The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 77 1-15 July 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-8 While various areas in CEN- common locus for incident of the Kandahar Ulema 9-15 Northern Region TRAL are slated for transi- reporting. Besides regular Shura. Western Region 16-17 tion in the coming weeks, attacks against them by Some of the key elements this period continued the AOG (partially due to com- Eastern Region 18-23 in reporting from the well established trends of the petition for area control as EAST included the numer- Southern Region 24-29 conflicts impact on the re- seen in Jawzjan & Sar-e Pul) ous indirect fire incidents gion. With 2 suicide attacks there were also occurrences ANSO Info Page 30 affecting the border areas reported (Wardak & Kapisa), of armed clashes between (originating from elements it was the latter that proved neighbouring militias. This of the PakMil) as well the most significant as it resulted dynamic was primarily not- ongoing struggle for domi- YOU NEED TO KNOW in 9 IMF casualties. In addi- ed in Kunduz and represent nance of various areas tion, there were 3 NGO inci- possible early indicators • 1st tranche of transition areas within Nuristan between upcoming dents in the region, 2 from that fractures along local opposition groups and Kabul and a 3rd in Panjshir, lines are beginning to devel- government forces. In • Militias a regular component in all of which once again in- op from within broader incident reporting from the North addition, Nangarhar also volved the demining sector. groups cohesion. recorded another NGO • High profile incidents/deaths Panjshir also reported an within Kandahar Reporting from the incident, the 9th this year, incident noteworthy for its SOUTH this period was once again affecting the • Heavy contestation of Nuristan rarity and violence in which 2 dominated by the assassina- health sector though this IMF soldiers were killed and tion of the Head of the time perpetrated by the • Mass abductions in Farah involv- a third wounded during an ing NGOs Provincial Council in Kan- IMF. altercation with an NDS of- dahar. Besides the formal ficer. In the WEST, 2 mass ab- power this role granted, the ductions reported from Mazar-i-Sharif City is the sole deceased (a close relative to Farah dominated reporting, ANSO is supported by site slated for transition in the President) also enjoyed both due to the rarity of the NORTH. Balkh Prov- extensive informal power such events in the region as ince was also the site of one through various structures well as the involvement of of the two NGO incidents existent in the area. While NGO staff in both. In one from the region. The first the exact circumstances event, a single demining involved a rather benign in- surrounding his death re- organisation had 31 of its teraction at one of the now main murky, AOG utilised staff directly targeted and ubiquitous illegal checkpoints the observations following abducted, with the incident while the second, this time in his murder to target other concluding after the execu- Badakhshan, also presented senior leadership in the tion of 4 (mostly the a regular feature for NGO South, including an at- groups leadership) with the incidents in this province, tempted IED attack against remainder being released. that is the use of grenades the Helmand PG as well as In the other incident against NGO facilities, ap- a suicide attack against a (involving up to 35), a lone parently for the purposes of service taking place in a NGO staff member ap- intimidation. Due to the mosque in Kandahar City. peared to be the victim of prevalence of pro- This latter attack resulted in circumstance and was re- government militias within numerous casualties, includ- leased shortly thereafter. the NR, they have become a ing the death of the Head THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 5 50 This Report Period 2 During this cycle, 9 AOG inci- 40 dents were recorded in Kabul activity with four AOG-initiated 30 Province, representing 25% of the attacks. Two cases were IDF at- 20 total incident volume while ANSF tacks launched towards the local 10 ANA base (1 case was accurate), -IMF were responsible for a fur- 0 ther 65%. IMF direct actions in- probably by AOG networks based cluded 3 arrest operations in Pa- in Kohi Safi. Two additional cas- es were IEDs. One device prema- ghman, and 1 engagement with KABUL AOG KABUL Crime AOG in Seyajoy of Musayi. In turely detonated on a secondary addition, there were 2 NGO inci- road in Tangi Kalay, shortly be- fore an ANA convoy drove thru certed three-fold rocket strike on the ANA dents this period, both of which base in Qalai Ahmadkhan (adjacent to the Ka- involved demining agencies. the area. Another case pertained to a set of two magnetic devices bul – Logar Highway) and the deployment of On 11 July, an AP mine (likely a which were attached and detonat- two RCIEDs on the secondary road in the remnant from previous conflicts) ed on a fuel tanker parked on the same location on the same day (discovered and detonated under the wheel of a New Bagram Road. The vehicle neutralized by ANA). AOG activity in Musayi local taxi in Sahak, Bagrami and recently arrived from Nangarhar, has intensified during the last two cycles (as it an ANP search of the area follow- where this TTP remains a com- regularly does during the summer months eve- ing this located another AP mine mon occurrence. Nonetheless, a ry year) and should be monitored by NGOs in the vicinity. The ANP handed similar device had been identified with operations in the district. over the device to a driver em- (and neutralized) on another fuel In Kabul City, an 82mm mortar rigged as an ployed with a demining NGO tanker which arrived to Kabul IED detonated in a culvert close by a check- working on a site nearby, and af- from Nangarhar on 9 June point operated by Traffic Police on the Deh ter the driver took the mine to the (Jalalabad Road, Paktya Kot). Mazang Circle (opposite the Traffic Police camp, it accidentally detonated Two additional attacks against HQ) on 3 July. The blast injured four ANP. (causing light injuries to the said IMF-contracted fuel tankers were So far, there has been no evidence which NGO staff). The next day, anoth- reported from Surobi (Kas would link the incident to AOG activity. The er demining NGO had to deal Shirkhan & Qabre Mullah Bur- planned security transition in Kabul Province with an AOG intercepting one of jan). (excluding Surobi) has entered the terminal their vehicles (reportedly an am- Musayi hosted another significant phase, scheduled to conclude during the last bulance) in Tangi Lalandar week of July. The process will likely have little (Chahar Asyab). The NGO occu- portion of conflict-related escala- tions. Besides the IMF operation change to the security paradigm in the prov- pants were not harmed, though ince as the momentum in rural district clearly the car was seized by the AOG mentioned in Seyajoy, NDS per- formed another arrest operation lies with the ANSF. AOG will likely continue gunmen who consequently drove to pursue their focus on sporadic spectacular away in the vehicle. in Qalai Abdul Rauf. AOG en- sured their share of incidents with attacks against high profile GOA and security In the absence of significant at- an IDF attack against the DAC, targets in Kabul City, another constant feature tacks in Kabul City, Deh Sabz and more prominently with a con- of local security environment. emerged as a focal area for AOG THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 4 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 Following the steep peak in AOG 40 low incident volumes, yet reputed volumes in June (44 AOG- 30 for AOG safe havens occasionally initiated incidents, compared to 20 25 in May), AOG activity dropped used by commanders and net- 10 to 10 escalations recorded so far works temporarily relocating from during this cycle (four close-range other districts, such as Moham- 0 and six stand-off attacks, the latter mad Agha. During this cycle, four incl. three cases of IDF and three Pakistani workers employed with LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime IED detonations). ANSF-IMF a construction company were operations maintained similar vol- killed and three local workers sus- tained injuries when AOG at- case of a criminal abduction of a young boy in umes, and were mainly visible in Qutubkhel (a location in Puli Alam linked by a Baraki Barak and Mohammad tacked a new ANP checkpoint under construction. direct road to Zarghun Shahr) was likely the Agha. Meanwhile, Azra remained job of a group temporarily dislodged from in the orbit of both sides of the Operation Omeide 8 concluded in Zarghun Shahr. The frustration of local com- conflict. An encounter in the dis- Mohammad Agha. Zarghun munities in reaction to the perceived resur- trict (Sherzad Area) encompassed Shahr continued to attract the gence of criminal abductions north of Puli a series of clashes between AOG majority of incidents and wit- Alam was also picked up by the IEA who re- and IMF and concluded with an nessed five escalations in the span leased an official statement praising its Logar air-strike resulting in a number of of five days, including a close- units for tracking down and punishing the civilian casualties (7 civilians be- range attack on a joint ANP/NDS criminals (the veracity of these allegations is sides 9 AOG). It seems that the convoy which resulted in two cas- yet to be confirmed). operation followed closely after an ualties among the security force. important coordination meeting The IMF-ANSF plans to establish A brief look at the geographic distribution of attended by several IEA shadow a joint ANP-ANA base in the area the mentioned developments indicates that District Shadow Governors, will likely stimulate further AOG besides the road network in Baraki Barak, the though the IMF announced that activity, the home turf to HIG joint Muhammad Agha-Azra area (incl. north- their effort was mainly dedicated networks. Criminal syndicates ern Khushi) has emerged as a focal area this to eliminating a commander usu- present another actor in play in summer, a development which highlights the ally active in the neighbouring Zarghun Shahr, though these ra- importance of the infiltration routes from Pa- Hisarak District of Nangarhar. ther tend to avoid confrontation kistan. Khushi was another district with with IMF-ANSF, and the recent

