Discussion Paper

June 2015

Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security

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Logo drawn as seperate elements with overlaps coloured seperately Peace monument in the central Azerbaijani city of Mingachevir. © Farman Nabiyev

Introduction of LOC and border incidents and their spread to new areas, in addition to rhetoric validating the use Mutual insecurity is a primary driver of the Nagorny of force, are embedding insecurity and closing off Karabakh (NK) conflict and a dominant factor in public debate of peaceful alternatives. contemporary Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Three episodes of communal violence and war The current peace proposal, known as the Madrid in 1905, 1918-20 and 1988-94 dominate modern Principles, addresses the issue of insecurity through Armenian-Azerbaijani history. The outcomes of the the envisaged deployment of an international 1991-94 Karabakh war included the segregation peacekeeping operation, as part of a wider security of Armenian and Azerbaijani populations, forced package. This would be implemented alongside displacement of more than a million people, and other key measures in the Madrid Principles, the establishment of a self-regulating ceasefire such as withdrawals from occupied territories, a line – without any peacekeeping forces and/or right of return for all displaced communities, the permanent military observers – far beyond the establishment of a land corridor between NK and territory originally under dispute. Armenia, as well as an interim status, guaranteeing Low-intensity conflict has recently increased security and self-governance, to the de facto along the state border between Armenia and authorities in NK. Beyond a fixed-term peacekeeper Azerbaijan, in addition to regular skirmishes along deployment, however, imagining future Armenian- the 260-kilometre Line of Contact (LoC), adversely Azerbaijani cohabitation and political arrangements affecting the lives of local populations. Meanwhile involves a much wider-ranging set of challenges for high levels of military spending, the diversification the transformation of security.

Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers • 3 View of the meeting point between Armenia, Nakhchivan/Azerbaijan and Turkey, from the road to Goris (Armenia). © Conciliation Resources

Despite the measures foreseen in the Madrid responses on the basis of international Principles, insecurity currently figures as a experience. It is based on discussions at a common argument as to why a peace agreement meeting of the Karabakh Contact Group (KCG), is unrealistic, unattainable or even dangerous. a platform for collaborative thinking on issues Consequently, even the advocacy of peace itself facing the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process. is securitised. It is therefore important to identify Facilitated by Conciliation Resources since 2010, post-agreement security challenges now, and the KCG was on this occasion hosted by the explore what kind of mechanisms and structures Carnegie Endowment for International Peace over could meet them, even if post-agreement scenarios two days in Washington in December 2014, and remain for now hypothetical. This is necessary to brought together Armenian and Azerbaijani civil overcome the ironic perception that peace is more society activists, policymakers and international dangerous than the militarised and unstable status experts on security and the Karabakh conflict. quo in the region today. Subsequent KCG discussions on this topic that have fed into this publication were held separately This discussion paper identifies several such in the region and engaged a wider circle of local security challenges, and considers possible expert opinion.

1. Securitising the status quo

Militarisation has been a key trend in the surrounding international context. The military Karabakh conflict over recent years. Whether fragmentation and confused lines of command through rearmament on the basis of oil revenues of the 1991-94 Karabakh war have become (Azerbaijan) or through geopolitical and military more professionalised armies with substantial alliance with the Russian Federation (Armenia budgets. In some areas local commanders have and the Armenians of NK), military competition is reportedly also been given increased decision- increasingly prominent, exacerbated by currently making authority, raising concerns about the high degrees of fluidity and uncertainty in the potential for local escalation. In a worrying sign

