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2019-05-28 The Role of Scandinavian Aid in the Development of Postcolonial Botswana, 1966-2000

Sello, Gorata Boitumelo

Sello, G. B. (2019). The Role of Scandinavian Aid in the Development of Postcolonial Botswana, 1966-2000 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/110443 master thesis

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The Role of Scandinavian Aid in the Development of Postcolonial Botswana, 1966-2000

by

Gorata Boitumelo Sello

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

MAY, 2019

© Gorata Boitumelo Sello 2019

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful for the guidance and constructive feedback that my supervisor, Dr Timothy

Stapleton, gave me throughout the writing of this thesis. The time he took off his schedule to edit every single page of this thesis to ensure quality is highly appreciated. The result is only evidence of his resentment for mediocrity. I am also deeply indebted to members of my supervising committee, Dr Amelia Kiddle and Dr Rowland Caesar Apentiik, for reviewing the final draft of the thesis and highlighting areas of possible improvement.

I am also thankful to the Botswana National Archives and Records Services, the Botswana

Documentation and Special Collections as well as the University of Botswana for granting me access to primary materials which have aided my research.

i

Dedicated to my mothers, Meriam B. Sello and Khakha Pheto. Thank you for your unwavering support ladies!

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ABSTRACT

The Role of Scandinavian Aid in the Development of Postcolonial Botswana, 1966-2000

Gorata Boitumelo Sello

This thesis provides a historical account of Botswana-Scandinavian relations. Through its analysis, the thesis will show how the Botswana-Scandinavian bilateral relations do not exemplify aid dependence as argued by scholars of dependency theory. To dependency theorists, bilateral aid is the reason why Africa is swimming in poverty and corruption scandals.

This thesis challenges the assertions that aid leads to the underdevelopment of Africa, by showing that there is a direct correlation between foreign aid and economic growth in post- colonial Botswana. The thesis argues that the success of bilateral aid is determined by the discipline of the recipient country and the intentions of the donor country.

Key words/phrases: Bilateral aid, Scandinavian, foreign aid, foreign policy, Botswana,

Norway, Sweden, development, assistance.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... i ABSTRACT ...... iii CHAPTER ONE ...... 3 INTRODUCTION ...... 3 Theoretical Framework ...... 4 Literature Review...... 7 Methodology and Limitations ...... 16 CHAPTER TWO ...... 18 A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SCANDINAVIAN-BOTSWANA RELATIONS .... 18 Botswana ...... 18 Scandinavia ...... 38 Foreign Aid Policy ...... 39 Conclusion: Forging Alliances with Botswana...... 45 CHAPTER THREE ...... 47 SWEDEN IN BOTSWANA ...... 47 Swedish Foreign Aid Policy ...... 47 Sweden-Botswana Cooperation Aid Agreements ...... 51 Swedish-Botswana Aid Cooperation: Three Decades of Growth...... 54 Aid to the Construction Industry in Botswana ...... 55 Involvement in Rural Area Development ...... 56 Education Sector Development...... 59 Agricultural Sector ...... 67 Conclusion ...... 70 CHAPTER FOUR ...... 73 NORWAY IN BOTSWANA ...... 73 NORWEGIAN AID POLICY ...... 73 Aid Agreements between Botswana and Norway ...... 75 Accelerated Remote Area Development Programme (ARADP) ...... 78 INFRASTRURE DEVELOPMENT ...... 82 Rural Roads Programme ...... 83

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HEALTH SECTOR DEVELOPMENT ...... 88 CONCLUSION ...... 100 CONCLUSION ...... 103 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 107

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The origins of foreign aid as an institution can be traced back to the Marshall Plan, an American initiative to assist Western Europe in the post-World War Two era around 1948. 1 Before its formalisation, foreign aid already existed in the precolonial era through mission works.

Christian missions from Europe set out to spread Christianity and introduce formal Western education across the world.2 Through the missionaries, schools and hospitals were built in most less developed countries. In the case of Africa, some missionaries sent African youths to

Europe for professional studies in an attempt to establish a westernised society within Africa.

Historians who wrote about mission works in the precolonial period hardly established the works as aid to Africa but rather as evangelical missions and these activities subsequently paved the way for the colonisation of Africa. A definition of foreign aid given by the Birla

Institute of Scientific Research asserts that foreign aid is associated with any form of resource inflow from an outside economy, usually from a well-off country to a developing country to assist the latter.3 This definition, therefore, qualifies early mission works as foreign aid based on the fact that teachers, nurses and doctors travelled to Africa from Europe under the mission societies. Most scholars concur with this definition and have used it as a basis for their various arguments. Such scholars as Carol Lancaster and Roger C. Riddell define foreign aid as the transfer of resources from a well off economy to a developing one.4

1 Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 2 (January 2004): 256. 2 For a case study of the earliest Christian mission works in Africa see J.F. Ade Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891: The Making of a New Elite (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965) 3 Birla Institute of Scientific Research: Economic Research Division, Does Foreign Aid Help? (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1981), 1. 4 See Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much To Do So Little Done (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 1 and Roger C. Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 85. 3

Foreign aid was established in the late 1940s as a means of helping developing countries reach financial growth and development in the form of industries and infrastructure. To oversee the

Marshall Plan, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948, which later became the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) in 1959.5 An agreement was made in 1970 by developed countries that they would each give 0.7 percent of their gross national income annually towards international aid.6 By

1970, Scandinavian countries were economically stable enough to offer assistance to newly independent countries. Although the term ‘Scandinavian’ is typically used to collectively refer to Sweden, Norway and Denmark, the thesis excludes the latter in its discussion.

The thesis claims that Scandinavian aid to Botswana contributed towards the latter’s economic development. Economic development takes into account broader aspects of a country’s progression such as the living standards of its citizens, infrastructural development and advanced education systems. It is often confused with economic growth, which is generally the rise in a country’s output of goods and services, measured in monetary value. 7 The following chapters will highlight the extent to which Scandinavian aid sped up Botswana’s economic development process. Financial aid granted to Botswana allowed her to maximise on the diamond industry and grow its economy.

Theoretical Framework To better understand the dynamics of the Scandinavian-Botswana relations, this thesis will use the International Relations (IR) theory and also critique the dependency theory to support its claims. It will use the liberalist school of IR thought to contextualise Scandinavian countries’ foreign policies in Botswana. As a discipline, IR broadly covers a number of sub-

5 Timothy Bainbridge, “A Brief History of the OECD.” OECD Observer (Summer 2000), 111. http://www.oecdobserver.org/ 6 Adeniyi Jimmy Adedokun, “Foreign Aid, Governance and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does One Cap Fit All?,” African Development Review 29, no. 2 (2017): 184. 7 Educba, “Economic Growth vs Economic Development,” accessed May, 27, 2019, https://www.educba.com/economic-growth-vs-economic-development/ 4 disciplines that include foreign policy analysis, international political theory and military affairs. It came into existence as a response to the realities of the First World War as an attempt to restore world peace and order. IR is generally a “study of how the system of states could be made to work more effectively to enhance the power of law, peacefully manage interstate affairs, preserve order and minimize the prospects of war.”8

Liberalism in some IR literature, is the school of thought that believes in global peace and cooperation. It was established as a critique of idealism which scholars characterise as utopian and unrealistic. Liberalist countries believe in social, political and economic progress of all countries. They also believe that the purpose of a foreign policy should be to promote world peace and global interconnectedness. 9 Scholars of liberalism include the ‘Father of

Liberalism,’ English philosopher John Locke, whose work influenced German philosopher

Immanuel Kant and the founding fathers of the United States. Locke strongly believed in self- determination, world order and the equality of individuals. His ideas condemned hereditary privilege, absolute monarchies and serfdom, which characterised the state of affairs in the eighteenth century. Kant’s ideas, projected in his 1795 Perpetual Peace: Philosophical Essay, emphasise the need for an international body that ensures the observation of peace. He argued that rather than negotiate treaties after every war, an international organisation would help reduce chances of future wars. 10 Between the 1950s and 1990, the Scandinavians promoted the growth of international organisations and respect of international law through such organisations as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade

Organisation (WTO). They also used bilateral aid to promote good governance, economic

8 Martin Griffiths, Rethinking International Relations Theory (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1. 9 Stephanie Lawson, Theories of International Relations: Contending Approaches to World Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 76. 10 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: Philosophical Essay, trans. Mary C. Smith (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1903), 55. 5 growth and economic independence of developing countries from oppressive, powerful neighbour states.

The relationship between Botswana and the Scandinavian countries defies the classical theory of dependency. There is a possibility that the relationship between Botswana and the

Scandinavians be interpreted as an exception of aid dependence rather than a case against the dependency theory. However, based on the argument that foreign aid creates dependence on the donor by the recipient, Botswana’s ability to function without Scandinavian aid challenges this theory.

The dependency theory was developed to contest the modernisation theory which argued that development would spread naturally from developed to developing nations by means of contact between the two. Dependency theory has often been used by critics of foreign aid in Africa who argue that aid grants breed corruption and dependence on donors by recipient countries. In his book, How Europe has Underdeveloped Africa, dependency theorist Walter

Rodney argues that Africa was better off without European contact and that for Africa to escape its current situation of ‘underdevelopment,’ it should sever ties with Europe. He argues that the

European capitalist system that was imposed on Africa during the colonial period created the dependency syndrome African states suffer from.11 Ander Gunder Frank built on the dependency theory to argue that European countries deliberately left Africa, Asia and Latin

America underdeveloped to exploit them for cheap raw materials. He argued that the capitalist system created by Western countries ensured that developing countries remained in the periphery while developed countries maintain their ‘core’ status. Written in the early 1970s,

11 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1972). 6

Rodney’s monograph attempts to explain why independent Africa was “underdeveloped” despite attempts by Western countries to revive it through foreign aid.12

The dependency theory influenced subsequent arguments on the effectiveness of foreign aid in the postcolonial era. For example, Dambisa Moyo’s stance that bilateral aid is a form of neo-colonialism which has made African states overly dependent on Western nations for survival draws from the theory. This thesis argues that some ties between Europe and Africa have been important to facilitate the latter’s development journey. Scandinavian aid eased

Botswana’s development journey, enabling the latter to quickly capitalise on the diamond discoveries to achieve economic independence before the start of the millennium.

Literature Review A number of scholars have written on the institution of foreign aid, mostly critiquing its effectiveness as an economic recovery program. Carol Lancaster’s book Foreign Aid:

Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics assesses the history and purpose of foreign aid as an institution. She highlights that foreign aid initially “began as a temporary expedient of Cold

War diplomacy.” She asserts that the United States would not have initiated the foreign aid policy had it not been for fear of Communist expansion. In her assessment of aid in the post-

Cold War era, Lancaster uses five case studies of countries that offer aid to Africa; United

States, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark to support her claims. She shows how domestic politics and international pressures combine to shape the reasons why a particular donor may offer aid. 13 In the case of Botswana and the Scandinavian countries, the United Nations’ declaration of 1960 as the Year of Africa likely influenced the latter’s decision to commit to bilateral relations with the former.

12 Andre G. Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment” in Imperialism and Underdevelopment, ed. R I. Rhodes (London: Monthly Review Press, 1970). 13 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). 7

Schools of Thought

The literature on foreign aid is vast and divided into two schools of thought: the proponents and opponents of the institution. The proponents highlight the positive results of the institution from its inception, using the case of European and some Asian countries as examples of aid recipients. The opponents, on the other hand, believe that the institution did not serve its purpose but rather drowned recipient countries in debt and fuelled corruption, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Proponents

Riddell’s Foreign Aid Reconsidered falls within the scholarship that argues that aid is necessary for development. His well-researched book draws on both the opposing and the supporting side to reach his conclusions on the purpose of foreign aid. In his analysis, he critiques scholars that oppose foreign aid who use the Dependency Theory to support their argument. He criticises assertions made by scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank who argue that foreign aid deters the full development of the Third World. As part of his solutions, Riddell suggests that recipient countries provide donors with a policy that indicates how the funds will be utilised. He also calls for donor countries to provide supportive political, institutional, administrative and socio-economic policies that encourage the proper utilisation of local resources in recipient countries. Riddell is also of the belief that an increase in aid quantities would promote development in the Third World especially Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). His analysis seems relevant to the time he writes in the sense that Sub-Saharan Africa during the

1980s had newly-independent countries (Ghana in 1957, Botswana in 1966, Angola 1975,

Zimbabwe in 1980 to name a few), and countries that were still fighting for independence

(Namibia until 1990). Most governments were still struggling to organise themselves, let alone penetrate the global market. Aid at that time was crucial to newly independent nations, which

8 is why Riddell was convinced that increasing aid quantities would improve the economic status of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 14

Riddell’s approach to foreign aid influenced subsequent arguments made on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Scholars such as Carlsson, Somolekae and van de Walle, the editors of Foreign Aid in Africa: Learning from Country Experiences, have made similar conclusions on the effectiveness of aid as Riddell. They argue that aid on its own is justified and that its effectiveness reflects the policies in the recipient countries. In their contribution to scholarship on the effectiveness of foreign aid, Carlsson et al focus on “the determinants of aid effectiveness.” These include among others the management capacity of the recipients. The volume asserts that the ability of the recipient nation to manage aid and integrate it into its own development management process determines the effectiveness of the aid. A centralised system of aid planning and management is essential in the sense that it promotes accountability and sustainability; which makes it possible for a recipient nation to reject aid that does not fit within its development priorities. 15

Another deduction that the study makes is that for aid to be effective, it has to be sustainable even when the donor withdraws its resources. In other words, the recipient nation has to take ownership of development projects that the aid is channelled at, rather than relying on the donor to start, oversee and finish the projects. The book draws its conclusions based on case studies of eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya,

Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia). It is from these case studies that the overall conclusion made on the effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa by the editors was that there is an uneven record of aid to Africa.16 The uneven record makes it more challenging for the authors to

14 Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, 136-272. 15 Jerker Carlsson, Gloria Somolekae and Nicholas van de Walle, eds., Foreign Aid in Africa: Learning from Country Experiences (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997) 9-216. 16 Carlsson et al., Foreign Aid in Africa, 211-221. 9 ascertain for sure, especially with the disappointing economic record in mind, that Africa could have developed faster without aid dependence. They conclude that with proper aid management policies, aid could be more effective than it previously was.

Another proponent of foreign aid in the post-colonial period is James Yunker, whose monograph Global Marshall Plan: Theory and Evidence calls for an increase in aid volumes.

Based on the global economic disparity created between developed and developing countries,

Yunker believes that the only way to fill the economic gap is through the creation of the ‘Global

Marshall Plan.’ Implementation of the Global Marshall Plan would mean high taxation in developed countries to increase aid inflows in developing countries. Like Carlsson et al,

Yunker believes aid can be effective in the twenty-first century if donor governments reward good governance and conduct follow-ups to encourage accountability. 17

Carol Lancaster’s book, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done seeks to highlight the problems of effective aid in Africa. Lancaster, like most scholars writing in the late twentieth century, is hopeful that with the right approach, aid could be improved and made effective. Her study does not suggest that aid should stop, but rather it calls for the understanding and examination of aid to improve its effectiveness. Unlike Riddell, Lancaster believes that more aid leads to less development and creates dependence. Rather than increase aid inflows, she argues that donors and recipients find a solution to make aid work. Lancaster also draws the conclusion that frequently recipient governments have been blamed for poor aid management, particularly weak aid policies and aid institutions. Her study has shown that the responsibility of ensuring aid effectiveness lies largely with the donor government than with the recipient.18

17 James A. Yunker, Global Marshall Plan: Theory and Evidence (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 40. 18 Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 221. 10

As part of her solutions, Lancaster suggests that donors embark on a mission to train

Africans to manage development projects instead of increasing aid. Rather than donor governments (through aid agencies) dictating how aid should be used and managing development projects, she calls for donors to equip Africans with skills of designing and implementing projects effectively and independently. Her experience as the former deputy administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is evident in the comprehensive argument that she makes about the role of aid agencies in the effective distribution of aid. She makes an interesting contribution to the scholarship on aid effectiveness in the late 1990s in the sense that she calls for aid agencies to reassess their strategy and make appropriate programs that are suitable to the recipients’ needs. 19

Using case studies of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Brautigam and Knack conclude that there is a strong relationship between high aid levels and deteriorating governance. As a solution, they suggest that aid should be selective and competitive, where donors use aid to reward good governance. The authors believe that this strategy would reduce aid dependency and deteriorating governance and promote accountability. An example could be United States’

Millennium Challenge Account, established in 2004, which aimed at only assisting countries with a good track record. Like most scholars before them, they disagree with the complete stopping of foreign aid. Their argument is that aid serves its intended purpose where there is good governance and policy-making as the foundation of development. Therefore, they conclude that the international community (in this case the donors) should help combat poor governance by providing incentives for good governance to recipients. Like Lancaster,

Brautigam and Knack have observed that donors continue to splash aid on countries with poor development strategies that often lead to high rates of corruption and increased debt. They too

19 Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 236. 11 have observed that if aid agencies committed to training Africans on proper aid management, aid would be put to effective use. At the same time this would cut down aid dependency. 20

Phyllis Pomerantz is another scholar in the 21st century who assesses the effectiveness of aid in Africa. As a former rural development specialist working with the World Bank,

Pomerantz applies the knowledge she acquired while on a special assignment to research and write about aid relationships in Africa. She brings into perspective the importance of a good working relationship between the donor and the recipient government. Her argument is that trust between the donor and the recipient in the aid setting is vital for the effectiveness of aid.

While conducting her research, Pomerantz discovered that most donors approach African governments with ready-made programmes that are not customised to certain countries in

Africa. Some even impose aid conditions on the recipient government with threats of withdrawing if the recipient fails to comply. Pomerantz’s volume falls within the wider aid reformist scholarship of the early millennium. She has examined the reasons behind the counter-productiveness of foreign aid in Africa after decades of its establishment. Her book offers a new angle of studying foreign aid effectiveness as it moves away from the numbers and statistics and brings agency to the study of foreign aid. This account of aid effectiveness maintains that trust and a good relationship matter more than the size of the aid. 21

In 2006, The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working, written by Robert

Calderisi, marked a further advance in foreign aid scholarship. The overarching argument that

Calderisi makes is that aid in Africa can only be effective if it complements and supplements development efforts rather than it being a lifeline and a necessity for development.22 He asserts

20 Brautigam and Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 255-285. 21 Phyllis R. Pomerantz, Aid Effectiveness in Africa: Developing Trust between Donors and Governments (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 173. 22 Robert Calderisi, The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 7. The book is essentially is a personal essay coupled with suggestions based on his experience working as the World Bank’s spokesperson in Africa. He has also worked for the Canadian International Development Agency. 12 that increased aid only feeds corrupt political leaders rather than serving its intended purpose.

In the book, Calderisi offers possible solutions to aid ineffectiveness in Africa. A majority of his solutions call for transparency by African political leaders on issues pertaining to finance management. For example, he argues that African heads of state, ministers and senior officials should “open their bank accounts to public scrutiny.”23 Calderisi also suggests that bilateral aid should be cut in half and not increased. He maintains that increased aid weakens the chances of having a self-reliant Africa that is able to effectively develop its own resources.24

Similar to the case made by Brautigam and Knack, Calderisi asserts that large amounts of aid should be spent on countries that prove to be determined to alleviate poverty and promote good governance. In essence, The Trouble With Africa offers more domestic than foreign solutions to foreign aid ineffectiveness. Calderisi, throughout the book, maintains that corrupt

African leaders, rather than insufficient aid, are largely to blame for aid ineffectiveness in

Africa. His thesis challenges the findings made by Lancaster in 1999 that the responsibility of aid effectiveness lies with the donor government. 25 The difference in the two monographs shows the growth in foreign aid literature and constant revision of the scholarship on aid effectiveness.

A proponent of foreign aid, Goran Hyden made a suggestion on how to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Southern Africa. Hyden argues that if donors and recipients maintain the same approach to foreign aid, where grants are availed bilaterally without accountability, the institution will do more harm than good. He proposes that both the donor and the recipient establish a legally independent development fund in a neutral state outside both countries. The fund would act as an intermediary between the donor

23 Calderisi, The Trouble With Africa, 208. 24 Calderisi, The Trouble With Africa, 209. 25 Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 221. 13 and the recipient government, serving to “strengthen institutions in the public, private, and voluntary sectors in Africa.” At the time that this suggestion was made, Hyden believed it was likely to reinvigorate the aid industry especially with the rise of multiparty politics in Africa.

