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Protest! Studies on Protest Politicization, Perceived Protest Atmosphere, and Protest Policing van Leeuwen, A.L.

2016

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Download date: 26. Sep. 2021 NY: Springer. Verhulst, Joris. 2010. ‘February 15, 2003: The World Says No to War.’ Pp. 1-19 in The World How Do Street Protests Differ Says No to War: Demonstrations Against the War on Iraq, edited by Stefaan Walgrave 2 | in Their Level of Politicization? and Dieter Rucht. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Wahlström, Mattias. 2010. ‘Producing Spaces for Representation: Racist Marches, Counterdemonstrations, and Public-order Policing.’ Society and Space 28: 811-827. Walgrave, Stefaan, and Dieter Rucht. 2010a. ‘Introduction.’ Pp. xiii-xxvi in The World Says No to War: Demonstrations Against the War on Iraq, edited by Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Walgrave, Stefaan, and Dieter Rucht, ed. 2010b. The World Says No to War: Demonstrations Against the War on Iraq. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Walgrave, Stefaan, Dieter Rucht, and Peter van Aelst. 2010. ‘New Activists or Old Leftists? The Demographics of Protesters.’ Pp. 78-97 in The World Says No to War: Demonstrations Against the War on Iraq, edited by Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Warner, Cody, and John D. McCarthy. 2014. ‘Whatever Can Go Wrong Will: Situational Complexity and Public Order Policing.’ Policing and Society: an International Journal of Research and Policy 24 (5): 566-587. Wikipedia. n.d. (a). ‘Demonstration (protest).’ Retrieved September 18, 2015 (https://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Demonstration_(protest)). Wikipedia. n.d. (b). ‘Picketing.’ Retrieved September 18, 2015 (https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Picketing). Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2001. ‘The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador.’ Pp. 267– 281 in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, edited by Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta. Chicago, IL, and London, UK: The University of Chicago Press.

Anouk van Leeuwen

Bert Klandermans

Jacquelien van Stekelenburg | Chapter 2

Abstract Street demonstrations are political by definition. For instance, Fillieule (1997: 44) defined a This study aims to improve our understanding of protest politicization—i.e. the extent to demonstration as ‘any temporary occupation by a number of people of an open place, public which a street protest epitomizes a power struggle. Although scholars have implied that or private, which directly or indirectly includes the expression of political opinions’ (our demonstrations may differ in their degree of politicization, we are unaware of any systematic emphasis). Favre (1990: 15) conceptualized a demonstration as ‘a collective movement 2 research on the topic. We begin our study with a conceptualization of protest politicization. organized on a public road to produce a political effect by the peaceful expression of an Then, we operationalize the concept as the extent to which demonstrators are angry and fight opinion or claim’ (our emphasis, and translation). Social movement scholars also explained for a collective good; an opponent is identified and vilified; and a claim is specific and what makes protest political: demonstrators make claims that bear on the interests of their combatively made. To test whether these indicators hold, we use a dataset of two Dutch opponents (e.g., government actors) (Franzosi, 2004: 29-61; Klandermans, 1997: 16-21, 37- protests: a reactive protest against the Russian anti-gay law and the ritual Pink Saturday 44; Lindekilde, 2013; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 3-37; Tilly, 2008: 1-30; Van parade. These events were selected, because we believed them to differ in their level of Stekelenburg, Van Leeuwen, and Van Troost, 2013; Wada, 2004). Although scholars have politicization. The reactive protest was considered far more politicized. So, we expected the found that demonstrators’ collective identities may differ in their level of politicization six indicators to manifest themselves here more prominently. These indicators were measured (Turner-Zwinkels, Van Zomeren, and Postmes, 2015, also see Klandermans, 2014; Simon and in various ways. Demonstrators reported their sense of anger and motives to participate in Grabow, 2010; Simon and Klandermans, 2001)1, we are unaware of any research that questionnaires. Researchers observed whether an opponent was identified and a claim was systematically differentiates between demonstrations’ politicization levels. This deficiency is made. In addition, we interviewed the protest organizers about their opponent and claim, and striking, given that some scholars consider politicization the single most important assessed media reports. Our results confirm our hypotheses. Therefore, we propose that the characteristic of a protest event (e.g., Fillieule, 1997: 42). In fact, by being politicized, six indicators constitute a model to study how protests differ in their level of politicization. demonstrations distinguish themselves from other collective gatherings, such as hooligan We conclude by discussing our findings and suggesting avenues for future research. meetings and suburban riots (Fillieule, 2012: 235-236). Admittedly, a few scholars have implied that demonstrations may differ in their degree Keywords of politicization. For instance, Klandermans, Van Stekelenburg, Damen, Van Troost, and Van Protest politicization Leeuwen (2014) distinguished between ‘protests’ and ‘parades’ (e.g., May Day, Gay Pride Demonstrators parade). Seemingly, the latter were considered less political, as the authors said: ‘almost Opponent always […] parades have moments of politicization to it’ (Op cit.: 705, our emphasis). Inclán Claims-making and Almeida (2014) made a similar distinction between ‘spontaneous protests’, which ‘are reactive and […] [relatively] rapid responses to political, social, and economic changes’ (Op cit.: 3), and ‘commemorative protests’, which are ‘ritual anniversaries of different social [movement] causes’ (Ibid.). Differentiating between such reactive and ritual protests proved relevant, as they drew different crowds. For instance, Inclán and Almeida (2014: 34) found that reactive protesters identify significantly more with other participants and the protest organizers than ritual protesters do. And Klandermans and colleagues (2014: 707) found that participants of ritual protests (‘parades’) are significantly more likely to be a member of protest organization(s) than participants of socio-cultural protests, but significantly less likely

1 Worth noting is that these scholars conceive of politicization as a (within-person) process.

22 | Protest Politicization |

Abstract Street demonstrations are political by definition. For instance, Fillieule (1997: 44) defined a This study aims to improve our understanding of protest politicization—i.e. the extent to demonstration as ‘any temporary occupation by a number of people of an open place, public which a street protest epitomizes a power struggle. Although scholars have implied that or private, which directly or indirectly includes the expression of political opinions’ (our demonstrations may differ in their degree of politicization, we are unaware of any systematic emphasis). Favre (1990: 15) conceptualized a demonstration as ‘a collective movement research on the topic. We begin our study with a conceptualization of protest politicization. organized on a public road to produce a political effect by the peaceful expression of an 2 Then, we operationalize the concept as the extent to which demonstrators are angry and fight opinion or claim’ (our emphasis, and translation). Social movement scholars also explained for a collective good; an opponent is identified and vilified; and a claim is specific and what makes protest political: demonstrators make claims that bear on the interests of their combatively made. To test whether these indicators hold, we use a dataset of two Dutch opponents (e.g., government actors) (Franzosi, 2004: 29-61; Klandermans, 1997: 16-21, 37- protests: a reactive protest against the Russian anti-gay law and the ritual Pink Saturday 44; Lindekilde, 2013; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 3-37; Tilly, 2008: 1-30; Van parade. These events were selected, because we believed them to differ in their level of Stekelenburg, Van Leeuwen, and Van Troost, 2013; Wada, 2004). Although scholars have politicization. The reactive protest was considered far more politicized. So, we expected the found that demonstrators’ collective identities may differ in their level of politicization six indicators to manifest themselves here more prominently. These indicators were measured (Turner-Zwinkels, Van Zomeren, and Postmes, 2015, also see Klandermans, 2014; Simon and in various ways. Demonstrators reported their sense of anger and motives to participate in Grabow, 2010; Simon and Klandermans, 2001)1, we are unaware of any research that questionnaires. Researchers observed whether an opponent was identified and a claim was systematically differentiates between demonstrations’ politicization levels. This deficiency is made. In addition, we interviewed the protest organizers about their opponent and claim, and striking, given that some scholars consider politicization the single most important assessed media reports. Our results confirm our hypotheses. Therefore, we propose that the characteristic of a protest event (e.g., Fillieule, 1997: 42). In fact, by being politicized, six indicators constitute a model to study how protests differ in their level of politicization. demonstrations distinguish themselves from other collective gatherings, such as hooligan We conclude by discussing our findings and suggesting avenues for future research. meetings and suburban riots (Fillieule, 2012: 235-236). Admittedly, a few scholars have implied that demonstrations may differ in their degree Keywords of politicization. For instance, Klandermans, Van Stekelenburg, Damen, Van Troost, and Van Protest politicization Leeuwen (2014) distinguished between ‘protests’ and ‘parades’ (e.g., May Day, Gay Pride Demonstrators parade). Seemingly, the latter were considered less political, as the authors said: ‘almost Opponent always […] parades have moments of politicization to it’ (Op cit.: 705, our emphasis). Inclán Claims-making and Almeida (2014) made a similar distinction between ‘spontaneous protests’, which ‘are reactive and […] [relatively] rapid responses to political, social, and economic changes’ (Op cit.: 3), and ‘commemorative protests’, which are ‘ritual anniversaries of different social [movement] causes’ (Ibid.). Differentiating between such reactive and ritual protests proved relevant, as they drew different crowds. For instance, Inclán and Almeida (2014: 34) found that reactive protesters identify significantly more with other participants and the protest organizers than ritual protesters do. And Klandermans and colleagues (2014: 707) found that participants of ritual protests (‘parades’) are significantly more likely to be a member of protest organization(s) than participants of socio-cultural protests, but significantly less likely

1 Worth noting is that these scholars conceive of politicization as a (within-person) process.

| 23 | Chapter 2

than those of anti-austerity protests. These results, however, cannot be automatically comprises a power struggle. This assumption is based on Tilly’s (2008: 11, 22) statement that attributed to protest politicization, because the supposed difference between the protests’ a demonstration is a form of ‘contentious politics’, which involves ‘episodic, public, politicization levels has not been empirically tested. collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one This paper is one of the first attempts to examine how street protests differ in their government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims 2 level of politicization. To do so, we first conceptualize protest politicization as the extent to would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al., 2001: which a demonstration epitomizes a power struggle. Then, we operationalize the concept as 5). The fact that demonstrations are political events has also been underlined in the previously the extent to which demonstrators are angry and fight for a collective good; an opponent is mentioned definitions by Fillieule (1997) and Favre (1990). Fillieule (2012) even argued that identified and vilified; and a claim is specific and combatively made. politicization is the characteristic that distinguishes demonstrations from other collective We test our assumptions by comparing two demonstrations: the ritual Pink Saturday gatherings, such as hooligan meetings and suburban riots. parade (2012), and a reactive protest against the Russian anti-gay law (2013). These events The second premise of our conceptualization is that street protests do not equally were selected as we considered them to differ in their degree of politicization, the latter being manifest a power struggle. In other words: we expect that some demonstrations are more far more politicized than the first. As the demonstrations were not assumed to differ much politicized than others. This assumption ensues from the way that social movement scholars otherwise, given that they were staged by the same social movement, in the same country, and have categorized protest events. Klandermans and colleagues (2014) distinguished between in the same period of time, this constitutes a ‘most similar systems’ design (Przeworski and ‘protests’ and ‘parades’. And Inclán and Almeida (2014) differentiated between ‘spontaneous Teune, 1970: 31-46). With such a design, we can maintain with some degree of certainty that protests’ and ‘commemorative protests’. Similarly, Tartakowsky (2004, in Tilly, 2008: 84) any differences between the two events are related to their level of politicization. discerned ‘politically initiated demonstration[s]’ from ‘politically tinged parades’. According To measure the protests’ politicization levels, we asked participants of the two events to Tarrow (2011: 113), ‘[political] performances’ differ from ‘ritual political performances’. to report their anger and protest motives in questionnaires (n = 234 and 202, respectively). Finally, Blake (2014: 8, 11) suggested that ritual protests may differ in their level of Researchers observed whether an opponent was identified and a claim was made, and, if so, in politicization as well, by saying: ‘unlike, say, Fourth of July parades in the United States, all what way. In addition, we interviewed protest organizers about their opponent and claim, and loyalist parades in Northern Ireland are […] intimately political’. This is also what assessed whether (and how) these were mentioned in media reports. Klandermans and colleagues (2014: 705) meant to say when they stated that parades usually This paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the concept ‘protest ‘have moments of politicization to it’. politicization’. Then, we report theorizing on three demonstration characteristics that are Although most of these scholars did not explain why they distinguished between expected to manifest such politicization: (1) demonstrators’ emotions and motives; (2) demonstrations in this way, we believe that they all aimed at different levels of politicization. adversarial attributions; and (3) claims-making. After having summarized our research For instance, ‘politically initiated demonstrations’ (Tartakowsky, 2004, in Tilly, 2008: 84, our question and hypotheses, we describe our dataset. Subsequently, we test whether the emphasis) seem more politicized than ‘politically tinged parades’ (Ibid.). Tarrow (2011: 113), hypothesized indicators of protest politicization were more prevalent at the reactive protest, as who devoted a few words to the matter, seems to concur with this premise. According to him, we expect. We end our paper by discussing our findings and suggesting avenues for future ‘ritual political performances sometimes evolve when [political] performances lose their research. original meaning but are preserved for symbolic reasons’. As an example he lists May Day, which ‘began as a day of protest but evolved into a ritualized festival of labor’ (Ibid.). INTRODUCING ‘PROTEST POLITICIZATION’

We define ‘protest politicization’ as the extent to which a demonstration epitomizes a power struggle. Our conceptualization consists of two premises. First of all, a demonstration

