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Volume 20 - 2012 Lehigh Review

2012 Economization of the War Stephen Erbrick

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Recommended Citation Erbrick, Stephen, "Economization of the Sierra Leone War" (2012). Volume 20 - 2012. Paper 42. http://preserve.lehigh.edu/cas-lehighreview-vol-20/42

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lehigh Review at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Volume 20 - 2012 by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ECONOMIZATION OF THE In the Sierra Leone , politically and SIERRA militarily counterproductive actions were commonplace and atrocities were committed LEONE against those who offered support. Despite efforts of external powers to broker peace agreements, WAR the various factions continued fighting. This study seeks to answer why the RUF was successful despite inferior numbers and strategies anathema to by Stephen Erbrick modern counterinsurgency doctrines. It analyzes how war legitimizes crime and the suppression of democratic politics, adding to the growing body of research on intrastate conflict and the political economy of civil war.

Halflife (detail) E’lana Lemon

65 “We fought ten years for nothing.” nomic, political, and military objectives of states that are also suffering from brutal –Gibril Massaquoi, spokesman for the RUF the opposing sides—the RUF and the SLA intrastate war that is caused and sustained high command (Sierra Leone Army)—and also how they by primarily economic factors and not real achieved their goals. Thus, I ask several or perceived ethnic divisions. subsidiary questions: what role did the initial political, social and economic con- Background “Conflict can create war economies, ditions play in inviting the RUF interven- The Political often in regions controlled by tion? Was the RUF primarily concerned Upon the death of Sierra Leone’s first rebels or and linked to with the exploitation of Sierra Leone’s prime minister in 1964, politics in the alluvial mines or did the RUF country became increasingly character- international trading networks; have real political aspirations as well? How ized by corruption, mismanagement and members of armed gangs can benefit did —of little or no value to electoral violence that ultimately led to a from looting; and regimes can ordinary Sierra Leoneans other than their weak and cynical civil society, the collapse attraction to foreigners—help finance the of the education system and a generation use violence to deflect opposition, decade-long conflict? Even more impor- of dissatisfied youth who would eventu- reward supporters, or maintain their tantly, did control of alluvial diamonds ally become the RUF.3 When President access to resources. Under these provide an incentive for the SLA and entered into politics in 1968 the RUF to tacitly collude to indefinitely Sierra Leone was a constitutional democ- circumstances, ending civil wars prolong the civil war so that they could racy.4 When he stepped down—seventeen becomes difficult. Winning may not maintain their unique access to Sierra Le- years later—Sierra Leone was a one-party be desirable: the point of war may one’s lucrative mineral wealth? And lastly, state with a lower GDP than both Somalia was the presence of the alluvial diamond and Rwanda.5 Steven’s rule, sometimes be precisely the legitimacy which it mines and unprotected villages a major called “the seventeen year plague of lo- confers on actions that in peacetime determinant of the RUF’s and the SLA’s custs,” saw the destruction and perversion 6 would be punishable as crimes.” sordid behavior towards non-combatants? of every state institution. Parliament was In Sierra Leone, the civil war legiti- undermined, judges were bribed and the –David Keen, The Economic Functions of mized various kinds of crime and the sup- treasury was bankrupted to finance per- Civil Wars, 1998 pression of democratic politics that served sonal projects that funneled millions of a multiplicity of local and individual goals. dollars to insiders.7 When Stevens failed Introduction Importantly, this report examines if local to coopt his opponents, he often resorted his report challenges the and individual elements had a strong in- to state sanctioned executions or exile. In assumption that the aim centive to indefinitely prolong the civil war 1985, Stevens stepped down and handed of war is to win. During to maintain their economic and political the nation’s preeminent position to Major the benefits and even their lives. In support General Joseph Momoh, a notoriously in- (SLCW), politically and of this claim, it took a determined inter- ept leader who maintained the status quo.8 Tmilitarily counterproductive actions were national force to tip the balance of power During his seven year tenure, Momoh wel- commonplace, enemies routinely col- of the local interests and end the ten year comed the spread of unchecked corruption laborated, and atrocities were committed long civil war.2 But, what are the impli- and complete economic collapse. Unable against the same population from which cations of the RUF’s success? Does the to pay its civil servants, those desperate both sides should have sought support.1 protracted and seemingly unending na- enough ransacked and looted government The primary question that this report will ture of the SLCW provide any lessons for offices and property.9 But the government attempt to resolve is why the RUF (Revo- structuring peace agreements when easily hit rock bottom when the treasury could lutionary United Front) was so successful accessible natural resources are present? no longer afford to pay schoolteachers and despite inferior numbers and barbarous Many of the conditions illustrated in this the education system collapsed.10 Because behavior that rebuked modern counter- report are not unique to Sierra Leone. Al- only wealthy families could afford to pay insurgency doctrines. In order to address though Sierra Leone was especially ripe private tutors during the late 1980s, the my primary question, I must examine the for conflict, the implications gleaned from bulk of Sierra Leone’s youth roamed the origins of the conflict as well as the eco- this report may be applicable to other streets aimlessly. Corruption and mis-

