The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS Author(s): ROMAN SOLCHANYK Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 20, IN THE WORLD: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State (1996), pp. 19-43 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036683 . Accessed: 03/10/2014 08:15

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Ukraine,Russia, and theCIS ROMAN SOLCHANYK

The pastdecade has witnessednothing short of a fundamentaltransformation in therelationship between Ukraine and Russia.The keyfactor, of course, was thecollapse of theSoviet Union and theemergence of Ukraineand Russia as independentstates. At this juncture, the discourse between Ukraine and Russia, whichthroughout the Soviet period had beenfocused almost entirely on inter- ethnic(or inter-nationality)questions, was broadenedto includeinternational issues,which, moreover, became paramount.1 Problems of language,culture, andinterpretation ofhistorical events were now over-shadowed by problems of state:borders, armies, and nuclearweapons. Neither side, each forits own specificreasons, was especiallywell preparedfor such a dramaticchange. Thus,it shouldnot be particularlysurprising that Ukrainian-Russian relations in thepost-Soviet period have largelybeen strained,conflictive, and, indeed, unstable.The veryfact that it was onlyin mid-1997,almost six yearsafter the SovietUnion had ceased to exist,that Kyiv and Moscow finallymanaged to concludea treatyon "friendship,cooperation, and partnership,"which, more- over,has yetto comeinto force, testifies to theinordinate difficulties of what is perhapsbest described as a lengthyand difficultprocess of "normalization."2

Issues,Problems, Perceptions

Mostdiscussions of contemporaryUkrainian-Russian relations have tendedto focuson specificissues aboutwhich Kyiv and Moscow have divergentopin- ionsand viewpoints. Among these, the most prominent and longstandinghave beenthe fate of theBlack Sea Fleetand itsmain base, Sevastopol;the related butlarger question of Crimea, specifically whether or not it should rightfully be considereda partof Ukraine; and the role and functionsof the Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS). Thereare a hostof otherproblems and irritants thathave exacerbatedrelations since independence, including sharing out the debtsand assetsof theformer Soviet Union; delimiting and demarcatingbor- dersbetween the two countries; and, more recently, the eastward expansion of NATO and Moscow's renewedconcern about the statusof the Russianlan- guagein Ukraine.All ofthese disputes may be said to be quite"normal" - that is, theyare easilyidentifiable and perfectlysoluble. Indeed, probably the most difficultand certainly the most emotionally laden issue - thedisposition of the Black Sea Fleet- whileperhaps not definitively resolved, has beenpostponed fortwenty years by theUkrainian-Russian agreements concluded on 28 May

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1997,3which, in turn,paved the way for the signing of the basic bilateral treaty severaldays later. This is quitean accomplishment,particularly if one recalls thatthe tension between Kyiv and Moscow overthe Black Sea Fleetin early 1992 was suchthat observers wondered whether the newly formed CIS would promptlyfall apart before it managed to getoff the ground. Overall,and in spiteof a difficultagenda of unfinished business, the experi- enceof the years since independence has shownthat the leaders of Ukraine and Russiaare capable of conducting a dialogue, that compromises can be reached, andthat seemingly intractable differences can be resolved.At thesame time, it is equallyclear thatthere are some fundamentalproblems in the Ukrainian- Russianrelationship that go deeperthan disagreements at thenegotiating table. In early 1997, a leadingMoscow newspaperpublished interviews with UkrainianPresident Leonid Kuchma and his top nationalsecurity adviser, VolodymyrHorbulin.4 The generalthrust of both interviews was thatrelations withRussia werebad and seemedto be gettingworse; the leitmotif was that Russia was nottaking Ukraine seriously, that its attitudewas patronizingand condescending.On the face of it, thereis nothingparticularly revealing or astonishingin theseperceptions. Russia, after all, is havingproblems of one sortor another with nearly all ofthe former Soviet republics, including , withwhom it has enteredinto a "union"of sorts.In thisrespect, Kazakh PresidentNursultan Nazarbaev is not alone in his estimatethat Moscow's policiesin theCIS have had theeffect of "notattracting potential allies, but repellingthem."5 Both Kuchma and Horbulin,however, seemed intent to un- derscorethat there was an addeddimension to theUkrainian-Russian relation- ship,that the problems went beyond the realm of the"normal." Horbulin, for example,said that he was notprepared to offera rationalexplanation as to why therewere such difficulties,suggesting that a close readingof Freudcould providesome insights or thatperhaps Dostoevsky might have theanswer. But thenhe added: "I oftenrecall what formerU.S. Secretaryof State Henry Kissingertold me: 'I nevermet a singleRussian who thoughtthat Ukraine couldbe independent.'"Kuchma was moreforthright, saying that "in Russia theypretend that Ukraine as a sovereign,independent state does notexist." "As I see it," he continued,"in Russia,the stereotypeof viewingUkraine as its constituentpart or, at anyrate, as thesphere of itsprevailing influence has not yet been eliminated."Kuchma returnedto the problema year later,after PresidentBoris Yeltsin's visit to Kyivand the successful conclusion of the long awaitedbilateral treaty. In an interviewin Izvestiia,the Ukrainianleader, althoughemphasizing that Ukrainian-Russian relations had vastlyimproved and that"problems of a politicalcharacter" were now virtuallynonexistent, nonethelessexpressed concern about what lay ahead. Specifically,Kuchma called attentionto whathe termedthe "divorce syndrome" in theUkrainian- Russianrelationship, briefly characterizing it as a "complicatedpolitical-psy- chologicalproblem that casts an ominousshadow on the entirecomplex of Ukrainian-Russianrelations."6

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But why shouldthe Ukrainian-Russiandivorce be any differentor more complicatedthan the other divorces that occurred at theend of 1991? Writing severalweeks after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Len Karpinskii,then chief editor of Moskovskie novosti, framed the problem in stark, almost eschatologicalterms. Karpinskii argued that one of theredeeming features of theBelovezha accords that created the CIS was thatit preventeda complete splitbetween Ukraine and Russia,which, he felt,would have been a "genuine tragedy"for Russian national consciousness. "Millions of Russians,"he as- serted,"are convincedthat without Ukraine not only can therebe no great Russia,but there cannot be anykind of Russia at all."7This perception empha- sizes thedegree to whichUkraine is not onlyand not simplya problemfor Russia,but, more importantly, that it is also a problemof Russia. The defining characteristicof the Ukrainian-Russian"divorce syndrome"is thatwhen Ukrainedeclared its independence in August1991 itinitiated divorce proceed- ingsnot only against the USSR, butalso againstwhat many Russians perceived to be "Russia."As RomanSzporluk has pointedout, in imperialRussia Ukrai- nians(and Belarusians)were viewed as componentparts of a greaterRussian nation,and whatsets themapart from all of the othernon-Russians of the formerSoviet Union is thatmany Russians question their very existence.8 Today, a large segmentof the Russian population,and certainlymuch of Russia's politicalclass as well as its culturalelites, still continues to view Ukraineas an integralpart of Russia and Ukrainiansas an organicpart of the Russiannation. A nationwidepoll conductedin Russia in thefall of 1997 by theCenter for the Study of PublicOpinion showed that 56 percentof respon- dentsfelt that Ukrainians and Russiansare "one people."9The same sentiment was voicedby Yeltsinin an addressto his countrymenin Novemberof that year: "It is impossibleto tearfrom our heartsthat Ukrainians are our own people.That is ourdestiny - ourcommon destiny."10 Russia's problemsin dealingwith Ukraine have also been greatlyexacer- batedby thefact that, with few exceptions,not muchof an efforthas been made in Russia, eitherin the mass media or among the intelligentsia,to reexamineand reconsiderthe historicalbaggage in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship.A studythat focused on theimage of Ukraineand Ukrainiansin theRussian press after the collapse of theSoviet Union found that, in spiteof the factthat the Ukrainianreferendum on independencein December1991 yieldeda vote of morethan 90 percentin favor,the prevailingtrend in the ensuingyears was to presenta pictureof Ukrainianindependence in almost conspiratorialterms - thatis, as theresult of effortsby "nationalist"or "sover- eign communist"elites ostensibly working against the genuinewill of "the people."The studyconcluded that, for the most part, "Russian public opinion andthe mass media evade seriousdiscussion of the problems that are posed for Russianidentity in connectionwith the formation of an independentUkraine. A significantspectrum of publicopinion continues to view the separationof Ukraineas somethingartificial and temporary."11There are no functioning

