McTaggart’s proof of the unreality of time Many of these philosophers have also held the view that what is real are mental things: minds, and their experiences. This combination of views -- that the material world is ultimately, in some sense, and illusion, and that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. In a sense, you can think of this sort of view as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that mental things are, in the end, fundamentally physical. Idealism says that material things are, in the end, fundamentally mental. Materialism and idealism are both forms of monism, since they both hold that there is only one fundamental kind of thing in the world; they just disagree about what this kind of thing is. Dualism is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the mental and the physical.

How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are non-mental material things is a mistake. Traditionally, idealists have tried to show this by trying to show that the existence of non-mental material things would lead to some sort of absurdity.

To do this, they have often focused on two of the main supposed attributes of material things: that they exist in space, and that theyLast existtime we in Manydiscussed time. of theseIf Zenoit can philosophersʼs arguments be shown have against thatalso the heldspace reality the view ofand motion. that time what Today are is realourillusions, topicare mental is an that even things: more minds, straight and forward argumenttheir experiences.for idealism: McTaggartThis combinationʼs argument of views for the -- thatunreality the material of time. world is ultimately, in some sense, and would provide a very strong argumentillusion, for and idealism. that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. Our reading for today is anJohn example McTaggartIn ofa Ellissense, this McTaggart kindyou can of was thinkargument; born of this in 1866;sort of his view most as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that McTaggart, aims to show importantthat time work, mentalis fromunreal. things which (The are, our inreading optional the end, today fundamentally reading, was taken, wasphysical. Idealism says that material things are, in the end, published in twofundamentally parts in1921 mental. and, posthumously, Materialism and in1927. idealism It was are both forms of monism, since they both hold that from Kant, aims at an analogousentitled The conclusion Naturethere is of only Existence aboutone fundamental. space.) kind of thing in the world; they just disagree about what this kind of thing is. Dualism is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the mental and the physical. Here is McTaggart’s statementPersonally, of hisMcTaggart view ʼabouts life seems time. to have been unexceptional, though marked by eccentricity. He was known around Cambridge How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are for his habits of getting around by riding a tricycle, and for non-mental material things is a mistake. Traditionally, idealists have tried to show this by trying to show saluting cats when he passed them. that the existence of non-mental material things would lead to some sort of absurdity.

His central philosophicalTo do this, they conviction have often was focusedthat reality on wastwo of the main supposed attributes of material things: that they fundamentallyexist spiritual; in space, and andhis central that they aim exist was in to time. show If thisit can by be shown that space and time are illusions, that deriving contradictionswould provide from athe very assumption strong argument that the for material idealism. world exists. Our reading for today is an example of this kind of argument; McTaggart, aims to show that time is unreal. (The optional reading, The most important of his arguments of this sort was his from Kant, aims at an analogous conclusion about space.) argument that the existence of time itself involves a contradiction. In the passage we read, he puts his view very clearly: Here is McTaggart’s statement of his view about time. Many of these philosophers have also held the view that what is real are mental things: minds, and theirMany experiences. of these Thisphilosophers combination have of alsoviews held -- that the the view material that what world is isreal ultimately, are mental in some things: sense, minds, and and illusion,their andexperiences. that the fundamental This combination reality is of mental views ---- isthat called the idealismmaterial .world is ultimately, in some sense, and illusion, and that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. In a sense, you can think of this sort of view as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that mentalIn a thingssense, are, you in can the thinkend, fundamentallyof this sort of physical.view as the Idealism opposite says of that materialism. material things Materialism are, in the says end, that fundamentallymental things mental. are, Materialismin the end, fundamentallyand idealism are physical. both forms Idealism of monism, says thatsince material they both things hold are,that in the end, therefundamentally is only one fundamental mental. Materialism kind of thing and in idealism the world; are they both just forms disagree of monism, about what since this they kind both of thing hold that is. Dualismthere is onlyis opposed one fundamental to both, and kind says of that thing there in the are world; two fundamentally they just disagree different about kinds what of things, this kind the of thing mentalis. Dualism and the physical.is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the mental and the physical. How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are non-mentalHow would material one gothings about is a arguing mistake. for Traditionally, idealism? Whatidealists needs have to tried be proved to show is this that by our trying view to that show there are thatnon-mental the existence material of non-mental things is material a mistake. things Traditionally, would lead idealiststo some havesort of tried absurdity. to show this by trying to show To dothat this, the they existence have often of non-mental focused on material two of the things main would supposed lead attributesto some sortof material of absurdity. things: that they exist in space, and that they exist in time. If it can be shown that space and time are illusions, that To do this, they have often focused on two of the main supposed attributes of material things: that they would provide a very strong argument for idealism. exist in space, and that they exist in time. If it can be shown that space and time are illusions, that Ourwould reading provide for today a very is an strong example argument of this kindfor idealism. of argument; McTaggart, aims to show that time is unreal. (The optional reading, fromOurThe Kant, mostreading aims important atfor an today analogous of hisis anarguments example conclusion of of this thisabout sort kind space.) was of hisargument; McTaggart,argument that aims the toexistence show that of time time itself is unreal. involves (The a contradiction.optional reading, from Kant, aims at an analogous conclusion about space.) HereIn is the McTaggart’s passage we statement read, he ofputs his his view view about very time. clearly:

Here is McTaggart’s statement1. Ifof there his view were about material time. objects, they would exist in time. 2. Nothing can exist in time. ------C. There are no material objects.

If one is interested in arguingMcTaggart’s for idealism, argument then is, McTaggart in effect, ʼas defense of premise 2. His aim is to show that the idea of argument has an obvioussomething use. For existingif there werein time material involves things, a contradiction. they would presumably have to exist in time; so if nothing does exist in time, there mustTo be understand no material this things. argument, a first step is to understand McTaggart’s distinction between two kinds of properties involved with time.