24 | Protest Politicization | than those of anti-austerity protests. These results, however, cannot be automatically comprises a power struggle. This assumption is based on Tilly’s (2008: 11, 22) statement that attributed to protest politicization, because the supposed difference between the protests’ a demonstration is a form of ‘contentious politics’, which involves ‘episodic, public, politicization levels has not been empirically tested. collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one This paper is one of the first attempts to examine how street protests differ in their government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims level of politicization. To do so, we first conceptualize protest politicization as the extent to would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al., 2001: 2 which a demonstration epitomizes a power struggle. Then, we operationalize the concept as 5). The fact that demonstrations are political events has also been underlined in the previously the extent to which demonstrators are angry and fight for a collective good; an opponent is mentioned definitions by Fillieule (1997) and Favre (1990). Fillieule (2012) even argued that identified and vilified; and a claim is specific and combatively made. politicization is the characteristic that distinguishes demonstrations from other collective We test our assumptions by comparing two demonstrations: the ritual Pink Saturday gatherings, such as hooligan meetings and suburban riots. parade (2012), and a reactive protest against the Russian anti-gay law (2013). These events The second premise of our conceptualization is that street protests do not equally were selected as we considered them to differ in their degree of politicization, the latter being manifest a power struggle. In other words: we expect that some demonstrations are more far more politicized than the first. As the demonstrations were not assumed to differ much politicized than others. This assumption ensues from the way that social movement scholars otherwise, given that they were staged by the same social movement, in the same country, and have categorized protest events. Klandermans and colleagues (2014) distinguished between in the same period of time, this constitutes a ‘most similar systems’ design (Przeworski and ‘protests’ and ‘parades’. And Inclán and Almeida (2014) differentiated between ‘spontaneous Teune, 1970: 31-46). With such a design, we can maintain with some degree of certainty that protests’ and ‘commemorative protests’. Similarly, Tartakowsky (2004, in Tilly, 2008: 84) any differences between the two events are related to their level of politicization. discerned ‘politically initiated demonstration[s]’ from ‘politically tinged parades’. According To measure the protests’ politicization levels, we asked participants of the two events to Tarrow (2011: 113), ‘[political] performances’ differ from ‘ritual political performances’. to report their anger and protest motives in questionnaires (n = 234 and 202, respectively). Finally, Blake (2014: 8, 11) suggested that ritual protests may differ in their level of Researchers observed whether an opponent was identified and a claim was made, and, if so, in politicization as well, by saying: ‘unlike, say, Fourth of July parades in the United States, all what way. In addition, we interviewed protest organizers about their opponent and claim, and loyalist parades in Northern Ireland are […] intimately political’. This is also what assessed whether (and how) these were mentioned in media reports. Klandermans and colleagues (2014: 705) meant to say when they stated that parades usually This paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the concept ‘protest ‘have moments of politicization to it’. politicization’. Then, we report theorizing on three demonstration characteristics that are Although most of these scholars did not explain why they distinguished between expected to manifest such politicization: (1) demonstrators’ emotions and motives; (2) demonstrations in this way, we believe that they all aimed at different levels of politicization. adversarial attributions; and (3) claims-making. After having summarized our research For instance, ‘politically initiated demonstrations’ (Tartakowsky, 2004, in Tilly, 2008: 84, our question and hypotheses, we describe our dataset. Subsequently, we test whether the emphasis) seem more politicized than ‘politically tinged parades’ (Ibid.). Tarrow (2011: 113), hypothesized indicators of protest politicization were more prevalent at the reactive protest, as who devoted a few words to the matter, seems to concur with this premise. According to him, we expect. We end our paper by discussing our findings and suggesting avenues for future ‘ritual political performances sometimes evolve when [political] performances lose their research. original meaning but are preserved for symbolic reasons’. As an example he lists May Day, which ‘began as a day of protest but evolved into a ritualized festival of labor’ (Ibid.). INTRODUCING ‘PROTEST POLITICIZATION’

We define ‘protest politicization’ as the extent to which a demonstration epitomizes a power struggle. Our conceptualization consists of two premises. First of all, a demonstration

| 25 | Chapter 2

STUDYING PROTEST POLITICIZATION (Klandermans, 1997: 24-29). Social motives ‘involve the reactions of significant others— spouses, friends, or colleagues—to the individual’s participation’ (Op cit.: 26), which may To study how street protests differ in their level of politicization, we focus on two actors— range from ridicule to admiration (Simon et al., 1998: 647). Non-social or ‘reward’ motives demonstrators and their opponent—and the activity in which the first engage: political claims- are ‘such matters as the amount of money and time one will spend’ (Klandermans, 1997: 26), 2 making (see Franzosi, 2004: 29-61; Lindekilde, 2013; Tilly, 2008: 1-30). and ‘making new friends’ (Simon et al., 1998: 647). For someone to be willing to participate, the expected benefits of protest participation should outweigh the costs. Demonstrators Expectedly, the more politicized the event, the more demonstrators have collective Generally, demonstrators are aggrieved about the way the authorities or other power holders motives to participate, rather than social or (especially) reward motives (H2). This is because treated a social problem (Klandermans, 1992, 1997). A grievance—‘a feeling of having been we gather that the more a power struggle epitomizes, the more salient demonstrators’ treated unfairly’ (Merriam-Webster, n.d. (a))—is considered ‘the linchpin’ of collective action grievances become. The more demonstrators are aware of shared grievances, the more likely (Jasper, 1997: 113). After all, without discontent about some state of affairs, what would there we consider it to be that they participate because of collective motives rather than individual be to protest about? Besides, a feeling of injustice induces a powerful protest emotion: anger. ones. This ‘intense and short-term feeling of displeasure, hostility, or antagonism toward someone or something, [which is] typically combined with an urge to attack or change another person’s Opponent behavior’ (Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli, 2009: 153) is considered powerful for protest (Jasper, Demonstrators generally blame an opponent (e.g., the authorities or other power holders) for 1998: 412), especially when it is group-based (Smith, 1993). This is because group-based the social problem that they are aggrieved about. Blaming—‘an act of attributing fault’ anger stimulates individuals’ willingness to participate in collective action, either directly (Dictionary, n.d.)—is considered ‘crucial to protest’ (Jasper, 1997: 118), because it induces a (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach, 2004) or indirectly (Van Stekelenburg, feeling of injustice, and, consequently, anger (Gamson, 1992: 32; Simon and Klandermans, Klandermans, and Van Dijk, 2011). 2001: 325). Especially the type and specificity of the blame are important. So, if the social We assume that a demonstration’s politicization level is positively related to problem is devoted to human action (e.g., budget cuts), we tend to feel more angry than if it is demonstrators’ sense of anger (H1). So, the more politicized the event, the angrier we expect caused by nature (e.g., flooding). And when a concrete and specific person is identified (e.g., demonstrators to feel. This is because the more a power struggle epitomizes, the more salient the Prime Minister), we generally feel more angry than if an abstract social force (e.g., demonstrators’ grievances must become. After all, by engaging in ‘an open power struggle’ society) is considered responsible for our grievance (Gamson, 1992: 31-58; Jasper, 1997: 118- (Simon and Klandermans, 2001: 326), demonstrators make their grievances known. And 121; Jasper, 1998: 410-412). grievances induce anger. Next to that, we theorized that protest politicization manifests itself As a result of such anger, opponents are generally not only identified, but also vilified by adversarial attributions (see next section), which are known to induce anger (Op cit.: 325). (Holmes, 2004; Jasper, 1997: 356-358).2 As Holmes (2004: 214) puts it: ‘When angry with Next to anger, we expect a demonstration’s politicization level to relate to someone, we are likely to call them belittling names and wish to ‘cut them down to size’’. demonstrators’ motives to participate. These motives are a function of the perceived costs and Although ‘vilification is pervasive in social movements rhetoric’, as Vanderford (1989: 166) benefits of protest participation (Oberschall, 1980), and may range from collective to entirely maintains, research on the topic is rare. Based on a few extant studies, we hold that individual (i.e. selective). Collective motives ‘are related to the achievement of the collective vilification may range in severity from ridiculing (Ferree, 2004: 90-91) to hate speech goal’ (Klandermans, 1997: 26), such as human rights, or environmental protection. At a first (Tarrow, 2013: 165-189; Vanderford, 1989). We provide a few examples. On November 14, glance, collective motives seem to be inherent to protest, given that such events are typically 2014, the International Business Times reported that ‘hundreds of protesters took Bondi

staged to redress a ‘collective problem’ (Toch, [1965] 2014: 5). However, protesters often 2 Vanderford (1989) gathers that identification of an opponent is a form of vilification. We, however, merely also have selective motives to participate, which may be either social or non-social in nature conceive of vilification as ‘a defamatory utterance’ (Merriam-Webster, n.d. (b)).

26 | Protest Politicization |

STUDYING PROTEST POLITICIZATION (Klandermans, 1997: 24-29). Social motives ‘involve the reactions of significant others— spouses, friends, or colleagues—to the individual’s participation’ (Op cit.: 26), which may To study how street protests differ in their level of politicization, we focus on two actors— range from ridicule to admiration (Simon et al., 1998: 647). Non-social or ‘reward’ motives demonstrators and their opponent—and the activity in which the first engage: political claims- are ‘such matters as the amount of money and time one will spend’ (Klandermans, 1997: 26), making (see Franzosi, 2004: 29-61; Lindekilde, 2013; Tilly, 2008: 1-30). and ‘making new friends’ (Simon et al., 1998: 647). For someone to be willing to participate, 2 the expected benefits of protest participation should outweigh the costs. Demonstrators Expectedly, the more politicized the event, the more demonstrators have collective Generally, demonstrators are aggrieved about the way the authorities or other power holders motives to participate, rather than social or (especially) reward motives (H2). This is because treated a social problem (Klandermans, 1992, 1997). A grievance—‘a feeling of having been we gather that the more a power struggle epitomizes, the more salient demonstrators’ treated unfairly’ (Merriam-Webster, n.d. (a))—is considered ‘the linchpin’ of collective action grievances become. The more demonstrators are aware of shared grievances, the more likely (Jasper, 1997: 113). After all, without discontent about some state of affairs, what would there we consider it to be that they participate because of collective motives rather than individual be to protest about? Besides, a feeling of injustice induces a powerful protest emotion: anger. ones. This ‘intense and short-term feeling of displeasure, hostility, or antagonism toward someone or something, [which is] typically combined with an urge to attack or change another person’s Opponent behavior’ (Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli, 2009: 153) is considered powerful for protest (Jasper, Demonstrators generally blame an opponent (e.g., the authorities or other power holders) for 1998: 412), especially when it is group-based (Smith, 1993). This is because group-based the social problem that they are aggrieved about. Blaming—‘an act of attributing fault’ anger stimulates individuals’ willingness to participate in collective action, either directly (Dictionary, n.d.)—is considered ‘crucial to protest’ (Jasper, 1997: 118), because it induces a (Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach, 2004) or indirectly (Van Stekelenburg, feeling of injustice, and, consequently, anger (Gamson, 1992: 32; Simon and Klandermans, Klandermans, and Van Dijk, 2011). 2001: 325). Especially the type and specificity of the blame are important. So, if the social We assume that a demonstration’s politicization level is positively related to problem is devoted to human action (e.g., budget cuts), we tend to feel more angry than if it is demonstrators’ sense of anger (H1). So, the more politicized the event, the angrier we expect caused by nature (e.g., flooding). And when a concrete and specific person is identified (e.g., demonstrators to feel. This is because the more a power struggle epitomizes, the more salient the Prime Minister), we generally feel more angry than if an abstract social force (e.g., demonstrators’ grievances must become. After all, by engaging in ‘an open power struggle’ society) is considered responsible for our grievance (Gamson, 1992: 31-58; Jasper, 1997: 118- (Simon and Klandermans, 2001: 326), demonstrators make their grievances known. And 121; Jasper, 1998: 410-412). grievances induce anger. Next to that, we theorized that protest politicization manifests itself As a result of such anger, opponents are generally not only identified, but also vilified by adversarial attributions (see next section), which are known to induce anger (Op cit.: 325). (Holmes, 2004; Jasper, 1997: 356-358).2 As Holmes (2004: 214) puts it: ‘When angry with Next to anger, we expect a demonstration’s politicization level to relate to someone, we are likely to call them belittling names and wish to ‘cut them down to size’’. demonstrators’ motives to participate. These motives are a function of the perceived costs and Although ‘vilification is pervasive in social movements rhetoric’, as Vanderford (1989: 166) benefits of protest participation (Oberschall, 1980), and may range from collective to entirely maintains, research on the topic is rare. Based on a few extant studies, we hold that individual (i.e. selective). Collective motives ‘are related to the achievement of the collective vilification may range in severity from ridiculing (Ferree, 2004: 90-91) to hate speech goal’ (Klandermans, 1997: 26), such as human rights, or environmental protection. At a first (Tarrow, 2013: 165-189; Vanderford, 1989). We provide a few examples. On November 14, glance, collective motives seem to be inherent to protest, given that such events are typically 2014, the International Business Times reported that ‘hundreds of protesters took Bondi staged to redress a ‘collective problem’ (Toch, [1965] 2014: 5). However, protesters often 2 Vanderford (1989) gathers that identification of an opponent is a form of vilification. We, however, merely also have selective motives to participate, which may be either social or non-social in nature conceive of vilification as ‘a defamatory utterance’ (Merriam-Webster, n.d. (b)).