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academiccenters or institutesfor Ukrainian studies in Russia,and Ukrainian historyin thecountry's leading university is stilltaught as partof "thegeneral courseon thehistory of thefatherland."12 As late as 1997,a leadingMoscow academicjournal could still publish a lengthytwo-part article essentially restat- ing the main theses of the Russian classics on "Ukrainianseparatism" - namely,that Ukrainian nationalism was largelythe invention of a smallgroup of intellectualsheaded by thehistorian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who was ma- nipulatedby "Polish chauvinists" determined "to setthe Little Russians against theRussians and thereby split the Russian Empire from within."13 Thisis notto say thatsuch views hold sway over the entire journalistic and academiccommunity in Russia. In an articleentitled "Problems in Relations with Ukraine Remain," the formerdiplomat and political commentator AleksandrBovin, for example, refers to "theemotional background against whichpractically all of us viewrelations with Ukraine." He admitsthat intel- lectuallyhe understandsthat Ukraine is independentand thatCrimea and Sevastopolare now in a foreigncountry, but confesses that emotionally he is unableto deal withthese realities. "Maybe I'm wrong,"says Bovin, "but I have thefeeling that a considerablepart of the Russian elite simply cannot part with this[divorce] syndrome." But he also offersa solutionto theproblem: Let'sthink about the situation. Either, or. Either we feel that the separation of Ukraineis an historicalmisunderstanding, a regrettable, temporary accident, thatthere is a realisticpossibility of changing the course of events or, as a minimum,imposing our will on Kyiv - andthen we can and should conduct a brutal,forceful course with respect to Ukraine. Or, after all, we cometo the conclusionthat, in the foreseeable future, there is nogoing back, that Ukraine is a trulyindependent and truly sovereign state that has the "right" to its own policiesthat correspond toits own interests - and then it follows that we learn howto live with that kind of Ukraine.14 DmitriiFurman, one ofa handfulof Russian academics specializing in contem- poraryUkrainian issues, also focuseson thepsychological and the irrational as thecore problem in theUkrainian-Russian relationship: "Grasping the realities, shakingoff the nationalist mythology - that is theway to deliverancefrom the painfulRussian and Ukrainian psychological complexes and the psychological tensionin Russian-Ukrainianrelations."15 There are representativesof the youngergeneration of Russian scholars who are interested in Ukrainianhistory andpolitics and whoseresearch and publications reflect their awareness of the complexitiesof the Ukrainian-Russianrelationship and offerthoughtful and balancedanalyses.16 To whatextent the Russian political class is movingor is evenprepared to movein thesame directionis an openquestion. Yeltsin's apparent conviction thatit is "impossible"to severthe special bond between Ukraine and Russia does notinspire a greatdeal of optimism.Although the Russian President is well-knownfor his sometimesstrange and erratic behavior, Yeltsin's statement on theeve of theRussian-Belarusian "union" that his Ukrainiancounterpart

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"wantsto join, but something's hindering him" belies either hopelessly wishful thinkingor completeignorance of Ukrainianrealities (or both).17Dmitrii Riurikov,Yeltsin's former adviser on foreignpolicy, is a particularlyinterest- ingcase of how the"divorce syndrome" affects Russian political behavior. In an interviewseveral years ago, Riurikovbriefly noted that there was "some- thing[in Ukrainian-Russianrelations] that remains immutable - namely,a psychologicallayer thatwe are unable to surmount."He thenproceeded, unwittingly,to personify the problem by expressinghis irritationat Ukraine's refusalto conductits relations with Russia on thebasis of a "specialrelation- ship"and a "specialhistory." Kyiv, he insistedshould make a "fraternalgrand Slavic gesture"and refrainfrom constant appeals to itsown nationallaws and internationalnorms as thebasis forits policiesregarding Russia.18 In short, Ukraine,as the"younger brother" in this"special relationship," should behave accordingto itsprescribed role. As one moveseither to theright or leftalong thecontemporary Russian political spectrum, the prospects for the "normaliza- tion"of Ukrainian-Russianrelations grows increasingly more questionable. In fact,the right-left delineation in thiscontext is meaninglessto theextent that theRussian nationalists and communistsshare essentially the same views on Ukraine.The convictionsof a "traditionalnationalist" like ViktorAksiuchits, who heads theRussian Christian Democratic Movement, appear not to have changedsince 1991-1992.In an articlein early1997, Aksiuchits argued that theconcept of Slavic unity was validwhen applied to Poles orSerbs, but that in thecase ofthe Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusiansit was a ployintended to cover up the factthat all threeconstituted a single and indivisiblenation. "History,"he insisted"does not know eitherthe Ukrainianor Belarussian nationsor the"sovereign" states of Ukraineor Belarus."19Similarly, Commu- nistParty leader GennadyZyuganov writes that "Russian civilization" has beentorn into three parts: In essence,this is a problemof ourviability. How it willbe solvedwill determinewhether or not our Fatherland will be whatit has always been - a unique,distinctive, and self-sufficient civilization. That is preciselywhy the secondstrategic task - afterthe internal consolidation ofall healthypolitical forces- is thetask of a newreunification ofUkraine and Belarus with Rus- sia.20 Some of Russia's confirmeddemocrats and proponentsof marketreforms have also articulatedviews or policypositions with regard to Ukrainethat, at thevery least, are quiteproblematical, and two of the leadingcontenders to succeedYeltsin, Moscow MayorYurii Luzhkov and formerSecurity Council SecretaryGen. AleksandrLebed, have bothraised Russian claims to Crimea andSevastopol.

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Beforeand AfterIndependence

Therewas a periodbeginning in May-June1990, whenYeltsin was elected headof theRussian Supreme Soviet and Russia declaredits statesovereignty, duringwhich Ukrainian-Russian relations enjoyed a briefbut unprecedented honeymoon.At thetime, the major political issue in theSoviet Union was the strugglebetween the Soviet center, represented by Mikhail Gorbachev as Party leaderand USSR president,and theUnion republics. It was in theinterests of bothRussia and Ukraine,the two most important and influentialrepublics, to worktogether in theirefforts to wrestas manyprerogatives from the center as possiblein theprocess of asserting their sovereignty. At the time, there was still a SovietUnion and, with few exceptions, no one in Russiagave muchthought to whatimplications the weakeningof the Soviet statecould have forthe legitimacyof thenew, democratic, and sovereignRussia and itsrelations with Ukraineand the other republics. A concreteexample of the "new era" in Ukrainian-Russianrelations was the "Declarationof the Principles of Inter-State Relations between Ukraine and the RSFSR Based on theDeclarations of StateSovereignty" signed by representa- tives of the Ukrainianparliamentary opposition group called the People's Council(Narodna Rada) and theirRussian counterparts from the Democratic Russia bloc. Notingthat the growthof democraticmovements in the two republicsoffered the Ukrainian and Russianpeoples "a real chanceto open a new page in the historyof theirrelations," the documentaffirmed: (1) the unconditionalrecognition of Ukraineand Russia as subjectsof international law; (2) the "sovereignequality" of the two republics;(3) the principleof noninterferencein each other'sinternal affairs and renunciationof forcein theirdealings; (4) theinviolability of existingstate borders between the two republicsand therenunciation of any and all territorialclaims; (5) the safe- guardingof thepolitical, economic, ethnic, and culturalrights of therepresen- tativesof nationsof theRSFSR livingin Ukraineand vice versa;and (6) the desirabilityof mutuallybeneficial cooperation in variousfields on thebasis of inter-statetreaties and the regulation of disputes in a spiritof harmony.21 These principleswere incorporated into the formal treaty between Ukraine and Russia signedon 19 November1990, which recognized the territorial integrity of both republicsand their existing borders within the USSR. The choiceof the Ukrai- niancapital as thevenue for the official ceremonies was notfortuitous. Speak- ing at a pressconference directly after the treaty was signed,Yeltsin pointed outthat previous agreements between Ukraine and Russia had been arranged in Moscowon unequalterms and stressedthat "we verymuch wanted to signthis one in Kyiv."22The gesturewas intendedto underlinethe fundamental change in relationsbetween Ukraine and Russia. Addressingthe Ukrainian Supreme Soviet(Verkhovna Rada), theRussian leader announced another fundamental change- a reassessmentof Russia's self-image:

