo73. According to a letter written on 6 December 1510 by one of Venetians taken to Cairo74, al-Ghawri questioned the consul Tommaso Contarini about the Venetians' three "hostile actions": The first was that those who were sent from al-Bira to Cairo were two Europeans (franchi = Firanj), one an interpreter of Cyprus and the other an ambassador; they held letters written by the Venetian doge, the king of France and other monarchs and also by Shah Isma'il; and they stated that they were sent by the doge. The second was that the Rhodians were entering Venetian Cyprus freely. The third was that the Rhodians and corsairs were supplied food and water in Cyprus. For the first point, the consul answered that the two Europeans were travelling on different affairs from such a mission; no answers are written in the letter concerning the second and third points. At any rate, al-Ghawri took the Venetians into custody by reason of their connection with the Safavids and the Hospitallers. The Venetians taken from Alexandria were confined in the house of the nazir al-khass. In Damascus, the Venetian consul Piero Zen and the merchants were also arrested and sent to Cairo, where they arrived in January 1511. According to the testimony of the secret messenger captured at al-Bira, Zen had expedited his mission75. The Venetians were treated as enemies by al-Ghawri, who was afraid of the conclusion of a Venetian-Safavid alliance, and continued to be confined for about one and a half years afterwards76. Moreover, in 1511, al-Ghawri detained a Venetian (nave) at Alexandria; the galleys sent in the summer of the same year, to avoid the danger at the place, sailed toward Abu Qir (Bichieri), a town in the eastern suburbs77. Thus the trade between the Mamluks and the Venetians again faced a crisis of interruption. Finally, on 10 November 1511, the supervisors of the cottimi of Alexandria and Damascus insisted in the Collegio on the necessity of sending an envoy to the sultan78; on 17 November, the Senate elected Domenico Trevisan as envoy79 and, on 31 December, decided on the instructions to him80. Trevisan arrived at Cairo on 6 May 151281. Trevisan and al-Ghawri negotiated on three points. The first was the Safavid matter; it was settled on the condition that the consul of Damascus, Zen, would be chained, repatriated, and punished by the doge. The second was the

190 ORIENT THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA question of whether the tribute which had been sent from Cyprus to Cairo during last six years was sufficient; al-Ghawri admitted that Venetians had completed payment82. The third was the matter of pepper dealing; the negotiations had a rough going. Al-Ghawri demanded of Trevisan that the Venetians purchase 210 sporte of the sultan's pepper annually at the market price, that is, customary quantity and uncustomary price; it was the same demand he had stated during the negotiations of 1506-07. Trevisan, the consuls and all the Venetian merchants would not consent to change the old rule. Al-Ghawri ordered the nazir al-khass and al-khawdja Ahmad to put his demand into practice. Then Trevisan proposed that for the following three years, Venetians would not be forced to purchasing pepper, but in compensation, they would pay 2,000 ducats annually from the cottimo to the royal storehouse. To that, the nazir al-khass: and al-khawdja Ahmad demanded compensation of 10,000 ducats a year. That was too high for the Venetians. However, the consul of Alexandria and all the merchants considered that paying compensation was better than being forced to purchase pepper. The Venetians upped their offer to 4,000 ducats a year and finally agreed to pay 5,000 ducats annually for three years. It was expected that after three years, the Mamluk armada, which was under construction at the time, would have obtained victory over the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the pepper price would go down83. All negotiations being completed, Trevisan, the consuls of Alexandria and Damascus, the merchants, and all other Venetians who had been detained left Cairo on 2 August 151284.

(4) Stagnation of Trade: 1513-16 Although the conditions of reopening trade were agreed upon between the Mamluks and the Venetians in 1512, the Venetian trade in Egypt was in a state of stagnation during 1513-16. Aggravating greatly the poor conditions of commercial activity, the homeland was not able to organize galleys to Alexandria for three years after 1513. On 3 May 1514, the Senate, to cover the insufficiency of transport capacity, allowed all Venetian ships (nave) to carry spices freely from Alexandria and Beirut85. This decision meant a change in the traditional muda system which had given galleys the priority in carrying spices; from a long-term viewpoint, it was the starting point of the process by which the main means of transport shifted from galleys to round ships during the sixteenth century86. However, as far as we can observe the situation of Alexandria at the time, no evidence can be found that the decision led to an improvement in trade.