| 27 | Chapter 2

Beach in Australia to literally bury their heads in the sands to mock Prime Minister Tony are staged for ‘symbolism, solidarity, and opposition’ (Ibid.).3 Clearly, the first type of claim Abbott for not putting climate change on the agenda at the G20 summit’ (Payne, 2014, our is more specific than the latter. Still, Tarrow (1989: 124) found that, during the Italian protest emphasis). Then, on March 1, 2015, New Yorkers protested against Putin for the alleged cycle of 1965-1975, ‘people used highly expressive actions when they made demands, but murder of Kremlin critic Boris Nemtsov. These protesters carried banners that said: ‘Putin relatively few protests lacked substantive claims altogether’. 2 Plague of 21st Century’, and ‘Stop Dictator Putin—Stop Murderers’ (Channel News Asia, Claims-making also implies combativeness. After all, a demand is ‘a forceful 2015). Clearly, Putin was more severely vilified than Tony Abbott. Research revealed that statement in which you say that something must be done or given to you’ (Merriam-Webster, severer types of vilification—what Jasper (1997: 121; 1998: 412) refers to as n.d. (d)). Yet, we presume that not all claims are made in an equally combative way. To the ‘demonization’—further increase negative emotions, such as anger. best of our knowledge, research on the topic is scarce. Yet, perhaps, Tilly’s (2008: 6) We assume that at a more politicized event, demonstrators identify their opponent statement says it all: ‘claims range from timid requests to strident demands’. His systematic more clearly (H3) and vilify their opponent more severely (H4). After all, the more a power categorization of ‘action verbs’ (Op cit.: 51) exemplifies this. For instance, claimants are struggle epitomizes, the more demonstrators must know who (or what) they oppose. As more combative when they ‘resist’ or ‘condemn’ than if they ‘beseech’ or ‘negotiate’ (Op cit.: reported, the specification of blame indirectly generates villains, whom (or which) may be 5, 51-52). defamed more or less pronouncedly. We expect that at a more politicized event, demonstrators have a more specific claim (H5) and make their claim in a more combative way (H6). After all, the more a power Claims-making struggle epitomizes, the more demonstrators must know what they want. In line with previous Demonstrators do not only aim to express their grievances to the identified opponent, but also research, which revealed that the specificity of blame induces anger (e.g., Jasper, 1998: 410- make a claim (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616; Jasper, 1997: 120; Simon and Klandermans, 412), we expect that the specificity of a claim induces more combative claims-making. 2001: 325). A claim is ‘a demand for something due or believed to be due’ (Merriam- Webster, n.d. (c)). If the opponent complies with this claim, it is expected to solve the social In Sum: Research Question and Hypotheses problem (Simon and Klandermans, 2001: 325). Examples are manifold. For instance, on In this paper, we examine how street demonstrations differ in their level of politicization. To January 21, 2011, a platform of Dutch student organizations staged a protest in The Hague to do so, we focus on two actors—demonstrators and their opponent—and the activity in which oppose the announced budget cuts on higher education in the Netherlands. These protesters the first engage: claims-making. In specific, we hypothesize that at a more politicized event, demanded from the Dutch government that this bill would be withdrawn. As one of the demonstrators feel angrier (H1), and have more collective motives to participate than social or banners succinctly said: ‘Fuck off with your education plans!’ (CCC dataset, 2011, our (especially) reward motives (H2). At a more politicized event, we also expect that the translation). And on February 28, 2015, Chicagoans protested against alleged unconstitutional opponent is more clearly identified and more severely vilified (H3-4), and that the claim is abuse by police officers at a facility called ‘Homan Square’. These demonstrators made a call more specific and more combatively made (H5-6). for official investigations into the facility. Also, one of the organizers publically said: ‘We demand that you [Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel] shut down this facility’ (Stafford, 2015). METHODS As the previous cases exemplify: claims-making suggests some specificity, just like blaming does. After all, ‘claims-making entails […] the formulation of a political demand Protest Events with a specific content (the claim)’ (Lindekilde, 2013: 201, our emphasis). Still, not all claims For this research, we studied two demonstrations that were staged by the Dutch Lesbian, Gay, are equally specific. For example, Tarrow distinguishes between ‘substantive’ claims, which Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) movement. On July 7, 2012 we covered the parade of an

are made on ‘rights, benefits, and policies’ (1989: 123-128), and ‘expressive’ claims, which 3 When delineating ‘the structure of [collective action] demands’, Tarrow (1989: 123-128) uses the terms ‘claims’, ‘demands’, ‘protests’, ‘action(s)’, and ‘conflicts’ interchangeably.

28 | Protest Politicization |

Beach in Australia to literally bury their heads in the sands to mock Prime Minister Tony are staged for ‘symbolism, solidarity, and opposition’ (Ibid.).3 Clearly, the first type of claim Abbott for not putting climate change on the agenda at the G20 summit’ (Payne, 2014, our is more specific than the latter. Still, Tarrow (1989: 124) found that, during the Italian protest emphasis). Then, on March 1, 2015, New Yorkers protested against Putin for the alleged cycle of 1965-1975, ‘people used highly expressive actions when they made demands, but murder of Kremlin critic Boris Nemtsov. These protesters carried banners that said: ‘Putin relatively few protests lacked substantive claims altogether’. Plague of 21st Century’, and ‘Stop Dictator Putin—Stop Murderers’ (Channel News Asia, Claims-making also implies combativeness. After all, a demand is ‘a forceful 2 2015). Clearly, Putin was more severely vilified than Tony Abbott. Research revealed that statement in which you say that something must be done or given to you’ (Merriam-Webster, severer types of vilification—what Jasper (1997: 121; 1998: 412) refers to as n.d. (d)). Yet, we presume that not all claims are made in an equally combative way. To the ‘demonization’—further increase negative emotions, such as anger. best of our knowledge, research on the topic is scarce. Yet, perhaps, Tilly’s (2008: 6) We assume that at a more politicized event, demonstrators identify their opponent statement says it all: ‘claims range from timid requests to strident demands’. His systematic more clearly (H3) and vilify their opponent more severely (H4). After all, the more a power categorization of ‘action verbs’ (Op cit.: 51) exemplifies this. For instance, claimants are struggle epitomizes, the more demonstrators must know who (or what) they oppose. As more combative when they ‘resist’ or ‘condemn’ than if they ‘beseech’ or ‘negotiate’ (Op cit.: reported, the specification of blame indirectly generates villains, whom (or which) may be 5, 51-52). defamed more or less pronouncedly. We expect that at a more politicized event, demonstrators have a more specific claim (H5) and make their claim in a more combative way (H6). After all, the more a power Claims-making struggle epitomizes, the more demonstrators must know what they want. In line with previous Demonstrators do not only aim to express their grievances to the identified opponent, but also research, which revealed that the specificity of blame induces anger (e.g., Jasper, 1998: 410- make a claim (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616; Jasper, 1997: 120; Simon and Klandermans, 412), we expect that the specificity of a claim induces more combative claims-making. 2001: 325). A claim is ‘a demand for something due or believed to be due’ (Merriam- Webster, n.d. (c)). If the opponent complies with this claim, it is expected to solve the social In Sum: Research Question and Hypotheses problem (Simon and Klandermans, 2001: 325). Examples are manifold. For instance, on In this paper, we examine how street demonstrations differ in their level of politicization. To January 21, 2011, a platform of Dutch student organizations staged a protest in The Hague to do so, we focus on two actors—demonstrators and their opponent—and the activity in which oppose the announced budget cuts on higher education in the Netherlands. These protesters the first engage: claims-making. In specific, we hypothesize that at a more politicized event, demanded from the Dutch government that this bill would be withdrawn. As one of the demonstrators feel angrier (H1), and have more collective motives to participate than social or banners succinctly said: ‘Fuck off with your education plans!’ (CCC dataset, 2011, our (especially) reward motives (H2). At a more politicized event, we also expect that the translation). And on February 28, 2015, Chicagoans protested against alleged unconstitutional opponent is more clearly identified and more severely vilified (H3-4), and that the claim is abuse by police officers at a facility called ‘Homan Square’. These demonstrators made a call more specific and more combatively made (H5-6). for official investigations into the facility. Also, one of the organizers publically said: ‘We demand that you [Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel] shut down this facility’ (Stafford, 2015). METHODS As the previous cases exemplify: claims-making suggests some specificity, just like blaming does. After all, ‘claims-making entails […] the formulation of a political demand Protest Events with a specific content (the claim)’ (Lindekilde, 2013: 201, our emphasis). Still, not all claims For this research, we studied two demonstrations that were staged by the Dutch Lesbian, Gay, are equally specific. For example, Tarrow distinguishes between ‘substantive’ claims, which Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) movement. On July 7, 2012 we covered the parade of an are made on ‘rights, benefits, and policies’ (1989: 123-128), and ‘expressive’ claims, which 3 When delineating ‘the structure of [collective action] demands’, Tarrow (1989: 123-128) uses the terms ‘claims’, ‘demands’, ‘protests’, ‘action(s)’, and ‘conflicts’ interchangeably.

| 29 | Chapter 2

annual LGBT rights event called ‘Pink Saturday’, which was staged in Haarlem. This event pencil questionnaire and the interview questionnaire for the reactive protest and ritual protest, was organized by the ad hoc foundation ‘Haarlem Pink City’. From now on, we refer to this respectively. Answers ranged from (1) ‘not at all’ to (5) ‘very much’. Missing cases represent parade as the ‘ritual protest’. Then, on April 8, 2013, we covered a rally against the Russian 3% and 0% for the reactive and ritual protesters, respectively. anti-gay law, which was staged in Amsterdam. This event was organized by the Dutch To assess demonstrators’ motives to participate, we asked: ‘Please tell us why you 2 association for Integration of Homosexuality (COC) during the state visit of Russian President participated in this protest event?’ This question comes from the paper-and-pencil Vladimir Putin to the Netherlands. We refer to this rally as the ‘reactive protest’. questionnaire and the postal questionnaire for the reactive protest and ritual protest, We selected these two protests as we considered them to differ in their degree of respectively. For both events, we excluded all respondents that self-proclaimed to be a politicization, the reactive protest being far more politicized than the ritual event. As the bystander. Such respondents, for instance, answered to the above mentioned question: ‘I have demonstrations were not assumed to differ much otherwise, given that they were staged by the not participated in the parade, but as an onlooker I saw it passing by from the side of the same movement, in the same country, and within a year’s time, this constitutes a ‘most similar road’.4 After this exclusion, data proved to be missing for 25% of the reactive protest sample systems’ design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 31-46). With such a design, we can be fairly and 7% of the ritual protest sample. certain that any differences between the two events are related to their level of politicization. Clearly, missing data are relatively high for the reactive protest sample. Worth noting, though, is that the missing cases have not biased this sample to any considerable extent. We Sampling Protesters draw this conclusion based on our assessment of two variables that are known to relate to At both events, we sought to gather a representative sample of demonstrators by using the demonstrators’ participation motives: their sense of anger (see, e.g., Van Stekelenburg et al., sampling procedure of the international research project ‘Caught in the act of protest: 2011) and their level of education (e.g., Hall, Rodeghier, and Useem, 1986). Firstly, reactive Contextualizing Contestation’ (CCC). This means that at both events participants were protesters who did report their motive(s) to participate felt slightly more angry than those who sampled by a team of researchers, which was spread over the protest area and used a count did not, but the difference was not significant (motive M = 2.85, SD = 1.27; no motive M = ratio to select respondents (Van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, and Verhulst, 2012; 2.61, SD = 1.18; t (158) = 1.06, p = .29). Further, demonstrators who did report their also see Klandermans et al., 2011). However, participants of the two events were questioned motive(s) to participate were as highly educated as those who did not: 78% and 77%, in a somewhat different way. respectively, had a college or university degree. So, we feel confident that the reactive protest Reactive protesters were asked to complete a paper-and-pencil questionnaire during sample will give a valid account of demonstrators’ participation motives. the demonstration. Of the approximately 180 demonstrators that were approached, 164 agreed To construe demonstrators’ motives to participate, we performed a ‘thematic analysis’ to complete the questionnaire. Ritual protesters were questioned in two ways. First of all, (Braun and Clarke, 2006), which is a method for identifying, interpreting, and reporting these protesters were asked to accept a postal questionnaire, which they were to fill out at patterns of meaning (‘themes’) within data. Procedurally, this meant that we carefully read all home and send back to the university in a prepaid envelope. Of the 368 people who accepted answers and tentatively coded them based on our interpretation of their meaning. For this questionnaire, 101 completed it and sent it back. Then, a subsample of these example, ‘Freedom of sexual orientation I find very important’ was coded as ‘sexual demonstrators was also asked to participate in a short, structured interview during the event. freedom’. Answers that contained multiple meanings, being the case for 26% of the reactive Seventy-four demonstrators agreed to this. We discuss the potential response bias that this protest sample and 50% of the ritual protest sample, were given multiple codes. For instance, differential sampling strategy might have generated after we have introduced our measures. ‘visibility LGBT’s + sense of belonging’ was coded as ‘visibility’ and ‘unity’. After all answers were coded, we repeatedly checked the codes against each other. This comparison led Measures to the merging and splitting of several codes. For instance, ‘sexual freedom’ was incorporated

To measure demonstrators’ sense of anger, we asked: ‘Thinking about the atmosphere of this 4 These and subsequent quotes from questionnaire respondents, interviewees, and media reports were translated protest event, to what extent do you feel angry?’ This question comes from the paper-and- from Dutch to English by the first author.

