sign in sign up
<<
Home , Ethics (Spinoza book), Free will, Modern philosophy, Nature (philosophy), Spinozism

, sive Natura: Substance and in Spinoza’s by Joshua DeJoy

But the is that Spinoza is made a testing-point in modern , so that it may really be said: You are either a Spinozist or not a at all. —Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the of Philosophy, 1825-1830

Baruch Spinoza’s posthumously published and , “an absolutely infnite ” (Spinoza Ethics is one of the most infuential and systematic 217). Spinoza also provides, at the beginning of works of modern philosophical . In it, he Part I of his Ethics, several axioms that are self- details his on various subjects, including evident based on his defnition of these preceding substance, causal necessity, and determinism. terms—for example: “All things that are, are either Spinoza, through establishing that there is only one in themselves or in something else” (Spinoza substance—namely, God/—arrives at the 217). Crucially, Spinoza’s Axiom 5 says, “Tings conclusion that humans do not actually exercise which have nothing in common with each other free , that our actions are determined. Spinoza cannot be understood through each other; that begins with , establishes that God and is, the conception of the one does not involve the Nature are identical, and then concludes from this conception of the other” (Spinoza 218). Based on that actions ostensibly chosen freely are actually the defnition of substance, Spinoza arrives at Part determined by external causes. Tis conclusion, the I, 2—“Two substances having diferent process used to reach it, or both, are critiqued by attributes have nothing in common”—because diferent , including Jonathan Bennett the conception of one substance cannot involve and Georgi Plekhanov. Ultimately, while Spinoza’s the conception of another, and commonalities in monism relies on somewhat dubious or superfuous attributes necessarily invoke multiple substances theological justifcations and his determinism is (Spinoza 218). Due to Proposition 2 and Axiom 5, insufciently elaborated and suggests some dubious Spinoza concludes, “When things have nothing in consequences, his argument is compelling and common, they cannot be the cause of the other” historically signifcant. While not perfect, Spinoza’s (Spinoza 218). Terefore, there cannot be more than thoughts are a remarkable and systematic exposition one substance—substances must be conceived of in of determinism that cannot be fully dismissed. and of themselves, and invoking one substance as the Tis essay summarizes Spinoza’s arguments for a cause of another violates this defnition (Hampshire pantheistic monism and determinism, examines 38). Tis single substance, according to philosopher three of , and fnally concludes Stuart Hampshire, “is therefore to be identifed with by assessing Spinozism’s staying power today. Nature conceived as a whole or as the totality of Spinoza’s argument for determinism—indeed, things” (Hampshire 38). Spinoza thus establishes a his entire —begins with monism, or the monist view of made up of one substance. that the world is made up of one substance. Along the way to establishing monism, To begin Part I of Ethics, he defnes several terms, Spinoza makes something of a detour to prove most crucially substance, “that which is in itself and the of God (“or substance consisting of is conceived through itself;” attribute, “that which infnite attributes, each of which expresses eternal the perceives of substance as constituting and infnite ”), which reinforces his monism its essence;” mode, “the afections of substance;” (Spinoza 222). Curiously, he begins with a version of

Aisthesis 22 Volume 8, 2017 Deus, sive Natura: Substance and Determinism in Spinoza’s Ethics

