Jonathan D. Smele, ed.. Civil War in : The Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. xix + 759 pp. $69.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-57335-1.

Reviewed by Eva M. Stolberg

Published on H- (April, 1998)

Historians have produced a plentiful litera‐ ilarities, besides foreign intervention, between ture on Civil War in Russia over the last four the above mentioned cataclysms. decades. And as an outstanding event in Russia's Whereas the older historiography predomi‐ modern history, the years of 1917-1922 with all nantly focused on the events in the Russian capi‐ their political, ideological, socioeconomic dimen‐ tals of St. Petersburg and Moscow, recent scholar‐ sions--not to mention the psychological impact-- ship beginning with the key mid-1970s works of evoke more than academic debates about the gen‐ Oliver Radkey and Peter Kenez has moved more esis and implications of this muddled web of cata‐ and more to the Revolution and Civil War at the clysms. They left an imprint on the participants in periphery of the former . [1] These fratricide--hardly any Russian family which did outlying regions--from the Baltic, Ukraine, and not mourn a victim--as the Revolution and Civil Caucasus to Siberia and the Russian Far East-- War destroyed kindred and friendship. Between were a kind of playing feld for the heterogeneous the decline of the ancien regime and the rise of a and therefore opalescent anti-bolshevik move‐ new regime, people lost their social bearings. ments. In this context, it is better not to use the With such a problem, the diferent political fac‐ term counter-revolution , because it smacks of a tions--from the , SR to the Kadets and typical Bolshevik stereotype, too often uncritically generals--had to act, and its solution would adopted by Western historiography (as well as in decide the fate of each political conception. The this book). Counter-revolution assumes that there civil war of 1917-1921 has been sometimes com‐ was a clear political program of the as pared with the Time of Troubles in medieval Rus‐ counter to Lenin's which in reality did not exist. sia. One of the prominent White Generals, Anton Moreover, the term blurs the diferences among Denikin, entitled his memoirs Ocherki russkoi the Whites. Whereas the SRs in principle support‐ smuty (Paris-, 1921-1926, 5 volumes). And ed the idea of a revolution, though not under the indeed, despite the distance of time, there are sim‐ one-party dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, the H-Net Reviews

Kadets and the Generals were far from being rev‐ Smele's study is predominately based on olutionaries. Instead, they intended a restoration White publications (e.g. pamphlets, newspapers), of the old pre-revolutionary order. As to these ob‐ which are stored in Western archives as the jections, the term anti-Bolshevik movements fts British War Ofce, the Public Records Ofce, the better. Hoover Institution, and the Regional Oral History If it is difcult to fnd an appropriate appella‐ Ofce at the University of California/Berkeley, tion for the White phenomenon, this still is due in with its inexhaustible mine of eyewitness ac‐ a greater extent to their politics, which seemed in‐ counts. Unfortunately, the rich material of the constant and restless. Three factors contribute to GARF (Gosudarstvenii Archiv Rossiiskoi Federat‐ this White dilemma: 1) the above-mentioned dis‐ sii) in Moscow has not been taken into considera‐ agreements among factions, 2) geographic loca‐ tion. Although the author points out that after the tion, 3) foreign intervention. Whereas the periph‐ collapse of the Union, the study of the ery facilitated the cooperation with the Allied In‐ Whites and especially Kolchak attracted the inter‐ terventionists, it simultaneously involved the est of Russian scholars, he does not sufciently Whites, who as the old elite were accustomed to deal with their revised view--except for some ref‐ central administration, in the web of regionalism erences to D. M. Zolnikov. [3] K.A. Bogdanov's and its special political and social local conditions. work Admiral Kolchak: biografcheskii povest'- Regionalism itself was an opalescent phenome‐ khronika (Moscow, 1993) is only briefy men‐ non in Civil War too, comprising peasants, cos‐ tioned in the preface. Instead, a broad scope of So‐ sacks, and nationalities. This tension between viet literature from the 1950s to 80s is utilized, centralism and regionalism was an outstanding which should be regarded with caution, because factor, which fnally led to the crushing of the of its one-sided perspectives and assessments.[4] White anti-bolshevik movements. And the vast Civil War in Siberia essentially traces the rise lands of Siberia, Russia's backyards, were the and decline of Admiral Kolchak, Russia's Supreme scene where this happened. Ruler, in his shrinking Siberian dominion which Jonathan Smele, lecturer in Russian History at never became a springboard for the envisaged the University of London, is a well-known expert conquest of Russia. Smele examines the subject in on the Civil War in Siberia. A decade ago he pub‐ six main chapters--framed by an introduction and lished with David Collins (British Siberian Semi‐ a conclusion. The sections represent the gradual nar, University of Leeds) valuable documentation changes of White Power between 1918-1920 un‐ on Kolchak i Sibir': dokumenty i issledovania, der the following apt headlines: 1) "The triumphal 1919-1926 (White Plains, New York: Kraus Inter‐ march of reaction" (10-107), 2) "The establishment national Publishers, 1988). This new volume--no of the Kolchak government" (108-182), 3) "'What less voluminous--again balances an analysis of Kolchak wants!': Military versus Polity in White Kolchak's twenty-six-month rule in Siberia with Siberia" (183-326), 4) "Inside Kolchakia: From 'A an excellent narrative that is addressed more to Land of Milk and Honey' to 'The Dictatorship of specialists than to students and general readers. The Whip'" (327-471), 5) "White Debacle" Reading this fascinating book, which comprises (472-550), and 6) "White agony" (551-667). over seven hundred pages and includes a seventy Before the triumphal march of White reaction pages bibliography, one feels the strong impact of reached the vastness of Siberia, the region was the forerunners in this feld like John A. White, under Bolshevik rule between Fall 1917 and Sum‐ Canfeld F. Smith, and Norman G.O. Pereira.[2] mer 1918. As quickly as the Bolshevik Revolution had come to Siberia, it disappeared. Thanks to

