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Mctaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time McTaggart’s proof of the unreality of time Many of these philosophers have also held the view that what is real are mental things: minds, and their experiences. This combination of views -- that the material world is ultimately, in some sense, and illusion, and that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. In a sense, you can think of this sort of view as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that mental things are, in the end, fundamentally physical. Idealism says that material things are, in the end, fundamentally mental. Materialism and idealism are both forms of monism, since they both hold that there is only one fundamental kind of thing in the world; they just disagree about what this kind of thing is. Dualism is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the mental and the physical. How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are non-mental material things is a mistake. Traditionally, idealists have tried to show this by trying to show that the existence of non-mental material things would lead to some sort of absurdity. To do this, they have often focused on two of the main supposed attributes of material things: that they exist in space, and that theyLast existtime we in Manydiscussed time. of theseIf Zenoit can philosophersʼs arguments be shown have against thatalso the heldspace reality the view ofand motion. that time what Today are is realourillusions, topicare mental is an that even things: more minds, straight and forward argumenttheir experiences.for idealism: McTaggartThis combinationʼs argument of views for the -- thatunreality the material of time. world is ultimately, in some sense, and would provide a very strong argumentillusion, for and idealism. that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. Our reading for today is anJohn example McTaggartIn ofa Ellissense, this McTaggart kindyou can of was thinkargument; born of this in 1866;sort of his view most as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that McTaggart, aims to show importantthat time work, mentalis fromunreal. things which (The are, our inreading optional the end, today fundamentally reading, was taken, wasphysical. Idealism says that material things are, in the end, published in twofundamentally parts in1921 mental. and, posthumously, Materialism and in1927. idealism It was are both forms of monism, since they both hold that from Kant, aims at an analogousentitled The conclusion Naturethere is of only Existence aboutone fundamental. space.) kind of thing in the world; they just disagree about what this kind of thing is. Dualism is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the mental and the physical. Here is McTaggart’s statementPersonally, of hisMcTaggart view ʼabouts life seems time. to have been unexceptional, though marked by eccentricity. He was known around Cambridge How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are for his habits of getting around by riding a tricycle, and for non-mental material things is a mistake. Traditionally, idealists have tried to show this by trying to show saluting cats when he passed them. that the existence of non-mental material things would lead to some sort of absurdity. His central philosophicalTo do this, they conviction have often was focusedthat reality on wastwo of the main supposed attributes of material things: that they fundamentallyexist spiritual; in space, and andhis central that they aim exist was in to time. show If thisit can by be shown that space and time are illusions, that deriving contradictionswould provide from athe very assumption strong argument that the for material idealism. world exists. Our reading for today is an example of this kind of argument; McTaggart, aims to show that time is unreal. (The optional reading, The most important of his arguments of this sort was his from Kant, aims at an analogous conclusion about space.) argument that the existence of time itself involves a contradiction. In the passage we read, he puts his view very clearly: Here is McTaggart’s statement of his view about time. Many of these philosophers have also held the view that what is real are mental things: minds, and theirMany experiences. of these Thisphilosophers combination have of alsoviews held -- that the the view material that what world is isreal ultimately, are mental in some things: sense, minds, and and illusion,their andexperiences. that the fundamental This combination reality is of mental views ---- isthat called the idealismmaterial .world is ultimately, in some sense, and illusion, and that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. In a sense, you can think of this sort of view as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that mentalIn a thingssense, are, you in can the thinkend, fundamentallyof this sort of physical.view as the Idealism opposite says of that materialism. material things Materialism are, in the says end, that fundamentallymental things mental. are, Materialismin the end, fundamentallyand idealism are physical. both forms Idealism of monism, says thatsince material they both things hold are,that in the end, therefundamentally is only one fundamental mental. Materialism kind of thing and in idealism the world; are they both just forms disagree of monism, about what since this they kind both of thing hold that is. Dualismthere is onlyis opposed one fundamental to both, and kind says of that thing there in the are world; two fundamentally they just disagree different about kinds what of things, this kind the of thing mentalis. Dualism and the physical.is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the mental and the physical. How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are non-mentalHow would material one gothings about is a arguing mistake. for Traditionally, idealism? Whatidealists needs have to tried be proved to show is this that by our trying view to that show there are thatnon-mental the existence material of non-mental things is material a mistake. things Traditionally, would lead idealiststo some havesort of tried absurdity. to show this by trying to show To dothat this, the they existence have often of non-mental focused on material two of the things main would supposed lead attributesto some sortof material of absurdity. things: that they exist in space, and that they exist in time. If it can be shown that space and time are illusions, that To do this, they have often focused on two of the main supposed attributes of material things: that they would provide a very strong argument for idealism. exist in space, and that they exist in time. If it can be shown that space and time are illusions, that Ourwould reading provide for today a very is an strong example argument of this kindfor idealism. of argument; McTaggart, aims to show that time is unreal. (The optional reading, fromOurThe Kant, mostreading aims important atfor an today analogous of hisis anarguments example conclusion of of this thisabout sort kind space.) was of hisargument; McTaggart,argument that aims the toexistence show that of time time itself is unreal. involves (The a contradiction.optional reading, from Kant, aims at an analogous conclusion about space.) HereIn is the McTaggart’s passage we statement read, he ofputs his his view view about very time. clearly: Here is McTaggart’s statement1. Ifof there his view were about material time. objects, they would exist in time. 2. Nothing can exist in time. ---------------------------------------------------------- C. There are no material objects. If one is interested in arguingMcTaggart’s for idealism, argument then is, McTaggart in effect, ʼas defense of premise 2. His aim is to show that the idea of argument has an obvioussomething use. For existingif there werein time material involves things, a contradiction. they would presumably have to exist in time; so if nothing does exist in time, there mustTo be understand no material this things. argument, a first step is to understand McTaggart’s distinction between two kinds of properties involved with time. The key to understanding McTaggartʼs argument is understanding his distinction between the A-properties and the B-properties. Many of these philosophers have also held the view that what is real are mental things: minds, and their experiences. This combination of views -- that the material world is ultimately, in some sense, and illusion, and that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. In a sense, you can think of this sort of view as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that mental things are, in the end, fundamentally physical. Idealism says that material things are, in the end, fundamentally mental. Materialism and idealism are both forms of monism, since they both hold that there is only one fundamental kind of thing in the world; they just disagree about what this kind of thing 1. If there were material objects, they would exist in time. is. Dualism is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the 2. Nothing can exist in time. mental and---------------------------------------------------------- the physical. C. There are no material objects. How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are non-mentalMcTaggart’s material argument things is, in effect,is a mistake. a defense Traditionally, of premise 2. idealists His aim haveis to show tried thatto show the idea this of by trying to show thatsomething the existence existing of in non-mentaltime involves materiala contradiction. things would lead to some sort of absurdity.
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