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I categoricallyreject the accusation that Russia is nowclaiming some special role.At the [Supreme Soviet] session, [Nikolai] Ryzhkov said that we alleg- edlywant to shiftthe center from the center to somewherein Russia.I categoricallyreject this accusation. Russia does notaspire to becomethe centerof some sort of new empire. Itdoes not want to have an advantage over otherrepublics. Russia understands better than others the perniciousness of thatrole, inasmuch as itwas Russia that performed precisely that role for a longtime. What did it gain from this? Did Russiansbecome freer as a result? Wealthier?Happier? You yourselves know the truth; history has taught us that a peoplethat rules over others cannot be fortunate.23 The SupremeSoviets of both republics ratified the document within a matterof days,although some Russian lawmakers questioned the wisdom of adheringto theaccord before having sorted out the Crimean question. In the monthsthat followed, Ukraine and Russia continuedto offerthe strongestopposition to Gorbachev'splans for a renewedUnion. At thesame time,it was becomingincreasingly clear that the Ukrainian and Russianposi- tionswith regard to the centerwere not identical.Yeltsin, in spite of his personalrivalry with Gorbachev, showed himself to be considerablymore flexibleand compliantin his dealingswith the centerthan the Ukrainian leadership.Already in September1990, the Presidiumof the UkrainianSu- premeSoviet issued a statementdeclaring that it wouldbe prematureto con- cludea newUnion treaty before the stabilization of thepolitical and economic situationin Ukraine,the building of a law-basedand sovereignstate, and the adoptionof a newrepublican constitution.24 The followingmonth, in response to thedemands of studenthunger strikers in Kyiv,the SupremeSoviet con- firmedthe stand taken by itsPresidium. The differencesbetween Ukraine and Russiawere particularly glaring with regard to the"Nine Plus One Agreement" concludedin April 1991 betweenGorbachev and the nine Union republics, includingUkraine, that had participatedin thereferendum on thepreservation of theSoviet Union the previous month. The agreementcalled forthe speedy conclusionof a newUnion treaty, recognized the sovereignty of therepublics, and concededthe need to broadentheir rights significantly. Yeltsin's public commentsgave the impression that all majordisagreements with the center had been resolvedto Russia's satisfaction.Kravchuk, on theother hand, who did notrepresent Ukraine at themeeting, while praising Gorbachev's concession on thesovereignty issue, nonetheless characterized the document as having"no juridicalforce."25 Ukraine's position hardened in June,when the parliament decidednot to discussthe new Union treaty until mid-September, arguing that itneeded time to determineif the latest draft was in linewith its declaration of sovereignty.Russia, on theother hand, approved the new draftin principlein earlyJuly; at theend of themonth, Yeltsin was quotedas sayingthat Russia was preparedto signthe document "tomorrow, if youlike."26 The firstserious conflicts between Ukraine and Russia,however, came in theaftermath of Ukraine'sdeclaration of independenceon 24 August1991.

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Two dayslater, Yeltsin's press secretary issued a statementsaying that Russia reservedthe right to raise borderissues withthose republics, apart from the threeBaltic states,that declared their independence and "discontinueunion relations."27Later the same day, he explainedthat the statement applied prima- rilyto Crimea,Donbas, and northernKazakhstan, all regionswith substantial Russianminorities. "If theserepublics enter the Union withRussia," he ex- plained,"it is nota problem.But if theygo, we musttake care of thepopula- tionthat lives thereand notforget that these lands were settled by Russians. Russia will hardlyagree to give away theseterritories just like that."28The situationwas furtheraggravated by remarksmade at the timeby Anatolii Sobchakand Gavriil Popov, the mayors of St. Petersburgand Moscow, respec- tively,and two of the most prominent representatives ofYeltsin's team. Popov, in particular,argued that declarations of independencewere "illegal"; ex- pressedhis fullsupport for Yeltsin's stand on borders;demanded the renego- tiationof treatieswith secessionistrepublics; and maintainedthat, among others,the statusof Crimeaand Odesa Oblast shouldbe decidedby local referendums.29The followingday, the meeting of theUSSR SupremeSoviet was interruptedby the announcement that "an emergencysituation" had devel- oped and thata Russian delegationheaded by Vice-PresidentAleksandr Rutskoiwas alreadyon itsway to Kyiv.As Yeltsinsubsequently explained, its purposewas "totell the Ukrainian people: if you stayin theUnion, we willnot maketerritorial claims."30 The deputieswere asked to approvethe dispatch of a delegationfrom the Soviet parliament as well.Both delegations arrived in the Ukrainiancapital later that day and weremet by a hostilecrowd said to be the largestsince the student strike of theprevious year. After night-long negotia- tions,with the USSR SupremeSoviet delegationacting as observers,the Ukrainianand Russiansides produced an eight-pointcommuniqué promising joint effortsto avert"the uncontrolleddisintegration of the "; recognizingthe need forinterim inter-state structures for a transitionalperiod withthe participationof interestedstates that were "subjectsof the former USSR"; and reaffirmingthe articlesof the 1990 Ukrainian-Russiantreaty concerningthe territorialintegrity of bothstates and the rightsof theirciti- zens.31The phrase"former USSR" appearsto havebeen coined at thatprecise moment. Ukraineand Russia continued to driftapart in thefinal months of the Soviet Union's existence.Already at theend of August1991, Kravchukmaintained thatUkraine could not work on thenew Union treaty until after its referendum on independence.By thattime, the Ukrainian leader was also insistingthat a confederationwas theonly option for Kyiv. Meanwhile, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nazarbaevreaffirmed their commitment to continuethe negotiationsin Novo Ogarevo.Several months later, in November,Kravchuk argued that the Novo Ogarevoprocess no longerexisted and thatGorbachev's efforts were a "fraud"in whichhe wouldnot participate. Relations between Kyiv and Mos- cow were also becomingincreasingly strained. Against the backgroundof

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE CIS 27 growingofficial concern in Moscow aboutthe rights of Russiansand Russian speakersin the non-Russianrepublics and unspecifiedpledges of support, AleksandrSolzhenitsyn, whose moral authority in Russiawas thenundisputed, issued an appeal in Octoberin connectionwith the forthcomingUkrainian referendumon independencein whichhe arguedthat the aggregate vote was meaningless.Instead, the results in each oblastshould be consideredseparately to decidethe territorial future, as it were,of thegiven oblast. The thrustof the Nobel laureate'sargument was thatUkraine was not a legitimateentity, but ratherthe product of "falseLeninist borders."32 Very soon thereafter,in the midstof the Ukrainian-Russiandebate over the fate of Ukraine'snuclear arsenal,Moskovskie novosti printed the sensational news that Russian govern- mentofficials had discussedthe possibilityof a nuclearconflict between Russiaand Ukraine. Another Moscow newspaper presented a somewhatdiffer- entversion - namely,that Russian leaders had considereda preventivenuclear strikeagainst Ukraine. The storywas deniedby theRussian defense minister and downplayedby Kravchuk,but then Yeltsin was quotedby Ukraine'sfirst deputyprime minister as havingtold him thathe had indeeddiscussed the possibilitywith his generals,but that"it was not technicallypossible." In Ukraine,the Russian president's explanation had theeffect of adding more fuel to thefire. The referendumresults appear to have shockedmany in Russia. Sobchak,like Gorbachev,tried to arguethat the vote for Ukrainian indepen- denceshould not be construedas a voteagainst some kind of Union and that, in anycase, ifUkraine were to secedeRussia wouldimmediately raise territorial claims,referring specifically to the"forced Ukrainianization" of theRussian minority.The St. PetersburgMayor likened the situationto the conflictbe- tween Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia, withthe exceptionthat a nuclear conflictcould not be excludedin theUkrainian-Russian case. Ukraine'splans fora separatearmy, he warned,posed a "seriousthreat for all ofhumanity."33 FromKyiv's standpoint,the results of the Ukrainian referendum effectively putan end to anyplans for a renewedUnion. Yeltsin and theRussian leader- ship,on the otherhand, continued to expresstheir support for some sortof arrangementwith the center until the very eve ofthe Belovezha meeting on 7-8 December.Even as late as 5 Decemberthe Russian leader claimed that there was no alternativeto a Uniontreaty. It was onlyin hisaddress to theBelarusian parliamenttwo days laterthat Yeltsin, while stressingthat Russia always wanteda Union,conceded that the attemptto reconstitutethe USSR was a failure.34Ukraine and Russia now turned to thedifficult process of dismantling theSoviet Union, which brought new tensions to thesurface.