4 • Conciliation Resources Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers • 5 of escalation, higher-ranking combatants have operation. A High Level Planning Group (HLPG) been counted among recent casualties, although was mandated in 1995 to plan and provide conscripts continue to make up most of the 40,000 technical recommendations to the Chairperson- troops deployed along the LOC and the Armenia- in-Office for such a deployment (see box below). Azerbaijan state border to the north (totalling nearly Without a comprehensive agreement, however, a 570 kilometres), and a majority of the casualties. peacekeeping operation remains hypothetical, and Violence in the LOC area and along the border the post-framework agreement security package between Armenia and Azerbaijan has increased unclear. Ambiguity as to how an agreement would and diversified. Although the reporting of casualties provide for basic human security fundamentally is inevitably unreliable and politicised, as many undermines both imagining and advocating for a as 72 combatants were reported killed in 2014, peaceful settlement. the highest number since the 1994 ceasefire and In attempting to build scenarios for a post- effectively a doubling of casualty rates in recent agreement security package, KCG discussions years. In November 2014 an Armenian helicopter highlighted movement from “hard” to “soft” was shot down near the LOC, the first time that security regimes. In a fixed-term initial phase aviation has been downed since the ceasefire. international deployment would be envisaged in Military exercises are regularly held in the vicinity, support of a harder security regime capable of adding to tensions and an atmosphere of escalation. meeting post-settlement challenges, such as the The sole body mandated to monitor the LOC as a return of displaced communities. After a transition confidence building measure (whose field visits are from, and withdrawal of, international actors, local agreed in advance by all parties) is the Personal agencies would assume responsibility for long-term Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office of the “soft security”. Security scenarios ultimately need Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe therefore to allow for movement from a concept hard (OSCE), Ambassador Andrzej Kasprczyk, and five enough to prevent recurrences of tragedies such as field assistants. Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, towards a In the framework of the 1994 ceasefire agreement, softer concept of “borderless normality” associated the conflict parties have agreed in principle to the with uninhibited movement, mingled populations and deployment of a multinational OSCE peacekeeping local policing.

The High Level Planning Group The OSCE High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) was established in 1994 with an open-ended mandate, issued on 23 March 1995 and supplemented by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) directives. It was mandated to make recommendations to the CiO on a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force for the “area affected by the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference.” Within the OSCE, those recommendations are therefore limited to the NK conflict and no other OSCE areas. With its capacity originally planned at 31 officers, it is currently composed of five seconded military officers who normally stay for a period of three to four years. The structure is headed by an appointee of the CiO (at the moment a Swiss national), and located in Vienna (although not in the same premises as the OSCE headquarters). The HLPG reports directly to the CiO, and in cooperation with the Minsk Group co-Chairs and the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office participates in monitoring exercises. Following its mandate (“… to make recommendations on, inter alia, the size and characteristics of the force, command and control, logistics, allocation of units and resources, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing States”), the HLPG has developed four planning options, updated on an annual basis, which are only known in detail to the Parties. Planning is conducted in consultation with the involved parties, who rely on a veto right as well. While the OSCE has gathered great experience in unarmed monitoring missions, a post-agreement deployment would be its first mission involving soldiers. It would demand the agreement of all 57 participating states and a UN mandate. The timeline for an actual deployment would depend on a number of factors, in particular the willingness of OSCE states to contribute troops and consensus within the organisation. The HLPG synchronises its work with the Minsk Process and constantly keeps track of the developments on the ground, understanding itself as a purely technical organ.

Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers • 5 2. Understanding the security calculus