The key to understanding McTaggartʼs argument is understanding his distinction between the A-properties and the B-properties. Many of these philosophers have also held the view that what is real are mental things: minds, and their experiences. This combination of views -- that the material world is ultimately, in some sense, and illusion, and that the fundamental reality is mental -- is called idealism. In a sense, you can think of this sort of view as the opposite of materialism. Materialism says that mental things are, in the end, fundamentally physical. Idealism says that material things are, in the end, fundamentally mental. Materialism and idealism are both forms of monism, since they both hold that there is only one fundamental kind of thing in the world; they just disagree about what this kind of thing 1. If there were material objects, they would exist in time. is. Dualism is opposed to both, and says that there are two fundamentally different kinds of things, the 2. Nothing can exist in time. mental and------the physical. C. There are no material objects. How would one go about arguing for idealism? What needs to be proved is that our view that there are non-mentalMcTaggart’s material argument things is, in effect,is a mistake. a defense Traditionally, of premise 2. idealists His aim haveis to show tried thatto show the idea this of by trying to show thatsomething the existence existing of in non-mentaltime involves materiala contradiction. things would lead to some sort of absurdity. To do this, they have often focused on two of the main supposed attributes of material things: that they To understand this argument, a first step is to understand McTaggart’s distinction between two kinds of exist in space, and that they exist in time. If it can be shown that space and time are illusions, that properties involved with time. would provide a very strong argument for idealism. Our reading for today is an example of this kind of argument; McTaggart, aims to show that time is unreal. (The optional reading, from Kant, aims at an analogous conclusion about space.) The key to understandingHere is McTaggart’s statement of his view about time. McTaggartʼs argument is understanding his distinction between the A-properties and the B- properties.

Here McTaggart says that the first class of properties The second class of properties -- which he later calls the he is interested in -- which he later calls the B series A series properties -- includes “past”, “present”, and properties -- includes “earlier than” and “later than” “future.” These properties are not permanent: so, for and is permanent, in the sense that if an event has a example, is an event is future, this does not imply that it certain B-series property, it always does. So, for will always be future. example, if X is earlier than Y, then X is always earlier than Y.

Itʼs important to get a handle on this distinction; letʼs run through some examples. A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties B-series propertiesB-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties which are whichnot permanent; are not permanent; examples examplesinclude include which are whichpermanent; are permanent; examples examplesinclude include “past”, “present”,“past”, “present”, and “future.” and “future.” “earlier than”“earlier and than”“later andthan”. “later than”.

Though youThough likely haveyou likely never have thought never about thought this aboutbefore, this I think before, that I twothink things that two are thingsclear: McTaggartare clear: McTaggart is right is right that there thatis a genuinethere is adistinction genuine distinction between these between two theseclasses two of classesproperties, of properties, and in our andordinary in our thought ordinary thought about time,about we do time, think we that do somethink thatevents some really events have really both havekinds both of properties. kinds of properties.

Itʼs important to get a handle on this distinction; letʼs run through some examples. Using this Usingdistinction, this distinction, McTaggart’s McTaggart’s argument argumentcan be thought can be of thought as of the of following as of the form:following form:

1. Nothing1. A-seriesreally Nothing has properties reallyany A-series has any property. A-series property. B-series properties 2. If nothing2. reallyIf nothing has reallyany A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing exists in time. exists in time. ______C. NothingC. exists Nothing in time. exists in time.

Let’s turn firstLet’s to turn his firstargument to his argumentfor premise for 1. premise 1.

McTaggart lived before you were born. A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties B-series propertiesB-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties which are whichnot permanent; are not permanent; examples examplesinclude include which are whichpermanent; are permanent; examples examplesinclude include “past”, “present”,“past”, “present”, and “future.” and “future.” “earlier than”“earlier and than”“later andthan”. “later than”.

Though youThough likely haveyou likely never have thought never about thought this aboutbefore, this I think before, that I twothink things that two are thingsclear: McTaggartare clear: McTaggart is right is right that there thatis a genuinethere is adistinction genuine distinction between these between two theseclasses two of classesproperties, of properties, and in our andordinary in our thought ordinary thought about time,about we do time, think we that do somethink thatevents some really events have really both havekinds both of properties. kinds of properties.

Itʼs important to get a handle on this distinction; letʼs run through some examples. Using this Usingdistinction, this distinction, McTaggart’s McTaggart’s argument argumentcan be thought can be of thought as of the of following as of the form:following form:

1. Nothing1. A-seriesreally Nothing has properties reallyany A-series has any property. A-series property. B-series properties 2. If nothing2. reallyIf nothing has reallyany A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing exists in time. exists in time. McTaggart lived before you were born. ______C. NothingC. exists Nothing in time. exists in time.

Let’s turn firstLet’s to turn his firstargument to his argumentfor premise for 1. premise 1.

The Bush administration is in the past. A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties B-series propertiesB-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties which are whichnot permanent; are not permanent; examples examplesinclude include which are whichpermanent; are permanent; examples examplesinclude include “past”, “present”,“past”, “present”, and “future.” and “future.” “earlier than”“earlier and than”“later andthan”. “later than”.

Though youThough likely haveyou likely never have thought never about thought this aboutbefore, this I think before, that I twothink things that two are thingsclear: McTaggartare clear: McTaggart is right is right that there thatis a genuinethere is adistinction genuine distinction between these between two theseclasses two of classesproperties, of properties, and in our andordinary in our thought ordinary thought about time,about we do time, think we that do somethink thatevents some really events have really both havekinds both of properties. kinds of properties.

Itʼs important to get a handle on this distinction; letʼs run through some examples. Using this Usingdistinction, this distinction, McTaggart’s McTaggart’s argument argumentcan be thought can be of thought as of the of following as of the form:following form:

1. Nothing1. A-seriesreally Nothing has properties reallyany A-series has any property. A-series property. B-series properties 2. If nothing2. reallyIf nothing has reallyany A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing exists in time. exists in time. McTaggart lived before you were born. ______The ______Bush administration is in the past. C. NothingC. exists Nothing in time. exists in time.

Let’s turn firstLet’s to turn his firstargument to his argumentfor premise for 1. premise 1.