An independent development fund, he assumed, would be of benefit to both the donor and recipient because for much of the late 20th century, it appeared that donor governments were splashing money on African governments without demanding accountability on the part of the recipients. 26

Roger Riddell’s book Does Foreign Aid Really Work? represents a detailed overall assessment of aid in which he revisits the history of foreign aid and traces its development throughout the years. Riddell dedicates a number of pages to discuss possible reasons why aid is given before he moves on to its effectiveness. He also includes a few solutions of his own to aid ineffectiveness. A major solution suggested by the book calls for the establishment of an

International Aid Office which would oversee and manage financial aid. Such an office would ensure that the interests of both the donor and the recipient are considered. Riddell also makes a proposition similar to Hyden’s suggestion of an international development fund mentioned earlier in this chapter. He recommends that instead of putting an end to foreign aid, countries should set up an International Development Aid Fund. Rich countries would contribute towards the fund and formulate a criterion for selecting recipient countries. Riddell still believes foreign aid could be reinvented rather than cut off, while most scholars around this period seem to suggest otherwise. 27

Opponents

26 Goran Hyden, “Aid and Developmentalism in Southern Africa” in Foreign Aid Toward the Millennium, ed. Steven W. Hook (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) 191-207. 27 Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 394. 14

Hans Morgenthau, leader of the opposing school of thought, believes that foreign aid was established as a tool of Western neo-colonialism. He asserts that foreign aid essentially represents glorified bribes handed from one rich government to a poor government for political favours. To Morgenthau, no form of foreign aid is without strings attached, even humanitarian aid, which he believes has hidden conditions. Despite the donor objectives of economic development, Morgenthau asserts that the conditions of foreign aid still resemble the early eighteenth century bribes, citing examples of Austrian statesmen who were subsidised by

France between 1757 and 1769. The only difference being that the eighteenth century bribes were straight forward while the twentieth century bribes were concealed behind notions of economic development and humanitarian assistance. Less developed countries, or ‘pre- capitalist’ countries as he calls them, have a weakness of accepting bribes especially if power rests in the hands of a ruling group that has control of land. In terms of the supposed successes of the Marshall Plan (and of course foreign aid), Morgenthau asserts that the targets of the institution were industrialised countries who were temporarily crippled by war. For aid to work in ‘pre-capitalist’ economies, he suggests drastic internal political changes either self-induced or as prerequisites from donor countries. Morgenthau’s scepticism about foreign aid in the

1960s is influenced by the idea of using foreign aid as an “instrument of foreign policy.” This, he believes, makes the institution controversial because it disqualifies aid as a means of helping other nations but rather a way of pursuing the donor’s interests. 28

An outright critic of foreign aid in Africa is the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo.

Published in 2009, her book Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another

Way for Africa criticises the notion that aid alleviates poverty and provides a solution for

African countries. The basic idea in Dead Aid is that foreign aid has crippled African economies

28 Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (June 1962): 301-309. 15 and made them reliant on aid and therefore unable to develop independently without aid. Moyo makes a clear distinction between humanitarian aid and the government-to-government economic development aid. Her main criticism is of the latter. She argues that in most cases,

African nations assume the loans they receive from donor countries are grants. Instead of finding innovative ways to utilise the aid and grow towards self-reliance, African countries rely on aid for economic survival. Unlike Riddell, she calls for the cutting off of development aid arguing that apart from dependence, it encourages and leads to corruption. Moyo makes a solid argument against foreign aid and how it is administered although her solution comes across as drastic. She believes that it is important for aid donors to put an end to aid by issuing bonds, where the receiving government commits to repaying the loan with an agreed amount of interest. As another one of her remedies, Moyo recommends that African countries abandon aid and take on the painful and difficult path of independent growth by establishing trade markets and transparency to fight corruption. Moyo’s book challenges the established belief that foreign aid is the key to Africa’s development and prosperity. She adds to the historiography of foreign aid in Africa with her unfiltered criticism of aid to Africa with verifiable facts and examples. Her ideas were influenced by the growing plight of corruption in independent Africa which she believes is influenced by foreign aid. 29

Methodology and Limitations

This thesis uses primary sources obtained mostly from the Botswana National Archives and Records Services (BNARS) and the Botswana Documentation and Special Collection

(BDSC, hosted by the University of Botswana) in Gaborone. The sources were mainly government of Botswana financial records, bilateral agreements, correspondence letters and

29 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 35-75. 16 project reports written by Scandinavian representatives. Primary source evidence is fundamental to the central argument of this thesis. The thesis, however, lacked official government records from the Scandinavian countries mostly due to lack of funds to finance a trip to Sweden and Norway. The records could have helped provide a clearer picture of the early years of Scandinavian-Botswana relations, which the thesis has to some extent struggled to account for. Nonetheless, Sida and Norad reports left in the custody of the BNARS, which contained details of the relations mostly after 1973, provided useful details about projects financed by the two agencies in Botswana.

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CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SCANDINAVIAN-BOTSWANA RELATIONS

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the relations between the Scandinavian countries and

Botswana. It traces the changes in the foreign policy of Botswana, Sweden and Norway. The three countries have more similarities than differences in their economic journeys. All three of them had traditional leadership in place before the adoption of modern parliamentary systems.

The traditional leadership systems still exist in the three countries but the kings and chiefs now have a more passive role. The three countries also reached economic peak fast, although the

Scandinavians benefitted from catching the industrial revolution wave earlier. The three countries’ foreign policies were mostly influenced by geopolitical events taking place in their respective regions and also the commitments the countries made to alliances. Botswana’s foreign policy after independence was influenced by the decolonisation struggles going on around it; Sweden was influenced by its commitments to the UN; while Norway was caught in between fulfilling its duties at the UN and also maintaining the alliances with members of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Botswana

A small, landlocked country with a population of over 2 million, Botswana has often been described as Africa’s testimony of postcolonial development success or ‘An African

Miracle.’30 It is located at the centre of Southern Africa, sharing a border with Namibia, South

Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia. It is now divided into nine administrative districts; the North-

West, North-East, Central District, Kgatleng, Kweneng, South-East, Southern, Kgalagadi, and

30 Abdi Ismail Samatar, An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999). 18

Ghanzi. The population is mostly concentrated on the eastern margin of the country that is made up of the Southern, South-East, Kgatleng, Kweneng and North-East districts, which is also the part that is closest to South Africa. It is a semi-arid country that is currently facing desertification due to global warming.

Pre-Colonial History

Precolonial Botswana was characterised by a traditional way of life, with the chief at the centre of society. His position was hereditary and central to all societal activities either social, political or economic. The Setswana saying, kgosi thotobolo e olela matlakala (The chief is accountable and responsible for his people) historically emphasises his position in traditional Tswana society as the overseer of the ethnic group. 31 In precolonial Botswana, the chief held all the powers of government, with headmen and royal elders as his advisors. Although he had the final say, the chief’s advisors were the checks of the traditional Tswana administrative system.

He was also the guardian of his established territorial land and the distributor of wealth among his subjects. Before the erosion of powers in the colonial period by the British administration, chiefs were sovereign rulers and could try all kinds of cases and settle legal appeals from subordinate chiefdoms, allowing them to exercise autonomous power.32

Botswana in the precolonial period was made up of ethnic states that coexisted independently. Central power and administration was introduced by the British after 1885. Like all African states and societies before the Scramble for Africa (c1880-1910), Botswana did not have political boundaries that now separate countries in the postcolonial era. Paramount chiefs of the eight principal ethnic groups in Botswana ruled over their respective territories

31 Gorata B. Sello, “The Politics of Succession amongst the Bamalete of Ramotswa, 1937-2002” (BA diss., University of Botswana, 2016), 23. 32 Thomas Tlou, “The Nature of Batswana States: Towards a Theory of Batswana Traditional Government-The Batawana Case,” in Botswana: Politics and Society, eds. W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (Pretoria: J. L. van Shaik Publishers, 1998), 25-28. 19 separately. They only united when faced with threats from the Boers, descendants of early

Dutch settlers, during the 1850s. Under the leadership of Kgosi Sechele of the Bakwena,

Batswana emerged victorious at the Battle of Dimawe against the Boers who invaded the territory in 1852. 33

Boer invasion from the east and German expansion from the west were not the only threats Batswana faced in the late precolonial period. The Cape settler government to the south had wishes of governing Bechuanaland as part of the Cape Colony in the 1870s. Reverend John

Mackenzie, a missionary in Kuruman and a strong humanitarian-imperialist, actively opposed

Cape rule. He advocated for British intervention in Bechuanaland and declaration of Botswana as a British colony. He also campaigned for the separation of offices of Governor of the Cape and that of High Commissioner to allow for separate administration of the Cape Colony and colonies beyond the Cape. Mackenzie’s campaign along with fear of German expansion into

Bechuanaland in the 1880s compelled the British to establish a protectorate over Bechuanaland at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. This was also a broad strategy to prevent a coalition of the Germans from the west and the Boers from the east. From the conference, the territory of

Batswana was called Bechuanaland Protectorate. The declaration of the Protectorate also followed a number of treaties signed between Tswana chiefs and the British government, through Special Commissioner Sir Charles Warren. The treaties essentially asserted British authority over Bechuanaland. 34

33 Jeff Ramsay, “The Batswana-Boer War of 1852-53: How the Batswana Achieved Victory” Botswana Notes and Records 23, (1991), 195-197. Bakwena were the first Tswana tribe in Botswana. It later split to form the Bangwato and Bangwaketse. Batawana emerged from Bangwato while Bakgatla migrated into Botswana from the Transvaal. David Livingstone founded his mission in precolonial Botswana among the Bakwena, where he converted Kgosi Sechele, his only African convert, into Christianity. 34 Anthony Sillery, Founding a Protectorate: History of Bechuanaland, 1885-1895 (London: Mouton and Co, 1965), 38-41. 20

Colonial History (1885-1965)

When the British declared a protectorate over Bechuanaland, they had no interests in the territory other than protecting the trader and missionary route to the north that stretched from the Cape Colony, passing through the eastern margin of Bechuanaland, to Southern Rhodesia

(now Zimbabwe). German expansion into Bechuanaland would have also separated the Cape

Colony from other British colonies in Central and East Africa. 35 Although the declaration of protection cushioned Bechuanaland from external threats, the sovereignty of chiefs in

Botswana was threatened by the British South Africa Company (BSACo) in the 1890s. Cecil

John Rhodes, a British mining magnate and founder of the BSACo as well as premier of the

Cape, proposed and acquired a Royal Charter from the British government that gave him powers to administer British territories. Annexation threats by Rhodes forced the three Tswana chiefs, Sechele, Bathoen and Khama III, to embark on a journey to London in 1895 to protest this move. Besides the British government, the chiefs embarked on a campaign against the

BSACo around Britain to gain support of the British populace. 36 The success of the three chiefs’ trip to London was marked by the rejection of Rhodes’ annexation plan and the formulation of an administration agreement between the British government and the chiefs in

1895. The 1895 agreement, which served as an ad hoc constitution of Bechuanaland, began the colonial history of indirect rule in the territory.

The 1895 agreement created ethnic territories for the five Tswana chiefdoms, the

Bangwato, Bakwena, Bangwaketse, Bakgatla and Batawana, referred to in most colonial documents as native reserves. By maintaining the traditional administration system, the British ran the protectorate through the chiefs. The chiefs were to collect revenue from their subjects

35 Matthew Lange, Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 144. 36 Ornulf Gulbrandsen, The State and the Social: State Formation in Botswana and its Pre-Colonial and Colonial Genealogies (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 48. 21 to pay the Hut Tax, a form of levy charged by the British administration. Because every household was required to pay ten shillings, many Batswana were forced to migrate to South

Africa to work in the gold mines. Prior to the taxation system, Batswana engaged in the barter system of trade. Monetary transactions were new to them and therefore to acquire the ten shillings, they had to seek employment in South Africa. 37

Another development that forced Batswana to give in to migration labour was the establishment of Crown Lands. As part of the terms of the 1895 agreement, chiefs had to yield land outside their territory to the British government. Land surrendered by the chiefs was listed as Crown Lands on which British settlers lived. The British acquired land in the eastern region in Tati and Ghanzi in the west, which the independence government inherited as the following chapters will show. Extensive regions of the Crown Lands were recognised as national parks and game reserves for purposes of wildlife preservation. A clear example of such is the Central

Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), the largest protected area which was also occupied by the hunter-gatherer population of Botswana known as Basarwa or the San. While the aim was to preserve wildlife, the British also created the CKGR in 1961 to protect the San way of life. 38

The introduction of the taxation system ushered in a long history of migration labour from Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland (referred to as High Commission Territories or

HCTs), the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (present day Malawi) to mines in South Africa. When the British government realised that the agricultural economy of Bechuanaland did not generate enough profit to maintain administration costs, they ordered chiefs to encourage men to migrate to South Africa for paid employment. Subsequently, the British government created a Native

Recruiting Corporation (NRC) and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) as recognised and authorised recruiting agencies. Having a centralised and monopolised control

37 Lange, Lineages of Despotism and Development, 145. 38 Lange, Lineages of Despotism and Development, 145-146. 22 of labour supply enabled the mining magnates to maintain low wages without competition threats and have an abundance of cheap labour. The smooth-running of the operation led to an increase of the hut tax from ten shillings to one pound per household in 1909.39

The taxation system introduced cash transactions and currency in Bechuanaland.

Migration to South Africa by Batswana men to work in mines for wages in order to afford tax had a huge impact on the agricultural economy and society of Bechuanaland. Women and children had to assume ploughing and tilling duties previously done by men. 40 Scholars of the effects of labour migration on Bechuanaland, such as David Massey, have argued that the

British policy of promoting labour migration and neglecting local development crippled the economy of Bechuanaland. Evidence of its neglect is the administration of Bechuanaland from

Mafikeng in South Africa (part of present day North West Province in the Republic of South

Africa). 41

While other African countries fought for independence and majority rule against white settler minority regimes, the HCTs fought to remain under British authority to avoid incorporation into the Union of South Africa in the 1940s. Nationalists in Bechuanaland were stronger advocates for British control than the British themselves. The most active nationalists from the early 20th Century until around the 1950s were the chiefs. Following in the footsteps of his father Sechele, Sebele of Bakwena spearheaded campaigns and petitions against incorporation into the Union of South Africa with the assistance of his witty secretary, Peter

Sidzumo. Through Sidzumo, Sebele associated himself with the rising wave of black protest politics in South Africa through platforms such as the Inter-State Native College Scheme that later founded Fort Hare University in 1916. Between 1908 and 1910, Chief Sebele, along with

39 John Taylor, “Mine Labour Recruitment in the Bechuanaland Protectorate,” Botswana Notes and Records 10, (1978), 99-100. 40 Richard Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa (London: Greenwood Press, 1995), 145. 41 David Reid Massey, “Labour Migration and Rural Development in Botswana” (PhD diss., Boston University Graduate School, 1981), 109. 23

Bathoen of Bangwaketse and Segale Pilane of Bakgatla, supported rising regional politics leading up to the formation of the South African Native National Congress, later renamed the

African National Congress (ANC). Unfortunately, both Sebele and Bathoen died in 1911 before the first conference of the ANC. 42

Nationalist sentiments in colonial Botswana, often conveyed through the formation of political parties, only appeared in the 1950s once the threat of incorporation faded after the

1948 elections in South Africa that ushered in an apartheid government. This is partly due to the nationalists’ unconventional support for British overrule, and partly the survival of chieftainship throughout the colonial period. The preservation of chiefly powers and status during the colonial period inherently made chiefs feel entitled to take over from British administration. However, the chiefs’ powers slowly faded in the 1950s. The institution was weakened by the inability to control emerging challenges such as the demand for equal treatment by subordinate ethnic groups such as the Bakalanga under Ngwato territory and

Bayeyi under Tawana. Other challenges that emerged were the growing religious movements such as the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) as well as an increasing number of intellectuals and elites in the Protectorate. The western-educated elites eventually ventured into politics, challenging the superiority of the patriarchal chieftainship institution. 43 As part of the growing circle of educated elite of colonial Botswana, Quett Ketumile Masire remarked:

We the young people wanted to see Batswana acting like a country at the end of the colonial era, not tribes. This is what caused two colleagues and I to want to start a paper. It was not money or politics. We were reading African Advisory Council minutes and seeing that the Chiefs wanted to be big fish in small ponds.44

42 Jeff Ramsay, “The Establishment and Consolidation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1870-1910,” in Botswana: Politics and Society, eds. W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (Pretoria: J. L. van Shaik Publishers, 1998), 87-92. 43 Jeff Ramsay, “Twentieth Century Antecedents of Decolonising Nationalism in Botswana,” in Botswana: Politics and Society, eds. W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (Pretoria: J. L. van Shaik Publishers, 1998), 101-111. 44 Ramsay, “Twentieth Century Antecedents of Decolonising Nationalism in Botswana,” 112. Sir Quett Masire later became the first Vice President and second President of the Republic of Botswana in 1966 and 1980 respectively. 24

Apart from the inability to handle demands for equality by the marginalised, the chieftainship institution also lacked one major quality necessary for government takeover, economic acumen. Formation of a postcolonial state required commercially-oriented leadership, equipped with entrepreneurial skills, to penetrate the global market in the post-World War II era. Cattle symbolised wealth and prestige in traditional Tswana society although monetary value was never attached to it. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) elites advocated for the reopening of the Lobatse abattoir in 1954, following its closure due to the rejection of Tswana cattle by the Union of South Africa. The commercialisation of cattle production allowed

Batswana cattle producers to participate in the growing global beef market, thus forming the base of postcolonial Botswana economy. 45

The first mass-based political party in colonial Botswana was the Bechuanaland

People’s Party (BPP), formed in 1960. Its predecessor, the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal

Party (BPFP) lost support due to its advocacy for non-partisan traditional administration. The

BPP was more radical, appealing to anti-racist movements in Southern Africa such as the ANC and the Pan-African Congress (PAC). While campaigning for the transfer of power to Africans, the party appealed to migrant Batswana workers who had been exposed to the atrocities of apartheid South Africa. The BPP, founded by Kgalemang T. Motsete, 46 also advocated for the abolition of the chieftainship institute, denouncing it as backward, narrow-minded and totalitarian. 47 It was this radical call against chieftainship that prompted Seretse Khama to respond by collaborating with Quett Masire to form the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in

1962. Despite being surrounded by controversy following his marriage to a white Briton, Ruth

Williams, Khama was still the legitimate successor to the Bangwato throne. He rallied other chiefs for support, encouraging them to deny the BPP the platform to campaign in their tribal

45 Gulbrandsen, The State and the Social, 81-82. 46 Kgalemang T. Motsete composed the national anthem of the Republic of Botswana in 1962. 47 Gulbrandsen, The State and the Social, 95. 25 areas. When the Protectorate held its first general elections for a territorial government in 1965, the BDP won by a landslide against the BPP, making Khama the Prime Minister. 48 He went on to become the first president of the Republic of Botswana the following year when the country became independent. The BPP was replaced by the Botswana National Front as the

BDP’s biggest political rival in subsequent years after independence.

Post-Colonial History (1966-Present)

The independent Republic of Botswana adopted a liberal democratic system that was based on the British parliamentary model of governance. One of the first developments made was the creation of a national constitution that would guide policy-making and also outline duties and powers of the legislature, judiciary and the executive. A unicameral parliament was created, with a thirty-one member Assembly responsible for legislation. Powers of government the chiefs enjoyed in the precolonial and colonial period were reduced but the institution was not abolished. A House of Chiefs (now referred to as Ntlo ya Dikgosi) was created to serve as an advisory body to the Parliament on customary matters. The postcolonial government stripped chiefs of their traditional power through the Chieftainship Act of 1965 (recently replaced by the Bogosi Act of 2008). Essentially, chiefs in the postcolonial period serve the government. The president is the only person who has the power to recognise a selected candidate as chief before he/she can assume duty as chief of a specific ethnic group. Chiefs act as intermediaries between the government and Batswana in rural areas. It could be argued that the institution was preserved to exercise control over Batswana by the central government.49

The Beef Industry

48 Jeff Ramsay and Neil Parsons, “The Emergence of Political Parties in Botswana,” in Botswana: Politics and Society, eds. W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (Pretoria: J. L. van Shaik Publishers, 1998), 137-147. 49 Gloria M. Somolekae and Mogopodi H. Lekorwe, “The Chieftaincy System and Politics in Botswana, 1966- 95,” in Botswana: Politics and Society, eds. W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (Pretoria: J. L. van Shaik Publishers, 1998), 190. 26

Since gaining independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana maintained steady economic growth, surpassing most African countries during the decolonisation and postcolonial period.50 It successfully progressed from being one of the poorest countries in the world to middle-income status within a period of thirty years. Before diamond mining began in the 1970s, the economy of Botswana was mainly reliant on the cattle industry. The semi- arid climate proved unfavourable for arable farming due to prolonged drought periods with little rainfall in between. Cattle survive better during drought periods on sparse ground vegetation and tapping into the beef industry seemed more feasible compared to arable farming.

The Lobatse abattoir, reopened in 1954, later became the first Botswana Meat Commission

(BMC) abattoir in 1966. Although the beef industry kick-started Botswana’s economy, cattle wealth distribution was skewed. Most Batswana in rural areas did not own cattle while a majority of the BDP elites and chiefs were large cattle owners. Khama himself owned close to

18 000 head, making him the largest cattle owner in the country during his presidency. As a non-profit organisation, the BMC is affiliated to the Ministry of Agriculture but under the directive of the President. The BDP-led government, from independence, used the BMC to strengthen the alliance it had with commercial farmers, traditional large cattle owners and high income-earning civil servants. For example, before 1980, the BMC had a quota that dictated that only producers with at least 40 head of cattle could be certified as suppliers. The only option small cattle owners had was to sell to traders who, at the end of the year, received bonuses from the BMC. Due to political backlash, the system was abandoned in 1980 to allow smallholders access to the BMC.51

Diamond Mining

50 Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa, 3. 51 Samatar, An African Miracle, 122-123. 27

The discovery of diamonds in 1967 in Orapa created a chance for economic diversification in the early years of independence. A kimberlite pipe was discovered by geologists working for De Beers, a South African multinational enterprise founded by Cecil

Rhodes in 1888. 52 The De Beers Company took over mining rights in Botswana from the

BSACo in 1892.53 It began mineral prospecting during the colonial period but this bore no fruit until the mid-1960s. Contrary to popular assertions that diamonds were discovered in 1967, some sources suggest that diamond deposits in Botswana were discovered as early as 1955.