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 13th of July 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Tagab remains the focal area in Kapisa. So far this year, the dis- The attack resulted in at least 9 30 trict has hosted the second high- IMF casualties (incl. 5 killed), the 20 est number of AOG-incidents in second heaviest toll among the 10 French forces since the ambush in Central (after Saydabad in Ward- 0 ak, though the gap between the the Uzbin Valley of Surobi in Au- two higher than the actual number gust 2009. The strike also marked of incidents in Tagab). This cycle, the second suicide attack against KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime the district hosted 11 out of 13 French IMF in the district this year. Despite the rare utilization incidents recorded in the prov- with which AOG operate in their known ince. A BM-1 rocket attack of a BBIED, targeting has stayed in line with the long-term trend of strongholds provide grounds to assume that launched against a private resi- the opposition networks have returned in dence in Nijrab (presumably an AOG focusing on IMF (over 50% of AOG attacks in Tagab clearly strength to the areas where extensive IMF- escalation of a dispute between ANSF operations took place earlier this year. two families and unrelated to the targeted IMF this year; compared political conflict) and an RCIED to 20% for ANP and over 10% The current statistics indicate a continued detonation against an NDS vehi- each for ANA and GOA militias/ growth in AOG-initiated attacks in Tagab, cle in Shukhi (Mahmudi Raqi - ALP). while this year’s AOG volumes are similar to Nijrab Road) were the only outli- Indeed, an increased willingness those recorded in 2010). AOG also kept pace ers, the rest pertaining to escala- on the side of AOG to take up with IMF-ANSF operations (over 40 entries tions in Tagab. These included 7 the fight was noticed in Tagab. It on each side since January 2011, though it is AOG attacks (1 BBIED, 5 SAF, is noteworthy that the community assumed that a fair deal of IMF special opera- and 2 IED detonations), 3 IED often attributed this ‘AOG boost tions go unreported). This leaves a grim pro- discoveries by IMF & ANSF and of confidence’ to the rumoured jection for GOA/IMF efforts in the future as an IMF night-time operation in deal in relation to the release of AOG continue to pursue a campaign which Sultankhel (days after the BBIED the two French journalists during has proved effective for the last decade of the attack). Of note to NGOs, all the the previous two weeks. Report- conflict (that is ‘a perpetually escalating stale- mentioned incidents took place edly, 2 AOG commanders and an mate’, ref. to the ANSO Quarterly Report on the main roads and within a additional 8 fighters were set free 2/2011). Meanwhile, the French military, the short distance from major popula- by GOA in exchange for the cap- pivotal component of GOA military efforts on tion centers. tives. Disregarding where the the ground, have announced the beginning of truth actually lies, the belief that their withdrawal process, with a quarter of the The developments took a dra- current troops slated to exit before the end of matic turn with a surprise visit by the release of French prisoners thru negotiations with AOG was 2012, and the remainder before the end of the French President on 12 July, 2014. Whereas the AOG appear to have the which was followed the next day seen locally as a victory of AOG over GOA & IMF. In more con- resources readily available to stay the course, by a lethal BBIED attack against IMF are wholly focusing their plans around the French troops halted at a police crete terms, the steady flow of opposition fighters and the ease abilities of the ANSF post-transition and with- checkpoint in Joybar (Tagab). drawal. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 AOG incident volumes remained 80 relatively high in Wardak, with the point. Since the opening of the 60 ANA-ANP Training Center in Saydabad section of the Kabul – 40 Ghazni Highway attracting two Dashte Towp, the base has at- 20 thirds of all AOG escalations in tracted 11 attacks (mostly IDF). the province (17 out of 26). For instance, an IDF attack was 0 AOG activity volumes in Sayda- launched on 15 June, occurring a few hours after the official inau- bad indeed returned back to an WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime upward trend after the drop rec- guration ceremony concluded in- side the base with numerous IMF orded throughout June (15 AOG districts remained low, though they outnum- attacks compared to 32 in May). and GOA VIPs in attendance (including the vice-president). bered (Nirkh, Jalrez) or stayed on par with An SVBIED strike against the ANSF-IMF interventions (Maidan Shahr, military base in Dashte Towp on The 12 remaining AOG attacks in Chaki Wardak, Day Mirdad). 13 July went almost unnoticed as Saydabad this cycle were also con- the strike occurred one day after centrated on the Kabul – Ghazni In Behsud I and II, Kuchi families commenced the killing of Ahmad Wali Karzai Highway. Overall, the attacks to withdraw (most notably from Tezak), a de- in Kandahar. The device involved were equally split between close- velopment likely due to the deployment of a substantial charge rigged in a range (7 cases of SAF against fuel ANA following the spate of violence four Mazda truck, though did not cre- tankers/PSCs and ANSF vehicles, weeks ago. The two districts remained devoid ate any significant impact besides 1 arson attack on telecom infra- of security incidents and it may be assumed the injuries to two ANA soldiers structure) and stand-off strikes that the area will slowly continue to normalize. as the base protection personnel (two IDF attacks in Dashte Towp, However, the underlying roots of the crisis positively identified and killed the five effective IED strikes in addi- have yet to be addressed and the Kuchi/ driver when the truck was still tion to one premature detona- Hazara clashes over access to land and water some 20m before the main entry tion). AOG volumes in the other will certainly re-emerge with the migration cy- cle next year.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 Following the AOG surge in 40 Ghorband, ANP in this province province dates back to two escala- 30 have been frequently tasked with tions in Kahmard in April (a SAF 20 engagement of ANP manning a performing search operations in 10 checkpoint in Eshpushta and a the Shikary and Ghandak valleys 0 of Shibar. This cycle, one such light IED detonating against an operation yielded four AP mines IMF convoy in Do Ab Mikh recovered from an old cache Zarin). BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime though there is no hard evidence In sum, Bamyan remains almost to indicate that the district would devoid of an AOG presence while host a significant AOG network the security forces head towards ence. or that exogenous AOG would the transition ceremony an- Perhaps a more visible development than the transit thru the area with any regu- nounced for the last week of July. transition process, the Hajigak iron reserves larity. According to current projections, came to the fore as the GOA is soon to open With the exception of AOG night AOG activity will remain an im- the bidding process and several Indian compa- -letters distributed in Kahmard portant factor along the access nies have expressed interest. There is unlikely and Sayghan in mid-June (and routes via Baghlan, Parwan and to be any direct impact on the security context more likely authored by a commu- Wardak. While the ability of the as the experience from Mes Aynak in Logar nity leader rather than an active opposition networks to penetrate indicates that large projects, even those associ- AOG, though the inspiration the province is minimal, Kahmard ated with GOA, do not necessarily become an probably came from Parwan), the warrants attention as this district important target even if located within areas only physical AOG imprint in the sporadically hosts an AOG pres- where AOG maintain a heavy presence. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 Incident volumes continue to re- 40 main low in Daykundi. This at- tion and engaged the group and 30 the police force ousted the attack- tests to the pervasive isolation of 20 the province as the structural ers but paid a heavy toll with one causes of insecurity remain in serviceman killed and one injured 10 place. Criminality and violent during the operation. The armed 0 escalations driven by local war- group remains at large. lords continue to shape the envi- In Kajran, an ANP patrol located ronment in the north, while the two pressure-plate IEDs in Kafter DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime political conflict occasionally spills Khana on the road to Kiti on 7 into the southern districts of July. Since the beginning of this trade, the documented cases of ANSF-IMF Kajran and Gizab. During this year, 12 IED incidents have been disrupting the drug business in Daykundi are cycle, ANP clashed with a local recorded in Kajran and Gizab rare. Five such cases have been captured by warlord in Khadir while three se- combined, with three cases result- ANSO since 2006 (2 in Shahristan, 1 in Gizab, curity incidents were reported ing in detonations. Besides two Kiti and Kajran each). In counter-point, the from the south. strikes against NDS and IMF, one amounts of opium seized (3 seizures yielded A Bollywood-style scenario rolled pressure-plate device detonated between 50 and 150 kg and 2 seizures were out in the village of Karas (Korga against a civilian vehicle in Gizab, above 400 kg) indicate that the business runs Ulya Area of Khadir) in the end killing two and injuring another large-scale across the province. Closing the of June. A local warlord (based in passenger. Occasional IED activ- portfolio, an IMF-ANSF operation in Omerk- Quli Khushk and heading a splin- ity is an expression of AOG net- hel of Gizab resulted in the arrest of two sus- ter group of gunmen formerly works facilitating their passage pected AOG members on 10 July. Overall, loyal to Sipahe Pasdaran) ap- between Ghazni and the battle- the ramifications of the conflict in the south peared in the area, pressurizing fields in the south (Uruzgan, Kan- are quite seasonal and culminate with the pas- the local community to financially dahar, and Helmand). sage of AOG in the late spring and late au- support his two dozen men at On 11 July, IMF announced the tumn. The summer months will likely remain arms in exchange for ‘protection’. seizure of a substantial cache in- quiet in Daykundi unless a new development When the community failed to cluding 900 kg of opium and an (for instance a concerted IMF push in the adja- deliver, the commander and his assortment of weapons and am- cent districts of Helmand or Uruzgan) creates men appeared in the village in the munition in Kajran. While one an incentive for AOG to relocate upwards to morning of 1 July, ready to loot. can draw casual correlations be- Daykundi. An ANP unit arrived to the loca- tween insecurity and the opium THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents spontaneous reaction of the NDS officer. PANJSHIR Year to Date 1 This Report Period 1 Of note, the incident marked a third violent While a rare NGO incident was escalation recorded between the community recorded this cycle in Anaba, the orded in the province since 2006. and an IMF element this year. While some case was less significant than a These were mostly linked to clan- NGO observers have noted a growing gap dispute which escalated into a driven power-struggles or person- between the more conservative circles of Pan- shoot-out between an off-duty al issues (involving local politics jshiri and the IMF contingent, most sources NDS officer and an IMF unit in or business interests), and do not agree that the more likely explanation of the Dara. have direct relationship with the attack was to be sought in the subjective pos- main conflict vectors. In the late evening hours of 28 tures and behaviours of the two parties. In June, an unidentified attacker In the morning of 9 July, a uni- this regard, the incident is reminiscent of the threw a light IED over the formed NDS member, who April shoot-out at KAIA, which turned fatal boundary wall into an NGO com- served as a bodyguard of a high- for an Afghan pilot and nine international pound. The device failed to initi- ranking NDS officer in Kabul, mentors. ate and was safely disposed of. approached an IMF detail sta- Nonetheless, the province steadily progresses There were no concrete claims or tioned on the side of the road in towards transition and an inauguration cere- threats linked to the case and the Dara. A verbal dispute ensued mony has been slated for the last week of July. NGO draws on a long-established shortly afterwards which ended As per the current assessment, AOG ability to presence and high acceptance lev- with the NDS officer drawing his penetrate the province is minimal and local els of its programming locally. gun and opening fire on his IMF circles cultivate the legacy of strong opposition Looking deeper into the valley interlocutors. Two IMF were to their historical rivals. The Panjshiris also where the power-centers are con- killed and another serviceman maintain a comfortable level of influence in- centrated, ‘warning’ IEDs and sustained injuries, though he also side the GOA and ANSF, which does not hand grenades are not unusual managed to shoot and kill the at- make them likely to abandon their ties to this (especially in Rukha and Bazarak) tacker. Most sources agree that important resource base anytime in the near with a total eleven such cases rec- the escalation resulted from a future. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 Ghorband remained in the fore 40 in Doab, Siyagerd and Toghbirdi, with two AOG attacks (Baghe 30 Afghan on the Bamyan Road, and Chaharikar. 20 Dara Khishki in Siyagerd) while In the night of 5 July, a civilian the IEA structures have been fur- Azerbaijani plane contracted by 10 ther consolidated with the ap- IMF crashed in the mountains of 0 pointment of District Shadow Siyagerd with 9 crew members Governors in Shinwari (a com- aboard. The circumstances of the mander originally based in Kohi crash have not been determined, PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime Safi) and Siyagerd (a local mullah though an AOG implication does from Wazghar). The Kohi Safi- not appear plausible. The follow- former HIG commander, who was facilitating Shinwari linkage is of interest as ing day, ANP sent a sizeable expe- the outreach of ANP in Dara Khishki. Since the personal relationships among ditionary force to assess the loca- the beginning of 2011, 6 cases of abductions & the domestic networks may trans- tion and while on their way back killings have been recorded in the valley, mak- late into a further boost of AOG to Chaharikar, the convoy of over ing it a prominent AOG TTP. Of note, this capacities in Ghorband, until now 70 ANP members came under type of activity is on par with the number of rather dependent on the cross- SAF/RPG attack in Baghe Af- stand-off attacks – IEDs or IDF, while the border cooperation with networks ghan, a locality on the Bamyan close-range attacks (typically SAF and/or in Baghlan and Wardak. With the Road which is easily accessible RPGs) prevail with 9 cases (38% of all attacks). Provincial Shadow Governor and from AOG strongholds in north- Two criminal incidents also raised attention a District Shadow Governor for ern Shinwari. While the attack this cycle. In Chaharikar, a driver employed Kohi Safi already in place, the failed and 11 AOG members were with a private development organization IEA structures in Parwan seem to captured by the force, AOG nev- (PDO) escalated a personal dispute and killed a have emerged in strength this ertheless once again demonstrated fellow driver from the same organization. In summer, although the overall inci- confidence in their ability to deal Senjed Dara, a local commander turned entre- dent volumes remain low. Else- with the police forces (even one preneur invited two fellow businessmen into where, the cycle experienced five of this size) in the district. his private residence to discuss a land acquisi- typical IDF attacks against the In counter-point, IMF & ANSF tion deal. The negotiations seemingly did not military bases in Chaharikar and placed efforts in touring the vil- quite work out, as the commander pulled his Bagram, as well as a rare case of lages in Siyagerd in order to mobi- gun and shot both interlocutors dead, himself an RCIED neutralized in Anarak lize the communities against receiving a gunshot injury in his thigh in the (Jabalussaraj). ANP-IMF per- AOG. Towards the end of this melee. formed two arrest operations tar- cycle, AOG abducted and killed a geting suspected AOG supporters THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 9 BALKH 50 This Report Period 1 With the (mostly ceremonial) 40 transition of security in Mazar Nahri Shahi, an ACG robbing 30 from ISAF to GOA set to occur vehicles in Khulm, and an IED 20 discovery in Kaldar. These dis- later this month (anticipated for 10 July 23rd though is subject to tricts, usually deemed relatively 0 change with little notice), ques- “calm and stable”, have seen an tions have risen as to what imme- unexpected spate of incident re- diate and/or lasting effects this porting. BALKH AOG BALKH Crime may have on the security para- Amongst these, Nahri Shahi saw digm. While it remains unclear the most significant surge. After lowed him to drive on unimpeded. This level whether or not a ceremony will anecdotal reports indicated that of activity in Nahri Shahi represents a signifi- take place commemorating the AOGs based in Shahrak Afghania cant deviation from the previous level of inse- shift (a ceremony would potential- (Nahri Shahi) were conducting curity, and while it remains unlikely that a well ly create a short term security risk, operations as far north as Dawlat- structured group capable of large operations is but also mean a likely boost in abad, the district witnessed the entrenched there, the situation should be mon- security forces), in actuality, Mazar targeted killing of a school head- itored for further developments. has been primarily under GOA master (who was singled out and Mazar saw the 3rd IED detonation to occur security for an extensive period, pulled from a vehicle to be exe- this year (whereas only 1 occurred in 2010) and and the transition is merely politi- cuted), the armed stopping of an the 2nd within weeks. An IED detonated un- cal. However, the transition peri- NGO vehicle, and an IED deto- der a culvert at 0700 on the 4th, between Kar- od opens a window to AOGs nation on a pro-government mili- tee Adalat and Yaka Toot, likely targeting the who may wish to attempt a state- tia commander’s vehicle (along ANP chief of logistics who had just passed in ment action, though this window the Sahrak – Mazar road). Prior an ANP Ranger. The appearance of 2 IEDs would be partially mitigated by a to these 3 incidents there had over such a short period in Mazar—where corresponding surge in security been only 12 incidents in Nahri AOGs have had a difficult time moving such forces. In short, while the overall Shahi in 2011, and none of those assets into the city in the past—is itself worth composition of security forces prior to May had been AOG at- monitoring, especially as the possibility for a within Mazar will not witness any tributed. high profile incident (around the transition) significant change, the probability In the NGO related incident, a approaches. that AOGs may attempt a high bus transiting from Mazar, run Insecurity continued in more traditionally vola- profile attack before, during, or and driven by an NGO, was tile locations as well, but it was the increase in directly following the transition stopped by armed men who asked incident reporting in relatively calm areas (as should be considered increased. the driver if the road ahead was noted above) that best demonstrated the over- This reporting period witnessed clear. When the driver reported all trend of deteriorating security in Balkh. IED explosions in Mazar and that it was, the armed men al- This trend is likely to continue through the summer. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 This was an irregular reporting 40 period for the most volatile prov- AOG activity for the reporting 30 ince in the North, both in terms period was limited to 1 clash be- 20 of volume and incident type. tween an AOG and a PGM 10 Kunduz registered only 17 securi- (which only occurred after the 0 ty incidents this reporting peri- PGM attempted to make an ar- od—a little over half of the usual rest), an RCIED detonation on an KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime average per reporting period this IMF EOD team, and 2 different IED discoveries made (Chahar year—with 7 of them consisting attacks such as Baghlan did, and it is more like- Dara and Khanabad). of IMF initiated operations (3 in ly that this inactivity will end soon, with more Chahar Dara and 3 in Archi). While trends towards relative inse- asymmetric attacks to occur in the near future. Further adding to this deviation, curity in Chahar Dara (both AOG PGM vs PGM insecurity will be a trend worth rather than the usual high volume and IMF), Archi (IMF), and monitoring in the Northeast, as there are a of AOG initiated incidents (or Khanabad (PGM) were notable, number of competing groups in Kunduz, and IED discoveries), 3 of the 17 inci- the scope and variety of incidents as mentioned here previously, the assassination dents consisted of clashes be- represented an outlier to the usual of General Daoud (head of all police forces in tween rival Jamiat Pro- security paradigm, and demon- the North), is especially significant among this Govenrment Militias (PGMs). Of strates a similar trend to what was population. Many PGMs (especially in the NE note, all 3 of the inter-PGM clash- seen earlier this year in Baghlan, in Kunduz and Takhar) were only barely kept es took place in Khanabad, but when Operation Nowruz activities in line by General Daoud’s strong presence, did not involve the same PGMs. were at their strongest. However, and it is likely that his death will continue to be This appears to suggest that rela- the strategic and sentimental im- most strongly felt in the loss of control over tions between PGMs in Khana- portance of Kunduz make it un- those important actors (as seen above in bad have temporarily fallen apart likely that the province will see a Khanabad). on a relatively broad level. long or significant lull in AOG

