PA00X2MV.Pdf

1 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Contents Foreword ...... 3 Acknowledgements ...... 4 Acronyms and Abbreviations ...... 5 Executive Summary ...... 7 Background ...... 8 Methodology ...... 11 Findings by Thematic Area ...... 17 Health ...... 18 Health in the Lake Chad Basin ...... 19 Cameroon ...... 20 Chad ...... 23 Niger ...... 26 Nigeria...... 29 Recommendations ...... 32 Governance ...... 34 Governance in the Lake Chad Basin ...... 35 Cameroon ...... 36 Chad ...... 38 Niger ...... 41 Nigeria...... 43 Recommendations ...... 45 Security ...... 48 Security in the Lake Chad Basin ...... 49 Cameroon ...... 50 Chad ...... 52 Niger ...... 54 Nigeria...... 56 Recommendations ...... 60 Crime and Criminality ...... 62 Crime and Criminality in the Lake Chad Basin ...... 63

2 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Cameroon ...... 64 Chad ...... 65 Niger ...... 67 Nigeria...... 69 Recommendations ...... 71 Environment ...... 73 Environment in the Lake Chad Basin ...... 74 Cameroon ...... 75 Chad ...... 77 Niger ...... 79 Nigeria...... 81 Recommendations ...... 83 Gender Considerations ...... 85 Gender Inequality in the Lake Chad Basin ...... 86 Cameroon ...... 87 Chad ...... 88 Niger ...... 89 Nigeria...... 90 Summary of Recommendations ...... 92 Conclusion ...... 96

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

3 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Foreword The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate has made giant strides in the practice of data driven early warning, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of incidents and situations from multiple sources, with the added benefit of original data generated through the ECOWARN system. Indeed, the Center’s state-of-the-art technological tools places it at a vantage position to monitor and analyze risks and vulnerabilities in the ECOWAS region, cutting across the key areas of human security.

ECOWAS has played, and continues to play, a critical role in the monitoring of threats to human security across the region including not only the Lake Chad Basin but also the Sahelo-Saharan, Mano River, Gulf of Guinea, and Senegambia conflict systems to improve response for the prevention and management of conflict escalation.

Beyond a narrow focus on violent conflict alone, and consistent with its mandate to promote the socioeconomic and political integration of the sub-region, ECOWAS applies a human security lens with a view towards enhancing the well-being of the population in accordance with the ECOWAS Vision 2020. Thus, this report highlights risks, structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors across five dimensions (demographic, economic, security, governance and rule of law) at the national and sub-national levels.

As in the CRVA reports, the RRVA report represents a myriad of perspectives and experiences from affected stakeholders including community leaders, civil society, administrative officials, security agents, traditional and religious leaders, just to mention a few. In this way, the report serves as a strategic document to provide an overview of the human security challenges in the Lake Chad Basin as well as the social and institutional resilience factors that can help manage those challenges.

We hope that this report will be useful for strategic planning in addressing issues of human security as well as to provide insights to a multitude of stakeholders including policy and decision makers in the public and private sectors for conflict-sensitive engagement within the region.

Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye Director, ECOWAS Early Warning

4 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Acknowledgements The Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RRVA) in the Lake Chad Basin would not have been possible without the support of numerous persons and organizations.

Special thanks go to the many stakeholders interviewed during the RRVA fieldwork, including representatives of government ministries, academic institutions, civil society organizations, non-government organizations, and religious institutions, among others. Their generosity in sharing their time, perspectives and expertise with the fieldwork team made this research possible.

Appreciation also goes to the ECOWAS. ECCAS, Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Nigeria National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA), and Fund for Peace (FFP) staff who participated in the RRVA fieldwork in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

Finally, we thank our development and technical partners in the Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data (REWARD) project, especially the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Creative Associates International, and the Fund for Peace.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project ALIMA Alliance for International Medical Action ANADER Agence Nationale de Développement Rural AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ART Antiretroviral Treatments AU African Union BH Boko Haram BIR Cameroonian Rapid Brigade Intervention BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community CJTF Civilian Joint Task Forces CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation CRVA Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment DANIDA Danish International Development Agency DHS Demographic and Health Survey ECCAS Economic Community of Central Africa States ECOWARN ECOWAS Warning and Response Network ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FCFS Central African CFA Francs FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network FGD Focus Group Discussions FGM/C Female Genital Mutilation and Cutting GBV Gender-Based Violence GDP Gross Domestic Product GIS Geographic Information Systems HALCIA National Authority Fighting Against Corruption HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome IBWTP Interbasin Water Transfer Project ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IMC International Medical Corps INGO International Non-Governmental Organization IOM International Organization for Migration IRC International Rescue Committee ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISWAP Islamic State in West Africa Province JAS Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (Shekau branch of Boko Haram) KII Key Informant Interviews LCB Lake Chad Basin

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LGA Local Government Area LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission MNJTF Multinational Joint Task Force MSF Médecins Sans Frontières NASRDA National Space Research and Development Agency NDLEA National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency NEMA National Emergency Management Agency NGO Non-Governmental Organization NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PARCA Refugees and Host Communities Support Project REWARD Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data RRVA Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SODELAC Organization for the Development of the Lake/ Société du Développement du Lac STI Sexually Transmitted Infection UN United Nations UNDP UN Development Programme UNFPA UN Population Fund UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF UN Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization

7 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Executive Summary In February 2018, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD) project, undertook a Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RRVA) process in the Lake Chad Region. The purpose of this report is to highlight data on key observations and findings collected during the RRVA fieldwork exercise in the Lake Chad Basin. These findings will serve as a baseline for ECOWAS’s monitoring of conflict patterns and trends. The report covers the following areas: Background; Methodology; Findings by Thematic Area, focusing on vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors; Gender Considerations, Recommendations; and Conclusions.

The RRVA builds on the success and methodology of the Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs), which were conducted in ECOWAS member states between 2016-2019 to assess structural vulnerabilities, event- driven risks, and resilience factors in each country to better identify and respond to human security threats across the region. Given the need for a better understanding of regional patterns and trends to inform local actors, the research began with a desktop study including preliminary assessments of risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience factors retrieved from the RRVA Index, GIS analysis, and stakeholder mapping.

Fieldwork conducted during the RRVA process found high levels of vulnerability across all pillars in the Lake Chad Region, but especially in the areas of Health, Governance, and Security. Key sources of vulnerability include inadequate public infrastructure; food insecurity and poverty; youth unemployment; increasing refugee and IDP populations; perceptions of corrupt and inadequate government and judicial systems; porous borders; and climate change. Insecurity due to Boko Haram and the counterinsurgency efforts have further exacerbated economic vulnerabilities, restricting access to the lake and large swaths of farmland. In addition to violent extremism, multiple factors were identified as negatively impacting human security in the region. These include disease outbreak; violation of women’s and girls’ rights (including GBV and early marriage); environmental degradation; price shocks; electoral controversies; criminality; human and drug trafficking; and youth radicalization.

Despite these challenges, the region has various social and institutional resiliencies to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities. NGOs, the government, and international partners have stepped up to provide necessary aid and medical assistance, even extending their services to groups who typically would have difficulty accessing that aid, such as nomads and refugees. NGOs and civil society have also begun working to empower women and youth populations through initiatives such as tontines and training centers. In addition, traditional and religious leaders have become key actors in promoting social cohesion, resolving disputes, and limiting the spread of extremism. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), local militias, and the national armies also play an important role in peacebuilding by maintaining security throughout the region.

Ensuring food security and the expansion of public services, engaging youth and women, responding to the effects of climate change, while also fighting Boko Haram and ensuring minimal civilian harm in the process will be critical for the region’s stability in the future. The following report aims to provide an overview so that regional and national stakeholders can have a clear picture of the challenges faced by the Lake Chad region, as well as the capacities that can be leveraged and built upon for the promotion of sustainable human security in the region.

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Background The Lake Chad region, which encompasses parts of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, is the site of a complex humanitarian crisis that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has described as “among the most severe in the world”.1 The presence and continued insecurity caused by Boko Haram has further complicated efforts to address the present crisis and prevent its expansion. The four countries which make up this region share a number of structural vulnerabilities that have, in part, helped fuel this crisis, and have given rise to related event-driven risk factors. These structural vulnerabilities include limited state capacity and legitimacy, limited economic opportunities, increasing environmental pressures, and shifting socio-religious dynamics. While these vulnerabilities are not new, they continue to affect these four countries, as reflected in the Thematic Area Index.

Despite being four separate nations with defined international borders, the regions of each country affected by the crisis have historically been isolated from the political and economic centers of their respective countries. This has been true even in the case of Chad where the capital city is geographically close to the epicenter of the crisis. This isolation is exacerbated by structural governance vulnerabilities at a broad level; Chad, Niger, and Cameroon have the first, third, and fifth lowest scores, respectively, in the Governance Thematic Area of all the countries in the region.2 This vulnerability in the governance sector is particularly evident in the sub-areas of Politics & Political Legitimacy and Public Services & Functioning of Government, reflecting the limited capacity and perceptions of weak legitimacy of the relevant national governments. These two vulnerabilities can negatively impact each other, creating a debilitating feedback loop in which poor service provision weakens legitimacy and weak legitimacy makes service provision more difficult. This context has historically created an opening in the region for organized criminal groups engaging in smuggling (of humans, arms, goods, drugs, etc.) and banditry. Issues surrounding weak governance and a rise in organized crime and criminality have been so acute in the past that both the Cameroonian Rapid Brigade Intervention (BIR) and the Multinational Joint Task Force were founded in the late 1990s and early 2000s to address the issue.3,4

In addition to issues of governance and criminality, the conflict-afflicted areas around Lake Chad share similar instability from economic vulnerability, with high poverty rates, unemployment, and underdevelopment common across the region. In Nigeria’s northern Borno state, where Boko Haram was founded, almost two thirds of the population lives below the poverty line, compared to less than 15 percent in many states in the south of the country.5 Similarly, in Cameroon’s Far North province, almost three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line, compared to a national average of 37.5 percent, making it both the poorest region in the country, as well as the most populous.6 The region’s economic instability is coupled with, and often exacerbated by low school attendance rates, insecurity, and limited infrastructure; for example, Chad and Niger have some of the lowest

1 “Lake Chad Basin Emergency: Revised requirement and response priorities (September 2018)”. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. August 29, 2018. 2 For the purposes of this study, the region is defined as the ECOWAS member countries, Chad, and Cameroon. 3 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ani, Ndubuisi C. “Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018. 4 Assanvo, William et. al. “Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. September 15, 2016. 5 Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, Country Level Analysis 6 Mahmood and Ani. “Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region”

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rates of access to electricity in the region.7 In some cases, these economic vulnerabilities are reflective of the situation at the national level – Chad and Niger are also two of the poorest countries in the region; while three of the four Lake Chad Basin countries have Economic Performance sub-area scores below the regional average – in some cases reflective of the regional disparities that have existed since before independence.

The Lake Chad region also faces enormous environmental pressures due to a combination of environmental degradation, climate change, population growth and conflicts. The most prominent manifestation of environmental degradation and climate change is the shrinking of Lake Chad itself, which has lost more than 90 percent of its area since 1963, contracting from 25,000 km2 to 2,500 km2.8 The lake lost much of its area in the severe droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, but despite renewed rainfall in the 1990s, it failed to recover due to high levels of water diversion for irrigation. Increased grazing, which contributes to desertification, also exacerbated the problem.9 While Lake Chad continues to shrink, the 50 million people that currently depend on the lake for their livelihoods are projected to double in size by 2030, further straining the remaining resources. These vulnerabilities are partially reflected in the Thematic Area Index; Niger has the lowest score in the region, due especially to overexploitation of water resources and high levels of air pollution, while Nigeria and Cameroon have specific vulnerabilities in Population Pressures and Biodiversity & Environmental Protection, respectively. All four countries do have relatively good scores in the Natural Disasters sub-area, which is calculated on a fatalities’ per capita basis.

At present, security concerns in the Lake Chad region are often centered around the presence and attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram. While the Lake Chad region was already one of the poorest and most fragile in the world, prior to the emergence of Boko Haram, the group’s continued presence in the border areas surrounding the region, and the instability caused by its operations within countries like Nigeria and Cameroon, have only fueled regional insecurity and worsened an already precarious humanitarian situation.10 Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid- Da'wah wa'l-Jihād, more commonly known as Boko Haram, was founded in Borno State, northern Nigeria, in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, an influential Islamist cleric. In 2009, after Yusuf’s death in Maiduguri earlier that year, the group had turned into an armed insurgency, which espoused a purist interpretation of Salafist Islam while exploiting widespread and profound social and economic grievances. These grievances stemmed primarily from the perceived wide disparity in development and federal resource distribution between northern Nigerian states and the rest of the country, particularly the oil-rich south. Additionally, from 2009 onwards, the often-heavy-handed response to the group, in the form of military crackdowns and imposed states of emergency, served to directly or indirectly exacerbate the suffering of local civilian populations. From 2014 onwards, Boko Haram, which operates more as multiple, loosely aligned factions rather than one monolithic entity, expanded its area of operations, often in retreat from operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force or specific Nigerian or Cameroonian military operations.

Between the increased efforts by state security forces and the emergence of vigilante forces under the banner of the Civilian Joint Task Force, Boko Haram was pushed from its urban strongholds in Maiduguri into the surrounding countryside. After being forced into becoming a rural-based insurgency, Boko Haram increased attacks on civilian targets, including in neighboring countries, expanding to northern Cameroon in 2014 and Niger and Chad in early 2015.11 In March 2015, Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s deputy, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS), but subsequently suffered a steady series of territorial losses due to operations of the military forces of the

7 World Bank Open Data 8 Bishop, Russell. “Confronting Climate Change: Africa’s leadership on an increasingly urgent issue”. Brookings Institution. January 9, 2017. 9 “The tale of a disappearing lake”. UN Environment Programme. February 28, 2018. 10 “Crisis and Development The Lake Chad Region and Boko Haram”. Agence Française de Développement. July 1, 2018. 11 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ani, Ndubuisi Christian. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018.

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four regional countries as well as the five-nation Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups: The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), led by Abu Musab al- Barnawi, and the group still led by Shekau, which re-adopted the name Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS).12 Though the two groups no longer control the territory they did in 2013-2014, they remain a substantial security threat to the Lake Chad region. The countryside remains insecure in many areas, and an estimated 20,000 civilians have been killed and over two million displaced, with the actual figures likely higher due to the lack of access in remote locations.

12 Mahmood and Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”

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Methodology The Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RRVA) of the Lake Chad Basin assesses structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors across five areas of human security: 1) Health, 2) Environment, 3) Crime and Criminality, 4) Security, and 5) Governance. These five areas align with the structure and priorities of the ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate, facilitating ongoing monitoring and analysis on the part of ECOWAS. The RRVA builds on the success and methodology of the Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs), which were conducted in ECOWAS member states between 2016 – 2019 to assess structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and resilience factors in each country to better identify and respond to human security threats across the region.

The RRVA relies on a holistic and integrated methodology (shown below) which draws on quantitative datasets, geospatial data from ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), stakeholder network analysis, and qualitative desktop and field research.

*Quantitative dataset sources include ECOWARN Situation Reports, Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, World Bank, and others. Incident data sources include ECOWARN Incident Reports, ACLED, and other conflict event databases.

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Phase 1: Desktop Study The Desktop Study included a preliminary assessment of structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors in the Lake Chad Basin.

For the assessment of structural vulnerabilities, the research used data from dozens of sources to create the RRVA Index. The RRVA Index measures the relative levels of vulnerability across the five human security dimensions in the 15 ECOWAS member states as well as Cameroon and Chad.

RRVA Index Scores In the Index, lower scores indicate greater vulnerability, while higher scores indicate greater resilience.

Nigeria Niger Chad Disease

prevalence Cameroon

Nigeria Niger Chad

Maternal/ Cameroon

health women's

Nigeria Nigeria Niger Chad Cameroon Malnutrition

Nigeria Health Niger Nigeria Chad Cameroon Health Services Health and Infrastructure

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Nigeria Niger Chad Judicial Cameroon Rule of Law of Rule Independence & Independence

Nigeria Niger Chad Cameroon Government Public Services Public & Functioning of & Functioning

Nigeria Niger Chad

Economic Cameroon Management

Governance Performance &

Nigeria Niger Chad Political Politics & Politics

Legitimacy Cameroon

Nigeria Niger Chad Cameroon Displacement

Nigeria Niger Chad Conflict & Conflict Terrorism Cameroon

Niger Nigeria Niger Security Chad

Defense Cameroon Institutions Capacity of Capacity

Nigeria Niger Chad Violence Cameroon Gender Based

Nigeria Niger Chad Cameroon Crime and Criminality Safety Personal

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Nigeria Niger Chad

Protection Cameroon Environmental andBiodiversity Nigeria Niger Chad Pressures Population Cameroon

Nigeria Niger Chad

Resources Cameroon Environment Air and Water Nigeria Niger Chad Natural Disasters Cameroon

For the assessment of event-driven risks, incident data from multiple sources was coded and mapped on a GIS mapping platform to estimate the locations and type of conflict issues at the sub-national level over time. This map also helped inform the identification of conflict hotspots to be visited during the field research.

Quarterly Fatalities by Region 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

Q1 2010Q1 2010Q3 2011Q1 2011Q3 2012Q1 2012Q3 2013Q1 2013Q3 2014Q1 2014 Q3 2015Q1 2015Q3 2016Q1 2016Q3 2017Q1 2017Q3 2018Q1 2018Q3 Borno Diffa Extreme-Nord Lac

For the assessment of social and institutional resilience factors, ECOWAS conducted a Stakeholder Network Analysis of peace and security actors working in the region through the distribution of a survey to in- country contacts. This data was then uploaded to a Stakeholder Network Map for quantitative analysis and to identify leverage points, spheres of influence, and social capital.

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Phase 2: Field Research

The Field Research began with four scoping workshops which brought together key stakeholders and technical experts in Abuja, Niamey, N’Djamena and Yaoundé in February 2019. The participants at these workshops validated and contextualized the initial desktop findings, tailored the qualitative research questions, and provided feedback on the proposed field research itinerary and contacts.

Two teams of experts and researchers from ECOWAS and partner organizations (including the USAID Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data [REWARD] project, the National Space Research and Development Agency [NASRDA], the Lake Chad Basin Commission [LCBC], and the Economic Community of Central Africa States [ECCAS]) then conducted key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with local stakeholders from Cameroon (Fotokol and Hile-Alifa), Chad (Baga Sola and Bol), Niger (Bosso, Diffa and N’guigmi) and Nigeria (Abadam, Baga, Gamboru, Kukawa, Monguno, and Ngala). The team covering Chad and Cameroon also met with a number of key government ministries in N’Djamena and Yaoundé in order to further inform the field research.

Phase 3: Analysis and Validation

After the quantitative, GIS and survey data were validated and contextualized in the field, and the qualitative data was collected and organized, this report was drafted and then validated by ECOWAS and USAID-REWARD. This report will serve as a resource for ECOWAS, as well as external organizations, to identify vulnerabilities, risks, resilience factors and potential entry points for dialogue and response in the region.

Terminology and Conceptual Definitions

In this report:

“Vulnerability” is defined as any structural factor that has the potential to be a conflict driver. These can include such things as youth unemployment, poverty, inequality, climate, patronage, demographic factors, etc.

“Risk” is defined as any event-driven factor that has the potential to be a conflict trigger. Risk factors can include specific controversies or events such as disasters or elections that may occur.

“Resilience” is defined as any social or institutional factor that has the potential to help mitigate or manage risks and vulnerabilities. These may include political, cultural, and community leadership with significant social capital to influence conflict dynamics in a constructive way, including public sector, private sector, religious institutions, civil society, opinion leaders, development workers, etc. Resilience factors can include institutions or policies that play a stabilizing role in the short, medium, or longer term.

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Scope and Limitations of the Assessment

While the RRVA methodology endeavors to be as holistic and robust as possible, all data sources and research methods have inherent limitations, whether temporal or in terms of scope and purpose. To the extent possible, the RRVA methodology attempts to recognize and account for these limitations by triangulating and layering quantitative and qualitative data sources in order to fill gaps and get as accurate a picture of the current situation in the region as possible.

The RRVA research also faced limitations due to the active security risks in the region. For example, while the Niger and Nigeria research team was able to bring participants from Niger and the northern and central parts of Borno State to Maiduguri for interviews, it was decided that traveling to communities in the southern part of Borno State or bringing these communities to Maiduguri would have placed undue risks on both the participants and the research team. The RRVA Index, GIS analysis and desktop research do capture the quantitative and incident trends in those communities; however, the direct perceptions and opinions of community members from this region are unfortunately missing from this report. Population displacement from affected communities and the burden of traveling in an insecure environment further affected the selection and representativeness of KII and FGD participants. However, to the extent possible, the research teams worked to maintain a broad sampling of interviewees across sectors and ensure representation of men, women and youth.

While the scope of the RRVA focuses solely on those regions immediately bordering Lake Chad, it is critical to remember that those regions are also influenced by national-level dynamics and broader trends across West and Central Africa and beyond. In certain cases, the impacts of these trends (e.g. weapons flows from Libya) on the Lake Chad Basin are mentioned in the text. However, readers should keep in mind that there may be other external factors at the national or regional levels which impact the dynamics of the Lake Chad Basin in the future but are beyond the scope of this report.

Finally, given the dynamic nature of conflict, it is important to note that the RRVA is not intended to serve as a definitive, unchanging assessment of the Lake Chad Basin. Rather, this report aims to document the salient risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience factors on the ground, presenting a snapshot of the region at the time of research. Due to the ever-shifting dynamics of conflict risks and vulnerabilities, the RRVA process is intentionally iterative and should be updated regularly. Readers should therefore supplement this report as needed with up-to-date data and research as well as their own knowledge of current dynamics and trends.