The best days for this yearʼs graduating seniors are still to come. A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties B-series propertiesB-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties which are whichnot permanent; are not permanent; examples examplesinclude include which are whichpermanent; are permanent; examples examplesinclude include “past”, “present”,“past”, “present”, and “future.” and “future.” “earlier than”“earlier and than”“later andthan”. “later than”.

Though youThough likely haveyou likely never have thought never about thought this aboutbefore, this I think before, that I twothink things that two are thingsclear: McTaggartare clear: McTaggart is right is right that there thatis a genuinethere is adistinction genuine distinction between these between two theseclasses two of classesproperties, of properties, and in our andordinary in our thought ordinary thought about time,about we do time, think we that do somethink thatevents some really events have really both havekinds both of properties. kinds of properties.

Itʼs important to get a handle on this distinction; letʼs run through some examples. Using this Usingdistinction, this distinction, McTaggart’s McTaggart’s argument argumentcan be thought can be of thought as of the of following as of the form:following form:

1. Nothing1. A-seriesreally Nothing has properties reallyany A-series has any property. A-series property. B-series properties 2. If nothing2. reallyIf nothing has reallyany A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing exists in time. exists in time. McTaggart lived before you were born. ______The ______Bush administration is in the past. The bestC. days Nothing for thisC. exists Nothingyear ʼins graduatingtime. exists in time. seniors are still to come.

Let’s turn firstLet’s to turn his firstargument to his argumentfor premise for 1. premise 1.

The Bush administration is in the past relative to 2010. A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties B-series propertiesB-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties which are whichnot permanent; are not permanent; examples examplesinclude include which are whichpermanent; are permanent; examples examplesinclude include “past”, “present”,“past”, “present”, and “future.” and “future.” “earlier than”“earlier and than”“later andthan”. “later than”.

Though youThough likely haveyou likely never have thought never about thought this aboutbefore, this I think before, that I twothink things that two are thingsclear: McTaggartare clear: McTaggart is right is right that there thatis a genuinethere is adistinction genuine distinction between these between two theseclasses two of classesproperties, of properties, and in our andordinary in our thought ordinary thought about time,about we do time, think we that do somethink thatevents some really events have really both havekinds both of properties. kinds of properties.

Itʼs important to get a handle on this distinction; letʼs run through some examples. Using this Usingdistinction, this distinction, McTaggart’s McTaggart’s argument argumentcan be thought can be of thought as of the of following as of the form:following form:

1. Nothing1. A-seriesreally Nothing has properties reallyany A-series has any property. A-series property. B-series properties 2. If nothing2. reallyIf nothing has reallyany A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing existsThe Bushin time. exists administration in time. is in the past. McTaggart lived before you were born. ______The best daysC. Nothing for thisC. yearexists Nothingʼs graduatingin time. exists in seniors time. are still to come. The Bush administration is in the past relative to 2010.

Let’s turn firstLet’s to turn his firstargument to his argumentfor premise for 1. premise 1.

The Reds’ last World Series win is more recent than the Cubs’. A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties B-series propertiesB-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties which are whichnot permanent; are not permanent; examples examplesinclude include which are whichpermanent; are permanent; examples examplesinclude include “past”, “present”,“past”, “present”, and “future.” and “future.” “earlier than”“earlier and than”“later andthan”. “later than”.

Though youThough likely haveyou likely never have thought never about thought this aboutbefore, this I think before, that I twothink things that two are thingsclear: McTaggartare clear: McTaggart is right is right that there thatis a genuinethere is adistinction genuine distinction between these between two theseclasses two of classesproperties, of properties, and in our andordinary in our thought ordinary thought about time,about we do time, think we that do somethink thatevents some really events have really both havekinds both of properties. kinds of properties.

Itʼs important to get a handle on this distinction; letʼs run through some examples. Using this Usingdistinction, this distinction, McTaggart’s McTaggart’s argument argumentcan be thought can be of thought as of the of following as of the form:following form:

1. Nothing1. A-seriesreally Nothing has properties reallyany A-series has any property. A-series property. B-series properties 2. If nothing2. reallyIf nothing has reallyany A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing existsThe Bushin time. exists administration in time. is in the past. McTaggart lived before you were born. ______The best daysC. Nothing for thisC. yearexists Nothingʼs graduatingin time. exists in seniors time. are still to come. The Bush administration is in the past relative to 2010. The Reds’ last World Series win is more recent than the Cubs’. Let’s turn firstLet’s to turn his firstargument to his argumentfor premise for 1. premise 1.

I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties B-series propertiesB-series properties: temporal: propertiestemporal properties which are whichnot permanent; are not permanent; examples examplesinclude include which are whichpermanent; are permanent; examples examplesinclude include “past”, “present”,“past”, “present”, and “future.” and “future.” “earlier than”“earlier and than”“later andthan”. “later than”.

I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between Though youThough likely haveyou likely never have thought never about thought this aboutbefore, this I think before, that I twothink things that two are thingsclear: McTaggartare clear: McTaggart is right is right these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some that there thatis a genuinethere is adistinction genuine distinction between these between two theseclasses two of classesproperties, of properties, and in our andordinary in our thought ordinary thought events really have both kinds of properties. about time,about we do time, think we that do somethink thatevents some really events have really both havekinds both of properties. kinds of properties.

Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as having the following structure: Using this Usingdistinction, this distinction, McTaggart’s McTaggart’s argument argumentcan be thought can be of thought as of the of following as of the form:following form:

1. Nothing really has any A-series property. 1. Nothing1. really Nothing2. has If nothing reallyany A-series has really any hasproperty. A-series any A-series property. property, then nothing exists in time. 2. If nothing2. reallyIf nothing has reallyany A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing exists in time. exists in time. ______C. Nothing exists in time. (1,2) C. NothingC. exists Nothing in time. exists in time. Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. Let’s turn firstLet’s to turn his firstargument to his argumentfor premise for 1. premise 1. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series propertiesA-series properties: temporal properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are notwhich permanent; are not permanent; examples include examples include “past”, “present”, and “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 1. Nothing1. reallyNothing has really any A-series has any property. A-series property. “past”, “present”,“past”, and“present”, “future.” and “future.” 2. If nothing2. If really nothing has really any A-series has any property, A-series thenproperty, nothing then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time.exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which areB-series permanent; properties examples: temporal include properties Thoughwhich youare permanent;whichlikely have are permanent;never examples thought include examples about this include before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right C. NothingC. “past”,existsNothing in “present”, time.exists in andtime. “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. that“earlier there than” is a“earlier genuine and “laterthan” distinction than”.and “later between than”. these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties.