Afterthe USSR: The CIS

In some sense,the Belovezha talkscan be viewed as the finalattempt on Russia's partto preservethe Soviet Union. A fullaccount of whattranspired duringthose two days has yet to be written.According to Kravchuk,the

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meetingwas arrangedon Ukraine'sinitiative already in mid-November1991. Yeltsinis said to haveinitially acted as a messengerfor Gorbachev, conveying theSoviet president's readiness to entertainwide-ranging concessions on the draftUnion treaty as longas Ukraineaffixed its signatureto thedocument. In thefinal analysis, Kravchuk refused to signthe existing draft, make amend- ments,or propose his own version of the treaty.35 The resultwas theagreement betweenRussia, Ukraine, and Belarusto createthe Commonwealth of Inde- pendentStates. After returning to Kyiv,the Ukrainian leader said thatRussia and Belarus would have preferreda closer association,but thatUkraine's positionprecluded such an arrangement.Yeltsin later admitted that "it was not Russiathat seceded from the [Soviet] Union," but that the pressure for indepen- dencein mostof the republics forced Russia to agreeto theCIS.36 Againstthis background,Russia's drive to facilitategreater integration withinthe CIS, whichinitially took the form of supporting the establishment of coordinatinginstitutions and supranationalbodies within the organization such as theInter-Parliamentary Assembly and promotingthe CIS Charter,are per- fectlyunderstandable. In April1992, the Congress of RussianPeople's Depu- tiesdeclared its dissatisfaction with the level of political,economic, and mili- taryintegration among the CIS memberstates and called forfurther efforts alongthese lines. By theend of theyear, Russian lawmakers were suggesting thatthe parliaments of theformer Soviet republics consider forming a confed- erationor some otherform of "drawingtogether."37 In Ukraine,on theother hand,Kravchuk was facedwith criticism from the parliamentary opposition, whichargued that Ukraine's membership in the CIS threatenedits indepen- dence.The UkrainianParliament ratified the agreement forming the CIS on 10 December,but added twelvereservations, including the affirmationof the inviolabilityof stateborders and theright to its own armedforces. Within a week,on theeve of theAlma-Ata (Almaty) meeting that saw eightadditional formerSoviet republics join theCIS, theparliament adopted a thirteen-point declarationdelineating its understandingof theCIS as a loose associationof independentstates. The move was promptedby whatthe lawmakersmain- tainedwere attempts to forma "newunion state" on thebasis ofthe CIS.38 Fromthe very start, therefore, itwas quiteclear that Ukraine and Russia had verydifferent views as to thenature and purposeof theCIS. For Ukraine,the CIS was, in thewords of its parliamentaryhead, Ivan Pliushch,a necessary mechanismfor an orderly"divorce process." At aboutthe same time, in Febru- ary 1992, Kravchukdescribed it as "a committeeto liquidatethe old struc- tures."39Both Ukrainian leaders essentially saw theCIS as a transitionalbody, whichwas reflectedin Kyiv's decisionto steerclear of the Inter-Parliamentary Assemblyand theCIS Charter.As a matterof principle,Ukraine refused to takepart in any CIS initiativesaimed at greaterintegration in the political, military,and securityspheres and, accordingly,did not sign the collective securitytreaty in Tashkentin May 1992. Towardthe end of thefirst year of independence,however, intransigence gave way to a more pragmaticand

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE CIS 29 balanced approach,which can largelybe ascribedto the impactof harsh economicrealities brought on byUkraine's devastating dependence on Russian sourcesof energyand theinability or unwillingnessof itsleaders to developa programof marketreforms. An importantfactor was theappointment of Le- onid Kuchma,an experienceddirector of one of Ukraine'slargest industrial enterprises,Pivdenmash in Dnipropetrovsk,as primeminister in the fall of 1992. Whilenot proposing shock therapy, Kuchma favored closer economic tieswith Russia, maintaining that "anti-Russian actions in politicsled to anti- Ukrainianeconomic consequences."40 The resultwas a partialreappraisal of earlierpolicies with regard to the CIS, at least insofaras the economywas concerned.Accordingly, in April1993 Ukraineinitialed the agreement to form theCIS ConsultativeCoordination Committee, with the proviso that it would not go beyondits mandateto coordinateeconomic policies, and at the CIS summitin May Kravchuksigned a joint declarationproposing greater eco- nomicintegration and a commonmarket for goods and services,while at the same timeobjecting in principleto the idea of an EconomicUnion. At the September1993 summit,which witnessed agreement on the creationof the EconomicUnion, Ukraine displayed its characteristicwariness by optingfor theundefined status of "associatemember." Kuchma'selection as presidentin July1994 was widelyexpected to result in a clean breakwith the previous administration's policies, specifically with regardto Russia and theCIS. The new presidenthad builthis electoralcam- paignaround the need forchange, promising economic improvement through therestoration of tieswith Russia. His slogans,which included official status forthe in Ukraine,fell on fertileground in theindustrial and heavilyRussian and Russifiedeastern and southernregions of the country, whichwere more visibly affected by theeconomic crisis and accountedfor a largerproportion of theelectorate than the central or westernregions. At the October1994 CIS summit,Kuchma signedthe agreementestablishing the Inter-StateEconomic Committee, which was envisagedas a bodycharged with coordinating,executive, and controlfunctions for the EconomicUnion and representedthe first supranational organ to be createdwithin the CIS. But the assumptionthat Kuchma would be morereceptive to political,military, and securityintegration within the CIS provedunfounded. The new Ukrainian presidentwas quickto pointout thatUkraine had notaffixed its signatureto anydocuments that conflicted with its constitution or laws, singling out Kyiv's continuedrejection of CIS collectivesecurity arrangements, and statedforce- fullythat he did notbecome president of Ukraine"in orderto becomea vassal ofRussia."41 If Ukraineviewed the CIS in termsof divorce, Russia gave everyindication thatit wanted to strengthenthe organization and, indeed, assume its leadership. Very revealingin this regardwas a confidentialdocument prepared by Yevgenii Ambartsumov,head of the Russian parliamentarycommittee on foreignaffairs, excerpts from which were leaked in August1992. The report,

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 30 SOLCHANYK whichsummed up closedhearings on Russia's foreignpolicy, called for rejec- tion of the Western-orientedcourse pursuedby Russian ForeignMinister AndreiKozyrev and proposedwhat was describedas a "Russian Monroe Doctrine"for the CIS: As theinternationally recognized legal successor to theUSSR, the Russian Federation'sforeign policy must be basedon thedoctrine that proclaims the entiregeopolitical space of the former [Soviet] Union the sphere of its vital interests(along the lines of the USA's "MonroeDoctrine" in Latin America) andto secure from the world community theunderstanding andrecognition of Russia'sspecial interests inthis space.42 Essentiallythe same thesiswas putforth by Yeltsinin early1993, whenhe asked theinternational community and, specifically,the United Nations, for "specialpowers as a guarantorof peace and stability"on theterritory of the formerSoviet Union. By theend of 1993 and in early1994, it was clearthat Russia'spolicies with regard to the CIS werebased on thepropositions that it is thedominant player in thepost-Soviet space and thatthe entire territory of the formerSoviet Union constitutes a zone of Russia's "historicallydetermined interests"wherein it performsa "special role." This was the substanceof Kozyrev's remarksat a January1994 meetingof Russiandiplomats from the CIS countries.43At thesame time, Yeltsin told Russian lawmakers that the CIS had reacheda crucialpoint in its developmentthat was markedby closer integrationand that,in the process,"Russia's missionis to be firstamong equals."44This was a clear departurefrom the Russian president'searlier renunciationof any claims to a leadingrole in the CIS. The hardeningof Russia's officialpolicy may well have been a responseto theDecember 1993 parliamentaryelections, which witnesseda major victoryfor Vladimir Zhirinovsky'sultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party. One of the indica- tionsof theshift to theright was theestablishment, in additionto theparlia- mentarycommittee on foreignaffairs, of a separatepermanent parliamentary committeeon CIS affairsand relations with compatriots, thereby underscoring theperception of the world outside Russia's bordersas fallinginto two catego- ries- theNear Abroad, which encompassed all of theformer Soviet republics, and the genuinelyforeign countries. The CIS committeewas headed by KonstantinZatulin, who definedRussia's policiestoward the CIS as falling withinthe realm of Russia's domesticaffairs and maintainedthat most of the formerSoviet republics had to becomeRussia's satellitesor face extinction. Zatulin's attitudetoward Ukraine was vividlyreflected in his skepticismabout theneed to recognize"the historically nonexistent borders of an historically nonexistentstate."45 Other prominent Russian politicians, including representa- tivesof thedemocratic camp, also voiced theirsupport for various forms of tighterintegration. Sergei Shakhrai, a deputyprime minister, announced plans in early1994 fora new confederation,including unified armed forces and a unifiedcommand, confessing that he was motivatedby a needfor "moral and