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Findings by Thematic Area

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Health

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Health in the Lake Chad Basin

RRVA fieldwork in the Lake Chad Basin Nigeria, 2.6 Niger, 6.6 found that the primary risks in the area Chad, 4.9

Disease of Health are disease outbreak – Cameroon, 3.9 prevalence especially measles, malaria, cholera, and Nigeria, 2.5 typhoid; famine and malnutrition, Niger, 5.6 with much of the region in the crisis Chad, 1.7

Maternal/ Cameroon, 6.5 phase of food insecurity; child and

women's health women's maternal mortality; early Nigeria, 3.1 marriage; and drug abuse. These Niger, 2.9 Chad, 1.4 risks are particularly salient in the Cameroon, 6.7 middle of the year. The lean season, Malnutrition which begins in June, represents the Nigeria, 4.5 period of most acute food insecurity, Niger, 3.0

and Chad, 1.7 while many diseases are more Cameroon, 5.5 prevalent during the rainy season, Infrastructure Health Services Health which occurs from July through Results of the RRVA Index in the area of Health. Low scores indicate greater September. vulnerability, while high scores indicate greater resilience. Scores reflect the entire country, not just the areas in the Lake Chad Basin. These risks are present in a context which fieldwork respondents described as characterized by a lack of adequate health infrastructure and resources, as well as a lack of qualified medical personnel, which manifests in high costs, long wait times, and the need to travel – sometimes across the region’s porous borders – to access medical care. These challenges are exacerbated by the insecurity in the region, which has not only uprooted people from their homes, but has also destroyed or rendered non-functional the already scarce healthcare infrastructure, particularly in Nigeria, and significantly curtailed the reach of healthcare providers.

Individuals interviewed in the field highlighted the vital work of NGOs in stepping in to fill some of the gaps, including vaccination campaigns, neonatal care, and basic health services. Fieldwork participants also emphasized the importance of sensitization campaigns conducted by civil society, government, and religious leaders, especially those centered around family planning in a region that is characterized by low rates of family planning services. These campaigns were cited as being particularly valuable in reaching rural populations, which often suffer from very limited availability of formalized healthcare services in their communities.

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Cameroon Structural Vulnerabilities

• Inadequate health infrastructure and resources • Lack of qualified medical personnel • Inadequate infrastructure for clean water and sanitation • High cost of medical care • Low rate of family planning • Food insecurity and malnutrition • High rates of poverty

Event-Driven Risks

• Disease outbreak • Incidents of child and maternal mortality • Famine • Malnutrition

Resilience Factors

• Medical services provided by NGOs and government • Sensitization campaigns by civil society, government and religious and community leaders • Coordination among regional and district health centers • Free medical treatments for children under five

The crisis in the Lake Chad Basin has exacerbated the pressures on the health system in the Far North region of Cameroon, which has historically been underdeveloped compared to the rest of the country and has suffered from a lack of infrastructure and resources. Nearly 75 percent of communities in the Far North region do not have a healthcare facility in the locality – the highest percentage in the country – and nearly 65 percent of households in the Far North region have to walk for at least half an hour to reach a healthcare facility.13 While both Fotokol and Hile-Alifa have health centers, residents interviewed during the fieldwork reported that the centers lack modern equipment, medical staff, and drugs. As a result, residents must travel to the hospital in Mada (50km from Fotokol, 30km from Hile-Alifa) to treat advanced conditions or undergo surgery. One interviewee from Fotokol reported that people travel nearly 100 km to Kousseri in order to purchase drugs, since the town does not have a pharmacy. Fieldwork participants also noted that, although some treatments for children under the age of five are free, the high cost of medical care deters people from seeking treatment. As a result, many

13 World Food Programme https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000062289/download/?_ga=2.120134984.1955505321.1553109856- 2077013434.1553109856

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people choose to use traditional or herbal medicine to treat themselves. The high cost of treatment also reportedly prevents many women from accessing prenatal care or giving birth in a hospital.

Interviewees in Fotokol and Hile-Alifa reported that the primary health concerns in the region are malaria, typhoid, cholera, and diarrhea. Across Cameroon as a whole, malaria is the leading cause of death among children under five and among pregnant women14 and as of 2011, the Far North region had a malaria prevalence rate of 27.1 percent.15 In 2018, four regions of Cameroon, including the Far North, experienced a cholera outbreak, with more than 400 suspected cases.16 According to the World Health Organization, the leading causes of death in Cameroon as a whole are HIV/AIDS (14.24 percent), lower respiratory infections (10.52 percent), malaria (8.78 percent), neonatal diseases (8.47 percent) and diarrheal diseases (5.01 percent).17

Fieldwork participants in Hile-Alifa also reported a lack of drinking water due to old and nonfunctioning water infrastructure. In the Far North region, only 40.5 percent of the population has access to an improved water source, compared to 72.9 percent at the national level. Furthermore, only 14.3 percent of the population in the region has access to improved sanitation.18,19

In addition, concerns persist around malnutrition and food security in the Far North region. As of 2017, the Far North had the largest proportion of food insecure population in Cameroon, with 33.7 percent of the region’s population considered food insecure.20 In addition to the effects of displacement and insecurity, the World Food Programme has attributed food insecurity in the Far North to high rates of poverty, below-average crop yields, and shocks such as shifts in rainfall and droughts, plant and livestock diseases, increases in food prices, and increases in the price of agricultural inputs.21 Malnutrition, particularly among children under five, remains high in the region; 42 percent of children in the Far North suffer from stunting due to chronic malnutrition.22 These high rates of malnutrition are attributable to “the limited consumption of nutritious food, diarrheal disease which limits the absorption of nutrients, and limited access to clean water, sanitation and health services.”23

In the area of maternal health, the Far North region lags far behind the rest of Cameroon. According to the 2011 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 40.1 percent of women surveyed in the Far North reported that they did not see a trained professional for prenatal care, which is the highest rate in the country. In addition, more than 75 percent of women in the region give birth at home, and only 25 percent were assisted by a trained professional. Several fieldwork participants attributed the lack of prenatal care and assisted births to the high cost of prenatal consultations and delivery in a hospital or health clinic. This assertion is confirmed by the 2011 DHS, which found that 40.7 percent of women in the Far North reported not having enough money to access treatment. In addition,

14 Ibid. 15 World Health Organization https://www.afro.who.int/sites/default/files/2017-07/Profil%20sanitaire_Cameroun_2016_%20FRENCH.pdf 16 ReliefWeb https://reliefweb.int/disaster/ep-2018-000142-cmr 17 World Health Organization https://www.afro.who.int/sites/default/files/2017-07/Profil%20sanitaire_Cameroun_2016_%20FRENCH.pdf 18 “Aperçu des Besoins Humanitaires”. UNHCR. January 2019. 19 “Improved water source” refers to water sources that are piped or otherwise protected from outside contamination, such as public taps, boreholes, protected dug wells, or protected springs. “Improved sanitation” refers to sanitation facilities that separate human feces, such as facilities with “sewer connections, septic system connections, pour-flush latrines, ventilated improved pit latrines and pit latrines with a slab or covered pit” Source: https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp2012/key_terms/en/ 20 World Food Programme https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000062289/download/?_ga=2.120134984.1955505321.1553109856- 2077013434.1553109856 21 Ibid. 22 World Food Programme https://www1.wfp.org/countries/cameroon 23 Ibid.

22 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

23.3 percent reported that the distance to the health facility was a barrier.24 As a result of these constraints, the maternal mortality rate for Cameroon as a whole was 782 per 100,000 births in 2011, which is well above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa.25

Individuals interviewed during the RRVA expressed differing opinions on family planning, with some interviewees reporting that a small number of women practice family planning while others asserted that it is not practiced at all. The Far North region has the highest fertility rate in Cameroon, with an average of 6.8 children per woman.26 According to the 2011 DHS, 82.3 percent of women and 95.5 percent of men in the Far North had heard of a family planning method; however, in the same survey, only 3.7 percent of women in the region reported using any form of contraception. This is the lowest usage rate in Cameroon, where the country-wide average is 23.4 percent/27 Among those women who did report using contraception, the most popular form was the injection, followed by the birth control pill. While the region has a low rate of family planning overall, participants in the Women’s FGD in Hile-Alifa did note that the “current hardships of life, as well as government programs to reduce births” have resulted in more women using contraception.

Fieldwork participants did not specifically discuss female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) as a concern, and statistics show that Cameroon has a very low prevalence rate – only 1 percent of Cameroonian women ages 15- 49 had undergone the procedure as of 2004.28 However, while rates remain relatively low, the Far North had the highest rate of FGM/C in the country, with 5.4 percent of women having undergone the procedure.29 Rates of FGM/C in Cameroon also vary significantly by ethnic group and religion. FGM/C is most commonly practiced by the Shuwa Arab and Peuhl ethnic groups, and among Muslims.30

Exacerbating the pre-existing health challenges and lack of infrastructure in the Far North, the ongoing crisis in the Lake Chad Basin has created additional pressures in the area of Health. Due to the insecurity, local populations are often unable to travel to access healthcare or may be unable to afford care due to the destruction of livelihoods. Some health facilities have been abandoned, or are lacking the staff and supplies needed to operate.31 The decrease in cross-border commerce and economic migration, as well as the inability of local populations to raise livestock or farm due to the insecurity, also increases the risk of food insecurity among populations in the Far North.32

The influx of refugee and IDP populations has put further pressure on an already weak and overburdened health system. Refugee and IDP populations may not have access to land and local markets, which increases their vulnerability to food insecurity. Populations affected by violence and displacement also often face additional health challenges such as the effects of psychological trauma and sexual and gender-based violence. Increased incidents of sexual violence can contribute to the spread of HIV and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) in addition to other physical and psychological consequences.

24 « Cameroun : Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples, 2011 » 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 “Female genital mutilation”. UNICEF. February 2018. 29 Enquête Démographique et de Santé, 2004 https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR163/FR163-CM04.pdf 30 Ibid. 31 ALIMA https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/amid-displaced-population-crisis-healthcare-system-far-north-cameroon-has-been 32 “Aperçu des Besoins Humanitaires”. UNHCR. January 2019.

23 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

While the Far North region faces significant challenges in the area of Health, fieldwork participants also reported a number of resilience factors, namely the role of NGOs such as The Alliance for International Medical Action (ALIMA), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Cameroonian government in supporting medical services and sensitization campaigns. One interviewee also noted that religious leaders play an important role in community sensitization on health issues. Lastly, a government official shared that the regional and district health centers play an important role in coordinating and preventing disease outbreaks.

Chad Structural Vulnerabilities

• Inadequate health infrastructure and resources • Lack of qualified medical personnel • Inadequate infrastructure for clean water and sanitation • Low rates of vaccination • High cost of medical care • Low rate of family planning • Food insecurity and malnutrition • Influx of refugees and IDPs

Event-Driven Risks

• Disease outbreak • Incidents of drug abuse • Incidents of child and maternal mortality • Incidents of early marriage • Malnutrition • Famine

Resilience Factors

• Medical services provided by NGOs and international partners • Sensitization campaigns by government, civil society and religious and community leaders • Vaccination campaigns implemented by the Ministry of Health and international partners • Promotion of reproductive health under Law 006/PR/2002 • “One Health” program for nomadic populations. • PARCA program to provide health services for refugee hosting communities • Government efforts to prevent early marriage

24 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

The leading health concerns identified by fieldwork participants in the Lac region of Chad were malaria (particularly during the rainy season), meningitis, tuberculosis, measles, and water-borne diseases such as typhoid. Representatives from the Chadian Ministry of “Bol doesn’t have adequate health Health further identified polio and cholera as additional infrastructure. There are no qualified ongoing concerns. The prevalence of these diseases is driven personnel, human resources are rare, in part by Chad’s relatively low rate of child vaccination, and medicine is expensive and hard to which lags behind other countries in the region. For find. People prefer to either go to Nigeria example, only 37 percent of infants in Chad received the first or Cameroon than to be healed in Bol. dose of the measles vaccine in 2017, compared to 77 Over there, medicine is available and percent in Cameroon and 78 percent in Niger.33 As a result, costs less.” vaccination campaigns are an ongoing focus of the Ministry Key Informant Interview, Bol of Health and international organizations operating in Chad.

Representatives from the Chadian Ministry of Health also highlighted zoonotic diseases as a concern, given Chad’s large pastoralist population. In response, the Ministry of Health has partnered with the Ministry of Livestock under the banner of the “One Health” program to map transhumance routes and provide vaccinations and primary healthcare to nomadic populations by establishing mobile clinics along these routes.

The spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections was also highlighted as a key concern by a wide range of participants. As of 2015, the Lac region had an HIV prevalence rate of 2.1 percent among adults aged 15- 49, above the national average of 1.6 percent.34 Participants in the Men’s FGD in Bol noted that the spread of HIV/AIDS has increased in recent years due to a trend of women turning to prostitution to provide for their families after their husbands are killed in attacks by Boko Haram. Individuals in the region also reportedly lack knowledge of preventative measures and must contend with high levels of social stigma around the topic of HIV/AIDS. Interviewees in Baga Sola reported that there have been cases of suicide by HIV-positive patients due to the strong stigmatization by the communities.

Several interviewees noted that, due to the psychological implications of the crisis in the region, alcoholism and the abuse of drugs such as Tramol and Tramadol have increased, particularly among youth.

Fieldwork participants particularly highlighted the lack of health infrastructure in the region as a key vulnerability. Health centers and hospitals are rare in rural areas, particularly on the islands in the Lake Chad Basin. The region’s limited road network, as well as the ongoing insecurity, further prevent rural populations from accessing care. Interviewees noted that where health centers exist, they are poorly equipped and lack an adequate number of qualified staff to provide for the population. Further, medicine and sanitary products are often prohibitively expensive. For more advanced care or surgeries, patients travel to urban areas such as Bol or N’djamena, or even cross the lake to Cameroon to access the hospital in Mada. Several interviewees noted that there are no

33 UNICEF https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/immunization/ 34 « Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples au Tchad, 2014-2015 »

25 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

ambulances or government-provided transportation, so individuals and families will pool resources in order to transport patients to the nearest hospital when there are complications.

Furthermore, interviewees noted the region’s lack of adequate potable water and sanitation infrastructure as a health risk.

The recent influx of refugees and IDPs in the Lac region has placed additional pressure on the region’s health system, and interviewees reported that the health centers and medical personnel in the region are unable to adequately respond to the increased needs. In response, local and international NGOs have established health centers to supplement government care. NGOs and aid agencies operating in the area include the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), among others. In September 2018, Chad also received a $60 million grant from the World Bank through the Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (PARCA) to improve health services in refugee hosting areas.35

Maternal health is of critical concern in Chad, as the country has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world (856 per 100,000 live births as of 2015).36 Fieldwork participants attributed this to a lack of access to health clinics as well as the high cost of prenatal care and hospital deliveries, which deters women from seeking care. As a result, many women give birth at home and some turn to traditional or illegal medicines. According to the 2015 Demographic and Health Survey, only 34.2 percent of women in the Lac region received prenatal care from a trained professional and more than half (64.8 percent) did not receive any form of prenatal care.37 Only 4 percent of women surveyed gave birth in a healthcare establishment (the lowest rate in the country), while 96 percent gave birth at home.38 In response, the UNFPA has provided assistance to pregnant women in the country by hiring and training midwives and providing kits and supplies for safe births and maternal health.39

Chad also has a high fertility rate, with an average of 6.4 children per woman.40 Despite a government program to promote family planning and sensitization by NGOs, in 2015 only 0.1 percent of women in the Lac region reported using any form of contraception.41 Youth in Bol noted that, in addition to cultural resistance to family planning, sensitization and advocacy efforts are often hindered by a lack of funding. However, women in both Bol and Baga Sola reported that women in the region are increasingly spacing births.

Although female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) is commonly practiced in south-eastern Chad and the country has a national prevalence rate of 38 percent, rates of FGM/C are relatively low in the Lac region. As of 2015 only 0.7 percent of women ages 15-49 in the Lac region reported having undergone the procedure.42 This was confirmed by fieldwork participants, who noted that FGM/C is not a common part of the culture of the region. Chad’s 2002 Reproductive Health Law (Law 006/PR/2002) prohibits FGM/C, although the law still requires an implementation decree to be fully applied.43

35 World Bank https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/12/chad-a-60-million-world-bank-grant-to-support-refugees- and-host-communities 36 UNICEF https://data.unicef.org/topic/maternal-health/maternal-mortality/ 37 « Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples au Tchad, 2014-2015 » 38 Ibid. 39 UNFPA https://www.unfpa.org/data/transparency-portal/unfpa-chad 40 « Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples au Tchad, 2014-2015 » 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 28 Too Many https://www.28toomany.org/static/media/uploads/Law%20Reports/chad_law_report_v1_(july_2018).pdf

26 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Early marriage remains common in Chad, although fieldwork participants reported that cases are declining. As of 2015, the average age at first marriage in the Lac region was 15.5 years for women and 24.3 years for men.44 Interviewees noted that early marriage is declining in part due to legislative actions by the Chadian government. In 2015, the Parliament of Chad increased the minimum age of marriage from 15 to 18 (although conflicts with the Criminal Code means that customary law marriages of girls as young as 13 are considered legal).45 In 2016 the government also introduced its “Roadmap to end child marriage and female genital mutilation (2016-2018).”46 One local government representative interviewed in Bol cited the case of a Chadian minister who was detained in 2018 for allegedly marrying an underage girl as an example of recent state action that serves to raise awareness of the issue.47

Finally, food insecurity and malnutrition are ongoing concerns in the Lac region as well. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) projected that the Lac region will enter into a “Crisis” phase of Acute Food Insecurity at the start of the agricultural lean season.48 80 percent of Chad’s population is dependent on subsistence farming and herding, and is thus highly vulnerable to food insecurity when agriculture and livestock are affected by climatic shifts or pest infestations.49 Fieldwork participants also noted that food security in the Lac region has been negatively impacted by the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, as farmers and herders are no longer able to access the islands formerly used for pasture and food production. As of 2019, 3.7 million people in Chad suffer from food shortages and malnutrition, and 4 percent of children under the age of five face serious acute malnutrition.50 Fieldwork participants also noted that the influx of refugees and IDPs in the region has placed additional pressure on food supplies. As interviewees in the Men’s FGD from Baga Sola reported, “With the increase of the refugee population, a harvest only lasts for three months. In the past, the same harvest would last for one year.”

Niger Structural Vulnerabilities

• Inadequate health infrastructure and resources • Lack of qualified medical personnel • High cost of medical care • Low rates of family planning • Food insecurity and malnutrition

Event-Driven Risks

• Disease outbreak

44 « Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples au Tchad, 2014-2015 » 45 Girls Not Brides https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/chad/ 46 Girls Not Brides https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/GNB-Lessons_learned_national_initiatives-2016.pdf 47 The Star https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-11-22-chad-minister-arrested-over-marriage-to-14-year-old/ 48 FEWS NET http://fews.net/west-africa/chad/food-security-outlook/february-2019 49 IFPRI http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/chad/resources 50 European Union https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/chad_en

27 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

• Incidents of early marriage • Incidents of child and maternal mortality • Malnutrition • Famine

Resilience Factors

• Medical services provided by NGOs and international partners • Free medical treatments for children under five and delivery for pregnant women • Sensitization and radio campaigns by government and civil society on family planning and early marriage

The leading health concerns identified by fieldwork participants from the Diffa region were malaria, meningitis, HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, cholera, polio, fevers, high blood “There is a general hospital in the pressure, hypertension, ulcers and diabetes. Malaria was the outskirts [of N’guigmi]. If there is a leading cause of death in Niger as of 2017, followed by need to be transferred to another diarrheal diseases, lower respiratory infections, neonatal hospital from the general hospital, you disorders, and meningitis.51 Compared to other countries in are required to pay N10,000. Even the Lake Chad Basin, Niger has a notably lower prevalence after payment you are given a list of rate of HIV/AIDS: less than 1 percent among adults ages 15- drugs that you can’t get or afford. So 49.52 However, there are regional disparities in prevalence what is the use?” rates, and the Diffa region has a rate of 1.7 percent, with rates Focus Group Discussion, significantly higher among vulnerable at-risk populations such N’guigmi as sex workers.53 Fieldwork participants from Diffa particularly emphasized the negative health impacts of conflict, displacement and trauma, noting that diseases spread easily among tired and traumatized populations. One women’s leader from Diffa also noted that pregnant and breastfeeding women have been particularly affected, citing cases of miscarriage and losing children when women are displaced.

Fieldwork participants also highlighted the Diffa region’s lack of adequate health infrastructure, including a lack of doctors, high cost of drugs, and shortages in drugs or other supplies. While larger towns such as Diffa, Bosso and N’guigmi have health clinics and hospitals, many peripheral and rural areas lack access to health services. NGOs and international donors, including Save the Children, MSF, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Oxfam, UNFPA, and Action Against Hunger, play a key role in providing healthcare in the Diffa region. NGOs and the Nigerien government also reportedly provide free healthcare to children under five and pregnant women are able to deliver in the hospital for free.

Healthcare is also reportedly provided by NGOs in IDP camps, although these services vary by location due to insecurity. For example, in the town of Diffa there are reportedly health centers in all IDP camps with 200 or

51 “Niger” Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. 52 UNAIDS http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/niger 53 World Bank http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/331821502720329827/pdf/August-31-2017-Final-ICR-Niger-HIVAIDS-Support- Project-2-P116167-08112017.pdf

28 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

more inhabitants, while near N’guigmi, NGOs are only able to visit once or twice a week and stay for only a few hours due to security concerns. As a civil society leader from N’guigmi noted, “The major health challenge is with the pregnant women that will have to wait until the medical personnel returns. Sometimes there is no phone network in the camps to call for help.”

At 7.24 births per woman, Niger has one of the highest fertility rates in the world.54 Family planning services are reportedly widely available at health clinics and hospitals but are under-utilized in the Diffa region. As of 2012, only 12.1 percent of women in the Diffa region used any form of contraception, despite nearly 95 percent of women saying that they had heard of one or more contraceptive methods.55 Among women who reported using contraception, the birth control pill was the most popular form of contraception, followed by the lactational amenorrhea method (using breastfeeding as a form of birth control) and the injection.56 Fieldwork participants attributed the region’s low rate of family planning to religious beliefs. However, women from Diffa reported that the economic decline and hardships caused by the ongoing insecurity have caused some women to begin spacing births or embracing family planning as they are unable to support their large families. NGOs and the Nigerien government reportedly carry out family planning sensitization campaigns, including via radio, which was highlighted as an effective way to reach rural populations.

Early marriage is widespread in the Diffa region, particularly in rural areas, although fieldwork participants reported that the age of marriage is slowly increasing. As of 2012, the average age of marriage was 16.5 for women and 25.8 for men.57 Some interviewees attributed the rising age of marriage over the last decade to a growing understanding that younger girls are more susceptible to birth complications. NGOs and the Nigerien government also reportedly carry out sensitization campaigns on ending early marriage, and the national government has developed a National Action Plan to End Child Marriage.58

Female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) is not widely practiced in the Diffa region: as of 2012, only 0.1 percent of women in the region had undergone the procedure.59

Finally, food insecurity and malnutrition are pressing concerns in the Diffa region and were key preoccupations of the fieldwork participants. Nearly 20 percent of the Nigerien population cannot meet their food needs, due in part to unfavorable agricultural conditions, poverty, rapid population growth, and the insecurity in the region.60,61 42 percent of children under the age of five in Niger suffer from chronic malnutrition and 10.3 percent are acutely malnourished, according to data from the World Food Programme.62 As of March 2019 the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) classifies Diffa as being in the “Stressed” acute food insecurity phase, although it was noted that the region would be in the “Crisis” or “Emergency” phase were it not for the presence of humanitarian aid groups providing food assistance.