Vigorous prospection by De Beers began in 1955 after the company discovered three small diamond stones in gravel deposits in the Motloutse River, a few kilometres from Orapa. After establishing the source of the diamonds as Orapa, the news was kept secret among a few individuals; the head of De Beers-Anglo American Corporation, Harry Oppenheimer, and

Khama. 54 The announcement was only made after the two parties were certain of the existence of a substantial amount of diamonds in Orapa. Discoveries in the Orapa mine paved the way for more discoveries using soil sampling in the Letlhakane and Jwaneng towns. 55 An agreement was reached between the government of Botswana and the De Beers Company, leading to the formation of the De Beers Botswana Company (otherwise known as Debswana) in 1969. Debswana was created to carry out mining operations in Botswana, marking the beginning of a diamond-fuelled economy. After four years of negotiations between the government of Botswana (GoB) and De Beers, the former acquired 15 percent of the company

52 A kimberlite is a diamond-bearing volcanic rock formed within the Earth mantle. ‘Kimberlite’ comes from the name Kimberly of a town in South Africa where the rock was discovered. See Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitaet Muenchen (LMU), “How diamond-bearing kimberlites reach the surface of Earth: Acidification provides the thrust,” Accessed 07 March 2019, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/01/120123094523.htm 53 Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa, 129. 54 Keith Jefferis, “Botswana and Diamond-Dependent Development,” in Botswana: Politics and Society, eds. W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (Pretoria: J. L. van Shaik Publishers, 1998), 301. 55 Mike C J de Wit, ‘Prospecting History Leading to the Discovery of Botswana’s Diamond Mines: From Artefacts to Lesedi La Rona,’ in 11th International Kimberlite Conference Extended Abstract no. 11IKC-4918, 2017, 2. 11ikc.com/long_abstract/11IKC%20Long%20Abstracts/11IKC_4918.pdf 28 shares while De Beers, as the source of capital, kept the remaining 85 percent. Operations in

Orapa, the largest diamond mine in the world by surface area, commenced in 1971. 56

Unlike other states such as South Africa, Botswana law dictates that all minerals discovered in the country are state property. Equity stake in Debswana remained at 15 to 85 percent, with the GoB at a disadvantage, until the second pipe of diamond deposits was discovered in Orapa in 1975. Although the terms of the agreement between the GoB and De

Beers in 1970 could not be established, it appears there was an “abnormal circumstances” clause that made renegotiation of the agreement possible in future. In this case, the discovery of the second pipe qualified as an “abnormal circumstance.” The GoB saw how profitable the

Orapa mine was and took this opportunity to negotiate a 50 percent equity stake in Debswana.

The timely renegotiation increased government profits in diamond mining (acquired through taxation, royalties and dividends) from 50 to about 75 percent. The new agreement was signed two years before a major discovery of three rich diamond-bearing pipes at Jwaneng, 125 km south of the capital, was made. As part of the agreement, the government ensured that

Debswana developed Orapa, Letlhakane and Jwaneng into towns rather than closed mining sites because the GoB wanted the company to reinvest in the country. 57

As production rose, diamonds became the driving force behind Botswana’s economy.

Between 1975 and 1989, economic growth in Botswana averaged around 11 percent a year.

Exports rose from around “US$210 million in 1976 to US$1723 million in 1994,” with diamonds accounting for an estimated 80 percent. While Botswana depended on foreign aid from independence, the diamond industry transformed and supported the economy such that

56 Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy, 130. 57 Jefferis, “Botswana and Diamond-Dependent Development,” 301. 29 most donors pulled out before 2000. By 1972, the government was able to finance its recurrent budget and in 1983, budget surplus was reached.58

Conflict Diamonds?

As the diamond industry in Botswana was flourishing, diamonds in other parts of Africa were scrutinised in the international arena. Rebel forces in countries such as Sierra Leone sold diamonds to finance their campaigns that brought terror to civilians. Global awareness against

‘blood’ or ‘conflict diamonds’ as they are popularly known, affected the reputation of diamonds in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. De Beers’ reputation for acquiring diamonds from politically unstable nations such as Sierra Leone and Angola only made the situation worse for Botswana. In an effort to revive its image, Botswana undertook the

Diamonds for Development campaign in 2001, highlighting the various ways diamond profits were used in developing the country. 59 The third president of Botswana, Dr Festus Mogae, conducted ‘damage control’ interviews to rally international support for diamonds in

Botswana.60 Apart from reassuring the international market of the ‘cleanliness’ of its diamonds,

Botswana’s involvement in the Diamond for Development campaign was also to make known its condemnation of the sale of conflict diamonds. However, the GoB’s efforts were always undermined by one issue, the San eviction from the CKGR.

The lack of diversity in the economy of Botswana proved problematic in the early

1990s. Economic diversification became more pressing in the early 1990s following accelerated mining activity between 1971 and 1989. The government had two viable options to explore: one was to increase mineral prospects around the country for more sources of

58 Jefferis, “Botswana and Diamond-Dependent Development,” 302-303. 59 Ian Taylor and Gladys Mokhawa, “Not Forever: Botswana, Conflict Diamonds and the Bushmen,” African Affairs 102, No. 407, April 2003, 271. 60 See for example, Council on Foreign Relations, Diamonds for Development, https://www.cfr.org/event/diamonds-development 30 diamonds; the other was to venture into tourism by developing existing national parks and game reserves (created by the British government during the colonial period) into reputable tourist attraction sites. The CKGR, however, was different because the area was also occupied by the San. Turning the CKGR into a tourism site meant preserving wildlife, which also meant depriving the San hunter-gatherers of their livelihood. Out of desperation, the government created camps outside the CKGR where they would relocate the San. It claimed that the relocation was meant to move the San to a more accessible location to facilitate the provision of government amenities such as education and health care. 61

The discovery of diamonds in the CKGR made the GoB’s intentions in the reserve more questionable. In 1981, two diamond-bearing pipes were discovered in the CKGR, believed to host more than 100 million tonnes of diamonds. 62 The government denied claims that the discovery of diamonds influenced the relocation in any way, reiterating its intentions to distribute social benefits to the San as the main reason behind the dispossession. However, the intensification of the relocation policy validated speculations that the GoB wanted to conduct mining activities in the reserve. 63

The relocation policy was intensified between 1996 and 2002 with the San community of !Xade being completely relocated in 1997. An advocacy group of the San, the First People of the Kalahari (FPK) led by Roy Sesana, was formed in 1991 to contest the compulsory move from the CKGR. In 2002, the FPK took the government to court over the relocation and won

61 Motsomi Ndala Marobela, “The State, Mining and the Community: The Case of the Basarwa of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana,” LABOUR Capital and Society 43, No. 1 (2010), 140. 62 Mining Technology, “Ghaghoo Diamond Mine,” Accessed 27 February 2019, https://www.mining-technology.com/projects/ghaghoo-diamond-mine/ The Ghaghoo mine was officially opened in 2014 but is currently closed. Rumours are that the mine contained less diamonds than previously estimated. 63 Marobela, “The State, Mining and the Community,” 148. 31 the case. Despite the victory, the San were not allowed to use the government boreholes in the reserve nor were they allowed to drill new boreholes in the CKGR.64

The San case attracted attention outside Botswana such as from the indigenous advocacy group Survival International. Through this group, representatives of the San travelled across the world campaigning against eviction from the CKGR, going as far north as Denmark.

In a report compiled by Survival International on the San relocation, the organisation suggests that the GoB wanted to expel the San to prevent future claims of the mineral wealth.65 The

2002 court case was financed by Survival International with donations from its supporters and people who sympathised with the San. In one of its campaign posters after the San victory in court, Survival International claimed that the GoB arrested the San for hunting in the CKGR and banned them from using the borehole that the government built. 66

Regardless of efforts to convince the international community of the ‘cleanliness’ of its stones, the GoB still received backlash for its policy in the CKGR. Apart from Survival

International’s widespread campaign against ‘blood diamonds’ in Botswana, scholars such as

Kenneth Good also jumped on the bandwagon. In his book, Diamonds, Dispossession and

Democracy in Botswana, Good claims the “acute over-dependence on diamonds” resulted in the emergence of a corrupt and greedy political elite which only pursued the CKGR for its economic potential. His conclusions are drawn from the alleged existence of a close personal relationship between Debswana management and top government officials, notably former president Festus Mogae’s and former Debswana director Louis Nchindo’s friendship. To Good,

64 Marobela, “The State, Mining and the Community,” 140-48. 65 Survival International, Bushmen Aren’t Forever- Botswana: Diamonds in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve and the Eviction of Bushmen, Accessed 07 March 2019, https://assets.survivalinternational.org/static/files/related_material/11_513_969_diamonds_facts.pdf 66 Survival International, Bushmen, Accessed 07 March 2019. https://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/bushmen 32

San expulsion from the CKGR, disguised as a social welfare move, was only an act of greed by the government to secure its economic interests in the reserve. 67

The argument over whether the GoB was justified to remove the San from the CKGR or deny them the right to use the borehole after allowing them back is contentious. It goes back to legislation and the place of indigenous people in modern governance. Most countries with indigenous people struggle to make policies that are inclusive of the indigenous people’s rights without changing their natural way of life. A further discussion of the San case against the GoB follows in the fourth chapter. It will draw similarities between the San case and the Saami of

Norway through Norwegian involvement in the matter.

Foreign Policy towards Southern Africa

When Botswana gained independence in 1966, most of its Southern African neighbours were still under colonial white minority rule. Botswana’s geopolitical location made it part of the liberation struggle despite its efforts to remain sovereign. In the south, South Africa was under apartheid administration; in the north-east, Southern Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) was under the Ian Smith regime; in the west, South West Africa (present day Namibia) was administered as a mandate territory by South Africa; while in the east and northwest,

Mozambique and Angola, respectively, were under Portuguese administration. Africans, who were in the majority in the aforementioned countries, were fighting to gain independence from colonial rule or civil rights from minority regimes. The post-colonial Botswana government made its non-racial and non-interventionist policy known to its neighbours, both the colonial regimes and the exiled freedom fighters many of whom were based in independent Zambia and

Tanzania.68 Botswana’s decision to remain neutral was influenced by two factors: economic

67 Kenneth Good, Diamonds, Dispossession and Democracy in Botswana (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2008), 3- 16. 68 Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie, “The Role of Botswana in the Liberation of Southern Africa since 1966,” in Botswana: Politics and Society, eds. W. A. Edge and M. H. Lekorwe (Pretoria: J. L. van Shaik Publishers, 1998), 426. 33 dependence on the settler-ruled countries; and its military inferiority vis-à-vis the South

African Defence Force (SADF) and the Rhodesian Security Forces.

Economically, Botswana relied on South Africa more than it did Southern Rhodesia.

Apart from reliance on the South African currency before 1976, most of Botswana’s export markets were in South Africa. The railway line that crossed through the eastern margin of

Botswana was controlled by South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Botswana relied heavily on the transport and communication system that, during the liberation struggle, was under minority regime control. It also needed South African ports to access its international markets.

In addition, a portion of the government revenue (although not as significant as beef and diamond exports) was acquired through remittance by migrant mine workers in South Africa.

The Khama administration’s policy was to maintain the economic relationship it had with the

South African apartheid government to protect the economic interests of the country. Actively supporting liberation movements would have jeopardised the economic rapport with South

Africa and Rhodesia that the independent government inherited from the British.69

The second most important factor that informed Botswana’s foreign policy was its lack of military power. Security was less of a priority to the independent government than socio- economic development. Suggestions to form a local military force were put forward by members of the political opposition in 1965, which the ruling BDP elites ignored.70 Even with refugees fleeing into Botswana in 1965, the BDP-led government was still reluctant. Before the formation of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in 1977, Botswana only had a paramilitary force, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), which eventually became the core of the BDF. The PMU was part of the Bechuanaland Border Police (BPP) but it conducted quasi-military training and operations. The combination of the BPP, the PMU and the BDF was still not a match against

69 Osei-Hwedie, “The Role of Botswana in the Liberation of Southern Africa since 1966,” 425-426. 70 Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy, 49. 34 the SADF and the Rhodesian Security Forces. With this knowledge in mind, the BDP government refrained from actively supporting the liberation movements. Instead, it devised a policy that provided asylum to refugees without provoking its powerful neighbours. 71 By providing sanctuary to refugees, Botswana claimed to be working in “adherence to the 1951

UN General Convention on refugees, the 1967 UN Protocol for Refugees as well as the 1969

Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Convention on Refugees.”72 With international law on its side, the GoB hoped to have external support, should the powerful regimes retaliate.

Despite its noninterventionist policy, Botswana was an outspoken critic of the apartheid government and the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia. Mounting pressure from the opposition party and freedom fighters forced the BDP-led government to join forces with other Frontline

States (FLS) to offer support to the liberation struggle. The FLS was a coalition between

Botswana, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia, formed to create a uniform policy in support for liberation movements. While showing its support, Botswana adopted a

“non-springboard” policy which essentially prohibited the use of the territory by guerrilla fighters to conduct covert attacks on either South Africa or Rhodesia. 73 Political refugees received between 1966 and 1994 included members of the ANC and PAC of South Africa; the

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union

(ZAPU) of Rhodesia; the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the South

West Africa National Union (SWANU) of South West Africa; and in small numbers the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).74

71 Part Mgadla, “‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice’: Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965- 1985),” Social Dynamics 34, No. 1, (June 2008), 6. 72 Osei-Hwedie, “The Role of Botswana in the Liberation of Southern Africa,” 430. The OAU later disbanded and replaced with the African Union (AU) in 2002. 73 Osei-Hwedie, “The Role of Botswana in the Liberation of Southern Africa,” 432. 74 Mgadla, “‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice,’” 7. 35

Violation of the “non-springboard” policy usually resulted in incarceration or deportation to Zambia of freedom fighters. Zambia and Tanzania provided operational and training bases for guerrilla forces in Southern Africa throughout the struggle. 75 Tanzania, since its independence in 1961, was dedicated to the complete liberation of Southern Africa. In 1963, the newly founded OAU located its Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Southern

Africa (popularly known as the Liberation Committee) in Dar es Salaam. From 1960 onwards, a number of Southern African liberation movements opened offices in Tanzania. 76 Tanzania also spearheaded the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination

Conferences (SADCC), which later became Southern African Development Community

(SADC) in 1992. SADCC was mainly formed to promote the development and economic independence of the FLS from South Africa. As it gained international support from European countries and the U.S., SADCC also became a tool for isolating apartheid South Africa. 77

Botswana’s compromised borders enabled freedom fighters to use the territory as a transit route to South Africa and Rhodesia, which eventually provoked the hostile governments.

Between 1976 and 1985, Botswana experienced a number of armed attacks by SADF and

Rhodesian Security Forces pursuing ZAPU, ANC and PAC guerrillas. In 1985, the SADF raided Gaborone to attack ten offices and houses rumoured to be ANC operational bases. The incident left fifteen fatalities, three of which were Batswana. 78 In hot pursuit of guerrilla forces, the Rhodesian forces ambushed and killed fifteen BDF soldiers and two civilians in Lesoma,

75 South African History Online, “Tanzania and its Support of Southern African Liberation Movements,” Accessed 27 February 2019, https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/tanzania-and-its-support-southern-african-liberation-movements 76 Tom Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa Volume I: Formation of a Popular Opinion (1950-1970) (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999), 80. 77 South African History Online, “Frontline States,” Accessed 05 April 2019, https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/frontline-states 78 Osei-Hwedie, “The Role of Botswana in the Liberation of Southern Africa,” 434. 36

North-West Botswana. 79 The incident occurred in March 1978 just nine months after the formation of the BDF, a further indication of Botswana’s military inferiority.

The GoB’s non-interference policy not only delayed attacks by the SADF and

Rhodesian forces, but it also reduced the magnitude of the potential attacks the two hostile forces could have imposed on Botswana. Had Botswana taken a firm stand in solidarity with the freedom fighters and adopted an ‘open door’ policy like Tanzania and Zambia, it would have been turned into a battle field between the settler governments and the liberation fighters.

The borders shared with South Africa alone were enough to force Botswana to submit to its superior neighbour. It is worth noting that between 1919 and 1990, South West Africa (present day Namibia) was administered by South Africa as a Mandate Territory.80 This basically

“extended” possible entry points by South Africa into Botswana, reaching as far north as the

Caprivi Strip. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, as a small and newly independent power, Botswana was vulnerable to external influence regardless of its attempts to assert its sovereignty.

Foreign Aid in Botswana

Due to colonial neglect, Botswana depended on British aid for the most of its first decade of independence. The British government provided grants to Botswana as compensation for its frugal administration of the territory during the colonial period. British grants in aid accounted for around 57 percent of Botswana’s recurrent budget from 1966 until 1973. 81 However,

Khama’s administration felt the need to diversify sources of foreign aid to “reduce influence of any single national donor.” 82 From 1970, aid inflows diversified and increased, eventually

79 Makgala and Fisher, “The Impact of the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle on Botswana,” 14. 80 See for instance, E. Emmett, “The Mandate over South West Africa,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 9, No. 1, (1927), 111. 81 Lise Rakner, “Botswana-30 Years of Economic Growth, Democracy and Aid: Is there a Connection?,” Chr. Michelsen Institute Report 8, (1996), 26. 82 Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy, 134. 37 reducing Botswana’s dependence on British aid for its recurrent budget. Sweden became the first major bilateral aid donor after the United Kingdom in 1971, followed by Norway in

1973.83

Other than the need to diversify sources of foreign aid, Botswana was attracted by

Scandinavian policy of unconditional aid, particularly that of Sweden and Norway. After 1970, the GoB transitioned from urban development towards rural development and the nature of

Scandinavian aid was more suited for the shift. Unlike the UK, the Scandinavians allowed

Botswana to carry forward unspent funds from the previous year onto the next. This aspect was particularly important to the GoB which was still learning to project expenses without over or underestimating the budget. 84

Botswana’s economic status at independence made her eligible for bilateral aid from a number of donors, including the Scandinavians. By 1987, international aid received by

Botswana amounted to about USD 219 million which was, at that time, the highest aid level measured per capita (per person) in the world. The diamond industry, even at its budding stage, encouraged donor participation as it promised rapid economic growth for the country. In addition, the diamond economy guaranteed maintenance of infrastructure built with donor money once it matured. 85

Scandinavia

Scandinavian countries are renowned for their social welfare model that is characterised by high taxes and heavy social spending. Although they were late to industrialise, the

Scandinavian countries reached high levels of economic growth before the First World War.

83 Rakner, “Botswana-30 Years of Economic Growth, Democracy and Aid,” 26. 84 Rakner, “Botswana-30 Years of Economic Growth, Democracy and Aid,” 27. 85 Rakner, “Botswana-30 Years of Economic Growth, Democracy and Aid,” 30. 38

Even as constitutional monarchies since the mid-1800s, industrialisation and the rise of the middle-class only occurred towards the end of the 19th Century. This was mainly because of constant clashes between conservatives, the aristocrats and the liberal bourgeois. 86

Foreign Aid Policy

Scandinavian policy during the decolonisation era of the 1950s and 1960s can be best understood under two frameworks; the ‘Global Good Samaritan’ framework that emerged in the post-World War II period; and also the desire to spread the Scandinavian Welfare Model to newly independent countries. The ‘Global Good Samaritan’ framework suggests that most developed European countries adopted Human Rights as a foreign policy following the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. 87 The Scandinavian support for liberation movements in Southern Africa and the general support for decolonisation makes this framework relevant. It is also consistent with the liberalist ideology in the sense that their relations with Botswana were motivated by the desire to restore global peace, to which the apartheid regime posed a threat. For example, the antiapartheid campaign that the Swedish government actively supported justifies the use of the human rights and liberalist frameworks in studying Scandinavian policy in Southern Africa. 88 After apartheid had been repressed,

Scandinavian policy shifted towards spreading the welfare model that is characterised by high quality social programmes. The following section outlines the individual journeys Sweden and

Norway took towards the formation of development aid.