2 H-Net Reviews their guns, the Bolsheviks gained power in all ment (PSG) at , were paralyzing each other. large cities along the Transsiberian Railroad. But This Omsk- divide fnally led to Kolchak's Bolshevism had never been rooted in the country‐ coup d'etat on November 18, 1918. The immature side, where the overwhelming majority of the democracy of the SRs, their lack of efective politi‐ population were peasants, sympathizers of the cal and military organizations despite their im‐ SRs. In Siberia a gentry did not exist as in Euro‐ pressive share in electoral support, and their furl‐ pean Russia. Siberian peasants were rich and sati‐ ing by the were compelling reasons for ated, as Lenin himself realized. In the November the proponents of dictatorship to argue that 1917 to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, democracy could not function under the circum‐ Lenin's party only got 10 percent of the regional stances of Civil War. vote, whereas the SRs received between 55 per‐ Even the Siberian autonomous movement cent (Irkutsk guberniia) and 85 percent (Tomsk ("oblastnichestvo") and its prominent advocates guberniia), compared to a 37.3 percent SR share Potanin, Vologodskii and Serebrennikov gave up of the All-Russian vote. One should add that the their dreams for the sake of centralism and soon Bolsheviks in Siberia were divided. There were became stalwarts of Kolchak, the "rescuer" from those regionalists, who--because of the organiza‐ the Bolsheviks. During its few sessions, the Siberi‐ tional weakness--demanded a cooperation with an Oblastnaia Duma (Sibobduma), summoned un‐ the SR and Mensheviks. On the other hand, the der the marvelous green-white fag (symbol for Leninists stood up for a strong centralism and a Siberian forests and snow), was never representa‐ one-party rule. Therefore, these militants not only tive of Siberian society, except of some intellectu‐ dispersed the Soviets in Siberia and the Russian als, especially professors from the Tomsk Univer‐ Far East. Moreover, they threatened their Siberian sity. In contrast to liberal Tomsk, Omsk was an ap‐ comrades with disciplinary punishments, includ‐ propriate breeding ground for conservatism. Here ing expulsion. was the outpost of the centralist Petersburg bu‐ The short prelude of Bolshevik power was in‐ reaucracy, the stronghold of conservative Siberian terrupted by the insurrection of the Czechoslo‐ and business circles--the social strata vakian Legion in summer 1918. The Czechoslo‐ which would support Kolchak's coup d'etat. Fol‐ vaks, controlling the ribbon of the Transsiberian lowing Smele's argumentation, this event was to Railroad, the nerve of Siberia, were the decisive be expected. factor that prepared th e ground for White rule in The next three chapters are devoted to the in‐ Siberia. The installation of their power, however, ner life of Kolchak's government in Siberia. From met with problems, not very unlike those faced by the very beginning, it had grave shortcomings. the Bolsheviks. Until November 1918 anti-Bolshe‐ The inaugural proclamations of "support of law, vik governments were springing up like mush‐ freedom and democracy" appealed to a recogni‐ rooms all over Siberia. Except for endless palaver, tion by the Western Powers, especially Great an unifcation on the basis of a compromising po‐ Britain and the United States. Kolchak did realize litical conception did not succeed. that "the Allies want something said about democ‐ >From the very beginning, the two rivaling racy and the absence of reactionary intentions"; White power centers, the SR-dominated, Commit‐ without such claims foreign aid was not available. tee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (KO‐ So, there was a new constitution. The Council of MUCH = KOMitet chleno v UCHreditel'nogo so‐ Ministers, despite their lack of real power, still braniia) at Samara and the more right-wing, had the popular mandate of the Sibobduma as a Kadets-dominated Provisional Siberian Govern‐ pure substitute until a revocation of an All-Rus‐