54 World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=NE 55 « Niger : Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples, 2012 » DHS 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 UNICEF https://www.unicef.org/niger/stories/ending-child-marriage-niger 59 « Niger : Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples, 2012 » DHS 60 World Food Programme https://www1.wfp.org/countries/niger 61 IFPRI http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/niger/resources 62 World Food Programme https://www1.wfp.org/countries/niger

29 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Nigeria Structural Vulnerabilities

• Inadequate health infrastructure and resources • Lack of qualified medical personnel • Influx of displaced populations • Destruction of health facilities due to insecurity • Low rate of family planning • Food insecurity and malnutrition

Event-Driven Risks

• Disease outbreak • Incidents of child and maternal mortality • Malnutrition • Famine

Resilience Factors

• Free medical treatments for displaced communities • Medical services provided by NGOs and international partners • Family planning and early marriage sensitization campaigns by NGOs and government

The key health concerns identified by fieldwork participants in Borno state were malaria, typhoid, hepatitis, cholera, polio, measles, HIV/AIDS, cataracts/eye problems, high blood pressure, fevers, and ulcers. As of 2017, the leading causes of death in Nigeria were lower respiratory infections, neonatal disorders, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and diarrheal diseases.63 Nigeria has an adult HIV prevalence rate of 2.8 percent, and has the second-largest HIV epidemic in the world.64 Borno state, which previously had one of the highest coverage rates for antiretroviral treatments (ART), has seen ART coverage drop by nearly 20 percent due to the ongoing insecurity.65

Fieldwork participants also highlighted health concerns specifically affecting displaced populations. Physical and psychological trauma has reportedly led to recurrent issues such as high blood pressure, headaches and weakened immune systems, which compound malnutrition and pre-existing health concerns.

Maternal mortality and women’s health are also key concerns in Borno state. The World Health Organization has estimated that the maternal mortality rate for Borno state may be as high as 1500-2000 deaths per 100,000 live births, nearly three times the national average of 576.66 Fieldwork participants identified severe calcium deficiencies

63 “Niger” Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. 64 “HIV and AIDS in Nigeria”. Avert. 65 “HIV and AIDS in Nigeria”. Avert. 66 World Health Organization https://www.who.int/hac/crises/nga/appeals/en/

30 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

and eclampsia as affecting pregnant women in the state, in addition to a lack of access to care. While the ongoing insecurity has negatively impacted women’s health and maternal mortality through the destruction of the health system, Borno state has historically had poor access to women’s health care. As of 2013, only 17 percent of pregnant women in the state gave birth in a health facility, and only 22 percent were assisted by a skilled provider.67 More than half of pregnant women in Borno state (58.7 percent) did not receive any form of pre-natal care.68

Fieldwork participants also highlighted the lack of adequate health infrastructure in the state, reporting that hospitals and health clinics often lack medicine, personnel, and services such as electricity. Interviewees from Abadam LGA also reported that the poor road infrastructure in the region hinders patients from accessing care. These issues pre-date the Boko Haram insurgency (for example, the northeast region of Nigeria has historically seen the lowest numbers of secondary and tertiary health care facilities in the country69), but the health infrastructure in Borno state has also been massively affected by the ongoing insecurity, both from the destruction of health facilities and from the influx of displaced populations. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that one-third of the 700 health facilities in Borno State have been totally destroyed and another third are nonfunctioning.70 To fill this gap, NGOs play a critical role in providing health services, both in IDP camps and in host communities. NGOs and international agencies operating in the area reportedly include the ICRC, Action Against Hunger, International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNICEF, Save the Children, World Food Programme (WFP), the Alliance for International Medical Action (ALIMA), FHI 360, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), INTERSOS, “Ngala and Gamboru each have International Medical Corps (IMC), and Danish International hospitals, but Ngala’s is not Development Agency (DANIDA). While these services are functional. Each IDP camp also has a welcomed by displaced populations, it was noted that due to health center. Medications are free the high level of need, NGO-run health centers are often but there is so much need – some overcrowded and may run out of medicine. people stand in line all day and may not get the medicine they need.” According to fieldwork participants, many IDP camps in the Key Informant Interview, region are marked by overcrowding, a lack of sanitation, Gamboru shortages of food and clean drinking water, and insecurity. Interviews cited widespread cases of rape, sexual harassment and prostitution in the camps, sometimes involving security forces. Young girls, widows, and other vulnerable groups of displaced women are reportedly most at risk of prostitution and sexual abuse, given their economic and social vulnerability.

While fieldwork participants reported that NGOs and the government provide sensitization and free family planning services, family planning is not widely accepted in Borno state due to cultural and religious beliefs. As of 2013, only 1.8 percent of women in Borno state reported using any form of contraception.71 This is the second- lowest rate in the Northeast region (Yobe state reported a usage rate of 1.1 percent) and well below the national

67 Demographic and Health Survey, 2013 https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR293/FR293.pdf 68 Ibid, 69 Ademiluyi, I. and Aluko-Arowolo, S., “Infrastructural distribution of healthcare services in Nigeria: An overview”, Journal of Geography and Regional Planning, 2009 http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1379432402_Ademiluyi%20and%20Aluko-Arowolo.pdf 70 World Health Organization http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/north-east-nigeria/en/ 71 Demographic and Health Survey, 2013 https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR293/FR293.pdf

31 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

average of 15 percent.72 Interviewees cited a number of beliefs which contribute to this low usage rate, including that family planning will cause future infertility. Participants in the Women’s FGD from Gamboru also expressed that for many displaced and conflict-affected populations “thinking about planning [for] the future is a luxury, when they are faced with more pressing matters such as feeding their families.” However, several respondents noted that the recent economic hardships are increasing interest in family planning as women are no longer able to care for large families.

Early marriage was not viewed as a major concern among fieldwork participants, and they noted that the age of marriage has increased in recent years due to government and NGO sensitization. However, as of 2013, the average age at first marriage in Borno state was 17.3 years for women and 27.5 years for men.73 Nigeria has committed to eliminating child, early and forced marriage by 2030, and in 2016 the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development launched a National Strategy to End Child Marriage.74 The 2003 Child Rights Act sets the minimum legal age of marriage as 18 years; however, in several northern states, the Child Rights Act has not been harmonized with Islamic law, which allows marriage as young as 12 years old.75 In May 2018, the Borno state government announced that child marriage will become a punishable crime in the state.76

It was noted, however, that Boko Haram commonly engages in forced marriages of kidnapped girls and women. In addition, an assessment of IDP communities conducted by Plan International found that underage girls have reported cases of forced marriage by their parents or community members due to economic pressures or pregnancy.77

Female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) was reported to be relatively rare in Borno state, and as of 2013 only 2.3 percent of women in the state reported having undergone the procedure.78 However, the removal of the clitoris is sometimes part of the traditional birth ceremony in Hausa communities, which take place either 7 or 40 days after birth. Female fieldwork participants reported that during these ceremonies, a traditional barber removes the baby’s uvula and clitoris, as well as the wisdom teeth. By contrast, birth celebrations in Kanuri communities more frequently involve only the removal of the uvula and wisdom teeth, rather than the clitoris. In some instances, a series of small cuts are also placed on the baby’s stomach, which is believed to let out “bad blood” and protect against stomach problems.

Finally, given the large displaced population and restrictions on agriculture, fishing and herding due to insecurity, food insecurity and malnutrition are of critical concern in Borno state. As of December 2018, humanitarian actors were providing food aid to 1.3 million people in the state.79 According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), nearly all of Borno state is projected to be in a phase of “Crisis” or “Emergency” acute food insecurity through at least September 2019.80 Among children under 5, 15.7 percent meet the criteria for

72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Girls Not Brides https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/nigeria/ 75 Girls Not Brides https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/nigeria/ 76 Channels Television https://www.channelstv.com/2018/05/23/333669/ 77 PLAN International https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/26092017_nga- child_protection_and_education_needs_assesment_borno_and_adamawa_state_plan_international.pdf 78 Demographic and Health Survey, 2013 https://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR293/FR293.pdf 79 FEWS NET https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-food-security-outlook-update-december-2018 80 FEWS NET http://fews.net/west-africa/nigeria

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acute malnutrition and 4.2 percent meet the criteria for severe acute malnutrition, which is above the WHO’s Thresholds for Emergency.81 Recommendations Cameroon

• Evaluate and expand innovative programs like “One Health” and PARCA with the assistance of national, regional, and international stakeholders and bodies. • Promote coordination among the national health system and the regional and international health bodies to encourage information sharing and best practices in order to address the larger trend of regional health vulnerabilities. • Increase healthcare spending to address infrastructure challenges and improve access to at risk and vulnerable populations. • Encourage the passage of an implementation decree for the 2002 Reproductive Health Law 006/PR/2002 and support de-stigmatization campaigns on HIV/AIDS. • Provide incentives to health workers serving in at-risk and remote communities to reduce attrition rate and promote better access to care for vulnerable populations. Niger

81 Save the Children https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nigeria_borno_august_2018_sci_final_report.pdf

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• Advance psychosocial practices as healthcare solutions, particularly for traumatized populations dealing with the negative health impacts of conflict, displacement, and trauma. • Invest in infrastructure development initiatives, increase healthcare spending to manage infrastructure challenges, and improve healthcare access for at risk and vulnerable populations and historically underserved areas. • Provide incentives to health workers serving in at-risk and remote communities to reduce attrition rate and promote better access to care for vulnerable populations • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor health incidents for a timely response Nigeria

• Promote coordination among the national health systems and the regional and International health bodies to encourage information sharing and best practices in order to address the larger trend of regional health vulnerabilities. • Increase healthcare spending to improve infrastructure and access to at risk and vulnerable populations. • Strengthen national early warning systems to effectively monitor health incidents for a timely response. • Strengthen national and local health systems through budget increase and provide incentives to health workers serving in at-risk and remote communities to reduce attrition rate and promote better access to care for vulnerable populations. • Support and encourage family planning and early marriage sensitization campaigns.

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Governance

35 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Governance in the Lake Chad Basin The primary event-driven risks in the area of Governance in Nigeria, 6.6 Niger, 4.4 the Lake Chad Basin are price Chad, 3.8 Judicial shocks, especially of basic Cameroon, 2.7 Independence & Rule of Law & of Rule commodities, which could be a

Nigeria, 8.0 result of unfavorable weather Niger, 1.5 conditions or exogenous Chad, 1.5 Cameroon, 4.4 factors; electoral & Functioning Public Public Services of Government of controversies involving Nigeria, 4.5 disputed or delayed elections, Niger, 4.3 security threats and Chad, 1.6 economic restrictions Economic Cameroon, 7.4 Management Performance & Performance arising from the Boko Haram Nigeria, 3.0 insurgency and counter- Niger, 4.7 insurgency efforts. These risks Chad, 2.1 Political

Politics & have aggravated long-standing Legitimacy Cameroon, 3.1 vulnerabilities in the region, which fieldwork participants Results of the RRVA Index in the area of Governance. Low scores indicate greater described as suffering from vulnerability, while high scores indicate greater resilience. Scores reflect the entire country, not just the areas in the Lake Chad Basin. state neglect, entrenched corruption, marginalization of women and youth in decision-making process, and the poor provision of public services, especially healthcare and education. As a result, inhabitants of the region have turned to religious and traditional leaders to play a major role in the resolution of disputes and have relied on informal community support institutions such as tontine groups and humanitarian assistance from NGOs to fill some of the gaps left by the weak state presence. There have, however, been some recent efforts by state institutions to introduce new policies to address some local grievances, such as Nigeria’s biometric ID system or free healthcare for children under five in Cameroon.

Greater efforts must be made by regional governments, however, lest these gaps in governance be filled by hostile actors. The greatest threat in this regard is the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), one of the two groups that emerged from the division of Boko Haram that occurred in 2016. ISWAP has established its territorial base on the banks and islands of Lake Chad, and has – unlike Boko Haram’s other descendent group, JAS – cultivated a level of support among local civilians by filling gaps in governance and service delivery. This includes digging wells, policing cattle rustling, providing some limited healthcare, and allowing freedom of movement between its territory and Maiduguri. This has allowed the group to leverage a level of taxation that, while generally accepted by the civilians under its control, provides the group with the resources to expand its power.82

82 “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province”. International Crisis Group. May 16, 2019.

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Cameroon Structural Vulnerabilities

• Perceptions of corruption and nepotism in government • Inadequate provision of public services including healthcare, education, electricity, clean water • Limited access to grazing space, farmland and waters of the Lake Chad area • Weak state presence • Porous borders • Environmental pressures including decreased flow of major rivers • Weak presence of formal judicial structure • Low participation of women and youth in government decision-making

Event-Driven Risks

• Protests • Incidents of corruption and nepotism

Resilience Factors

• NGOs support in capacity-building and creation of training centers for women and youth • Access to free healthcare for children under five • Tontine groups for women for economic resilience • Positive role of religious and traditional leaders to promote social cohesion • Role of opinion leaders and human rights groups

According to many of fieldwork participants, although the Cameroonian state has a nominal presence in the region through the police and defense forces, along with administrative and public services, in practice the state “There is not any program is largely absent. Respondents stated that they felt isolated from and for the youth. It has been ignored both by national political figures in Yaoundé and Douala and by only talk talk talk and local government. Participants in the Youth FGD in some regions added nothing actionable for the that the government offered only promises without any action and that youth empowerment.” they felt that the administrative authorities were often corrupt, a Focus Group Discussion, perception that is echoed by some outside observers. Although Fotokol Cameroon has a National Anticorruption Commission that has secured the prosecution and imprisonment of several former high-level government officials, the prevailing belief is that those cases were largely

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driven by political motivations rather than a commitment to tackling corruption per se.83

The lack of responsiveness on the part of the government is exacerbated by the sense of exclusion that women and youth feel from the political process. The youth participants expressed a feeling that they are, informally, prevented from running for office and women said that despite the assistance of NGOs operating in the area, they lack opportunities to gain the necessary qualifications or experience to run for office. Although the interviewees were able to point to a couple of women holding political office, these were few and far between, a paucity that is reflective of national conditions. Despite constituting 52 percent of Cameroon’s population, women only accounted for 30 percent of the registered voters in 2018 and only hold 26 of the 386 mayoralties.84 The former statistic especially suggests that there are informal barriers to women’s participation in the political process that are at least as important as any formal barriers that still exist.

As an additional aspect of the absence of a robust state presence Cameroon’s formal judicial system is reportedly absent from more rural areas of the Far North, with fieldwork participants repeatedly reporting that their towns lacked any courthouses and that formal court cases needed to be brought to Kousseri. As a result, many fieldwork participants reported turning to traditional and religious authorities as the first line of dispute adjudication for both interpersonal and intercommunal disputes. However, if these authorities are unable to find a solution or if any blood has been shed, the matter must be referred to the administrative authorities – in the former case – or the police, in the latter.

Another result of the functional absence of the state is the failure to provide adequate public services. Fieldwork participants in Fotokol stated that their community lacked electricity and respondents in both Fotokol and Hile- Alifa said that they had insufficient access to clean water even after drilling boreholes. In addition, although the physical structures for health centers and school have been built, they have not been maintained and have become rundown. Moreover, they lack equipment or qualified staff. In Fotokol, respondents stated that although children under the age of five receive free healthcare, all serious medical cases – for both children and adults – have to be referred to the hospital in Mada. The schools, meanwhile, lack chairs and tables and parents are frequently inundated by requests for money to purchase basic expenses. Higher education, meanwhile, is accessible only to those families who can afford to support a student in distant Maroua, the capital of the Far North region that is hundreds of kilometers away. As a result of this situation, the literacy rate is at 28.3 percent in the six provinces of the Far North region.85

The limited provision of education is especially concerning because of the shocks that have afflicted the local economy, which is based primarily around farming, fishing, and herding. Even before the arrival of Boko Haram, the Far North was Cameroon’s poorest region with 74 percent of the population living below the poverty line as opposed to the country average of 37.5 percent.86 However, the population had access to the fertile lands in and around Lake Chad, allowing them to harvest multiple crops per year of a variety of crops, including maize, beans, onions, okra, and sweet potatoes. The economy first took a major hit in 1979 with the construction of the Maga

83 Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/cameroon 84 Voice of America https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-seeks-greater-female-political-participation/4264003.html 85 UNDP https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/CMR/(Cameroon%20040215)%20UNDPJapan%20supplementFunding_version%20(revised%20s emi-final).pdf 86 International Crisis Group https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/b133-extreme-nord-du-cameroun-le-casse-tete- de-la-reconstruction-en-periode-de-conflit

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Dam, which according to one report shrunk the local economy by $2.4 million per year87 by diverting 70 percent of the flow of the Logone river, drying up the floodplain pastures that had previously supported 130,000 people and dramatically reducing inflow to Lake Chad.88 The Maga Dam was also explicitly cited by a traditional leader in Fotokol – nearly forty years after it was built – as playing a major role in substantially reducing the flow of the El Beid river, destroying the ability to fish and severely curtailing its use as a source of irrigation.

More recently, two recent arrivals have combined to restrict the economic activities of the local population – Boko Haram and the dumba method of fishing. Due to the former, residents reportedly are unable to visit their farms located even just a few kilometers from their towns and are not able to utilize the waters, the grazing land or farmland of Lake Chad due to fear of being killed by Boko Haram or being mistaken as a member of Boko Haram by security forces. Boko Haram has also engaged in cattle raiding, stealing over 200 cattle from one interviewee, as well as disrupting trade. Dumba fishing, which uses kilometers-long rows of traps with fine mesh to form a non-selective barrier, has destroyed what local fishing communities still had access to. The belief from fieldwork participants was that those who practice this type of fishing come from outside Cameroon and bribe law enforcement officials in order to continue with their lucrative practice.

As a result, unemployment in the area has worsened, with particularly severe consequences for women. Many of the men have left their wives and children, either to join Boko Haram or to seek employment further afield. As a result, and because of the limited presence of formal financial institutions, tontines have resurged in popularity again, as they did during the 1990s CEMAC banking crisis. Tontines allow a group of women to pool their savings and meet on a regular basis to decide how best to use the combined funds. The most common uses are periodic contributions, in which the pool is given to a rotating recipient; savings and loans, in which the group acts much like a microfinance institution; and solidarity funds, which function as a form of insurance covering catastrophic events, such as health crises or major events (e.g. weddings, funerals).89 Fieldwork participants also reported that they have received some support from NGOs, which both provide necessities such as food directly and create training centers and capacity-building workshops for women and youth.

Chad Structural Vulnerabilities

• Perceptions of corruption in the administrative and judicial systems • High rates of poverty • Poor provision of public services, including healthcare and education • Worsening climactic conditions • Poor communication between central and local government

87 National Geographic https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/06/100604-dams-economic-impact/ 88 Pearce, Fred. “How Big Water Projects Helped Trigger Africa’s Migrant Crisis”. Yale Environment 360. October 17, 2017. 89 Barry, Mamadou et. al. “Cameroon: Selected Issues”. International Monetary Fund. June 22, 2018.

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Event-Driven Risks

• Boko Haram insurgency stalling economic activity in the Lac Region • Electoral irregularities • Undiversified economy subject to external shocks • Famine

Resilience Factors

• Role of religious and traditional leaders in dispute resolution • Humanitarian assistance, especially for displaced populations

At the national level, the Chadian economy has been heavily dependent on oil ever since 2003, when the country first began exporting the commodity. As reflected in the deep recession in 2016 and 2017, this dependence leaves Chad extremely vulnerable to “With the increase of the swings in global oil prices, and though growth has returned in 2018,90 refugee population, a harvest only lasts for three months. the poverty rate is still expected to increase to nearly 40 percent by In the past, the same harvest 2019 due to cuts in public expenditures, low foreign investment, and would last for one year.” disruption of the cross-border livestock trade with Nigeria due to the insecurity caused by Boko Haram.91 In the Lac region, however, the Focus Group Discussion, economy is still driven primarily by cattle herding, fishing, and farming, Baga Sola both cash crops such as cotton and subsistence crops such as corn.

All three of these principal types of economic activity in the region have been severely affected by insecurity, both directly and indirectly. Boko Haram attacked and occupied the islands in the Lake in 2015, and shortly thereafter, the Chadian Army ordered an evacuation of the islands – displacing more than 110,000 people – and banned the use of fishing boats.92 Fieldwork participants reported that herders, farmers, and fishermen continue to lack access to the islands in Lake Chad. Attacks by Boko Haram, and security restrictions put in place on both the Chadian and Nigerian sides of the border due to the group’s participation in cattle rustling and fishing,93 have further disrupted markets and impeded movement, including many major trade routes in the area, the most notable of which is perhaps the one to the lake area’s biggest market, which is located in Baga, Nigeria.94 Combined with the influx of refugees, respondents reported that the decrease in agricultural production meant that while harvests used to provide enough food for a year, they now only provide enough food for three months. These concerns are echoed by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), which found that in April and May, humanitarian assistance was the only thing keeping the area from being in crisis, and that

90 AfDB https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/central-africa/chad/ 91 World Bank https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chad/overview 92 Taub, Ben. “Lake Chad: The World’s Most Complex Humanitarian Disaster”. The New Yorker. November 27, 2017. 93 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018. 94 Foreign Affairs https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2017-07-17/how-nigerias-boko-haram-crackdown-harms-local-economies

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despite this assistance, the region was likely to reach a crisis point in June or September.95 In 2018, UN OCHA found that in the Lac region 172,000 would be “under pressure” during the lean season and more than 187,000 would need emergency assistance.96 Although outside NGOs play an important role in addressing food insecurity, some fieldwork participants decried a pattern in which NGOs rarely returned to the community after an initial consultation visit.