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 191 The debt of the cottimo had reached 50,000 ducats by June 151687. One of the reasons which aggravated the conditions of commercial activity was the prevalence of plague in Alexandria from March to May 1513. Many Venetians, Catalonians and Ragusans died of it88. At the same time, the situation of the spice supply also grew worse. According to the letters written by the consul Tommaso Contarini from June to August 151389, the Portuguese entered the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean, conquered Kamaran Island, and attacked Jidda. As a result, spices became scarce and the pepper price in Cairo became 120-150 ducats/sporta. However, what Venetians took most seriously was the failure of commercial order and also the obligation of paying 15,000 ducats (5,000 ducats annually for three years) as compensation for the suspension of the forced purchase of pepper. On the last day of March 1515, the Senate decided on a letter addressed to al-Ghawri90. It states that the Venetian government desired to continue the trade in Alexandria but that the merchants were explaining it was impossible for the following reasons: in the past three or four voyages, they had lost 40 percent of their capital because the spice prices were too high and the sieves and steelyards were not proper; they were not able to buy and sell freely as they were forced to make unfavorable contracts in dealing in their goods; one of them had been whipped; and, though the situation of the cottimo had deteriorated greatly, they had to pay the sultan 15,000 ducats. Next, the letter states that Venetians would send galleys again if the obligation of payment were abolished. Al-Ghawri also desired the reopening of trade and endeavored to keep the commercial order, but he persistently refused to abolish the obligation of paying compensation. At his visit to Alexandria from December 1514 to January of the next year to inspect fortresses there, he, in answer to the request of the consul Tommaso Venier, issued edicts reasserting the customary rules to the authorities in Alexandria and Damietta91. In his letter addressed to the doge, dated 18 al- Mutarram 921 A.H. (4 March 1515)92, he states that he had ordered the Venetians to be treated justly and ordered al-khawaja Ahmad to deal according to the "customs of the merchants of the royal storehouse"; but, on the other hand, he complains that the royal storehouse suffered heavy loss because the Venetians had not accepted the pepper dealing and indicates that he had no will to abolish the obligation of paying compensation. In late 1515, the consul Venier went to Cairo to negotiate on the matter, but he was not granted an audience with al-Ghawri; "el coza (probably al-khawaja Ahmad)" also refused to talk with him93. The matter was still unresolved at the time of the fall of Mamluks to

192 ORIENT THE MAMLUKSULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANSIN ALEXANDRIA the invasion of the Ottoman army.

Conclusion From the above account of the frictions and negotiations between al- Ghawri and the Venetians, the causes which led the spice trade into stagnation, or at least some of them, become clear by themselves. Above all, it was a failure of the traditional system of forced purchase of pepper. Al-Ghawri, after trying to increase the financial revenue from the system, persisted in keeping a minimum revenue from the system while the Venetians persisted in demanding the customary official price in spite of the rising market price. In other words, the interests of the two were basically opposed, though both sides desired to continue the trade. Besides that, the trade situation was aggravated when al- Ghawri took the Venetians into custody as a diplomatic measure to cope with difficult foreign relations. In the end, the traditional order of trade failed wholly, but neither side possessed effective means to cope with the situation. The contrast between the situation during the reign of al-Ghawri and that after 1517, when Egypt came under Ottoman rule, is worth emphasizing". The Ottomans, after the conquest, abolished the system of forced purchase of pepper. They had already stopped the Safavids' westward advance at the Battle of Chdldiran in 1514, and in 1522 they conquered Rhodes and drove out the Hospitallers. Thus the Ottomans were able to overcome promptly the problems which had seriously threatened al-Ghawri. On the other hand, the tax farming (iltizam) system introduced by the Ottomans enabled Jews to obtain the concession of managing the customhouses in Egypt; they came to oppose the Venetians in the 1520's. Thus the main hindrance to Venetian trade shifted from forced purchases to high customs duties. This shift did not mean, however, direct opposition with the Ottoman interest. The Ottoman power in Istanbul was in a position to keep the order of trade by adjusting interests between the Venetians and the Jews. Thus, the situation after the Ottoman conquest contrasted greatly with that of the Mamluk age. Therefore we can say that the situation during the reign of al-Ghawri represents the last phase of the Levant trade of the Middle Ages.