Since the 1970s, Scandinavian countries have dominated the global Official

Development Aid (ODA) scene as the most generous donors in the world. This is due in large

86 Gosta Esping-Andersen and Walter Korpi, “From Poor Relief to Institutional Welfare States: The Development of Scandinavian Social Policy,” International Journal of Sociology 16, No. 3 (Fall 1986), 43. 87 Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, Steven LB Jensen, Linde Lindkvist and Johan Strang, “Histories of Human Rights in the Nordic Countries,” Nordic Journal of Human Rights 36, No. 3 (October 2018), 193. 88 Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3-4. 39 part to the fact that their assistance is less tied to strategic and economic interests compared to other European donors. One reason for this could be their lack of colonial history. In most cases, former colonial masters-turned aid donors look to benefit from bilateral aid relations with developing countries, attaching conditions to their grants. Another reason could be the fact that the bulk of Scandinavian aid in the 1950s, 1960s and, to some extent, 1970s was channelled through multilateral organisations. This essentially reduced contact between the donor and recipient which affected the former’s influence on the latter. Aid through multilateral organisations aligned well with Scandinavian aid policy, which was guided by their humanitarian concerns and recipient countries’ needs. The need to sell the Scandinavian social model to recipient countries has also been a distinguishing feature of their aid policy. The need to maintain their reputation as the most generous and altruistic donors guided their development assistance policy. 89

Sweden

Since the 1930s, the Swedish Social Democratic-led government focused on its domestic policy that involved the creation of the Swedish welfare model. Foreign policy was neglected because high priority was given to increasing the quality of social services and catering for the needs of the Swedes, hence the vision of “creating the ‘people’s home’.” Its policy of neutrality during the First and Second World Wars ensured that the industry and infrastructure remained intact, guaranteeing a secure economy that reached its peak around the 1950s. When Denmark and Norway joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, Sweden remained alliance-free to protect its interests and welfare. In addition, Sweden feared provoking the

Soviet Union by joining any alliance, let alone the NATO.90 Despite the non-alignment policy,

89 Hilde Selbervik with Knut Nygaard, “Nordic Exceptionalism in Development Assistance? Aid Policies and the Major Donors: The Nordic Countries,” Chr. Michelsen Institute Report 8 (2006), 5-6. 90 Sweden also considered Finland’s autonomy when making the decision not to join the NATO. Provoking the Soviet Union by joining the West would have resulted in immediate occupation of Finland by the former as a retaliation move. 40

Sweden remained an active member of the United Nations (UN) from 1946. Before the beginning of bilateral aid with Botswana in 1965, Sweden addressed global challenges through the UN. 91

Swedish bilateral engagements in Southern Africa were motivated by the UN’s declaration of 1960 as the “Year of Africa.” This was the year in which independence was granted to a number of African countries. In the same year, the UN General Assembly adopted a Decolonisation Declaration which presented the UN’s support for decolonisation and the right to self-determination. 92 With the adoption of the declaration, the Swedish government rallied public support to convince the ordinary Swede of Sweden’s moral responsibility to ensure world peace. For example, in May of 1960 the Social Democratic Labour Day marches in Stockholm included an international section that protested the Sharpeville massacre in South

Africa that had happened in March. The march was conducted under banners of ‘Freedom in

Africa’ and ‘Brotherhood over the Borders.’ The proceeds of the traditional sale of First of

May pins went to the “African Liberation Movement” in Stockholm, which amounted to Skr

5000. 93

In 1965, the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) was formed. It initially directed funds towards technical assistance but eventually included development projects such as infrastructure. Priority was given to India and Pakistan in Asia and Ethiopia,

Tanzania, Kenya and Tunisia in Africa. However, with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland preparing for independence amid conflict in Southern Africa, the Swedish government prepared proposals for the assistance of the HCTs. The main reasons for Swedish engagement in Southern Africa was to strengthen the three countries’ independence from apartheid South

91 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa Volume I, 46. 92 United Nations, “The United Nations and Decolonization: Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” (December 1960) http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml 93 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa Volume I, 60. 41

Africa. In 1966, the three HCTs were included in the list of Swedish country assistance. 94

When explaining Scandinavian involvement in Southern Africa, a Swedish delegate in the UN remarked during the Fourth Committee debate on South Africa on October of 1970 that:

We must also recognise the importance of a general strengthening of the economic and political stability of free Africa, in particular, the need for special measures to assist those who are situated in the immediate neighbourhood of the racially oppressed territories. Our aim should be to increase their ability to resist pressure from the minority regimes in southern Africa, thereby helping to release them from undue dependence on these regimes. 95 Swedish administration of external assistance through the UN was replaced by bilateral assistance after 1971 following pressure from Swedish taxpayers who wanted accountability from the government. They also found it easier to monitor the effectiveness of aid if there was direct Swedish presence in the recipient country. 96

Compared to other HCTs, Botswana was of particular importance to the Swedish government’s campaign against apartheid South Africa. The Swedish government wanted to use Botswana as a base for assisting liberation movements in Southern Africa. Botswana was more accessible to them compared to Swaziland and Lesotho whose geographical location was inconvenient. After Khama granted the ANC permission to open offices in Gaborone, the

Swedish government found it easier to provide humanitarian assistance to the movement from

Botswana. For example, in the fiscal year 1975/1976, Swedish support to the ANC in Botswana amounted to Skr 33,500 which went towards foodstuff and daily necessities. Assistance was granted directly to the ANC offices through the Swedish Embassy in Gaborone and through the GoB to the refugee camps in Dukwi and Francistown. 97

94 Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa Volume I, 79. 95 Carl Gosta Widstrand and Zdenek Cervenka, Scandinavian Development Agreements with African Countries (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1971), 18. 96 Widstrand and Cervenka, Scandinavian Development Agreements with African Countries, 18. 97 Tom Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance 1970- 1994 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 677. 42

Norway

From the late 1940s to the 1960s, Norwegian foreign policy was mainly dictated by the Cold

War situation. Its foreign policy was confined to its duties as a member of NATO to help contain Communism. While protecting its sovereignty following German occupation during

World War II, and Soviet threats during the Cold War, Norway was also concerned about the preservation of world peace. Norway abandoned its policy of neutrality in 1949 by joining

NATO after realising how fast Communism was spreading, and the amount of pressure the

Soviet Union placed on smaller states. Norway felt the moral obligation to reach out to newly independent countries before the Soviet Union. In 1949, the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs remarked:

The supreme Norwegian interest is peace, and the entire Norwegian foreign policy tradition makes it absolutely clear that we desire nothing else from our participation in international politics than to do our best to ensure that peace, good-will and co-operation is maintained in the relations between states and peoples. 98 Norwegian aid to Africa was initially influenced by the continent’s struggle for independence.

As one of the founding members of the UN in 1945, Norway was also influenced by the

Decolonisation Declaration to extend assistance to African countries. 99 In addition, its decision was also influenced by the United States’ condemnation of colonisation and the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1950s.100

Before the provision of bilateral aid, Norway provided funding for refugees through the

UN. It funded education and training programmes which benefitted refugees from politically unstable countries. In 1963, the Norwegian government, through the Ministry of Foreign

98 Halvard Leira, “‘Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace’: The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace,” Swiss Political Science Review 19, No. 3 (2013), 347. 99 Norway in the UN, “Permanent Mission to the UN in New York” Accessed 02 March 2019, https://www.norway.no/en/missions/UN/norway-and-the-un/norways-rich-history-at-the-un/ The first UN Secretary-General was Norway’s former Minister for Foreign Affairs Trygve Lie. He was succeeded by Swedish Dag Hammarskjold. 100 Leira, “‘Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace’,” 347. 43

Affairs, created the Special Committee for Refugees from Southern Africa which was responsible for direct assistance to refugees in Southern Africa. The Special Committee was key in administering Norwegian funds, with approximately NOK 20 million disbursed from

1963-1976. However, it did not have direct links with the liberation movements. That remained the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, after 1973, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The Special Committee funded educational institutions in Southern Africa (mainly secondary schools in the HCTs) and also offered scholarships through the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF). Another educational organisation in Norway, the Norwegian Students’ and Academics’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH) raised funds and campaigns against white minority rule in Africa. The SAIH had close relations with the Swaneng Hill School in Botswana, to which it influenced the donation of around NOK

170 000 by the Special Committee in 1972. 101

The Norwegian government’s reluctance to show active support for liberation movements in Southern Africa was exposed by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).

FRELIMO was a liberation movement in Mozambique formed in 1962 to fight against

Portuguese colonial rule. The party leader, Eduardo Mondlane accused the Norwegian government of siding with its NATO and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) co- member Portugal. His campaigns in Norway in 1965 succeeded in rallying public support for

Norwegian intervention against Portugal. In 1969, the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam

(created by FRELIMO) received a donation of NOK 200 000 through the Special Committee, marking the beginning of Norwegian support for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. An additional NOK 700 000 was granted to the Mozambique Institute in 1971 towards medicines

101 Tore Linne Eriksen, “The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975,” in Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa, ed. Tore Linne Eriksen (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet, 2000), 37-40. 44 and textbooks. 102There is no evidence suggesting that Norway offered military support to the liberation movements. The thesis could not establish whether Norway assisted any other liberation movements apart from FRELIMO.

Norway’s foreign policy in Southern Africa during the decolonisation period was always torn between humanitarian duties at the UN and also standing in solidarity with NATO partners. It could not actively assist the liberation struggle unlike Sweden (which maintained its neutrality policy) because NATO was in solidarity with Portugal. Pressure from the public following Mondlane’s visit to Oslo forced the Norwegian government to react against

Portugal’s rejection of the Declaration of Decolonisation. 103

Conclusion: Forging Alliances with Botswana

Richard Dale suggests that as a powerful state, South Africa has long influenced events in

Botswana. From the precolonial period, Bechuanaland struggled to assert its sovereignty against different forces in what became the Union of South Africa on multiple occasions. The first encounter with the Boers was suppressed by Sechele’s forces but that was not the last of invasions through the southern border. During the colonial period, chiefs in Botswana fought to remain under British protection rather than be handed over to the white minority ruled Union of South Africa. In fact, they fought to be administered directly by the British government.

When discussing Botswana’s policy in the decolonisation period, Dale maintains that South

African influence still dictated how Botswana related to other states and vice versa. He asserts that if developed nations ever did something in or for Botswana, it was probably due to their fascination with South Africa or their abhorrence of the apartheid system in South Africa. 104

In the case of the Scandinavian countries, it is clear that their policy in Botswana was

102 Eriksen, “The Origins of a Special Relationship,” 45. 103 Eriksen, “The Origins of a Special Relationship,” 46. 104 Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy, 151. 45 influenced by the latter. During the 1960s, Botswana’s disadvantaged location during the hostilities in Southern Africa made her victim to invasions and an influx of refugees escaping oppression by white minority governments. Despite its non-interference foreign policy,

Botswana still suffered attacks by its hostile neighbours due to its inferior security forces.

Sweden and Norway engaged with Botswana on a bilateral level to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa. As the following chapters will show, the Scandinavians granted generous amounts of aid towards the development of industries and infrastructure in Botswana.

The booming diamond industry acted as an incentive for extended Scandinavian assistance because it promised independence of the Botswana economy within a short period of time. By

1990, Botswana was already stable enough to function without Scandinavian aid, defying the theory of dependence.

46

CHAPTER THREE

SWEDEN IN BOTSWANA

Introduction

This chapter explores Botswana-Sweden relations in both a multilateral and bilateral context.

The chapter begins by assessing Swedish foreign aid policy to provide a more nuanced understanding of its relations with Botswana. It continues to present the multiple ways Sweden assisted Botswana from independence to 1998. The chapter shows why Swedish assistance to

Botswana began in 1972, reached its peak in the 1980s and declined towards the new millennium. Botswana benefited from the sectoral approach that the Swedish employed in administering aid. The flexibility of Swedish aid allowed the GoB to maximise on sectors such as education and infrastructure to create a local workforce. The chapter demonstrates how the education sector received the bulk of Swedish aid during the three decades of active aid assistance. Through its analysis of the bilateral relations, the chapter will show how, even with large aid inflows, Botswana did not crumble after Sweden withdrew its aid. By allowing the

GoB to handle the implementation of projects, the Swedish government ensured that Botswana remained with a functional local workforce at the end of their aid relations.

Swedish Foreign Aid Policy

Following the Marshall Plan, a number of European countries gained interest in helping newly independent states in Africa to achieve economic independence. Sweden during this period was already developed and economically stable which made it eligible to provide developmental aid to underdeveloped countries. 105 In 1962, Sweden’s international

105 Jerker Carlsson, “Swedish Aid for Poverty Reduction: A History of Policy and Practice,” Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 107, (April 1998): 9. 47 development aims were to help alleviate poverty and raise the living standards of poor people.

106 Through the 1962 Budget Bill, Swedish development aid focused on infrastructure and social development in less underdeveloped countries. 107

Swedish assistance from the 1970s still emphasised poverty reduction in underdeveloped countries as influenced by the ‘basic needs’ concept that dominated the aid debate in the global arena. 108 Swedish aid after 1970 aimed at reaching the most disadvantaged groups in remote areas in recipient countries. It targeted sectors such as education and health with specially formulated programmes for people living in poverty. Global trends in foreign aid in the 1970s aimed at strategies that emphasised building the capacity of recipient nations such that they reduce dependency. Donor countries moved towards training recipient nations to manage aid. Sweden followed this trend with its administration of aid in Botswana as detailed later in the chapter.

From the 1980s, the Swedish government followed a certain criteria of selecting countries eligible for aid assistance. Countries such as Cuba and Tunisia were dropped from the list as Sweden concluded that the two did not qualify as less developed. 109 In 1999, Sweden ended assistance to Botswana because Botswana was “economically mature” and on the right path to poverty reduction. 110 Based on Botswana’s economic progress by 1990, the country no longer qualified for Swedish aid assistance. 111

106 Carlsson, “Swedish Aid for Poverty Reduction: A History of Policy and Practice,” 10. 107 Arne Bigsten, Ann-Sofie Isaksson, and Sven Tengstam, “The Changing Structure of Swedish Foreign Aid,” University of Gothenburg School of Business, Economics and Law Working Papers in Economics 651, (March 2016): 2. A Budget Bill is a proposed operating budget for the state for the next fiscal year. See https://www.lectlaw.com/def/b060.htm 108 Carlsson, “Swedish Aid for Poverty Reduction: A History of Policy and Practice,” 13. 109 Carlsson, “Swedish Aid for Poverty Reduction: A History of Policy and Practice,” 14. 110 Albert Ndebele, “Sweden Ends Assistance to Botswana,” Botswana Daily News, 13 January, 1999, 1. 111 Botswana had made considerable economic progress although the rate of economic growth slowed down post 1990 due to complex political decisions and a reorientation towards private sector-led development. See Gervase S. Maipose and Thapelo C. Matsheka, “The Indigenous Development State and Growth in Botswana,” http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/soconne1/book/Ch15_RRBotswana_GMTM.doc 48

Swedish foreign aid policy is better understood through the liberalist lens. In essence, their foreign policy emphasises liberalism and cosmopolitanism in the world order. 112 This defined the nature of the Swedish aid to Botswana. Archival sources from the BNARS reveal that most projects carried out by the Swedish government, through the Swedish International

Development Cooperation Authority (SIDA), in Botswana involved infrastructure enhancement and contributions towards improving the education system. SIDA coordinated

Sweden’s bilateral development cooperation while multilateral cooperation (aid through organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union) is coordinated by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden. SIDA, the authority, administered Swedish bilateral aid before 1995. After 1995, Sida, the agency, took over responsibilities of SIDA and a number of agencies as will be discussed briefly in the chapter. Acronyms of the two bodies will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis depending on the period being discussed. 113

Archival sources on the bilateral relations between Sweden and Botswana suggest that the relations were forged in 1966 but most of the projects funded by SIDA began in 1972.114

There seems to be an information gap on the dealings between the two countries from 1966 to

1972 from the sources that have been consulted. A possible explanation for this could be that

SIDA had not yet begun its projects at this point. This could be connected to the constitutional reform in Sweden in 1970 that was in discussion from 1968. Before the reform, Sweden had a bicameral parliamentary system. In 1970, a new unicameral parliamentary system was

112 Peter Wilson, “Idealism in International Relations,” in Encyclopedia of Power, ed. Keith Dowding (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2011): 332. 113 Swedish International Development Agency, “Swedish Development Cooperation: This Is How It Works,” Accessed 22 September 2018, http://www.sida.se/contentassets/0c4df4e24c2e44d0a8aa867388e4ee54/swedish-development- cooperation_1165.pdf 114 BOPA Reporters, “Swedish Minister Leaves Gaborone after Visit,” Botswana Daily News, February 17, 1999, 32. Examples of these projects include the village water supplies. 49 formed.115 This meant that instead of having two legislative chambers, they had only one. It is possible that the constitutional reform impacted Sweden’s foreign missions.

Provision of bilateral aid to Botswana by Sweden began in 1966. In Sweden, a Central

Committee consisting of church groups, trade unions and the cooperative movement was formed with the sole responsibility of launching foreign aid projects in various developing countries. 116 Between 1960 and 1970 the Swedish foreign aid policy underwent various changes. In 1962, the Central Committee was reabsorbed by the government to form the

Swedish International Development Cooperation Authority (SIDA). 117 This agency was funded by the government to carry out and oversee foreign aid projects in countries that Sweden had bilateral relations with. The 1960s was also the decolonisation era in Africa. Although some countries gained independence before and after the 1960s, most African countries were independent by 1970. Most developed countries found it generally easier to forge bilateral relations with independent countries, as did Sweden. A review was made in 1970 on the

Swedish foreign aid bill that essentially dictated how foreign aid was to be administered. The

Swedish government discovered that foreign aid was being administered without a proper policy in place. The argument made was that aid should become an “instrument of Swedish foreign policy.” In 1970, the Swedish government decided that foreign aid, through SIDA, should only be administered to countries that showed a certain level of commitment towards self-improvement.118 Only countries that had development plans in motion were to be considered for Swedish assistance.

115 Roger D. Congleton, Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform, Liberalism and the Rise of Western Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 275. 116 Goran Ohlin, “Swedish Aid Performance and Development Policy,” Development Policy Review A6, no. 1 (November 1973): 50. 117 Ohlin, “Swedish Aid Performance and Development Policy,” 50. Initially, Swedish foreign aid was administered by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). 118 Ohlin, “Swedish Aid Performance and Development Policy,” 52. 50

By 1970, Botswana had already begun preparations for diamond mining in the country.119 Although production in the Orapa mine started in 1972, Botswana became eligible for Swedish aid in the sense that it now had the potential of developing within a shorter period of time compared to other African states. It is most likely that the discovery of diamonds in

Orapa influenced the commencement of Swedish aid projects in Botswana in 1972 following the revision of the aid bill in Sweden in 1970. There are no sources to confirm the main reason behind the delayed commencement date of Swedish aid projects in Botswana but it is possible that events leading to it could have influenced the decision. There is also a possibility that

Swedish government documents might contain the answer but that would mean further research beyond funds awarded to a masters research trip.

Sweden-Botswana Cooperation Aid Agreements

A number of agreements between Botswana and Sweden were signed after 1972. Most of the agreements guaranteeing development cooperation were signed after proposals and surveys had been conducted by Swedish field experts in Botswana. Archival records reveal that agreements between the two countries were renewed every two years. With every new agreement, a progress report would be attached as well as a proposed budget for the next two years. Towards the end of the Swedish financial year in 1977, the government of Botswana sent a detailed proposal and request for financial aid to the Swedish government. As part of the agreement, the two countries held annual consultations between April and May. 120

In the 1977/78 proposal, Botswana’s minister of finance Baledzi Gaolathe elaborated on the economic progress the country had made, giving further details of how Swedish

119 Joe Nocera, “Diamonds Are Forever in Botswana,” The New York Times, August 8, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/business/worldbusiness/09nocera.html 120 Botswana National Archives and Records Services (hereinafter referred to as BNARS), OP 23/11, Vol 1, Botswana Foreign Relations, January 1977. The Swedish financial year ends every June 30. 51 assistance facilitated this growth. The purpose of the survey was to give the Swedish government an idea of recent updates made on the National Development Plan (NDP) before the consultations. The proposal touched on a number of developments made, ranging from the mining sector to agriculture and rural development. The most significant development that the proposal highlighted was the launching of the national currency, the Pula, in August 1976. 121

Prior to this, Botswana was a member of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) with the South

African Rand as a national currency. 122 The launching of the Pula facilitated Botswana’s economic independence from apartheid South Africa.

Given the situation in 1970s Southern Africa explained in the previous chapter, the GoB made the Swedish government aware of the threat it faced formally in the 1977 proposal. The disruption of borders by neighbouring minority regimes forced Botswana to divert resources from development to security. Botswana was also faced with a growing problem of refugees from surrounding minority ruled states. The government also had to come up with contingency transportation plans because Botswana relied heavily on her neighbours’ seaports for imports and exports. 123

An agreement was signed in July 1977 to extend the development cooperation between

Sweden and Botswana for the financial year 1977/78. As part of the agreement, Sweden vowed to avail resources (in the form of financial resources, personnel, consultancy services, equipment and commodities) to the value of fifty million Swedish Kronor (SKr 50 000 000), about 12 million US Dollars. In addition, the Swedish government also provided additional resources, through the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR), for the support of refugees in response to this state of emergency Botswana found herself in. The Swedish

121 BNARS, OP 23/11, Botswana Foreign Relations, 3. 122 Bank of Botswana, History of the Pula, Accessed 26 September 2018, http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/content/2009110912000-history-of-the-pula 123 BNARS, OP 23/11, 4. 52 government also put a sum of five million Kronor at Botswana’s disposal for anything to ease the strain of the emergency. 124 Sweden’s state of neutrality in world politics allowed her the freedom to choose when and when not to intervene and offer assistance. The Swedish government also made it clear that it would offer support to liberation movements as it valued world peace as well as its relations with members of the Third World. 125

In 1980, a new biennial agreement was signed between Botswana and Sweden. The

GoB, through the minister of finance, compiled a report on the progress made since the last agreement was signed. The new Botswana minister of finance, Kenneth Mathambo submitted a detailed proposal with a budget to the Swedish government containing new projects listed under the new NDP which effected from 1978 to 1985. Some of the major proposed projects included plans to take-over the Botswana-based section of the National Railways of Zimbabwe

(NRZ) (formerly Rhodesia Railways).126 The railway was a legacy of Cecil John Rhodes’ vision to have a British railway line stretching from the Cape in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt.