Insecurity is not the only challenge facing the local economy in the Lac region, however. Despite occasional significant year-on-year fluctuations, Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 percent over the years, and environmental conditions are unlikely to improve in the future. Of the 186 countries analyzed in the 2016 Climate Change Vulnerability Index, Chad was rated the most vulnerable.97 The country has already been experiencing declining rainfall and increasing temperatures. Though in the 1990s rainfall recovered from its rapid decline between 1950 and the 1980s, it fell again in the 2000s; between 2000 and 2009, average rainfall in the country’s crop growing regions were 13 percent lower than the 1920-1969 mean, though much of this decrease was concentrated in the southeast of the country. As of 2012, temperatures had also risen by more than 0.8º Celsius since 1975 across much of Chad, including the Lac region.98 Several fieldwork participants highlighted that harvest yields had declined in the last few years, and while this was not explicitly linked to climate change, it was cited as a driver of youth joining Boko Haram, since the poor harvests have resulted in increased poverty and fewer available jobs. Chad also has the 10th fastest population growth in the world, at over 3 percent in 2017, which will likely put further strain on the available resources.99

These poor economic outcomes are exacerbated by the poor provision of public services, which are far worse than the national average. Several fieldwork participants highlighted perceived deficiencies in a public education system which has a gross enrollment rate below 30 percent and which depends on “community teachers” – students’ parents – regularly serving as stopgap instructors.100 Others discussed the lack of healthcare facilities; Baga Sola reportedly has only a single hospital with 10 staff, including a single doctor, reflecting a local situation in which there is only one doctor for every 140,000 residents, a quarter of the national average.101 Others noted poor waste management systems or the paucity of paved roads – less than half of the 400 km road from Baga Sola to N’djamena is reportedly paved. Numerous fieldwork participants cited these deficiencies as being a major factor behind the lack of good jobs in the region, and noted that the situation is worse for women and girls, both because religious and cultural gender roles restrict their schooling and because they lack the option to join the military when other employment is unavailable.

Many respondents blamed perceived corruption and nepotism in the government for the deficits in public service provision and for the general economic woes of the region. Although there is not reliable data on corruption at a sub-national level, Chad was ranked the 15th most corrupt country on the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index,102 and the 2018 BTI found that civil servants often expect to be personally compensated for processing documents

95 FEWS NET http://fews.net/west-africa/chad 96 “Chad: Food Security and Nutrition Crisis – Appeal for a response at scale (January 2018)”. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. January 25, 2018. 97 Abdi, Hakim. “Chad is the country most vulnerable to climate change – here’s why”. The Conversation. June 8, 2017. 98 “A Climate Trend Analysis of Chad”. USGS. June 2012. 99 “Population growth (annual %)”, World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW 100 “Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures”. International Crisis Group. March 8, 2017. 101 Ibid. 102 Transparency International https://www.transparency.org/country/TCD

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or payments.103 President Déby vowed in May 2018 to crack down on corruption,104 but no respondents suggested that this had led to any meaningful changes. Instead, Déby’s government has restricted access to both social and traditional media, most recently beginning in March 2018.105 The imposition of these restrictions follow the even more severe blackout in 2016, when access to the internet was cut and mobile phones were unable to send text messages during an election in which the opposition alleged that hundreds of ballot boxes and 60 soldiers who voted for Mr. Déby’s opponent were disappeared by the ruling party and protests were banned.106 Although most fieldwork participants stated that neither women nor youth played a major role in decision-making processes, one respondent did note that the number of women in the national legislature did increase significantly in 2012 and that women have recently been more assertive of their political rights.

The judicial system in the Lac region is not exempt from perceptions of corruption and from the underinvestment that reportedly afflicts other public services in the area. The belief that the judicial system was corrupt, inefficient, and tilted towards the rich was widespread amongst fieldwork participants, and one traditional leader claimed that court cases can stretch on for 30 to 40 years without a verdict, causing conflicts to become protracted and passed on from generation to generation. As a result, many respondents stated that they relied far more heavily on traditional and religious leaders, especially for resolving day-to-day disputes, and even for adjudicating land disputes. Nonetheless, a traditional leader noted that sometimes people are unsatisfied with these alternative dispute mechanisms and choose to elevate their case to the formal court system.

Niger Structural Vulnerabilities

• Perceptions of widespread corruption • Ineffective/absent government • Inconsistent power supply • Youth marginalization in decision-making • High levels of poverty • Low productivity due to dependence on subsistence agriculture • Frequent political turnover

Event-Driven Risks

• Drought and other climactic shocks • Electoral processes

103 “BTI 2018 | Chad Country Report”. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country- reports/detail/itc/tcd/ity/2018/itr/wca/ 104 News 24 https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/chad-president-vows-anti-corruption-drive-for-new-republic-20180504 105 Dahir, Abdi Latif. “Chad has blocked social messaging apps and BBC amid political and economic anxiety”. Quartz Africa. April 8, 2018. 106 “Chad’s President Idriss Deby wins fifth term”. BBC. April 22, 2016.

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• Commodity price shocks

Resilience Factors

• Trust in traditional leaders

One of the most frequently discussed issues by fieldwork participants in the area of Governance was corruption. Niger is ranked 114th out of 180 countries in the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, though this is higher than the other three countries in the Lake Chad Basin. According to Afrobarometer, 33 percent of Nigeriens believe that there is nothing ordinary citizens can do to combat corruption – the sixth highest rate of the 36 countries surveyed and much higher than both Nigeria and Cameroon (Chad was not surveyed).107 In that same report, a majority of the respondents who gave a reason for not reporting corruption stated that it stemmed from a fear of the consequences. Many fieldwork participants echoed these concerns, reporting that they believed nepotism and corruption to be pronounced, widespread, and corrosive of the legitimacy of and trust in government institutions, especially the judiciary. These respondents also reported that although there were some institutions ostensibly devoted to fighting corruption, such as the National Authority Fighting Against Corruption (HALCIA), these were largely ineffective. However, there was a minority of respondents – all of whom were from Diffa – who reported that corruption did not exist in their communities.

According to a report by the United States Department of State, Niger has had issues with judicial independence due to interference by the executive branch in the judicial process, including through the “On paper they [youth and lengthening of pre-trial detention periods, reassigning of judges who women] all have rendered decisions unfavorable to the government, and interference in opportunity. But in reality, cases involving opposition leaders.108 The fieldwork highlighted another this is not the case. They concern around the rule of law in Niger, namely the gap between urban are not part of the and rural areas. While interviewees in Diffa offered little commentary decision-making process.” on the rule of law in their communities, several of those from Bosso Focus Group Discussion, and N’guigmi reported that the rule of law was weakly applied, and that Diffa perceptions of impunity and corruption were widespread. Fieldwork participants also reported that many people rely on traditional systems of justice and of conflict resolution and that confidence in these systems is significantly higher than in state institutions, though traditional leaders do not have much ability to address systemic issues such as corruption. Demonstrating again the urban-rural divide, this reliance on traditional systems was more frequently reported by respondents in Bosso and N’guigmi, and less so in Diffa.

The legitimacy of the Nigerien political system has been impaired by frequent regime changes over the last two and a half decades and by controversies and grievances around electoral processes. Since 1993, Niger has had five constitutions and several interspersed periods of civilian and military rule, though the current period of civilian rule has lasted since 2011. Although the African Union judged the elections of 2016 – in which President Mahamadou Issoufou was re-elected – to be largely free of manipulation, the principal opposition candidate, Hama

107 Isbell, Thomas. “Efficacy for fighting corruption: Evidence from 36 African countries”. Afrobarometer. July 2017. 108 “2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Niger”. U.S. Department of State. 2018.

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Amadou, was arrested and imprisoned a few months before the elections were held. In March of 2017, a court sentenced Amadou in absentia to one year in prison on what the opposition has maintained were politically motivated charges. Fieldwork participants reported that political actors were largely disengaged from their communities, only appearing during electoral periods. One interviewee from N’guigmi stated that outside of election season, the politicians “just stay and enjoy their money in the capital cities”. Many respondents also noted that youth in particular lack opportunities to participate in politics and decision-making. The absence of the state extends to the provision of services. According to the WHO and UNICEF,109 Niger has the largest gap between urban and rural areas in the provision of basic sanitation and drinking water services of the countries in West Africa plus Chad and Cameroon. Fieldwork participants also largely reported that the state failed to provide basic public services, particularly health services.

The Nigerien economy is highly bifurcated, with most of the population dependent on subsistence agriculture while most of the monetary value of the economy is based on the export of high-value commodities such as uranium and petroleum. This dependence leaves the economy extremely vulnerable to sudden commodity price shocks, as well as to the repeated droughts, inconsistent rainfall, rising temperatures, and growing desertification that have affected the country and has left over 70 percent of Niger’s population in severe multidimensional poverty and over 85 percent of them classified as working poor by the UNDP.110 At the same time, Niger population is growing at over 3.8 percent per year, the third fastest in the world.111 Although the fieldwork discussions were not focused on economic issues, the members of the Women’s FGD in N’guigmi did report that they were in desperate need of financial assistance to provide a kickstart to their livelihoods. Nigeria Structural Vulnerabilities

• Food insecurity • Widespread perceptions of corruption • Absence of government staff • Lack of public services • Threats to freedom of speech • Low engagement in the political process • High levels of poverty • Limited economic opportunities in IDP camps • Raiding/looting by Boko Haram • Absence of credit facilities • Unemployment

109 WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene, accessed through the World Bank 110 Human Development Report 2016, United Nations Development Programme 111 “Population growth (annual %)” World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW

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Event-Driven Risks

• Drought and other climactic shocks • Attacks by Boko Haram • Increases in commodity prices, especially for basic foodstuffs

Resilience Factors

• Traditional governance structures • Biometric ID system

The Boko Haram insurgency has severely curtailed effective governance in the areas of Borno state, Nigeria that are nearest to Lake Chad. The most frequently cited concern among fieldwork participants was food insecurity, which is particularly acute among those displaced from their homes, communities, and livelihoods. Before the emergence of Boko Haram, the economy in the area was principally based around agriculture, fishing, herding, and trade, but participants reported that the threat of violence has made most people unwilling or unable to return to their previous livelihoods, almost completely shutting down the local economy and leaving them dependent on aid from the government or NGOs. Some interviewees reported that food prices have been rising, likely as the result of the collapse of production, and that they have encountered problems securing aid. These problems have included the departure or scaling back of the operations of many international NGOs, the necessity of feeding newly displaced relatives who have not yet been officially registered as displaced and therefore not entitled to aid, and perceptions of corruption involved in the distribution of ID/aid cards. Many respondents reported that many IDPs are unable to secure an independent source of livelihood because they lack the skills or education to be hired and lack the financial resources to launch their own enterprise. A few participants reported that they received some aid from the Federal and State Emergency Management Agencies, both in the form of distributed food items and in the form of repair of local infrastructure.

This situation is compounded by the retreat of public and private services due to the threat of Boko Haram. Fieldwork participants almost universally reported that the crisis has driven off what credit facilities existed previously, and schools were widely reported to be underfunded – lacking even basic supplies such as chairs and blackboards – and overcrowded as they try to cope with the influx of IDPs. Some respondents stated this situation was exacerbated by the fact that corruption is reportedly present at every level, with bribes being required to get into school, secure employment, or receive benefits. These problems are reportedly not limited to credit facilities and schools; medical facilities are also reportedly underfunded and understaffed, electricity is reportedly largely absent, and most interviewees reported having to travel a significant distance to access water because many of the boreholes had failed. In this context of failing public services, most local government officials reportedly spend most of their time in Maiduguri, visiting their constituencies one to two days per week at most, creating a feeling of separation between them and the people they are ostensibly governing. Additionally, one interviewee in Gamboru reported that there had been no local government elections for four years due to the insurgency; during that time, local government leaders have been appointed by the state governor and changed every six months, a situation which has deepened the feeling of estrangement between local government officials and the general population. This has left the population almost entirely dependent on traditional leaders. Respondents reported

45 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

that they feel the traditional leaders are closer and more responsive to their needs and typically go first to whichever traditional leader is most easily accessible to resolve conflicts or solve problems.

Fieldwork participants in some communities reported that the judges in their communities have left due to the Boko Haram insurgency. In those communities where the state judicial system is still functional, respondents reported that it was not just, and that corruption was perceived to be pervasive. These experiences accord with the results of the latest series of Afrobarometer surveys, which found that less than 40 percent of Nigerians trust the judicial system, 47 percent believe that most or all judges and magistrates are corrupt, and 40 percent report having paid a bribe to get assistance from a court.112 These statistics are reflective of a broader pervasiveness of perceived corruption – multiple fieldwork participants expressed that they felt that corruption was so pervasive that it was “in our blood”. Outside observers have also found Nigerian rule of law institutions to be under- resourced and understaffed and to suffer from allegations of lengthy detention times, arbitrary arrests, and a failure to investigate reports of human rights violations on the part of security services.113 Several fieldwork participants echoed similar concerns, stating that there was freedom of speech but it did not exist in practice, and that people refrain from expressing their opinions for fear of being labeled Boko Haram and disappeared.

As previously noted, fieldwork participants frequently expressed a feeling of alienation from local government officials, and in some areas no local-level elections have been held for several years. Additionally, respondents reported that there were few opportunities for women and youth to become involved in decision-making processes in any meaningful way. At the national level, Nigeria has also seen a steady decline in participation in elections, with the voter turnout in the presidential elections falling from 52 percent in 2011 to 42 percent in 2015 to 33 percent in 2019. In Borno, however, voter turnout increased from just over 30 percent in 2015 to 43 percent in 2019, the only state to see an increase in turnout between the last two presidential elections, an anomaly which is likely related to the strength of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2015 suppressing turnout. Some interviewees, however, described a pervasive environment of vote buying accompanied by a widespread belief that the results of elections would be directly manipulated regardless of the choices made by individual voters. Recommendations Cameroon

• Review gaps in the governance structure and invest in and support initiatives aimed at addressing political vacuums and infrastructural deficiencies. • Empower women and youth to run for political office and encourage inclusive policies to strengthen women’s participation in political processes. • Strengthen the role of the National Anticorruption Commission in fighting corruption. • Expand civic education to build trust and transparency in the judicial system and invest in initiatives aimed at improving access to the formal judicial system for rural areas, particularly in the Far North. • Build the capacity of traditional institutions to arbitrate and mediate disputes at the grassroots level.

112 Logan, Carolyn. “Ambitious SDG goal confronts challenging realities: Access to justice is still elusive for many Africans”. Afrobarometer. March 2017. 113 “Nigeria Human Rights Report 2016”. US DoS.

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• Encourage the review of counterinsurgency measures and advance solutions that limit the economic and social harm done to civilians. • Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to evaluate aid distribution process and service delivery to IDP camps, which are central recruiting zones for Boko Haram. • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures for economically insecure populations.

Chad

• Expand civic education to build trust and transparency in the judicial system and invest in initiatives aimed at improving access to the formal judicial system. • Empower women and youth to run for political office and encourage inclusive policies to strengthen women’s participation in political processes. • Invest in infrastructure development initiatives, increase healthcare and public education spending to manage infrastructure challenges, and build the capacity of “community teachers” who function as stopgap instructors. • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures for economically insecure populations. • Encourage a review of counterinsurgency measures at the national, regional and international levels and advance solutions that limit the economic and social harm done to civilians. Niger

• Review gaps in the governance structure and invest in and support initiatives aimed at addressing political vacuums and infrastructural deficiencies. • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures for economically insecure populations. • Encourage the review of counterinsurgency measures and advance solutions that limit the economic and social harm done to civilians. • Strengthen anti-corruption measures and support initiatives for transparency at the local and national levels. • Encourage inclusive policies to strengthen women’s participation in political processes and support awareness-raising and civic education efforts for women and youth. • Expand civic education to build trust and transparency in the judicial system, invest in initiatives aimed at improving access to the formal judicial system and support legal assistance programs focusing on vulnerable populations. • Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to evaluate aid distribution process and service delivery to IDP camps, which are central recruiting zones for Boko Haram. Nigeria

47 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

• Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures for economically vulnerable populations, including IDPs. • Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to evaluate aid distribution protocols for unregistered displaced persons. • Review gaps in the governance structure and invest in and support initiatives aimed at addressing political vacuums. • Strengthen anti-corruption measures and support initiatives for transparency at the local and national levels. • Encourage inclusive policies to strengthen women’s participation in political processes and support awareness-raising and civic education efforts for women and youth. • Expand civic education to build trust and transparency in the judicial system and invest in initiatives aimed at improving access to the formal judicial system and support legal assistance programs focusing on vulnerable populations.

48 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Security

49 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Security in the Lake Chad Basin Although the Boko Haram Nigeria, 4.4 insurgency began in northern Nigeria Niger, 5.8 in 2009, it has been a regional issue Chad, 4.8 Cameroon, 5.2 almost from the beginning. Due to its Displacement regional nature, the four countries Nigeria, 1.8 expanded the mandate of the Niger, 3.7 Multinational Joint Task Force Chad, 4.0 (MNJTF), which was originally set up Conflict & Conflict Terrorism Cameroon, 1.5 in 1994, to fight Boko Haram with Nigeria, 4.4 troops from each of the four Niger, 1.4 countries, as well as Benin. In Chad, 10.0 Defense Cameroon, 3.9 addition, Nigerian President Institutions Capacity Capacity of Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in May 2013 in Results of the RRVA Index in the area of Security. Low scores indicate greater Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. vulnerability, while high scores indicate greater resilience. Scores reflect the entire country, not just the areas in the Lake Chad Basin. Despite these actions, the threat posed by Boko Haram continued growing over the following years, culminating in the group overrunning the headquarters of the MNJTF in Baga, a town in Kukawa LGA, Nigeria in January 2015, killing between 150 and 2,000 people in Baga and the surrounding villages and forcing thousands to flee from their homes to either Maiduguri or Annual Fatalities Due to Violence and across the border into Chad. That Insecurity event, coupled with the election of Muhammadu Buhari in March 2015, 2500 sparked substantial reforms in both the 2000 MNJTF and the Nigerian army. 2015 marked the highpoint of violence and of 1500 Boko Haram’s territorial holdings as the 1000 militaries of the four regional countries and the MNJTF successfully pushed 500 Boko Haram out of much of the territory they controlled, driving them 0 Y - 2011 Y - 2012 Y - 2013 Y - 2014 Y - 2015 Y - 2016 Y - 2017 Y - 2018 into strongholds in Sambisa Forest and in and around Lake Chad. Since then, Abadam (Nigeria) Monguno (Nigeria) violence has continued, albeit at a much Ngala (Nigeria) Logone-et-Chari (Cameroon) Mamdi (Chad) Diffa (Niger) N'Guimi (Niger) Kukawa (Nigeria)

50 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

lower rate than in 2015, particularly in Logone-et-Chari (Cameroon), Abadam (Nigeria), N’guigmi (Niger), and Fatalities by Local Government Mamdi (Chad). Area

In 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions, one 3000 endorsed by the Islamic State, headed by Abu Musab al- 2500 Barnawi, which appears to be more active in the Lake 2000 Chad area, and the other headed by Abubakar Shekau, 1500 which has been active further south around Sambisa 1000 Forest. Many respondents interviewed expressed the perception that the Shekau wing was much more 500 indiscriminate in who they targeted with violence and 0 terror, while the ISWAP wing was more tactical in targeting military and political actors, while seeking to gain the willing support of community members.

Despite the reduced rate of violence in recent year, at Y - 2011 Y - 2012 Y - 2013 Y - 2014 the end of April 2019 there were still nearly 2.5 Y - 2015 Y - 2016 Y - 2017 Y - 2018 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), with nearly 2 million of them in Nigeria. In addition, there were close to 250,000 Nigerian refugees in the three other regional states, with almost half in Niger and over 40 percent in Cameroon.114

Cameroon Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • Insecurity/attacks by Boko Haram • Competition for resources • Influx of refugees and IDPs

Event-Driven Risks

• Abductions • Armed attacks • Looting • Assassinations • Refugees & Displacement

114 UNHCR, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation#_ga=2.39489059.1061559524.1559149117-1507788115.1558634152

51 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

• Rape

Resilience Factors

• Role of army, MNJTF, local militias • Role of religious leaders preaching against violent extremism

In the latter half of 2014, Boko Haram initiated regular attacks in northern Cameroon in response to the involvement of the Cameroonian military in combat operations against the group.115 Violence in the country’s Far North Region spiked beginning in August 2014, reaching a high in February 2015 before falling back to a much reduced, albeit still elevated, level.116 This reduction in violence, which has continued to fall in recent years, has come about, at least in part, due to the effectiveness of the Cameroonian security forces, which captured more than 1,000 suspected Boko Haram members between 2014 and the end of 2017 and accepted the surrender of hundreds more.117 State security forces have been augmented since 2014 by vigilantes, which number over 14,000 and have played a vital role in the fight against Boko Haram by providing intelligence, acting as scouts and guides, and sometimes engaging in direct combat with Boko Haram fighters.118

Several concerns for the Cameroonian military, however, have recently been rising to the fore. Troop morale, especially amongst regular army units, has been low, and there have been multiple incidents of soldiers killing their commanding officers.119 Morale is not any higher amongst the Cameroonian contingent of the MNJTF, reportedly because the soldiers posted there expected to be getting the same bonus payments they would receive on a UN peacekeeping mission.120 Further complicating Cameroon’s role in the MNJTF, thousands of Cameroonians have fled the violence in the western Anglophone provinces to Nigeria,121 and the Cameroonian government believes that Nigeria has been sheltering insurgents and separatists, straining relationship between the two states. 122 This strain is perhaps contributory to the lack of any operations by the Cameroonian army – either in cooperation with the Nigerian military of the MNJTF – on its border with Nigeria between February and December 2017, which allowed Boko Haram to rebuild its cells in the area.123

Fieldwork participants stated that although Boko Haram’s attacks are less frequent than in the past thanks to the work of the security forces, the group continues to come over the border from Nigeria, attacking mosques and religious figures who do not share their ideology, looting and abducting civilians, and killing anyone suspected of assisting the Cameroonian armed forces. Some respondents believed that Boko Haram also continues to have supporters and informants in communities in the Far North. Additionally, some interviewees mentioned that a

115 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018. 116 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); https://www.acleddata.com 117 “Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram”. International Crisis Group. August 14, 2018. 118 Ibid. 119 “Cameroun: un soldat tue son supérieur et se suicide”. BBC News. October 5, 2017. 120 “Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram” 121 The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/07/cameroon-refugees-flee-ruthless-violence-nigeria 122 Kouagheu, Josiane. “Gunmen cross from Nigeria, attack Cameroon border post: witnesses”. Reuters. January 25, 2018. 123 “Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram”

52 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

few of the security services had committed human rights abuses, especially towards women in the communities in which they were stationed.

Chad Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • Competition for resources • Ethnic and sectarian tensions • Influx of refugees and IDPs

Event-Driven Risks

• Abductions • Looting • Assassinations • Displacement • Rape

Resilience Factors

• Role of army, MNJTF, local militias • Role of traditional and religious leaders preaching against violent extremism • Provision of humanitarian aid for IDPs and refugees

Although the level of violence in the Lac Region of Chad has usually been lower than that of the other regions in the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram’s continued occupation of the islands in the Lake itself poses a continued security threat. Boko Haram militants carried out their first attack in Chad in February 2015, when fighters crossed Lake Chad and attacked a village, shortly after the pivotal Baga Massacre in Nigeria. A few months later, the group carried out one of its most-high profile attacks in two suicide attacks against two police stations in N’Djamena.124 Since 2015, however, Boko Haram’s presence in Chad has been mostly restricted to the areas in and around the Lake. Due to the region’s unique environment and geography, Boko Haram was able to exploit the area and seek

124 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018.