66 the lehigh review rule by Momoh and Stevens left ordinary unemployed youths.17 But it is important structure and its members were trained citizens with nothing. The most pressing to note that the local civilians referred to in the use of modern weaponry.27 The issues for these citizens were (and arguably many of these new soldiers as “sobels” or clashed with both government still are) basic: land, shelter and justice. “soldiers by day, rebels by night” because of and RUF forces and was instrumental in their close ties to the RUF.18 With morale countering government soldiers and rebels Major Actors low and rations even lower, many SLA that were looting villages.28 The success of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers discovered that they could do the Kamajors raised calls for its expansion, Organized in under the guidance better by joining with the rebels in loot- and members of street gangs and deserters and leadership of both Charles Taylor and ing civilians in the countryside instead of were also co-opted into the organization.29 , this rebel group during fighting against them.19 By mid-1993, the However, the Kamajors became corrupt the spring of 1991 intervened in Sierra two opposing sides became virtually indis- and deeply involved in extortion, murder Leone in an attempt to overthrow the tinguishable.20 and kidnappings by the end of the Momoh government and sparked a grue- conflict.30 some ten year civil war that enveloped the (EO) entire country and left 50,000 dead.11 The For $1.8 million per month (financed ECOMOG RUF had several objectives in addition primarily by the IMF), EO, a paramilitary The military branch of the Economic to financing and equipping its forces, but group from , was paid to ac- Community of West African States, this three were most important: crippling the complish three goals: return the diamond force intervened in the first days of the government’s commercial and industrial mines to the government, locate and de- conflict and was most significant following activities, undermining the physical se- stroy the RUF’s headquarters and operate the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council curity of the state and attracting interna- a successful propaganda program that (AFCR) coup.31 Condemning the AFRC tional publicity to their cause.12 The main would encourage local Sierra Leoneans to coup, ECOMOG forces demanded that the political goals of the RUF called were for support the GoSL.21 EO’s military force new junta return power peacefully to the the overthrow of the Momoh regime, the consisted of 500 military advisors and Kabbah government or risk sanctions and establishment of a multiparty democracy 3,000 highly trained and well equipped increased military presence.32 and an end to economic exploitation.13 combat ready soldiers backed by tactical Although the RUF used populist rhetoric air support and transport.22 Executive Geography and People to legitimize its initial and at- Outcomes employed black Angolans and Sierra Leone is a small state—approxi- tract supporters, it continuously failed to Namibians from South Africa’s mately the size of North Carolina—and articulate a coherent political agenda other old 32nd Battalion, with an officer corps of lies on the West African coast.33 It is sur- than criticism that highlighted the short- white South Africans.23 Harper’s Magazine rounded by its larger neighbors: comings of the constantly changing gov- described this controversial unit as a col- to the north and east, and both Liberia to ernment.14 It is conceivable that the RUF’s lection of former spies, assassins and crack the southeast and the Atlantic Ocean form initial rebellion was in part motivated by bush guerrillas, most of whom had served its western border. Of the fourteen ethnic the shortcomings of the government of for fifteen to twenty years in South Africa’s groups that settled in Sierra Leone, three Sierra Leone (GoSL), however as the war most notorious counter insurgency units.24 groups—the Mende, Temne and Limba— progressed, the RUF became increasingly are the numerically the largest.34 Although enamored with the cumulative benefits of Civil Defense Force (Kamajors) real and imagined ethnic divisions have Sierra Leone’s profitable natural resources A grassroots irregular force, the Kamajors influenced political contests and military and not political power.15 operated invisibly in familiar territory and recruitment in the past, the SLCW was not was a significant impediment to maraud- characterized by ethnic strife.35 Sierra Leone Army (SLA) ing government and RUF troops.25 For Originally a weak and rag-tag group, the displaced and unprotected Sierra Leonans, The Demographics of RUF Recruitment SLA was largely impotent during the first the Kamajors was a means of taking up As a result of the Liberian Civil War, year of the war.16 Within four years, how- arms to defend family and home due to 80,000 fled neighboring Liberia ever, the SLA had grown from under 4,000 the SLA’s perceived incompetence and ac- for the Sierra Leone-Liberian border.36 to over 17,000 troops by recruiting impris- tive collusion with the rebel enemy.26 The This displaced population, composed oned criminals and also by dragooning Kamajors had a well-organized command almost entirely of children, would prove