3 H-Net Reviews sian assembly. As to the ofcial press, there was did not know life in its severe, practical applica‐ only a provisional dictatorship. It is striking that tion."[8] But this view is one-sided and does not inside of Siberia no one believed in this do justice to Kolchak. How could he gain adminis‐ makeshift. trative skills behind a screen of his camarilla? It The Kolchak government was faced with a was the complacent military circle around him multiple dilemma. First, the White Army was which fnally provoked the failure of White Gov‐ splintered by warlordism. Atamans like Semenov, ernment in Siberia and in All-Russia. Ungern-Sternberg did not recognize Kolchak's au‐ The last two chapters provide the background thority and gained the support of the Japanese, of White failure in Siberia in the crucial months who followed their own strategic and economic from July 1919 to January 1920. History some‐ motives in rivalry with the United States--an out‐ times smacks of irony. On July 1, 1919, the frst an‐ standing factor which still needs a deeper elabo‐ niversary of the inauguration of the Provisional ration than in this book.[5] Secondly, the Council Siberian Government in Omsk was celebrated of Ministers never succeeded as an efective with pomp. But at the same time, the dusk of counter-check on the arbitrary military around White power in Siberia arose at the horizon of Kolchak. Third, Kolchak himself never gained the Civil War. The Red Army was trampling down stature of a dictator. He seemed to be a "dictator" Kolchak's troops in the West Siberian plains. Now, against his own will. As Smele points out, the the Whites had to pay dearly for their long-stand‐ head of the British Military Mission in Siberia, ing reluctance to implement political and social Major-General Alfred Knox, and the Kadet Pepeli‐ reforms. Their realization of a necessary change aev were the "king-makers" in the background. came too late. Hated by the population because of Fourth, the "Supreme Ruler" relied on a ca‐ the arbitrary requisitions of grain and soldiers, marilla of ofcers who had no interest in politics, high taxation and corruption, White rule was a even not in military afairs. On the contrary, they artifcial creation in the Siberian remoteness, were "afraid to fght at the front" and preferred a which could only exist thanks to Allied and "dolce vita" in Omsk. And enjoying the luxurious Czechoslovakian support. gardens and cafes, they lost the contact to the It was the great paradox that the Kolchak masses at and behind the front. In this context, regime had only found supporters among foreign‐ the intrigues of Ivan Mikhailov, Kolchak's Minis‐ ers, but not among the Russian population. At ter of Finance or the so called "Siberian Borgia," least, the Whites and Allies had strongly underes‐ played an outstanding role. He was one of those timated the organizational skill and military per‐ "advisers," who successfully built up a screen sistence of the Bolsheviks. Whereas the Czechoslo‐ around Kolchak. So, it is not surprising that vaks were eager to return to their newly estab‐ Kolchak "did not understand the complexity of the lished state and tired of their involvement in the political system, the role of political parties, or the dragging , the Western Allies lost part of self-interest as a factor of government in summer 1919 their hope in Kolchak's survival. life," as Guins, Kolchak's administrative secretary, The Western governments had to consider the remembered later.[7] Or with sharper words, al‐ growing criticism at home, where the population luding to Kolchak's former career in the Russian and the parliaments demanded an end of the in‐ Marine and as then explorer of the Northern Sea tervention, because of its high fnancial price. And Route, Baron Budberg, Kolchak's Acting Minister it was Albert Knox, Kolchak's former "king-mak‐ of War in summer of 1919, judged: "A narrow er" during the days of coup d'etat of November sailor...absolutely ignorant of administration...he 1918, who taciturnly commented in August 1919