53 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

refuge on the lake’s many islands. Low literacy rates and few opportunities for gainful employment in the area has also aided in the recruitment of the local community.125

Chad has traditionally played an outsized role in regional security issues; its troops are considered some of the most capable in the region, and have played a prominent role in the fight against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other extremist groups in the Sahel. Accordingly, the Chadian army has also played a principal role in operations against Boko Haram. In 2014, alarmed at the possible loss of access to regional ports in Nigeria, Chad took the lead in initiating regional operations to counter Boko Haram, and has been a leader in the successful operations of the MNJTF since that time. Since the dismantling of the Boko Haram cells in N’Djamena following the attacks in 2015, the group’s presence in Chad “Outside the camp there is total rejection has been largely been contained to in and around the by the host population. They believe that Lake.126 However, some fieldwork participants are the refugees and IDPs are better taken skeptical of the army’s effectiveness, or even believe that care of by governments and international they are complicit with Boko Haram. Additionally, other donor organisations. The host community is complaining that they don’t have basic respondents described alleged human rights abuses, amenities that exist in the camp, such as including extra-judicial killings and rape, committed by toilets, food, health support, etc.” members of the army.

Key Informant Interview, Baga As of the end of 2017, Chad held over 400,000 refugees Sola and 100,000 IDPs.127 However, the vast majority are from Sudan and the Central African Republic, with only 2 percent, coming from Nigeria.128 However, the combination of Nigerians fleeing across the border and Chadians displaced from their homes on the islands of the Lake have, according to several interviewees, contributed to placing considerable pressure on the region’s natural resources, such as firewood and grazing land, and pushed prices for food and housing higher. Several international humanitarian organizations have a presence in the area and provide critical aid to displaced populations, but respondents stated that this can also increase tensions between displaced people and host communities, as the latter feel they are not receiving sufficient benefits from the outside organizations.

The crisis and movement of people across borders has disrupted trade, livelihoods, and socio-economic ties,129 a sentiment which was echoed by fieldwork participants from both Baga Sola and Bol, two towns which historically have been key commercial hubs. However, in order to avoid the increased level of insecurity, the few people who continue to trade are now reportedly forced to take long, circuitous routes, adding hundreds or even thousands of kilometers and multiple days to their journey. People are also afraid to farm in their fields, to fish, and to graze their livestock. The deterioration of economic prospects has incentivized some people to join Boko Haram, since

125 International Crisis Group https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246-fighting-boko-haram-chad-beyond-military- measures 126 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018. 127 UNHCR http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview 128 UNHCR http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern 129 Reach Initiative http://www.reach-initiative.org/chad-understanding-displacement-patterns-and-population-needs

54 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

the group reportedly pays 300,000 FCFS, approximately $500, for the successful completion of a mission as well as a percentage of any benefits that may come from it, such as the sale of stolen cattle.

Additionally, respondents described how the situation has contributed to increased inter-ethnic tension and suspicion over alleged sympathy to or support for Boko Haram, which has sometimes broken out into open conflict.

Niger Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • Competition for resources • Ethnic and sectarian tensions • Distrust of security forces

Event-Driven Risks

• Abductions • Looting • Assassinations • Displacement • Rape

Resilience Factors

• Role of army, MNJTF, local militias • Role of religious leaders preaching against violent extremism • Humanitarian aid and livelihood schemes for IDPs

The Diffa region of Niger has close historical, religious, and economic ties to the Nigerian state of Borno. Accordingly, many Nigeriens from Diffa had joined Boko Haram in the early days of the organization, before the 2009 uprising that drove the group out of Maiduguri. In the following years, Boko Haram avoided launching attacks in Niger in order to build up Diffa as a refuge and a source of funds, supplies, and recruits. Nigerien authorities, consequently, kept the group under surveillance, but largely treated it as a Nigerian problem. By 2014, however, Boko Haram’s territorial expansion towards the Nigerien border and an expanded recruiting push inside Niger prompted Niger to join the efforts of the MNJTF.130 In early 2015, Boko Haram conducted its first attack in Niger.

130 “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency”. International Crisis Group. February 27, 2017.

55 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Throughout 2015 and 2016, these attacks became a frequent occurrence, predominately along the Nigerian border in the Diffa department of the Diffa region. In 2017, the operations of Nigerien and regional security forces successfully managed to reduce the rate of violence, but in 2018, violence began to rise again,131 with the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) claiming several attacks in the area.132

In their fight against Boko Haram, the Nigerien security forces have received direct support from Chadian troops since 2015 and has been improving its collaboration with the Nigerian army.133 Fieldwork participants described both the Nigerien Armed Forces, particularly the army and police, and the Chadian army as important sources of resilience, even though some respondents did mention that they do not always respond quickly, especially outside major urban areas, forcing the population to rely on self-defense militias. Part of this slow reaction time is the limited resources available to Nigerien forces fighting in the Lake Chad Basin. Niger does benefit from major military assistance programs, especially from France and the US, but this aid – and the French and American military presence – is more focused on the fight against extremist groups in the Sahara in Niamey and the Agadez region than on the Lake Chad Basin. Niger also receives financial aid as part of the MNJTF operations, but this aid is managed by the AU and is often slow to be dispersed. However, Niger has had to increase its military expenditures fifteen-fold since 2010 and now spends more than 10 percent of its GDP on defense and security.134

This rapid increase in security expenditures has made it difficult to pay civil servants in other sectors, and in 2016 workers in the education and judiciary sectors went on strike in protest at lack of resources and wage arrears. At the same time, the fight against Boko Haram has put considerable pressure on the judicial system; the number of detainees held because of their links to the group increased from about a 100 at the end of 2014 to almost 1,700 by the beginning of 2017. The great majority of these detainees had been arrested based on information supplied by informants.135 Some fieldwork participants stated that potential informants must do so through village authorities in order to avoid misinformation from anonymous sources, but other respondents said that there is a toll-free number that allows people to anonymously alert the authorities of a threat and that the security forces also have secret informants.

Following the first spate of attacks by Boko Haram in Niger, the Nigerien government declared a state of emergency in Diffa in February 2015. The declaration, which gives troops the power to search homes without a warrant, imposes a curfew, and gives Diffa’s governor the right to introduce new restrictions without passing any laws,136 has been consistently extended over the following four years. These additional restrictions have included bans or restrictions on several commercial activities.137 According to fieldwork participants, these restrictions have included a ban on the use of motorcycles and restrictions on access to fishing zones to those who have explicit authorization. Together with the imposition of checkpoints and fear of Boko Haram attacks, this has severely curtailed trade, agriculture, and fishing in the area specifically, as well as mobility and economic activity more generally. Interviewees also discussed how this decrease in movement and interaction between different communities has led to a sharp deterioration in social cohesion, particularly along ethnic lines. Restricted access to farming and herding lands has exacerbated this breakdown, as livestock and crops have to co-exist in a limited

131 According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) https://www.acleddata.com/ 132 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018. 133 “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency”. International Crisis Group. February 27, 2017. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 “Niger declares emergency in Diffa after Boko Haram attacks”. BBC News. February 11, 2015. 137 “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency”. International Crisis Group. February 27, 2017.

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space with the result that the former often trample or destroy the latter, which fieldwork participants mentioned as exacerbating communal tensions. “[There is] no market, no farmland, they only depend on aid workers to As a result of the close ties between Diffa and Borno, Niger bring food for them. When they don’t has seen a large influx of Nigerian refugees as a result of Boko come, it is a major problem. They Haram’s insurgency. As of the end of March 2019, Niger is host want to be independent and want the to nearly half of all Nigerian refugees in the region, numbering government to secure their places, so that they can go back home and be almost 120,000 people. In addition, there are over 100,000 free to live their normal lives.” Nigerien IDPs displaced by the insurgency.138 According to fieldwork participants, relationships between displaced people Key Informant Interview, and host communities are good, but there are growing N’guigmi concerns that the displaced place additional pressures on local infrastructure and resources. The temporary settlements in which refugees and IDPs live are reportedly marked by inadequate security, shortages of food and clean drinking water, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and insufficient shelter. Sexual abuse, drug use, and criminality are also reportedly common in those settlements according to several interviewees. Some of the Nigerian refugees in Diffa reported feeling abandoned and forgotten by their local officials back in Nigeria, despite their proximity to the Nigerian border. However, the Nigerian government does provide some support to refugees in Niger. One program, in which agricultural extension officers helped provide the initial resources, training, and help in securing land for a program of watermelon cultivation, was cited as a particular success that is now being scaled up. According to fieldwork respondents, there are also a number of NGOs and humanitarian aid groups operating in the Diffa region, both in the displaced people camps and in the broader community.

Nigeria Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • Competition for resources • Curtailing of trade • Ethnic and Sectarian tensions • Influx of refugees and IDPs • Perceptions of inequality in the distribution of aid

138 UNHCR https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation

57 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Event-Driven Risks

• Abductions • Looting • Assassinations • Displacement • Rape • Tensions between IDP and host communities

Resilience Factors

• Role of army, MNJTF, local militias • Role of religious leaders preaching against violent extremism • Humanitarian aid for refugees and IDPs

The Boko Haram uprising began in July of 2009 in Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno states, in which about 1,000 people were killed when militants attacked police stations across the region. Initially the uprising was put down by security forces, but then in 2010, after hundreds of militants escaped from a Bauchi prison, violence began to escalate. In April 2012, the mandate of the Multinational Joint Security Force, which had existed since 1994, was expanded to fight Boko Haram, and in October 2014, the force was renamed the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF).139 In January 2015, Boko Haram overran the headquarters of the MNJTF in Baga, killing hundreds and forcing thousands to flee.140

By late 2014 and early 2015, Boko Haram had also managed to seize control of over 17 local government areas (LGAs) across three states, representing an area the size of Belgium,141 and were responsible for an estimated 6,000 civilian fatalities alone in 270 attacks in the northeast of Nigeria.142 According to data from ACLED, 2015 was the deadliest year since the group began coordinated attacks against Nigerian government and security forces in 2011. In addition to the states in the northeast, Boko Haram insurgents also mounted attacks in Abuja, Kano and Nasarawa, killing dozens. They also claimed responsibility for attacks in neighboring Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

In response to the Boko Haram’s successes, a number of reforms were instituted in both the MNJTF and, following the election of Muhammadu Buahri in March 2015, the Nigerian military. The MNJTF’s headquarters was moved to N’djamena, the force was reorganized into four national sectors, and it was placed under the political supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission with strategic, technical, and logistical support from the African AU.143 Buhari also worked to improve regional operation planning and intelligence sharing, and allowed Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerien troops to operate on Nigerian territory. Buhari also replaced the upper

139 Sawadogo, W. A. “Can the joint task force against Boko Haram stay the course?”. Institute for Security Studies. January 13, 2017. 140 Fessy, Thomas. “Boko Haram attack: What happened in Baga?”. BBC News. February 2, 2015. 141 Fielding, Alex. “How Nigeria’s Buhari is Turning the Tide Against Boko Haram”. International Peace Institute. October 26, 2016. 142 Uhrmacher, Kevin and Sheridan, Mary Beth. “The brutal toll of Boko Haram’s Attacks on Civilians”. Washington Post. April 3, 2016. 143 Assanvo, W., Jeannine Ella A Abatan, and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo. “Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. September 2016.

58 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

echelon of the Nigerian military hierarchy, moved the headquarters of its anti-Boko Haram command from Abuja to Maiduguri, and uncovered a $2 billion arms procurement scandal that encompassed more than 300 companies and officers. These reforms also prompted the US to expand its military aid to Nigeria.144

As a result of these reforms and the benefits they produced, by the end of 2015, Buhari declared that Boko Haram had been “technically” defeated and that the group, “as an organized fighting force”, could no longer carry out “articulated conventional attacks on centers of communication and populations”. He also said that the group had been almost entirely driven out of Adamawa and Yobe states.145

Despite having been routed from key areas and significantly downgraded in their capacities, Boko Haram has continued to launch attacks against Nigerian security forces and civilians, using improvised explosives devices (IEDs) and other crude weaponry. This often included the use of suicide bombers, an increasing number of whom were women and girls recruited to attack markets, transportation depots, mosques, and IDP camps.146 Fieldwork participants reported that Boko Haram also commits targeted killings of community leaders and of those suspected of informing the army. The group also loots goods and food and levies taxes on those who live in areas where they still have some measure of control.

In August 2016, Boko Haram officially split into two groups, formalizing a rupture that had been brewing for some time based on three principal issues: leader Abubakar Shekau’s dictatorial leadership style, the need to recover after a period of defeats and territorial loss, and the question of who constituted an acceptable target of violence.147 The faction that split took the name Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) under the leadership of Mamman Nur and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, a son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf, and is estimated to have 3,500 to 5,000 fighters.148 The faction that remained under the leadership of Shekau reassumed Boko Haram’s original name, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), and is estimated to have between 1,500 and 2,000 fighters.149 The two groups have largely divided the former territory of Boko Haram between them; ISWAP operates primarily to the north and west of Maiduguri with its base in and around Lake Chad while JAS principally operates to the south and east of Maiduguri, as well as in the city itself, with its base in Sambisa Forest.150 According to fieldwork participants, ISWAP is less predatory than Shekau, mainly attacking the military and symbols of the Nigerian state, such as Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) gas stations. This description is consistent with other evaluations of the strategies and tactics of the two groups. ISWAP has launched a series of successful major attacks on military installations in the latter half of 2018, the most notable of which have included a raid on a battalion-sized camp in Jilli, Yobe State in July, overrunning the town of Gudumbali in September – the first time since 2015 that Boko Haram forces had taken an LGA headquarters – and seizing major army and navy bases in Baga and Doro Gowon in December.151 At the same time, the Nigerian security services have been stretched increasingly thin by rising violence between herders and farmers in the Middle Belt, which killed more than 1,300 people in the first half of 2018, six times more than Boko Haram’s insurgency.152

144 Ibid. 145 “Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants ‘technically defeated”. BBC News. December 24, 2015. 146 Taft, Patricia and Lawrence, Kendall. “Confronting the Unthinkable: Suicide Bombers in Northern Nigeria.” The Fund for Peace. February 2016. 147 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018. 148 “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province”. International Crisis Group. May 16, 2019. 149 Ibid. 150 Mahmood, Omar S. and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. “Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies. July 2018. 151 “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province”. 152 “Stopping Nigeria’s Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence”. International Crisis Group. July 26, 2018.

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Perceptions of the security forces among fieldwork participants varied. Although some respondents praised the work of the military, and especially of the MNJTF, several others raised “There are people who prefer to grievances, which were centered around two main issues: the return to Baga and face death economic impact of security restrictions and the lack of knowledge there than face hunger and of, and commitment to, the local area. The security restrictions homelessness in Maiduguri. ‘You imposed on movement, most visibly the checkpoints, coupled with either die here or you die there the insecurity caused by Boko Haram, has caused the price of and at least Boko Haram lets you transportation to skyrocket, increasing between 3 and 5 times. eat.’” Additionally, respondents reported that permits were now Focus Group Discussion, required to visit farms and fisheries. Furthermore, in addition to Baga the tax that Boko Haram imposes on economic activity in their areas of influence, some interviewees accused Nigerian soldiers of confiscating their goods and selling it for themselves. Fieldwork participants also reported that many of those deployed to the area were from elsewhere in Nigeria and had no local knowledge, most especially no ability to speak the local language, which inhibits interaction with the local populace and reportedly makes the security forces inaccessible and unresponsive to their needs. Some interviewees went so far as to say that the soldiers, especially those not from the area, seemed more interested in protecting themselves and waiting in their barracks for someone to hire them as a security escort than in confronting the insurgents and that they were quick to flee when Boko Haram attacked.

The Nigerian military and the MNJTF is supported by local militias, most notably the civilian joint task forces (CJTF), which emerged as a coalescence of previously fragmented vigilante groups in 2013 and which played a major role in pushing Boko Haram out of its urban strongholds. Since then, the CJTF, along with traditional hunters, have secured markets and other public spaces from Boko Haram fighters and suicide bombers and have played a big role in intelligence gathering for the military. They have also played a mediation role between herders and farmers and fought alongside the army against Boko Haram. In general, the fieldwork participants spoke more positively about these local militias, which were felt to be closer and more accessible to the local population – and therefore more effective – than the security services. A few respondents did report cases of local militias abusing their power and committing acts of looting and robbery, but others were more concerned that they were under- resourced and undertrained and that their effectiveness had been curtailed due to a new requirement that they wait for authorization from the army before taking any action.

The social geography of northern Nigeria has been transformed by the Boko Haram insurgency. Fieldwork participants said that some towns have been completely depopulated and no longer exist, all the residents having fled to other cities in Nigeria or across the border into Chad, Cameroon, or Niger. As of the end of April 2019, according to UNHCR there are almost 250,000 Nigerian refugees seeking asylum in those three countries with around 2 million internally displaced within Nigeria itself.153 Many of these IDPs live in the larger cities and towns in Borno State, including Maiduguri, Monguno, and Gamboru-Ngala. Many live in IDP camps, housed in converted primary and secondary schools or unused government buildings, while some live outside of the camps in rented apartments or other “unofficial” locations.

153 UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/nigeria-emergency.html

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Although IDPs receive assistance from the many international and local NGOs operating in Borno State, fieldwork participants reported that many of the IDP camps are marked by shortages of food and drinking water, poor access to basic services such as education and healthcare, inadequate shelter, poor sanitation, overcrowding, a lack of economic opportunity, criminality, and gender-based violence. In addition, Boko Haram, and since the split, JAS, has also targeted refugee and IDP camps, with a noticeable increase in attacks in 2017. These attacks are often launched by female suicide bombers due to the fact that they generally arouse less suspicion when attempting to access the camps.154 The influx of IDPs has contributed to tension between the IDPs and their host communities, as well as tensions among the IDPs themselves. Much of this is due to the additional pressure that the IDPs have placed on local infrastructure and resources, as well as the resentment that some host communities, who are often also suffering from security and economic hardships, feel towards the aid that the IDPs receive. Fieldwork participants also reported that there have been allegations of fraud around the distribution of humanitarian aid, particularly food aid. This has included host community members posing as IDPs in order to receive aid and locals or traditional leaders demanding bribes to register IDPs or allow the distribution of aid.

Recommendations Cameroon

• Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to address larger regional trends of insecurity and trafficking networks, including strengthening border controls. • Invest in information sharing to promote trust and effective communication between security forces and local populations for enhanced security. • Promote the review of counterinsurgency measures and advance solutions that limit the harm done to civilians. • Support bi-and multi-lateral training assistance programs to enhance the institutional and organizational capacity of the security forces. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of insecurity for a timely response.

Chad

• Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to address larger regional trends of insecurity and trafficking networks, including strengthening border controls. • Promote the review of counterinsurgency measures and advance solutions that limit the harm done to civilians. • Invest in information sharing to promote trust and effective communication between security forces and local populations for enhanced security.

154 Institute for Security Studies https://issafrica.org/iss-today/refugees-are-boko-harams-latest-soft- target?utm_source=BenchmarkEmail&utm_campaign=ISS_Today&utm_medium=email

61 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

• Promote partnerships with CSOs, security forces and local communities to build trust and encourage relationship-building. • Support alternative livelihood programs for at risk youth, IDPs and populations susceptible to radicalization. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of insecurity for a timely response.

Niger

• Strengthen and improve cooperation and between the Nigerien Armed Forces and the Chadian and Nigerian armies. • Invest in initiatives to address the operational gaps impacting the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Chadian army to improve response times, particularly in areas outside urban areas. • Build the capacity of self-defense militias, encourage relationship-building and information sharing between formal and informal security forces. • Encourage and expand coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to address larger regional trends of insecurity and trafficking networks, including strengthening border controls and strengthening the presence of international military groups in the LCB region. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of insecurity for a timely response. • Improve processes relating the disbursement of aid for the effectiveness of MNJTF operations. • Promote relationship building between host communities and refugees/IDPs. Nigeria

• Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of insecurity for a timely response. • Enhance the relationships between local populations and security forces and address language barrier issues to improve access and responsiveness of security forces. • Promote relationship building between host communities and refugees/IDPs. • Strengthen regional operation planning and intelligence sharing and support the operation of Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian troops on Nigerian territory. • Promote the review of counterinsurgency measures and advance solutions that limit the harm done to civilians.

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Crime and Criminality

63 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Crime and Criminality in the Lake Chad Basin

RRVA fieldwork in the Lake Chad Nigeria, 6.3 Basin found that the primary risks in Niger, 3.1 the area of Crime and Criminality are Chad, 3.4 armed banditry, robbery and Cameroon, 4.1 theft; Boko Haram cross-border

Gender Based Violence attacks and raids; drug abuse; cross-border smuggling; gender- Nigeria, 3.8 based violence; prostitution; and Niger, 8.5 kidnapping, forced recruitment Chad, 3.7 and forced marriage by Boko

Personal Safety Personal Cameroon, 7.0 Haram. Criminality in the Lake Chad Basin is facilitated by the region’s Results of the RRVA Index in the area of Crime & Criminality. Low scores indicate greater porous borders, as well as a vulnerability, while high scores indicate greater resilience. Scores reflect the entire proliferation of small arms and country, not just the areas in the Lake Chad Basin. light weapons (SALW).

The vulnerability of youth to radicalization and recruitment by Boko Haram is also an ongoing concern, particularly given the region’s high rates of poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment. However, individuals interviewed in the field highlighted the role of NGOs, governments, and religious and traditional leaders in carrying out deradicalization and sensitization campaigns. These campaigns, in combination with a growing societal awareness of the violence and negative impacts of Boko Haram’s tactics, have reportedly served as an effective deterrent to youth radicalization in some areas.

Refugee and IDP communities in the Lake Chad Basin are particularly at risk of experiencing elevated rates of criminality, given the overcrowding and lack of livelihoods in many of the camps. Reported incidents have ranged from cases of petty theft to rape perpetrated by security forces. Women and girls living in refugee and IDP camps are particularly at risk of violence, given their economic and social vulnerability.