the developed by St. Anselm determined to exist and to act in a defnite way” and employed in a modifed form by René Descartes (Spinoza 234). Only substances are determined by (Allison 59). Tis argument, however, especially themselves, and God/Nature is the only substance, its reliance on existence as a perfection (although so all other things must be determined, in the fnal Spinoza does not expressly state this part of the analysis, by God/Nature—that is, by natural , argument), was already discredited in Spinoza’s without (Spinoza 234). Everything (Allison 59). Spinoza’s real goal is to establish an within Nature is determined. Will itself—divine or between God and the “substance consisting mortal—is constrained by this, and, according to of infnite attributes” (Spinoza 222), or between God Proposition 32, “cannot be said to be a free cause, but and Nature, “with [N]ature considered as an infnite only a necessary or constrained cause” (Spinoza 235). … and necessary system of laws” (Allison Te frst corollary to this is the radical position “that 35). Te practical efect of this position is to render God does not act from of will” (Spinoza the of God as a being incoherent and, in reality, 235). Humans are, of course, a part of Nature (and reduce God to Nature, or “a demonstration of the of nature), and are likewise constrained by the lack nonexistence of God—at least of the God of the of “freedom of will.” It should be noted here that Judeo-Christian ” (Allison 60). Tis attack one of the results of Spinoza’s subversive , on the Judeo-Christian idea of God is somewhat whereby God is more or less depersonalized, is that concealed in the phrase Deus, sive Nature [God, or there is no Judeo-Christian God to protect humans’ Nature] (Spinoza 321), which nevertheless shocked , in part because the problem of public opinion and was branded as and is no longer an issue when God is constrained as pantheism (Hampshire 39). Other early modern much as he is in Spinoza’s philosophy. In Part III, philosophers saw in Spinoza’s philosophy a radical, Proposition 2, Spinoza causally collapses the even atheistic aim. , opposing and body—that is, he notes that they are both caused Spinoza, said, “Spinoza [is] the great leader of our by God (or Nature)—and thereby removes a place modern infdels, in whom are to be found many for the will to exercise any independent role in schemes … such as undermining under the determining human (Spinoza 279). Human pretence of vindicating and explaining it” (qtd. in actions are now “completely explicable by purely Melzer 253, emphasis added). Similarly, Pierre Bayle physical laws and in terms of physical equilibrium claimed, “One calls Spinozist all those who hardly and of the recent disturbances of this equilibrium” have any religion, and who do not hide this fact very (Hampshire 129). We are thus lef with humans much” (qtd. in Melzer 253, emphasis added). Given governed by the laws of Nature, not by free will. the circumstances in which Spinoza wrote—he was Of course, not everyone will accept that excommunicated from the local Jewish community, human behavior is entirely -governed and that attacked by both conservative theologians humanity has no free will. Spinoza anticipates some and Cartesians, and then Ethics was published objections to this deterministic position in Ethics, posthumously and subsequently censored—an beginning with the fact that there was not, at the esoteric reading, through which one attempts to time, a scientifc explanation of human behavior and “read between the lines,” in this section in particular that suggests that humans have free will. is warranted (Melzer xii; Nadler; Spinoza 213). Te reliance on words that appear to describe free Spinoza thus removes the personal qualities of God , especially in vernacular writing, proves an and reduces the God/Nature to an ordered obstacle for acceptance of determinism, especially Nature. for non-philosophers. In the Scholium to Part III, Spinoza draws radical conclusions from his Proposition 2, Spinoza dismisses discussions of monist thesis that there exists a single substance, the ordinary senses of the words “will,” “choice,” Nature, including the orderly determination of the “judgment,” etc., as unscientifc—the and even human behavior. Part I, Proposition of these phenomena are undoubtedly real, but they 29, concludes, “Nothing in nature is contingent, but describe something that does not meaningfully exist all things are from the necessity of the divine nature (Hampshire 129; Spinoza 280). One could also argue

Aisthesis 23 Volume 8, 2017 Deus, sive Natura: Substance and Determinism in Spinoza’s Ethics

that if humans’ actions are determined by natural the cause of the hatred, that the hatred toward and laws, then a rigorous of human behavior overall will diminish (Spinoza 302-3). As Bennett should be possible. In his own time, there was no notes, this is not exactly how hatred works. Further science of human behavior in any proper sense of the explanation, which may cause one to consider term— did not exist. Spinoza, in the same causes other than Peter in one’s displeasure (say, for Scholium, seems to have faith that such a science example, that Paul assisted or even prompted him) would emerge and would be capable, in at will not necessarily lessen one’s hatred toward Peter least, of discovering laws of human behavior: absolutely, but at most proportionally, as now the Again, no one knows in what way and by what hatred directed toward Peter will be added to the means the mind can move body, or how many new hatred directed toward Paul (Bennett 338). In degrees of it can impart to body and other words, hatred is not a fnite resource. Spinoza’s with what speed it can cause it to move. Hence later, further-reaching conclusions, including it follows that when men say that this or that that understanding the causes which make events action of the body arises from the mind which necessary will allow the mind to exercise greater has command over the body, they do not know control over the prompted by those events what they are saying, and are merely admitting, (in Part V, Proposition 6), are likewise dubious under a plausible cover of words, that they are (Spinoza 367). Bennett notes that this is not how ignorant of the true causes of that action and are emotions work at all—at best, the emotions will not concerned to discover it (Spinoza 280). change somewhat involuntarily, either from anger Unfortunately, centuries afer Spinoza’s death, to frustration or from one target to another (namely, humanity has yet to explain human actions by its causes): “When I think of Peter deterministically, means of rigorous laws, although has much of my hate is redirected towards his ancestors arguably been made toward this end. Moreover, and schoolteachers; I have as great a total amount of relying on the current ignorance of explanations for hate as before, and now it is harder to control because human behavior explained in physical, determined it is wide-ranging and unfocussed” (Bennett 339). terms is a poor argument for drawing a priori lines Tese are admittedly pretty signifcant weaknesses of human ignorance (Hampshire 130-1). Tat said, in Spinoza’s arguments regarding the efects of a powerful challenge to this ever-upward, ever- accepting determinism in one’s interpersonal life. more-comprehensive march of science exists in the However, if Spinoza is wrong about the efects of form of and developments in determinism, that does not invalidate determinism. regarding uncertainty: “In the last ffy Tat said, if Spinozist philosophy has little practical years [prior to 1951], physicists have abandoned efect and clearly not much of a positive practical the more simply mechanical models as essential efect, its utility is certainly put into question. to all physical explanation, and have admitted vast A third, fnal, , one that is much complexities of structure of an unmechanical kind, friendlier to Spinoza than the two previous ones, not only in the study of the , but in other is that of Russian Marxist philosopher Georgi branches of and physiology …” (Hampshire Plekhanov, commonly called the Father of Russian 133). While it is difcult to say a priori that these , citing German materialist philosopher difculties are inherently impossible to overcome, Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach. Plekhanov notes they certainly provide a formidable challenge to that Feuerbach “made the subtle … that the rational explanation of human behavior and pantheism is a theological , a negation therefore of Spinozist determinism. of but as yet on a theological standpoint” A second critique of Spinozist determinism, (“Fundamental Problems,” emphasis in the original). taken up by Jonathan Bennett, is aimed at Spinoza’s Much of this theology in Spinoza’s Ethics seems description of the psychological and social contrived to avoid serious repercussions, as per an consequences of accepting determinism. In Part esoteric reading, but nevertheless the abstraction III, Proposition 48, Spinoza claims that if one, for of Nature would be troubling to strict materialists example, hates Peter, but then considers that he is not like Feuerbach and Plekhanov (it should be noted