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 Although witnessing only 14 inci- 40 dents this reporting period, on an ANP vehicle injuring 3 30 Baghlan continues to show signs ANP. 20

of deteriorating security. The re- Fuel tankers were also targeted 10

porting of IMF operations that over the reporting period, with a 0 seemed to define the security par- fuel tanker receiving SAF along adigm during the first quarter has the Tala Wa Barfak – Dushi road BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime given way to reports of illegal on the 1st (at 1600), and another checkpoints, attacks on fuel tank- being set on fire on July 4th in Lastly, prior to this reporting period (but only ers, and IED detonations and dis- Puli Khumri along the main road recorded during it), an ACG conducted an coveries. at approximately 0100 hrs in the illegal checkpoint along a district road in Dih In Puli Khumri a magnetic IED morning. Salah on June 30th. While the variety of inci- was attached to a bank vehicle (a Adding to the insecurity, 2 IEDs dent reporting shows few emerging trends, it Toyota Hi-Lux), and subsequently were found in Nahrin (1 on the appears that after a fairly extensive lull, detonated on July 14th in the mid- 2nd and 1 on the 9th) both of Baghlan is witnessing a general increase in in- dle of the day (at approximately them removed before detonating. security, especially IED activity and attacks on 1110 hrs), injuring 2 bank employ- Of note, these were the first IEDs fuel tankers. As the season progresses, this ees and 4 passer-by’s, while in recorded in Nahrin district since trend is likely to continue and generally center Baghlani Jadid, 2 IEDs were re- October of 2008, and local around traditional hot spots (Baghlani Jadid moved from Band Sang village on sources have suggested that they and Puli Khumri) though more analysis will be the 5th, and on the 8th, in Alaud- were the work of feuding power required to complete the picture. din Khil Area, an IED detonated brokers rather than AOGs. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 4 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 In terms of reporting volume, 40 Faryab surpassed even Kunduz Other insecurity included 3 IED 30 this reporting period (partially due detonations and an illegal check- 20 to the large number of incidents point along the Qaysar – Almar 10 in Faryab, but also due to a rela- road. 0 tively quiet reporting period in Dawlatabad also continues to be a