Let’sLet’s turn turnThough firstLet’s first to youtoturn his his likelyargumentfirst argument tohave his for neverargument for premise premise thought for1. 1. premiseabout this 1. before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: Here is what McTaggart says: Here is whataboutHere McTaggart time, is what we do McTaggartsays think about that says: thissome premise: events really have both kinds of properties. 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______1. Nothing really has any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. C. Nothing exists in time.

Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1.

The idea here seems to be this: if any event has one of the three basic A-series properties of past, present, and future, it has all of them. (Let’s forget for now about the possibility of a first and last moment of time; they would have just two of these three properties.) But this is impossible, since these properties are, as he says, incompatible. So no event ever has any of these properties. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. The idea here seems to be this: if any event has one of the three basic A-series properties of past, present, andLet’s future, turnThough it first has youto all his of likely them.argument have (Let’s never for forget premise thought for now1. about about this the before, possibility I think of that a first two and things last are moment clear: ofMcTaggart time; is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: theyHere would is what have McTaggart just two of says: these three properties.) But this is impossible, since these properties are, as he says, incompatible.about time, Sowe no do event think everthat somehas any events of these really properties. have both kinds of properties. 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. We can layUsing out thisthis distinction,defense of premiseMcTaggart’s 1 as argumentfollows: can be thought of as of2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______1. If 1.any Nothing event hasreally one has of any the A-seriesfollowing property. properties - being past, beingC. Nothing present, exists in time. being2. futureIf nothing - then really it also has has any the A-series others. property, then nothing 2. No eventexists can in time. have more than one of the following properties: ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. being past, being present, being future. C. Nothing exists in time. ______C. No event has any of the following properties: being past, being present, being future. (1,2) Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1.

This is a valid argument; it is of the form: (1) If p then q, (2) not-q, therefore (C) not-p.

So, the only question we need to ask about this defense of premise (1) of McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time is: are its premises true? A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. 1. If any event has one of the following properties - being past, being present, Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right being future - then it also has the others. that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: 2. No event can have more than one of the following properties: Here isabout what time,McTaggart we do says:think that some events really have both kinds of properties. being past, being present, being future. ______1. Nothing really has any A-series property. UsingC. this No distinction,event has any McTaggart’s of the following argument properties: can be thoughtbeing past, of as being of2. the present,If nothingfollowing being really form: has any A-series property, then nothing future. (1,2) exists in time. ______The only question1. weNothing need reallyto ask has about any this A-series defense property. of premise (1) of McTaggart’sC. Nothing argument exists for in the time. unreality of time is: are its premises2. If nothing true? really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. As McTaggart is aware, this argument is open to an obvious objection. (As he puts it, “it has been impossible to C. Nothing exists in time. state the difficulty without almost giving the explanation.”) The objection might be put like this:

McTaggart’sLet’s turn first argument to his argument rests on for an premiseambiguity. 1. Every event has all of the A-series properties at some time or other; but what is impossible is that any event have all of these properties at the same time. We can’t just talk simply about events having these properties -- being past, present and future -- we have to talk about them having these properties at certain times. And when we do that, the contradiction goes away, since there is no contradiction in a certain event being past at one time but future at another.

Let’s call this the obvious objection. McTaggart thinks that the obvious objection fails. To see why, we have to ask: what does it mean for an event to have one of these three properties at a certain time? A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. 1. If any event has one of the following properties - being past, being present, Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right being future - then it also has the others. that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: 2. No event can have more than one of the following properties: Here isabout what time,McTaggart we do says:think that some events really have both kinds of properties. being past, being present, being future. ______1. Nothing really has any A-series property. UsingC. this No distinction,event has any McTaggart’s of the following argument properties: can be thoughtbeing past, of as being of2. the present,If nothingfollowing being really form: has any A-series property, then nothing future. (1,2) exists in time. ______What does it mean1. Nothing for an event really to has have any one A-series of these property. three properties at a certainC. Nothing time? exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing Here is one thing we exists might in time.mean: perhaps no event simply has the properties of being past, present, and future. ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. Instead, it has these properties: will be past, is present, was future. So instead of our three simple A- series C. Nothing exists in time. properties--

Let’s turnpast first to his argument for premise 1. present future

We should really be talking about these nine second-level A-series properties:

was past is past will be past was present is present will be present was future is future will be future A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. 1. If any event has one of the following properties - being past, being present, Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right being future - then it also has the others. that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: 2. No event can have more than one of the following properties: Here isabout what time,McTaggart we do says:think that some events really have both kinds of properties. being past, being present, being future. ______1. Nothing really has any A-series property. UsingC. this No distinction,event has any McTaggart’s of the following argument properties: can be thoughtbeing past, of as being of2. the present,If nothingfollowing being really form: has any A-series property, then nothing future. (1,2) exists in time. ______What does it mean1. Nothing for an event really to has have any one A-series of these property. three properties at a certainC. Nothing time? exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing was past exists in time. is past will be past ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. was present is present will be present C. Nothing exists in time. was future is future will be future

Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. Or, in other words:

past in the past past in the present past in the future present in the past present in the present present in the future future in the past future in the present future in the future A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. 9 second-level A- series properties 1. If anyLet’s event turnThough has first one youto hisof likely the argument following have never for properties premise thought 1. -about being this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, andpast in our McTaggart’s in ordinarythe past thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: past, beingHere ispresent, what McTaggart being future says: - then it also has the others. 2. No event canabout have time, more we thando think one thatof the some following events really have both kinds of properties. present in the past properties: being past, being present, being future. future in the past ______1. Nothing pastreally in has the any present A-series property. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing C. No event Usinghas any this of distinction, the following McTaggart’s properties: argument being past, can be thought of as of the followingpresent form: in the present exists in time. being present, being future. (1,2) ______future in the present 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. C. Nothing pastexists in in the time. future McTaggart2. If nothing thinks really that this has delays any A-series rather thanproperty, resolves then nothing present in the future exists in time. future in the future the ______contradiction in the A-series. Here is what he says: Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. C. Nothing exists in time.

Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties.

Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: Here isabout what time,McTaggart we do says:think that some events really have both kinds of properties.

1. Nothing really has any A-series property. Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______1. Nothing really has any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. C. Nothing exists in time. The problem that McTaggart sees here is that just as our 9 second-level A- three initial A-series properties (past, present, future) are series properties both incompatible and such that every event that has Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. past in the past one has them all, the same can be said of our new nine present in the past A-series properties. future in the past past in the present To see this, focus on the three “middle” second-level A- series properties. Isn’t there the same contradiction in an present in the present event having all three of these as in an event having the future in the present three first-level A-series properties of being past, present, past in the future and future? present in the future future in the future A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. The problem that McTaggart sees here is that just as our three initial Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things9 are second-level clear: McTaggart A- is right A-series properties (past, present, future) are both incompatible and that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, andseries in our McTaggart’s properties ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: such that every event that has one has them all, the same can be Here isabout what time,McTaggart we do says:think that some events really have both kinds of properties. said of our new nine A-series properties. past in the past present in the past 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. To see this, focus on the three “middle” second-level A-series future in the past Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing past in the present properties. Isn’t there the same contradiction in an event having all exists in time. three of these as in an event having the three first-level A-series ______present in the present properties of being1. Nothing past, reallypresent, has and any future? A-series property. C. Nothingfuture exists in in the time. present 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing past in the future One might reply existsto McTaggart in time. as follows: present in the future ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. future in the future No, C.it simply Nothing is existsnot true in thattime. every event has each of these nine second-level A-series properties; each event has all of these properties at some time. While it is true that event event which is Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. present in the present was future in the present and will be past in the present, no event has each of these properties at the same time.

This is to repeat the obvious objection: it is once again to insist that we can only talk about events having A-series properties at a certain time. But on our present construal of that objection, this just amounts to the claim that we should abandon the 9 second-level A-series properties in favor of the 27 third-level A-series properties. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. One might reply to McTaggart as follows: Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: No, it simply is not true that every event has each of these nine Here isabout what time,McTaggart we do says:think that some events really have both kinds of properties. second-level A-series properties; each event has all of these properties at some time. While it is true that event event which is 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. Usingpresent this indistinction, the present McTaggart’s was future argument in the present can be and thought will be of past as of in2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing the present, no event has each of these properties at the same exists in time. time. ______1. Nothing really has any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. This is to repeat2. the If nothing obvious really objection: has any it isA-series once again property, to insist then that nothing we can only talk about events having A-series properties exists in time. at a certain time. But on our present construal of that objection, this just amounts to the______claim that we should abandon the 9 second-level A-seriesLet’s turn properties first to inhis favor argument of the for 27 premise 1. third-level A-seriesC. Nothing properties. exists in time.

To see that this will not help, it is sufficient to note that among the 27 third-level A-series properties will be: Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. past in the present in the present present in the present in the present future in the present in the present

But as with the relevant first- and second-level A-series properties it seems both that (i) every event has all of these third-level properties, and yet (ii) these third-level properties are incompatible. Hence the contradiction in the A-series, McTaggart thinks, remains. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. To see that this will not help, it is sufficient to note that among the 27 third-level A-series properties will be: Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: Here isabout what time,McTaggartpast we doin thesays:think present that some in the events present really have both kinds of properties. present in the present in the present future in the present in the present 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing But as with the relevant first- and second-level A-series properties it seems both exists that in(i) time.every event has all of these third-level properties, and yet (ii) these third-level properties are incompatible.______Hence the contradiction in the A-series, McTaggart thinks,1. Nothing remains. really has any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. C. Nothing exists in time.

Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. To see that this will not help, it is sufficient to note that among the 27 third-level A-series properties will be: Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: Here isabout what time,McTaggartpast we doin thesays:think present that some in the events present really have both kinds of properties. present in the present in the present future in the present in the present 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing But as with the relevant first- and second-level A-series properties it seems both exists that in(i) time.every event has all of these third-level properties, and yet (ii) these third-level properties are incompatible.______Hence the contradiction in the A-series, McTaggart thinks,1. Nothing remains. really has any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______Let’sLet’s sum turn up. firstThe toobvious his argument objection for to premise McTaggart’s 1. C. Nothing exists in time. defense of premise (1) of his argument was that we can’t just talk about events having the A-series properties of past, present, and future, but rather Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. must talk about whether an event is present or was future. This amounted to a switch from first- level to second-level A-series properties; but we saw that this does not avoid the contradiction. And this contradiction will remain at the third level, the fourth level, and so on. So the obvious objection does not seem to remove the contradiction in the A-series. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. To see that this will not help, it is sufficient to note that among the 27 third-level A-series properties will be: Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: Here isabout what time,McTaggartpast we doin thesays:think present that some in the events present really have both kinds of properties. present in the present in the present future in the present in the present 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of2. the If nothingfollowing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing But as with the relevant first- and second-level A-series properties it seems both exists that in(i) time.every event has all of these third-level properties, and yet (ii) these third-level properties are incompatible.______Hence the contradiction in the A-series, McTaggart thinks,1. Nothing remains. really has any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then Let’snothing sum up. The obvious objection to McTaggart’s exists in time. ______defenseLet’s ofturn premise first to (1) his of argument his argument for premise was that 1. we C. Nothing exists in time. can’t just talk about events having the A-series properties of past, present, and future, but rather must talk about whether an event is present or Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. was future. This amounted to a switch from first- level to second-level A-series properties; but we saw that this does not avoid the contradiction. And this contradiction will remain at the third level, the fourth level, and so on. So the obvious objection does not seem to remove the contradiction in the A-series, and so does not help to block McTaggart’s defense of the first premise of his argument for the unreality of time. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are are not not permanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties exists in time. B-series properties: temporal properties ______which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing “past”,exists in “present”, time. and “future.” Though“earlier you than”likely haveand “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that“earlier there than” is a genuine and “later distinction than”. between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. However, one might at this point try a different line of reply: Let’s turnThough first youto his likely argument have never for premise thought 1. about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classesUsing of properties, this distinction, and in our McTaggart’s ordinary thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: Here isabout what time,McTaggart we do says:think that some Theevents obvious really haveobjection, both kinds take of2 properties.