64 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Cameroon Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • High rates of poverty and youth unemployment • Established networks for arms trafficking within the West Africa region

Event-Driven Risks

• Cross-border attacks and raids by Boko Haram • Incidents of drug trafficking and abuse • Incidents of prostitution • Incidents of human trafficking, forced recruitment and forced marriage • Youth radicalization Resilience Factors

• Presence of security forces • Initiatives to limit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

The primary concerns expressed by fieldwork participants in Cameroon in the area of Crime and Criminality were cross-border attacks and cattle raids perpetrated by Boko Haram, as well as cases of drug trafficking, drug abuse and prostitution. Interviewees noted that both drug trafficking and cross-border Boko Haram activities (which reportedly originate in Nigeria) are facilitated by the region’s porous borders. However, there was a general sentiment expressed that the ongoing presence of Cameroonian security forces in the Far North region has improved security and resulted in decreasing levels of crime.

Fieldwork participants reported that cases of drug use primarily occur among youth and involve marijuana or abuse of pain relievers such as Tramadol and Tramol. Several interviewees attributed cases of drug use to the Far North region’s high rates of poverty and youth unemployment. Similarly, cases of prostitution were viewed as being driven by poverty.

Interviewees during the RRVA did not directly mention human trafficking as a concern; however, Cameroon is a source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking.155 Importantly, the large number of refugees and IDPs in the Far North region are particularly at risk of trafficking due to their social and economic vulnerability. Boko Haram also continues to kidnap both male and female civilians, either for ransom, forced recruitment or forced marriage. Participants in the Women’s FGD in Fotokol noted that due to poor living conditions and the lack of livelihoods in the IDP camps in Fotokol, some IDPs also willingly choose to return to their homes in Boko Haram-controlled areas, which increases the risk of forced recruitment for those individuals.

155 U.S. Department of State https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282800.pdf

65 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

While youth radicalization was not viewed as a pressing concern by fieldwork participants from Cameroon, several interviewees did note that continued unemployment and poverty could make youths susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram.

Arms proliferation and trafficking was not considered to be a major concern among fieldwork participants in the Far North region. However, there is evidence that Boko Haram has been able to establish supply lines to obtain and smuggle weapons from northern Cameroon into Nigeria. In 2014, a number of government officials in Fotokol were arrested on suspicion of supplying Boko Haram with arms.156 Cameroonian security forces have also arrested arms smugglers suspected of arming Boko Haram with weapons from the Central African Republic,157 Niger,158 Chad, and Libya.159 In addition, Boko Haram is able to obtain lower-end weapons from the “saturated post-conflict markets” for illicit firearms across West Africa.160 Given the ongoing crisis in the Far North region, as well as insecurity in the Northwest and Southwest regions, the Cameroon government has taken steps in recent years to limit the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the country. In 2016, Cameroon passed a law making the unlawful possession of a firearm punishable by a prison term and a fine,161 and in April 2018, the government banned the sale of arms and ammunition in six regions in the south and center of the country.162 In August 2018, Cameroonian president Paul Biya signed a decree to ratify a cooperation agreement on small arms non-proliferation between Cameroon and Nigeria.163

Chad Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • Poor road infrastructure • High rates of poverty and youth unemployment • Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Event-Driven Risks

• Incidents of theft and armed banditry • Cross-border attacks and raids by Boko Haram • Incidents of drug trafficking and abuse • Incidents of cross-border smuggling

156 The Jamestown Foundation https://jamestown.org/program/boko-harams-backyard-ongoing-battle-cameroon/ 157 The New Humanitarian https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/arms-smuggling-boko-haram-threatens-cameroon 158 Open Briefing https://www.openbriefing.org/docs/Reducing-the-supply-of-weapons-to-Boko-Haram.pdf 159 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point https://ctc.usma.edu/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake- chad-region/ 160 Open Briefing https://www.openbriefing.org/docs/Reducing-the-supply-of-weapons-to-Boko-Haram.pdf 161 Voice of America https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-batting-insurgencies-cracks-down-on-illegal-weapons/4382858.html 162 AfricaNews https://www.africanews.com/2018/04/06/cameroon-bans-the-sale-of-arms-and-ammunition-in-six-regions// 163 Enact https://enactafrica.org/research/trend-reports/cameroon-and-nigeria-renew-cooperation-to-fight-arms-proliferation

66 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

• Youth radicalization • Incidents of human trafficking, forced recruitment and forced marriage • Incidents of gender-based violence and rape Resilience Factors

• Initiatives to limit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Among fieldwork participants from Chad, the primary concerns in the area of Crime and Criminality were theft and armed banditry, as well as cases of drug abuse, cross-border smuggling, and gender-based violence. Interviewees noted that incidents of theft are particularly pronounced in the islands surrounding Lake Chad and are facilitated by the poor state of the region’s road infrastructure and porous borders. Boko Haram has also been implicated in incidents of cross-border livestock thefts, and interviewees reported that this is now a key source of financing for the group.

Drug abuse in the Lac region consists primarily of abuse of pain relievers such as Tramol and Tramadol, and trafficking occurs between Nigeria and Chad. Drug trafficking and abuse is reportedly most common among youth, and fieldwork participants expressed that this has contributed to a rise in criminality and delinquency. In addition to drug trafficking, there are reportedly cases of cross-border smuggling of goods between Chad and Niger or Nigeria, facilitated by the region’s porous borders.

Interviewees expressed concern around the risk of youth radicalization due to the Lac region’s high rates of poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment. Boko Haram has historically attracted recruits by offering money, status symbols or goods such as motorcycles, and local residents fear that Chadian youth could be susceptible to these offerings.

Fieldwork participants also reported previous cases of human trafficking, primarily for child labor, from the Lac region to N’Djamena or parts of northern Chad near the Libyan border. Most often these cases are driven by extreme poverty, and involve children being sent away by their parents for education, apprenticeships or money and being subjected to forced labor such as herding or domestic service.164 In the Lac region, the economic and social vulnerability of refugees and IDPs makes these populations particularly at risk of trafficking. As in other countries in the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram has also historically kidnapped both male and female civilians for ransom, forced recruitment or forced marriage.165

Gender-based violence (GBV) and rape are ongoing concerns in the region, and fieldwork participants reported incidents of rape committed by both civilians and security forces. Interviewees in the Women’s FGD in Bol stated, “Sometimes, some of the military sent to protect us or secure the area also abuse their power or authority by raping some women.” According to interviewees, refugee and IDP women are particularly at risk of GBV.

164 U.S. Department of State https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282800.pdf 165 Center on Sanctions & Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies https://s3.us-east- 2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/CSIF_Boko_Haram.pdf

67 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Finally, fieldwork participants noted concerns around the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Northern Chad played a key role in transiting looted weapons from Libya in 2011 and 2012,166 and there is evidence that weapons flows in Chad (including arms from Libya) have supplied Boko Haram.167 Fieldwork participants also noted that arms proliferation in the region is exacerbated by herder-farmer tensions and conflicts among ethnic groups. The Government of Chad has taken some steps to curb the proliferation of SALW in the region, including a U.S. government-funded project to secure weapons storage facilities.168 In 2015, the government also ratified the UN Arms Trade Treaty, which aims to curb illicit weapons trade.169

Niger Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • High rates of poverty and youth unemployment • Lack of livelihoods among refugee and IDP populations • Proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)

Event-Driven Risks

• Incidents of theft and armed banditry • Cross-border attacks and raids by Boko Haram • Incidents of drug abuse • Incidents of cross-border smuggling • Youth radicalization • Incidents of gender-based violence and rape • Incidents of prostitution • Incidents of kidnapping, forced recruitment and forced marriage Resilience Factors

• Deradicalization and awareness-raising campaigns by government, NGOs and religious leaders • Youth engagement programs implemented by government • Sensitization campaign in IDP camps to prevent gender-based violence and rape

166 National Defense University https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1171858/brothers-came-back-with-weapons-the-effects-of-arms- proliferation-from-libya/ 167 Combating Terrorism Center https://ctc.usma.edu/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region/ 168 U.S. Department of State https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2019/01/30/en/us-conventional-weapons-destruction-program-counters-illicit- arms-trafficking 169 United Nations http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/s/chad

68 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

In the area of Crime and Criminality, fieldwork participants from the Diffa region highlighted concerns around theft and armed banditry, drug abuse, gender-based violence, and cross-border smuggling. Interviewees reported that incidents of armed banditry, petty theft and livestock theft of cows and donkeys are common, particularly in IDP communities, and have increased since the start of the Boko Haram crisis due to rising unemployment, poverty, and overcrowding. As one IDP from Bosso stated, “Before, [we] could leave bikes outside with the ignition on and no one will steal it. But today they break into homes to steal mobile phones because they can easily sell it and make some money.” Stolen cows and donkeys are most often taken across the border to Nigeria for sale. Boko Haram also carries out cross-border attacks and livestock thefts in the Diffa region, providing the group with a key source of financing.

Drug use among youth is also a concern, particularly marijuana and abuse of medication or pain relievers such as Tramadol and Diazepam. Fieldwork participants reported that drug abuse among youth contributes to criminality and sexual violence in the region, and that drugs are routinely used by Boko Haram fighters and armed bandits while carrying out attacks. While many interviewees attributed cases of drug abuse to high rates of poverty and youth unemployment, one women’s leader from Diffa also noted that drug use is often driven by a desire to forget for a population that has been severely traumatized by insecurity.

Given the region’s porous borders and proximity to both Nigeria and Chad, fieldwork participants in the Diffa region identified cases of cross-border smuggling, including of petrol and fish. In Bosso in particular, interviewees reported that smuggling of fish from Lake Chad into Nigeria – which violates bans on fishing put in place by the security forces – is rampant. Petrol is also reportedly smuggled into Niger from Nigeria, where petrol is less expensive.

Radicalization of youth by Boko Haram is also a potential concern due to poverty and a lack of livelihoods, which makes youth susceptible to manipulation. Boko Haram has historically encouraged recruitment by offering money, status symbols or goods such as motorcycles, or promising to marry off women to their fighters. Interviewees expressed concern that the economic decline caused by the insecurity and restrictions on livelihoods such as motorcycle taxis and farming could make youth, particularly less-educated youth in rural areas, more susceptible to radicalization. While Boko Haram no longer preaches publicly, a youth leader in N’guigmi noted that Boko Haram still “has relays in society” and that videos and propaganda materials are clandestinely shared between youth. However, it was also highlighted that the population is increasingly aware of Boko Haram’s recruitment tactics due to awareness-raising campaigns by NGOs, government and religious leaders, which have contributed to a decline in radicalization. A businessman from Diffa also pointed to a government program which engages youth to complete “[There is] poverty, a lack of community service projects as an example of effective activities for youth, so they are easily recruited by terrorists. Youth programming. He explained, “Youth are mostly unemployed and no longer do kabou-kabou (moto don’t have much to do in the community. There is a government taxis). They can no longer circulate program to engage the youth to do community service for a because of measures taken for token and this keeps them engaged. Most of them farm pepper security.” and the period after planting when they are less busy is when this program is implemented.” Key Informant Interview, Diffa

Incidents of GBV and rape are also reportedly common in the Diffa region, both in IDP camps and in host communities.

69 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Fieldwork participants particularly noted incidents of rape perpetrated by Nigerien security forces. As participants in the Men’s FGD in Diffa recounted, “If a soldier likes a lady, he goes into her house, drags her out and rapes her. There are also cases of soldiers going into homes to drag out married women and rape them. If the husband says anything, they will threaten to shoot him.” Prostitution, including of young girls, is also reportedly common in the IDP camps, and hawkers are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse. Interviewees reported that there is often little recourse for cases of sexual violence. Men from Diffa noted that “when [cases of rape by soldiers] are reported to the commander, they only say that they will handle it, but nothing will be done.” However, one IDP from N’guigmi did cite a sensitization program implemented by the NGO CARE with boys in IDP camps as an effective tool for reducing cases of rape.

Kidnapping and subsequent forced recruitment of boys and forced marriage of girls by Boko Haram is also a concern in the Diffa region. Fieldwork participants reported that Boko Haram fighters in the region kidnap women and girls both for ransom and for forced marriage. Those women and girls who do not make ransom are either killed or are forced to marry a Boko Haram fighter.

Many fieldwork respondents felt that criminality in the Diffa region is exacerbated by the proliferation and circulation of arms. As one religious leader from Bosso stated, “Thieves are more and more armed, which was not the case before. The population has picked up weapons. Children [have been] injured by grenades with which they played.” Niger has long been a transit point in regional networks of arms trafficking, including from Libya, Chad, Nigeria, and Mali.170 With the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency, however, there is now a greater domestic demand for weapons. While many of Boko Haram’s weapons are acquired through raids on Nigerien and Nigerian military operations, there have also been cases of Nigerien soldiers providing government weapons to the group, and of Boko Haram purchasing weapons on the black market.171 In addition, many hunters and herding communities in Niger are armed, which contributes to the proliferation of weapons in the Diffa region.

Nigeria Structural Vulnerabilities

• Porous borders • High rates of poverty and youth unemployment • Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) • Lack of livelihoods among refugee and IDP populations

Event-Driven Risks

• Incidents of theft and armed robbery • Cross-border attacks and raids by Boko Haram

170 Small Arms Survey http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf 171 Ibid.

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• Incidents of cross-border smuggling • Incidents of drug abuse • Incidents of prostitution • Youth radicalization • Incidents of gender-based violence and rape • Incidents of kidnapping, forced recruitment and forced marriage • Tensions between security forces and local populations Resilience Factors

• Checkpoints by National Drug Law and Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and security forces • Deradicalization and awareness-raising campaigns by government, NGOs and religious leaders

Key concerns in the area of Crime & Criminality identified by fieldwork participants from Borno state included petty theft, livestock theft, and armed banditry, as well as cross-border smuggling, gender-based violence (GBV), prostitution, drug use and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). In the northern part of the state, such as Abadam Local Government Area (LGA), interviewees reported that thieves often cross the border into Nigeria from Niger, while in eastern LGAs such as Kukawa and Ngala, thieves reportedly come from Cameroon and Chad. While the issue of theft and robbery pre-dates the Boko Haram insurgency, many interviewees expressed the view that criminality has increased due to the region’s insecurity and economic decline. Boko Haram is also frequently implicated in cases of cross-border cattle rustling and smuggling.

Community members from Kukawa also cited cases of cross-border smuggling of petrol, drugs and weapons, particularly across the border with Cameroon. One community leader noted that this trafficking can contribute to tensions between local populations and security forces because “the security are always blaming or accusing the community for not giving them enough information for tracking down these culprits.”

Drug use among youth, particularly smoking marijuana, huffing chemical or rubber solutions (including one known as “sholisho”) and the abuse of pain relievers such as Tramadol, is also a concern according to fieldwork participants. Several interviewees also implicated Nigerian security forces in drug abuse and trafficking. Men in one FGD from Gamboru noted that soldiers will at times traffic drugs across the border with Cameroon, while a community leader from Abadam living in Maiduguri stated that soldiers on leave in Maiduguri’s Baga Road neighborhood will frequently engage in drinking, drug use, and prostitution. However, despite these concerns several interviewees did give credit to the positive role played by security forces and law enforcement, including the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), in maintaining checkpoints at border crossings and outside of IDP camps to restrict the flow of drugs.

Proliferation of weapons within Borno State is another concern, and some fieldwork participants reported that the number of weapons circulating has increased since the start of the Boko Haram insurgency. Two interviewees from Monguno and Ngala reported that there are flows of weapons coming into the country from Chad and

71 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Cameroon. However, evidence shows that the vast majority of weapons used by Boko Haram are stolen from Nigerian and Nigerien military stockpiles.172

Fieldwork participants reported that the overall rate of youth radicalization and voluntary recruitment to Boko Haram has dropped in recent years, due in part to deradicalization efforts and sensitization campaigns by NGOs, traditional rulers and religious leaders. However, concerns still remain around the vulnerability of marginalized youth due to the state’s high rates of poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment. One community leader from Monguno reported that almajiri (Islamic students) in his town have been a “soft target” for Boko Haram recruitment. Despite this risk, however, today, Boko Haram primarily recruits through kidnapping and forced recruitment. Kidnapping and forced marriage by Boko Haram fighters is also a risk particularly facing women and girls in Borno state.

Interviewees noted that IDP camps face high rates of theft and criminality, prostitution and sexual violence. As members of the Women’s FGD from Ngala described, “There are many children under the age of 15 in the IDP camps, and because they don’t have anything to do, many of them have adopted criminal tendencies. They can’t be controlled by the government or parents. Things have gotten to the point where NGOs will give food aid and the children will steal it to buy drugs, candy, or other small treats.” Young girls under the age of 15, orphans, and widows are also reportedly involved in prostitution, which opens up these economically vulnerable women and girls to sexual violence and adverse health effects.

Recommendations Cameroon

172 UNODC https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Simonetta-UNODC-at-CTED_May2017v2.pdf

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Chad

• Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to address larger regional trends of insecurity and trafficking networks, including strengthening border controls. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of crime and criminality for a timely response • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs, alternative livelihood measures, and behavioral intervention efforts, for economically insecure populations, including at risk youth. • Promote awareness-raising activities around domestic and sexual violence. • Address infrastructural deficiencies such as poor roads that foster the cycle of crime and criminality. • Advance psychosocial practices, particularly for traumatized populations dealing with the negative impacts of conflict, displacement, and trauma. Niger

• Equip and train security forces and vigilante groups on operational best practices and human rights standards. • Promote awareness-raising activities around domestic, sexual, and gender-based violence. • Develop and implement recourse measures for victims of sexual assault. • Invest in awareness-raising campaigns, led NGOs, the government, and religious leaders, to inform at risk populations about Boko Haram recruitment strategies and expand skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures. • Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to address larger regional trends of insecurity and trafficking networks, including strengthening border controls. • Advance psychosocial practices, particularly for traumatized populations dealing with the negative impacts of conflict, displacement, and trauma. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of crime and criminality for a timely response

Nigeria

• Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to address larger regional trends of insecurity and trafficking networks, including strengthening border controls and reviewing security protocols on military stockpiles. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of crime and criminality for a timely response • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures for economically insecure populations, including at risk youth. • Equip and train security forces and vigilante groups on operational best practices and human rights standards. • Promote awareness-raising activities around domestic and sexual violence.

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Environment

74 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Environment in the Lake Chad Basin

RRVA fieldwork in the Lake Nigeria Chad Basin found that the Niger Chad primary challenges in the area

Protection Cameroon of Environment are poor Environmental Biodiversity andBiodiversity waste management and Nigeria sanitation processes; an Niger increase in the Chad

Pressures concentration of Population Cameroon populations due to an influx

Nigeria of refugees and IDPs; Niger environmentally Chad destructive cultural and

Resources Cameroon

Air andAir Water economic practices, such as the felling of wood for charcoal Nigeria and the use of pesticides; and Niger Chad climate insecurity and Cameroon natural disasters, specifically

Natural Disasters Natural rain variability, rising temperatures, seasonal flooding, and wind erosion. The shrinking of the Lake, once the sixth largest lake in the world173, primarily due to climate change, climate variability, harmful human practices like damming and water diversion was a widespread concern.

As the environment and the economy are inextricably linked, fieldwork participants outlined the adverse impacts of human-induced and climate-driven environmental degradation on the area’s undiversified economy. Reports of low agricultural output; a depletion in fish stocks, which have contributed to food insecurity and economic insecurity; as well as the limited availability of fertile land for cultivation and grazing, which has heightened farmer- herder tensions, were prevalent.

Perceptions about the relationship between the Boko Haram insurgency and the environment were twofold, with respondents characterizing it as both a driver and a beneficiary of the Lake Chad Basin’s poor environmental quality.

Fieldwork participants in all countries mentioned the presence of several resilience measures, which take the form of international organizations, NGOs, and governmental programs. Many of these resiliencies look to address the impact that environmental challenges have on food insecurity through food and aid distribution projects. Conservation and reforestation initiatives led by national, regional, continental and international bodies were also

173 Gao, Huilin & Bohn, Theodore & Podest, E & Mcdonald, Kyle & P Lettenmaier, D. (2011). On the causes of the shrinking of Lake Chad. Environmental Research Letters. 6. 034021. 10.1088/1748-9326/6/3/034021.

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highlighted. The Great Green Wall initiative, an African-led plan to grow an 8,000 km wall of vegetation along the width of Africa, was mentioned by interviewees in multiple countries as a potential resiliency against environmental degradation.174 Cameroon Structural Vulnerabilities

• Climate variability, specifically variations in rainfall patterns and rising temperatures • Poor waste disposal practices • Damming and river diversion programs • Reliance on environmentally destructive agricultural practices such as the use of pesticides and fertilizers • Perceived lack of adequate environmentally friendly policies

Event-Driven Risks

• Effects of climate change, including the shrinking Lake and food and water insecurity

Resilience Factors

• Great Green Wall initiative • Food aid programs by NGOs and humanitarian organizations

Across the hotspot areas in Cameroon, the primary environmental issue of concern centered around the shrinking Lake. Once the sixth largest lake in the world,175 Lake Chad, has shrunk by 90 percent176 over the last 60 years due to an interplay between climate variability, climate change, and human activities. Variations in “During the raining season, rainfall patterns, rising temperature, climate-induced drought and the Chari and Logone rivers desertification, as well as damming and water diversion activities were sent water that feeds all of us. cited as contributors to the scarcity in freshwater and the contraction Now rain is scarce, and we are of the lake’s surface area, which is reported to have reduced from all suffering from it.” 26,000 square kilometers in 1963 to approximately 1,500 square Focus Group Discussion, kilometers in recent years.177 In particular, respondents from Fotokol Fotokol highlighted the Maga Dam, which was constructed in 1979 as a measure against food insecurity and a means to improve rice cultivation in northern Cameroon, as reducing inflow to the Lake. One key

174 Great Green Wall https://www.greatgreenwall.org/about-great-green-wall 175 Gao, Huilin & Bohn, Theodore & Podest, E & Mcdonald, Kyle & P Lettenmaier, D. (2011). On the causes of the shrinking of Lake Chad. Environmental Research Letters. 6. 034021. 10.1088/1748-9326/6/3/034021. 176 United Nations Environment Programme https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/tale-disappearing-lake 177 Ibid.

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informant interviewee described how seasonal floods from the El Beid and Chari-Logone river systems, the latter of which accounts for approximately 80 percent of the Lake’s inflow,178 no longer contributed substantially to the Lake’s water supply due to the water diversion dikes of the Maga Dam.