30 | Protest Politicization | annual LGBT rights event called ‘Pink Saturday’, which was staged in Haarlem. This event pencil questionnaire and the interview questionnaire for the reactive protest and ritual protest, was organized by the ad hoc foundation ‘Haarlem Pink City’. From now on, we refer to this respectively. Answers ranged from (1) ‘not at all’ to (5) ‘very much’. Missing cases represent parade as the ‘ritual protest’. Then, on April 8, 2013, we covered a rally against the Russian 3% and 0% for the reactive and ritual protesters, respectively. anti-gay law, which was staged in Amsterdam. This event was organized by the Dutch To assess demonstrators’ motives to participate, we asked: ‘Please tell us why you association for Integration of Homosexuality (COC) during the state visit of Russian President participated in this protest event?’ This question comes from the paper-and-pencil 2 Vladimir Putin to the Netherlands. We refer to this rally as the ‘reactive protest’. questionnaire and the postal questionnaire for the reactive protest and ritual protest, We selected these two protests as we considered them to differ in their degree of respectively. For both events, we excluded all respondents that self-proclaimed to be a politicization, the reactive protest being far more politicized than the ritual event. As the bystander. Such respondents, for instance, answered to the above mentioned question: ‘I have demonstrations were not assumed to differ much otherwise, given that they were staged by the not participated in the parade, but as an onlooker I saw it passing by from the side of the same movement, in the same country, and within a year’s time, this constitutes a ‘most similar road’.4 After this exclusion, data proved to be missing for 25% of the reactive protest sample systems’ design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 31-46). With such a design, we can be fairly and 7% of the ritual protest sample. certain that any differences between the two events are related to their level of politicization. Clearly, missing data are relatively high for the reactive protest sample. Worth noting, though, is that the missing cases have not biased this sample to any considerable extent. We Sampling Protesters draw this conclusion based on our assessment of two variables that are known to relate to At both events, we sought to gather a representative sample of demonstrators by using the demonstrators’ participation motives: their sense of anger (see, e.g., Van Stekelenburg et al., sampling procedure of the international research project ‘Caught in the act of protest: 2011) and their level of education (e.g., Hall, Rodeghier, and Useem, 1986). Firstly, reactive Contextualizing Contestation’ (CCC). This means that at both events participants were protesters who did report their motive(s) to participate felt slightly more angry than those who sampled by a team of researchers, which was spread over the protest area and used a count did not, but the difference was not significant (motive M = 2.85, SD = 1.27; no motive M = ratio to select respondents (Van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, and Verhulst, 2012; 2.61, SD = 1.18; t (158) = 1.06, p = .29). Further, demonstrators who did report their also see Klandermans et al., 2011). However, participants of the two events were questioned motive(s) to participate were as highly educated as those who did not: 78% and 77%, in a somewhat different way. respectively, had a college or university degree. So, we feel confident that the reactive protest Reactive protesters were asked to complete a paper-and-pencil questionnaire during sample will give a valid account of demonstrators’ participation motives. the demonstration. Of the approximately 180 demonstrators that were approached, 164 agreed To construe demonstrators’ motives to participate, we performed a ‘thematic analysis’ to complete the questionnaire. Ritual protesters were questioned in two ways. First of all, (Braun and Clarke, 2006), which is a method for identifying, interpreting, and reporting these protesters were asked to accept a postal questionnaire, which they were to fill out at patterns of meaning (‘themes’) within data. Procedurally, this meant that we carefully read all home and send back to the university in a prepaid envelope. Of the 368 people who accepted answers and tentatively coded them based on our interpretation of their meaning. For this questionnaire, 101 completed it and sent it back. Then, a subsample of these example, ‘Freedom of sexual orientation I find very important’ was coded as ‘sexual demonstrators was also asked to participate in a short, structured interview during the event. freedom’. Answers that contained multiple meanings, being the case for 26% of the reactive Seventy-four demonstrators agreed to this. We discuss the potential response bias that this protest sample and 50% of the ritual protest sample, were given multiple codes. For instance, differential sampling strategy might have generated after we have introduced our measures. ‘visibility LGBT’s + sense of belonging’ was coded as ‘visibility’ and ‘unity’. After all answers were coded, we repeatedly checked the codes against each other. This comparison led Measures to the merging and splitting of several codes. For instance, ‘sexual freedom’ was incorporated

| 31 | Chapter 2

into the overarching code ‘support gay rights/LGBT acceptance’. Eventually, fourteen codes Interviews, Observations, and Media Assessments were identified (see Table 1 on page 35). In the following ways, we assessed whether (and how) an opponent was identified at the two We then categorized these codes as either collective, social, or reward motives (see events, and a claim was made: Klandermans, 1984, 1997; Simon et al., 1998). During this exercise, we found that one code Before both events, we interviewed the protest organizers. For the reactive protest, we 2 (‘solidarity’) did not fit in well with either of these motives. This code was given to answers interviewed an organizer of the COC, whom had been actively involved in the preparations of such as: ‘to encourage Russian LGBT’s’ and ‘[…] gays are (often) colorful, lovely people and the event. For the ritual protest, we interviewed five active volunteers of Haarlem Pink City. they can use all the support they can get’. While these people had a social motive, they did not All interviews were semi-structured, and took place face to face or on the telephone. These seem to participate because of the anticipated reactions of their significant others, but to conversations lasted in between 20 and 63 minutes each. When face to face, they were taped achieve a collective good. This good would, however, not benefit them personally. So, in fact, and transcribed verbatim. When on the phone, the interviewer made notes, which were these respondents were ‘conscience constituents’ (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1222). elaborated immediately afterwards. Following this reasoning, we decided to create a fourth motive category, which we called Researchers observed both events. These researchers—three at the reactive protest and ‘solidary’. two at the ritual protest—made field notes, which were elaborated immediately afterwards. At each event, one of these researchers also taped the speeches that were held, and took pictures Response Bias of claims-making performances, such as demonstrators’ costumes and protest banners. Our two questionnaire measures—sense of anger and motives to participate—may be biased, We gathered media reports of both events, which included newspaper articles, and given that these measures were posed somewhat differently at the two events. However, in messages on the organizers’ web pages and Facebook sites. In addition, one of the organizers both cases, we gather that the response bias is insignificant. of the ritual protest, whom we had interviewed before the event, sent us a copy of the action Demonstrators’ sense of anger was reported during both events. Given that emotions plans for the various activities of the day. Also, after the reactive protest, we received a copy are transitory, this consistency is vital. Of course, ritual protesters may have been more prone of the speech that the chairwoman of the COC had given. to social desirability than reactive protesters, given that the first reported this emotion during an interview, whereas the latter filled out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. However, we RESULTS gather that the response bias in the ritual protest sample may have gone either way. On the one hand, these protesters may have tempered their anger, as people—and especially A collective power struggle consists of two actors—demonstrators and their opponent—and oppressed groups—are generally ‘encouraged to suppress their anger’ (Holmes, 2004: 210). the activity in which the first engage: claims-making. As we considered the reactive protest to On the other hand, respondents may have heightened their anger if they saw the interview as be more politicized than the ritual event, we expect to find that reactive protesters were an opportunity to voice their grievance. Expectedly, these biases balanced each other out. angrier than ritual protesters (H1). Also, reactive protesters are assumed to have had more Our sample on demonstrators’ motives may be biased as well, because of the time lag. collective motives to participate than ritual protesters did (H2). Further, at the reactive protest, After all, reactive protesters reported their motives during the event, while ritual protesters did we expect that the opponent was more clearly identified and more severely vilified (H3-4), this afterwards. As a result, ritual protesters’ answers may have been influenced by their and that the claim was more specific and more combatively made (H5-6). protest experiences, while for reactive protesters this was only possible up to a certain point. As a result, we gather that collective motives may be overrepresented in the ritual protest Demonstrators sample. However, as we expected participants of the reactive protest to report these motives Sense of Anger more extensively, such a deviance will not have distorted our results in a meaningful way. Figure 1 portrays to what extent demonstrators’ sense of anger diverged between and within the two events. Most reactive protesters (59%) felt angry, at least to some extent. At the ritual

32 | Protest Politicization | into the overarching code ‘support gay rights/LGBT acceptance’. Eventually, fourteen codes Interviews, Observations, and Media Assessments were identified (see Table 1 on page 35). In the following ways, we assessed whether (and how) an opponent was identified at the two We then categorized these codes as either collective, social, or reward motives (see events, and a claim was made: Klandermans, 1984, 1997; Simon et al., 1998). During this exercise, we found that one code Before both events, we interviewed the protest organizers. For the reactive protest, we (‘solidarity’) did not fit in well with either of these motives. This code was given to answers interviewed an organizer of the COC, whom had been actively involved in the preparations of 2 such as: ‘to encourage Russian LGBT’s’ and ‘[…] gays are (often) colorful, lovely people and the event. For the ritual protest, we interviewed five active volunteers of Haarlem Pink City. they can use all the support they can get’. While these people had a social motive, they did not All interviews were semi-structured, and took place face to face or on the telephone. These seem to participate because of the anticipated reactions of their significant others, but to conversations lasted in between 20 and 63 minutes each. When face to face, they were taped achieve a collective good. This good would, however, not benefit them personally. So, in fact, and transcribed verbatim. When on the phone, the interviewer made notes, which were these respondents were ‘conscience constituents’ (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1222). elaborated immediately afterwards. Following this reasoning, we decided to create a fourth motive category, which we called Researchers observed both events. These researchers—three at the reactive protest and ‘solidary’. two at the ritual protest—made field notes, which were elaborated immediately afterwards. At each event, one of these researchers also taped the speeches that were held, and took pictures Response Bias of claims-making performances, such as demonstrators’ costumes and protest banners. Our two questionnaire measures—sense of anger and motives to participate—may be biased, We gathered media reports of both events, which included newspaper articles, and given that these measures were posed somewhat differently at the two events. However, in messages on the organizers’ web pages and Facebook sites. In addition, one of the organizers both cases, we gather that the response bias is insignificant. of the ritual protest, whom we had interviewed before the event, sent us a copy of the action Demonstrators’ sense of anger was reported during both events. Given that emotions plans for the various activities of the day. Also, after the reactive protest, we received a copy are transitory, this consistency is vital. Of course, ritual protesters may have been more prone of the speech that the chairwoman of the COC had given. to social desirability than reactive protesters, given that the first reported this emotion during an interview, whereas the latter filled out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. However, we RESULTS gather that the response bias in the ritual protest sample may have gone either way. On the one hand, these protesters may have tempered their anger, as people—and especially A collective power struggle consists of two actors—demonstrators and their opponent—and oppressed groups—are generally ‘encouraged to suppress their anger’ (Holmes, 2004: 210). the activity in which the first engage: claims-making. As we considered the reactive protest to On the other hand, respondents may have heightened their anger if they saw the interview as be more politicized than the ritual event, we expect to find that reactive protesters were an opportunity to voice their grievance. Expectedly, these biases balanced each other out. angrier than ritual protesters (H1). Also, reactive protesters are assumed to have had more Our sample on demonstrators’ motives may be biased as well, because of the time lag. collective motives to participate than ritual protesters did (H2). Further, at the reactive protest, After all, reactive protesters reported their motives during the event, while ritual protesters did we expect that the opponent was more clearly identified and more severely vilified (H3-4), this afterwards. As a result, ritual protesters’ answers may have been influenced by their and that the claim was more specific and more combatively made (H5-6). protest experiences, while for reactive protesters this was only possible up to a certain point. As a result, we gather that collective motives may be overrepresented in the ritual protest Demonstrators sample. However, as we expected participants of the reactive protest to report these motives Sense of Anger more extensively, such a deviance will not have distorted our results in a meaningful way. Figure 1 portrays to what extent demonstrators’ sense of anger diverged between and within the two events. Most reactive protesters (59%) felt angry, at least to some extent. At the ritual

| 33 | Chapter 2

protest, to the contrary, only two participants (representing 3% of the sample) felt angry. An In conclusion, reactive protesters mainly participated to fight for a collective good, independent samples t-test confirmed that participants of the reactive protest felt significantly whereas ritual protesters mainly aimed to have a good time. This finding confirms our second angrier than participants of the ritual protest did (reactive M = 2.79; SD = 1.25; ritual M = hypothesis. 1.20, SD = .64; t (229.43) = 12.84, p < .001). This finding confirms our first hypothesis. 2 Table 1: Demonstrators’ Self-reported Motives to Participate in Reactive and Ritual Protest (in %) Figure 1: Demonstrators’ Self-reported Sense of Anger for Reactive and Ritual Protest (in %) reactive ritual 90 collective 93 55 support gay rights/LGBT acceptance 52 22 80 promote visibility LGBT’s 3 30 70 oppose Russian anti-gay law/delayed 24 2 implementation transgender law 60 against opponent (Putin) 15 0 50 Reactive solidary 32 9 solidarity with Russian/Dutch LGBT’s 32 9 40 Ritual

30 social 1 16 asked by friends/family 1 9 20 reunion 0 7 10 reward 2 94 0 enjoyment 0 30 Not at all Not very much Somewhat Quite Very much unity 0 28 n = 160 for reactive protest. n = 74 for ritual protest. local event 0 13 empowerment 0 10 tradition 0 2 Motives to Participate event organizer 1 6 represent political party 1 4 At both events, participants had collective, solidary, social, and reward motives to participate Note: Percentages do not add up to 100, as multiple answers could be given (mean (see Table 1). However, these motives were not equally important. At the reactive protest, answers per person = 1.3 for reactive protest and 1.8 for ritual protest). n = 120 for reactive protest. n = 82 for ritual protest. nearly all participants (93%) had a collective motive, such as supporting gay rights, opposing the Russian anti-gay law, or opposing Putin. Nearly a third (32%) participated out of Opponent solidarity with Russian LGBT’s. Social and reward motives were hardly mentioned. Only one The reactive protesters clearly identified their opponent, being Russian President Vladimir participant had a social motive: she had been asked to participate by her friends. Just two Putin. For example, before the event, the protest organizers created a Facebook site to participants (2% of sample) reported a reward motive: one was an event organizer, and the mobilize for the event. This site was called: ‘LGBT NL against Putin’ (Facebook, 2013a). other represented a political party. Further, the Dutch Broadcast Foundation (NOS) headed on March 16, 2013: ‘Gay protest At the ritual protest, the tables were turned. Here, nearly all participants (94%) had a during visit Putin’. During a pre-event interview with one of the organizers, Putin was also reward motive, such as enjoyment, experiencing a sense of unity, or empowerment. Nearly a clearly targeted. In fact, to address him, the organizers had chosen to stage their protest on the sixth (16%) had a social motive. These respondents had been asked to participate by their Amsterdam ‘Oosterdok’, a square just across from the National Maritime Museum where friends or family, or aimed to reunite themselves with other LGBT’s. Nine percent Putin would attend a banquet. As the organizer put it: participated out of solidarity with the (Dutch) LGBT community. More than half of the participants (55%) had a collective motive, such as promoting the visibility of LGBT’s, or supporting their acceptance.