Kunduz), accounting for 26 total focal point for insecurity, especial- FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime security incidents, with half of ly notable around the main And- those 26 taking place in either khoy – Maymana road and/or for The 5th incident took place on the 11th, in the Qaysar (8) and Dawlatabad (5). incidents occurring during the Qozi Boy Qala Area, when an AOG attacked Qaysar saw the full spectrum of day. In all, Dawlatabad has now an ANP CP. Attacks against civilians in Daw- incident reporting with rocket witnessed 15 security incidents latabad (including the most recent abduction attacks, IED detonations and dis- over the past month and a half and the shooting of a rickshaw driver last re- coveries, illegal checkpoints (CPs), (June and the first half of July) porting period) have increased with the surge and attacks on ANP CPs. Stand- which is practically equal to the 16 in insecurity, although most of the daytime ing out amongst these were the it witnessed over the entire first 5 incidents have been directed against GOA/ ones where the potential (or actu- months of the year. An excep- IMF security forces. alization) of civilian casualties tional 13 of those 31 incidents Outside of these 2 districts, insecurity else- were high. At 1800 on the 9th of have occurred during the day. where included notable incidents in Maymana July, an AOG shot an RPG at an 5 of the above 15 incidents took City on the 3rd, when a grenade was thrown ANP CP in Shakh village. The place this reporting period, includ- into a co-ed school at 1245 hrs, badly injuring RPG missed the CP but impacted ing 2 attacks on ANP CPs (both 2 children (as well as causing minor injuries to a local Mosque, where it injured on the 1st), a daytime illegal CP 15 others), and an AOG rocket attack targeting 18 children who were praying on the 8th and the stoppage and the ANP HQ in the DAC of Khwaja Sabz there (1 of them was injured seri- burning of a gravel truck, includ- Posh District at 0300 hours on the 9th. With ously, while the other 17 suffered ing the abduction of the driver, on the high number of AOGs continuing to move minor injuries). Although no cas- the 7th. All 4 of these occurred in through Ghormach into the province, and the ualties were reported, AOG rock- the Jungal area, which has seen continued conflict in that area (Ghormach/ et attacks also occurred twice in the most activity, partially due to Qaysar), insecurity is likely to continue in the Chil Gazai Market area, show- the ease in which AOGs can con- Qaysar, and subsequently throughout the ing a willingness in the district to ceal themselves and move province for the foreseeable future. engage in civilian heavy areas. amongst the low bush in this area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 This reporting period remained 40 fairly indistinct for Takhar, other Intelligence in Khwaja Ghar 30 than the relatively high number of (Qrogh Area), and an IED deto- 20 incidents that were recorded nation in Rustaq (Sar-e Chawk 10 (17). The 17 incidents represent a Area). 0 total that was only duplicated The IED detonation is notable once thus far in 2011, during the amongst these, as it marks only TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime first reporting period in the 3rd security incident in Rustaq June. While incident reporting in District this year, as well as the province: Darqad District witnessed 2 separate Takhar has not demonstrated dis- first to be AOG initiated since ANSF operations on the 9th—1 in Kaltoot tinct patterns or problem areas March 2010, and the first IED Village and 1 in Qul Abad Village—and an (outside of predictable criminality detonation since August IMF air strike occurred near Nowabad Village in Taloqan), it has shown mild 2006. However, no information on the 6th in Dashti Qala Distirct, where anec- volume increments that are gener- has surfaced as to any other in- dotal reports suggest that IMF was targeting 3 ally in line with region wide sea- creased AOG activity in the dis- AOG members who had recently arrived in sonal trends. Takhar is doubly trict. In Yangi Qala District, spe- the area to plant IEDs. effected by such trends, as it is cifically in Ishan Abad Village, 2 While the last 2 months have seen the average potentially subject to both AOG AOGs clashed on July 2nd, fol- level of incident volumes rise slightly, these activities and drug trafficking lowed by an AOG/ANSF clash increases do not demonstrate specific location criminality that occurs during the on the 5th, which led to the arrest or category threats (such as a sudden spike in drug harvest season. However, of 2 AOG members on the IED related incidents in any particular district despite these potential issues, the 9th. Prior to this series of inci- might). As with most other provinces, some true security paradigm for the dents, there had been only 8 secu- type of deterioration to security is expected province has remained relatively rity incidents of any type in this during the summer, when AOGs are conduct- unchanged, with armed criminality district over the previous 6 ing more operations and drug trafficking crime remaining an existent but not pro- months, with none of them occur- is more prominent (Takhar is a drug harvesting hibitive issue, and few districts ring in Ishan Abad Village. In and trafficking province, although less so than witnessing any sustained AOG/ both of the above districts, the Badakhshan). In light of this, while it is likely GOA operations. incidents described bare noting— that Takhar will continue to reflect some sea- Of the 17 incidents this reporting as they are outside of the existing sonal increases in AOG/ACG activity—as per period, 5 were attributed to ACGs security paradigms—but without the region—the general security paradigm re- and 4 to AOGs, with those latter follow up activity, appear to rep- mains relatively consistent at this time, with 4 including an armed clash be- resent outliers rather than the es- AOGs, the GOA, and IMF in the Northeast tween 2 AOGs in Yangi Qala, the tablishment of new trends. still primarily focused on Kunduz (and to a killing of the District Chief of Of note elsewhere around the much lesser extent, Baghlan).

GRAPH INFORMATION: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 13th of July 2011. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data. THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 2 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Jawzjan saw a relatively low total 40 volume of incident reporting this PGMs—as written about previ- 30 reporting period, with 10 security ously—present a physical threat 20 incidents total, 8 of those taking to AOG control in the strong- 10 hold, but more importantly also place in the strongly contested Tri 0 -Provincial Area (TPA), including draw from the same target popu- lation that AOGs draw from for 7 in Qush Tepa and 1 in Darzab. JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime Incident reporting eased up in the much needed community support. eastern districts of Jawzjan The more PGMs the GOA can only incident to occur in Darzab was the deto- (Mardyan, Mingajik, Aqcha, and recruit in any area, the less easy it nation of a UXO. In light of the competition Fayzabad), where more activity is for AOGs to find support in for resources, PGM vs AOG incident report- had been recorded recently, as that same area. It remains in the ing in the AOG strong TPA is likely to contin- Operation Ebtekar 2 moved best interest of AOGs to deter ue to increase for the remainder of the sum- AOGs from their usual operation- civilians from joining PGMs by mer “fighting season.” al areas near the ring road further showing them how dangerous it is Also of note, the 2 nationals (a driver and a into the districts. This reporting for themselves and for their fami- translator) who were abducted along with 3 period that portion of the prov- lies. In that light, it is not surpris- international engineers at a previously reported ince saw only 1 incident in ing that amongst the 7 incidents in illegal checkpoint in Khwaja Du Koh District Fayazabad, when an IED detonat- Qush Tepa, 6 were AOG attacks (28 June), were released on the 10th of July. ed on an ANP vehicle, killing 8 on PGMs or PGM family mem- Allegedly their families paid a ransom, and it ANP on the 7th in Kokal Dash, bers, with the 7th being a PGM has been suggested that the same group that and 1 in Mardyin, when 2 pressure attack on an AOG position. No- took them has asked for a large ransom for the cooker IEDs were discovered in a table amongst these were 2 sepa- release of the internationals. The ransom re- culvert in the Jungal Aareq village rate attacks on PGMs in Khanaqa quest is unconfirmed, but if true, may suggest on the 10th. Village, and the abduction and that this is the work of an ACG rather than an killing of a family member of a Qush Tepa’s insecurity continues AOG. However, blurred lines and/or motives PGM in Abdul Rahman Pahlawan to be strongly defined by AOG are common in these types of crimes, and fur- Village (where an AOG also at- initiatives against Pro- ther assessment of the actors and their inten- tacked 2 PGM checkpoints). The Government Militias (PGMs). tions are required.

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 The willful destruction of a GOA 40 contracted water tanker in Hazrati Looking more closely at Dara-I 30 Sultan District (Chochman Vil- Suf Payin, multiple unconfirmed 20 lage) was the most notable inci- reports surfaced that AOGs were 10 laying IEDs along the Aybak – dent in the still quiet province of 0 Samangan this reporting period, Dara-I Suf Payin road, with a number of NGOs and GOA offi- with conflicting views on whether SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime the tanker was destroyed by cials remarking that the road from AOGs or ACGs with no proof to Mazar through Sholgara/Kishinde midst—the majority of sources in the field clarify yet existent. (Balkh) to Dara-I Suf Payin re- have remarked that the groups in this district mains the safer route. It is be- That incident aside, Samangan remain comprised mostly of locals. However, lieved that the group in Dara-I Suf saw a total of 3 incidents, includ- the above somewhat conflicts with earlier re- Payin is working with less power ing a UXO detonation in ports, and alternative opinions still exist. Fur- and infrastructure than it had pre- Maqsood Village in Dara-I Suf ther assessment as to the structure and ability viously, and—despite strong ru- Payin, which injured 3 sheperds. of the AOGs in Dara-I Su Payin will be re- mors of outisiders in their quired going forward. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 4 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Sar-e Pul’s security paradigm this 40 reporting period was mostly dom- bility that the road will see more 30 inated by issues between AOGs over the latter 2 as insecurity con- 20 and Pro-Government Militias tinues to increase. This stretch of 10 (PGMs), and the threat of illegal road is generally considered one 0 checkpoints along the main Sar-e of the least secure in the North thus far in 2011, although over Pul – Shibirghan Road. 7 of the SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime 14 incidents in the province took the past 7 weeks, Dawlatabad Dis- place inside the district of Sar-e trict in Faryab has seen more rec- PGMs. In Panjshir Village in Sar-e Pul, AOGs Pul, including 2 illegal checkpoints orded insecurity. Contrasting the twice attacked PGM checkpoints (CPs) on along the above stretch of road on 2 districts, Dawlatabad in Faryab different nights, making up 2 of the 5 AOG the 4th and 14th. Of specific has seen less day light illegal attacks on PGM CPs this reporting period (the note, both of these checkpoints checkpoints (although more day- others occurring in Kohistanat (Sardara and took place during daytime hours light incidents), while in Sar-e Pul, Tangi Afghan Villages) and Sayyad (where (0900 hrs on the 4th, and 1030 hrs AOGs have stuck primarily twice AOGs attacked 3 PGM CPs simultane- on the 14th), which is during (although not entirely) to conduct- ously in Pistamazar Village)). ing illegal checkpoints, and have NGO travel times and shows the As noted in the Jawzjan section, in areas under shown at times a high level of comfort level of AOGs operating strong AOG influence, PGMs put themselves intelligence gathering and spot- there to conduct activities in in direct physical competition with AOGs, not ting, allowing them to identify and broad daylight. only for security, but for influence over the stop specific targets (such as Although this road has seen a to- local communities, from which they both draw GOA officials or businessmen) en tal of 13 successful illegal check- support and recruit from. Aqso Village in Say- route—even during the day. The points (averaging exactly 2 a yad twice witnessed these issues when on the road between Sar-e Pul and month), the volume-per-month 12th, 1 PGM member left the PGM to join an Shibirghan has also seen 2 abduc- has fluctuated, with July and Au- AOG, and then afterwards, 2 others tried to tions, and 3 attempted check- gust tending to be more active, so follow suit but were arrested. PGM vs AOG points, plus various skirmishes. further increases may be on the dynamics in the Tri-Provincial Area (TPA)— near horizon. So far July has al- The other source of major insecu- which includes Sayyad—are likely to continue ready seen 2 illegal checkpoints in rity this reporting period consisted to create strong instability in Sar-e Pul Prov- the first 2 weeks, with the possi- of issues between AOGs and ince for the remainder of the fighting season and beyond. THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 7 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 1 With the drug harvest in season, it 40 is no surprise that Baharak and place. This particular incident was 30 Warduj, 2 eastern districts situated followed 10 minutes later by a 20 along the main drug trafficking grenade thrown into the prison 10 route that links Badakhshan to approximately a kilometre away. 0 Tajikistan, remained the epicentre Other random violence in Ba- for insecurity in Badakhshan this harak included a missile/SAF at- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime reporting period. Baharak, fol- tack on a civilian vehicle the same lowing the replacement of the day, which caused injuries to 2 said trafficking route) on the 3rd, where vehi- District Chief of Police, has been local civilians. Security in the dis- cle were supposedly searched for GOA/ANSF perhaps the most volatile district trict is not expected to get better employees. After that, anecdotal reports sug- in the province this year, and until the animosity between the gest that the GOA approached elders to speak Warduj has seen a spike in activity ACG responsible for these attacks with the AOG and ask them not to establish that has corresponded with the and the GOA can be amended illegal checkpoints. When the elders met with harvest. (either through deals or conflict), the AOG, the AOG demanded a number of In Baharak, the hurling of a gre- and insecurity is likely to continue concessions which the elders were unable to nade into an INGO office at ap- at these levels for the duration of fulfill. the drug season, when the im- proximately 2115 hrs on the 11th Issues continued in the district, with rumors portance of controlling criminal accounted for this year’s 5th surfacing of IEDs being laid on the road, and activities in the district is at its NGO related incident in the dis- one incident in which a teacher was shot and most crucial (lucrative). However, trict, and the 7th in the province. killed by an AOG on the 11th. This resulted insecurity has mostly attempted to With many of these incidents fol- in a large ANSF force of over 250 entering the intimidate, and has caused very lowing a similar modus operandi area on the 12th to seek out the AOG in an few casualties to this point. (grenade, IED, missile attack on operation that would go on for over 2 days. an NGO compound or living resi- Also tied to the drug season and The main road was blocked off by ANSF as dence in the District Administra- the lucrative nature of controlling they went into the Bashund Area (where much tive Center (DAC)), it appears to the trafficking routes, insecurity of the instability had occurred) and engaged in be a relatively common aspect of increased in Warduj (just border- a 3 hour firefight that ended with ANSF at- the landscape for the district. ing Baharak and along the same tempting to track the AOG through the moun- These fit the greater overall trend trafficking route). This first mani- tains around the area (Khirman). The lasting of general violence throughout fested when a group set up an effect of this large scale operation remains un- the DAC, where 18 of the dis- illegal checkpoint along the main known, as that portion of the trafficking route trict’s 25 incidents have taken road (Bahrak – Ishkashim, part of is likely to remain heavily contested. THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