South Africa operated the line from Vryburg to Mahalapye while Rhodesia/Zimbabwe controlled the line from Mahalapye to Bulawayo. By 1980, physical resources essential for the running of an independent railway had already been created by the GoB. A district organisation that was expected to handle the day to day functions of the railway line within Botswana was created in Francistown and expected to be operational by the end of 1980. Plans for the construction of an international airport were already in place, with construction expected to commence by January 1981 and take two and a half years to complete.127 In terms of transport and communication, the GoB was making considerable progress to achieve independence from

South Africa and Zimbabwe. The report, however, does not show Swedish involvement in the

124 BNARS, OP 23/11, “Agreement on Development Cooperation 1977,” 66-73. 125 BNARS, OP 23/11, “Government Statement at the Riksdag Debate on Foreign Policy,” March 1976, 7. 126 BNARS, OP 23/11, “Botswana-Sweden Cooperation,” 4. Complete take-over of the railway section happened in 1987. 127 BNARS, OP 23/11, “Botswana-Sweden Cooperation,” 4. 53 abovementioned developments. It rather shows how far the GoB had developed by 1977 as well as plans it had in the pipeline. The purpose of the information was to show the Swedish government the efforts that had been made towards establishing economic independence by

Botswana and how much assistance it needed.

The GoB also made new biennial requests to the Swedish government, a majority of which pertained to issues around education and training. It requested an increase in funding for the construction of primary school classrooms and other facilities such as teachers’ quarters, toilets, offices and kitchens. With the new NDP, the target of classrooms to be built by 1985 was increased, therefore the government needed extra funding for the project. 128 The increase in numbers could not be established since the report was vague about the information. The minister of finance also commended the government of Sweden for the sector approach to aid administration that it was employing. This approach worked effectively for Botswana since the sectors targeted by the Swedish administration were areas in which Botswana needed the most assistance. The sector approach was made even more effective by the proposals written by

Botswana and survey missions conducted by Sweden that assessed the level of need in

Botswana.

Swedish-Botswana Aid Cooperation: Three Decades of Growth

Swedish activity in Botswana during the 1970s was largely characterised by mission surveys of various parts of the country. The Swedish missions generally made suggestions based on their findings before a particular development project could commence. During this period, the Swedish were establishing themselves as donors in Botswana and so thorough

128 BNARS, OP 23/11, “Botswana-Sweden Cooperation,” 6. For the financial year 1979/80, the government of Botswana funded most of the project through the Economic Stimulus Package (ESP). An extra P4 million was requested from the Swedish government. For the duration of NDP V, Botswana asked for P43 million from Sweden. 54 research on the country had to be done before the allocation of funds. In some cases, surveys and proposals were also conducted by the GoB in an attempt to show proactivity. The change in Swedish aid policy in the 1970s as noted above meant that Botswana had to prove herself worthy of Swedish assistance. Swedish assistance to Botswana gained momentum in the late

1970s and remained at a peak between 1980 and 1998.

Aid to the Construction Industry in Botswana

With infrastructure as one of the main focuses of Swedish aid, their earliest project in

Botswana was improving the construction industry in 1972. Not only were they concerned with the quality of buildings in Botswana, they also aimed at improving the conditions and skills of the construction workers. A report compiled for SIDA by the government of Botswana showed that an assessment was made on the quality of the five levels of training on construction: academic, technical, vocational, brigade and apprenticeship. The report made a request to

SIDA for the provision of funds and consultants for studies on the improvement of the building industry and the building materials industry in Botswana. In addition, the GoB requested the construction of twenty-five staff houses in the capital, Gaborone, from SIDA to accommodate the personnel provided by Sweden to work on the project. The intention behind the report was to allow SIDA to assess the need for quality infrastructure in Botswana and allocate relevant resources and consultants with a basic understanding of the local situation. 129

A rough estimation of funds needed was made by the GoB for the periods from 1972 to1974 and 1977 to 1978. This expenditure estimation was not exclusive to buildings but included roads and other infrastructure. 130 A Swedish mission consisting of the Head of

Division at the National Swedish Board of Building and Planning visited Botswana during

129 Government of Botswana, Building and Housing in Botswana, Report for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), April 1974, 1. 130 Government of Botswana, Building and Housing in Botswana, 7. 55

February and March 1973. The purpose of the visit was for the Swedish experts to survey specific areas in Botswana and then compile a report with recommendations to SIDA. The level of thoroughness involved in the project is consistent with the recommendations made by

Lancaster in her book Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done. As part of the solutions to aid ineffectiveness, Lancaster suggested that the aid recipient should provide the donor with a proper plan of how they intend on using the funds. She also suggests that the donor nation embark on a mission to train the recipient on how to manage development projects. 131 In this instance, both Botswana and Sweden showed active involvement in the project. The GoB, rather than relying on the Swedes for aid and manpower, placed the responsibility of the project on the local town councils. 132

Involvement in Rural Area Development

The GoB has a programme in place known as the Remote Area Development Plan

(RADP) that allows them to better provide services to people in hard-to-reach areas. Created in 1974, the programme initially targeted the marginalised San minority in the western part of the country but it eventually grew more inclusive of other groups in remote areas. The government increased the target group in 1978 to “all people living outside organised village settlements” to avoid allegations of ethnic bias. 133 The target group was also expanded following the 1974/75 Rural Incomes Distribution Survey (RIDS) which showed that severe poverty not only affected the Kgalagadi region, but also affected other people in remote areas outside organised village settlements in other regions of the country.134

131 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much To Do So Little Done (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 236. 132 Government of Botswana, Building and Housing in Botswana, Appendices 7. 133 BNARS, BNB 8896, Pamphlets ‘E’, E. B. Egner, The Remote Area Development Programme: An Evaluation, June 1981, 2. 134 Botswana Institute for Development Policy, Report on the Review of the Remote Area Development Programme, 7. 56

Although the target group increased, the programme design and implementation seemed more suited for the Basarwa in the west than other remote area dwellers. Brian Egner’s evaluation report has shown that in the 1980s, the programme neglected other ethnic minorities living amongst the Basarwa. His observations are drawn on the basis that the RADP policies had not been adopted as a national policy unlike the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) for instance.135 Nevertheless, the RADP received international attention from countries such as

Sweden and Norway. At the revision of the programme in 1974, it was partly financed by the government and mostly by international donor funds. SIDA was a major contributing partner in the programme’s early stages post-independence. However, Norway took over in 1988 as the major partner by signing a grant deal with the GoB for a total of P 11 500 000 for a period of four years. 136 The next chapter discusses, in detail, Norwegian assistance to rural development in Botswana.

Sweden has made rural development one of its main aid priorities. In a progress report compiled in 1999, Sida concluded that in order for sustainable aid to achieve its intended purpose, the recipient nation’s needs should be considered and prioritised.137 In 1972, a

Swedish mission conducted a survey in the western margin of Botswana for a proposed village development project. 138 The western margin of Botswana is often unintentionally neglected when development plans are made mostly because the population is concentrated along the eastern margin. The mission covered ten villages including Ghanzi, Kalkfontein, Kule,

Lehututu and Kang to name a few. The purpose of the survey was for the mission to come up

135 BNARS, BNB 8896, Egner, The Remote Area Development Programme, 6. 136 University of Botswana Library: Botswana Documentation and Special Collection (hereinafter referred to as BDSC) Pamphlets 93/173, Project Memorandum: Rural Area Development Programme LG 127, October 1991, 3. 137 Karin Isaksson, “Rural Development: A Summary of Sida’s Experiences and Priorities,” Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency: Department for Natural Resources and the Environment Position Paper (Stockholm: May 1999): 8. https://www.sida.se/contentassets/a00bd9487b4b420e964ce0c2289a6613/14345.pdf 138 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, The Village Areas Development Project of the Western State Lands of Botswana, December 1972. 57 with solutions on how to better deliver services and resources to people in the western margin.

It also aimed at finding better ways of promoting agriculture in the arid area.

One of the suggestions that the mission made was that local institutions in the area should be reinforced. Emphasis was placed on the importance of strengthening the Village

Development Committee (VDC) and the customary courts (lekgotla). In preparation for bigger projects, the mission suggested that the members of the VDC be encouraged to learn the techniques of project management and development planning by undertaking small projects for practice. The mission also recommended that the lekgotla be given the powers to allocate land and agricultural resources with recommendations from the VDC. 139

Another field that the mission thought needed improvement was education. The curriculum in Botswana is standard across the country with English and Setswana as the mediums of instruction. From grade 1 through to 4 the medium of instruction is Setswana while

English becomes the medium of instruction from grade 5 to tertiary level. 140 As the mission observed, a majority of languages used in the western margin are not Setswana or English. This therefore means a learning barrier is automatically created by the system. The mission recommended that the government create a curriculum that was customised for schools in the western area and also relevant to the needs and way of life of the learners. 141 The GoB is still working on improving this aspect of the education system.

According to Swedish development scholar Karin Isaksson, Swedish rural development projects in the 1960s and 1970s were mainly focused on agriculture and forestry projects. 142

In a position paper submitted in 1999, Isaksson shows how emphasis was placed on the

139 SIDA, The Village Areas Development Project of the Western State Lands of Botswana, 12. 140 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, “Botswana: The Impact of Language Policy and Practice on Children’s Learning,” Country Review: Evidence from Eastern and Southern Africa, 2016, 2. 141 SIDA, The Village Areas Development Project of the Western State Lands of Botswana, 13. 142 Isaksson, “Rural Development: A Summary of SIDA’s Experiences and Priorities,” 7. 58 importance of promoting self-sufficiency in rural areas. The 1972 mission observed a difficulty in communication between the most remote communities and the villages in the western areas.

Even if the government made attempts at providing resources to villages in the western margin, the most remote areas would still be neglected as a result of poor communication and infrastructure. Therefore, the mission emphasised improving agriculture to promote self- sufficiency. It also recommended that the government improve roads and transport linking villages in the western margin. This also included other means of communication such as radios and mail services. 143 By 1975, the GoB and Sweden had made progress in their development cooperation agreement; in terms of rural area development, funds were allocated for rural electrification, village area development and village water supplies. 144

Education Sector Development

For a long time, the Swedish government offered aid to sectors with which it had the most experience. The Swedes were renowned for their well organised and practical education policies as well as vocational training. The bulk of Swedish development assistance was dedicated to training and education in developing countries. 145 Although SIDA was formed in

1962, Sweden created its first policy of aid to education in developing countries in 1972. The

1972 policy was created after Sweden had identified that education in developing countries was expensive; a majority of parents could not afford primary education for their children.

Another discovery made was that western values, as remnants of colonialism, dominated education systems in developing countries. 146 This strong belief in education is why the

143 SIDA, The Village Areas Development Project of the Western State Lands of Botswana, 14. 144 BNA, OP 15/3, Vol 4, “Agreement of Development Cooperation 1975/76,” External Aid, October 1977, Appendix 2, 1. 145 Langazye Henry Kaluba, “International Cooperation in Education: A Study of Education Aid Policy and Management- with Particular Reference to British and Swedish Aid in Zambia, 1964-1989” (PhD diss., Institute of Education, University of London, 1990), 357. 146 Kaluba, “International Cooperation in Education,” 363. 59

Swedish mission that surveyed rural Botswana in 1972 suggested that the government formulate a curriculum that was customised to the way of life of people in the western margin of the country.

In 1972, a Swedish mission carried out a survey specifically on education and training in Botswana for SIDA. The purpose of the survey was to assess the needs in the field of education and how best the Swedish government could offer assistance. One of the conclusions drawn by the mission was that there was a direct correlation between the drought season and poor education performance especially in rural Botswana. The country recorded a high number of drop-outs during the 1966-1970 drought, most likely because parents could not afford school fees. Most parents paid for their children’s school fees using money they acquired from trading their cattle at the BMC. During drought periods, most parents lost their livestock which then affected their ability to pay for their children’s education. 147

The Swedish mission also reported on ongoing Swedish assistance to the education sector in Botswana. Financial assistance was committed towards the construction of secondary schools in the central and north-eastern region of the country. In 1971, Sweden had contributed a total of US $37 000 towards the Shashe River School project, one of the Swaneng group of schools.148 The Swedes also placed an expert on the staff of the Teacher Training College in

Francistown as part of the cooperation agreement. It is also worth noting that the college buildings were put up as a result of the UNESCO funds-in-trust projects in collaboration with

Swedish government aid. 149

147 BNARS, BNB 8152, “Education and Training in Botswana,” June 1972, 2. 148 Swaneng Hill School was established by the late Patrick van Rensburg, a South African-born anti-apartheid activist who settled in Serowe in 1962. From Swaneng Hill, a number of schools were built, using community assistance, including brigades in Serowe. Later van Rensburg collaborated with the government of Botswana to expand the project into Mahalapye, forming what came to be known as the Swaneng group of schools. See Sandy Grant, “The Non-Government Contribution to Development in Botswana, 1962-1980,” Botswana Notes and Records 12, (1980), 41-47. 149 BNARS, BNB 8152, “Education and Training in Botswana,” 20. 60

As the late educationist Langazye Henry Kaluba noted, the Swedes were often attracted by innovation and economic potential.150 The Swaneng group of schools project attracted

Swedish aid the most as it presented itself as a community project with the intention of promoting secondary education. The main aim of Swedish assistance was to encourage cost reduction methods in development. Their active involvement in the Swaneng group of schools projects is thus evidence of this objective. With locally trained teachers at the Francistown teacher training college, the cost of education would be reduced. Paying locally trained teachers was and still is a better option to paying expatriates. The more teachers trained, the more schools the government would be encouraged to build.

From 1970, the GoB also adopted self-help schemes that ensured that certain education projects were carried out successfully with less outside aid. Primary schools were run by the town and district councils but the content of primary education was the responsibility of the ministry of education. The local government authorities paid teachers and built, maintained and equipped the schools. Secondary schools were managed by the ministry of education. By

1972, Botswana had fourteen secondary schools. Seven of the fourteen were owned by the government, five were grant-aided while the remaining two were undefined in the report.

Botswana then also had a joint university with Lesotho and Swaziland, known as the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS) which was established in 1965. The main campus was in Lesotho but the school was controlled and managed by a council consisting of representatives from all three countries. The university was a legacy of the HCTs as the three countries had been Protectorates under the British Crown. Subsequently, each country independently established national universities with the University of Botswana (UB) being created in 1982. 151

150 Kaluba, “International Cooperation in Education,” 360. 151 BNARS, BNB 8152, “Education and Training in Botswana,” 22-29. 61

After 1975, the GoB emphasised the improvement of primary and non-formal education. This was a shift from the early 1970s focus on secondary education. By 1979, a total of 3 200 classrooms had been constructed, of which 1 350 were built in the rural areas.

Botswana worked closely with SIDA to widen access to basic education for children and adults especially those in rural areas. By the late 1970s, 35 percent of funds had been allocated to the construction of facilities such as branch libraries, classrooms and teachers’ quarters. The shift was guided by the new National Commission on Education (NCE) of 1977 that declared basic education as an essential need in Botswana. The economy of Botswana towards the late 1970s was fast growing and more professional skilled workers were needed to maintain the pace. In order to meet the manpower needs, more Batswana had to be trained at a primary level so as to increase secondary and tertiary level intake. Agrell et al highlighted that with the development of a modern sector of the economy, the requirements for government employment were a formal qualification in the late 1970s, with emphasis on white collar training. With a growing economy, there was an increased shortage of manpower trained in a science-based field, a growing need in an economy that heavily depended on the mining industry. 152

The NCE of 1977 put equality at the forefront of planning in education. From the education point of view, equality meant equal access to education regardless of sex, social class, ethnicity or residential area and most importantly equality with regards to redistribution of wealth through education. The main aim of this redefinition of education was to allow

Batswana the ability to move up the social ladder to improve their standards of living through education. Better education meant better paid jobs especially in the government sector that was in need of skilled personnel. By 1979, the structure of the education system in Botswana was diverse. It accommodated people of various backgrounds and abilities. The system consisted

The five grant-aided schools included Swaneng, Shashe, Moeding, St Josephs and Mater Spei. 152 J. O. Agrell, I. Fagerlind and I. Gustafsson, “Education and Training in Botswana 1974-80: The Impact of Swedish Assistance,” Education Division Documents 2, (March 1982), 5-20. 62 of a basic seven year primary education, with the option of branching into brigades for vocational training, or continuing into junior secondary depending on academic performance.

Vocational training was varied; apart from teaching colleges, the government added typist schools, nursing schools, agricultural training, crafting and accounting and commercial training to the list of vocational schools. This development was vital for the diversification of the economy and the provision of services in various sectors. As mentioned above, the government was adopting self-help schemes in order to have a locally run economy without depending on expatriate labour. This aim was a product of the 1970-1975 NDP. Its ultimate goal was to have manpower self-sufficiency within the next twenty-five years. The broadening of vocational education is evidence of the efforts made to achieve this goal. 153

Overall, Swedish assistance between 1973 and 1981 to the education sector added up to a total of 66 percent of development in education alone, with the GoB’s efforts amounting to 34 percent. 154 This was in the form of much needed funds and technical assistance. Although

Botswana had a plan in place in the form of the NCE of 1977, it still needed outside funding and expertise. The Swedish government continued to assist the education sector by providing sessional teachers who would visit schools and also offer technical assistance in the development of the curriculum. The primary and vocational levels of training received the most

Swedish attention with guidance from Botswana’s 1970-1975 NDP. These were areas that the

GoB felt needed more improvement than others as they seemed vital to the growth in the country’s literacy rates and growing an educated local workforce.

Assistance to Education in the 1980s Most projects in education that the Swedish were engaged in before the 1980s were still at the proposal or infancy stage. By the early 1980s, a lot of progress had been made. In 1981,

153 Agrell, Fagerlind and Gustafsson, “Education and Training in Botswana 1974-80.” 22-29. 154 Agrell, Fagerlind and Gustafsson, “Education and Training in Botswana 1974-80.” 48. 63 an evaluation report was submitted to SIDA with regards to the ongoing assistance agreement between the two governments. 155 The GoB’s intention to increase access to free primary school education had reached a breakthrough; primary education had reached around 80 to 85 percent of children of school-going age. 156 The report, however, does not show the number of classrooms available in the country and to what extent Swedish aid had been used in their construction. This makes it difficult to compare the progress made from the 1979 number of classrooms constructed with the supposed 1981 development.

By 1981, the literacy programme that was proposed in 1979 had already grown to cover the whole country with about 30 000 learners registered.157 It was launched in the 1979-85

NDP, following which the GoB wrote a proposal requesting financial assistance from the

Swedish government. 158 The Swedish government was asked to contribute P250 000 each year from 1980 to 1985, a total of P 1 250 000 by 1985. As part of the literacy programme, the GoB planned, with Swedish assistance, to construct libraries in villages across the country, especially rural areas. In 1981, the programme was delayed. Part of the agreement was that

Botswana should produce an evaluation report on the impact of branch libraries on various communities.159 The report implies that there was a certain number of branch libraries constructed in some villages but it fails to produce figures to confirm this. According to the report, the failure to produce an evaluation by the GoB delayed the construction of five branch libraries scheduled for the financial year 1981/82. 160

155 BNARS, BNB 10271, SIDA, Swedish Education Sector Support to Botswana: Report from the Sector Review 1981, November 1981. 156 BNARS, BNB 10271, Swedish Education Sector Support to Botswana, Annex 1. 157 In the 1979 report reviewed above, Botswana proposed a literacy programme to the Swedish government that aimed at equipping Batswana of all ages with basic education ranging from languages to basic mathematics concepts. 158 BNARS, OP 23/11, “Botswana-Sweden Cooperation,” 2. 159 BNARS, BNB 10271, Swedish Education Sector Support to Botswana, 3. 160 BNARS, BNB 10271, Swedish Education Sector Support to Botswana, 3. 64

By 1996, the Botswana National Library Service, with Swedish assistance, was operational with branches in multiple villages in Botswana. Approximately 58 reading rooms equipped with visual materials, ranging from documentary films to photographs, had been established all over the country. 161 The government used Swedish funds to acquire manuscripts from local authors as part of the literacy programme proposed in 1979. A total of P24 000 was spent on acquiring manuscripts from six selected authors who wrote on a variety of issues such as children’s rights. 162 The GoB took advantage of the Swedish generosity to enhance literacy and education in the country. It was through Swedish assistance that the GoB was first able to provide reading materials in Setswana, the most widely used African language in the country.

Through this development, the GoB was able to break the communication and language barrier which was a great challenge to local students. 163 Training of local vocational instructors by the

Swedish government also improved vocational education in Botswana.

Women in Development Planning (In-Service Training) The United Nations declared 1975 as the International Women’s Year at the first World

Conference on Women in Mexico City, Mexico. In addition, 1975 to 1985 was declared the

UN Decade for Women, emphasising the involvement of women in modern society. 164 Donor nations were encouraged to engage women in development planning in recipient nations. The

Swedish government caught the wave around the late 1990s through offering scholarships and in-service training to women in Botswana. 165 In the 1990s, Women in Development (WID) was an important topic for most development agencies. The goal in the 1990s was to achieve equality between men and women and improve the social and economic status of women

161 BNARS, HA 6/12, Vol 4, BNLS Rural Libraries Funded by SIDA in 1995/1996 Financial Year. 162 BNARS, HA 6/12, Vol 4, BNLS Rural Libraries Funded by SIDA in 1995/1996 Financial Year. The manuscripts were all written in Setswana. 163 BNARS, BNB 10271, Swedish Education Sector Support to Botswana, 6. 164 “World Conferences on Women,” Accessed 05 October 2018. https://www.ngocsw.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CSW59-handbook-World-Conferences-on-Women.pdf 165 BNARS, HA 6/12, Vol 4, SIDA, “Training Programme Invitation- Project Management,” January 1997. 65 through the development of programmes designed for women empowerment. The WID approach began as a project and programme-focused approach that assessed the place of women in development policy making. It mainly targeted programmes funded by foreign aid.