Without knowledge of the contents of a which is seen as preferable to the ceding of security comprehensive agreement, it is difficult to specify provision to outsiders, and is reflected in another parameters for a security package to support it. KCG participant’s view that “the best guarantee for Indeed, Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities regional stability is the preservation of balance.” reject any such exercise as premature and based Azerbaijani perceptions of security are currently on unfounded assumptions. Yet, this approach dominated by fears of entrenching an unfavourable effectively postpones the planning for a post- status quo, in which Azerbaijani territory is seen to agreement security architecture, and closes be under foreign occupation. Keeping the LOC area off public discussion on what the key security insecure is a way to challenge the normalisation challenges to a framework agreement would be, of occupation and “frozen” conflict, a strategy and how they can be addressed. Moreover, the over- currently supported by Azerbaijan’s substantial arching framework of the Madrid Principles allows military purchasing power. Azerbaijan rejects a certain number of assumptions to be made about military confidence-building and security-building other elements in the overall package. measures in the LOC area and sees deepened Armenian and Azerbaijani positions accord different international involvement in security arrangements meaning and prioritisation to security. Armenian as potentially weakening Azerbaijan’s leverage thinking on security prioritises the prevention and influence to counter the stagnation of an of future repetitions of historical episodes of unacceptable situation. Furthermore, there is no violence against Armenian communities. This residual population of Azeris living in NK today, drives a popular demand for self-reliance in hard and hence no incentive to support interaction or security, reflected, for example, in the prominence transformation of the local security situation in NK of the “Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army” in NK. itself. In the event of a comprehensive agreement, International involvement is seen as a dilution however, the mandated return of displaced and surrendering of this self-reliance, especially communities would transform both Azerbaijani in NK itself; in the words of one KCG participant, and Armenian outlooks on security. The viability “it would be more efficient and cheaper to keep of returnee communities in territory controlled the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as a provider of by the other side would require international security, than to transform it into a consumer of guarantees. In order to be sustainable, it would security.” For Armenia, military competition with also require a transformed security relationship Azerbaijan has motivated a deepening alliance between Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities, as with Russia, which contains a strong military well as those in NK (whether enjoying interim or component. This establishes a deterrence dynamic, final status).

3. Armenian, Azerbaijani and international perspectives on peacekeeping

Although the deployment of peacekeepers has A. Mandate been hypothetically accepted by the parties and KCG discussions highlighted the contrast between the OSCE, there is no consensus on scenarios. “traditional” and newer schools of peacekeeping. For the conflict parties, it is hard to imagine the The former envisages “inter-positioning” of introduction of a major new actor on the ground in peacekeepers between hostile parties, and a context that has seen no change in more than 20 consequently a harder enforcement mandate. years. For the international community, the political The latter imply a more holistic approach to and financial capital required for a peacekeeping peacekeeping involving not only traditional security deployment, and lessons learned in other post-war actors such as the military and police, but also a contexts, drives a cautious approach. wide range of other state and non-state actors, such Locally and internationally the reservations and as the judiciary, customs and immigration, ministries contradictions surrounding mandate, longevity, of defence and internal affairs, civil oversight location, armament and above all composition mechanisms and civil society organisations. of any such operation are considerable, as For Azerbaijan a key concern is to reassert detailed below. sovereignty and not to see the restoration of

6 • Conciliation Resources Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers • 7 The Mrav mountain range (known in Azeri as Murovdag) and surrounding landscape in the north of Nagorny Karabakh © Conciliation Resources sovereignty over previously occupied territories security will be being provided for, from whom and restricted by a peacekeeping operation. This can by whom…” Furthermore, Armenian arguments drive concerns to see a more limited mandate for seek the clarification of the status of NK prior to any such deployment. There may, however, be more discussion of peacekeeping mandates. If NK’s openness to discuss a more extended mandate secession is ratified, as Armenians wish, then the for a peacekeeping operation when this issue is need for peacekeeping diminishes and becomes placed in the context of overseeing the return of symbolic. Finally, Armenian thinking predicates the displaced communities. Yet the return of displaced deployment of peacekeepers on a transformation communities need not be seen solely as a security in political conditions. Belligerent rhetoric and risk, or as a “necessary evil” to legitimate a peace a siege mentality would, in this view, make any agreement. Armenian-Azerbaijani cohabitation can peacekeeping deployment premature and even also be re-imagined as generating cross-community dangerous, as illustrated in various conflicts stakes in security, and hence as a kind of security across the world where peacekeepers have guarantee. This approach requires a much longer- been unable to fulfil their mandate and prevent term capacity building process reaching into the recurring violence. period beyond international involvement. B. Longevity Armenian-Azerbaijani cohabitation Parties’ preferences regarding the longevity “ of peacekeeping are moderated by the high can also be re-imagined as likelihood of limited timeframes for international generating cross-community engagement. KCG discussions highlighted the lack stakes in security, and hence as a of international appetite for extended peacekeeping operations today. According to one KCG participant, kind of security guarantee. “The world is tired of long-term peacekeeping ” operations; if a settlement demands a long-term Armenian positions are cautious and sceptical peacekeeping deployment, then it’s not seen as about engaging in a discussion of an international a settlement.” International engagements are peacekeeping mandate. Any such mandate is more likely to seek fixed timeframes and clear perceived in largely zero-sum terms vis-à-vis exit strategies. If deployment appears to maintain the role of Armenian security providers. As one a dysfunctional situation by separating people in KCG participant noted, “We don’t know whose the absence of real agreement, it will be unlikely

Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers • 7 to gain support. These limitations emphasise the mission. Doubts were expressed within the KCG integral role of domestic security providers, and regarding the viability of a purely civilian mission consequently, the importance of political change (which would effectively be an extension of the and public commitment to peace at both elite and unarmed civilian monitoring mission active today) societal levels. in an immediate post-settlement Karabakh context. Yet at the same time international preoccupation with defined and limited engagement naturally If a settlement demands a focuses attention on conflict parties’ capabilities “long-term peacekeeping and commitments to assuming responsibility on deployment, then it’s not seen as a the ground. In the words of one KCG participant: settlement. “The robustness of an agreement has to come in ” political authority, not in peacekeeping numbers or armaments.” C. Location The location of peacekeeping deployment E. Composition is contingent on the modalities of displaced The composition of a future peacekeeping operation community return and territorial withdrawals. by national origin is the aspect currently attracting KCG discussions highlighted variation in the likely the most controversy. Highly variable degrees of local needs of different regions. This could point trust in specific “great powers”, particularly Russia, to multiple peacekeeping zones, with different negative perceptions of past experience of Russian- profiles of deployment, mandate and responsibility. led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) The return of Azerbaijanis to NK is the area that peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the South most clearly implies a need for traditional “inter- Caucasus, and contrasting geopolitical vectors in positioning”, at least in early phases; a local and the foreign policies of the conflict parties make specific security architecture could cover Shusha agreement on peacekeeper selection elusive. Current (known to Armenians as Shushi), or formerly fluidity in the wider Caucasus and Black Sea regions Armenian-populated territories to the north of the makes discussion of this issue especially difficult. LOC, for example, as shared locations. A different KCG discussions highlighted contrasting set of modalities would apply in Agdam or Fizuli, approaches to this issue. In the past there was where Azerbaijani police forces would be policing reported to be a “gentleman’s agreement” amongst Azerbaijani returnee communities. Particular the mediators that peacekeepers would include “no difficulties are likely to attach to arrangements Minsk Group co-Chair countries and no neighbours.” in Lachin and Kelbajar as strategic territories In the light of questionable capacity and situated between Armenia and the former NK commitment from countries neither involved nor autonomous region. close to the Caucasus, this approach was contrasted In today’s environment, a zonal approach proposing with a “regional stakeholder” approach. This would variable mandates clashes with contemporary seek to establish stakes in security provision rhetoric attaching uniform sovereign claims to amongst those regional actors with interests and territory. Yet in the event of a comprehensive capacity, without giving any single one of them a agreement, security challenges are likely to dominant majority. Realistically as of this writing, vary by locality. This also offers opportunities for Russian would be likely to be the lingua franca of agreements through locally-relevant trade-offs any such force; Iran’s involvement in peacekeeping within an overall package. was also noted as a possible broadening of relevant stakeholders. D. Armament The question of peacekeeper armament is The robustness of an agreement conditioned by the parties’ varying prioritisation “ of security, captured in this way by one KCG has to come in political authority, participant: “Azerbaijanis see a very small group not in peacekeeping numbers or of unarmed peace monitors; Armenians see the armaments. other end of the spectrum: one for one, fully armed ” peacekeeping forces.” The composition of peacekeepers could also vary There is a wide spectrum of different types of by area of deployment, in order to accommodate peacekeeping mission, ranging from unarmed and geopolitical sensitivities; if some nationalities are civilian, to unarmed but not entirely civilian, to a more welcome in some areas than others, they more “traditional” armed and “inter-positioning” could be deployed there. Nevertheless, there are