67 an invaluable asset to the invading rebel ence of diamonds in Sierra Leone invited thousands of civilians were expelled and armies because the and detention and fed the civil war in several important kept away from these important economic centers, populated first by displaced Libe- ways. First, the highly unequal benefits centers.45 rians and later by Sierra Leoneans, helped incurred from diamond mining made Although diamonds were a significant provide the manpower for the RUF’s in- ordinary Sierra Leoneans frustrated. For motivating and sustaining factor, there surgency.37 Abandoned, starving and in instance, the National Diamond Mining were other means of profiting from the dire need of medical attention, the RUF Corporation (NDMC)—DeBeer’s venture civil war. For instance, mining was took advantage of the refugees poor condi- during the Steven’s government—was used prominent in some regions.46 Even more tion by promising food, shelter, medical to fund luxurious personal construction common was cash crop farming through care and whatever profits they gleaned projects and extravagant salaries for gov- the use of forced labor.47 Looting during from looting and mining in return for ernment elites.42 With the RUF incursion, the Sierra Leone Civil War was not limited their support.38 When this method of the formal diamond mining industry col- to diamonds, but also included that of recruitment failed, as it often did for the lapsed; government sponsored diamond currency, household items, food, livestock, RUF, youths were then coerced at the bar- exports declined significantly during the cars, and international aid shipments.48 rel of a gun to join the ranks. After being civil war while Liberia, a state with very For Sierra Leoneans who lacked access to forced to join, many child soldiers learned few diamond reserves, exported more arable land, joining the rebel cause was that the complete lack of law—as a result than $2 billion worth of diamonds to Bel- an opportunity to seize property through of the civil war—provided a unique op- gium.43 This figure suggests that the profits the use of deadly force. But the most im- portunity for self-empowerment through garnered from the diamond trade with Li- portant reason why the civil war should violence and thus continued to support beria and other international clients were not be entirely attributed to conflict over the rebel cause.39 instrumental in financing both the RUF’s the economic benefits incurred from the and even Charles Taylor’s war efforts in alluvial diamond mines is that the pre-war frustrations and grievances did not just concern that of the diamond sector. Con- But the most important reason why the trary to some notable political economists, the root cause of SLCW was poor gover- civil war should not be entirely attributed nance, poverty, and corruption, and the to conflict over the economic benefits failure to create institutions that protected 49 incurred from the alluvial diamond the freedoms of individual citizens. mines is that the pre-war frustrations and The Sierra Leone Civil War (, 1991 to January 11, 2002) grievances did not just concern that of the On March 23, 1991, The RUF, with support from the special forces of Charles Taylor’s diamond sector. revolutionary army, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded East- Diamonds – The Natural neighboring Liberia. ern Sierra Leone.50 As the armies moved The Eastern and Southern districts in The RUF used funds harvested from towards the interior of the country they Sierra Leone, most notably the Kono and the alluvial diamond mines to purchase looted, raped, and murdered innocent the Koido districts, are rich in alluvial dia- weapons and ammunition from neighbor- civilians causing a massive refugee move- monds, and more importantly, are easily ing Guinea, Liberia and even SLA sol- ment into the neighboring countries of Li- accessible by anyone with a shovel, sieve, diers.44 Furthermore, the lack of external beria and Guinea.51 The village of Koindo and transport.40 Since their discovery in support made the control of the alluvial was a key target for the rebels during the the early 1930s, diamonds have been criti- diamond mines that much more impor- initial incursion because it was an impor- cal in financing the continuing pattern of tant. Most significantly, the presence of tant staging point for smuggling between corruption and personal aggrandizement easily extractable diamonds provided an Sierra Leone and Liberia.52 at the expense of needed public services, incentive for violence. To maintain control The initial rebellion could have easily institutions and infrastructure.41 The pres- of important mining districts like Kono, been quelled in the first half of 1991.53 But