W ESTERN REGION

HERAT NGO Incidents HERAT Year to Date 4 50 This Report Period 0 Once again, there was no reported 40 AOG activity in Herat City this tricts, particularly Kushk and 30 period while there were five crimi- Shindand. During this reporting 20 nal events. This indicates a vol- period 75% of the total incidents 10 ume of criminal activity consistent in these districts happened while with longer term trends following the affected parties were in transit, 0 a reduction in ANSF activity lev- and 86% of the total attacks were els this period. The recent surge conducted with IED or SAF. For HERAT AOG HERAT Crime in security force activity, while instance, 2 out of 3 AOG attacks were wounded. In addition, 9 fuel tankers partially in response to the attack in Shindand District and 3 out of were also destroyed. against the PRT, was also likely 4 in Kushk occurred against IMF linked to the pending transition of convoys and ANA patrolling vehi- Overall, these cases further trends identifying Herat to ANSF control slated to cles. As a result of these attacks a that AOG activity is primarily concentrated in take place in the coming weeks. total of 1 IMF soldier and 7 ANA the northern and southern districts along ma- At the provincial level, AOG con- soldiers were killed and a further 1 jor roads used by IMF/ANSF for patrolling tinue to concentrate their activity IMF soldier and 4 ANA soldiers and logistical resupply. In addition, the use of in the northern and southern dis- IED and SAF is likely to remain the primary tactics for AOG in targeting the same.

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 9 GHOR 50 This Report Period 0 While the total number of AOG 40 attacks during the first 6 months ince, primarily due to the districts 30 of this year is similar to that of the proximity to Helmand and the 20 last year, the data indicates that AOG networks active there. The 10 the areas of AOG activity has cause of this shifting is unclear at 0 gradually been shifting. While this time, as there have been no there is an apparent decline of major IMF/ANSF operation re- AOG action in Du Layna (from 4 ported thus far this year. Howev- GHOR AOG GHOR Crime to 0), Passaband (from 12 to 2), er, as seen in the increase of AOG far this year. There appears to be some corre- and Saghar (from 4 to 0) Districts, activity in Tulak, Taywara, and lation between the geographical shift of AOG the number of AOG related inci- Shahrak districts, there is a possi- activity in the province and NGO incidents dents has risen in Charsada (from bility that some of the AOG ele- volumes. Among 12 NGO incidents this year, 2 to 6), Shahrak (from 1 to 5), ments from Passaband District 50% was authored by AOG, and 67% of these Taywara (from 1 to 7), and Tulak have moved into these neighbour- have occurred in the 4 districts (i.e. Charsada, (from 1 to 4). Among these ing districts. Shahrak, Taywara, and Tulak districts) where changes, the sharp decline of Regarding NGO incidents, while AOG activity levels have increased. The data AOG activity in Passaband Dis- the period of the first 6 months of also indicates that NGOs were primarily af- trict is noticeable since it had been the last year recorded only 3 fected while in transit: 3 out of 6 AOG related an area where AOG were tradi- NGO incidents, there have been a NGO incidents that happened this year have tionally most active in the prov- total of 12 NGO incidents thus involved AOG use of roadblock/searches. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 2 40 During this reporting period, 30 there were two mass abduction ber amongst them, on the 10th of incidents, both AOG attributed, July 2011. Based on an accusation 20 and which involved NGO staff. made by the AOG, the abductees 10 The first and most significant inci- were perceived as collaborators 0 dent involved the abduction of 31 with the GOA and it would ap- pear that the NGO staff member demining NGO staff members in FARAH AOG FARAH Crime Bala Buluk District on the 6th of was only incidentally involved in July. The AOG subsequently the incident. The NGO staff the pattern of the AOG presence in this prov- killed 4 of the staff (and apparent- member, along with 2 other ab- ince. In comparison between the first of this ly targeting the leadership of the ductees were released, on the 14th year to the last, AOG activity has increased in group) while the remaining were following vigorous questioning. Bala Buluk (from 22 to 36), Khaki Safed (from released in Bakwa District a few These cases mark the first NGO 9 to 16), Pusht Rod (from 21 to 41), and Qala- days later. While the exact mo- incidents in this province since I-Kah (from 0 to 6) Districts while Bakwa Dis- tives behind this event are not November 2009 when two NGO trict has remained consistently unstable (18 entirely clear at present, there are staff members were kidnapped AOG incidents recorded). These two events indicators that the AOG responsi- while in transit in Khaki Safed occurred in the central districts (i.e. Bala Buluk ble was dissatisfied with some District. Although it is not clear and Bakwa districts), where most AOG activi- aspect of organisations activities. at this moment what caused these ties have been concentrated this year. While In the second case, AOG abduct- two incidents almost simultane- these two incidents alone are not sufficient ed up to 35 locals in Gulistan Dis- ously, there could be a correlation establish trends, it does suggest that there ex- trict, with one NGO staff mem- between them and the change in ists an increased risk of abduction in the cen- tral districts, at least in the short term.

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 Compared to the period of the 40 first half of the last year, AOG could be one of factors which 30 activity in Badghis Province has contribute to the change of the 20 increased nearly 21% while at the pattern this year as it was previ- 10 district level; there has also been a ously reported that AOG moved 0 change in the pattern of AOG from Muqur into Qadis due to presence. The data indicates that these operations, while other fac- Qadis District has hosted the tors, such as a change in AOG BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime leadership and AOG involvement sharpest increase of the number Targets of AOG attacks are continuously fo- of AOG attacks from 9 to 35 in the APRP may also be contrib- uting. cused to IMF/ANSF and the use of IEDs and (constituting a 290% increase), SAFs still remain a common tactic for AOG, while there has been a 35% drop While there have been geograph- as 80% of the total AOG attacks this year were in Muqur District. Increases in ical changes, there has been little IEDs or SAF against IMF/ANSF. IMF/ANSF operations in Muqur change in tactics and targeting. THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 9 NANGARHAR This Report Period 1 100 The sole NGO incident in this likely to continue until early Sep- 80 reporting period occurred in Kot 60 district, when IMF searched and tember. 40 interrogated doctors in an NGO The southwest of the province clinic on suspicion of treating in- represents the only part of 20 jured AOG fighters, as well as Nangarhar that recorded signifi- 0 accusing them of storing weapons cant AOG presence and kinetic