34 | Protest Politicization | protest, to the contrary, only two participants (representing 3% of the sample) felt angry. An In conclusion, reactive protesters mainly participated to fight for a collective good, independent samples t-test confirmed that participants of the reactive protest felt significantly whereas ritual protesters mainly aimed to have a good time. This finding confirms our second angrier than participants of the ritual protest did (reactive M = 2.79; SD = 1.25; ritual M = hypothesis. 1.20, SD = .64; t (229.43) = 12.84, p < .001). This finding confirms our first hypothesis. Table 1: Demonstrators’ Self-reported Motives to Participate in Reactive 2 and Ritual Protest (in %) Figure 1: Demonstrators’ Self-reported Sense of Anger for Reactive and Ritual Protest (in %) reactive ritual 90 collective 93 55 support gay rights/LGBT acceptance 52 22 80 promote visibility LGBT’s 3 30 70 oppose Russian anti-gay law/delayed 24 2 implementation transgender law 60 against opponent (Putin) 15 0 50 Reactive solidary 32 9 solidarity with Russian/Dutch LGBT’s 32 9 40 Ritual

| 35 | Chapter 2

Emotionally, it makes a very big difference for everyone who will be present […] if, end of the protest, an inflatable doll of two Delft blue, kissing men sailed by the dock. These let’s say, Putin is in the palace on the Dam Square and we are on the Oosterdok, or if men were holding a banner that said: ‘Just Putin a penis’. he is in the National Maritime Museum, within fifty meters’ reach. A few referrals to Putin were downright demonizing. For example, protesters held banners that said Putin is a dictator (‘Putin, just another dictator’), or a monster (‘The sleep of 2 During the event, Putin was identified as the group’s opponent in various ways. All reason produces monsters’). Further, Dolly Bellefleur’s song lyrics described Putin as ‘an evil public speakers mentioned Putin. For example, drag queen Dolly Bellefleur performed the man’, ‘a czar’, and ‘a wicked puppeteer’ (Tienkamp, 2013). ‘Putin protest song’. Protesters also targeted Putin by repeatedly booing, whistling and chanting (e.g., ‘Putin go home!’) in the direction of the National Maritime Museum. Also, The ritual protesters, however, did not clearly identify an opponent. For instance, before the nearly all protest banners mentioned Putin (e.g., ‘Putin go homo!’), or displayed him (see event, the organizers only reported their grievance in a general way: Picture 1 below). If we […] oversee the public debate in the Netherlands, we can hardly escape the Picture 1: Tsarina Putin impression that the Netherlands is rapidly changing from an open society into a hard and closed society. […] Imposed conformism and uniformity lead to the exclusion of individuals and groups, because they would no longer […] fit within the dominant standard (Haarlem Roze Stad, 2012a).

Although the reader may deduct from this quote that the organizers aimed to address intolerant Dutch men and women, they did not pinpoint any specific individuals or organizations that brought them together. During a pre-event interview with one of the organizers, we specifically asked whether the protest targeted a particular opponent. This is how she replied:

No…no…no… There might be people who are angry about certain things… I believe

Source: The picture was taken bij Platon, that […] there is something going on with a Transgender law, which hasn’t passed yet and adapted by Harrie de Fotograaf (see Harrie de Fotograaf, 2013). this week. […] So, on social media Fred Teeven is being called names, but as an Printed with permission. organization we do not turn against anything. As the protest poster makes clear: Putin was not only identified, but also ridiculed. By depicting Putin with make-up on, and calling him an empress (‘Tsarina Putin’), the protesters Worth mentioning here, is that Fred Teeven, who was State Secretary of Safety and implied he is effeminate. Such suggestions were made throughout the event. For instance, Justice at the time of the protest, had drafted the ‘Transgender Bill’ in 2011 (Rijksoverheid, another protest poster of Putin, on which he was depicted with rainbows instead of eyebrows, 2011). This bill would enable Transgenders to have the have their gender changed in their said: PUTINARAINBOW.COM. Worth noting is that this heading refers to a website that passport as well as other official documents without having to undergo sex reassignment catalogs ridiculing protest posters of Putin. For instance, on one of the posters, which is called surgery and sterilization (Ibid.). Although Fred Teeven had indicated that the law would be ‘my little Putin’, Putin is depicted riding on a ‘my little pony’ (i.e. a girl’s toy). Also, at the presented to the House of Representatives by mid-2012, this had not happened (Facebook, 2012).

36 | Protest Politicization |

Emotionally, it makes a very big difference for everyone who will be present […] if, end of the protest, an inflatable doll of two Delft blue, kissing men sailed by the dock. These let’s say, Putin is in the palace on the Dam Square and we are on the Oosterdok, or if men were holding a banner that said: ‘Just Putin a penis’. he is in the National Maritime Museum, within fifty meters’ reach. A few referrals to Putin were downright demonizing. For example, protesters held banners that said Putin is a dictator (‘Putin, just another dictator’), or a monster (‘The sleep of During the event, Putin was identified as the group’s opponent in various ways. All reason produces monsters’). Further, Dolly Bellefleur’s song lyrics described Putin as ‘an evil 2 public speakers mentioned Putin. For example, drag queen Dolly Bellefleur performed the man’, ‘a czar’, and ‘a wicked puppeteer’ (Tienkamp, 2013). ‘Putin protest song’. Protesters also targeted Putin by repeatedly booing, whistling and chanting (e.g., ‘Putin go home!’) in the direction of the National Maritime Museum. Also, The ritual protesters, however, did not clearly identify an opponent. For instance, before the nearly all protest banners mentioned Putin (e.g., ‘Putin go homo!’), or displayed him (see event, the organizers only reported their grievance in a general way: Picture 1 below). If we […] oversee the public debate in the Netherlands, we can hardly escape the Picture 1: Tsarina Putin impression that the Netherlands is rapidly changing from an open society into a hard and closed society. […] Imposed conformism and uniformity lead to the exclusion of individuals and groups, because they would no longer […] fit within the dominant standard (Haarlem Roze Stad, 2012a).

No…no…no… There might be people who are angry about certain things… I believe

| 37 | Chapter 2

So, the organizers of the reactive protest did not oppose a particular person or group. Also, during a pre-event interview with one of the protest organizers, this demand was clearly In fact, the ritual protest organizers aimed to address Dutch society at large. This is illustrated phrased: by the following statement, which was included in the organizers’ action plan for one of the event’s activities: A nasty anti-gay law has been drawn up, which has already been accepted in the first 2 meeting [of the State Duma7] […] and we think that law just needs to be thrown out. Pink Saturday […] aims to show society with how many we are, and how different we are, and also to strengthen the solidarity between LGBT’s in the Netherlands, and Also during the event, this demand was clearly articulated. Most specific were some of especially in Haarlem (Haarlem Roze Stad, 2012b, our emphasis). the public speakers. For instance, the chairwoman of the COC said: ‘Mister Putin, that anti- gay law has to be thrown out!’ (COC, 2013). Some banners aligned with this demand (e.g., To reach Dutch society, the organizers had chosen to parade through Haarlem’s city ‘Love is not illegal’), but most of them opposed Putin (see previous section). center. As one of the organizers put it: Also the rainbow flag visualized the protesters’ opposition to the anti-gay law. ‘Russia is about to prohibit [the] use of the rainbow as a symbol of LGBT pride’, the organizers stated It [Pink Saturday] is about the visibility of homosexuality […] [so] we do not only on their Facebook site (2013b). To refute this, they made sure that the ‘international symbol want to march through the Waarderpolder5, and an industrial area, or something like of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders around the globe’ (Ibid.) was omnipresent at the that. event by asking demonstrators to dress up in a rainbow color (Ibid.). In addition, the protest area had been decorated with rainbow balloons, and the organizers distributed 3,000 colored Interestingly, though, a handful of people identified three different opponents during flyers. Further, at the end of the event, a large rainbow flag was rolled out over the crowd. All the event. Two small groups of protesters (of approximately four and 15 individuals) targeted of these rainbows made for a, as Nederhof (2013) put it, ‘colorful reception for Putin’. the Pope and Fred Teeven, respectively. Besides, during a speech at the end of the event, the The reactive protesters’ demand was not only specific, but also quite combatively chairman of Haarlem Pink City made some requests for ‘the next government’.6 Only the first made. For instance, the chairwoman of the COC said during her speech: group ridiculed their opponent (the Pope) by wearing a habit. The other group and the chairman made their demands without portraying their opponents in a negative way. As president of Russia you should be there for ALL your people. […] Your police All in all, these findings indicate that the reactive protesters identified their opponent should protect gays, instead of standing by carelessly when they are beaten up. […] more clearly than the ritual protesters did, and that they vilified this opponent more severely. But you propose a ‘gay-prop-a-gan-da-law’. A vile name that is meant to disguise These findings confirm our third and fourth hypothesis. what it really is: an ordinary anti-gay law (COC, 2013).

Claims-making The previously mentioned banner texts, and the behaviors in which demonstrators The reactive protesters had a specific demand: the Russian ‘anti-gay bill’ had to be engaged, also exemplify combativeness. renounced. By calling the protest ‘stop the anti-gay law’ (www.stopdeantihomowet.nl), the organizers made this demand quite clear. Newspapers reiterated this demand, by using The ritual protesters did not have a specific demand. For example, on their website, the headlines such as: ‘Protest against anti-gay law Russia during visit Putin’ (Van Vuure, 2013). organizers only reported their aim for the event, being: ‘anchoring the right of ‘being different’ in the public domain’ (Haarlem Roze Stad, 2012a). Clearly, this aim was quite

5 The ‘Waarderpolder’ is a polder located northeast of Haarlem, which accommodates, inter alia, a business area. 6 Presumably, the chairman addressed the future government, rather than the current government, as general elections were scheduled for September 12, 2012. 7 The State Duma is the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia (Wikipedia, n.d. (a)).