4 H-Net Reviews on the "Supreme Ruler": "A Lost Case." In the next 1, 1987, pp.2-19; White Siberia: The Politics of Civ‐ months, the White rule in Siberia dissolved in il War, Montreal, Kingston 1996. panic and agony. In January 1920, Kolchak was ar‐ [3]. D.M. Zolnikov et al. (eds.), Klassy i rested by the SR Political Center in Irkutsk. The SR politicheskie partii v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii i negotiated with the Bolsheviks on a coalition gov‐ grazhdanskoi voine v Sibiri, 1991. ernment to save their own skin. The price was the [4]. Igor Naumov, Grazhdanskaia voina na extradition of Kolchak to the Bolsheviks, who shot Dal'nem Vostoke v sovetskoi istoriografi serediny him on February 7, 1920. Neither the Allied Com‐ 1950--serediny 1980-e godov, Irkutsk 1991. manders like Knox nor the Czechoslovaks made the slightest arrangements to save the All-Russian [5]. To the present, there is only one compre‐ Supreme Ruler. It was a tragedy of Kolchak that hensive work of the Japanese historiography on he was only a fgure in the international power Civil War and Japanese Intervention in Siberia: game and in the web of Inner Whites' intrigues. Hara Teruyuki, Shiberia shuppei: kakumei to kan‐ As quickly as Kolchak appeared on the stage of sho, 1917-1922 [The Siberian Intervention: Revo‐ Civil War, he disappeared with the same rapidity. lution and Interven tion, 1917-1922]; Tokyo 1993. Kolchak was a "provisional phenomenon" like the [6]. G.K. Guins [Gins], Sibir', soiuzniki i "Provisional Siberian Government" in Omsk. Kolchak: povorotnyi moment russkoi istorii, Smele presents a competent and masterly 1918-1920gg. (Vpechatleniia i mysli chlena Om‐ written insight into the emergence and decline of skogo pravitel'stva), vol. 2, Peking 1921, pp. Kolchak and White Rule in Siberia with an exten‐ 368-369. sive depth concerning the inner (political, eco‐ [7]. Baron A.P. von Budberg, "Dnevnik", nomic, social) factors and the international impli‐ Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, Berlin, vol. 15 (1924), cations. It is a valuable book over which no one pp. 331. with interest in the mechanism of Civil War in Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ Siberia should pass. served. This work may be copied for non-proft Notes educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ [1]. Oliver H. Radkey, The Unknown Civil War thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ in Russia: A Study of the Green Movement in the tact [email protected]. Tambov Region, 1920-1921, Stanford 1976; Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1918-19: The De‐ feat of the Whites, Berkeley 1977; Orlando Figes, Peasant Russia, Civil War: The Volga Countryside in Revolution, 1917-1921, Oxford 1989; R.B. Spence, White against Red in Uriankhai: Revolu‐ tion and Civil War on Russia's Asiatic Frontier, 1918-1921, Revolutionary Russia, vol. 6, 1993, no. 1, pp. 97-120. [2]. John A. White, The Siberian Intervention, New York 1950; Canfeld F. Smith, un‐ der Red and White Rule, Seattle 1975; Norman G.O. Pereira, White Power during the Civil War in Siberia (1918-1920): Dilemmas of Kolchak's "War Anti-Communism", Canadian Slavonic Papers, no.

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Citation: Eva M. Stolberg. Review of Smele, Jonathan D., ed. Civil War in Siberia: The Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918-1920. H-Russia, H-Net Reviews. April, 1998.

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