Aisthesis 24 Volume 8, 2017 Deus, sive Natura: Substance and Determinism in Spinoza’s Ethics

here that Feuerbach was a non-dialectical or so- Nature” formulation while establishing the universe called vulgar materialist, whereas Plekhanov was a as a monist substance capable of being rationally dialectical materialist). Feuerbach’s main criticism of understood. He then proceeds to logically posit, Spinozism is that “in it the sensible, anti-theological although shockingly, that humans—and even God, essence of Nature assumes the aspect of an abstract, to the extent that a personal God exists—do not have metaphysical being” (qtd. in “Fundamental free will but are likewise law-governed and capable Problems”). Plekhanov, seeing Feuerbach as not of being rationally understood. Recent challenges just the bridge that and to Spinoza’s philosophy, especially the development took to get from Hegelian to dialectical of scientifc thought in the intervening centuries, materialism but also from Spinozist semi- provide a challenge to his positions, especially materialism to , approved determinism, although these are by no means of Feuerbach removing Spinozism’s “theological defnitively fatal. At any rate, one can still learn a pendant.” He notes with satisfaction that “it was great deal from Ethics and the debates surrounding from the standpoint of this kind of Spinozism, which it. Feuerbach had freed of its theological pendant, that Marx and Engels adopted when they broke Works Cited with idealism. … Consequently, the Spinozism of Allison, Henry E. Benedict Spinoza: An Marx and Engels was indeed materialism brought Introduction. Rev. ed., Yale UP, 1987. up to date (“Fundamental Problems,” emphasis in the original). Spinozist determinism still stands Bennett, Jonathan. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. without the backing of God or an abstracted Nature. Hackett, 1984. Plekhanov himself argued something very similar in another article, in which he notes “freedom Hampshire, Stuart. Spinoza. Penguin, 1951. [of the will] is merely necessity transformed into mind” (“Te Role” 12). Tat is, by understanding Melzer, Arthur M. Philosophy between the Lines: that one’s actions are historically conditioned and Te Lost History of Esoteric Writing. U of Chicago “an inevitable link in the chain of inevitable events,” P, 2014. many are able to summon an indomitable will (“Te Role” 12). Tis is similar to Spinoza’s collapsing of Nadler, Steven. “.” Te Stanford the body and mind in terms of causation of human Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. actions. Plekhanov, because he understood Spinoza Zalta, Fall 2013 ed., Metaphysics Research Lab, as the product of his time and as an advancement Stanford University, 15 July 2013. Accessed 6 philosophically, conducted a friendly criticism in his Apr. 2016. discussion of philosophical developments, and even afer this criticism, Spinozist determinism stands. Plekhanov, Georgi. “Fundamental Problems of Indeed, despite the aforementioned three critiques, Marxism.” Selected Philosophical Works, vol. 3, it is clear that Spinozism has some staying power Progress, 1976, pp. 117-83. Accessed 6 Apr. 2016. and, if nothing else, importance in the history of the development of human thought. Plekhanov, Georgi. Te Role of the in Spinoza’s Ethics provides a comprehensive History. International, 1940. metaphysical discussion of the nature of the universe, , human actions, and . His work, Spinoza, Baruch. Spinoza: Complete Works, which infuenced philosophers as diverse as Hegel, translated by Samuel Shirley. Edited by Michael Marx, Kant, Goethe, and Nietzsche, was considered L. Morgan, Hackett, 2002. dangerous enough that even the Dutch—along with the Catholic Church—censored it. By beginning with a metaphysical examination of substance, Spinoza puts forward for his famous “God, or

Aisthesis 25 Volume 8, 2017