166 The Swedish adoption of this policy was most likely influenced by global discussions on the WID policy.

The timing of the Swedish policy change is also coincidental with changes in the administration of development aid in Sweden. Initially, Swedish aid had been administered through SIDA, with the aid of development agencies such as SwedeCorp, BITS(Swedish

Bilateral Investment Treaties) and SAREC (Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation).In

1995, the aforementioned agencies were dissolved and the Swedish International Development

Agency (Sida) was created. The duties and responsibilities of the agencies fell on Sida as the sole manager of Swedish international cooperation duties. In 1997, the Swedish government sent an invitation to the government of Botswana to nominate suitable candidates for a project management training programme that would be funded by Sida. In addition, the Swedish government also funded the training of three female prisons officers in 1997 as part of a Human

Rights Programme that was run by Lund University in Sweden during April and May 1997. 167

Gender affairs were at the fulcrum of the Sida in-service training in Botswana between

1997 and 1998. At the mid-term review of the cooperation between Botswana and Sweden in

1996, Sida representative Mr Jan Bjerninger stated that they intended to put more emphasis on women’s empowerment in the following years of the cooperation agreement term.168 By engaging in projects that promoted women empowerment and civil rights, the Swedish government hoped to help strengthen good governance and democracy in Botswana. In-service

166 Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, “Women in Development,” Women 2000 1, 1992, 5. 167 BNARS, HA 6/12, Vol 4, SIDA, “Human Rights April 1st to May 7th, 1997,” January 1997. 168 BNARS, HA 6/12, Vol 4, SIDA, “Mid-Term Review of Cooperation between Botswana and Sweden,” June 1996, Annexe 4. 66 training priorities in 1996 were given to issues pertaining to women or gender issues, population dynamics and HIV/AIDS. 169

The Swedish economy in the years leading up to 1990 experienced slow growth due to structural changes. Changing consumer behaviour as well as emerging global competition invalidated the old Swedish industrial model. Towards 1990, the Swedish economy adapted to the new changes in the global market leading up to her entrance into the European Union in

1995. 170 While recovering from financial difficulties, the Swedish government was more than willing to top-up funds already allocated to a study that aimed at reviewing laws affecting the status of women in Botswana. 171

Agricultural Sector

Despite efforts at diversification, the economy of Botswana relies heavily on the export of two commodities: diamonds and beef. Agriculture plays a very important role in the society especially in rural Botswana. Even as formal employment rose in the post-independence era, agriculture still remained to a large extent part of Botswana society. 172 Migrations from urban areas to the farms and cattle posts during the rainy season and again for harvesting still defines the Tswana lifestyle. Agriculture played a vital role in Tswana society both economically and socially. Economically, cattle and farm produce were used as a means of exchange through the barter system of trade; different farmers within the same community would specialise in

169 BNARS, HA 6/12, Vol 4, Savingram: Director of Public Service Management to Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs, “Ministerial Training Plans for the SIDA In-Service Training Fund,” October 1996. 170 Lennart Schon, “Sweden-Economic Growth and Structural Change, 1800-2000,” Economic History Association, Accessed October 14, 2018, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/sweden-economic-growth-and-structural-change-1800-2000/ 171 BNARS, HA 6/12, Vol 4, SIDA, Correspondence between Swedish Charge d’ Affaires L-O Jansson and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Planning R.E. Cole, “Consultancy on the Review of Laws that Affect the Status of Women in Botswana,” September 1996. Due to budgetary deficits in Sweden, bilateral aid was cut down from 1% of the country’s GNP to 0.7%. 172 James Denbow and Phenyo C. Thebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana (London: Greenwood Press, 2006), 165. 67 growing certain crops or rearing a certain breed of livestock for exchange with farmers who grew and bred a different kind. Socially, wealth was measured by the size of one’s herd; the more cattle a person had, the higher their social status. 173 The establishment of the Botswana

Meat Commission (BMC) in 1965 further contributed to the gap between social ranks in traditional Tswana society. People could trade their livestock for material wealth. In most cases, families sold cattle to invest in the education of their children with hopes that the investment would pay off once the child grew up and started working.

For years, the government of Botswana has been trying to equalise wealth distribution and fill the gap between the rich and the poor with regards to cattle ownership. Climatically,

Botswana’s east is more endowed with favourable conditions for agriculture than the west. The eastern margin receives the most rains and has the most fertile lands compared to the western region. In an attempt to bridge the gap, the government of Botswana designed the first

Livestock Development Programme in 1970. 174 A proposal was sent to the World Bank and

SIDA (as the co-funder) where the three parties reached an agreement in 1972. The aim of the programme was to create fenced cattle ranches and sheep farms in the western state lands in the western margin. The initial stages of the programme were meant to test the benefits of fenced ranching and subsequently develop the project into a nationwide programme based on the results. 175

A joint loan from SIDA and the World Bank of about R1 909 784 (US$ 2 674 769) was given to Botswana to develop its livestock industry. 176 Subsequently, the GoB established ranches in the eastern state lands. These ranches were managed by the BMC since they were

173 Denbow and Thebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 163. 174 BNARS, BNB 4963, SIDA Report, Marcia L. Ordell, Botswana’s First Livestock Development Project: An Experiment in Agricultural Transformation, June 1980, 1. 175 BNARS, BNB 4963, Odell, Botswana’s First Livestock Development Project, 1. 176 The thesis could not establish the amount contributed by SIDA from the loan granted to Botswana. 68 specifically made for farmers who traded with it. 177 The ranches in the eastern state lands had the most fertile grazing land because they were established for purposes of fattening cattle to improve their quality. The report conducted by agricultural researcher, Marcia Odell for SIDA in 1980 was a survey and review of the progress made in livestock production by the GoB since the establishment of the ranches. Conclusions made by the review were that although the western state land ranch was created as a model for livestock development in other parts of

Botswana, it acted as an example of what not to do when establishing other ranches. 178 For example, financial failures of the ranch brought about by budget underestimates enabled the

GoB to make appropriate estimates for the new ranches. The GoB also failed to take account the climatic differences between the western state lands and the northern and eastern state lands. Therefore ranches in the eastern and northern state lands were more successful than that in the west, although not by a great deal. The GoB still battles with overstocking in rural areas and foot and mouth diseases in the east.

As part of an initiative by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation

(FAO), the Swedish government co-funded a fertiliser demonstration and pilot credit scheme in Southern Africa. The demonstration was conducted in Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana only and it began operating in August 1969. In 1973, a joint FAO and SIDA mission visited the three countries to monitor the progress and identify factors that might have facilitated the progression or delay of the scheme. Throughout the duration of the first phase of the scheme in Botswana, 200 local agricultural demonstrators were trained. Demonstrations were conducted in a considerable number of farms across Botswana in its initial phase. Some of the conclusions drawn regarded application methods of fertilisers. The mission concluded that crops responded best when applied systematically in bands than the random broadcasting

177 BNARS, BNB 4963, Odell, Botswana’s First Livestock Development Project, 16. 178 BNARS, BNB 4963, Odell, Botswana’s First Livestock Development Project, 144. 69 application method Batswana used. The mission was also able to establish that fertiliser prices in Botswana were fairly higher than neighbouring countries. Recommendations for the second phase were that the parties involved consider subsidising fertiliser prices given that rainfall in

Botswana is fairly scarce. Farmers ran at a loss due to low rainfall which made the fertilisers ineffective. To improve arable farming in Botswana, the mission also recommended that the

FAO and SIDA place a FAO-trained Soil Fertility specialist in Botswana to work with local farmers on how best to benefit from the fertilisers. Through this initiative, the Swedish government continued assisting Botswana but at a multilateral level.179

Conclusion

Swedish assistance, through SIDA (and later Sida), was vital to Botswana’s social and economic growth. The sectoral approach adopted by the Swedish was successful in their aid to

Botswana for nearly three decades. The opening of Botswana’s first diamond mine in 1971 as well as Botswana’s proactivity influenced the success of its bilateral relations with Sweden.

Efforts to improve rural development were made by the Swedish government as seen through their engagement with Village Development Committees in Botswana in 1972. Swedish aid to

Botswana was mostly concentrated on the education sector. With Swedish assistance, a number of secondary schools were built in Botswana, through the Swaneng Hill School project.

Education was made more affordable and accessible to children across the country, although policies on the use of mother-tongue language in classrooms in non-Setswana and English speaking parts of the country remains a challenge. Through their active involvement in vocational training in Botswana, the Swedish government was able to help grow the workforce in Botswana, therefore contributing towards economic growth.

179 BNARS, BNB 5858, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Report of the FAO/SIDA Evaluation Mission to Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland on Project TF-AFR.51 (SWE) Fertiliser Demonstration and Pilot Credit Scheme, September 1973, B1-B4. 70

In the late 1990s, the Swedish began incorporating women in development, influencing

Botswana to adopt the WID Policy. The UN encouraged donor nations to incorporate the WID policy in their aid administration to promote gender equality in developing countries. Through the UN, Sweden continued to assist Botswana to improve its agricultural sector. Sweden collaborated with the UN in the agricultural sector because she did not have a stable policy in place regarding agriculture.

Through Sida, the Swedish government achieved its aims of helping Botswana reach some level of independence from apartheid South Africa. The government of Botswana and

Swedish government worked together through regular consultations for transparency and effectiveness. The government of Botswana provided the Swedish government with detailed budgets and proposals to prove its intentions of using aid effectively. The Swedish government, on the other hand, engaged field experts and technicians to conduct surveys and oversee projects in Botswana to ensure the overall management of aid funds. To guard against aid dependence, the Swedish government made the government of Botswana responsible for aid implementation rather than having Swedish officials at the forefront of projects. The government of Botswana might have struggled to continue after Swedish withdrawal had the

Swedes been at the forefront of projects in Botswana. This would have been a recipe for disaster consistent with Moyo’s criticism of foreign aid. In addition to that, by 1977 the government of

Botswana had already independently gained control of the railway section within its territory and was making plans to construct an international airport. Such level of proactivity eliminated any chance of aid being misused by government officials.

As liberalists, the Swedish government felt they had a moral obligation to help

Botswana rise from poverty and grow its economy to participate in global trade. From sources the thesis consulted, no evidence was found indicating string attached to Swedish aid to

Botswana. In addition, Sweden’s provision of aid, through the UNHCR, to Botswana to ease

71 the burdens of the refugee crisis in 1977 resonates with the Swedes’ value of world peace as a liberal state.

72

CHAPTER FOUR

NORWAY IN BOTSWANA Introduction

This chapter explores the bilateral relations between Norway and Botswana. It highlights the main sectors of collaboration between the Norwegian government and the government of

Botswana. It shows the areas Norwegian assistance was concentrated on and the rate of success achieved in the varied sectors. Collaboration between Norway and Sweden in their relations with Botswana is evident in some sectors although not to a great extent. Botswana’s good governance and aid management is apparent throughout the chapter mostly due to Norway’s strict policy on aid accountability. The planning and implementation of programmes funded by

Norway was the responsibility of the GoB based on the country’s needs. Norwegian assistance to the rural and health sectors will be contextualised within global events occurring at the same time of the partnership. Like most donors assisting Botswana, the Norwegian government withdrew in the late 1990s due to the Botswana’s budding and promising mineral resource economy.

NORWEGIAN AID POLICY

Norway administered bilateral development aid through an agency known as the

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). Through this agency, the

Norwegian government adopted the sectoral approach to aid administration. Although similar to Swedish aid, Norwegian aid to Botswana was more limited. The Norwegian government only maximised on two specific sectors, health and rural development, although funds allocated to these sectors were also restricted to agreed and budgeted amounts. Generally, it followed

Botswana’s National Development Plan in its allocation of assistance.

73

The Norwegian criteria for selecting an aid cooperation country was and still is determined by the potential partner’s governance and economic situation. Countries that qualify for Norwegian aid should have good governance and be classified as underdeveloped by the World Bank. Good governance in recipient countries is generally important for aid effectiveness because it demonstrates their commitment towards improving their economic state. Norwegian economist, Just Faaland highlights that Norwegian bilateral aid objectives from the 1970s were meant to target the poorest communities in recipient countries and improve their living standards. His analysis of Norwegian aid divides these activities into three categories: projects aimed mainly at supporting the poorest (in the recipient country); projects directly benefiting everyone, including the poorest; and projects which may indirectly benefit the poorest.180 From the rural development section of this chapter, it will be evident that the engagements of Norwegian aid in Botswana the 1980s focused on the second objective. This objective was intended to cover basic human needs and some of the programmes that it supported included primary health services. Most projects that Norad supported in Botswana ensured that basic government amenities reached the majority of the population, including people in remote areas. Through Norad, Norway extended its domestic policy to recipient countries, ensuring that priority is given to creating a welfare state.

The administration of Norwegian aid since the 1970s promotes ownership of development and poverty reduction strategies. A Norad report on poverty reduction strategies emphasises the need for recipient countries to make poverty reduction policies political. By politicising strategies, different stakeholders (among them politicians and the general public) engage in discussions for people to understand and own the policies. Consultation of ordinary citizens ensured that policies implemented were relevant and addressed their needs. The

180 Just Faaland, “Norwegian Aid and Reaching the Poor,” Development Policy Review 2, (London: Sage 1984), 1-5. 74

Norwegian government also reasoned that this method promotes transparency and enhances democracy since consultation forms part of a democratic society. In addition, donor contributions had to be included in the budget to prevent the spread of corruption. This ensured that every grant was accounted for since government budgeting was usually under regulation and monitoring.181

Aid Agreements between Botswana and Norway

Cooperation between Norway and Botswana began in 1972, six years after Sweden-

Botswana relations started. Development assistance granted to Botswana by Norway between

1972 and 2002 amounted to a total of about 1.8 billion Norwegian Kronor (about US$

215,641,800 in 2018 rates). The Norwegian government agreed to development cooperation with Botswana for a number of reasons. Botswana in the 1970s was on the list of ten least developed countries and was therefore qualified for development assistance. Most importantly,

Norway was aware of the geopolitical position Botswana was in, that is, being a landlocked country in a region undergoing liberation struggle wars against minority settler governments.

The Republic of South Africa, South West Africa (present day Namibia) and Southern

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were all put under international sanctions and by complying with the

UN resolution on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, Botswana qualified for Norwegian assistance. 182

The global political atmosphere in the 1970s is worth noting for context. Norway, being part of the NATO, was committed to blocking the spread of communism. This meant using every resource she had to win over as many newly independent states as possible, including the use of foreign aid. Part of the reasons why Norway agreed to development cooperation with

181 NORAD, “Poverty Reduction Strategy Processes in Partner Countries,” NORAD Report, 2001/02, 4-5. 182 BNARS, OP/13/8, Norway, Vol 1, “Report Emanating from a Trip to Norway and Sweden by H.E. Mr S.A. Mpuchane and Mr T. Ikitseng, 18th to 29th October 1983.” 75

Botswana was because the Soviet Union had already extended its influence to South African nationalists and other countries in Southern Africa. 183 NATO feared that the Soviet Union would eventually succeed in spreading communism across Botswana and therefore it had to act to deter that from materialising. Since Botswana’s economy was weak and vulnerable, it would have been easier for the Soviet Union to attract it with aid. 184 Norway reacted by providing aid to Botswana to liberate it from apartheid South Africa. Not only was it acting in its capacity as a NATO member, Norway was also pursuing its liberal foreign policy. Like other Scandinavian countries, Norway wished to have an influence in the restoration of global peace. Unlike Sweden though, Norway did not aid liberation movements in Botswana. It only made efforts to help Botswana cut economic ties with apartheid South Africa.

As the economy of Botswana progressed with time, the Norwegian government made a decision to withdraw financial assistance in 2002. Similar to Sweden, Norway was confident that Botswana’s economy was well-managed and that it could sustain herself without financial assistance. In addition, the regional conflicts had ended and the Cold War was over. 185 Despite being involved in a number of sectors in Botswana, Norwegian aid was more concentrated on health and rural development (which included psychiatry, rural health posts and clinics and rural roads). The 1977 cooperation agreement between the two governments indicated that

Botswana was to receive P5.4 million (35 million Norwegian Kronor) a year onwards. The

183 The African National Congress formed by South African nationalists worked closely with the Soviet Union and the South African Communist Party to overthrow the apartheid government. The Soviet Union was also aligned with nationalist movements in Angola and Mozambique which eventually gained independence from Portugal. See Sue Onslow and Anna-Mart van Wyk (eds.), “Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974,” History and Public Policy Program: Critical Oral History Conference Series, 2013, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_SouthAfrica_Final_Web.pdf 184 Helen Desfosses, “The USSR and Africa,” A Journal of Opinion 16, No. 1, 1987, 3-10. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was advancing a consolidation policy in Africa. Through Cuban involvement in such countries as Angola (and, to some extent, nationalists in South Africa), communism was fast-spreading in Africa. Most nationalist movements emerging in the 1970s in Africa subscribed to socialist ideologies (for example the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia). Naturally this gave the eastern bloc an upper hand in the ideological battle in Southern Africa. 185 Botswana Roads Department and Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Botswana-Norway, 30 Years of Cooperation in the Road Sector, September 2007, 7. https://www.vegvesen.no/_attachment/336346/binary/585505 76

Norwegian government also committed itself to donating US$ 10 million towards refinancing the World Bank’s loan to Botswana (granted in early 1977) for the construction of the

Mahalapye-Serule Road. This donation reduced the amount Botswana would have to repay the

World Bank by half. A Botswana government delegation including the vice president, Dr

Festus Mogae, met with Norad representatives in Oslo to discuss ongoing projects in 1977.

Files available at the Botswana National Archives indicate that by 1977, there were some projects already in motion that Norad was involved in. Norad was engaged in the construction of the Sehithwa-Shakawe Road, although only 60 kilometres of the road was to be included in the Norad programme. The rest of the road’s distance was to be covered by the government of

Botswana’s development budget. 186

Norad also vowed to draft a health programme that would later be discussed with the

GoB. This programme was to include clinics (with maternity wards) in major villages and health posts in minor villages. The 1977 agreement also indicated that Botswana would receive technical assistance, in the form of experts in various fields, to the value of 6 million Norwegian

Kronor. A majority of expatriate personnel provided by Norway was committed to the roads and health programmes. Some of the terms of this agreement were that Norad was to provide three experts a year per field from 1979 onwards.187

In 1985, representatives of the two countries met in Gaborone for consultation on ongoing projects and new requests that the GoB wished to make. The meeting was held following the finalisation of the Sixth National Development Plan (NDP VI) that covered the period 1985/86 to 1991/92. Major themes of this Plan were rural development, employment creation and economic diversification. The Norwegian delegation promised the Botswana

186 The finished road stretches for slightly above 282 kilometres. 187 BNARS, OP 15/3, Vol 4, External Aid, Economic Mission to Europe and the Middle East led by the Vice President, 4. 77 delegation Nkr 71.2 million in 1985 and Nkr 70 million from 1986 to 1989 in country programme funds.188 Development cooperation between the two countries would continue to be concentrated on the main sectors of health and village development.

RURAL AREA DEVELOPMENT

In the following sections of the chapter, it will be evident that Norad aid contributed significantly towards improving the living standards of people in remote areas. The

Norwegians were involved in programmes such as the Remote Area Development Programme

(RADP) since 1988, which was later revised to form the Accelerated Remote Area

Development Programme (ARADP) as well as San Development. By the time the ARADP was formed, the RADP was already well established in different villages. In 1991, NORAD agreed to assist in funding the ARADP without suggesting any major revisions to the programme but it made a few additions and minor adjustments.

Accelerated Remote Area Development Programme (ARADP)

The ARADP was formed after the GoB realised that the RADP was inefficient. At the start of the ARADP, SIDA and Norad were the major contributing partners for the program.