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE CIS 3 1 politicalcompensation" for his role in thedestruction of the SovietUnion.46 VladimirShumeiko, head of theupper house of the Russianparliament and chairmanof the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, saw theCIS beingtransformed intoa confederationand "later,maybe, we willeven see a federation."47 Russia's officialpolicy with regard to the CIS was reflectedin plans for developmentof a long-termCIS integrationplan and in theestablishment of a slotin thegovernment for a deputyprime minister specifically responsible for CIS affairs.Such documentsas thereport of theForeign Intelligence Service, headed at the timeby YevgenyPrimakov, entitled "Russia-CIS: Does the West'sPosition Need Modification?"(September 1994); theMemorandum on "The Basic Directionsof the IntegrationistDevelopment of the Common- wealthof IndependentStates" and theaccompanying long-term plan proposed by Russia and adoptedat theCIS summitin Moscow (October1994); and the presidentiallydecreed "Russia's StrategicCourse with the States-Participants in the Commonwealthof IndependentStates" (September1995) were all geared towardpromoting and strengtheningintegration. The "Strategic Course" spelledout thatRussia's "mainvital interests in the economic,de- fense,and securityareas and in thedefense of therights of Russians"were all to be foundon theterritory of the CIS, therebydictating Moscow's priority relationswith its member states. The maintask was describedas "thecreation of an economicallyand politicallyintegrated union of states."48In practical terms,by early1996 Russia expandedits original customs union with Belarus to includeKazakhstan and .At thesame time,Russia and Belarus formalizedthe first of severalagreements designed to establisha "unionstate." Russia's StateDuma, thelower house of parliament,went further. In March 1996,it passedtwo resolutions denouncing and retractingRussia's role in the dissolutionof theUSSR and thecreation of theCIS in December1991 and,at thesame time,it reaffirmedthe validity of theRussian vote in the so-called Gorbachevreferendum of March 1991 on preservingthe Soviet Union.49 Zatulin'ssuccessor as head of theparliamentary CIS committeeexpressed the sentimentsof most of his fellow lawmakerswhen he explainedthat his committee'smain task was: "To gathertogether the Great Mother Rus' and,to thatend, prepare the necessary legal groundwork."50 Ukraine,on the otherhand, increasingly moved toward a morebalanced foreignpolicy coursebetween East and West. The TrilateralStatement on denuclearizationin January1994 paved theway forthe development of rela- tionswith the West, and thefollowing month Ukraine was thefirst of theCIS countriesto signon to NATO's Partnershipfor Peace Program.By thespring andsummer of 1996,it was clearthat Kuchma and his advisers had seta course forUkraine's "return to Europe." This foundits clearestexpression in the UkrainianPresident's address at a meetingwith top foreign affairs officials in July,where he specifiedthat Kyiv's strategicaim was to "integrate"into European and transatlanticorganizations while "cooperating"within the frameworkof the CIS:

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I wouldalso liketo note that our foreign policy terminology should reflect the principledpolitical line of the state. Along with the strategic choice of adher- ing to theprocesses of Europeanintegration, Ukraine's firm and consistent lineis theline of maximumbroadening and deepeningof bilateraland multi- lateralforms of cooperation both within and outside the framework of the CIS while safeguardingthe principlesof mutualbenefit and respectfor each other'sinterests and abidingby thegenerally recognized norms of interna- tionallaw.51

In practice,Kyiv has downplayedthe multilateralaspect of its CIS policies and placed primaryemphasis on developing and expanding bilateral cooperation withvirtually all of the CIS memberstates.

Ukraineand theFormer Republics

Primaryconsideration has been given to Ukraine's immediateneighbors Belarusand . The formerposes a particularproblem because of Presi- dentAlyaksandr Lukashenka's foreign policy, which is pro-Russian,integra- tionist,and anti-Western,and his authoritarianand anti-democraticdomestic policies.In spiteof theseconstraints, Ukraine has soughtto counterthe isola- tionof Belarus,which could have the effect of drivingthe country further into thearms of Russia,and has workedvery closely with Poland to thatend. The basicbilateral treaty between the two countries was signedin July1995, and in May 1997 Kyivand Minsksigned a stateborder treaty, the first of itskind in theCIS. Ukraine'sinterests in Moldova are dictated,above all, by theimpact on regional stability of the unresolved dispute over the breakaway Transdniesterrepublic, with its centerat Tiraspolwhere, moreover, Russia's influenceremains strong. In additionto Russianpeacekeepers, there are still about3,000 troops of the former 14th Russian Army in the region, and Moscow doesnot appear to be in a hurryto implementits 1994agreement with Chisinäu on theirphased withdrawal. Ukrainians in Moldova overallas well as in the Transdniesterregion are the largestnational minority, a factorthat has also beencited by Ukrainiandiplomats. During the last few years, Kyiv has played a muchmore visible role in efforts to mediate the dispute between Chisinäu and Tiraspol.In January,1996, together with the presidents of Russia and Moldova, Kuchma signeda joint declarationthat underscored the need for a quick resolutionof the Transdniesterconflict by defininga special statusfor the regionwithin Moldova; Ukraineand Russia also assumedthe role of guaran- torsof agreementsbetween the two sides. Both Chisinäuand Tiraspolhave urgedthe Ukrainian leadership to sendpeacekeepers to theregion, a proposal thatis underconsideration in Kyiv,but whichwould requiresome formof agreementon Russia's part.In May 1997, Ukraineand Russia added their signaturestogether with a representativeof theOrganization for Security and Cooperationin Europe(OSCE) to theMemorandum signed by Moldova and

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE CIS 33 theTransdniester republic on normalizationof relations.Further agreements betweenthe fourwere reachedin March 1998. JointUkrainian-Moldovan militaryexercises were held forthe firsttime in June1998, and plans are underwayfor a joint peacekeepingbattalion similar to the one formedwith Poland. Ukraine'srelations with Moldova, however, have not been entirely freeof problems. In theimmediate post-Soviet period, when Moldova's Popu- lar Frontstill played a prominentrole in thecountry's political life, disputed borderclaims were a sensitiveissue, and it was only in late 1994 thatan agreementwas signedrenouncing mutual border claims. This madeit possible to begintalks on delimitingand demarcating the state border, which are nearly completed,and, in turn,facilitated the ratification of thebasic bilateraltreaty signedin October1992. Ukraine'spriorities in theTranscaucasus, in additionto politicaland secu- rityissues, have a veryclear economicdimension. Specifically, Kyiv has enteredinto the competition for delivering Caspian oil to internationalmarkets byproposing a transitroute from Baku in Azerbaijanthrough Supsa in andon to a terminalnear Odesa. The factthat Georgia and , together withMoldova and Ukraine,have recentlyformed the informal grouping fre- quentlyreferred to as GUAM is an indicationnot only of thelevel of coopera- tionbetween the four countries, but, as someobservers have noted, reveals the degreeto whichUkraine has emergedas a respectedand influentialcounter- weightto Russia in the CIS. From the standpointsof both Georgia and Azerbaijan,Kyiv' s defenseof the principle of territorialintegrity bolsters their positionswith regard to the separatistregimes in Abkhazia and Nagorno- Karabakh,respectively. Tbilisi has a runningdispute with Moscow aboutthe roleand functionsof Russianpeacekeepers in Georgiaand has askedKyiv to assumea peacekeepingrole. As withMoldova, Ukraine and Georgiaare plan- ninga jointpeacekeeping battalion that would eventually include Azerbaijan. Amongthe Central Asian countries, and Turkmenistanhave pur- sued policieswithin the context of theCIS thatlargely overlap with those of Ukraine;the former because of its tough-mindeddefense of its independence and criticismof Moscow and thelatter because of itsunswerving principle of neutrality. The threeBaltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not members of theCIS, andthey see themselvesto a largeextent as alreadybeing in Europeas opposedto returningto Europe,which clearly impinges on theirforeign policy priorities.Ukraine's relations with Tallinn, Riga, and Vilniushave benefited enormouslyfrom Kyiv' s policyof supportingthe efforts of theBaltic states to join NATO andthe European Union. Needlessto say,Ukraine's diplomatic activity in thepost-Soviet space is a sourceof concern for Moscow. In somequarters, Ukraine is perceivedas being thedriving force behind the emergence of a Tashkent-Baku-Tbilisi-Kyivaxis, whoseprimary purpose is purportedto be the"destruction" of Russia.52

