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Kant's Proleptic Philosophy of History

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Kant's Proleptic Philosophy of History KANT’S PROLEPTIC PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: THE WORLD WELL-HOPED A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by José Luis Fernández May 2019 Examining Committee Members: Dr. Espen Hammer, Advisory Chair, Department of Philosophy Dr. Lara Ostaric, Department of Philosophy Dr. Joseph Margolis, Department of Philosophy Dr. Richard Eldridge, Outside Examiner, Department of Philosophy, Swarthmore College ABSTRACT The aim of this dissertation is to examine several proleptic bases running through Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of history. The approach that I take is broad and wide- ranging, and while I sacrifice concentrated focus on any one particular area of Kant’s philosophy, I cast my nets in ways that remain problem centered and exegetical by drawing from both the primary literature as well as classic and contemporary research. While I try to answer several worrisome concerns in the secondary literature pertaining to Kant’s proleptic philosophy of history, I also attempt to stay close to the primary texts by providing references and citations to key claims and passages which reinforce Kant’s forceful portrait of the poietic power of human reason to create a world hospitable to its rational ends. Consequently, rather than concentrating on any one aspect of Kant’s proleptic philosophy, I set out to (i) investigate seemingly untenable problems with his characterization of reason in history, (ii) to counter what I take as a misreading, if not a misattribution of Kant’s philosophy as being prophetic, rather than proleptic, (iii) to offer an original reflection on Kant’s use of a famous stoic phrase in two of his political essays, and (iv) to attempt a close exegesis toward tying notions of teleology and hope with that of need. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I should like to give thanks for the support I have received during my career at Temple University beginning with acknowledging Professor Miriam Solomon, who initially welcomed me to Temple and worked to provide support and encouragement first as the graduate director, and then as the department chair. I wish to thank the Graduate School for two years of stipend support as a Future Faculty Fellow (2009 & 2012), and the philosophy department for two years of support in the form of a teaching assistantship (2010-2011). I also wish to thank Ms. Sonia Lawson for her invaluable help as the department coordinator. I also want to thank my advisor and internal and external examiners, Espen Hammer, Lara Ostaric, Joseph Margolis, and Richard Eldridge for sitting in on my defense and for proposing changes and improvements on my work. While I sincerely and gratefully acknowledge the instruction and support I have received from all of my professors on the philosophy faculty at Temple University, I wish to bring specific attention to professors at Temple who have contributed not only to my academic advancement and education, but also to my sense of well-being. I should very much like to acknowledge my gratitude to the late Professor Charles Dyke for his uplifting encouragement and generous support of my academic talents. I had the pleasure of taking three courses with Chuck, on literature, on science, and on history. This last course led me to produce a paper on Kant’s proleptic philosophy of history, which eventually became the basis for my dissertation. I had even more pleasure getting to know him a bit. Chuck was a ubiquitous presence in the department, seen teaching, working in his office, and roaming the halls on what seemed like every day of the week. I look back iii fondly at our encounters, which often led to delightful talks in his office to better shape our ideas on topics ranging from the literature of Borges, to the science of emergence, to the architecture of gothic cathedrals. Permeating all of these talks, however, I never lost sight of Chuck’s charitable spirit because he also offered personal reflections to help me understand a very complicated time in my life in trying to balance personal, professional, and academic responsibilities. Professor Lewis Gordon was a sight to behold: dynamic, passionate, and filled with an intellectual energy that, apropos to his expertise in existentialism, reminded me of Kierkegaard’s remark about Goethe’s take on Hamlet, namely, that the prince’s soul in relation to his body was like an acorn planted in a flower pot, with the result that it was bound burst out of its container. Such was Lewis’s soul in class, building up, pouring forth, unable to restrain its palpable concerns with human existence, the agon-y (struggle) of history, and, always, its willful defiance to acquiesce to mere historical facts. Lewis was also a very perceptive and sympathetic teacher, actively so in his mentorship of students. Many times did Lewis offer me his help, in and out of the classroom. He is, in my eyes, a gleaming mensch. Taking courses with Professor Joseph Margolis was like sitting in the presence of the mythical sphinx, spinning