for AOG fighters – which were engagements between IMF and NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime not found upon inspection of the AOGs. After a large infiltration facility – before warning them of Afghan and Pakistani AOG the only incident was the attempted RCIED they would return if they found fighters into the southern parts of assassination of the Hisarak District Governor evidence of such activity in the Khogyani and Sherzad on July in the main bazaar, while in the latter it was future. 3rd, IMF combined air and likewise restricted to a single IED against an That AOGs were not responsible ground operations the following ANA convoy in the Fatehabad area of the for this NGO incident is indica- day in Khogyani’s Balalkhel area main Khogyani Road on July 10th, although tive of the broader security picture killed 30 of the fighters, including two seemingly criminally-motivated killings of of Nangarhar during the period, one of their commanders and the locals were also recorded. where AOG-initiated activities Hisarak District Shadow Gover- In Chaparhar, an IEA stronghold, a girl’s continued the June trend of sig- nor, while other operations in school was set on fire and partially destroyed, nificant decline. With only 12 this Memla and Markikhel killed 2 and the third such incident in the past 2 months; period, if next period’s AOG- arrested 5 in the same week. With locals see this as criminally motivated or at the initiated incident volumes contin- many of the newly arrived fighters behest of ‘Pakistani elements’, as the IEA in ue in this vein, July would repre- reported to have returned back to the region are known to have lifted their objec- sent a decline of more than a third Kurram Agency after the IMF tion to this emotive social issue. And, further over June’s levels, and nearly a operation, it can be said that the north on the southern outskirts of Jalalabad quarter of May’s peak. To illus- IMF presence in these districts is City, near to Chaparhar’s northern district trate, Jalalabad City witnessed only bearing fruit in preventing a re- boundary, ANSF conducted raids on suspect- a single IED discovery on the turn to the heavily AOG- ed AOG locations in Mawlawi Khalis Family morning of the 13th, when an dominated local environment seen Colony, the HIK township known to have IED was discovered and defused in late 2010, in spite of the impos- been a staging point for AOG operations on at the perimeter of the provincial sibility at full prevention of infil- the Ring Road and in the provincial capital; at ANP HQ. The reasons behind tration. However, in demonstra- the time of writing, the results of these raids this unexpected calm can only be tion of the continued AOG pres- remained unknown. speculated about, with the theory ence, gunmen attacked the former Khogyani DG in the Pirakhel ar- Along the northeast border with Mohmand that Nangarhar’s AOG command Agency, on 13th July an ANBP vehicle was are re-assessing their provincial ea, while an IED struck a private vehicle and killed one in the struck by an IED, killing 2 policemen. And strategy after some significant finally, four separate artillery fire incidents IMF-led setbacks the most likely Grabawa area of Khogyani. Two mobile antennas were also struck were recorded in Goshta, each of which were explanation; a reported recent reported to have come from Pakistani military reshuffle of a number of District by grenades in Memla and Ha- kimabad. forces across the border, and landing in Af- Shadow Governors is consistent ghan territory – including one incident in the with this. However, whatever the In the neighbouring districts of Anargay area, which was the site of a number reasons it is likely that, with Ram- Hisarak and Surkh Rod, incidents of PakMil attacks on villages and an ANBP CP adan due to arrive, this calm is were also limited; in the former in February, March and May. THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 8 KUNAR 150 This Report Period 1 The only NGO incident recorded 100 during this period in Kunar was cation that the recent IMF clear- ing operations there only partially an indirect one, where 4 informal 50 labourers employed by the CDC dented the AOG presence (which remains a mix between IEA and of an NGO NSP project were 0 accidentally killed in an IMF air- HIG). strike in Asmar district, after an Other areas that saw significant IMF base in the area came under numbers of such direct attacks KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime fire from the hillside upon which were Chawkay’s Gato Kala (3), the labourers were constructing an Ghaziabad’s Shaheed Barily (2), In respect to other notable incidents, perhaps irrigation channel. Civilian casual- Narang’s Ghulam Mohammad the most significant was the abduction of the ties are an unfortunately common Khan Ghundy (4), Nari’s Sawo (4) Ghaziabad District Governor in the Dabroro feature of the conflict landscape and Sirkanay’s Yar Khan (2). The area of the district on July 1st; even more sig- in Kunar, from both the IMF and majority of these targeted ANP nificant was the fact that he was released the AOG sides. CPs and ANA OPs, and resulted following day, an unusual conclusion to such in short, non-fatal exchanges of More broadly, incident volumes incidents in the eastern region. Of note, his fire (apart from civilian collateral remained similar to June levels, captors were reported to have told him – a fatalities/injuries in a small num- and as such down on the May Ghaziabad native – that Ghaziabad belongs to ber of them). Some, though, peak; for AOG-initiated incidents, Nuristan, and as such it should be relinquished stood out, most notably the SAF this drop is of the order of 40% to the non-Pashtun peoples of that province – attack on the Provincial Gover- from that month. Moreover, after significant because it appears to demonstrate nor’s convoy in the Shen Korak the conclusion of the Wata Pur that underneath much of the contemporary area of Shegal, as he was returning operation in late June, this period conflict in Kunar and Nuristan, historical tribal to Asadabad – the fifth time the saw only 1 recorded IMF incident and geographical rivalries continue to exist, governor has been attacked since (beyond the above NGO inci- which are likely to become more pronounced October 2010, and the fourth dent), an airstrike on AOG loca- as IMF numbers and the intensity of their ac- time when he was in transit – in a tions in Nari in which two women tivities decrease, as has already begun in demonstration of the excellent were reported injured. Direct Kunar. attacks remained the most preva- information networks that the Finally, Pakistani military shelling of Afghan lent form of AOG TTP, with Wa- province’s opposition groups territory continued, with multiple incidents ta Pur recording the highest – 9 – maintain about key province-level being recorded across 4 districts, Khas Kunar, focused on IMF facilities and the GOA officials. Another such Dangam, Shegal and Asmar – with one fatality, DAC, while an illegal CP was also attack that stood out occurred in a child, being recorded in Khas Kunar as a established on the Manogai-Wata Nari, where AOG fighters entered result. Pur road, in which an ANP of- the house of an ANA officer, kill- ficer was abducted, a further indi- ing him and injuring his brother. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Nuristan’s Gawardesh area – the 40 key border crossing into Kamdesh – and suffering 40 fatalities of 30 District, and from there, into their own, including 15 Pakistanis 20 Bargi Matal and AOG-held – as they overran at least 4 CPs 10 Waygal – witnessed the most se- and took land kilometres from the 0 vere AOG assault on the ANBP border. This also led to a dozen positions there registered since civilian deaths, and 7-10 local resi-

the October 2010 beginning of a dences destroyed. After ANA NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime concerted AOG push against the assistance, both from their recent- ANBP in the valley. After IMF ly established facilities overlook- Further north in the Bashgal valley, elevated and supporting ANA withdrew ing the valley floor and from air threat reporting was registered concerning from the area in late 2009/early assets based elsewhere, the ANBP AOG movements into the area around the 2010, ANBP positions had been managed to take back their lost Bargi Matal DAC, where it appeared momen- established there to prevent such CPs and push the AOG fighters tum was gathering on further attempts to take infiltration, and while AOGs, pri- back towards the border late on the DAC, after the unsuccessful attempts at marily IEA and allied Pakistani the 6th and into the 7th. Moreo- the beginning of May, when ANA commandos groups, skirmished with the ver, the local communities, angry raided a key camp and staging post in Awla ANBP there a number of times a at the loss of life caused by the Gul, and killed two dozen local and Pakistani month since October, the status AOG-initiated fighting, decided fighters. However, after the unsuccessful op- quo had remained unchanged by on the 9th to actively oppose fur- eration in Kamdesh described above, it ap- these mostly inconsequential en- ther cross-border infiltration. As pears that AOG numbers in Bargi Matal have gagements. However, these latest such, when combined with what is fallen again, perhaps as the groups in the clashes, beginning on July 5th, likely to be a sustained period of broader eastern Nuristan area regroup. intensifying on the 6th and lasting heavier ANSF presence in the until the 9th, stood outside the area, this period’s events can be Finally, after being reopened to civilians, the norm for the much greater num- seen to be something of a shot in road to Wama was again temporarily blocked bers of combatants, heavier casu- the foot of the AOGs’ efforts to because of rivalries between Gosalak AOGs alties, and capture of territory and strengthen their ability to infiltrate and a pro-GOA local leader in southern CPs – and as such represents a into Kamdesh, a district already Wama. These local rivalries remain ongoing, clear AOG attempt to establish a held by antagonistic, GOA- but the road has again been opened to civil- firmer hold over this infiltration reconciled HIG leadership – per- ians, with each faction only giving trouble to route. On the 6th, more than 100 haps even making their low-key those attempting to transit on the road that are AOG fighters engaged the ANBP passage through rural parts of the allied with the other side. CPs on the valley floor, killing 23 district more difficult. THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 3 KHOST This Report Period 0 150 Consistent with the broader re- gional pattern, Khost has also Bak and Tere Zayi, just one AOG 100 recorded a substantial drop in -initiated incident was recorded AOG-initiated conflict incidents apiece, an IDF on the DAC in the 50 during the first half of July, with former, causing minor building 0 slightly less than half the number damage, and an IED in the latter’s recorded in the previous period – Dabgee village, injuring a civilian. from 48 to 22. Khost City and its Also in Bak, IMF also conducted KHOST AOG KHOST Crime environs in particular saw the con- an airstrike, in which three locals tinued low level of incidents that were killed. In all, AOG activity fellow villagers of the deceased the following began during last period, with just in this formerly key trio of dis- day on the Khost-Gardez Highway, blocking it 11 registered, and only 3 AOG- tricts continues to be sharply low- for 6 hours. These two incidents stand in in- initiated: two IED detonations er than in winter and spring. teresting contrast to each other, in that the first with no resulting damage or casu- In the border districts of Tani and is an excellent demonstration of the frequent alties, one in the ANP hospital Gurbuz, IED emplacement re- opposition local communities can have to area, and an ill-advised attack on a mained a problem, but 5 of the 6 AOG activities, while the second is a salutary parked container in the Durgi ar- attempts at IED attacks were dis- reminder that it is the civilian casualties result- ea, to which the family that owned rupted by the ANP, with just a ing from anti-AOG operations by IMF that it took exception – engaging and single detonation in Gurbuz’s can degrade the same local support. killing three AOG fighters in a Borikhel village, injuring 4 ANBP firefight. In Nadir Shah Kot, 3 of the 4 incidents that policemen. In Tani one direct occurred did so in the Shambawoot village, all Sabari, which had witnessed a rel- attack on the main district IMF AOG-initiated. First, an IED struck an ANA ative calm in the past two months base was also recorded, which was vehicle on the 8th, and the following day, a after being the focus for provin- short and inconsequential, but a local schoolteacher was beheaded by local cial conflict over much of the past similar direct attack in Gurbuz’s AOG fighters. Three days later, AOG opera- year, saw an increase in the num- Torkhabee area, on an ANSF pa- tives attacked the house of a local doctor, kill- ber of incidents recorded there, trol, led to the death of 4 AOG ing a family member before ANA arrived and although the majority continued fighters. engaged the attackers, leading to the detention to be in the form of IMF-ANSF In Shamal, two stand out inci- of 5 and the injury of two ANA soldiers. The- operations (9), in which 32 AOG dents occurred. In the first, local se unusual targets suggest that the AOG unit fighters were arrested. Just 6 villagers in the Zamaysa area at- operating in this area may have a particularly AOG-initiated attacks were rec- tacked AOG fighters lying in wait ruthless commander, and NGOs operating orded; three IDF attacks that to ambush IMF/ANSF convoy, there are advised to be aware of potential failed to hit their target, two IED killing 3 and injuring 3 others, threats to their staff. detonations in the Kholbesat area, who were then detained and and the shooting dead of a civil- At the provincial level, while the Khost con- handed over to the ANP for pro- flict environment remains unpredictable and ian. As such, the IMF appear to cessing. Secondly, a July 6th IMF have maintained the momentum fragile, AOG activities and IMF kinetic opera- airstrike on a house in which tions continue to be recorded at a significantly they have had over the past 2 AOG fighters were (correctly) months, although currently in decreased level relative to the spring, although believed to be located killed 11, the province is far away from being considered what seems primarily a pre- including 6 women and children, emptive manner. In neighbouring on the way to a sustained reduction in vio- which generated a protest by the lence. THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 The number of total conflict inci- 40 see Kabul provincial assessment) dents, as well as AOG-initiated 30 to the Surkhakan area. events, rose in Laghman over last 20 period, although still a little below However, perhaps the most seri- the May peak. Some of the most ous incident that occurred did so 10 serious of these continued to be in Alingar, Mango area, in which 0 found in Qarghayi’s Surkhakan the Do Ab ANP Chief was ab- area, where the two IEA units ducted from his home village operating there out of the Torghar along with two bodyguards. LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime mountains, one of which is re- Whether it was criminal or AOG- detaining 1 AOG operative, but it appears that ported to have recently arrived related is unknown, but from the AOG presence in the district has risen in the from Azra, continued to engage in details of the incident it appears past month. attacks and abductions. First, on well thought out and specifically July 1st they attacked the convoy targeted. Negotiations for his In Mehtarlam city, where the handover to of a tribal elder with SAF, killing release are underway at the time ANSF-led security responsibility is underway, two civilians and injuring 5 others of writing. Also in Alingar, AOG two IDF attacks occurred out of the Sultan – notable for occurring at 1400 fighters established an illegal CP Ghazi township fired in the general direction hrs – while on the evening of July on a secondary road in the Sangar of the city, in each case damaging a house, 8th in the Kheirokhel area, they area, which ran unmolested for 24 while an IMF vehicle was targeted by an IED abducted 5 civilians not known to hours as they searched vehicles in the Pachakhel area. And in Alishing, Barow be connected to the GOA as they for GOA employees before with- area saw one IED detonation against an IMF were transiting the area in a Co- drawing to Nurgaram – an indica- vehicle, and one IED discovery. Bad Pakh rolla, releasing one later. For tion of the weak IMF and ANSF remained quiet. In all, then, the key loci of in- broader Highway 7 security, there- presence away from Alingar’s security were Surkhakan and Alingar, with a fore, the pattern of incidents over main roads. Even the DAC area slight increase in incident volumes across the past 6-8 weeks has indicated a registered single IDF and IED Laghman, although the province has fortunate- shift in the focus for insecurity attacks, unusual for the district. ly been free of the high-profile suicide attacks from Tangi Abrisham (although IMF did, however, conduct an and significant kinetic engagements that were attacks still continue in that area, operation in Alingar, Parwai area, recorded in the spring. THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 6 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 1 Paktya saw one NGO incident 80 during this period, in the form of targeted by the operation – to 60 a collateral damage event in Lija transit through that agency into 40