Notes 1 The revival of the spice trade was emphasized for the first time in Lane (1966b) . For the relation between the expansion of Ottoman power and the India trade, see Inalcik & Quataert (eds.) (1994), 315-363. 2 Heyd (1885-1886); Labib (1965); Ashtor (1983) . 3 Magalhdes-Godinho (1969) , 713-731; Ashtor (1973); Wake (1996), table 5, 6 and 7 (pp.

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 193 180-182). 4 Petry (1994) , 117-120. 5 Brummett (1994) , 143-174. 6 The change in the governor's status in 1365 can be regarded as a turning point in the history of the Mamluk administration in Alexandria; see Muller-Wiener (1992). 7 'Abd ar-Raziq (1982), 157-159. 8 Bada'i' , III, 71, 75, 89; Inbei', 341, 441-442, 444-445, 481, 487. 9 Bada'i' , III, 55, 56, 80, 110-111, 130-133, 142; Inbd , 243; Daw', IV, 213. 'Abd ar-Raziq (1982) does not mention an appointment of an amir of one hundred after 1380. For an analysis of the appointees to governor in 1468-1517, see Horii (1998). 10 Sato (1997) , p. 130, n. 5. Ibn al-Ji'an, in his description of the Egyptian financial situation in 1375 and 1475, notes that the revenue of the city (madina) of Alexandria is applied to the "khass: al -sharifa" (Ibn al-Ji 'an, 138) . 11 Zubda , 107-108. 12 According to al -Qalqashandi (1355-1418) , non-Muslims visiting Egypt from the "abode of war (dar al-harb)" were levied a tenth ('ushr) or a fifth (khums) of the price of goods which they brought in (Subh III, 463). Both of them may have been levied by the superintendent of the fifth (shadd al-khums), one of the officials (mubeishirun) in Alexandria (Zubda, 134). 13 Ashtor (1971) , 65-108. 14 Zubda , 108; Khitat, I, 110. 15 Ashtor (1983) , 275-283, 308. 16 Pedani -Fabris (1996) , 216. 17 Van Ghistele , 113; Fabri, 694-695. 18 The customary rights which Venetians had obtained by the fifteenth century are reflected in the sultan's edicts issued in 1489, 1497, and 1507 which recognize the rights of Florentines (Wansbrough (1965a); Wansbrough (1965b); Wansbrough (1971)). Most clauses of the edict of 1497 were applications of rules which had been agreed upon between the Mamluks and the Venetians in 1442 (Wansbrough (1965b), 486-497). 19 Ashtor (1983) , 401. 20 The following paragraph is based on my investigation of the diary of the Venetian nobleman Marino Sanuto (1466-1536). It covers the years 1496 through 1533 and contains many reports from Alexandria and Egypt. 21 Sanuto , I, 261, 508; III, 1123; VI, 209, 279, 636; V, 973. 22 See the figures in Tenenti & Vivanti (1961) . Galleys were sent to Alexandria for the first time in 1346. 23 Lane (1973) , 339; Tenenti & Vivanti (1961). 24 Lane (1973) , 338. 25 Ashtor (1983) , 249-250. 26 Ashtor (1973) , 34-35. 27 Sanuto , II, 172. 28 Ashtor (1975) , 264-267; Ashtor (1979), 564-566; Ashtor (1983), 250, 401-402, 429, 450- 479. 29 ASV (1994) , 945, 980-981. Later this office fell under the control of the Board of Trade (Cinque savi alla mercanzia), which the Senate established in 1507 to supervise Venetian economic activities. 30 Sanuto , III, 924. 31 Sanuto , IV, 169. 32 Ashtor (1983) , 450. 33 Miura (1989) , 2-4. 34 Badd'i' , III, 280-281. 35 Badd'i' , IV, 14-15. 36 Baddi` , IV, 44-46. When al-Ghawri was executive secretary (dawadar kabir) before his