Look, when I said that events don’t simply have or not have the A-series1. properties Nothing really but onlyhas anyhave A-series them at property. a time,Using I didn’tthis distinction, mean to replace McTaggart’s past, present,argument and can future, be thought with second-level of as of2. the If nothingfollowingA-series really propertiesform: has any like A-series being property, then nothing past in the present. What I meant was that the properties that events really exists have in are time. properties like ______1. Nothing really has any A-seriespast property. relative to 1/1/2010 C. Nothing exists in time. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing and these properties exists in don’ttime. seem to lead to any contradiction, since it is simply not true that every event ______Let’s turn first to his argument for premise 1. which has this property also has, for example, the property of being future relative to 1/1/2010. So C. Nothing exists in time. McTaggart’s argument that the A-series involves a contradiction fails.

What is wrongLet’s turn with first version to his 2 argumentof the obvious for premise objection, 1. from the point of view of someone who wants to object to premise (1) of McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time?

It is very natural to think that we can block McTaggart’s argument for the conclusion that the A-series is contradictory by saying that events only have A-series properties at certain times. But on one way of developing this thought, we don’t really get rid of the contradiction; and on the other, we end up giving up on A-series properties altogether, which is just to agree with McTaggart’s first premise. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are arenot notpermanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has anyMcTaggart’s A-series property, argument then for nothing the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties exists inA-series time. properties: temporal properties B-seriesB-series properties propertieswhich: temporal: temporalare not properties permanent; properties examples include ______1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”, “present”, and “future.” which are not permanent; examples include whichwhich are permanent;are permanent; examples examples include include C. Nothing“past”, exists in“present”, time.2. If nothingand “future.” really has any A-series property, thenThough nothing“earlier you than” likely andhave “later never than”. thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right exists in time. “earlier than” and “later than”. ______that there is a genuineB-series distinction properties between: temporal these propertiestwo classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing exists in time. about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. At this point, you might wonder: why would this be so bad? Why not think that events have“earlier B-series than” and “later than”. It is veryproperties, naturalThough to but thinkyou don’t likely that really wehave havecan never block A-series thought McTaggart’s properties? about thisargument Why before, think, for I think asthe McTaggart’s conclusion that two things premisethat theare A-series(2)clear: says, McTaggart thatis contradictory if is right by sayingwe give thatthat upevents there on the isonly aA-series genuine haveAt A-seriesthisproperties distinction point, properties you we between mighthave atwonder:to thesecertaingive up whytwo times. on wouldclasses the But idea this onUsingof thatbe properties,one so objects this bad?way distinction, ofWhy existand developing not inin thinkourtime McTaggart’s ordinary that atthis all? events thought, thought argument have we B-series can be thought of as of the following form: don’t really aboutget rid time, of the we contradiction; do thinkproperties, that andsome but ondon’t events the really other, really have we haveA-series end bothup properties?giving kinds up of on properties.Why A-series think, as properties McTaggart’s altogether, premise (2) which says, that if is justWhether to agree or with not McTaggart’swe acceptwe McTaggart’s firstgive premise.up on theargument A-series that properties time requires we have change to give andup on that the change idea that requires objects theexist A- in time at all? series, there certainly are some odd consequences of giving up on the reality1. of Nothing A-series really properties. has any (In A-series property. Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of 2.the If followingnothing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing At thiswhat point, follows, you might I will usewonder: the B-theory why would as thisa name be for the theory that time exists and that events have B- exists in time. so bad?series Why properties, not think butthat that events events have don’t B-series ever really have any A-series properties.______properties, but don’t really have A-series properties? 1. Nothing reallyHere has is what any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. Why think,Consider, as McTaggart’s first, the idea premise thatMcTaggart time (2) moves says, says that in about a ifcertain we direction. This idea is certainly part of our 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing give upcommonsense on the A-series view properties of time,this but we idea: it have is hard to giveto see up how someone who does not believe in A-series properties exists in time. on thecan idea explain that objects this.______Isn’t exist the in movement time at all? of time just the movement of “theLet’s present” turn first -- the to changehis argument in which for timepremise 1. has the propertyC. Nothingof being existspresent? in time. But this is an A-series property, and hence a property that the B-theorist McTaggartdoes notdefends think thatthe secondany events Whatpremise really is his of have. argument? his argument by trying to show thatWhy time would requires this show change,However, andLet’s that perhaps turn genuine first this tochange ishis not thatargument sorequires time bad can’t for for the the premiseexist reality B-theorist, 1. since it is not clear that the idea that time moves of A-seriesreally makesproperties. sense. It seemsunless that objectsif time moves,have A- it must move at a certain speed. But what could be the speed at which time moves?series It does properties? not seem that there is any good answer to this question. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties whichwhich are arenot notpermanent; permanent; examples examples include include which are permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”,“past”, “present”, “present”, and and “future.” “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists inA-series time. properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties ______B-series properties: temporal properties which are not permanent; examples include whichwhich are permanent;are permanent; examples examples include include C. Nothing exists in time. Though you likely have never thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right “past”, “present”, and “future.” “earlier“earlier than” than” and and“later “later than”. than”. that there is a genuine distinction between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties. At this point, you might wonder: why would this be so bad? Why not think that events have B-series One might,properties,Though however, but you don’t respond likely really have to have McTaggart’s never A-series thought argumentproperties? about this as Why follows:before, think, I thinkas McTaggart’s that two things premise are (2)clear: says, McTaggart that if is right we givethat up there on the is aA-series genuine properties distinction we between have to thesegive up two on classes the idea Usingof that properties, objects this distinction, existand inin ourtime McTaggart’s ordinary at all? thought argument can be thought of as of the following form: about time, we do think that some eventsThe really B-theory have ofboth time kinds of properties. Whether or not we accept McTaggart’s argument that time requires change and that change requires the A- series, thereThe certainly only genuine are some temporal odd consequences properties are of thegiving B-series up on properties.the reality1. of ButNothing A-series objects really properties. still has any (In A-series property. Using this distinction, McTaggart’s argument can be thought of as of 2.the If followingnothing really form: has any A-series property, then nothing what follows,change, I will use since the for B-theory an object as toa namechange for is the just theory for that that object time existsto have and different that events properties have B- at exists in time. series properties,different but times. that eventsOf course, don’t it ever is always really truehave (and any alwaysA-series was properties. true)______that the object would have those properties at those times. But that doesn’t mean that the object doesn’t 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. C. Nothing exists in time. Consider, first,change. the idea that time moves in a certain direction. This idea is certainly part of our 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing commonsense view of time, but it is hard to see how someone who does not believe in A-series properties exists in time. can explain this.______Isn’t the movement of time just the movement of “theLet’s present” turn first -- the to changehis argument in which for timepremise 1. The B-theorist defends the reality of time by agreeing with McTaggart about the A-properties, but rejecting premise 2 has the propertyC. Nothingof being existspresent? in time. But this is an A-series property, and hence a property that the B-theorist of McTaggart’sdoes not think argument. that any events really have.