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The CIS maywell be at a turningpoint in its relativelyshort history. It is becomingincreasingly clear that most of thepost-Soviet states, while still tied toRussia in a myriadof ways, have made a greatdeal ofprogress in developing a fairlyclear senseof purposeand identity.The resulthas been thatthey are movingin directionsother than Moscow. It has been estimatedthat by the beginningof 1997 almost800 multilateralCIS agreementshad been signed, but thatonly somewhatover 200 had been actuallyimplemented.53 At the October1997 CIS summitin Chiçinãu,Yeltsin, who has been reelectedto the postof head of the CIS Councilof the Heads ofStates for the last several years, was subjectedto harshcriticism for what was describedas Russia's inefficient andirrational policies with regard to theCIS. His onlysupporter was said to be BelarusianPresident Lukashenka. Russia, it seems,may be drawingthe appro- priateconclusions. It was agreedthat the CIS neededto be reformed.In early 1998,Russian Deputy Prime Minister in chargeof CIS affairsValerii Serov arguedthat the term "Near Abroad" had to be removedfrom Moscow's diplo- maticparlance because it impliedthat the independence of theformer Soviet republicswas a temporaryphenomenon and thatsooner or latereverything wouldreturn to the"normal" state of affairs. Serov is reportedto have said that it was timeto recognizethat "a civilizeddivorce had takenplace and thatthe mainthing now was tobuild our relations on thebasis ofthe realities that are in place."54Several months later, in connectionwith the reorganizationof the Russiangovernment, his slot in theCabinet of Ministerswas abolishedand mattersrelated to theCIS weretransferred to the Ministry of ForeignAffairs. On theface of it, this looks like progress.

Crimea,the Black Sea Fleet,and Sevastopol

The questionof Crimea'sstatus, the problem of Sevastopol- concretely,the factthat it was themain base of theSoviet Black Sea Fleetand had a specific administrativestatus - and theissues, both practical and political,involved in determiningthe fateof the Black Sea Fleet in the aftermathof the Soviet Union's collapse,have arguablybeen themost important concrete issues af- fectingUkrainian-Russian relations. The Crimeanquestion is definedby a combinationof specificfactors that, takentogether, have formedone of the most intractableand longstanding problemsthat confront Ukraine and thatimpinge directly on the country's stabilityand on itsrelations with Russia. First of all, Crimeawas formerlypart of theSoviet Russian republic. It was transferredto Ukraine in February1954 by a decreeof thePresidium of theUSSR SupremeSoviet on theinitiative, at leastformally, of thePresidium of theRussian Supreme Soviet. Shortly after thecollapse of theSoviet Union, reform-minded democrats like Kozyrevar- guedthat the legality of thetransfer was highlydubious because the decisions had actuallybeen madeby thetotalitarian leadership of thediscredited Com- munistParty of theSoviet Union.55 A secondfactor is thatCrimea is theonly

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE CIS 35 administrativeregion of Ukraine with a majorityof ethnic Russians. According to the1989 census,Russians accounted for 67 percentof thepopulation, while Ukrainiansconstituted only 25.8 percent;an even largermajority considered Russianto be theirnative language, including 47.4 percentof theUkrainians. Today,the proportion of Russianshas decreased,largely because of thereturn of the exiled CrimeanTatars, who numbered240,000 (9.1 percentof the population)in mid-1996.56Third, the Black Sea Fleet is based largelyin the Crimeanport of Sevastopol,which imparts a militaryand geostrategicdimen- sion to Russia's policies withregard to the region.But probablythe most importantfactor is simplythat most Russiansfeel thatCrimea is Russian territory,that it has littleto do withUkraine, that it shouldnever have been transferredto Ukraine, and that rightfully it should be partof Russia. Russianclaims to Crimea,it will be recalled,were first raised directly in connectionwith Ukraine's declaration of independence.The firstattempt to reversethe 1954 transfer of the peninsula was initiatedby Vladimir Lukin, who was thenchairman of theRussian parliamentary committee on foreignaffairs and foreigneconomic relations, in January1992. The committeedrafted a résolution"On theDecisions of the Presidium of theUSSR SupremeSoviet of 19 February1954, and theUSSR SupremeSoviet of 26 April1954, Concern- ing theRemoval of Crimeafrom the RSFSR," whichproposed that the law- makersdeclare those decisions invalid and void of legal force.At the time, relationsbetween Kyiv and Moscow wereseverely strained over the Black Sea Fleet and thelarger question of the fateof the Sovietmilitary on Ukraine's territory,and the draftresolution was not acted upon so as not to further exacerbatetensions. Not long after,however, a groupof nationalistdeputies led by Sergei Baburinsucceeded in gainingoverwhelming approval for a resolutioninstructing two parliamentary committees to studythe constitution- alityof the 1954 decisionsand suggestingthat the Ukrainian parliament con- ducta similarreview. At thesame time,the Russian parliament approved an appeal to its Ukrainiancolleagues, urging them to recognizethe Black Sea Fleetas an indivisiblepart of the CIS StrategicArmed Forces. This was donein spiteof the factthat the CIS summitin Moscow (16 January)had already agreedthat the as yetundetermined part of theBlack Sea Fleetthat would be transferredto Ukraine did notconstitute a strategic force. The degreeto which theRussian parliamentarians saw theCrimean and Black Sea Fleet issues as intertwinedbecame apparent from the leaked excerpts of a letterfrom Lukin to RuslanKhasbulatov, the parliamentary speaker, recommending, among other things,that Crimea be used as a bargainingchip in theBlack Sea Fleetdispute. Lukinargued that after parliament invalidated the 1954 decisionson Crimea, theUkrainian leadership would be confrontedwith a dilemma:either it agreed to thetransfer of the Black Sea Fleetand its bases to Russia,or Crimea'sstatus wouldbe called intoquestion. The letteralso referredto the"special relation- ship"between Russia and Ukraine,which, Lukin argued, Ukraine wanted to severby orientingitself toward the West.

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In the springof 1992, Yeltsinsent Rutskoi to Crimeaand thebreakaway Transdniesterrepublic, where the Vice-President openly claimed that Crimea was partof Russia.Asked if he was awareof militaryequipment being trans- ferredfrom Crimea to Russia,Rutskoi responded sarcastically: "Why should we transferanything from Russia to Russia?"57His remarkscaused a stirin Ukraineand coincidedwith a warningfrom Yeltsin thatany attempton Ukraine'spart to changethe status of theBlack Sea Fleetunilaterally would resultin its beingplaced underRussian jurisdiction and subsequentlytrans- ferredto theCIS strategicforces. Kravchuk, in themeantime, signed a decree on 5 April1992 on measuresto createUkraine's armed forces, which presup- poseda navybased on theBlack Sea Fleet.This prompted Yeltsin to issue his own decreemaking good his earlierwarning. The war of decreeswas sus- pendedat the end of Aprilas partof an agreementreached in Odesa that committedboth sides to a moratoriumon unilateralactions and providedfor a workinggroup to preparea treatyon theBlack Sea Fleet.At the same time, nationalistRussian lawmakers attempted to place theCrimean question and the Black Sea Fleetissue on theagenda of theSixth Congress of Russian People's Deputies.The followingmonth, on 21 May, a closed sessionof theRussian parliamentadopted a resolutiondeclaring the 1954 decisionson Crimea"with- outthe force of law" and urgedthat the Crimean problem be resolvedthrough Russian-Ukrainiannegotiations, with Crimea's participation, and on thebasis of"the will of its population." It was againstthis background that Baburin was quotedas tellingthe Ukrainian ambassador in Moscow: "EitherUkraine re- uniteswith Russia, or therewill be war."58 The firstKravchuk- Yeltsin summit in Dagomysin June1992 did notpro- duce a solutionto theproblem of theBlack Sea Fleet,stipulating only that discussionsshould continue on theformation of Ukrainianand Russiannaval forceson thebasis of the Black Sea Fleet.The twoleaders met again in Yalta in Augustand decided that the Black Sea Fleetwould be dividedafter 1995. In the interim,it was removedfrom CIS subordinationand placed underthe direct commandof bothpresidents. The June1993 summitin Moscow resolvedthat the"practical formation" of theRussian and Ukrainiannavies was to beginin Septemberand thatthe fleetwas to be dividedevenly in accordancewith furtheragreements. The Massandrasummit in September1993 endedin confu- sion,with the two sides backingconflicting interpretations of what had tran- spired.The controversyfocused on whetheror not the Ukrainianside had actuallyagreed to surrenderits half of the Black Sea Fleetand its infrastructure in returnfor the cancellation of all or partof Ukraine'sdebts to Russia. The firstmore or less concreteagreement was reachedin Moscow in April1994, stipulatingthat the Russian and Ukrainian fleets would be based separatelyand thatUkraine would receive 15-20 percentof the warships and was followedby a moredetailed agreement in Sochiin June1995.59 None of these documents, it shouldbe pointedout, were ratified by eitherside.