68 the lehigh review the RUF—despite being both numerically inferior and extremely brutal against civil- ians—controlled two-thirds of Sierra Le- one by the year’s end.54 The SLA’s equally poor behavior made this outcome possible. Often afraid to directly confront or un- able to locate the elusive RUF, government soldiers were brutal and indiscriminate in their search for rebels or sympathiz- ers among the civilian population.55 After retaking captured towns, the SLA would perform a “mopping up” operation in which the townspeople were transported to concentration camp styled “strategic hamlets” far from their homes in Eastern and Southern Sierra Leone under the pre- tense of separating the population from the insurgents. However in many cases, this was followed by much looting and theft after the people were evacuated. This inevitably led to the alienation of many ci- vilians and pushed some Sierra Leoneans to join the rebel cause. For these reasons, civilians increasingly relied on the Kama- jors for their protection. Within one year of fighting the RUF offensive had stalled, but it still remained in control of large territories in Eastern and Southern Sierra Leone, leaving many villages unprotected while also disrupting food and government diamond produc- tion.56 Soon the government was unable to pay both its civil servants and the SLA.57 As a result, the Momoh regime lost all remaining credibility and a group of disgruntled junior officers led by Captain overthrew the govern- ment on April 29, 1992.58 Strasser justified the coup and the establishment of the Na- tional Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) by referencing the corrupt Momoh regime and its inability to resuscitate the economy, provide for the people of Sierra Leone and repel the rebel invaders.59 The NPRC’s coup was largely popular because it prom- ised to bring peace to Sierra Leone.60 But the NPRC’s promise would prove to be African Cheetah, Linh Do short-lived.

69 In March of 1993, with much help from capital at .67 and widespread food and ammunition ECOMOG troops provided by , In March 1995, the South African mer- shortages, many rebels still did not sur- the SLA recaptured the and Kono cenary group EO arrived in Sierra Leone render because they were extremely fearful diamond districts and pushed the RUF when the RUF was within twenty miles of of retribution from the now ruling Kab- to the Sierra Leone-Liberia border. The Freetown.68 As a military force, EO was bah regime and the Kamajor. In January RUF was facing supply problems as the extremely skilled and conducted a highly of 1997, the new democratically elected United Liberation Movement of Liberia for successful counter insurgency against government of Sierra Leone—beset by Democracy (ULIMO) gains inside Liberia the RUF. In just seven months, EO, with demands to reduce expenditures by the were restricting Charles Taylor’s NPFL’s support from loyal SLA and the Kamajors IMF—ordered Executive Outcomes (EO) ability to trade with the RUF.61 By the end battalions, recaptured the diamond min- to leave the country, even though a neutral of 1993, many observers thought that the ing districts and the Kangari Hills, a major monitoring force had yet to arrive.74 The war would soon be over because for the RUF stronghold.69 A second offensive embryonic peace process began to collapse first time, the SLA was able to establish captured the provincial capital and the almost as soon as was signed be- itself in the Eastern and the Southern min- largest city in Sierra Leone and destroyed cause of renewed Kamajor attacks and the ing districts.62 the RUF’s main base of operations near fear of punitive tribunals following demo- However, with senior government of- Bo, finally forcing the RUF to admit de- bilization kept many rebels in the bush ficials neglectful of the poor conditions feat and sign the .70 despite their dire situation. faced by SLA soldiers, front line soldiers The hiring of EO seems to demonstrates On March 25, 1997, a group of dis- became resentful and began helping that some elements within the National gruntled SLA officers freed and armed themselves to Sierra Leone’s rich natural Provisional Ruling Council still wanted to 600 prisoners from the Pademba Road resources. This included alluvial diamonds repel the RUF invasion. Another explana- prison in Freetown.75 One of the prison- as well as looting and “sell game,” a tactic tion is that the NPRC simply desired to ers, Major , emerged in which government forces would with- protect the capital (and themselves) while as the leader of the coup and the Armed draw from a town but not before leaving regaining control of the profitable mining Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)— arms and ammunition for the roving reb- districts. In short, the efforts of EO forced the new GoSL.76 After blessing from the els in return for cash.63 Abraham suggests Sankoh to cut his losses and enter into a captured and imprisoned Foday Sankoh, that both sides not only had an interest in ceasefire and peace process. This period of RUF fighters—who were supposedly on looting for personal enrichment, but also relative peace also allowed the country to their last legs—were ordered out of the had a reason to collude so that the strained hold elections during which the military bush to participate in the coup.77 Without RUF could remain a formidable fighting junta handed power over to the democrati- hesitation and encountering only light re- force, prolonging the war to the benefit of cally elected President Ahmad Tejan Kab- sistance from SLA loyalists, 5,000 rag-tag both parties. Renegade SLA soldiers even bah in March of 1996.71 rebel fighters marched one hundred miles clashed with Kamajor units on a number The Abidjan Peace Agreement was and overran the capital.78 Without fear or of occasions when Kamajors intervened signed on November 30, 1996.72 Abidjan reluctance, RUF and SLA dissidents then to halt looting and mining.64 Furthermore, mandated that EO was to pull out in five proceeded to parade peacefully together. an end to the fighting would have made weeks after the arrival of a neutral peace- In short, the coup had been planned in elections a certainty, ending the benefits keeping force. However, it soon became conjunction with the RUF leadership.79 that the NPRC military elites gained clear Sankoh and other hardline elements Koroma then invited Sankoh to join his from holding office.65 Instead of working within the RUF did not want peace. The government, and appointed him Deputy towards ending the war, SLA soldiers and main stumbling block that prevented Charirman of Mining after appealing to NPRC elites appeared to be acting to pro- Sankoh from signing the agreement soon- Nigeria (where he was imprisoned) for his long it.66 The war dragged on as a low in- er was the number and type of peacekeep- release.80 The joint AFCR/RUF leadership tensity conflict until January of 1995 when ers that were to monitor the ceasefire.73 then proclaimed that the war had been RUF forces and dissident SLA elements Had the RUF leadership legitimately want- won, and a great wave of looting and re- seized the Sierromco and Sierra Rutile dia- ed to end the conflict, they would have prisals against civilians in Freetown under mond mines in the South West, furthering requested more, not fewer, peacekeepers. the auspice of: ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ the government’s economic struggles and Despite the RUF’s loss of strongholds in followed.81 President Kabbah, surrounded enabling a renewed RUF advance on the the Kangari hills and Kailahun districts only by his bodyguards, left by helicopter