Is theHowever, B-theoryLet’s perhaps anturn acceptable first this to ishis not viewargument so ofbad time? for for the premise B-theorist, 1. since it is not clear that the idea that time moves really makes sense. It seems that if time moves, it must move at a certain speed. But what could be the One speedapparent at which consequence time moves? of the It B-theorydoes not isseem eternalism that there: the is anyview good that answerthe past to and this the question. future - and the objects and events of the past and future - exist in just the same way as the objects and events of the present moment. This seems to be a consequence of the B-theory, since according to the B-theory there is no property of “being the present moment” which singles out one time as special. (That would be an A-series property.) The B-theory of time

The only genuine temporal properties are the B-series properties. But objects still change, since for an object to change is just for that object to have different properties at different times. Of course, it is always true (and always was true) that the object would have those properties at those times. But that doesn’t mean that the object doesn’t change.

One apparent consequence of the B-theory is eternalism: the view that the past and the future - and the objects and events of the past and future - exist in just the same way as the objects and events of the present moment. This seems to be a consequence of the B-theory, since according to the B-theory there is no property of “being the present moment” which singles out one time as special. (That would be an A-series property.)

One way to understand eternalism is by analogy with space. No one (at least, no one sensible) would think that only objects here exist; the eternalist makes an analogous claim about the now. Indeed, the spatial analogy is useful for understanding the B-theory more generally. Denial of A-series properties is sort of like the denial that there is any genuine property of here-ness.

Many people find eternalism to be hard to accept. When we say that the past is gone, for example, aren’t we saying that it no longer exists?

But perhaps this is an area in which common sense should be rejected; after all, the B-theorist can point out that eternalism can be given at least two fairly plausible lines of defense.

1. It is a consequence of special relativity that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity. But if there are no facts about which events are absolutely simultaneous with a certain event, how can we draw the presentist’s distinction between what exists and what does not?

2. It seems that present events can be related by past events; for example, present events are caused by past events. But how could past events stand in certain relations to present events unless they exist to stand in those relations? McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties which are not permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”, “present”, and “future.” 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______B-series properties: temporal properties which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing exists in time. “earlier than” and “later than”. The B-theory of time

The only genuine temporal properties are the B-series properties. But objects still Whether or notchange, we accept since for McTaggart’s an object to argumentchange is just that for time that objectrequires to have change different and properties that change at requires the A- series, there certainlydifferent times. are some Of course, odd itconsequences is always true (and of givingalways upwas on true) the that reality the object of A-series would properties. (In what follows, haveI will those use theproperties B-theory at those as atimes. name But for that the doesn’t theory mean that that time the exists object and doesn’t that events have B- series properties,change. but that events don’t ever really have any A-series properties.

PerhapsBut there the are most some striking other surprising consequence consequences of the B-theory,of the B-theory. though, One theis the is statusstatus that that it assignsit assigns to the to presentthe present moment.moment. Suppose that you have complete amnesia, Suppose that you have complete amnesia, and are presentedand withare presenteda series of books with awhich series detail of booksthe wholewhich history detail of planet the earth whole -- past, history present, of planet and earth future.-- You past, might present, think that and when future. you finishYou mightreading think the books,that whenyou will you still finishhave one reading question the which books, in you unanswered:will still namely, have one Which question moment which is the presentin moment?unanswered: namely, Which moment is the present moment? There is a sense in which the B-theorist thinks that this questionThere ishas a senseonly a trivial in which answer: the each B-theorist time is thinks presentthat relative this questionto itself, and has no only event a is trivial PRESENT, answer: period,each since time no event is present has any relative A-series to properties. itself, and no But thisevent seems is PRESENT,odd. Doesn’t period, our history since leave no out event a has genuineany fact? A-series properties. But this seems odd. Isn’t the present time fundamentally different than other times? McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series properties: temporal properties which are not permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”, “present”, and “future.” 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______B-series properties: temporal properties which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing exists in time. “earlier than” and “later than”.

Whether or not we accept McTaggart’s argument that time requires change and that change requires the A- series, there certainly are some odd consequences of giving up on the reality of A-series properties. (In what follows, I will use the B-theory as a name for the theory that time exists and that events have B- series properties, but that events don’t ever really have any A-series properties.