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Having"disposed" of theCrimean question, at theend of 1992 theRussian Congressof People's Deputiesturned its attention to thestatus of Sevastopol. Actingon thebasis of a little-knowndecree adopted in October1948 by the Presidiumof the Russian Supreme Soviet that gave thecity a separateadminis- trativeand economicrepublican status, the lawmakersargued that because Sevastopolwas not,strictly speaking, a partof Crimeait, therefore, was never actuallytransferred to Ukraine. Accordingly, in July1993, the Russian parlia- ment passed a resolution,without a single dissentingvote, affirming Sevastopol's"Russian federal status," providing for its financingfrom the Russianbudget, and calling for negotiations with Ukraine on thecity's status as themain base ofthe single Black Sea Fleet.Dmytro Pavlychko, then chairman ofUkraine's parliamentary committee on foreignaffairs, qualified the move as tantamountto a declarationof war; Yeltsin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairsdenounced the resolution. For thefirst time in theUkrainian-Russian dispute,the international community, including the United Nations, publicly criticizedRussia for violating internationally accepted norms and agreements. The new bicameralRussian parliamentelected at the end of 1993 was considerablymore moderate than its predecessor,although it, too, reactedto developmentsin Ukraine.In connectionwith Crimea's decision in May 1994 to,in effect,renew its claimto independenceby restoringits earlierconstitu- tion,the State Duma adoptedan appealto theUkrainian parliament cautioning againstany forceful moves in theconflict between Simferopol and Kyiv, but at thesame time praising the Ukrainian leadership's handling of the situation and promisingto promotea constructivecompromise. Later in theyear, however, promptedby theUkrainian parliament's revocation of a hostof Crimeanlaws judged to be in violationof the Ukrainianconstitution, Russian lawmakers approveda declarationsaying that, although they recognized the realityof Crimeabeing partof Ukraine,they were concernedby Kyiv's actionsand suggestedthat these could jeopardize the ongoingnegotiations on the Black Sea Fleetand the signing and ratification of the basic Russian-Ukrainian treaty. Russia's positionon Crimea was seriouslyweakened by its campaignin Chechnya,although this did notprevent Luzhkov from declaring Sevastopol a districtof Moscow whileon a visitto thecity. The Ukrainianleadership took advantageof Russia's predicamentin the springof 1995 by abolishing Crimea's constitutionand its presidencyand temporarilysubordinating the Crimeangovernment to thecentral government. Representatives of theRussian governmentwere cautious in theirreactions, stating that Crimea was an inter- nal Ukrainianmatter. The StateDuma, however, did issuea statementexpress- ingits concern about the impact of thesedevelopments on Russian-Ukrainian relations,referring specifically again to the Black Sea Fleet talks and the negotiationson restructuringthe Ukrainiandebt. Less thana monthlater, however,Yeltsin, in his firstresponse to Kyiv's actions,insisted that the treaty withUkraine could not be signeduntil Russia was assuredthat the rights of the Crimeanswere being respected; later, he addedthat the unresolved problem of

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 38 SOLCHANYK theBlack Seat Fleetalso precludedhis visitto Kyiv.At aboutthe same time, Kozyrevmade the sensationalstatement, without referring specifically to Crimea,that in somecases theuse ofdirect military force might be necessaryto protectRussia's compatriotsabroad.60 In theaftermath of a meetingbetween Yeltsinand Ukraine'sacting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk in mid-April, it becameclear that the Black Sea Fleetwas themain obstacle to thesigning of thebasic treaty.Russia's pointof departurewas thatall of Sevastopolshould serveas thebase forthe Black Sea Fleet,which meant, in effect,that Ukraine wouldhave to yieldjurisdiction over the city to Russia.The Ukrainianleader- ship refusedto yield on this point as a matterof principle.The Russian parliament,in themeantime, continued to playan obstructionistrole. In Octo- berand December 1996, it passed several resolutions and statements that called intoquestion the division of theBlack Sea Fleet,the status of Sevastopol,and, indeed,Crimea as a whole.By thistime, however, it appearsthat Moscow's concernabout Kyiv' s Westernorientation - specifically, its courting of NATO, overshadowedall otherissues.

Conclusion

The statusof Crimeaand Sevastopolhave been primary concerns for Russia's electedrepresentatives, who accurately reflect the mood of their electors.61 For someonelike Luzhkov,whom many observers consider to be thefavorite to succeedYeltsin, Sevastopol, in particular,has becomesomething in thenature of a preoccupation.After one of his frequentvisits there in early 1998, the Moscow Mayor articulatedhis positionin a very straightforwardmanner: "Relationsbetween Russia and Ukrainewill notbe clear untila questionof principle,the status of theeternally Russian lands Crimea and Sevastopol,is solved."62In thefinal analysis, however, neither Crimea nor Sevastopol could standin theway of concludingthe basic treatybetween Ukraine and Russia, whichis therequired initial step paving the way forthe "normalization"of relations.In some sense,Russia had littlechoice butto acquiesce.Its hands weretied by commitmentsto respectUkraine's territorial integrity in interna- tionalagreements such as the TrilateralStatement (January 1994) and the Budapestagreements of theOSCE (December1994). More important,how- ever,was therealization that Ukraine's "European choice" posed the danger of completely"losing" Ukraine unless concessions were made. In February1995, thetreaty was finallyinitialed after Moscow droppedits insistence on a clause providingfor dual citizenship and a compromisewas reachedon a clearformu- lationof whatconstitutes the inviolability of borders.This leftthe Black Sea Fleetas theonly serious outstanding issue. Eventually,in early1997, Russia abandonedits previous policy of linkingan agreementon theBlack Sea Fleet to the treaty,which paved the way forthe long awaitedstate visit by the Russian presidentto the Ukrainiancapital and the ceremonialsigning. In February1998, Kuchma made his firststate visit to Russia and signeda wide-

This content downloaded from 184.94.134.74 on Fri, 3 Oct 2014 08:15:24 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND THE CIS 39 rangingand long-termprogram of economiccooperation. But problemsstill remain.Most important,the State Duma has given no indicationthat it is preparedto ratify the treaty. On thecontrary, ithas demonstratedthat it is ready to exploitnon-issues such as thealleged linguistic discrimination of Russians and Russian-speakersin Ukraineas a pretextfor rejecting the document. The firstconcrete steps have been takenon delimitingand demarcatingthe state borderbetween the two countries,which eventually should result in a formal treaty,although it is clear thatthe Russian side prefersso-called transparent bordersand would like to formalizethe conceptof CIS "externalborders." Specialistson bothsides have decidedthat further negotiations are apparently necessaryin orderto implementthe base-lineagreements on the Black Sea Fleet.The discussionson thedebts and assetsof the former Soviet Union seem to be goingnowhere. In themeantime, no one is quite surehow Ukrainian- Russianrelations will develop in thepost- Yeltsin era.