70 the lehigh review for exile in nearby Guinea. Lome Peace Agreement was not particu- patron-client relationships allowed the Condemning the AFRC coup, ECO- larly popular with the people of Sierra GoSL to exclude almost all of society from MOG forces demanded that the new junta Leone because Sankoh, the commander of any tangible economic development or return power peacefully to the Kabbah the unimaginably brutal and treasonous political representation.94 In societies that government or risk sanctions and in- RUF, was now handed the second most are organized along patron-client lines, creased military presence.82 Starting at the powerful position in the country and even the state still extracts and distributes Lungi aiport, ECOMOG forces formed more importantly, control over all of Si- resources, however the extraction and a three-pronged attack that surrounded erra Leone’s lucrative diamond mines. distribution is privatized and therefore the the capital of Freetown.83 Overcoming en- Following the Lome Peace Agreement, interests of the society suffer immensely at the hands of small but powerful individual and group interests.95 In political systems The Sierra Leone Civil War was the that are typified by entrenched patron- client relationships, politics becomes a result of decades of state neglect and business because political power controls exploitation. the distribution of economic resources.96 Thus, politics becomes economics. Con- sequently, life during the SLCW became a trenched AFCR positions, the ECOMOG several renegade elements within the RUF, competition for the distribution of already forces retook the capital and reinstated the like the “,” would require scarce resources and had disastrous conse- Kabbah government but let the rebels flee not only a 17,500 man UN intervention quences.97 without further harassment.84 However, but also a British intervention to finally tip A history typified by underdevelop- the regions lying just beyond Freetown the balance of power and end the war de- ment, single party rule, and widespread proved much more difficult to pacify.85 cisively on January 11, 2002.90 By most es- corruption generated a yearning for revo- In summation, ECOMOG’s intervention timates, over 50,000 people lost their lives lutionary change—especially amongst the in Sierra Leone brought a tentative peace in the Sierra Leone Civil War.91 Countless youth of Sierra Leone.98 Anger at the exist- that also reestablished the Kabbah regime more fell victim to the reprehensible and ing political system was pervasive, and through negotiated talks with the RUF/ perverse behavior of the combatants. That many youths concluded that the unfair AFCR rebels.86 Unable to push the AFCR/ May, hundreds of thousands of Sierra system of exploitation justified their often RUF rebels from South and Eastern Sierra Leoneans reelected President Kabbah, and violent attempts at obtaining prosperity. Leone, the Kabbah regime was forced to the RUF failed to gain a single seat in par- But most importantly, this great divide be- make serious concessions in the coming liament.92 A victor was never proclaimed, tween the “haves” and the “have-nots” of year. and it is evident that all parties involved Sierra Leone made the country particular- Given that Nigeria was due to recall its in the Sierra Leone Civil War had gained ly receptive to the RUF’s 1991 invasion.99 ECOMOG forces without achieving a tac- little in the end. The RUF’s initial rebellion was an attempt tical victory over the RUF, the internation- to address the grievances of those at the al community intervened diplomatically Analysis bottom of a political system that failed to to promote negotiations between the RUF/ Patrimonial System of Rule provide even basic state services. It was AFRC rebels and the newly reinstated Kab- The Sierra Leone Civil War was the result only in this environment of utter state col- bah regime.87 The Lome Peace Agreement, of decades of state neglect and exploita- lapse that such levels of sustained violence signed on July 7, 1999 is controversial in tion. To better understand the civil war, it could be maintained. that Sankoh was pardoned for treason, is paramount to remember the decades of granted official status at the Vice President, political collapse that enabled a dysfunc- The Economization of the Sierra Leone and made chairman of the commission tional state system to perpetuate a pat- Civil War that oversaw the entirety of Sierra Leone’s rimonial system of rule. In Sierra Leone, While political rationality is difficult to diamond mines.88 In return, the RUF patron-client relationships have extended find in the rebels’ and the government’s of- was ordered to demobilize and disarm its well past the time of colonial rule and have ten counterproductive tactics, some sem- armies through a process of disarmament, become commonplace in the modern po- blance of economic rationality was more demobilization, and reintegration.89 The litical system.93 This system of entrenched evident throughout the conflict. If one