SIDA aid to the programme ended in mid-1991 when Norad took over as the major partner for an agreed P 11.5 million to be disbursed in a period of four years. 189 The GoB’s total budget for the ARADP was P 15.2 million. In this agreement, Norad’s responsibilities were restricted

188 Nkr 71.2 million is approximately US$ 8.4 million in current exchange rates. The additional Nkr 1.2 million on the 1985 budget was carried forward as unused funds from previous years. 189 BDSC Pamphlets 93/173, Project Memorandum: Rural Area Development Programme LG 127, 3. NORAD was involved in the RADP programme from 1988 to 1993. Both NORAD and SIDA continued to assist developing countries in the post-Cold War due to the nature of the Nordic model of socio-economic development. The Nordic model is committed to the welfare of the state and egalitarian income distribution. See Lars Mjoset, “The Nordic Economies 1945-1980,” ARENA Centre for European Studies Working Papers WP 00/4, 2000, https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/1994- 2000/2000/wp00_6.htm#topp** 78 to the provision of funds while the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing (MLGLH) in Botswana were responsible for the planning, administration and implementation of the programme. Similar to the RADP, the ARADP’s main objective was to improve the lives of Remote Area Dwellers

(RADs) in Botswana. People in remote areas were to have services extended to them; their economic opportunities were to be promoted and their political and legal rights were to be ensured. The terms of the programme were to avail land for projects of economic empowerment; provide basic infrastructure to enable services such as health care, transport and education to take place; promote and ensure formal recognition of local institutions and leaders that represented the target groups; and also the recognition and preservation of the cultural integrity of the RADs. 190

The Botswana and Norwegian governments both agreed on the target group being

RADs rather than just the San group, who were the initial targets. The GoB regarded the San as an ethnic group within Botswana, rather than indigenous people. The forced dislocation and provision of services only to the San would have had discriminatory undertones similar to the apartheid situation in South Africa which Botswana and Norway condemned. However, the situation of the San in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) had become a political issue by the time the ARADP Agreement was signed. The GoB had provided a borehole to ensure that the San in that area had access to water but the issue was with the hunting of wildlife that San continued to engage in. It was viewed as dangerous to the preservation of wildlife in that area. The government also claimed that they wanted to relocate the San out of the CKGR to more accessible villages in order to avail government services conveniently to the San. 191

190 Chr. Michelsen Institute, “NORAD’s Support of the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) in Botswana,” Development Studies and Human Rights: Evaluation Report 1.96, February 1996, 18. http://interactions.eldis.org/sites/interactions.eldis.org/files/database_sp/Botswana/Remote%20Area%20Dweller s%20Programme/RADS%202.pdf 191 Chr. Michelsen Institute, “NORAD’s Support of the RADP in Botswana,” 22. 79

Norad’s involvement in the San dispute was mostly influenced by prior experience with the Sami, an indigenous group in Norway.192 The Sami were marginalised both geographically and socially. Norway struggled to come up with policies that best suited and recognised the

Sami as a distinct group from other Norwegians. Similar to the San case in Botswana, even policies intended to benefit the Sami hardly acknowledged their uniqueness from other

Norwegians. Before 1984, Norway’s attempt to formulate policies that benefited the Sami were discriminatory as they divided the Sami into categories rather than come up with collective policies that accommodated all Sami people. However after 1984, changes were made to the

Norwegian Constitution to acknowledge that Norway was inhabited by two peoples, the Sami and Norwegians. The Sami experience also contributed a great deal to Norway’s international commitment towards the protection of indigenous communities. Norway became actively involved in the promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights through development aid and through international organisations such as the United Nations.193

The main cause of conflict that sparked the events discussed was the Ghanzi Farms issue of 1991 (discussed in the previous chapter as the Western State Lands). The San were kept out of the farms that the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing (MLGLH) had allocated for RAD use. The area in which the farms were built in 1989 had been previously occupied by the San, who were eventually displaced. The involvement by both Norad and

SIDA forced the GoB to reconsider and become more accommodating of the requests of the

San. It is unclear how Botswana was exactly more accommodating but a report produced by

192 The Sami, or Saami are an indigenous ethnic group found in Scandinavia, occupying parts of Norway, Sweden, northern Finland and on the Kola peninsula of Russia. A majority of their population is found in Norway. See Harald Gaski, “The Sami People: The “White Indians” of Scandinavia,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 17, no. 1 (1993), 115-128. 193 Sidel Saugestad, The Inconvenient Indigenous: Remote Area Development in Botswana, Donor Assistance, and the First People of the Kalahari (2001), 143-145. 80 the Chr. Michelsen Institute suggests that the MLGLH held more RADP consultations with the

San than before.

The Ghanzi Farms issue of 1991 discouraged Norad from extending the period of assistance to the ARADP Agreement. Norad had initially intended on funding the programme until the end of NDP 7 (1991-1997) but it only renewed by a year.194 The 1991 incident illuminates Norad’s hidden agenda in the ARADP agreement. Although Norad entered into the agreement on the basis that the target group for the ARADP was all remote area dwellers, it is clear that it had intentions of eventually reaching the San. Norway was more interested in the

San than other remote area dwellers. Sidsel Saugestad makes the same conclusions based on the fact that Norway’s foreign policy clearly targets minorities in poor communities. She attributes the ambiguities of the ARADP agreement to typical political communication that is often sufficiently vague to receive support and to eliminate criticism. 195 Norway and Botswana both entered into the agreement with different visions of the outcome of the program. The unstated objectives by the Norwegian government almost soured relations between the two governments. What the Norwegian government did not understand was that if the San were regarded as indigenous, then that meant Batswana were not. Nonetheless, Norad remained indirectly influential on the San matter. For instance, Norad funded a non-governmental organisation in Botswana known as the Botswana Christian Council (BCC). In 1992, the BCC produced a human rights paper that was critical of the government and examined the situation of the San. Norad also co-funded (with SIDA) a regional San conference in Namibia in June

1992. From this conference, the San advocacy group, the FPK, was formed. 196

194 Chr. Michelsen Institute, “NORAD’s Support of the RADP in Botswana,” 31-33. 195 Saugestad, The Inconvenient Indigenous, 148. 196 Chr. Michelsen Institute, “NORAD’s Support of the RADP in Botswana,” 22-36. 81

Programme Implementation

The implementation of the programme was the responsibility of the MLGLH, which continued with the RADP aims. Special attention was given to development problems of districts on the western margin of the country. The MLGLH mainly focused on implementing recommendations made after the evaluation of the RADP in 1986. Some of the recommendations were that RADs should be assured of their rights to own land and have assistance from land boards on how to apply for land; where possible, hunter-gather communities should be retained in their original living space; and most importantly that public services should be availed to RADs at a more accelerated pace. 197 The memorandum released on the implementation of the ARADP listed the districts of Central, North West, Kweneng,

Gantsi, Kgalagadi, Southern and Kgatleng as areas of priority as they had lagged behind in development. 198 Evidence of the implementation of the programme makes up a majority of the following sections of this chapter.

INFRASTRURE DEVELOPMENT

Assistance offered for infrastructure development in Botswana by Norad was mostly dedicated to the Roads Department. Part of the 1977 agreement between Norway and Botswana was that Norway would follow Botswana’s National Development Plan to administer aid following the recipient-based cooperation model. This essentially meant putting the recipient country’s needs at the forefront of the assistance programme. In the early stages of the roads programme, Norad provided expatriate personnel to manage planning, road design and maintenance of new roads while also providing administrative support to the Roads

Department and planning officers to the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication.

197 Chr. Michelsen Institute, “NORAD’s Support of the RADP in Botswana,” 46-47. 198 BDSC Pamplets 93/142, Ornulf Gulbrandsen, Report to NORAD on Botswana’s Accelerated Remote Area Development Programme, Appendix I. 82

Norwegians brought to Botswana were also responsible for providing in-service training to

Batswana in the Ministry and the Roads Department. Using this approach ensured that more

Batswana were trained to maintain projects once Norad withdrew its aid from Botswana. The

Roads Department was able to sustain itself and by 1992, it had an organisational structure with a number of divisions such as materials and research, maintenance, training and department management.199

Rural Roads Programme

The intention of the rural roads programme was to construct roads in remote areas to improve development and increase accessibility. The roads were meant to link two or more villages for better dissemination of resources countrywide. All District Councils were requested to propose priority routes for the programme and submit to the Central Government.

The Central Government would then compare the routes proposed, taking into account the population and distance to health centres and schools. 200 The pilot project failed due to the dry climate and the type of construction materials used. The dry climate was unsuitable for the gravel surface and most roads had to be re-gravelled twice in two years. The process of re- gravelling was costly such that Norad threatened to withdraw financial support if the government of Botswana did not change its technical methods. In 1977/78, Botswana resorted to using bituminous seals and discontinued the construction of gravel roads. 201

199 Botswana Roads Department and Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Botswana-Norway, 15. 200 Botswana Roads Department and Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Botswana-Norway, 16. 201 Bituminous seals are made up of asphalt and an aggregate (usually natural gravel or crushed stone). It is a thin protective layer applied to a pavement or gravel to guarantee and increased road lifespan (2-4 year service life). In the case of the roads project in Botswana, the aggregate used ranged between pit-gravel, coarse river sand and fine-grained natural sand. See “Bituminous Surface Treatments,” Pavement Interactive, Accessed 09 November 2018 https://www.pavementinteractive.org/reference-desk/maintenance-and-rehabilitation/maintenance/bituminous- surface-treatments/ 83

The Norwegian government emphasised the improvement of social and economic conditions of people in rural areas and therefore the rural roads project was the first step Norad took towards achieving this goal. As indicated in the previous chapter, location and accessibility of villages posed a challenge to the GoB’s ability to deliver services across the country. The rural roads project was believed to link well with the strategy of development in

Botswana; using profits from foreign investments later to develop rural areas. 202 Not only did the roads make rural villages accessible to government services, they also made the transportation of goods to and from the villages easier. The roads created a network of trade routes in the rural areas which improved self-sufficiency.

In Botswana’s NDP 1979-1985 (NDP V), infrastructural projects received the bulk of development funds. The projects included the taking over of the Botswana section of the railway line (from South Africa and Zimbabwe) and construction of the new airport, the

Botswana-Zambia road and the rural roads. The government of Botswana sought Norwegian assistance for the rural roads more than the other infrastructural projects listed in the fifth NDP.

The construction of main roads was economically vital as compared to the rural roads; priority was given to the construction of main roads on the basis of a cost versus social and economic benefit method and so government funds were used to construct main roads. Norway invested in the rural roads project because the roads specifically targeted people in remote areas. 203

Norad compiled a report on the conditions of rural roads across Botswana. The report was produced in 1982 based on data collected by Norad representatives in 1976 and information gathered by the author, Jan Hesselberg, in 1978 and 1980. Norad offered technical and financial assistance towards the construction of eight roads in Botswana. The report

202 BNARS, BNB 5228, Jan Hesselberg, “Integration and Development in Rural Botswana: Socio-Economic Evaluation of Rural Roads Final Report,” Department of Geography, University of Oslo, 1982. 203 Botswana Roads Department and Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Botswana-Norway, 30 Years of Cooperation in the Road Sector, 11. 84 however was based on information collected from Letlhakane and Tutume since the roads in these villages had been completed in 1977, a year before the beginning of Hesselberg’s research. The main aim of the report was to assess the socio-economic impact of the Rural

Road Programme since its establishment in 1976. Hesselberg’s study on the socio-economic impact of the rural roads showed that although people gained access to more prominent village centres, people from the middle class benefitted more from the rural roads than poor people.

They could afford to buy cars and travel more than their lower class counterparts. For people in the lower class, the roads only helped them access better health facilities in the village centres as well as markets for their agricultural produce.204 The report however neglects to stipulate the exact amount of money and personnel Norad contributed towards the construction of rural roads.

Despite being a reliable source on the early stages of the rural roads programme,

Hesselberg’s study would have been more informative about the impact of the programme on people in Letlhakane and Tutume had it been conducted at least five years after the roads were constructed. Nonetheless, the roads improved accessibility to village centres from the periphery. For those living in Letlhakane, Molepolole was the nearest centre while Francistown was made easily accessible to people in Tutume. Francistown, being Botswana’s second city after the capital Gaborone, had better resources compared to other urban centres. In comparison, the Tutume rural roads benefitted people in the Central District more compared to people in Letlhakane, whose lives were less impacted by the construction of the rural roads.

This may be attributed to the fact that the Tutume roads linked the village to a city compared to Molepolole, which was still a developing major village.

204 BNARS, BNB 5228, Jan Hesselberg, “Integration and Development in Rural Botswana: Socio-Economic Evaluation of Rural Roads Final Report,” 85

The Botswana Roads Department (under the Ministry of Works and Transport), in collaboration with the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA), compiled a report in

2007 summarising the cooperation between the two departments. It revealed that the rural roads programme that the Norwegian government was involved in created more opportunities for

Batswana apart from improving travel and communication. The Roads Department expanded on this programme. Bodies within the Roads Department such as the Roads Training Centre

(RTC) were formed for purposes of conducting training in fields such as plant operations and road construction and management. The Norwegian government advanced a policy of sustainable development in Botswana, ensuring that the country remained stable even after the withdrawal of financial aid. Norwegian mechanics had to intensify on-the-job training to compensate for the lack of theoretical training of local mechanics. The Rural Roads programme produced a number of highly trained mechanics, capable of carrying out complex operations such as routine overhauling of gearboxes and engines on complicated heavy machinery. 205

Technical Assistance

Between 1974 and 1980, Norad provided technical assistance to the Roads Department in the form of skilled personnel. Experts were recruited from the NPRA which had a good working relationship with the Roads Department in Botswana. During this period of assistance,

Norwegian engineers and experts could only hold low-level positions in the Roads Department.

This was meant to facilitate the localisation process that Norad was preparing Botswana for.

The localisation process began at a very early stage of the Rural Road programme to allow the government of Botswana to realise the need for more trained Batswana engineers to sustain the department upon Norwegian departure. Nevertheless, Norwegian personnel continued to support the management of the Rural Road programme until the mid-1980s when a

205 Botswana Roads Department and Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Botswana-Norway, 19. 86 considerable number of Batswana engineers and technicians were trained and ready to assume responsibility within the department. By 1996, all positions in the Rural Roads programme were localised. 206

Norwegian technical support to the programme was phased out in 1998. Norad’s greatest achievement in the Roads Department was the on-the-job training of Batswana which eventually helped grow and sustain the department years after the programme ended. It was able to accomplish this through the Roads Training Centre that was established in 1974. By the end of the programme in 1998, more than 1650km of roads had been constructed to Bitumen standardsby the Rural Roads section of the Roads Department. 207 The Norwegian Embassy in

Gaborone closed in 1998 when Norwegian aid in Botswana was phasing out. For purposes of reducing administration costs, the Norwegian government kept its embassy in South Africa open to serve Southern African countries collectively. In 1998, Botswana and Norway agreed on a new four year Institutional Cooperation programme between the Botswana Roads

Department and the NPRA. Norwegian development aid to Botswana phased out as the economy of Botswana was steadily growing with no signs of possible relapse. Costs incurred during the Institutional Cooperation programme period were covered by Botswana after Norad support was withdrawn from this programme in 2003. The two departments worked together between 2005 and 2010. The agreement budget amounted to P1.8 million (around US$ 168,284 in current conversion rates), of which Botswana was responsible for 83% and Norad and NPRA offered support of about 15% and 2% respectively. The programme handled mainly the revision of the Botswana Road Design Manual and the Standard Specifications for Road and

206 Botswana Roads Department and Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Botswana-Norway, 21. 207 Most roads in 1998 had been constructed and sealed with a bitumen seal instead of gravel. This ensured durability and an increased lifespan. 87

Bridge Works. Other projects that the programme was engaged in included Pavement/Road

Management and Road Safety. 208

HEALTH SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Norwegian assistance to the health sector in Botswana began in 1975. Health programmes introduced initially aimed at improving accessibility to health services for people in rural areas.

Towards the end of the assistance agreement signed by Norway and Botswana, Norad branched into growing the administration side of Botswana’s health sector. Norwegian assistance to

Botswana’s Health Sector took place in two phases: phase one effected from 1975 to 1996, valued at around Nkr 400 million through a series of programmes; phase two ran from 1996 to

2012 on a smaller budget of around Nkr 136 million. 209 The second phase began a few years before Norwegian development assistance to Botswana was withdrawn. Similar to the Rural

Roads section, the second phase was carried out through an Institutional Cooperation approach to develop institutional links between Botswana and Norway.

The collaboration between Norway and Botswana to create a functional health system was in accordance with the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) international policies on health care. The first policy on health care was the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 which put forward the concept of Primary Health Care as an appropriate model for development of health services. The provision of vaccinations, antenatal care and maternity care were among services that were suggested at Alma-Ata. The second initiative was the Ottawa Charter on Health

Promotion of 1986. It emphasised the promotion of equal opportunities and access to health care which included access to information, a supportive environment for patients and generally

208 Botswana Roads Department and Norwegian Public Roads Administration, Botswana-Norway, 22-41. 209 Health Research for Action (HERA), “Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana: Final Report,” Vol 1, January 2012, vii. Nkr 400 million can be estimated to about US$ 823 000 while Nkr 136 million converts to around US$ 279 900 using 2018 rates. 88 access to health care resources. The Bamako Initiative of 1987 aimed at increasing access to

Primary Health Care especially in remote areas. This included access to drugs and regular interaction between health-care providers and the community. 210 Subsequent initiatives focused on government policies more than previous WHO strategies. For instance, the World

Development Report of 1993 encouraged governments to formulate policies that emphasised low cost, highly effective programmes such as vaccinations for control and treatment. 211

During the first phase of Norad aid to the Botswana health sector, assistance was focused on the development of primary health care services through the provision of health infrastructure (buildings, equipment, health staff housing, and communication systems). The primary goal was to attend to the express need for health services in the newly independent

Botswana. The second phase essentially sought to improve the quality of health care provided.

It was also launched at a time when the HIV/AIDS epidemic had hit most African countries,

Botswana included. Through the partnership of health institutions in Norway and the Ministry of Health in Botswana, the effective Anti-Retroviral Therapy was introduced in Botswana. The second phase also aimed at improving research on health care and to improve HIV prevention efforts as well as the training of more medical personnel in Botswana. The long-term success of the health sector in Botswana is partly a result of the efforts made in the second phase of the

Norad programme. 212

In 2012, the public health research centre, Health Research for Action (HERA),213 conducted a study on the overall effectiveness of Norwegian aid to Botswana’s health sector.

210 HERA, “Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana: Final Report,” 6. See also World Health Organisation, Regional Committee for Africa, “Review of the Implementation of the Bamako Initiative,” Windhoek, 30 August- 3 September 1999. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/1937/AFR-RC49- 13%20EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 211 The International Bank, World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 212 HERA, “Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana: Final Report,” viii. The first HIV infection case reported in Botswana was in 1985. 213 HERA is a centre in UC Berkeley’s School of Public Health. See http://healthresearchforaction.org/about-hra 89

The research centre was contracted by the Norad Evaluation Department and assisted by the

Ministry of Health in Botswana. The evaluation was meant to document the impact of

Norwegian assistance to the health sector and also make recommendations for future result- oriented health sector programmes based on lessons from this partnership. 214 The main goal of having a functioning primary care health system in Botswana was achieved. Through both phases, Norwegian assistance was designed such that the Botswana Ministry of Health would sustain itself years after aid was withdrawn. Like the Rural Road programme, Norwegian assistance to the health sector followed Botswana’s NDP priorities. Provision of aid was structured around the requests made by the government of Botswana. Although some projects began earlier than 2005, the provision of aid was in accordance with the Paris Declaration of

2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 made by the OECD. The Paris Declaration of

2005 is essentially an action-oriented plan on the improvement of the quality of foreign aid while the Accra Agenda for Action was designed to strengthen the Paris Declaration. They both emphasise that developing countries should set their own strategies for poverty alleviation and tackle corruption. 215

In a nutshell, at the beginning of the health sector collaboration between Norway and

Botswana in 1975, priority was given to making health care accessible to people in remote areas. The intention was to increase life expectancy and reduce infant and child mortality rates.

The Ministry of Health in Botswana also had to react fast to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the

1980s that was claiming lives in most parts of Africa and Botswana. 216 The construction of

214 The report was released in two volumes. Volume I was the main report containing the data analysis and recommendations while volume II was a series of annexes that included among others the description of the study methodology and interview details. 215 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm 216 By 1999, there were about 2.8 million AIDS-related deaths in the world and 24.5 million people living with HIV/AIDS in sub-saharan Africa. There were about 15 000 AIDS-related deaths recorded in Botswana by 2000 and around 290 000 people living with HIV/AIDS all ages out of a total population of around 1.7 million. See UNAIDS Country Fact Sheets http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/botswana and UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic, June 2000. data.unaids.org/pub/report/2000/2000_gr_en.pdf 90 health posts in remote areas and clinics in village centres was an effective way of improving accessibility to health care. In accordance with the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978, Norwegian assistance took Botswana’s health sector from hospital-based to one that ensured that a majority of the population had access to primary health care. The Botswana health system now has three tiers with clinics and health posts at the bottom, hospitals in the middle and referral hospitals at the top. 217

Mental Health in Africa

For many years, mental health has been a neglected aspect of health care. Recent global trends on health emphasise the promotion of mental health awareness as mental wellbeing forms part of the WHO’s definition of health. 218 Mental health in Africa was mostly associated with western health systems as mental illness in Africa was believed by Africans to be a rare disorder. During the colonial period, westerners argued that Africans rarely experienced any mental disorders because they believed that mental illness was influenced by civilisation and living in a civilised society.219 In other words, the simplicity of an African lifestyle was thought to create a good environment for mental wellbeing. This is however questionable because

Leland V. Bell’s monograph indicates that there were cases of mental illness in Sierra Leone in the pre-colonial era in the late 1780s. The earliest cases of mental illness recorded in Africa indicate schizophrenia as the most common psychiatric disorder. 220 When discussing the nature of mental health care in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, Bell asserts that the culture of sending mentally ill people to mental institutions was uncommon. Africans preferred to have their patients treated and cared for by traditional healers because mental institutions were fairly

217 HERA, “Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana: Final Report,” 53. 218 World Health Organisation, “Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed December, 21, 2018, https://www.who.int/suggestions/faq/en/ 219 In this instance, the word civilisation is used to refer to western civilisation. 220 Leland V. Bell, Mental and Social Disorder in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Sierra Leone, 1787-1990 (California: Greenwood Press, 1991), 7. 91 new. Bell concludes that mental hospitals were regarded in African society as a place where unwanted and troublesome people were kept. For example, in South Africa, mentally ill people were sent to Robben Island along with other groups of outcasts that included the chronically ill. 221

In addition to Bell’s conclusions, Matthew Heaton states that traditional healing systems played a big role in controlling mental illness in Africa, using the case study of Nigeria from the colonial to post-colonial era. As was common in most African societies, traditional healing systems often had different explanations for causes of mental illness than western or psychiatric systems. Witchcraft, sorcery, spirit possession and violation of taboo are some examples of underlying reasons for mental illness given by traditional healers. The case of traditional healing systems in Botswana was in no way different from that of Nigeria. Reasons given by Heaton’s study were believable to most Africans who had not received any form of science education. Heaton also concludes that in the 1980s most patients treated by traditional healers seemed to heal better and faster than when they consulted psychiatrists. The key to traditional healing systems was the healer’s ability to “convince patients of the nature of their problem and convince them that he knew the proper treatment.” The traditional healers’ ability to convince patients of his/her healing power was also a proven method verified by prevailing psychotherapeutic models. 222

Mental Health in Botswana

In providing assistance to the Botswana health sector, Norad helped grow mental health services in Botswana. Norad agreed to help establish mental health units across Botswana as a

221 Bell, Mental and Social Disorder in Sub-Saharan Africa, 7-8. 222 Matthew M. Heaton, Black Skins, White Coats: Nigerian Psychiatrists, Decolonization, and the Globalization of Psychiatry (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2013), 127. Psychiatric infrastructure in Nigeria grew faster than other African countries. By 1970, Nigeria was one of the few countries in Africa that could locally train psychiatrists. 92 way of assimilating psychiatric services into primary health care. The government of Botswana had issued a request in 1982 to Norad for further assistance in facilitating psychiatric services across the country. By 1978, the Ministry of Health in Botswana had implemented a national community psychiatric care programme. The programme was thought to be a remedy to the growing challenge of overcrowding at the Lobatse Mental Hospital, the only psychiatric referral hospital in Botswana (now known as Sbrana Psychiatric Hospital). Initially, the

Ministry of Health in Botswana had created a number of bases for psychiatric nurses at strategic hospitals and clinics to visit on a regular basis. Clinic nurses would refer patients that they had identified as being in need of psychiatric attention to the visiting psychiatric nurse for further examination. 223

Norad had supported the first phase of the programme by funding the construction of small in-patient office suites in four of the base hospitals in Maun, Francistown, Mahalapye and Serowe. The request made by the government of Botswana acknowledged the progress made in the first phase and wished for further assistance in areas of research and training in mental health and psychiatric illness. Norad’s subsequent assistance to the psychiatric section of the Ministry of Health in Botswana was guided by the WHO general principles of mental health services. These principles proclaimed that mental health services should be of adequate quality, hence Norad’s agreement to assist in training and expanding mental health research in

Botswana. In addition, mental health services had to be community-based to allow for easy access by patients and less travelling distance from their homes. The services also had to be comprehensive, that is, provide a range of facilities to cater for different patient conditions including rehabilitation and after-care facilities.224

223 BNARS, BNB 7129, Ingrid L. Ellingsen, “Botswana: Report on Consultancy Concerning Psychiatry, November-December 1982,” Annex 2. 224 World Health Organisation, “Mental Health Care Law: Ten Basic Principles, Geneva, 1996.” www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/75.pdf 93

By assimilating psychiatric services into primary health care, the government (with the assistance of Norad) was able to solve the overcrowding problem that had emerged at the

Lobatse Mental Hospital. The number of new admissions per year was reduced from over 700 to around 400; the patient population was also reduced from over 500 to around 100 by 1982; and the number of out-patient cases had been increased from 2 500 to around 10 000 a year.