8 • Conciliation Resources Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers • 9 strong fears of “geopoliticised” peacekeeping could be met by clear, prior definitions of roles and ultimately compromising national sovereignty. geographic remit. There was a certain consensus Concerns regarding disproportionate representation in the KCG that it was better to involve potential in peacekeeping or dominance by any one country “spoilers” than to exclude them.

4. The security commitment dilemma

The differences in emphasis and approach incentive the conflict parties have to contemplate outlined above reveal a dilemma in strategising the necessary risks in moving to agreement. This for Armenian-Azerbaijani security. The less the reality was expressed in the comment: “Without conflict parties offer in terms of commitment to a stable base for implementing a framework de-securitising their relations, the less likely it is agreement, discussing peacekeeping takes us down that broad-based international engagement will a dangerous road where we’ll discuss fictional be forthcoming. Without this engagement, it is threats and opportunities and miss the real ones.” more likely that eventually peacekeeping will fall More explicit international commitments to a post- to regional actors more likely to have cross-cutting agreement security architecture could contribute to geopolitical agendas, which the parties do not mitigating this dilemma. want. This eventuality was captured by one KCG participant: “Either Armenians and Azerbaijanis do Either Armenians and Azerbaijanis this together, with each other, by themselves, for “do this together, with each other, themselves, or someone is going to do it for them.” by themselves, for themselves, Yet the less that the international community offers in terms of specified commitments to securing or someone is going to do it an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement, the less for them.”

5. Local policing

The likely limitations to any international As noted above, thinking on post-conflict security peacekeeping deployment make it necessary to has evolved in recent years from a traditional imagine the transition from international to local concept of “inter-positioning” PKF to a more security provision and hence the future roles of holistic approach premised on the reform of local security providers. Unfortunately, the parties security sectors to become responsive to, and have never agreed upon the importance or validity legitimate in, societies. This approach requires of a local policing approach, so only the military long-term, even generational, change in the way aspect of post-agreement security has been that key institutions such as the police, judiciary thought about. This is bound to be a hypothetical and civil oversight operate. Yet there is a relatively discussion at the moment but without it, it is short window from agreement to implementation impossible to imagine post-settlement scenarios in which to develop capacity for a robust repertoire beyond segregation. Furthermore, as one KCG of local policing practices adequate to the context. participant observed: “Without transforming In the KCG discussions it was observed that, governance, none of the military aspects would “you don’t always have a lot of time before your have the functionality or ratification to work… peacekeeping force starts to look like an occupying Unless this is an imposed peace.” one.” This highlights the importance of consultative Without transforming governance mechanisms providing for three-way “none of the military aspects communication between international deployments, local security providers and local communities. would have the functionality or It also highlights the importance of securing ratification to work… Unless this is commitment to addressing these issues as part an imposed peace. of a framework agreement in as comprehensive a ” way as possible. While practice in other contexts differs, and in some instances issues that were not