The nexus between the environmental threats posed by the shrinking Lake and the socio-economic livelihood of residents in Lake Chad was also cited as a challenge. The shortage in freshwater and the accompanying desertification of the surrounding area, destructive to the ecosystem, has adversely impacted the region’s key economic activities, primarily the fisheries industry, which has seen a depletion in fish stocks. In addition, longstanding social tensions, driven by resource competition, have been exacerbated, specifically those between farmers and herders. Given the limited availability of grazing land as a result of desertification around the Lake, herders have increasingly disregarded transhumance routes for farms, resulting in tensions with farmers. However, in Hile-Alifa, participants cited the relationships and shared histories between veteran farmers and herders as sources of conflict mitigation.

General trends of climate change and environmental degradation identified by Cameroonian interviewees as additional threats include deforestation, wind erosion, bush burning, poor waste “Now we cannot go to our farms disposal mechanisms, the use of pesticides and fertilizers, and that are far away from our water scarcity stemming from irregular rains and irresponsible settlement due to insecurity and irrigation practices. As with the shrinking Lake, these trends of the fear of being killed by Boko climate insecurity and land degradation have proven destabilizing Haram. In the last five years, I to the region’s undiversified economy, resulting in low agricultural have not visited my farm located yields and food insecurity. 4-5 km from Fotokol.”

Fieldwork respondents also expressed concern about the role of Key Informant Interview, climate change in fostering the cycle of the Boko Haram-led Fotokol insecurity, which in turn has contributed to the area’s acute economic challenges. As one respondent stated, “The drying of the Lake provides chances to Boko Haram to operate easily because of the available dry space and gives them the opportunity to ride bikes. If there is water available, the insurgency or Boko Haram will not be able to ride bikes across the space.” Although Cameroonian residents around the Lake have resorted to alternative economic practices to alleviate the economic pressures associated with the shrinking Lake, respondents noted that the restriction of movement, due to insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, as well as the imposition of taxes and incidents of thefts and killings by Boko Haram have undermined the viability of these options.

Discussions about resilience measures that counter the risks and vulnerabilities listed above prioritized food security, with respondents highlighting the food aid programs of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross, Food Aid, and the World Food Program (WFP). However, some participants noted that the irregular distribution of food aid has been detrimental to the effectiveness of such programs. Responses about resiliencies dedicated specifically to environmental concerns were few, with some participants identifying the Great Green Wall initiative.179 Perceptions about the role of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in addressing the environmental threats to the region were largely negative. In particular,

178 Dow To Earth https://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/water/lake-chad-forgotten-crisis-56974 179 The Great Green Wall initiative, launched by the African Union, aims to restore the continent’s degraded landscape.

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interviewees cited the lack of adequate policies and the inability of the commission to enforce and implement policies under its mandate.

Chad Structural Vulnerabilities

• Climate insecurity, specifically wind erosion, variations in rainfall patterns and seasonal flooding • Poor waste disposal practices • Environmentally destructive cultural, agricultural, and mining activities

Event-Driven Risks

• Effects of climate change, including the shrinking Lake • Influx of refugees and IDPs

Resilience Factors

• Government-led wildlife conservation programs • Great Green Wall initiative • The proposed multilateral Interbasin Water Transfer Project (IBWTP), • Reforestation activities led by INGOs and NGOs

Discussions about environmental vulnerabilities emphasized the relationship between the environment and the economy, with RRVA participants noting that the environment simultaneously provides resources to the economy and, to its detriment, absorbs the waste and pollution generated from economic activities. As such, fieldwork respondents cited the use of pesticides and fertilizers to increase agricultural productivity, wood cutting for the production of charcoal, overgrazing, siltation, and bush burning for planting activities as key agents of environmental degradation, increasing the rate of nutrient loss as well as the susceptibility of the land to the effects of climate change. Another economic activity identified as a driver of environmental degradation was mining, specifically mining activities related to salt, algae, spirulina, and natron.180 For Chadian interviewees, particularly those from Baga Sola, the environmental risks associated with natron mining have in turn impacted staple economic activities, particularly agriculture. As one respondent stated, “Its exploitation aids in the destruction of agricultural practices and the denaturing of the quality of water.” Another expressed, “The mining of natron pollutes water and destroys arable land for farming.”

180 Natron is the only mineral exported from Chad.

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Concerns about the role of human activities in fostering the rapid decline of the region’s environmental quality extended to the country’s waste management and sanitation culture, with RRVA respondents showing mixed perceptions about the presence of waste management protocols. While some fieldwork participants reported the existence of a ban and campaign on open defecation, which is practiced by 68 percent of the population,181 the presence of designated refuse dumps, and the construction of toilets for poor neighborhoods as notable progress, others highlighted the dumping of plastic waste into water bodies and a general lack of developmental and waste management processes as evidence to the contrary. For youth respondents from Baga Sola, the lack of developmental planning is increasingly worrying, given the influx of refugees and IDPs to the “As the Lake is drying, it is town. difficult to till the land Also of concern to Chadian RRVA respondents were environmental because the land becomes risks posed by climate change. Drought; erosion; seasonal flooding, harder to cultivate. As a result, the prices of foodstuff which has destroyed polders; irregular rainfall; desertification, increase.” attributed to the advance of the Sahara Desert; rising temperatures; soil deposition in water bodies and farmlands due to wind erosion; and the Focus Group Discussion, shrinking of the Lake, attributed to deforestation and rainfall variability, Bol were identified as key environmental vulnerabilities. As with the human- induced environmental threats described above, interviewees emphasized the role of climate-driven environmental degradation in undermining economic, financial, and food security.

While a few respondents, citing the availability of more land for farming and pastoralism, held that the drying of the Lake was beneficial, a majority of RRVA interviewees noted otherwise. Specifically, they relayed how the drying of the Lake has been detrimental to the ecosystem and biodiversity, rendered land untillable, reduced activities relating to wetland farming, forced fishermen to fish far beyond the shoreline, and limited access to markets. One youth respondent, reflecting on the inability of traders to access markets by boats expressed, “The decrease of the Lake has numerous consequences on the life of the people of Bol. It is currently difficult to leave Bol to reach daily markets.” Participants also spoke of the how the degradation of the Lake has contributed to the heightening of social tensions. One traditional leader from Bol recounted how the creation of islands, due to the shrinkage, has resulted in land tenure issues among inhabitants. Another, referencing the case of the Boudouma-Kanambou, detailed how intractable inter-communal conflicts have become frequent due to increased competition over pastures.

Addressing the complex relationship between the Boko Haram insurgency and the environment, participants maintained that the climate of insecurity, specifically the nature of the conflict and its accompanying influx of refugees and IDPS, functions as a central driver of the region’s poor environmental quality. As one respondent from the Youth FGD stated, “The Lake environment has deteriorated considerably because of the fact that it is the center of the clashes with the Boko Haram State.”

181 Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: 2017 Update and SDG Baselines”. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 2017

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Despite the risks and vulnerabilities highlighted by fieldwork participants, Chad has various resilience factors that continue to mitigate these challenges. Across the various hotspots, respondents repeatedly cited resilience measures that accounted for the inextricable link between the environment and the economy. National agencies that work to address the challenges in the region were identified. The proposed multilateral Interbasin Water Transfer Project (IBWTP), which aims to divert water from the Congo River Basin to the Lake, was presented as an additional measure of resilience.182 However, feelings about the effectiveness of the plan were mixed, with interviewees raising concerns about the possibility of displacement and land-based and resource conflicts. Finally, respondents noted the reforestation and environment improvement initiatives of INGOs and NGOs like UNICEF, OCHA, UNDP, and Save Lake Chad. The African-led Great Green Wall initiative, which aims to grow an “8,000- kilometer natural wonder of the world across the entire width of Africa,” was also identified.183

Niger Structural Vulnerabilities

• Environmentally destructive cultural and economic practices • Climate change, seasonal flooding and rain variability • Poor waste management protocols and ad hoc sanitation policies

Event-Driven Risks

• Effects of climate change • Natural disasters, particularly flooding and locust infestation

Resilience Factors

• Food aid and skills acquisition programs • Regulation on natural resource management and environmentally destructive practices • Seasonal flooding

Echoing similar sentiments as those expressed in the other countries of interest, Nigerien respondents underscored the importance of human activities, climate pressures, and natural disasters in contributing to the environmental vulnerabilities in the LCB region.

Human activities identified as notable drivers of environmental degradation include the cultural practices of bush burning; forest fires due to smoking; wood cutting for charcoal, described as an enterprise dominated by refugees and IDPs; poor waste management systems, driven by ad hoc sanitation policies; and exploitative economic endeavors, particularly those of the extractives sector. Since the 2011 commencement of oil production by the

182 La Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad https://www.cblt.org/fr/projets/projet-de-transfert-deau-interbassin 183 Great Green Wall https://www.greatgreenwall.org/about-great-green-wall

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China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in the Agadem Oilfield, continued discoveries of oil reserves in the Agadem bloc has positioned Niger’s nascent petroleum sector at the forefront of the petroleum industry, increasing expectations about the sector’s contribution to economic growth and vibrancy, and to infrastructural development.184 However, for fieldwork participants, mainly those from Diffa, thus far, oil production has yielded very little dividend, and has instead maintained the region’s economic and infrastructural status quo all while heightening environmental difficulties. In addition to ineffective resource distribution provisions, interviewees cited instances of pipeline leakages on traditional farmland and herding land, as well as the non-treatment of chemical waste from petrol companies. They further detailed how extraction processes have led to health problems and rendered the land infertile, thereby limiting the availability of grazing areas. During one KII, an interviewee recounted how as a result of exploration activities, an individual had developed a swollen stomach and decreased urine output. Although N’guigmi respondents acknowledged the existence of the country’s petroleum sector, they held that the lengthy distance between their location and the site of extraction activities had protected them from the experiences described by their Diffa counterparts.

Whereas attitudes about the role of cultural practices in triggering environmental issues were identical, perceptions about agricultural activities as critical drivers of environmental degradation were mixed. While a few RRVA interviewees, referencing how non-fallow “The Government’s laws now say that villagers can no longer go beyond agricultural processes had undermined the vitality of the land and 10km from the village. The fertile hindered off-season cultivation, maintained that agricultural activities lands are about 30km away from the were key to the region’s environmental vulnerabilities, a majority of village close to Lake Chad. This is not fieldwork respondents indicated otherwise. For these respondents, the satisfactory to the community. This is pervasive climate of insecurity, coupled with counterinsurgency affecting food security in the village and has affected our way of life.” measures and the restriction of movement by the government, has crippled agricultural enterprise and output, thereby limiting its impact Key Informant Interview, on the environment. N’guigmi

Other environmental challenges highlighted during the fieldwork were locust infestation; irregular rainfall, which has heightened pre-existing challenges around access to water; and shrinking Lake, also attributed to rain variability as well as the advance of the Sahara Desert.

Although some interviewees, presenting examples of damaged farmlands, cited seasonal flooding as a source of environmental risks, others, particularly respondents from N’guigmi and those familiar with the northern basin, characterized it as a positive occurrence that has helped ease the pressures associated with climate-driven economic and food insecurity. One participant, stating that inhabitants take advantage of both rainy season and recessional farming, explained how farmers, after preparing the land before inundation, plant crops once flood waters have receded.

While these environmental risks, along with their accompanying economic and food insecurities, have hindered the stability and livelihoods of inhabitants in the area, respondents highlighted several resilience measures. NGOs, aid institutions, and developmental and humanitarian organizations like the WFP and Veinde Nur were

184 United Press International https://www.upi.com/Energy-News/2018/08/08/Niger-looks-to-capitalize-on-oil-wealth/4371533731151/

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acknowledged for their food distribution programs, while Caritas was noted for its skills acquisition programs. Specifically, a respondent from Diffa described how as a result of Caritas’s dynamic skills acquisition program on animal husbandry, which teaches beneficiaries about the importance of rearing and planting during the rainy season, cattle rearers have been able to cope with the dry season’s limited availability of grazing areas by feeding their animals the plants cultivated during the wet season. State-led efforts such as legislation regarding the management of natural resources and the enforcement of anti-deforestation regulations were cited. However, according to fieldwork participants, the lack of popular awareness about the content of such regulations and the reported lack of water-specific legislations undermine the effectiveness of such governmental initiatives.

Nigeria Structural Vulnerabilities

• Environmentally destructive cultural and economic practices • Climate change, including wind erosion, inconsistent rainy seasons

Event-Driven Risks

• Effects of climate change, including the shrinking Lake • Influx of IDPs and refugees

Resilience Factors

• Aid programs

The primary issue of concern to emerge during discussions surrounding environmental vulnerabilities was the continued shrinking of Lake Chad. Participants focused primarily on the economic impacts of the shrinking Lake, the surface area of which has shrunk by more than 90 percent since 1963.185 Inconsistent rainy seasons, frequent droughts, and damming were all cited as factors contributing to the shrinking Lake. Nigerian “We do more planting now interviewees also expressed concern about the environmental issues because the water has receded. of desertification, access to drinking water, lower river flows, wind In the past it was mainly erosion, bush burning, and the use of chemical fertilizers. In addition fishing. And we had more fish to the economic impacts of environmental degradation, interviewees in the past. But now we don’t highlighted the role that Boko Haram has played in exacerbating get enough fish as before.” environmental conditions and worsening the impacts of environmental decay. Key Informant Interview, Baga The relationship between the environmental threats, notably, the shrinking Lake and decreased river flow, and the socio-economic

185 Bishop, Russell. “Confronting Climate Change: Africa’s leadership on an increasingly urgent issue”. Brookings Institution. January 9, 2017.

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livelihood of interviewees was cited as a challenge. Curtailed access to fresh water has hampered the ability of individuals to pursue economic activities such as fishing and farming. Specifically, interviewees reported how as a result of the shrinking Lake, residents have been forced to travel further to access fishing areas on the Lake, with one participant saying, “Before, it was 1km from Lake Chad, but now we travel 20km to Lake Chad”. The receding waters of Lake Chad also impacts the ability of farmers to irrigate crops. There is concern that farmers are increasingly unable to rely on recessional farming, the practice of irrigating fields through the seasonal flooding of the Lake.

Additionally, increasingly low river flows were a concern amongst interviewees. Individuals expressed considerable concern about the damming of the Yobe River, whose flow has decreased by 35 percent in the last three decades due in large part to the construction of dams upstream.186 The decrease in river flow contributes to the shrinking of Lake Chad, but also adds to the economic impacts of environmental changes. As one interviewee stated, “Before now, we used boats to move around the town and to the neighboring area. Now the river is almost gone.”

Individuals also highlighted the role that insecurity has played in worsening the socio-economic impacts of environmental degradation. Interviewees “As for me, the explained that the insurgency prevents them from accessing fishing grounds consequence is not being and fertile land, which are now further away due to the shrinking of Lake able to farm, fish or herd Chad. our cattle.” Boko Haram’s activities create a feedback loop whereby the presence of Key Informant the insurgency creates conditions that worsen the environmental Interview, Ngala degradation, thereby feeding back into the adverse conditions that facilitate the group’s activities and recruitment.

According to KIIs and FGDs, IDPs are especially reliant on wood as a source of fuel and to build shelters. High demand has further contributed to deforestation in the region, which interviewees say also suffers from the agriculture-driven practice of bush burning. Respondents to the Women’s FGD in Abadam stated that they are unable to access firewood because, due to deforestation, they are now required to walk further for wood, compelling them to venture into areas controlled by Boko Haram. However, they did state that Fulani traders have begun bringing firewood for sale, which alleviates some of the pressure for those who can afford to purchase the fuel.

Interviewees discussed the presence of several NGOs that provide aid to offset the vulnerabilities, mainly focused on food insecurity. Several participants mentioned state-led programs, specifically the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) as a provider of food, water, and medicine, especially providing aid within IDP camps. However, other participants, citing episodes of institutional corruption,187 questioned the effectiveness of NEMA and local leaders at providing aid efficiently and fairly.

186 Barchiesi, Stefano. “Water and Nature Initiative Case Study Komadugu Yobe Basin, Upstream of Lake Chad, Nigeria”. International Union for Conservation of Nature. 2016. https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/2011-097.pdf 187 Brechenmacher, Saskia. “Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042

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Recommendations Cameroon

• Empower the Lake Chad Basin Commission in its implementation of policies under its mandate. • Encourage the review and assessment of damming and water diversion initiatives and invest in sustainable solutions. • Foster coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to advance integrated solutions that account for inextricable link between the environment and the economy. • Promote and support environmentally friendly initiatives such as the Great Green Wall project and reforestation programs. • Improve, advance, and implement regulation on natural resource and waste management. • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood for economically insecure populations. Chad

• Encourage the review and assessment of damming and water diversion initiatives and invest in sustainable solutions. • Support agriculture adaptation, smart agriculture and climate-resilient agriculture solutions, including mechanized and modernized agriculture practices. • Invest in and support environmentally friendly initiatives such as the Great Green Wall project and reforestation programs. • Improve, advance, and implement regulation on natural resource, water, and waste management. • Enhance coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to advance integrated solutions that account for inextricable link between the environment and the economy.

Niger

• Invest in and improve awareness-raising on anti-deforestation regulations and legislation on the management of natural resources. • Institute and formalize policies on sanitation and water. • Promote and expand skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood for economically insecure populations. • Foster coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to advance integrated solutions that account for inextricable link between the environment and the economy.

Nigeria

• Encourage the diversification of fuel sources and expand support environmentally friendly initiatives.

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• Support agriculture adaptation, smart agriculture and climate-resilient agriculture solutions, including mechanized and modernized agriculture practices. • Foster coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to advance integrated solutions that account for inextricable link between the environment and the economy.

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Gender Considerations

86 Regional Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of the Lake Chad Basin

Gender Inequality in the Lake Chad Basin As recognized by many of the fieldwork participants, women and girls have been particularly affected by the Lake Chad Basin crisis. In addition to representing over half of those displaced,188 they have reportedly faced sexual and gender-based violence at the hands of both insurgent groups and formal security forces. Boko Haram has used kidnappings, rape, sex trafficking, and forced marriages as sources of forced recruitment and income, and as ways to further the group’s goals by disrupting female education.189 The group has also been known to use women as suicide bombers, spies, smugglers, and recruiters.190

The crisis has also exacerbated issues such as physical violence against women, food insecurity, poor health outcomes, and limited access to education. The violence has destroyed much of the existing infrastructure and the generalized atmosphere of insecurity, combined with restrictions imposed by state security forces, has curtailed access to what still exists. Women and girls who have been displaced are particularly vulnerable since they have often been separated from their family and community networks.

These risks and vulnerabilities affect all four countries in the Lake Chad Basin, but their manifestation is shaped by the different contexts in each country. Cameroon and Niger have enshrined equal rights in their constitutions, while Chad and Nigeria are signatories of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Nevertheless, far from being uniform across the four states, gender equality is governed by a patchwork of conventions and protocols, as well as paradoxical and often competing legal codes within individual countries. The resulting picture is one of uneven female emancipation around Lake Chad, leading to widely varying priorities among female respondents and different levels of vulnerability to external factors of insecurity.

In light of the long-running and complex crisis in the region, there is a risk that gender equality may be downplayed compared to more visible risk and vulnerabilities. However, as much as the pillar of Governance provides the foundation for managing the other four dimensions of human security and can either be an additional source of vulnerability or a vital source of resilience, gender equality efforts and initiatives underscore how women’s wellbeing is crucial to limiting the impact of external insecurity factors upon the communities living around and depending on Lake Chad. Conversely, just as inadequate governance can worsen the situation, neglecting gender equality can exacerbate other sources of human insecurity.

Systems of resilience that emerged in interviews include the presence of aid organizations attempting to address the gaps in the governance and socio-economic space, including issues of female political participation and disenfranchisement; land tenure challenges, stemming from unfavorable inheritance laws; poor family planning practices; and access to education for women and girls.

188 Plan International, https://plan-international.org/publications/adolescent-girls-crisis-lake-chad-basin 189 Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-harams-violence-against-women-and-girls-demands-justice 190 UNODC, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2017/August/lake-chad-basin_-integrating-gender-dimen sions-to-fight- terrorism.html

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Cameroon Of the four countries in the Lake Chad Basin, the field research in Cameroon suggested a comparatively progressive attitude to women’s role in society. The barriers that women face tend to be of a cultural nature rather than a legal one. However, women in Cameroon continue to face serious risks; 51 percent of Cameroonian women have suffered physical or sexual violence from intimate partners, face a shortage of medical professionals and must deal with a fee-based medical system that deprives many women of the healthcare they need. Furthermore, there are loopholes that undermine some legal protections. Notably, though child marriage is criminalized, the Cameroon Civil Status Registration Ordinance permits girls under 15 years of age to get married if “a waiver has been granted by the President of the Republic”.191 Additionally, women face practical barriers, as official documents are published in French and English, languages that many Cameroonian women do not speak.192

With regards to the Lake Chad region in particular, women’s reported grievances center around their limited economic opportunities. Unemployment in the area is said to have worsened with Boko Haram’s establishment in the region, and the few jobs available go to men. Female education is also comparatively limited, thereby contributing to women’s limited economic opportunities and political aspirations. There was a widespread sense among fieldwork respondents that women do not have the necessary qualifications or experience to run for office; where elections are open to them, there is a dearth of qualified female candidates. This perceived inability to make it into office is reflected in the reality that there are a mere 26 female mayors out of 386 in the country.193

Despite women’s marginalized position, access to land is not a recurring complaint. Instead their ability to inherit and sometimes purchase land is hailed. It is predominantly the lack of enabling factors, such as access to microcredit, that deprives women of a viable livelihood, even as they are forced to take care of their families when their husbands are killed or otherwise absent. This lack of access to economic support is curtailed not only by social mores but also by Boko Haram’s presence in the area. A respondent from a Women’s FGD spoke of the situation before Boko Haram’s arrival, when more women’s organizations existed and there was greater access to microcredit loans.

Compounding already-poor national access to health care, Cameroonian women in the Lake Chad region are affected by the “There is no access to family distance to the nearest maternity center, which is located over 100 planning. The women just kilometers to the south, in Kousseri. This leaves most women reliant give birth without control and on traditional methods, which are often dangerous and expensive. One there is no means of feeding solution would be adequate family planning, but the Fotokol women the kids, no discipline or are clear on its unavailability, citing an out-of-control birth rate and a education.” lack of food, discipline, and education for the children. Focus Group Discussion, Fotokol Additionally, women suffer from a lack of economic opportunities. Whereas in neighboring Chad and in Niger, further north, women are constrained by strict social customs largely based on religious grounds,

191 Njikem, Jude. “Ending Inequality Against Women in Cameroon”. United Nations Foundation. 2017. https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/ending-inequality-women-cameroon/ 192 Ibid. 193 Voice of America https://www.voanews.com/africa/cameroon-seeks-greater-female-political-participation

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Cameroonian women around Lake Chad enjoy greater top-down independence but lack the tools to pursue it. Nor are these tools simply limited to economic activities curtailed by Boko Haram’s presence; their communities are in desperate need of adequate educational institutions, affordable and local maternity health services and family planning initiatives. Though nearby NGOs attempt to address the symptoms (hunger and poverty), locals’ grievances are predicated on the lack of economic opportunities, for which aid organizations can do little.