38 | Protest Politicization |

So, the organizers of the reactive protest did not oppose a particular person or group. Also, during a pre-event interview with one of the protest organizers, this demand was clearly In fact, the ritual protest organizers aimed to address Dutch society at large. This is illustrated phrased: by the following statement, which was included in the organizers’ action plan for one of the event’s activities: A nasty anti-gay law has been drawn up, which has already been accepted in the first meeting [of the State Duma7] […] and we think that law just needs to be thrown out. 2 Pink Saturday […] aims to show society with how many we are, and how different we are, and also to strengthen the solidarity between LGBT’s in the Netherlands, and Also during the event, this demand was clearly articulated. Most specific were some of especially in Haarlem (Haarlem Roze Stad, 2012b, our emphasis). the public speakers. For instance, the chairwoman of the COC said: ‘Mister Putin, that anti- gay law has to be thrown out!’ (COC, 2013). Some banners aligned with this demand (e.g., To reach Dutch society, the organizers had chosen to parade through Haarlem’s city ‘Love is not illegal’), but most of them opposed Putin (see previous section). center. As one of the organizers put it: Also the rainbow flag visualized the protesters’ opposition to the anti-gay law. ‘Russia is about to prohibit [the] use of the rainbow as a symbol of LGBT pride’, the organizers stated It [Pink Saturday] is about the visibility of homosexuality […] [so] we do not only on their Facebook site (2013b). To refute this, they made sure that the ‘international symbol want to march through the Waarderpolder5, and an industrial area, or something like of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders around the globe’ (Ibid.) was omnipresent at the that. event by asking demonstrators to dress up in a rainbow color (Ibid.). In addition, the protest area had been decorated with rainbow balloons, and the organizers distributed 3,000 colored Interestingly, though, a handful of people identified three different opponents during flyers. Further, at the end of the event, a large rainbow flag was rolled out over the crowd. All the event. Two small groups of protesters (of approximately four and 15 individuals) targeted of these rainbows made for a, as Nederhof (2013) put it, ‘colorful reception for Putin’. the Pope and Fred Teeven, respectively. Besides, during a speech at the end of the event, the The reactive protesters’ demand was not only specific, but also quite combatively chairman of Haarlem Pink City made some requests for ‘the next government’.6 Only the first made. For instance, the chairwoman of the COC said during her speech: group ridiculed their opponent (the Pope) by wearing a habit. The other group and the chairman made their demands without portraying their opponents in a negative way. As president of Russia you should be there for ALL your people. […] Your police All in all, these findings indicate that the reactive protesters identified their opponent should protect gays, instead of standing by carelessly when they are beaten up. […] more clearly than the ritual protesters did, and that they vilified this opponent more severely. But you propose a ‘gay-prop-a-gan-da-law’. A vile name that is meant to disguise These findings confirm our third and fourth hypothesis. what it really is: an ordinary anti-gay law (COC, 2013).

| 39 | Chapter 2

generic. During a pre-event interview with one of the organizers, the goal of the event was feel angry at all. Also, collective motives were more important for reactive protesters than for phrased in an equally generic way: ritual protesters (H2). The latter mainly participated to have a good time. Further, reactive protesters identified their opponent more clearly than ritual protesters The most important goal of Pink Saturday is the visibility of Pink Dutchmen and did (H3). While the first collectively targeted one opponent, the latter sporadically identified a 2 women, asking attention for their position, and by being together it is at the same time few different opponents. In fact, most ritual protesters merely aimed to raise awareness that also a very special day for a minority to be a majority for once. LGBT’s were still discriminated against in Dutch society. In line with these results, we also found that reactive protesters vilified their opponent more severely than ritual protesters did What these quotes exemplify is how Pink Saturday aimed to promote a cultural shift. (H4). Still, most reactive protesters only engaged in ridiculing. Therefore, raising awareness and promoting empowerment appeared to be more relevant than Lastly, reactive protesters had a more specific claim than ritual protesters did, and making a particular claim. The latter, however, did happen in a few instances, with regard to made their claim more combatively (H5-6). Whereas reactive protesters had a specific claim, issues that were affecting LGBT’s at the time. For instance, the small group of protesters that most ritual protesters only had a generic aim. The few claims that were made at the ritual opposed Fred Teeven demanded a swift implementation of the Transgender law. Their protest differed in content and combativeness. banners, for instance, said: ‘Teeven! Where did our transgender law go?’ and ‘We transgenders demand: Self-determination and respect instead of compulsory treatment’. Also CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION the chairman of Haarlem Pink City made a few specific demands during his speech: This study aimed to improve our understanding of how street protests differ in their level of We ask the next government to end the ‘refusal civil servant’8, to start compulsory politicization. To do so, we first conceptualized ‘protest politicization’ as the extent to which education on homosexuality in our education, with a new transgender law through a demonstration epitomizes a power struggle. Then, we operationalized the concept as the which transgenders are better protected against discrimination and no-one in this extent to which demonstrators are angry, and fight for a collective good; an opponent is country is forced to get sterilized. identified and vilified; and a claim is specific and combatively made. To test whether these indicators hold, we deployed a dataset of two Dutch LGBT protests: a reactive protest and a Clearly, the chairman made his demands quite timidly. This was not the case for the ritual protest. These events were selected as we considered them to differ in their degree of protesters that fought for the Transgender law. Yet, these (approximately fifteen) protesters politicization, the reactive protest being far more politicized than the ritual protest. To comprised a small minority at the event, which counted some 775 participants.9 measure the protests’ politicization levels, we used questionnaire data of demonstrators’ sense All in all, these findings indicate that the reactive protesters had a more specific claim of anger and motives to participate. Researchers observed whether an opponent was identified than the ritual protesters did, and that they made their claim more combatively. These findings and a claim was made, and, if so, in what way. In addition, we interviewed the protest confirm our fifth and sixth hypothesis. organizers about their opponent and claim, and assessed whether these were mentioned in media reports. In Sum Based on our premise that the reactive protest was more politicized than the ritual Our analyses confirm our six hypotheses. As expected, participants of the reactive protest felt protest, we expected the indicators to manifest themselves more prominently at the reactive angrier than participants of the ritual protest did (H1). In fact, the latter, in general, did not event. The results confirm our hypotheses. Reactive protesters felt angrier than ritual protesters did, and had more collective motives to participate. Also, reactive protesters

8 A ‘refusal civil servant’ is a civil servant who refuses to marry same-sex couples (see Wikipedia, n.d. (b)). identified their opponent more clearly than ritual protesters did, and vilified their opponent 9 This demonstration size is the mean of the estimates made by researchers and the Haarlem police forces (CCC dataset, 2011). more severely. In addition, reactive protesters had a more specific claim than ritual protesters

40 | Protest Politicization | generic. During a pre-event interview with one of the organizers, the goal of the event was feel angry at all. Also, collective motives were more important for reactive protesters than for phrased in an equally generic way: ritual protesters (H2). The latter mainly participated to have a good time. Further, reactive protesters identified their opponent more clearly than ritual protesters The most important goal of Pink Saturday is the visibility of Pink Dutchmen and did (H3). While the first collectively targeted one opponent, the latter sporadically identified a women, asking attention for their position, and by being together it is at the same time few different opponents. In fact, most ritual protesters merely aimed to raise awareness that 2 also a very special day for a minority to be a majority for once. LGBT’s were still discriminated against in Dutch society. In line with these results, we also found that reactive protesters vilified their opponent more severely than ritual protesters did What these quotes exemplify is how Pink Saturday aimed to promote a cultural shift. (H4). Still, most reactive protesters only engaged in ridiculing. Therefore, raising awareness and promoting empowerment appeared to be more relevant than Lastly, reactive protesters had a more specific claim than ritual protesters did, and making a particular claim. The latter, however, did happen in a few instances, with regard to made their claim more combatively (H5-6). Whereas reactive protesters had a specific claim, issues that were affecting LGBT’s at the time. For instance, the small group of protesters that most ritual protesters only had a generic aim. The few claims that were made at the ritual opposed Fred Teeven demanded a swift implementation of the Transgender law. Their protest differed in content and combativeness. banners, for instance, said: ‘Teeven! Where did our transgender law go?’ and ‘We transgenders demand: Self-determination and respect instead of compulsory treatment’. Also CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION the chairman of Haarlem Pink City made a few specific demands during his speech: This study aimed to improve our understanding of how street protests differ in their level of We ask the next government to end the ‘refusal civil servant’8, to start compulsory politicization. To do so, we first conceptualized ‘protest politicization’ as the extent to which education on homosexuality in our education, with a new transgender law through a demonstration epitomizes a power struggle. Then, we operationalized the concept as the which transgenders are better protected against discrimination and no-one in this extent to which demonstrators are angry, and fight for a collective good; an opponent is country is forced to get sterilized. identified and vilified; and a claim is specific and combatively made. To test whether these indicators hold, we deployed a dataset of two Dutch LGBT protests: a reactive protest and a Clearly, the chairman made his demands quite timidly. This was not the case for the ritual protest. These events were selected as we considered them to differ in their degree of protesters that fought for the Transgender law. Yet, these (approximately fifteen) protesters politicization, the reactive protest being far more politicized than the ritual protest. To comprised a small minority at the event, which counted some 775 participants.9 measure the protests’ politicization levels, we used questionnaire data of demonstrators’ sense All in all, these findings indicate that the reactive protesters had a more specific claim of anger and motives to participate. Researchers observed whether an opponent was identified than the ritual protesters did, and that they made their claim more combatively. These findings and a claim was made, and, if so, in what way. In addition, we interviewed the protest confirm our fifth and sixth hypothesis. organizers about their opponent and claim, and assessed whether these were mentioned in media reports. In Sum Based on our premise that the reactive protest was more politicized than the ritual Our analyses confirm our six hypotheses. As expected, participants of the reactive protest felt protest, we expected the indicators to manifest themselves more prominently at the reactive angrier than participants of the ritual protest did (H1). In fact, the latter, in general, did not event. The results confirm our hypotheses. Reactive protesters felt angrier than ritual protesters did, and had more collective motives to participate. Also, reactive protesters

| 41 | Chapter 2

did, and made their claim more combatively. These findings suggest that our six indicators of Although we consider our research to be relevant for social movement scholarship, it protest politicization are valid. Therefore, we propose that these indicators constitute a model is not without flaws. First of all, our data on demonstrators’ sense of anger and motives to to study the degree to which street protests differ in their level of politicization. participate were measured in a slightly different way for the two events. Reactive protesters Our research unites various strands of research on protest participation: demonstrators’ reported these data during the event on a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Ritual protesters, 2 emotions and motives, adversarial attributions and claims-making. Admittedly, these features however, reported their sense of anger during the event by participating in a structured have already been identified by other social movement scholars, such as Franzosi (2004), interview. After the event, these demonstrators reported their motives to participate on a Lindekilde (2013), and Tilly (2008). Yet, we believe that we have taken their research one postal questionnaire. This different methodology may have generated a response bias. step further by arguing that protests may differ in their level of politicization, and by Although we gather that this bias is small, future research should verify whether participants proposing a model to study such differentiation. of a more politicized protest indeed feel angrier than members of a less politicized event, and Understanding how demonstrations differ in their level of politicization is relevant for if the first have more collective motives to participate than the latter. at least two reasons. First of all, various social movement scholars have implied that some A second limitation of our study is that we tested our hypotheses on two events only. protest events are more politicized than others. For example, Klandermans and colleagues Although these events comprise a ‘most similar systems’ design (Przeworski and Teune, (2014) implied that ‘protests’ are more politicized than ‘parades’. Also, Tartakowsky (2004, 1970: 31-46), which is a valid way of performing an exploratory study, the results should not in Tilly, 2008: 84) appeared to maintain that ‘politically initiated demonstration[s]’ are more be generalized without further independent research. Our study is based on current social politicized than ‘politically tinged parades’. To the best of our knowledge, this premise had movement’s research, and our hypotheses are supported without exception. Still, future not yet been tested. Possibly, this is because, as Fillieule argued, ‘the political nature of a research may identify other, perhaps more valid, indicators of protest politicization. demonstration is […] the most difficult to isolate’ (1997: 42, our translation). Now, we Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that our research provides important believe we have found a way. new insight into protest politicization, and how this could be measured. We hope that we have Studying the (relative) politicization of street protests is also worth the effort, because stimulated scholars to take up the challenge of studying how protests differ in their level of it may help to explain differential protest participation. This assumption is based on research politicization, given that politicization is intrinsic to protest, but understudied. Insight into by Inclán and Almeida (2014) and Klandermans and colleagues (2014), which revealed that protests’ politicization levels may help us to better understand collective gatherings, and the demonstrators’ group identification and organizational membership may differ between people that take part in them. Perhaps, more importantly, insight into protests’ politicization reactive protests and ritual ones. We can now verify whether these differences are related to levels may lead us to reassess these events, to some extent. Currently, some protests are rarely the degree to which a protest is politicized, as they implied. In addition, we could, for studied, perhaps because we do not consider them to be political enough. For example, example, test whether more politicized events attract less politically embedded protesters— Tartakowksy (2004, see Tilly, 2008: 84) decided to exclude politically tinged parades (e.g., i.e. protesters that are members of organizations that are more closely connected to the May Day, Bastille Day, and Armistice Day) from her sample of French demonstrations (1919- political establishment. After all, Blocq, Klandermans, and Van Stekelenburg (2012) found 68). Similarly, in their study of political activism in Switzerland (1945-78), Kriesi and that members of less politically embedded social movement organizations (SMOs) are colleagues (1981) did not include ‘politically symbolic celebrations’ (e.g., Bundesfeier) and generally angrier than members of more politically embedded organizations. This is, they ‘annual political celebrations’ (e.g., May Day) (Op cit.: 19-20, our translations), amongst argue, because ‘less politically embedded SMOs emit more radical or confrontational frames others. By reconsidering what makes protest political, we may broaden our scope, and, as a than more politically embedded SMOs’ (Op cit.: 330). Also interesting would be to analyze result, increase our knowledge of this interesting phenomenon. whether more politicized events attract more experienced protesters. After all, research revealed that such ‘stalwarts’ may be more politically engaged (Saunders, Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford, and Rootes, 2012: 274).