Mangal district DAC area. On Paktya. 20 July 6th, incoming mortar fire In the restive southern zone of 0 missed the GOA buildings and Zurmat, Wuza Zadran and Shwak, impacted in the vicinity of an there were just 5 incidents, down NGO clinic, injuring two nurses. 50% on last period. In Shwak just PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime This came a day after AOG fight- a single incident was recorded, a ers attacked the same DAC facility short ambush of an ANA convoy previous week an ANP vehicle was also target- with SAF and RPGs, withdrawing in the Sato Kandow area, while in ed by an IED. Finally, AOG fighters unsuc- after an exchange of fire that in- Wuza Zadran AOG fighters mor- cessfully targeted an IMF helicopter with an jured an ANP officer and a civil- tared the district’s IMF base, RPG in the Momenkhel area. In neighbouring ian. This sort of event is an un- which drew an air response by the Sayed Karam, where much of the recent esca- fortunately common by-product IMF; in the resulting airstrike, two lation in AOG-initiated violence was recorded, of NGO facilities situated close to AOG fighters were killed. In including last period’s failed BBIED, just a DACs across the region, particu- Zurmat, site of a half dozen IMF single incident was recorded – an abduction of larly in rural districts. operations during last period, just three civilians from the Kohseen area, but fur- More broadly, after the sharp up- 3 IED detonations were recorded; ther insecurity can be expected in the district in turn in AOG-initiated conflict however, both those that occurred the near future. incidents in May and June, the in the Sahak area led to security first half of July has seen a notable force deaths – the first killing 3 To the north of the province, Chamkanay and fall in these incidents, with just 23 IMF soldiers and the second kill- Dand wa Patan were both relatively quiet, with this period compared with 43 in ing two ANA. just a single incident in the former – albeit a serious incident, in which AOG fighters shot the second half of June, almost a Gardez district, the secondary and killed two ANA soldiers travelling in a 50% drop over last period’s peak. focus for conflict in the province, private vehicle in the Bagyar area. And in Jani Part of this appears attributable to also registered a decline in conflict Khel, where the conflict is focused upon the an increase in ANSF numbers incidents. Notable incidents in- DAC area, only 3 incidents occurred in con- over the past two weeks, as well as cluded one AOG SAF assault on trast to last period’s 6; however, each one was their equipping with heavy weap- an ANP convoy on the Kabul- of a serious nature, with an IED killing an ons, but it is likely to also reflect Gardez Highway, and the distri- ANP officer, another dying when AOG fight- the consequences of the PakMil bution of nightletters in the Ab- ers attacked the DAC, and two further ANP operation in Kurram Agency, dullah Kala village, warning locals being kidnapped from the private vehicle in making it more difficult for against working with the GOA or which they were travelling. AOGs – even those not being IMF, and in the same village the THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 1 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 In Kandahar, after several weeks 150 tives (tribal or personal) explain- with no high profile media attract- 100 ing security incidents, this report- ing the impetus behind the inci- ing period saw several incidents of dent should not be ruled out. The 50 note, although connected to one death of such a powerful person 0 specific event – the killing of the marks a significant change in the Head of Provincial Council, Ah- security paradigm in the region med Wali Karzai that occurred on and also beyond, and will certainly KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime 12 July. Ahmed Wali Karzai was leave a certain power vacuum in killed with small arms fire by a Kandahar. The subsequent ap- ceremonies due to the presence of VIPs or trusted bodyguard inside his pointment of Shah Wali Khan officials remain opportunistic targets and as house with the perpetrator conse- Karzai as a replacement Head of such should be avoided. This was highlighted quently shot and killed by another the Provincial Council marks an on 14th July, when a single BBIED attacker member of the security detail of attempt to avoid this vacuum. managed to get access to the Red Mosque dur- the said official. While assassina- However, at this stage there are ing a related commemoration ceremony for tions or targeted killings of ANSF numerous potential scenarios that the deceased. As a result of the blast, besides or GoA personnel (generally by can emerge following this inci- the death of the attacker, four civilians were AOG) remain one of the most dent, nonetheless NGOs should killed (including the Head of the Kandahar common features of the security be attuned to possible changes in Ulema Shura) and an additional 17 persons paradigm in Kandahar City, the security dynamics in the area of were wounded. Although the account of casu- death of the Head of the Provin- their activities. alties is significant, this number could have cial Council (and close relative of Although there were no reports of been worse as the attack occurred at the end of President Karzai) marks one of incidents directly associated with the ceremony when the mosque was less the most significant high-profile the burial ceremony that occurred crowded. assassinations thus far. While on 13th July, in Karz area of AOG were quick to take (as is Dand, an explosive device deto- In regards to the province as a whole, the usually the case in high profile nated in Maywand District while threat picture remains consistent with the pre- incidents) the responsibility for the convoy of the Helmand Gov- vious period. In the last fortnight the districts the killing, the exact motive for ernor and the NDS Chief was of Zhari, Panjwayi and Kandahar City bore the the assassination remains unclear. travelling on Highway 1 to partici- brunt of AOG activities, with IED emplace- Given the high profile, and at pate in this ceremony. The offi- ment being the AOG favoured tactics. On a times controversial nature, of the cials escaped unharmed but two different note, the first week of this reporting victim as well his status as one of NDS employees were wounded. period marked the withdrawal of Canadian the key powerbrokers of both the As frequently mentioned in AN- troops from Kandahar and the end of their province and region, other mo- SO reports, public gatherings or combat mission in the country. THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 Similar to its northern neighbour 100 Paktya, Paktika witnessed a slight cross-border mortar shelling in drop in total incident numbers, the Lwari area, although it is un- 50 after the peak reached in the se- clear if this was an AOG incident cond half of June, and returning or carried out by the PakMil, as 0 more into line with levels record- has been occurring across the ed in the six weeks from the start length of the border in recent of May until mid-June. However, weeks. In Urgun, finally, AOG PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime even with this slight drop the fighters engaged IMF and ANSF province remains the most violent in 3 separate firefights in the Finally from the AOG side, the IED campaign in the southeast, inclusive of Shwai Kamar area, as well as rock- was held in partial check by security forces, Khost, Paktya and Zabul, both in eting the DAC. An armed clash disrupting 10 of the 18 attempted IED attacks, terms of absolute number of con- between IMF and AOG fighters while of those 8 that did detonate, 3 struck flict incidents and in terms of the in the DAC area was also record- tractors, killing and/or injuring civilians, 3 levels of conflict fatalities record- ed on July 5th, wounding one sol- struck IMF vehicles, 1 prematurely detonated ed. dier. and 1 killed two ANA soldiers in an ANA ve- The Barmal-Urgun-Gayan trio of Elsewhere in the province, Dila hicle in the Do Ab area of Sar Hawza. Of note districts continued to be the cen- stood out with two IDF attacks was the absence, as in the rest of the border tral focus of AOG-initiated vio- and an ambush of an IMF/ANSF region, of any BBIED or VBIED attacks dur- lence, with 30 of the 73 overall patrol in the DAC area, which ing this period. incidents recorded in their bor- also saw an IED strike on an IMF Significant IMF operations were recorded in a ders. More than 50% of these oc- vehicle that injured two soldiers. number of districts: Mata Khan (3), Khair Kot curred in Barmal, and the majority In Omna, unknown gunmen shot (2), Sar Hawza (2), and one each in Gomal, took the form of IDF and SAF and killed a local mullah and for- Omna, Sarobi, Yosef Khel and the provincial attacks on the IMF bases in Shkin mer Paktika Shura head. This inci- capital Sharana. In all, across the operations, 7 and Margha. None of these led to dent was similar to the shooting AOG fighters were killed and 21 arrested, with recorded fatalities or injuries, alt- dead of the brother of the Lagh- a number of weapons caches also seized. While hough an AOG-ANBP firefight man provincial governor in Waza this signifies that Paktika remains the most in Margha on the 7th did lead to 4 Khwa district on the 4th, as well kinetic area of IMF operations in the south- AOG and 2 ANBP deaths. Gayan as a number of targeted assassina- east, these figures are substantially down on saw a similar pattern, with 5 rock- tions of pro-GOA figures in re- previous months. cent months. et attacks on the IMF base there. It also saw one occurrence of

NEW SOUTHERN REGION RSA: ANSO would like to welcome and introduce the newest member of the team, Mr. Volker Lankow. He is a welcome addition, coming to us with a wealth of experience from both the NGO community and Afghanistan. He will be taking over the responsibility for the South in the coming weeks and will be based in Kandahar City. You will be able to contact him at [email protected] or 0796 688 416 THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 In Uruzgan the overall volume in 80 security incidents remained rela- IED placed in the ditch on the 60 tively consistent with the previous opposite side of the first ones. reporting period; though there Although the said attack did not 40 was a slight decrease in the num- cause significant damage or casu- 20 ber of AOG initiated actions. It is alties to security forces, this two- 0 worth noting that almost 60% of fold IED strike seems to indicate all incidents recorded across the the presence of sophisticated skills URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime province were related to IED em- and availability of materiel to wage placement, displaying a familiar a continued IED campaign in the decreased as well in the last two weeks and pattern of tactics employed across area. While the overall number of were carried out on five different occasions. A the province. In the last fortnight actual detonations was lower than noteworthy incident occurred on 5th July, the large majority of IED related last period, nonetheless IED as- when AOG attacked an ANP post located in incidents occurred in Chora and saults resulted in a significant the vicinity of the gate of Tirin Kot Airfield, Tirin Kot districts. A notable in- number of casualties. In addition wounding three ANP. cident took place on 12 July in the to the aforementioned incident, During the present cycle the AOG campaign provincial capital -Tirin Kot City- an IED strike targeting a civilian of targeted killings were focused on Tirin Kot where two RCIEDs placed in a vehicle reported in Khas Uruzgan District. In three separate attacks conducted ditch detonated one after the oth- District on 11th July, caused 6 by AOG mobile ‘hit teams’ a total of four er against IMF/ANSF in front of deaths (3 adults and 3 children) ANP and one ANA were wounded. On the a newly built ANP HQ. As a re- with five other passengers wound- ANSF/IMF side documented operations (6) sult, one civilian was killed and ed. Prior to this, in Chora, a road- were reported in Chora, Khas Uruzgan and two other civilians along with one side IED struck an Afghan Local Tirin Kot districts, resulting in seven AOG ANP official were wounded in the Police (ALP) vehicle, killing six members killed, two wounded and nine arrest- blasts. Subsequently, security ALP members and one civilian. ed. forces located and defused a third AOG initiated direct attacks have