194 ORIENT

THE MAMLUK SULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANS IN ALEXANDRIA

enthronement, he had employed Ibn Abi al-Jud as his bailiff (bardadar). 37 Bada'i' , IV, 8-9, 13-14, 16, 19, 20, 25, 41, 49. 38 Bada'i` , IV, 50. 39 Sanuto , IV, 240-241. 40 Sanuto , IV, 168. 41 Sanuto , IV, 265. 42 Sanuto , V, 35, 64, 826. 43 Sanuto , V, 78. 44 Sanuto , II, 166; IV, 10; V, 826-827. Sanuto, VI, 64. 46 Sanuto , VI, 149, 150, 162, 199-204. 47 ASV, Senato, Secreti, reg. 40, f. 109v.; Sanuto, VI, 193. 48 These instructions were issued on 8 August 1505 (Sanuto , VI, 199-207) after discussions in the Senate on the 4th, 5th and 7th of the same month (ASV, Senato, Secreti, reg. 40, ff. 112v.- 114r. , 114r. -116r. , 117r. -118r. ) 49 Bada'i' , IV, 12. so Badd'i' , IV, 18, 74. 51 Badr al-Din Mahmud b. Aja al-Halabi al-Hanafiwas a former qadi in Aleppo who was appointed as confidential secretary by Sultan al-'Adil Tuman Bay (1501) on 23 March 1501 (3 Ramadan 906) and continued holding the office after al-Ghawri's enthronement (Badd'i', III, 474). 52 Bada'i' , III, 474; IV, 22, 35, 50. 53 Sanuto , V, 824. His first appearance in the chronicle of Ibn Iyas is in the articles of Dhu al-Hijja 920 A.H. (January/February 1515) (Bada'i', IV, 424). Sanuto, VI, 200. 55 Sanuto , VI, 311, 313, 316, 321, 331-332, 464-468. 56 Sanuto , VI, 354, 356, 424. 57 Wansbrough (1963) , 514-518. 58 Sanuto , VII, 203-207. Following it, another letter from al-Ghawri to the doge (no date mentioned) is recorded; its contents are mostly same as the previous one (ibid., VII, 207-210). 59 ASV , Senato, Secreti, reg. 40, ff. 192v.-193v.; Sanuto, VII, 211-215. 60 Sanuto , VII, 215-220. 61 The facsimile , transcribed text, and English translation of the document are in Wansbrough (1963), 521-530 and plates I and II. 62 Sanuto , VII, 178. 63 Sanuto , VII, 603. 64 Sanuto , VII, 30-31. 65 Sanuto , XI, 57. The market price at al-Tur in December of the same year was 100 ducats (ibid., XI, 829). 66 Sanuto , XI 104. 67 Bada'i' , IV, 129-130. 68 Bada'i' , IV, 191. 69 Bada'i' , IV, 191-192. The European force which attacked the Mamluk vessels was the "Rhodian armada ," namely the Hospitaller armada, in which eight French vessels were participating (Sanuto, XI, 645). 70 According to Sanuto's diary , on 9 December 1504, an edict from Cairo arrived at Alexandria formally appointing Khudabirdi, the head of fortress there and also the acting governor, as governor (Sanuto, V, 826). Ibn 'yds, in his article of 11 Sha'ban 910 A.H. (15 January 1505), writes the name of Khudabirdi with the title of governor of Alexandria (Bada'i', IV, 74). From Khuddbirdi's letter addressed to the ruler (sahib) of Ragusa, dated 18 Rabi` al- Awwal 916 A.H. (25 June 1510), it is clear that he was "amir muqaddam al-alf" at that time (Qurqut, 1-3, 13-15). He was removed from office on 17 October 1516 (20 Ramadan 922)