riddles, couching conundrums, and devouring philosophy. Joe opened my eyes to a way in which an historical orientation to philosophy can be profitably combined with analytic and argumentative precision. Joe is also extremely kindhearted, relating experiences that were somewhat similar to my own challenges in trying to improve my abilities in a discipline I loved while keeping to my promise of not doing so at the expense of my wife and young daughter. I am very proud and happy that a iv paper I wrote for Joe’s class on philosophy in literature, which examined the notion of truth in the literature of Jorge Luis Borges, is soon to be published in November as a chapter in a compendium being put out by Palgrave Macmillan. I owe to professor Professor Kristin Gjesdal, with whom I took two classes on the philosophy of history, great thanks for her always thorough instruction on modern German philosophy, and for introducing me to Yirmiyahu Yovel’s commentary on Kant’s philosophy of history. My interest in Yovel’s identification of Kant’s “historical antinomy” was stirred in preparing for her class, and grew to comprise the second chapter of my dissertation, which also made its way to publication in modified form in a 2017 issue of the Southwest Philosophy Review . I am also sincerely grateful to Kristin for extending to me in her capacity as the department’s graduate director repeated consideration when, for many external reasons, I was not able to keep to timely deadlines in my dissertation planning and writing. Most important to the completion of this dissertation and to the alleviation of stress and anxiety related to its production, I cannot fully convey my appreciation for the sustained support of my advisor, Professor Espen Hammer. Upon meeting Espen and taking two of his classes, I felt that we shared similar intellectual interests. As an undergrad, I was introduced to the thought of Hans Blumenberg by Frank Farrell, who took a famed graduate course on the German philosopher at Yale with Karsten Harries. The course was a revelation for me, and I was fortunate to produce an essay that would eventually be published in the Yale Philosophy Review , a select undergraduate publication which was sometimes cited in professional publications. My first class with Espen, as it would turn out, was on the topic of secularization and modernity, which focused heavily on v Blumenberg’s monumental The Legitimacy of the Modern Age . This instantly made me feel very at-home studying philosophy at Temple, and also convinced me to approach Espen to advise my dissertation work. Unfortunately, my production in this area met many obstacles and disappointments. Throughout all this, however, Espen has been nothing but forgiving to a such a compassionate degree that I am embarrassed to have tested its limits. I hope to incorporate Espen’s example in my own interaction with students, always recalling my failures with humility and working to encourage the ends of my students with similar patience and understanding. Outside of my graduate experience at Temple, I should like to thank my philosophy professors at Stony Brook University, from which I received my M.A., most notably Professors Allegra de Laurentiis, Edward Casey, and Eva Kittay, all of whom offered outstanding instruction and generosity. At Purchase College, I received a grounding in philosophy that keeps serving me to this day, especially, from Professors Frank B. Farrell and Casey Haskins. Both of whom still fill me with wonder and inspiration. On a closing note, I wish to thank my wife, Miraline, and daughter, Sofía, for their sustaining love. I recall writing a fourth-grade assignment in which I stated that I could never properly repay my parents for all they have done and sacrificed for me. My father was a construction laborer and my mother worked in a hospital kitchen. Individually and in unison, they would always implore, “José, think!” I find myself, so many years later, still inclined to obey. Hence, I wish to dedicate my dissertation to my mother, María Teresa Fernández, and to the memory of my father, José A. Fernández. Optimis Parentibus : Omnia mutantur, nihil interit . A Mis Padres Excelentes: Todo cambia, nada se pierde vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT…….………………………………………………………………………...ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………..iii TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………....…………………………………………..vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS….……………………………………………………….viii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING HOW HOPE IN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY REQUIRES BROAD EXPLICATION, AND PRÉCIS OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS……..……………………………….……....1 CHAPTER 2: THE FACULTY OF REASON AS GROUND AND BRIDGE...……….27 CHAPTER 3: KANT’S PROLEPTIC PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY ............................ 73 CHAPTER 4: HOPE, HAPPINESS, AND HISTORY………………………………...101 CHAPTER 5: LEADING THE WILLING: KANT’S SENECAN PHRASE………….123 CHAPTER 6: HISTORICAL HOPE SUPPORTED BY TELEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS…………………….
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