Perhaps the most striking consequence of the B-theory, though, the is status that it assigns to the present moment. A-series properties: temporal properties SupposeB-series that properties you have: temporal complete properties amnesia, Suppose that you have complete amnesia, and are which are not permanent; examples include and whichare presented are permanent; with examplesa series ofinclude books “past”, “present”, and “future.” presented “earlierwith a seriesthan” ofand books “later which than”. detail the wholewhich history detail of planet the earth whole -- past, history present, of planet and earth -- past, present, and future. You might think future. SupposeYou might that think you that have when complete you finish amnesia, reading the books,thatand whenyouare presentedwill you still finishhave with one reading a series question ofthe books which books, in you unanswered:willwhich still detailnamely, have the one Which whole question moment history which ofis planetthe presentin earth moment?unanswered:-- past, present, namely, and future. Which You moment might think is the presentthat when moment? you finish reading the books, you will still have one question which in There is a sense in which the B-theorist thinks that Thereunanswered: is a sense namely, in which Which themoment B-theorist is the thinks this questionpresent has moment? only a trivial answer: each time is presentthat relative this questionto itself, and has no only event a is trivial PRESENT, answer: period,eachThere since time isno a event senseis present has in which any relative A-series the B-theorist to properties. itself, thinks and no But thiseventthat seems this is PRESENT,odd.question Doesn’t has period, ouronly history a trivial since leave answer: no out event a has genuineanyeach fact? A-series time is present properties. relative But to itself,this seemsand no odd. Isn’tevent the is PRESENT,present time period, fundamentally since no event different has thanany A-seriesother times? properties. But this seems odd. Isn’t the present time fundamentally different than other times?

The B-theorist must think of our question, “Which moment is present?” as analogous to Thethe B-theoristquestion one can might reply askthat whenthere presentedis a sense in whichwith the our information history “leaves at right. something out”; but this is the same sense in which the map at right leaves somethingIn general, out. the SinceB-theorist this shouldwill think not of convince time as us thatanalogous there is toan space; objective just property as there ofis “here-ness”,no theobjective example property of the world-historyof HERE-NESS, should so there not is convinceno objective us of property the reality of NOW-NESS;of A-series properties. there are only the properties of being here, or now, relative to particular things or events. A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include “past”, “present”, and “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”.

Suppose that you have complete amnesia, and are presented with a series of books which detail the whole history of planet earth McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time A-series-- properties past, present,: temporal and properties future. You might think which are not permanent; examples include 1. Nothing really has any A-series property. “past”, “present”,that when and you “future.” finish reading the books, you 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing will still have one question which in exists in time. ______B-seriesunanswered: properties: temporal namely, properties Which moment is the which are permanent; examples include C. Nothing exists in time. present moment? “earlier than” and “later than”. There is a sense in which the B-theorist thinks Whether or not we accept McTaggart’s argument that time requires change andthat that this change question requires has the onlyA- a trivial answer: series, there certainly are some odd consequences of giving up on the reality ofeach A-series time properties. is present (In relative to itself, and no what follows, I will use the B-theory as a name for the theory that time exists andevent that is events PRESENT, have B- period, since no event has series properties, but that events don’t ever really have any A-series properties. any A-series properties. But this seems odd. Perhaps the most striking consequence of the B-theory, though, the is status thatIsn’t it theassigns present to the timepresent fundamentally different moment. than other times? Suppose that you have complete amnesia, and are presented with a series of books The B-theorist must think of our question, which detail the whole history of planet earth “Which moment is present?” as analogous to -- past, present, and future. You might think that when you finish reading the books, you the question one might ask when presented will still have one question which in with the information at right. unanswered: namely, Which moment is the present moment?

In general, the B-theorist will think of time as There is a sense in which the B-theorist thinks analogous to space; just as there is no that this question has only a trivial answer: objective property of HERE-NESS, so there is each time is present relative to itself, and no no objective property of NOW-NESS; there event is PRESENT, period, since no event has any A-series properties. But this seems odd. are only the properties of being here, or now, Isn’t the present time fundamentally different relative to particular things or events. than other times?

However, one can challenge the sort of analogy that the B-theorist wants to draw between time and space.

from Arthur Prior, “Some free thinking about time” However, one can challenge the sort of analogy that the B-theorist wants to draw between time and space.

from Arthur Prior, “Some free thinking about time”

One way of bringing out Prior’s idea is to point out that there seem to be genuine asymmetries between past and present which have no obvious analogue in the case of space. This emerges especially clearly, he though, when we think about the difference between some painful experience being in the future and being in the past. One might think that to capture this disanalogy one needs to believe in A-series properties.

Another way to argue that time and space are less analogous than the B-theorist thinks is to focus on the fact that time, unlike space, is something that moves. Our language for talking about time is full of metaphors that pick up on this: we talk about time flowing, or the passage of time. But according to the B-theorist, there can be no such thing as the movement or flow of time; hence this aspect of our experience of time must be an illusion.

However, here again the B-theorist has a response; and this is to point out that a plausible case can be made that the flow of time must be an illusion. After all, if time moves, there must be some speed at which it moves; but how could there be a speed at which time moves, since speeds are measured with respect to time? A-series properties: temporal properties B-series properties: temporal properties which are not permanent; examples include which are permanent; examples include “past”, “present”, and “future.” “earlier than” and “later than”.

Though you likely have never thought about this before, I think that two things are clear: McTaggart is right that there is a genuine distinction between these two classes of properties, and in our ordinary thought about time, we do think that some events really have both kinds of properties.

Summing up:Using McTaggart this distinction, gave us McTaggart’s the following argument argument can against be thought the reality of as of of time. the following form:

1. Nothing really has any A-series property. 2. If nothing really has any A-series property, then nothing exists in time. ______C. Nothing exists in time.

If one believesLet’s that turn things first to really his argument do exist infor time, premise then 1. one must reject one of the premises of this argument. Two opposing views of time are defined in part in terms of which premise they reject. The A-theorist rejects the first premise, and holds that events really do have A-series properties like being present. The B-theorist rejects the second premise, and holds that the absence of A-series properties needn’t count against the reality of time, which requires only B-series properties.