Vol. XXXVIII 2003 195 (Bada'i', V, 109). 71 Bada'i' , IV, 192. 72 Bada'i' , IV, 195. In October/November (Rajab 916), al-Ghawri sent an amir to Jerusalem to seal up the Europeans' property (mal al-Firanj) in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (ibid., IV, 196). 73 Bada'i' ,IV, 195. 74 Sanuto , XI, 827-830. 75 Sanuto , XII, 234-235. According to Ibn Iyas, on 21 February 1511 (23 Dhu al-Qa'da 916), al-Ghawri came down to the Hippodrome (al-Maydan) in front of the Citadel, severely criticized the "European consuls" of Alexandria, Damascus, and Tripoli for the matter of the secret letters of Isma'il, and ordered them placed under the nazir al-khass for questioning (Bada'i', IV, 205). 76 The Catalonian consul and merchants who had been arrested in Alexandria together with the Venetians were soon released because the Catalonian consul offered al-Ghawri to send his own messenger and the monks of Jerusalem to Rhodes, the king of France and the Pope to resolve the matter of the plundering of the Mamluk vessels (Sanuto, XII, 156). Al-Ghawri, in his letter to the king of France Louis XII (dated 16 November 1510), promised that he would treat the French better than the Venetians (ibid., XII, 624-630). This promise, however, may not have substantially influenced the treatment of the Europeans, because al-Ghawri in 1512 severely criticized the French envoy and consul for their failure to keep their promise (ibid., XV, 19-20). 77 Sanuto , XII, 427; XIII, 209, 211-212, 305. 78 Sanuto , XIII, 216. 79 Sanuto , XIII, 248. 80 ASV, Senato, Secreti, reg. 44, ff. 92v.-94v. 81 Sanuto , XIV, 500. 82 Sanuto , XV, 17-18, 203. 83 Sanuto , XV, 18-19, 204-205. The document was agreed upon in June 1512 (ASV, Commemoriali, reg. 19, ff. 212r.-213v.; the text was published in Pedani-Fabris (1994), 62-64). The clauses written there generally prescribe the same rules as the document agreed upon in 1507. At its end, the history of the negotiations on the matter of pepper dealing is summarized. 84 Sanuto , XV, 202. 85 ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 18, f. 29r.; Sanuto, XVIII, 178. 86 Lane (1966a) , 3, 14. 87 ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 18, ff. 112v.-113v.; Sanuto, XXII, 292. 88 Sanuto , XVI, 436-437, 649. 89 Sanuto , XVII, 154-157. 90 ASV, Senato, Mar, reg. 18, f. 61r.-v.; Sanuto, XX, 82-83. 91 Sanuto , XX, 168-171, 171-173, 173-174. Ibn Iyas describes the situation in Alexandria at the time of al-Ghawri's visit as follows: "At the time, there were no big merchants (a'yan al- tujjar), either Muslim or Frankish, in the seaport of Alexandria. The city had gone to extreme ruin because of the injustice (zulm) of the governor and the oppression (jawr) of the tax collectors (qubbad), who had begun to collect ten times the tithe ('ushr) from the merchants. The Frankish and Maghribi merchants stopped entering the seaport. The situation of the city was in annihilation and ruination, so much so that it was said that neither bread nor any other food was able to be obtained there. There were few stores open, while the others were dilapidated and not opened" (Bada'i', IV, 424). Such a failure of the social order and stagnation of commercial activity in the seaport obviously formed a background to the Venetian consul's request that the sultan issue the edicts. However, whether the high customs duty was fact or not is unclear because no evidence to indicate it can be found in Sanuto's diary. 92 Sanuto , XX, 357-360. 93 Sanuto , XXII, 180-181. 94 For the Venetians in Egypt in the early period of the Ottoman rule , I read a paper entitled

196 ORIENT THE MAMLUKSULTAN QANSUH AL-GHAWRI (1501-16) AND THE VENETIANSIN ALEXANDRIA "Venetians in Alexandria in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century" at the International Symposium of the Islamic Area Studies Project: "The Dynamism of Muslim Societies: Toward New Horizons in Islamic Area Studies" (5-8 October 2001, the Kazusa Ark, Kisarazu, Chiba, Japan), Session 3: "Ports, Merchants and Cross-Cultural Contacts." The papers of the participants in this session will be published in the near future.

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