Evidently, the integration of psychiatric services into primary health care was an effective way of solving overcrowding while at the same time ensuring that patients receive high quality medical assistance. 225

A Norad-appointed expert on psychiatric health suggested a scientific or medical upgrade of the Lobatse Mental Hospital in 1982. The expert also suggested giving a nurse or a matron from the hospital an opportunity to visit another mental hospital outside Botswana to get more ideas on how to improve services offered in the local hospital. Mental health awareness was also recommended as it was evident that most health workers and the general public had limited knowledge on the subject. Suggestions were made that the mental hospital staff work with social workers and other health workers to learn how best to deal with psychiatric patients. It was also suggested that family welfare educators receive knowledge of psychiatric and neurological symptoms as they usually were the first one to make contact with the patients.

To solve the problem of understaffing, the Norad-appointed expert suggested that the

Ministry of Health train a large number of registered general nurses to become psychiatric nurses and place them across the country. As mental health was still a new concept of health to most Batswana, including trained medical personnel, the Norad-appointed expert suggested research on psychiatric health services and research regarding the treatment of psychiatric

225 BNARS, BNB 7129, Ellingsen, “Botswana: Report on Consultancy Concerning Psychiatry,” Annex 2. 94 disorders for background. By conducting psychiatric health services research, the Ministry of

Health would be investigating the effectiveness of decentralising mental health services and public reception of the new system. This type of research was and is relevant to a society that is new to the use of psychiatric health systems. Conducting research on the treatment of psychiatric disorders would allow the Ministry of Health to look into different ways of handling disorders either psychotherapeutically or pharmaceutically. The final suggestion made was that

Norad consider engaging a psychotherapist and a Norwegian mental health institution to partner and help grow mental health services in Botswana. 226 As this was a consultancy report, the thesis could not establish whether the two parties acted on the suggestions made by field experts or not.

Mental health awareness in Africa has grown over the years and health authorities have made attempts to integrate psychiatry with indigenous healing systems. A group of psychiatrists conducted research with the aim of establishing the similarities and differences between psychiatry and traditional healing systems in independent Nigeria as indicated in

Heaton’s monograph. What came out of this study was that the two systems are different in their treatment methods and that true healing came from the patient’s ability to trust in their healer or doctor’s abilities. 227 By 2011, the Ministry of Health in Botswana had established a working relationship with traditional healers after discovering that a good number of Batswana

(especially those in rural areas) trusted traditional healing more than western healing systems.

228

226 BNARS, BNB 7129, Ellingsen, “Botswana: Report on Consultancy Concerning Psychiatry,” 21-26. The paper was unable to find any follow-up information on the engagement of a Norwegian psychotherapist or a Norwegian mental health institution from the literature consulted. 227 Heaton, Black Skins, White Coats, 125-126. 228 Paul Sidandi, Phillip Opondo and Sebonetse Tidimane, “Mental Health in Botswana,” International Psychiatry 8, No. 3, August 2011, 67. 95

By 2011, with the assistance of Norad, Botswana had psychiatric units at the

Mahalapye, Sekgoma, Scottish Livingstone and Letsholathebe II Memorial Hospitals, each with around twenty to thirty beds. The national referral facility in Gaborone, Princess Marina

Hospital also offers out-patient psychiatric services. In terms of specialists, Botswana in 2011 had eight psychiatrists; psychiatric and general nurses; medical officers; psychologists; social workers; and occupational therapists. Psychiatric nurses had to have a Diploma in Advanced

Community Mental Health Nursing as they formed an integral part of psychiatric care outside referral hospitals. 229

HIV/AIDS

Since the first recorded HIV/AIDS case in 1985, the epidemic has grown to be a worldwide threat to development. A 1999 World Bank report described it as an unprecedented catastrophe in world history since the bubonic plague of the European Middle Ages. The report recorded nearly 34 million people in the world living with HIV/AIDS, a third of which were young people aged between 10 and 24. The report also indicated that in 1998, around 22.5 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa were living with HIV/AIDS, a million of which were children.

High rates of new infections in Africa were attributed to slow responses to the epidemic by policymakers. 230 Similarly, Adrian Flint believes that the spread of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan

Africa was influenced by governance and priorities of policymakers. He pinpoints Botswana as an exceptional case of a Sub-Saharan country that showed urgency to the growing pandemic while countries such as Cameroon used the epidemic as an opportunity to receive increased foreign aid. Flint’s findings indicate that “only Botswana and Gambia have reached the 2001

229 Sidandi, Opondo and Tidimane, “Mental Health in Botswana,” 67. 230 The World Bank, Intensifying Action Against HIV/AIDS in Africa: Responding to a Development Crisis (1999), 6-12. On the impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa, see also David E. Sahn, ed., The Socio-Economic Dimensions of HIV/AIDS in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Misconceptions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 96

Abuja Declaration target of allocating around 15 percent of total government expenditure to health.” 231

Botswana already had a functional health system when HIV/AIDS became a significant problem in the country. The country had achieved a high level of health access made possible by a network of health posts and clinics built with the assistance of Norad.

Community Home-Based Care Programme

In 1992, as part of the second phase of Norwegian assistance to the health sector in

Botswana, the two governments initiated the Community Home-Based Care (CHBC) programme. The programme was established as a solution to overcrowding in hospitals across the country that was escalated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Its main purpose was to allow for terminally ill patients to receive medical attention from their homes. The logic behind this was that the family, being a traditional care-giving unit, would be a better place for discharged patients that showed no signs of recovery. Health service providers worked closely with families and the community to assist patients on home-based care. Services provided were centred on counselling, home visits, provision of social services (for example, food and clothing), basic clinical care and health education. Although the programme generally covered most chronic illnesses, it was motivated by the growing HIV/AIDS infections and death tolls that terrorised Botswana in the 1990s. It was estimated that by October 1999, there were about

10 000 full blown AIDS patients in hospitals and around 20 000 people admitted with

HIV/AIDS related illnesses. More than sixty percent of medical and paediatric wards were occupied by patients with AIDS and HIV-related complications. 232

231 Adrian Flint, HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: Politics, Aid and Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 8-21. 232 BDSC, R/B 362.096883 BOT, Toro Ditirafalo, Elsa Doehlie, Daisy Mojapelo and Monosi Tau, “Client Satisfaction and Providers’ Perspective with Home Based Care in Kweneng District, Botswana,” February 2001, 1-22. 97

A home-based care unit was created in the AIDS/STD unit of the Ministry of Health.

Each district in the country was to have a home-based care coordinator supported by specially assigned home-based care nurses, social workers and family welfare educators. Despite this level of organisation, the programme proved to be more complex than Norad and the Ministry of Health in Botswana had anticipated. Most families found it difficult to care for patients especially critically ill ones who could not perform certain tasks (such as bathing and feeding) without assistance. Caregivers in this instance had to provide total care for the patient, which was strenuous. 233

Another aspect that challenged the success of the programme was lack of family resources. A majority of patients in home-based care came from poor households that often relied on government welfare. Dietary requirements of patients were often compromised especially in cases of large families living on government welfare. To some caregivers, visiting the patients in hospital and feeding them food provided by the hospital was better than having to worry about providing the food. The home-based care programme drove some families into deeper poverty than intended. In the case of families in the Kweneng District where a survey was made on the effectiveness of the home-based care programme, most families complained about having little knowledge on how to care for the patients. A majority of them indicated that the only instruction they were given was to “use gloves” without further instructions on how to react if the patient’s condition changed. Some families preferred taking care of their patients than have them admitted to hospitals. This showed distrust in the health care system and its ability to provide assistance to patients. 234

233 BDSC, R/B 362.096883 BOT, “Client Satisfaction and Providers’ Perspective with Home Based Care in Kweneng District, Botswana,” 22-23. 234 BDSC, R/B 362.096883 BOT, “Client Satisfaction and Providers’ Perspective with Home Based Care in Kweneng District, Botswana,” 23. 98

As indicated above, the Norway-assisted Community Home Based Care programme was initiated mainly as a solution to overcrowding in hospitals given increased HIV/AIDS infections. Since the introduction of the Anti-Retroviral Treatment, the number of AIDS- related deaths has declined as well as the number of new HIV/AIDS infections. In 2012, the

CBHC programme had about three hundred community-based organisations and non- governmental organisations registered to contribute to its implementation. The programme overall reached its intended goals despite challenges in its infancy stage. Due to the success of the Anti-Retroviral Treatment programme, the number of patients on the CHBC programme has also declined from about 12 000 in 2002 to around 3 600 in 2009. 235

Unlike the other countries in Southern Africa such as South Africa, Botswana reacted promptly to the pandemic becoming the first country in the region to provide universal free

Anti-Retroviral Treatment. The ARV treatment in South Africa was met with opposition from key members of government, among them the then president Thabo Mbeki in 1999. South

Africa under Mbeki focused on prevention rather than treatment of HIV/AIDS. Mbeki is famous for his “denialist” viewpoint that HIV does not cause AIDS but rather the latter is caused by poverty. He condemned ARVs, dismissing them as pharmaceutical imperialism that

Westerners used to conduct medical experiments on African populations. Following close to ten years of national debate, Mbeki’s viewpoint was criticised and treatment began in 2004. 236

Medical Doctor Training

Education and training of medical students was part of phase 2 of the Botswana-Norway

Health Sector Agreement. The government of Botswana wanted to have Batswana medical students trained at the University of Botswana in 1990 but the process of beginning a program

235 HERA, “Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana: Final Report,” 46. 236 Robert Sember, “The Social Construction of ARVs in South Africa,” Global Public Health: An International Journal for Research, Policy and Practice 3, no. 2, July 2008, 62-63. 99 took more time than anticipated. While a committee of medical experts in Botswana and

Norway were working on designing a comprehensive program, Norad offered sponsorship for

Batswana students to study in Norway in the meantime. The idea was to help Botswana reduce the number of expatriate medical personnel working in the country and have more trained

Batswana medical doctors. Thirty-five students were enrolled in the program; the first one went to Norway in 1995 and the last group went in 2006. The UB medical training school was only ready for its first intake in 2009. 237

Training students in Norway proved less effective than Norad had hoped. Of the thirty- five students who went to Norway, twenty-six graduated, eight quit and one was still studying in 2014. Of the twenty-six who had graduated, only five were confirmed to have returned to

Botswana. Although students had signed an agreement that they would return to Botswana upon graduation, many of them remained in Norway. The main reason that the students gave was that the opportunity of specialisation was greater in Norway than in Botswana.

Opportunities for medical practitioners were limited in Botswana. A majority of those who returned practiced as general doctors given that the country was still growing its local medical staff and so it needed to have more general practitioners. The demand for general practitioners surpassed the demand for specialists, therefore, it seemed cheaper to have more local than expatriate general doctors. Expatriate doctors were only employed as specialists. In comparison with other projects under the health sector agreement, this program was the least effective. 238

CONCLUSION Norwegian aid to Botswana was more restricted as compared to Swedish aid in terms of allocation of funds. It was concentrated mostly on the health and rural development sectors. Its

237 Lone Svendsen, “Botswana Medical Students Education in Norway,” June 2014, 1-8. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43615365.pdf 238 HERA, “Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana: Final Report,” 57. 100 main purpose was to improve the living standards of people in rural areas. Norad’s involvement in the rural roads programme was a great success that improved accessibility to remote areas and also enabled access by people in remote areas to resources in village centres. The construction of health posts and village clinics contributed largely towards the provision of health services across the country. The prompt response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic allowed the GoB to control and manage the spread of the disease in the country. With the assistance of the Norwegian government, the Ministry of Health in Botswana developed a functional health system that cushioned the country against the fast-spreading HIV/AIDS pandemic. The availability of the Anti-Retroviral Treatment was made more efficient by a combination of the rural roads and the health posts and clinics projects. Despite initial failure, the community home-based care programme was essential in solving the problem of overcrowding in hospitals that had occurred in the mid-1990s before the Anti-Retroviral Treatment was made available.

The different views that both Norad and the government of Botswana had on the treatment of the San still remains a complex matter. Currently, the University of Tromso in Norway is in collaboration with the University of Botswana focusing on San research and capacity-building.

The two institutions have worked together to form in 2010, the Research Centre for San Studies at the University of Botswana that transitioned from the UB-Tromso program. The research centre builds on the program’s initial mandates which advocated for the rights of the San in

Botswana.239

The nature of the Botswana-Norway relations does not confirm the dependency theory.

Norwegian aid to Botswana served its intended purpose; it was meant to facilitate Botswana’s development experience, which this chapter has shown. While Norad financed the rural roads project, the GoB focused on the construction of main roads that link major villages and towns

239 Maitseo Bolaane and Sidsel Saugestad, “The University of Botswana and the University of Tromso Collaborative Programme: Its Relevance to Minority Education and San Capacity-Building,” Diaspora, Indigenous, and Minority Education 5, 2011, 119-125. 101 in Botswana, such as the A1 road linking Lobatse and Francistown through Gaborone. It would have taken the GoB longer to develop rural roads and the health sector had it not been for

Norwegian aid. As indicated above, Norad worked with the guidance of Botswana’s NDP.

Norad allowed the GoB to spearhead the implementation of projects to avoid creating dependence on Norwegian personnel.

Within the IR theoretical framework, Norwegian aid to Botswana characterises Norway as liberal. The Norwegian government’s foreign policy in Botswana was informed by its desire to empower Third World countries economically and also restore world peace. Like Sweden,

Norway’s interests in Botswana were also motivated by the liberation struggle’s economic burden on the latter. The only difference was that Norway did not offer support to liberation movements in Botswana, mostly due to its NATO alliance. It did, however, help reduce

Botswana’s economic dependence on South Africa, which further alienated the apartheid government.

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CONCLUSION

The disappointing history of foreign aid in Africa since the decolonisation period has made it easy for dependency scholars to condemn and question the purpose of the institution. Despite large aid inflows into Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa in the post-colonial era, economic growth still remained low; the political situation in African countries worsened due to an increase in corruption cases. The case made by scholars such as Moyo is that bilateral aid has landed Africa in a mess. As an opponent of foreign aid writing in the post-millennium era,

Moyo, who holds a PhD in economics, believes that it is high time African countries took the long road to development through trade and Foreign Direct Investment and steer clear of foreign aid.

The argument that this thesis has made is that bilateral aid can work towards economic empowerment, donor and recipient willing. Rather than criticise and call for the cessation of aid to Africa, this thesis suggests that other African countries can learn from the Botswana-

Scandinavian relations. It does not imply that the relations were without flaws but compared to other African countries’ experiences, it is worth applauding. Throughout the thirty years of assistance, Botswana did not show any signs of dependence on Scandinavian aid. For this reason, its economy did not suffer upon the withdrawal of Scandinavian assistance. Foreign aid as an institution was created as a model of economic recovery for Europe in the late 1940s.

Because most European countries were industrialised by then and only needed financial rescuing from the war experiences, the model quickly served its purpose. As nationalist sentiments spread from Asia, the Middle-East and eventually Africa around the 1950s, the model became a development assistance program to help newly independent countries find their feet. Chapter two has shown that Botswana was already on the path to development, only that without foreign aid it would have taken longer than thirty years to elevate from the poorest

103 country in the world to upper middle-income status. Many African countries are rich in natural resources which they, like Botswana, could capitalise on. However, the disappointing relationship between donors and African recipients should be pinpointed as the reason behind failed aid, not the nature of bilateral aid or the institution itself.

To suggest that Africa should sever ties with Europe and North America as dependency theorists argue would be to deny the role played by foreign aid in Botswana. Aid dependence occurs when a recipient government fails to make plans for economic independence. Botswana took advantage of foreign aid to develop various sectors it had limited funds and technical knowledge to develop on its own. It took the initiative of creating the development plans to assure donors of its intentions of effectively using grants and technical assistance at its disposal.

In addition, the relationship between the Scandinavian countries and Botswana created a healthy environment for growth. Botswana proactively spearheaded the implementation of projects with the assistance of Scandinavian field experts. By having experts in Botswana, the

Scandinavians ensured accountability and eliminated chances of misappropriation of funds. At the same time, the Scandinavians avoided creating dependence on Swedish and Norwegian experts by allowing Batswana to lead projects and also localising various departments towards the end of relations.

Viewed through the liberalist lens, the Scandinavians’ foreign aid policy was guided by the desire to participate in restoring global peace and promoting economic progression.

Botswana at independence was one of the poorest countries in the world, and also in the middle of a politically unstable region. The Scandinavians entered bilateral relations with Botswana with intentions of providing economic and humanitarian assistance. They wanted to help reduce Botswana’s economic dependence on South Africa, and also provide humanitarian assistance to refugees granted asylum by Botswana. Only Sweden strategically used Botswana as a base to aid liberation movements in Southern Africa. Due to its NATO commitments,

104

Norway abstained from assisting liberation movements in Southern Africa until the FRELIMO campaign of 1969 in Oslo which resulted in the donation of funds to the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam. The thesis found no evidence indicating Norwegian assistance to liberation movements in Botswana. There was also no indication of the provision of Scandinavian aid to liberation movements in the form of military assistance.

The thesis has shown how Scandinavian policy in Botswana is best studied using the liberalist IR framework. Their approach to bilateral aid contributed to the success of the relations. Apart from spreading the social welfare model, Scandinavian aid was more flexible to the needs of Botswana compared to the British, for instance. Due to the humanitarian nature of their foreign aid policy, the Scandinavians emphasised poverty reduction and the improvement of social amenities in their dealings with Botswana. Evidence of such is their focus on health care, rural area development and the improvement of the education sector.

This thesis does not suggest that Botswana was or is free of corruption allegations. It argues that the elite group of leaders who took over from the British administration worked for the common good of the people. They created an independent capitalist economy, which now takes part in global trade, by making the most of the country’s natural resources. Their leadership created an optimum environment for the effectiveness of aid. Opponents of foreign aid believe that economic and political atmospheres are usually determinants of foreign aid effectiveness. Where the economic and political situation is stable, foreign aid sometimes works to strengthen development and governance. However, in an economically and politically unstable environment, aid is almost guaranteed to worsen the situation. The performance of

U.S. aid inflows to Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Somalia and Liberia between

1970 and 1990 is a good case in point. The three countries were among the worst development

105 performers in the world in the late 1990s yet they received the bulk of U.S. aid. 240 In retrospect, the strategies of the ruling political elites of Botswana coupled with the generous nature of

Scandinavian aid is the main reason why Botswana-Scandinavian relations defy the dependency theory.

240 Carol Lancaster, “Aid Effectiveness in Africa: The Unfinished Agenda,” Journal of African Economies 8, no. 4 (1999), 497. 106

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