Securing an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement: the roles of international and local security providers • 9 specified at the negotiating table need to be fleshed The issue of security sector reform in unrecognised out by commissions, committees or other bodies entities is both sensitive and controversial, yet it is already at the implementation stage, there are risks critical to making sustainable political arrangements in leaving much of the detail to a later stage when and ensuring the return of displaced persons in the expectations of implementation are already high. future. Discussion at the KCG of experience in other It can be both possible and useful to undertake contexts highlighted that it can be possible to create technical talks on specific issues in advance of conditions for a higher margin of tolerance for non- a framework agreement, and discussions held governmental organisations to engage with de facto at this stage to identify appropriate mechanisms authorities on security and justice issues. While it is could assist at various stages of implementation. hard to envisage progress being made on this vis-à- This is in line with the Minsk Group co-Chairs’ vis NK, institutional and security sector reform in NK mandate that includes the promotion of “direct remain central aspects to any post-settlement local talks, as appropriate, and substantial talks, among policing perspective on security. the parties to the conflict.” Armenians have strong reservations about starting such talks before an Work along the international de jure boundary overall package, including the status of NK, has between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers more been agreed upon. However, such talks would not possibilities at present than the highly politically- be limited specifically to security-oriented remits, sensitive environment of the LOC, although it is still and the work that could be done in advance to a challenging environment. A project initiated in flesh out detail could make an agreement more 2014 by local partners supported by the UK-based robust when it comes to the implementation stage NGO Saferworld has initiated a civilian monitoring – hence helping to secure it. Such discussions may scheme documenting ceasefire violations affecting be limited to mainly governmental personnel but civilians and their property. Work on this local level would have greater legitimacy if they also involved has successfully mobilised the natural pragmatism non-governmental participants and a degree of of local contexts and avoided the more political public consultation. interests at play at the national level.

10 • Conciliation Resources This publication is based on a meeting of the Karabakh Contact Group (KCG), an initiative established by Conciliation Resources in 2010 aimed at generating policy-relevant thinking about the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. Held over two days in Washington in late 2014, this meeting brought together Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society activists, policy-makers and international experts on security and the Karabakh conflict. Subsequent KCG discussions on this topic that have fed into this publication were held separately in the region and engaged a wider circle of local expert opinion. This publication was made possible by the generous support of the European Union, through the “European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK)”. Although drawing on the KCG discussions, the views presented here (with the exception of quotes) are Conciliation Resources’ own, and cannot be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or individual participants in the KCG. Possible entry points for future dialogue

A. Specifying international commitment C. Community perspectives on security to security Institutions that have the capabilities, the values A paper setting out what is required and and the oversight to understand and provide anticipated in terms of international security in a post-conflict situation need to commitments to post-agreement security gain legitimacy through citizen participation. could clear some of the ambiguities and fears Opportunities are extremely limited in today’s surrounding this all-important aspect to the securitised context, but more work can be peace process. Research could be undertaken done in the de jure Armenian-Azerbaijani by an international NGO or think tank drawing border area. This may be very local in its on best practice in the OSCE area, soliciting context (for example, cooperation on lost the views of key international actors and livestock, irrigation, documentation of ceasefire setting out a range of scenarios. This would violations). Lessons learned can be taken up to help make clear to local actors the extent the level of national policy. of support they may count on to minimise security risks in a post-agreement scenario, D. Planning for bridging the gap between and help them to overcome the security agreement and implementation commitment dilemma. There is a critical time-period between the signing of a framework agreement and the B. Local security sector reform full negotiation of a comprehensive peace International involvement in post-agreement agreement when on-the-ground security security provision must be seen in terms provision will face special challenges. This of partnership and an eventual handover to underscores the need for comprehensiveness local security providers. Long-term “micro- in agreements. Today’s extremely security” capabilities adequate for policing narrow negotiating format works against and providing security in challenging contexts comprehensiveness, and could be extended of Armenian-Azerbaijani cohabitation require to include meetings between Armenian and an overhaul of Armenian and Azerbaijani Azerbaijani Ministers of Defence. Working security sectors today. If the future security of groups, including a strong civil society returnees, and the populations among whom and expert component, could also assist they would live in the Karabakh area, is to in the advance work of identifying the full be provided for, this process must include de range of issues to be addressed in a future, facto agencies in NK. comprehensive agreement.

Cover photo: Soviet roof decoration (“Mir/Peace”) in a main street of Nagorny Karabakh’s capital. © Conciliation Resources

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