71 takes a narrow conception of rationality as the conflict indefinitely so that they could independent operations. This fragmenta- pursing ones interests by the most efficient extend their presence in these remote tion was such that some rebels had little means possible, then making money at the areas. The RUF, and the SLA to a lesser or no connection to that of Sankoh’s RUF, expense of unarmed civilians while avoid- extent, relied heavily on mining and loot- as demonstrated by the renegade elements ing open confrontation with other armed ing to sustain their operations.102 Through within the RUF that were reluctant to groups becomes perfectly rational. This the illegal diamond trade with neighbor- demobilize following Lome even when does not mean that the rebels or govern- ing Liberia, the RUF generated $75 million Sankoh was awarded the Vice Presidency ment dissidents were primarily motivated annually which was then used to purchase and control of the country’s alluvial dia- by greed instead of grievance. Grievances arms, ammunition and equipment.103 In mond mines. Both the RUF and the SLA stemming from Sierra Leone’s low level of a weak state like Sierra Leone, control of fragmented once in contact with the rich development—e.g. perpetual poverty, poor the political center was not necessarily the alluvial diamond mines. These rogue ele- healthcare and non-existent education most efficient means of achieving wealth ments within the RUF, like that of the system—invited and sustained the RUF and power. For the impoverished and “West Side Boys,” even fought against RUF invasion. Thus, one of the RUF’s motivat- under-educated youth that constituted the forces during the late 1990s.107