Chad The Chadian legal system combines a secular system based on the French Civil code with Islamic law. This can lead to tensions between the two systems, one example being the existence of a national-level ban on FGM/C and child marriages alongside the continued, legal occurrences of both in certain parts of the country. However, the field research does suggest that there is a relatively more established expectation that women should take part in economic activities. Nevertheless, the research also suggests that there are important gendered differences in the salience of governance and health inequalities.

There is a widespread perception among fieldwork participants that the government has a weak presence in the Lake Chad area, a perception “In Baga Sola, men compounded by past promises of health support that never materialized. consider that the NGO efforts to fill the gap are recognized, though their shortcomings are woman cannot be equal also recognized. These grievances are reflected at the national level, where [to] the man.” Chad’s maternal death rate remains high, at 856 per 100,000 live births,194 Key Informant and where contraceptive prevalence stands at just 5.7 percent - almost half Interview, Baga Sola that of Niger’s, which has a higher fertility rate (7.239 children per woman compared to 5.947 in Chad).195 These figures contribute to steady population growth as well as worsened malnutrition and maternal mortality. Furthermore, it compounds the issue of a growing population around a lake whose ability to sustain the estimated 50 million people reliant on it is already severely stressed. Efforts to curb the high fertility rate are hamstrung by the belief that children provide a social security substitute by helping provide for their parents in the latter’s old age.

The above issues were cited by fieldwork participants as contributing to a heightened risk of Boko Haram targeting women for recruitment. To limit the allure of the insurgent group to jobless and restless women, participants in the Women’s FGD suggested sensitization; further entrenchment of gender equality; reform of Islamic scholars’ teachings; and better education, specifically higher education institutions. This recognition of women’s potential to pose a security threat to their communities is salient among the interviewed communities: it highlights the risks that disenfranchisement of a community’s female population carries. This is best underscored by a traditional leader in Bol, who explicitly stated that women’s inability to join the military, due to cultural and traditional norms, could be an issue, and that girls without any education or jobs are targets for Boko Haram.

194 “Maternal Mortality Rate: Chad”. World Bank. 2015. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=TD 195 “Adolescent Fertility Rate: Chad”. World Bank. 2017. https://data.worldbank.org/topic/gender?locations=TD

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Niger The most commonly cited inhibitor to gender equality in Niger is strict social mores; women’s societal roles are restricted to child-rearing and domestic duties. The expectation to marry young and have many children is invariably a factor in the pressures placed upon Nigerien communities in and around the Lake Chad Basin, as Niger’s fertility rate of 7.2 births per woman, the highest in the world, contributes to the significant demographic and environmental pressure.196 Compounding this is a particularly low rate of contraception use; despite government-led efforts to promote family planning, only an estimated 11 percent of Nigerien women make use of modern contraception.197 Where a willingness exists to make use of health and family planning services, access is often made difficult by the isolated nature of rural communities. Furthermore, the country’s growing youth bulge means that unless social customs change, the stress on the Lake and its surrounding resources will only grow; the Demographic and Household Survey reveals that almost two in three girls aged 15-19 have already married, divorced or been made widows.198

These trends are largely influenced by the existence of statutory, customary and religious law. Access to the judiciary is intermittent, plagued by allegations of corruption and often skewed in men’s favor; spousal rape is not recognized in Niger, and in the rare cases where women come forward in instances of domestic violence, law enforcement has tended to place the blame upon them. A tendency to downplay the prevalence of rape was also evident among female FGD participants, though when allegations were levelled, they were predominantly directed towards security forces.

Given the limited reach of the federal legal system, Islamic law is the de facto judicial recourse and was regularly mentioned in interviews as the framework used for adjudicating upon ownership and inheritance of land for women, both of which remain limited as a result of the patriarchal tendencies of Sharia law. Whereas neighboring communities across country borders responded to such limitations with recommendations aimed at boosting economic opportunities for women, often with measures such as better education for girls or improved opportunities to make it into politics, there was a general sense that women have no place working the fields or in decision-making positions in Niger. Men’s FGDs tended to yield frank recognition of the limited economic and political opportunities available to women and their vulnerability to gender-based violence. Female respondents instead emphasized the opportunities that are available to women, or deflected questions with assertions that politics is the men’s domain and that they are unaware of any elected female officials at the local or regional level. On the issue of women’s economic participation, most respondents discussed small-scale retail or concern about general food insecurity and a lack of livelihoods.

196 “Total fertility Rate: Niger”. World Bank. 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=NE 197 “Social Institutions and Gender Index: Niger”. OECD. 2019. https://www.genderindex.org/country/niger/#_ftnref 198 “Niger: Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples”. DHS. 2012. https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR277/FR277.pdf

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Nigeria Despite its status as the continent’s largest economy, Nigeria trails behind all but two of its ECOWAS neighbors in terms of gender equality, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Gender Gap Report199 Unlike Chad and Niger, there are limited protections for women’s rights at the constitutional level, while the country’s federal nature curtails the implementation of bills on a national level. This is reflected in the 2015 Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act (VAPP), aiming to address all forms of violence and discriminatory practices against women; until states pass similar legislation, this bill is only applicable in the Abuja Federal Capital Territory.

In one of his last acts in office, President Goodluck Jonathan signed a bill criminalizing FGM/C in June 2015.200 Unlike the VAPP law, this applied across the country, though is it only a first step in eliminating the practice. FGM/C is rife in Nigeria, making it the biggest contributor to global estimates of women affected. It is estimated that one in four Nigerian women have undergone the procedure, and four years on from its criminalization, it remains a widespread practice.201 This is evident in opposing accounts given by interviewees. Though its implementation is not uniform across the country, Borno state provides an exception to its pervasiveness. This is because the Fulanis make up a sizeable portion of the state’s ethnic makeup, and they are the only group of Nigeria’s six largest to not practice FGM/C.202

Around Lake Chad, women and girls have far more than just FGM/C to contend with. They make up a majority of the estimated 1.8 -2 million IDPs in the region, a situation which gives rise to numerous gender-specific issues, such as the disruption of girls’ education and women’s livelihoods.203 This makes women more vulnerable to economic and physical exploitation and abuse.204 Furthermore, general insecurity creates the conditions for the proliferation of rape, sexual and gender-based violence, child abuse, and abduction. As the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency, Borno state’s female population has understandably suffered some of its worst effects. Nigerian women are generally at high risk of sexual, domestic and child abuse, perpetrated within their communities by known and trusted men and boys, including male family members, neighbors and authority figures such as religious leaders.205 The violence engendered by the back-and-forth of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations adds to this already bleak picture, Boko Haram’s tactics include the deliberate targeting of women for rape, abduction, and forced marriage.206 Furthermore, fieldwork participants reported a widespread mistrust of security forces due to incidents of rape and sexual abuse.

Prior to Boko Haram’s emergence, women were involved in farming and trading, as well as politics, but these rights have been rolled back since Boko Haram’s emergence, suggesting that they were never fully entrenched to begin with. The female respondents in particular recall the situation before Boko Haram and mostly in positive terms, yearning for now-absent banks and microcredit loans, primary and secondary schools, jobs, NGOs, and women’s support groups. As a result of the insecurity, many NGOs are unable to step in; women whose husbands

199 WEF, The Global Gender Gap Report 2018 200 The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/may/29/outlawing-fgm-nigeria-hugely-important-precedent-say-campaigners 201 Sanni, Y., Bishwajit, G. Female Genital Mutilation in Nigeria: A Persisting Challenge for Women’s Rights; An Overview of Female Genital Mutilation in Nigeria, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507121/ 202 Ibid 203 UNHCR https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/nigeria-emergency.html 204 Ibid. 205 The Fund for Peace, http://library.fundforpeace.org/303011612-plateau 206 Ibid

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were killed by Boko Haram are often left alone to fend for themselves and their children, with few economic opportunities to do so, while those whose families have remained more or less intact are consigned to housework and home-keeping duties. This invariably involves caring for children, as schooling is one of many governance provisions to have fallen by the wayside in light of the crisis, a consequence compounded by the sheer size of the IDP population.

Despite these hardships, traditional views of women’s role in society dictate oft-rigid refusal to countenance family planning. Whereas numerous communities in neighboring LCB countries seem alert to the part high fertility “We will not believe rates play in the crisis, Nigeria’s respondents often readily dismiss it. One their stories and will not FGD response suggests that this is due to misunderstanding as to the agree to any family planning services.” effectiveness of contraception, as it is often perceived as permanent and irreversible. It is also considered a luxury when faced with more pressing Key Informant matters such as feeding their families. There was also little mention of Interview, Baga maternity-related health issues by the fieldwork participants, despite the high prevalence of FGM and limited health facilities.

Comparative Analysis

The marked difference in the issues that were most frequently raised by fieldwork participants on how the Lake Chad Basin crisis affects women and girls reflects the diverse contexts that are present in each country affected by the crisis. In Niger, despite a constitutional clause that enshrines gender equality, women have very limited access to economic and political opportunities, with their roles being heavily shaped by conservative social norms and the reliance on Islamic law. In Cameroon, on the other hand, although there is no analogous constitutional protection, the field research suggested that women and girls have greater access to economic and political opportunities and are supported by a more effective educational and health infrastructure, including greater use of family planning.

In Nigeria, the state has attempted to further gender equality through legislation, but women remain largely underrepresented in the work force, in educational attainment, and in terms of political empowerment, in part because the particularities of the Nigerian political system have hindered the federal government’s attempts to implement its policies. Fieldwork participants noted that practices such as FGM/C, low uptake of family planning services, and a reluctance to allow women to own land have limited the opportunities afforded to women. The Boko Haram insurgency in the country’s northeast has further worsened the situation, in large part by destroying much of the physical and social infrastructure that had existed, thereby eliminating many of the economic and educational opportunities that were previously available to women.

Finally, in Chad there is tension between a socially conservative country where Islamic law is in widespread use on a quotidian basis, but which has also enshrined gender equality in its constitution. Concerns raised by fieldwork participants primarily focused around health issues. Although the uptake of family planning services is significantly higher in Chad than in many of its neighboring countries, the limited presence of public health infrastructure, along with limited economic and political opportunities, has left many women feeling disenfranchised and consequently susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram or other extremist groups.

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Summary of Recommendations Health

• Encourage coordination among the national health system and the regional and international health bodies to promote information sharing and best practices in order to address the larger trend of regional health vulnerabilities. • Invest in infrastructure development initiatives, increase healthcare spending to manage infrastructure challenges, and improve healthcare access for at risk and vulnerable populations and historically underserved areas. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor health incidents for a timely response. • Support food aid programs by humanitarian organizations and promote the adoption of high-level famine resilience measures like the cultivation of drought-resistant crops. • Provide incentives to health workers serving in at-risk and remote communities to reduce attrition rate and promote better access to care for vulnerable populations. • Evaluate and expand innovative programs like “One Health” and PARCA in Chad with the assistance of national, regional, and international stakeholders and bodies. • Encourage the passage of an implementation decree for Chad’s 2002 Reproductive Health Law 006/PR/2002 and support de-stigmatization campaigns on HIV/AIDS. • Advance psychosocial practices as healthcare solutions, particularly for traumatized populations dealing with the negative health impacts of conflict, displacement, and trauma. • Support and encourage family planning and early marriage sensitization campaigns Governance

• Review gaps in the governance structure and invest in and support initiatives aimed at addressing political vacuums and infrastructural deficiencies.

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• Empower women and youth to run for political office and encourage inclusive policies to strengthen women’s participation in political processes. • Strengthen the role of the National Anticorruption Commission in fighting corruption in Cameroon, and anti-corruption measures in all countries, as well as support transparency at the local and national levels. • Expand civic education to build trust and transparency in the judicial system and invest in initiatives and legal assistance projects aimed at improving access to the formal judicial system for rural areas. • Build the capacity of traditional institutions to arbitrate and mediate disputes at the grassroots level. • Encourage the review of counterinsurgency measures and advance solutions that limit the economic and social harm done to civilians. • Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to evaluate aid distribution process and service delivery to IDP camps, which are central recruiting zones for Boko Haram. • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures for economically insecure populations, including IDPs. • Invest in infrastructure development initiatives; increase healthcare and public education spending to manage infrastructure challenges; and build the capacity of “community teachers”, in Chad, who function as stopgap instructors.

Security

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Crime and Criminality

• Encourage coordination between national, regional, and international bodies to address larger regional trends of insecurity and trafficking networks, including strengthening border controls, supporting the enforcement of the 2018 Cameroon-Nigeria agreement on small arms non-proliferation, and reviewing security protocols on military stockpiles. • Promote and advance skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures for economically insecure populations, including at risk youth and IDPs. • Invest in infrastructure development initiatives and increase access to healthcare and public services for IDPs living in IDP camps. • Strengthen national and regional early warning systems to effectively monitor incidents of crime and criminality for a timely response. • Empower community policing organizations, as well as equip and train security forces and vigilante groups on operational best practices and human rights standards. • Advance psychosocial practices, particularly for traumatized populations dealing with the negative impacts of conflict, displacement, and trauma. • Promote awareness-raising activities around domestic and sexual violence. • Address infrastructural deficiencies such as poor roads that foster the cycle of crime and criminality. • Develop and implement recourse measures for victims of sexual assault in Niger. • Invest in awareness-raising campaigns, led by NGOs, the government, and religious leaders, to inform at risk populations about Boko Haram recruitment strategies and expand skills acquisition programs and alternative livelihood measures.

Environment

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• Institute and formalize policies on sanitation and water. • Encourage the diversification of fuel sources and expand support environmentally friendly initiatives.

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Conclusion

As the meeting point of four countries, the Lake Chad Basin presents a crisis that is undeniably transnational, but also subject to distinct cultural, environmental, economic and socio-religious factors. Though the crisis largely came to the world’s attention with Boko Haram’s kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls in 2014, the Islamist group is but one influence driving the emergency affecting an estimated 50 million207 people who live around and depend on the lake. The large population and the environmental pressures placed upon the Lake contribute to severe demographic stress; this will be further compounded as the population is projected to double over the next decade or so.208

The insecurity that the Lake Chad communities are subject to is at best facilitated – at worst caused – by chronic vulnerabilities across the human security spectrum, starting with issues related to Health. Tying in with general marginalization of the regions, the health infrastructure and resources are deemed largely inadequate, which goes hand-in-hand with a lack of qualified medical personnel. Further stress is placed on the few facilities there are by large numbers of displaced people resulting from the region’s insecurity. Medical care is rarely free and often beyond the means of those in need of it, while inadequate infrastructure for clean water and sanitation compounds these health provisioning shortcomings by contributing to the spread of preventable diseases. In the same vein, vaccination rates are low because of poor health services, while food insecurity and malnutrition place further stress on the little infrastructure there is. All this is intensified by often dismissive attitudes to family planning, whether for cultural reasons or to compensate for the absence of social security nets. The result is a state of constant vulnerability to health-related triggers, such as famine, malnutrition and disease outbreaks, while child and maternal mortality rates are high, and drug abuse and ailments remain common many communities.

To an even greater extent than Health, Governance is regularly flagged as an area of concern amongst interviewees. Though issues widely fall under the headline of insufficient/weak state presence, fieldwork participants had a number of specific complaints. Perceptions of government corruption and nepotism are rife, while the judiciary is widely considered as absent or crooked. The shrinking of the Lake is often viewed as a result of government mismanagement of water resources, especially with extensive diversion for irrigation purposes elsewhere. Exemplifying the extent of the frustration with the governments, it is also blamed for worsening climatic conditions. There are in fact many complaints which do not pertain specifically to Governance, instead relating to other pillars of human security. This serves to further underline the frustration vis-à-vis the widespread marginalization of those in and around the Lake Chad Basin, which largely translates to poor or non-existent public services and which in turn affect countless aspects of inhabitants’ security. These failings leave the population particularly vulnerable to drought; commodity price shocks exacerbated by undiversified local economies; Boko Haram attacks as well as the group’s effects on economic activity; famine; and election-related issues such as protests, corruption, nepotism, and electoral irregularities.

207 “Confronting Climate Change: Africa’s leadership on an increasingly urgent issue” https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2017/01/global_20170109_foresight_africa_chapter-5.pdf 208 Ibid.

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Security concerns are partly linked to Boko Haram activities, though also to the security forces deployed to address the insurgent group; distrust of the latter is regularly raised as a concern by respondents (though others are hesitant to criticize them given the relative security they provide). As with Governance, other problems not directly relevant to Security make their way into respondents’ answers, highlighting the interlinked nature of the multiple pillars of human security in the context of the crisis. Though Boko Haram is recognized as a threat, it is their effects on trade and livelihoods more generally that worries many. As such, competition for resources is a recurring concern. This in turn is largely put down to the millions of IDPs engendered by Boko Haram’s activities, which are seen to exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions. Furthermore, the presence of large groups of IDPs in certain communities gives rise to perceived injustices and inequalities with regards to the distribution of aid. Event- driven risks include abductions, armed attacks, looting, assassinations, rape, displacement and tensions between IDPs and host communities.

There is a predictable overlap between respondents’ Security concerns and their Crime and Criminality concerns, largely because one of the main factors of insecurity, Boko Haram, impacts the local economy in such a way as to make crime both easier to partake in, and in many cases, necessary for survival. Nevertheless, Boko Haram is not the sole driver of criminality; the mismatch between a poorly performing local economy and an ever-increasing working-age population diminishes the opportunities for legitimate economic activities. Indeed, economic considerations are the most common drivers of vulnerability for Crime and Criminality. These include high rates of poverty and youth unemployment; poor road infrastructure (another Governance issue with an economic dimension), and lack of livelihoods among refugees and IDPs. Furthermore, as with the Security pillar, porous borders are a recurring concern and a key component of event-driven risks. Porous borders facilitate the proliferation of cross-border smuggling as well as having been key to Boko Haram’s spread from Borno state into the three neighboring countries from 2014 onwards. Other risks include youth radicalization, prostitution, drug trafficking and abuse, theft and armed banditry, kidnapping, human trafficking, forced recruitment and forced marriage, gender-based violence and rape, and tensions between security forces and local populations.

Finally, Environment is a key pillar to the overall vulnerability of the basin’s inhabitants, partly driving economic malaise, though government prohibition of access to the Lake due to the security emergency is a major element. Respondents identify reduced rainfall; wind erosion; shrinking of the Lake and the quantity of fertile land; lack of potable water; drier farmlands; and drier and shorter wet seasons as exogenous factors. Meanwhile, people are driven to an overreliance on wood as a fuel source and of bush burning for agriculture, causing deforestation, desertification and land degradation, and a growing dependence on recessional irrigation, which grows increasingly unreliable as the Lake shrinks. Common complaints about support networks include a lack of enforcement for the few environmental regulations that exist; lack of oversight regarding oil pipelines; irregular NGO and government aid; and corruption in the aid process. All these factors are either caused, or massively exacerbated, by a number of actions: Boko Haram restricts access to farmland and fishing (and the lake more generally), as well as killing or rustling herds; in response, the government restricts the ability to leave villages – for security reasons, though without providing alternatives to the foregone economic activities and lost income or harvest. The government is also seen as a cause of the environmental crisis. Fieldwork participants and desktop research point to the damming of rivers as a reason for the Lake’s shrinking. Oil pipeline leaks also feature among the grievances, as well as restrictions affecting access to fertilizer and fuel needed for irrigation pumps. The influx of IDPs and refugees is seen as compounding these environmental issues.

Despite a considerable number of vulnerabilities and event-driven risks, there is a network of resiliencies to counteract some of the vulnerabilities and risks, specifically with regards to Health. These include NGOs who fill

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some of the infrastructure gaps left by governments. Furthermore, along with governments, NGOs provide some free healthcare (namely for children under five, but also for displaced communities in Nigeria). Sensitization campaigns are conducted by government, civil society, and religious and community leaders to prevent early marriage, promote family planning and reproductive health. Vaccination campaigns, though not universally available, do exist.

In matters of Governance, public service shortcomings are largely addressed by NGOs, often in the form of humanitarian assistance but also with capacity-building and the creation of centers for women and youth. Women organize tontines to ensure a degree of economic resilience. Religious, traditional and opinion leaders promote social cohesion and aid in dispute resolution. In Nigeria, a biometric ID system was introduced to address local grievances.

In the area of Security, the army, MNJTF and local militia are often viewed as positive entities while traditional and religious leaders preaching against violent extremism are another resilience factor. Humanitarian aid to address the large numbers of IDPs and refugees, specifically their lack of livelihoods, is also cited.

Initiatives to limit the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are essential in tackling Crime and Criminality, while deradicalization and awareness-raising government campaigns go some way to limiting the number of Boko Haram recruits. Youth engagement programs limit marginalization and sensitization campaigns are implemented in IDP camps to tackle gender-based violence and rape. Broadly speaking, the presence of security forces is a factor of resilience.

Finally, in the area of Environment, NGOs institute food and water aid programs, as well as tree planting projects and access to farmland, as SODELAC does for women, while governments are able to implement some degree of assistance.

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Photo Credits

• “EU Humanitarian Aid in Nigeria” by EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, via Flicker. Reproduced under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. No modifications made. https://bit.ly/31Ij1Ls (Cover Page) • “EU Humanitarian Aid in Nigeria” by EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, via Flickr. Reproduced under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. No modifications made. https://bit.ly/2EwU7FV (Page 17) • “A race against time in Niger: setting up a cholera treatment centre in a matter of days” by EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, via Flickr. Reproduced under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. No modifications made. https://bit.ly/2UdZ2Bm (Page 18) • “Lake Chad Bassin Crisis January 2017” by Utenriksdepartementet UD, via Flickr. Reproduced under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. No modifications made. https://bit.ly/2U9OW4m (Page 34) • “Flintlock 2018 Training in Agadez, Niger” by USAFRICOM, via Flickr. Reproduced under (CC BY 2.0). No modifications made. https://bit.ly/2Eyq2Ws (Page 48) • “Spent Bullet” by Liu Tao, via Flickr. Reproduced under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. No modifications made. https://bit.ly/2BV1yFh (Page 62) • “Kri Kri, on the shores of Lake Chad” by EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, via Flickr. Reproduced under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. No modifications made. https://bit.ly/2SpSoWJ (Page 73) • “EU Humanitarian Aid in Nigeria” by EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, via Flickr. Reproduced under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. No modifications made. https://bit.ly/2UatkET (Page 85)