42 | Protest Politicization | did, and made their claim more combatively. These findings suggest that our six indicators of Although we consider our research to be relevant for social movement scholarship, it protest politicization are valid. Therefore, we propose that these indicators constitute a model is not without flaws. First of all, our data on demonstrators’ sense of anger and motives to to study the degree to which street protests differ in their level of politicization. participate were measured in a slightly different way for the two events. Reactive protesters Our research unites various strands of research on protest participation: demonstrators’ reported these data during the event on a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Ritual protesters, emotions and motives, adversarial attributions and claims-making. Admittedly, these features however, reported their sense of anger during the event by participating in a structured 2 have already been identified by other social movement scholars, such as Franzosi (2004), interview. After the event, these demonstrators reported their motives to participate on a Lindekilde (2013), and Tilly (2008). Yet, we believe that we have taken their research one postal questionnaire. This different methodology may have generated a response bias. step further by arguing that protests may differ in their level of politicization, and by Although we gather that this bias is small, future research should verify whether participants proposing a model to study such differentiation. of a more politicized protest indeed feel angrier than members of a less politicized event, and Understanding how demonstrations differ in their level of politicization is relevant for if the first have more collective motives to participate than the latter. at least two reasons. First of all, various social movement scholars have implied that some A second limitation of our study is that we tested our hypotheses on two events only. protest events are more politicized than others. For example, Klandermans and colleagues Although these events comprise a ‘most similar systems’ design (Przeworski and Teune, (2014) implied that ‘protests’ are more politicized than ‘parades’. Also, Tartakowsky (2004, 1970: 31-46), which is a valid way of performing an exploratory study, the results should not in Tilly, 2008: 84) appeared to maintain that ‘politically initiated demonstration[s]’ are more be generalized without further independent research. Our study is based on current social politicized than ‘politically tinged parades’. To the best of our knowledge, this premise had movement’s research, and our hypotheses are supported without exception. Still, future not yet been tested. Possibly, this is because, as Fillieule argued, ‘the political nature of a research may identify other, perhaps more valid, indicators of protest politicization. demonstration is […] the most difficult to isolate’ (1997: 42, our translation). Now, we Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that our research provides important believe we have found a way. new insight into protest politicization, and how this could be measured. We hope that we have Studying the (relative) politicization of street protests is also worth the effort, because stimulated scholars to take up the challenge of studying how protests differ in their level of it may help to explain differential protest participation. This assumption is based on research politicization, given that politicization is intrinsic to protest, but understudied. Insight into by Inclán and Almeida (2014) and Klandermans and colleagues (2014), which revealed that protests’ politicization levels may help us to better understand collective gatherings, and the demonstrators’ group identification and organizational membership may differ between people that take part in them. Perhaps, more importantly, insight into protests’ politicization reactive protests and ritual ones. We can now verify whether these differences are related to levels may lead us to reassess these events, to some extent. Currently, some protests are rarely the degree to which a protest is politicized, as they implied. In addition, we could, for studied, perhaps because we do not consider them to be political enough. For example, example, test whether more politicized events attract less politically embedded protesters— Tartakowksy (2004, see Tilly, 2008: 84) decided to exclude politically tinged parades (e.g., i.e. protesters that are members of organizations that are more closely connected to the May Day, Bastille Day, and Armistice Day) from her sample of French demonstrations (1919- political establishment. After all, Blocq, Klandermans, and Van Stekelenburg (2012) found 68). Similarly, in their study of political activism in Switzerland (1945-78), Kriesi and that members of less politically embedded social movement organizations (SMOs) are colleagues (1981) did not include ‘politically symbolic celebrations’ (e.g., Bundesfeier) and generally angrier than members of more politically embedded organizations. This is, they ‘annual political celebrations’ (e.g., May Day) (Op cit.: 19-20, our translations), amongst argue, because ‘less politically embedded SMOs emit more radical or confrontational frames others. By reconsidering what makes protest political, we may broaden our scope, and, as a than more politically embedded SMOs’ (Op cit.: 330). Also interesting would be to analyze result, increase our knowledge of this interesting phenomenon. whether more politicized events attract more experienced protesters. After all, research revealed that such ‘stalwarts’ may be more politically engaged (Saunders, Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford, and Rootes, 2012: 274).

| 43 | Chapter 2

REFERENCES Fillieule, Olivier. 2012. ‘The Independent Psychological Effects of Participation in Demonstrations.’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17 (3): 235-248. Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: Franzosi, Roberto. 2004. From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social Science. An Overview and Assessment.’ Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611-639. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2 Blake, Jonathan S. 2014. ‘Identity on the March: Contentious Rituals in Post-Conflict Gamson, William A. 1992. Talking Politics. Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, Melbourne, Northern Ireland.’ Unpublished paper, presented at 2014 Annual Meeting of American AU: Cambridge University Press. Political Science Association in Washington, DC. Haarlem Roze Stad, 2012a. ‘Motivatie.’ Retrieved November 5, 2012 (http://www. Blocq, Daniel, Bert Klandermans, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg. 2012. ‘Political haarlemrozestad.nl/OverOns/Motivatie.aspx). Embeddedness and the Management of Emotions.’ Mobilization: An International Haarlem Roze Stad. 2012b. Roze Zaterdag 7 juli 2012. Evenementenboek Locatie Kenaupark. Quarterly 17 (3): 319-334. Update 6 mei 2012. Unpublished scenario, received July 25, 2012. Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke 2006. ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.’ Hall, Robert L., Mark Rodeghier, and Bert Useem. 1986. ‘Effects of Education on Attitude to Qualitative Research in Psychology 3 (2): 77-101. Protest.’ American Sociological Review 51: 564-573. CCC (Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing Contestation) dataset. 2011. Will be made Harrie de Fotograaf. 2013. ‘News.’ Retrieved March 2, 2015 (http://www.harriedefotograaf.nl/ publically available by Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS; pages/news.html). http://dans.knaw.nl/nl). Also see www.protestsurvey.eu Holmes, Mary. 2004. ‘Feeling Beyond Rules: Politicizing the Sociology of Emotion and Channel News Asia. 2015. ‘Anti-Putin Protesters Rally in New York after Nemtsov’s Anger in Feminist Politics.’ European Journal of Social Theory 7 (2): 209-227. Murder.’ Published and retrieved March 2, 2015 (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/ Inclán, María and Paul Almeida. 2014. ‘Urban Mobilization in Mexico: From Bystanders to news/world/anti-putin-protesters/1688044.html). Participation in Ritual and Spontaneous Demonstrations.’ Unpublished paper, COC. 2013. ‘Poetin Demonstratie.’ Unpublished speech, April 8. Received April 16, 2013. presented at 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Dictionary. n.d. ‘Blame.’ Retrieved February 25, 2015 (http://dictionary.reference.com/ Francisco, CA. browse/blame). Jasper, James M. 1997. The Art of Moral Protest. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Facebook. 2012. ‘Teeven Waar Is Onze Wet Gebleven?’, July 7. Retrieved October 10, 2015 Press. (https://www.facebook.com/events/333509960065335/). Jasper, James M. 1998. ‘The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and Facebook, 2013a. ‘Een Koud Welkom voor Poetin/LGBT NL Against Putin’, January 24. around Social Movements.’ Sociological Forum 13 (3): 397-424. Retrieved October 10, 2015 (https://www.facebook.com/GeenWelkomVoorPoetin). Klandermans, Bert. 1984. ‘Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions Facebook. 2013b. ‘Poetin Komt! Kom Jij Ook?’, April 8. Retrieved April 15, 2013 of Resource Mobilization Theory.’ American Sociological Review 49 (5): 583-600. (http://www.facebook.com/events/ 313273045462056/). Klandermans, Bert. 1992. ‘The Social Construction of Protest and Multiorganizational Fields.’ Favre, Pierre. 1990. ‘Manifester en France Au-jourd’hui.’ Pp. 11-65 in La Manifestation, Pp. 77-103 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon D. Morris and edited by Pierre Favre. Paris, FR: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Politiques. Klandermans, Bert. 1997. The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Ferree, Myra Marx. 2004. ‘Soft Repression: Ridicule, Stigma, and Silencing in Gender-Based Blackwell Publishers. Movements.’ Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 25: 85-101. Klandermans, Bert. 2014. ‘Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and Fillieule, Olivier. 1997. Stratégies de la Rue: Les Manifestations en France. Paris, FR: Presses the Dynamics of Protest.’ Political Psychology 35 (1): 1-22. de Sciences Po.

44 | Protest Politicization |

REFERENCES Fillieule, Olivier. 2012. ‘The Independent Psychological Effects of Participation in Demonstrations.’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17 (3): 235-248. Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: Franzosi, Roberto. 2004. From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social Science. An Overview and Assessment.’ Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611-639. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Blake, Jonathan S. 2014. ‘Identity on the March: Contentious Rituals in Post-Conflict Gamson, William A. 1992. Talking Politics. Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, Melbourne, 2 Northern Ireland.’ Unpublished paper, presented at 2014 Annual Meeting of American AU: Cambridge University Press. Political Science Association in Washington, DC. Haarlem Roze Stad, 2012a. ‘Motivatie.’ Retrieved November 5, 2012 (http://www. Blocq, Daniel, Bert Klandermans, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg. 2012. ‘Political haarlemrozestad.nl/OverOns/Motivatie.aspx). Embeddedness and the Management of Emotions.’ Mobilization: An International Haarlem Roze Stad. 2012b. Roze Zaterdag 7 juli 2012. Evenementenboek Locatie Kenaupark. Quarterly 17 (3): 319-334. Update 6 mei 2012. Unpublished scenario, received July 25, 2012. Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke 2006. ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.’ Hall, Robert L., Mark Rodeghier, and Bert Useem. 1986. ‘Effects of Education on Attitude to Qualitative Research in Psychology 3 (2): 77-101. Protest.’ American Sociological Review 51: 564-573. CCC (Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing Contestation) dataset. 2011. Will be made Harrie de Fotograaf. 2013. ‘News.’ Retrieved March 2, 2015 (http://www.harriedefotograaf.nl/ publically available by Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS; pages/news.html). http://dans.knaw.nl/nl). Also see www.protestsurvey.eu Holmes, Mary. 2004. ‘Feeling Beyond Rules: Politicizing the Sociology of Emotion and Channel News Asia. 2015. ‘Anti-Putin Protesters Rally in New York after Nemtsov’s Anger in Feminist Politics.’ European Journal of Social Theory 7 (2): 209-227. Murder.’ Published and retrieved March 2, 2015 (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/ Inclán, María and Paul Almeida. 2014. ‘Urban Mobilization in Mexico: From Bystanders to news/world/anti-putin-protesters/1688044.html). Participation in Ritual and Spontaneous Demonstrations.’ Unpublished paper, COC. 2013. ‘Poetin Demonstratie.’ Unpublished speech, April 8. Received April 16, 2013. presented at 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Dictionary. n.d. ‘Blame.’ Retrieved February 25, 2015 (http://dictionary.reference.com/ Francisco, CA. browse/blame). Jasper, James M. 1997. The Art of Moral Protest. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Facebook. 2012. ‘Teeven Waar Is Onze Wet Gebleven?’, July 7. Retrieved October 10, 2015 Press. (https://www.facebook.com/events/333509960065335/). Jasper, James M. 1998. ‘The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and Facebook, 2013a. ‘Een Koud Welkom voor Poetin/LGBT NL Against Putin’, January 24. around Social Movements.’ Sociological Forum 13 (3): 397-424. Retrieved October 10, 2015 (https://www.facebook.com/GeenWelkomVoorPoetin). Klandermans, Bert. 1984. ‘Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions Facebook. 2013b. ‘Poetin Komt! Kom Jij Ook?’, April 8. Retrieved April 15, 2013 of Resource Mobilization Theory.’ American Sociological Review 49 (5): 583-600. (http://www.facebook.com/events/ 313273045462056/). Klandermans, Bert. 1992. ‘The Social Construction of Protest and Multiorganizational Fields.’ Favre, Pierre. 1990. ‘Manifester en France Au-jourd’hui.’ Pp. 11-65 in La Manifestation, Pp. 77-103 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon D. Morris and edited by Pierre Favre. Paris, FR: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Politiques. Klandermans, Bert. 1997. The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Ferree, Myra Marx. 2004. ‘Soft Repression: Ridicule, Stigma, and Silencing in Gender-Based Blackwell Publishers. Movements.’ Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 25: 85-101. Klandermans, Bert. 2014. ‘Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and Fillieule, Olivier. 1997. Stratégies de la Rue: Les Manifestations en France. Paris, FR: Presses the Dynamics of Protest.’ Political Psychology 35 (1): 1-22. de Sciences Po.