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NOTES

1. Admittedly,something approximating international relations between Soviet republicshad already made its appearance duringthe late perestroikaperiod. Specifically, in November1990, Leonid Kravchuk and ,at the timeheads of theirrespective parliaments, signeda treatyin Kyiv thathad all theaccoutrements of an inter-state document,with each side"recognizing the other as sovereignstates." For thetext, see Radians'ka Ukraina21 November1990, and below, Appen- dixA, pages 319-29. 2. The treatywas signedin Kyiv on 31 May 1997 and ratifiedby the Ukrainianparliament by an overwhelmingmajority on 14 January1998. As of July1998, the Russian parliament had notratified the document. Forthe text of the treaty, see Uriadovyikur'ier 3 June1997. 3. For thetexts of thethree agreements and theprotocol signed by thethen PrimeMinisters Viktor Chernomyrdin and Pavlo Lazarenko,see Vestnik voennoiinformatsii 10 (October1997): 15-18; 11 (November1997): 9- 10; and 1 (January1998): 17-19. For an analysis,see JamesSherr, "Russia-UkraineRapprochement!: The Black Sea FleetAccords," Sur- vival39(3) Autumn1997: 33-50. 4. Nezavisimaiagazeta 20 February1997 and 5 February1997, respec- tively. 5. Nezavisimaiagazeta 16 January1997. 6. Izvestiia24 February1998. 7 . Moskovskienovosti 22 December1991. 8. RomanSzporluk, "Belarus, Ukraine and theRussian Question: A Com- ment,"Post-Soviet Affairs 9(4) October-December1993: 366. 9. Interfax,27 October1997. This figure has remainedfairly stable. In June 1993, a poll conductedamong Russia's urbanpopulation yielded a 63 percentaffirmative response to thesame question. See Novoevremia 37 (September1993): 6. 10. Forthe text, see Krasnaiazvezda 22 November1997. 11. A. I. Miller, "Obraz Ukrainyi ukraintsevv rossiiskoipresse posle raspadaSSSR," Politicheskieissledovaniia 1996 (2): 135. 12. Kievskievedomosti 28 May 1997.This problem is discussedin some detail byRoman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood,"The Harriman Review 7(7-9) March-May1994: 5-6. 13. S. M. Samuilov,"O nekotorykhamerikanskikh stereotipakh v otnoshenii Ukrainy,"SShA - ekonomika,politika, ideologiia 1997 (3): 89. See also the rejoinderby A. Gararí[O. Harán'],"O 'rasizme' Grushevskogoi

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ukrainskomnatsionalizme kak 'pol'skoi intrige,'"SShA - ekonomika, politika,ideólo giia 1998 (1): 125-27. Readersinterested in a representa- tive sample of Russian interpretationsof "Ukrainianseparatism" are referredto the recentlypublished Ukrainskiiseparatizm v Rossii. Ideologiianatsional'nogo raskola. Sbornik (Moscow, 1998). 14. Izvestiia5 March1998. 15. See his introductorychapter "Russkie i ukraintsy:trudnye otnosheniia brat'ev,"in Dmitrii Furman, ed. and comp., Ukraina i Rossiia: obshchestvai gosudarstva (Moscow, 1997), 16. 16. I have in mind,specifically, the scholarlyand publicisticworks of AlekseiMiller and ArkadiiMoshes. Milleris a specialiston 19thand early20th century Ukraine. He contributedto theFurman volume cited above ("Rossiia i Ukrainav XIX-nachaleXX v.: nepredopredelennaia istoriia,"71-87) and edited,together with V. F. Reprintsevand B. N. Floria,and contributedto a collectionof articleson Ukrainian-Russian relationsentitled Rossiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootneshenii (Moscow, 1997). Moshes specializes in contemporaryUkrainian affairs. See, among others,his Vnutripoliticheskoerazvitie i vneshniaiapolitika Ukrainyv 1991-1995 gg. (Moscow, 1996) [=DokladyInstituía Evropy, RossiiskaiaAkademiia Nauk, 27]. 17. Quotedin theFinancial Times 27 March1996. 18. Kievskievedomosti 28 April1995. 19. Nezavisimaiagazeta 27 February1997. 20. GennaduZiuganov, Geografiia pobedy. Osnovyrossiiskoi geopolitiki (Moscow,1997), 248-49. 21. Forthe text, see LiteraturnaUkraina 6 September1990. 22. VechirniiKyiv 21 November1990. 23. Molod' Ukrainy2 December1990. 24. Forthe text, see Radians'kaUkraina 28 September1990. 25. Komsomol'skoe znamia 6 May 199 1. 26. Los AngelesTimes 3 1 July1 99 1. 27. Forthe text, see Rossiiskaiagazeta 27 September1991. 28. Reuters,27 August1991. 29. CentralSoviet Television, 27 August1 99 1. 30. TASS, 29 August1991. 31. Forthe text, see Molod' Ukrainy30 August1991. 32. Russkaiamy si' (Paris) 11 October1991. A yearearlier, Komsomol 'skaia pravda and Literaturnaiagazeta publishedSolzhenitsyn's well-known

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brochure"Kak namobustroif Rossiiu?" in whichhe proposedthat a new "Russia"called the Russian Union be formedon thebasis ofthe Russian, Ukrainian,and the Belarusian republics as well as a partof . 33. Le Figaro4 December1991, and AFP, 9 January1992. 34. For a detaileddiscussion, see RomanSolchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and theImperial Legacy," Post-Soviet Affairs 9(4) October-December1993: 353-54. For an excellenttreatment of Yeltsin's position on thepreserva- tionof the Soviet Union, see MarcZlotnik, "Yeltsin and Gorbachev: The Politicsof Confrontation,"in Mark Kramer,ed., The Collapse of the SovietUnion (forthcoming). 35. See theinterviews with Kravchuk in Paris Match26 December1991; RussianTelevision, 11 February1992; Sobesednik15 April 1992; and Leonid Kravchuk,Ostanni dni imperii. . . pershi rokynadii (Kyiv, 1994), 11-37. 36. See Yeltsin's addressto the Sixth Congress of Russian People' s Deputies inRossiiskaia gazeta 23 April1992. 37. ITAR-TASS, 14 December1992. 38. For thetexts, see Holos Ukrainy14 December1991 and 21 December 1991,respectively. 39. Nezavisimaiagazeta 12 February1992, and AFP, 20 February1992. 40. Uriadovyikur'ier 16 October1992. 41. Nezavisimaiagazeta 28 October1994. 42. Izvestiia(Moscow evening ed.) 7 August1992. 43. Diplomaticheskiivestnik 3-4 (February1994): 28-30. 44. Rossiiskaiagazeta 12 January1994. 45. Nezavisimaiagazeta 24 March1995. 46. Moskovskienovosti 3-10 April1994. 47. ITAR-TASS,9 June1994. 48. Forthe text, see Diplomaticheskiivestnik 10 (October1995): 3-6. 49. Forthe texts, see Sobraniezakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 13 (25 March1996): 3153-3154. 50. Delovoimir 6 February1997. 5 1. Uriadovyikur yier 1 8 July1 996. 52. See thereport entitled "SNG: Nachalo ili konetsistorii?" authored by KonstantinZatulin and AndranikMigranian in Nezavisimaiagazeta, 26 March1997. 53. Novoevremia 3 (26 January1997): 4.

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54. Izvestiia.22 January1998. See also TheEconomist 31 January1998: 53. 55. TASS, 23 January1992, and Rossiiskaia gazeta 24 January1992. 56. S. M. Chervonnaia,"Vozvrashchenie i integratsiiakrymskikh tatar v Krymu:1990-e gody," in V. A. Tishkov,ed., Vynuzhdennyemigranty: integratsiiai vozvrashchenie(Moscow, 1997), 148. For somewhatdif- ferentfigures, see JaneI. Dawson,"Ethnicity, Ideology and Geopolitics in Crimea,"Communist and Post-CommunistStudies 30(4) December 1997:429. 57. Quotedin Nezavisimaiagazeta 1 April1992. 58. Izvestiia(Moscow evening,ed.) 26 May 1992. 59. These agreementsare convenientlyreprinted in S. P. Kudriashov,S. O. Odarych,Iu. M. Orobets',and M. V. Tomenko,Karta Sevastopolia: triumfprezydentiv, trahediia Ukrainy (Kyiv, 1997). For a detaileddis- cussion of the Black Sea Fleet question, see Nikolai Savchenko, Anatomiianeobiavlennoi voiny (Kyiv, 1997). 60. The WashingtonPost 19 April1995, and the Los AngelesTimes 21 April 1995. 61. A nationwidesurvey in December1996 showedthat 70 percentof re- spondentsfelt that Sevastopol should be a part of Russia. See NG- Stsenarii10 April1997. 62. Quotedin Trud24 February1998.

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