Brutalization of Civilizations In our perverse world, civilians are The economic opportunities provided by the civil war coupled with the fragmenta- sometimes feared simply because they tion in the chain of command allowed are representative of some unknown and groups on both sides to brutalize citizens with little recourse.108 During the SLCW, therefore possibly dangerous element. low ranking SLA and RUF soldiers com- mitted violent atrocities against non-com- ing factors in intervening in Sierra Leone RUF, the alluvial diamonds mines were an batants, because they did not have to fight was the desire to overthrow the neglectful, easy means of improving one’s well-being. for the support of the local population authoritarian and self-interested Momoh For the RUF, warfare for expropriation when the economic benefits derived from regime.But Sierra Leone’s rich natural became its raison d’etre. It is conceivable mining and looting increasingly replaced resources and easily lootable commodities that if the RUF failed to maintain control their desire for political control.109 But also invited the RUF invasion and pro- of the alluvial diamond mines or refrained even when political control was desired as longed the conflict. from theft and robbery, then the conflict in the case of RUF elites like Sankoh, the would have likely fizzled out by the end profits earned from the diamond trade Protracted Nature of Conflict of the year given forceful government op- could be used to achieve political office Although reformist or revenge based mo- position.104 through bribery or violent insurrection. tivations motivatedinvited the rebel inva- Furthermore, the SLA could loot and sion to some extent, the attainment of the Fragmentation of Warring Parties pillage because it could rely on external alluvial diamonds mines and material re- In other intrastate conflicts that did not powers like ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, or sources from looting and theft increasingly involve a wealth of natural resources, only the British to protect the political center. became the overarching motivation for a small number of warring parties openly With actors on both sides less reliant on prolonging the insurgency.100 This does not confront each other because only a few the civilian population for support be- mean that the rebel forces did not wish to groups are capable of financing the war cause of profits earned from the diamond overthrow the government, but rather that effort.105 But the SLCW is different from trade, the belligerents’ main rational from the rebel factions wanted to gain political other intrastate conflicts in that the oppos- refraining from egregious acts of violence control as a means of maintaining their ing factions were fragmented and numer- was essentially marginalized. Moreover, as access to the vital economic resources.101 ous.106 In Sierra Leone, the rich benefits the civil war progressed, groups from both The alluvial diamond mines and raids on that could be reaped from the alluvial sides increasingly recruited criminals and villages were very real means of economic diamond fields and unprotected villages, derelicts to join their respective ranks.110 advancement for both sides in the civil war towns and cities enabled numerous actors This, coupled with independent factions and were powerful incentives to prolong to emerge because they could finance their that were able to operate free of the cen-

72 the lehigh review tralized chain of command, led to abuses against civilians during the SLCW that were high relative to counter counterinsur- gency doctrine. But both economic and political moti- vations are sometimes inadequate justifi- cations for the RUF’s and the SLA’s simply barbaric and unnecessary level of violence. According to Watch, 7,635 corpses were buried as a result of the January 1999 incursion into Freetown.111 Keen suggests that the AFCR/RUF rebels feared civilians and their because they stood beyond the system of collusion and therefore posed a substantial threat to their security.112 By passing or harbor- ing important information, civilians can hurt or betray, particularly because civil- ian women and children are not usually suspected. In our perverse world, civilians are sometimes feared simply because they are representative of some unknown and therefore possibly dangerous element. The A Tinge of Summer, Lihn Do ever increasing effectiveness of the CDFs Kamajors also added to the RUF’s fear of the civilian population. Given that the the economic motivation to continue the differ greatly from other intrastate con- Kamajors could not easily be targeted, in- insurgency. Sadly, the fragmentation of flict in which economic motivations play discriminate and gruesome attacks against the warring parties and economic ben- little role. civilians became common as the Kamajors efits gained from criminal and extractive Although the focus of this report has grew in strength. efforts facilitated the brutalization of the concerned itself with only the SLCW, civilian population because the lower this analysis has similar implications Conclusions and Implications ranks within the warring parties increas- for other cases in which the actors have All in all, access to Sierra Leone’s rich ingly lost interest in political control. access to valuable natural resources and natural and material resources—the allu- When the primary motivation of sustain- real and imagined ethnic divisions are vial diamond mines and unprotected vil- ing the war is the extraction of resources negligible. Importantly, these findings lages—enabled both sides to finance a war for personal enrichment, then it is more may improve our understanding of how that was increasing fought for economic likely that both sides would be less to prevent civil war and also how to re- motivations. The great wealth reaped from inhibited to commit atrocities against solve them successfully. But even more the vital economic centers had three pri- civilians.113 Coupled with an increasing importantly, if the actors in the Sierra mary effects. First, it enabled the fragmen- number of criminals and thugs that con- Leone Civil War had access to economic tation of both sides, because the individual stituted the armies of both sides, the civil and political advancement through other detachments could break away from their war took a barbaric turn. When civil war means than just civil war, then the exist- former leadership and still fund their mili- is no longer framed as a political contest ing conditions that invited the invasion tary campaigns with the income that they for control of the state, but instead de- would largely be marginalized and thus generated from mining and looting. Addi- volves into an economic contest between there would be little reason for conflict. tionally, the diamond mines and material individual, local and foreign elements, goods gained from theft were often used then it can be assumed that the manner for personal enrichment thus reinforcing in which the civil war will be fought will

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