| 45 | Chapter 2

Klandermans, Bert, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Marie-Louise Damen, Dunya van Troost, Oberschall, Anthony. 1980. ‘Loosely Structured Collective Conflicts: A Theory and an and Anouk van Leeuwen. 2014. ‘Mobilization without Organization: The Case of Application.’ Pp. 45-68 in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change Unaffiliated Demonstrators.’ European Sociological Review 30 (6): 702-716. (volume 3), edited by Louis Kriesberg. Greenwich, CT.: JAI Press. Klandermans, Bert, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Dunya van Troost, Anouk van Leeuwen, Payne, Samantha. 2014. ‘G20: Protesters Bury Heads in Sand to Ridicule Tony Abbott’s 2 Stefaan Walgrave, Joris Verhulst, Jeroen van Laer, and Ruud Wouters. 2011. Manual ‘Embarrassing’ Climate Change Inaction.’ International Business Times, November for Data Collection on Protest Demonstrations. Caught in the act of protest: 14. Retrieved March 23, 2015 (http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/g20-protesters-bury-heads- Contextualizing Contestation (CCC-project). Version 3.0. Amsterdam, NL, and sand-ridicule-tony-abbotts-embarrassing-climate-change-action-1474908). Antwerp, BE: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and University of Antwerp. Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New Kriesi, Hanspeter, René Levy, Gilbert Ganguillet, and Heinz Zwicky, eds. 1981. Politische York, NY: Wiley-Interscience. Aktivierung in der Schweiz 1945-1978. Diessenhofen, CH: Verlag Rüegger. Rijksoverheid. 2011. ‘Transseksualiteit Wetsvoorstel’, September 14. Retrieved October 10, Lindekilde, L. 2013. ‘Claims-Making.’ Pp. 201-203 in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of 2015 (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/ Social and Political Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert 2011/09/14/wetsvoorstel-transgenders/transseksualiteitwetsvoorstel-consultatie.pdf). Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Saunders, Clare, Maria Grasso, Cristiana Olcese, Emily Rainsford, and Cristopher Rootes. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. 2012. ‘Explaining Differential Protest Participation: Novices, Returners, Repeaters, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. and Stalwarts.’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17 (3): 263-280. McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: Simon, Bernd, and Olga Grabow. 2010. ‘The Politicization of Migrants: Further Evidence that A Partial Theory.’ American Journal of Sociology 82 (6): 1212-1241. Politicized Collective Identity is a Dual Identity.’ Political Psychology 31 (5): 717- Merriam-Webster. n.d. (a). ‘Grievance.’ Retrieved February 24, 2015 (http://www.merriam- 738. webster.com/dictionary/grievance). Simon, Bernd, and Bert Klandermans. 2001. ‘Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Merriam-Webster. n.d. (b). ‘Vilification.’ Retrieved February 26, 2015. (http://www.merriam- Psychological Analysis.’ American Psychologist 56 (4): 319-331. webster.com/dictionary/vilification). Simon, Bernd, Michael Loewy, Stefan Stürmer, Ulrike Weber, Peter Freytag, Corinna Habig, Merriam-Webster. n.d. (c). ‘Claim.’ Retrieved March 2, 2015. (http://www.merriam-webster. Claudia Kampmeier, and Peter Spahlinger. 1998. ‘Collective Identification and Social com/dictionary/claim). Movement Participation.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (3): 646- Merriam-Webster. n.d. (d). ‘Demand.’ Retrieved February 27, 2015 (http://www.merriam- 658. webster.com/dictionary/demand). Smith, Eliot R. 1993. ‘Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations Miron-Spektor, Ella, and Anat Rafaeli. 2009. ‘The Effects of Anger in the Workplace: When, of Prejudice. Pp. 297-315 in Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes Where, and Why Observing Anger Enhances or Hinders Performance.’ Research in in Group Perception, edited by Diane M. Mackie and David L. Hamilton. San Diego, Personnel and Human Resources Management 28: 153-178. CA: Academic Press, INC. Nederhof, Agnès. 2013. ‘Kleurrijk Ontvangst voor Poetin.’ Ondertussen.nl, April 8. Retrieved Stafford, Zach. 2015. ‘Homan Square Protesters Demand Answers over Chicago Police ‘Black March 15, 2015 (http://www.ondertussen.nl/nieuws/ kleurrijk-ontvangst-voor-poetin/). Site.’ The Guardian. March 1. Retrieved March 2, 2015 (http://www.theguardian.com/ NOS. 2013. ‘Homoprotest bij Bezoek Putin.’ Published March 16. Retrieved April 8, 2013 us-news/2015/feb/28/homan-square-protest-chicago-police-black-site). (http://nos.nl/artikel/485222-homoprotest-bij-bezoek-poetin.html). Tarrow, Sidney. 1989. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

46 | Protest Politicization |

Klandermans, Bert, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Marie-Louise Damen, Dunya van Troost, Oberschall, Anthony. 1980. ‘Loosely Structured Collective Conflicts: A Theory and an and Anouk van Leeuwen. 2014. ‘Mobilization without Organization: The Case of Application.’ Pp. 45-68 in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change Unaffiliated Demonstrators.’ European Sociological Review 30 (6): 702-716. (volume 3), edited by Louis Kriesberg. Greenwich, CT.: JAI Press. Klandermans, Bert, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Dunya van Troost, Anouk van Leeuwen, Payne, Samantha. 2014. ‘G20: Protesters Bury Heads in Sand to Ridicule Tony Abbott’s Stefaan Walgrave, Joris Verhulst, Jeroen van Laer, and Ruud Wouters. 2011. Manual ‘Embarrassing’ Climate Change Inaction.’ International Business Times, November 2 for Data Collection on Protest Demonstrations. Caught in the act of protest: 14. Retrieved March 23, 2015 (http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/g20-protesters-bury-heads- Contextualizing Contestation (CCC-project). Version 3.0. Amsterdam, NL, and sand-ridicule-tony-abbotts-embarrassing-climate-change-action-1474908). Antwerp, BE: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and University of Antwerp. Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New Kriesi, Hanspeter, René Levy, Gilbert Ganguillet, and Heinz Zwicky, eds. 1981. Politische York, NY: Wiley-Interscience. Aktivierung in der Schweiz 1945-1978. Diessenhofen, CH: Verlag Rüegger. Rijksoverheid. 2011. ‘Transseksualiteit Wetsvoorstel’, September 14. Retrieved October 10, Lindekilde, L. 2013. ‘Claims-Making.’ Pp. 201-203 in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of 2015 (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/ Social and Political Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert 2011/09/14/wetsvoorstel-transgenders/transseksualiteitwetsvoorstel-consultatie.pdf). Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Saunders, Clare, Maria Grasso, Cristiana Olcese, Emily Rainsford, and Cristopher Rootes. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. 2012. ‘Explaining Differential Protest Participation: Novices, Returners, Repeaters, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. and Stalwarts.’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17 (3): 263-280. McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: Simon, Bernd, and Olga Grabow. 2010. ‘The Politicization of Migrants: Further Evidence that A Partial Theory.’ American Journal of Sociology 82 (6): 1212-1241. Politicized Collective Identity is a Dual Identity.’ Political Psychology 31 (5): 717- Merriam-Webster. n.d. (a). ‘Grievance.’ Retrieved February 24, 2015 (http://www.merriam- 738. webster.com/dictionary/grievance). Simon, Bernd, and Bert Klandermans. 2001. ‘Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Merriam-Webster. n.d. (b). ‘Vilification.’ Retrieved February 26, 2015. (http://www.merriam- Psychological Analysis.’ American Psychologist 56 (4): 319-331. webster.com/dictionary/vilification). Simon, Bernd, Michael Loewy, Stefan Stürmer, Ulrike Weber, Peter Freytag, Corinna Habig, Merriam-Webster. n.d. (c). ‘Claim.’ Retrieved March 2, 2015. (http://www.merriam-webster. Claudia Kampmeier, and Peter Spahlinger. 1998. ‘Collective Identification and Social com/dictionary/claim). Movement Participation.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (3): 646- Merriam-Webster. n.d. (d). ‘Demand.’ Retrieved February 27, 2015 (http://www.merriam- 658. webster.com/dictionary/demand). Smith, Eliot R. 1993. ‘Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations Miron-Spektor, Ella, and Anat Rafaeli. 2009. ‘The Effects of Anger in the Workplace: When, of Prejudice. Pp. 297-315 in Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes Where, and Why Observing Anger Enhances or Hinders Performance.’ Research in in Group Perception, edited by Diane M. Mackie and David L. Hamilton. San Diego, Personnel and Human Resources Management 28: 153-178. CA: Academic Press, INC. Nederhof, Agnès. 2013. ‘Kleurrijk Ontvangst voor Poetin.’ Ondertussen.nl, April 8. Retrieved Stafford, Zach. 2015. ‘Homan Square Protesters Demand Answers over Chicago Police ‘Black March 15, 2015 (http://www.ondertussen.nl/nieuws/ kleurrijk-ontvangst-voor-poetin/). Site.’ The Guardian. March 1. Retrieved March 2, 2015 (http://www.theguardian.com/ NOS. 2013. ‘Homoprotest bij Bezoek Putin.’ Published March 16. Retrieved April 8, 2013 us-news/2015/feb/28/homan-square-protest-chicago-police-black-site). (http://nos.nl/artikel/485222-homoprotest-bij-bezoek-poetin.html). Tarrow, Sidney. 1989. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

| 47 | Chapter 2

Tarrow, Sidney. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (third through Group-Based Anger and Group Efficacy.’ Journal of Personality and Social edition). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Psychology 87 (5): 649-664. Tarrow, Sidney. 2013. The Language of Contention: Revolutions in words, 1688-2012. New Wada, Takeshi. 2004. ‘Event Analysis of Claim Making in Mexico: How Are Social Protests York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Transformed into Political Protests?’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 9 (3): 2 Tartakowsky, Danielle. 2004. La Manif en Éclats. Paris, FR: La Dispute. 241-257. Tienkamp, Priscilla. 2013. ‘Poetin Protestsong en Gratis Regenboogvlaggen op 8 April.’ Wikipedia. n.d. (a). ‘State Duma.’ Retrieved March 4, 2015 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Dichtbij.nl, March 26. Retrieved April 15, 2013 (http://www.dichtbij.nl/amsterdam- State_Duma). centrum/regio/artikel/2693562/poetin-protestsong-en-gratis-regenboogvlaggen-op-8- Wikipedia. n.d. (b). ‘Trouwambtenaar.’ Retrieved October 9, 2015 (https://nl.wikipedia.org/ april.aspx). wiki/Trouwambtenaar#cite_note-2). Tilly, Charles. 2008. Contentious Performances. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Toch, Hans. [1965] 2014. The Social Psychology of Social Movements. Hove, UK: Routledge. Turner-Zwinkels, Felicity, Martijn van Zomeren, and Tom Postmes. 2015. ‘Politicization during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections: Bridging the Personal and the Political through an Identity Content Approach.’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 41 (3): 433-445. Vanderford, Marsha L. 1989. ‘Vilification and Social Movements: A Case Study of Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Rhetoric.’ Quarterly Journal of Speech 75: 166-182. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Bert Klandermans, and Wilco W. van Dijk. 2011. ‘Combining Motivations and Emotion: The Motivational Dynamics of Protest Participation.’ Revista de Psicología Social: International Journal of Social Psychology 26 (1): 91- 104. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Anouk van Leeuwen, and Dunya van Troost. 2013. ‘Politicized Identity.’ Pp. 1220-1224 in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Stefaan Walgrave, Bert Klandermans, and Joris Verhulst. 2012. ‘Contextualizing Contestation: Framework, Design and Data.’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17 (3): 249-262. Van Vuure, Romanca. 2013. ‘Demonstratie tegen Anti-Homowet Rusland tijdens Bezoek Poetin.’ Metro, March 27. Retrieved April 4, 2013 (http://www.metronieuws.nl/ nieuws/demonstratie-tegen-anti-homowet-rusland-tijdens-bezoek-poetin/SrZmcA!b WF9bA76j5YA/). Van Zomeren, Martijn, Russell Spears, Agneta H. Fischer, and Colin Wayne Leach. 2004. ‘Put your Money where your Mouth Is! Explaining Collective Action Tendencies

48 | Protest Politicization |

Tarrow, Sidney. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (third through Group-Based Anger and Group Efficacy.’ Journal of Personality and Social edition). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Psychology 87 (5): 649-664. Tarrow, Sidney. 2013. The Language of Contention: Revolutions in words, 1688-2012. New Wada, Takeshi. 2004. ‘Event Analysis of Claim Making in Mexico: How Are Social Protests York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Transformed into Political Protests?’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 9 (3): Tartakowsky, Danielle. 2004. La Manif en Éclats. Paris, FR: La Dispute. 241-257. 2 Tienkamp, Priscilla. 2013. ‘Poetin Protestsong en Gratis Regenboogvlaggen op 8 April.’ Wikipedia. n.d. (a). ‘State Duma.’ Retrieved March 4, 2015 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Dichtbij.nl, March 26. Retrieved April 15, 2013 (http://www.dichtbij.nl/amsterdam- State_Duma). centrum/regio/artikel/2693562/poetin-protestsong-en-gratis-regenboogvlaggen-op-8- Wikipedia. n.d. (b). ‘Trouwambtenaar.’ Retrieved October 9, 2015 (https://nl.wikipedia.org/ april.aspx). wiki/Trouwambtenaar#cite_note-2). Tilly, Charles. 2008. Contentious Performances. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Toch, Hans. [1965] 2014. The Social Psychology of Social Movements. Hove, UK: Routledge. Turner-Zwinkels, Felicity, Martijn van Zomeren, and Tom Postmes. 2015. ‘Politicization during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections: Bridging the Personal and the Political through an Identity Content Approach.’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 41 (3): 433-445. Vanderford, Marsha L. 1989. ‘Vilification and Social Movements: A Case Study of Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Rhetoric.’ Quarterly Journal of Speech 75: 166-182. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Bert Klandermans, and Wilco W. van Dijk. 2011. ‘Combining Motivations and Emotion: The Motivational Dynamics of Protest Participation.’ Revista de Psicología Social: International Journal of Social Psychology 26 (1): 91- 104. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Anouk van Leeuwen, and Dunya van Troost. 2013. ‘Politicized Identity.’ Pp. 1220-1224 in The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, Stefaan Walgrave, Bert Klandermans, and Joris Verhulst. 2012. ‘Contextualizing Contestation: Framework, Design and Data.’ Mobilization: An International Quarterly 17 (3): 249-262. Van Vuure, Romanca. 2013. ‘Demonstratie tegen Anti-Homowet Rusland tijdens Bezoek Poetin.’ Metro, March 27. Retrieved April 4, 2013 (http://www.metronieuws.nl/ nieuws/demonstratie-tegen-anti-homowet-rusland-tijdens-bezoek-poetin/SrZmcA!b WF9bA76j5YA/). Van Zomeren, Martijn, Russell Spears, Agneta H. Fischer, and Colin Wayne Leach. 2004. ‘Put your Money where your Mouth Is! Explaining Collective Action Tendencies

| 49