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 In Nimroz Province the periods 80 incident level was slightly in- struck a roadside IED while trav- creased when compared to the elling on Khash Rod – Zaranj 60 last. In parallel, IED emplace- Main Road in Dehmazang area, 40

ment and direct attacks – the two killing 18 passengers and wound- 20 preferred AOG tactics in the ing 26 others. An additional two province – showed an upward IED strikes were reported in 0 trend as well. Dlarem area, one against an IMF NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime It is worth noting that a 6 month patrol and one against an ANP review of reveals that 67% of all vehicle of note in Zaranj (Bazaar in five AOG members killed and one ANP recorded incidents in Nimroz oc- area). IED detonations in Zaranj wounded. curred in Khash Rod, followed by District have so far been quite rare as the said incident is the While IED and direct attacks remain the main Zaranj, Kang and Chahar Burjak. AOG TTPs in the province, a rocket attack In the past two weeks Khash Rod third IED that detonated in the district this year. was also reported this period. On 3rd July, continued to be volatile and ac- AOG fired four rockets against Ghor Ghori counted for the majority of inci- AOG direct attacks were focused Town (Khash Rod) that landed in an open dents. A noteworthy incident was on the areas of Posht-e Hassan, field. The incident marks the fourth IDF as- reported at the end of the last re- Ghor Ghori and Dilaram (twice). sault reported this year and the fourth to occur porting period, highlighting the The most significant took place in in Khash Rod District. Similar to last year’s threat of collateral involvement Ghor Ghori Town on 4 July when pattern, sporadic IDF attacks became an ele- for the local population due to the AOG attacked an ANP post with ment of the ‘spring offensive’ as all incidents ongoing conflict. On 30th June heavy weapons and SAF. The fire have been reported over the last three months. in the afternoon, a local bus fight lasted for one hour, resulting THE ANSO REPORT Page 27

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 2 HELMAND This Report Period 0 350 An extremely high number of 300 AOG direct attacks on ANP incidents in Nahri Sarraj and Na- 250 along with IED strikes against wa-i-Barak Zayi, civilians contin- 200 150 IMF mobile patrols constituted ued to be involved in IED inci- dents. In Shahbaz village of 100 the main characteristic of the se- 50 curity environment in the past Kajaki District, two civilians were 0 two weeks in Helmand. In this killed and another was wounded reporting period the geographical in an IED detonation, and in HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime distribution of incidents followed Nahri Sarranj another explosive previously established patterns, device wounded two locals. prematurely in the vehicle parking lot of the with the majority of AOG initiat- AOG indirect fire attacks are usu- ANP HQ, causing no casualties. The same ed incidents taking place in Nahri ally rare across the province when day it was reported that in the bazaar area, a Sarraj, Sangin, Musa Qala and compared to the huge volume of suspected AOG member wearing the uniform Marja districts. direct and IED attacks. This re- of a PSC guard, opened fire on a passing ANP Although the volume of AOG porting period five ineffective vehicle wounding one ANP. He was conse- direct attacks reported throughout rocket attacks against IMF FOBs quently killed by other ANP elements. the province remained impressive, (Forward Operating Base) oc- Although Lashkar Gah City appears to be the in the majority of cases these at- curred in Naw Zad and Nahri most challenging area for the transition in the tacks did not involve casualties on Sarraj districts. In the latter dis- countrywide context, the process remains ra- either side. There were only two trict on 2nd July in Mirmandaw ther symbolic than actual as ANSF have bee in separate incidents that reported area, two AOG members riding defacto charge of security, as is the case in the casualties, with one ANP injured on a motorcycle shot and killed a majority of areas that have been chosen for the and one AOG killed. local Shura member in the vicinity transition. The process is expected to be offi- of his house. In the last two weeks at least 60 cially finalised by the end of July and a formal IEDs, mainly against IMF or joint In Lashkar Gah City AOG con- ceremony marking this symbolic date is likely IMF/ANP patrols (in addition to tinued to show efforts to assert to occur in the coming days. However, it will a further 62 discoveries/disposals their presence as the date of the likely remain very low profile in order to lower which were reported across the official transition approaches. For the risk for potential AOG attacks. province). Apart from the four instance, on 9th July, an IED ANP wounded in two separate placed in a parcel, detonated THE ANSO REPORT Page 28

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 Zabul has witnessed a drop in 80 incidents this reporting period. A two killed (the attacker and a 12 60 year old boy who died of his glance at current data shows that 40 whereas AOG has scaled down wounds) and another eight civil- 20 their activities (with a decrease ians injured. The incident is the observed in both-direct attacks second involving a suicide attack- 0 and IED incidents as compared to er reported in Zabul Province this year. On 22 March, also in the the previous period), ANSF/IMF ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime has maintained a high tempo of Bazaar area of Qalat City, a sui- operations throughout the prov- cide bomber riding on a motorcy- The number of IED incidents decreased this ince. cle accidentally collided with a reporting period, for a total of 16 IED related private vehicle before reaching its This reporting period AOG activi- events across the province. However, the target. His explosive device deto- ties were focused, in particular on number of casualties associated with them was nated, killing himself and 1 civil- Shahjoy and Qalat districts. The once again significant. On 2nd July in Zanzir ian, and wounding another 13 most noteworthy incident in the area of Shamulzayi District a roadside IED civilians. Although the main last fortnight was reported from detonated against a civilian vehicle, killing 11 AOG targets remain ANSF/IMF, Qalat City, when on 9th July an occupants (5 men, 4 women and 2 children). it would appear that the authors attacker riding on a motorcycle In addition, on five other occasions ANSF/ of such attacks have little reluc- targeted an ANP convoy carrying IMF and PSC vehicles were hit by roadside tance to carry out assaults in areas the COP in Bazaar area. While IEDs, resulting in 4 ANA soldiers and 2 PSC which may result in numerous none of the official party sus- guards being killed, and 2 ANA and another 2 civilian casualties, as seen in both tained injury, casualties included PSC guards wounded. instances this year.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 29

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 In the past two weeks the level of 200 AOG activity reported from in Ghazni frequently disengage Ghazni showed signs of decrease. rapidly during a fire fight while 150 However, the province nonethe- facing strictly military opponents, 100 less witnessed the usual spate of and employing ‘hit and run’ tactics 50 rarely results in casualties. During AOG initiated direct and indirect 0 attacks, IED strikes and intimida- this cycle, however, their attacks tions. AOG direct attacks record- on ‘softer’ targets such as IMF GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime ed this period were concentrated logistical convoys appeared more on ANP check posts, in particular efficient and resulted in numerous ince with the Gelan DAC being the most fre- in Ghazni District with 8 reported PSC casualties who escort these quent target along with Andar and Ajristan. assaults and 4 in Qarabagh. Fur- convoys. Whereas a rocket attack against Ghazni city on ther AOG direct attacks were car- In addition to multiple direct at- 11th July was ineffective, on 1st July one child ried out against DACs across the tacks, IED emplacement remains was killed and another three civilians (1 wom- province, some of them receiving another AOG typical tactic in the an and 2 children) were wounded when anoth- multiple attacks. For instance, in province. This period at least 22 er projectile impacted on their house in Ta- the last fortnight the Andar and IED strikes were reported in An- wheed Abad village of Ghazni District. Ajristan DACs came under SAF dar, Dih Yak and, in particular, in This reporting period AOG attempts to intimi- and RPGs fire two and six times Ghazni district. On 1st July a respectively. date locals from cooperating with the GOA premature detonation of an IED continued in the DAC of Muqur, where on 12 In line with previous periods, reported in Ganj area of Ghazni July, AOG shot and killed a son of a local AOG attacks along the Highway city resulted in one civilian GoA employee. In two separate incidents- in remained a distinctive feature of wounded, however the most Ajristan and Qarabagh -AOG also abducted the security environment in Ghaz- deadly incident took place in Pule- two civilians over the accusation of having ni. Apart from ambushes on e-Bazak area of Qarabagh District links with IMF/ANSF. ANSF/IMF convoys, AOG ap- where on 7th July, four ANA sol- pear to focus on disrupting IMF diers were killed when their vehi- ANSF/IMF conducted at least 22 documented supply channels leading attacks on cle struck a roadside IED. Be- operations, a majority of them experienced in logistical convoys on at least nine sides IED emplacement, another Andar, Dih Yak and Gelan districts. Whereas different occasions. IMF logisti- inherent threat for the local popu- weapon and ammunition discoveries were rare, cal convoys in Qarabah, Gelan, lation in Ghazni is related to indi- ANSF/IMF focused their efforts on AOG Andar, Muqur, and Ghazni dis- rect attacks. In the past two manpower employing air assets on several oc- tricts were attacked by AOG with weeks at least 14 rocket or mortar casions and killing a significant number of SAF and RPGs. AOGs operating attacks were reported in the prov- AOG elements.

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 ANSO is hosted by INSO-International NGO Safety Organisation Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) This is because we Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 do not know enough To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 about the area to contact: comment on the sig- [email protected] EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) nificance of the inci- Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 dents occurring Naseer - [email protected] - 077 2546 242 there. ANSO is managed by an NGO Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) If you can help us feedback, good or bad, let Volker Lankow - [email protected] 0796 688 416 understand the prov- them know on: Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 ince better, please [email protected] contact us. ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) Taro Yamagata - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / ANCOP-Afghan Nation- al Civil Order Police / AOG- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Armed Opposition Group / Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised mili- tias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghani- stan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Ex- plosive Device / RCIED-Remote or Radio Controlled IED / IMF- International Military Forces / FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / BBIED-Body Borne IED / PDO- Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA) / APRP-Afghan Peace and Re- integration Program