CONlSEIL. DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL «"ILi. r-

NATO UNCUSSlFfED (•: x ]•: m im. a f n i; and N" j PUBLfC DISCLOSED <.; o i y

OPTQTNAL^,, ENQLÏSH/PRE-HCK MATO OEQfiBg' 18th April 1933 • ADDENDUM t.o 3 DOCUMENT ç^MÎSSlîlê

TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY

ADDENDUM

to

( dated 1st December, 1 952)

At its meeting on 21+th Januaryg the Council agreed that the Working Groun on Trends in Soviet Policy should. be re-convened to revise or supplement its report on Trends in Soviet Policysw which was considered by Ministers in December.

2. Due to the rapid change of events' since Stalin's death and the shortage of time available, the Working Group was unable to prepare and adequately consider a paper. The Working Group therefore requested the Secretariat to prepare a text (Annex)' for consideration by Ministers. 3. . This paper is listed under Item I. of the draft agenda for the Ministerial Meeting. • DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED -2- NATO SECRET ADDENDUM to C-Mr^gJTTjT

TRENDS IM SOVIST POLICY

PART_I

- SUMMARY

Before Stalin's death, it seemed possible that stresses and strains within the were causing the Soviet lea- ders some' anxiety. There was and is no evidence .of any organized resistance, even of a passive kind; but Stalin seems to have been once more preoccupied with the old problem of human re.sis-. • tance to the forced pace . of Soviet economic development, in the form, it seems, of indifference, and the desire for an easier life. In the light of the release of the doctors, it is also possible that important circles in the Soviet hierarchy disa-. greed with Stalin's more repressive methods. In addition, there may have been some fear of the- intentions of the new United States Administration. It appeared that Stalin was dealing with these problems in his own characteristic way by. staging his ideological campaign, by the drive for "vigilance" dramatised in the "Doctors' Plot" and by. the minor purge in progress when he died. Externally, Soviet policy was based on unremitting hostility to the West, which expressed itself mainly in a world- wide campaign to split and undermine the non-Communist countries ana to isolate the United States.

2, When Stalin died, his .principal colleagues were faced •not only with these internal difficulties, but with the problem of the transfer of power in a totalitarian state. No successor had.been publicly selected. They treated the situation as. one of emergency, and in announcements immediately following Stalin's death stressed the danger of "panic and disarray", and the need for the people to close their ranks round the Communist Party. They acted swiftly to consolidate their -hold on the administra- • tion, and in. addition soon made a number of reassuring moves in both, their internal and external policies.

3.- The administrative readjustments have been: DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED (a) The eight leading members of Stalin's old have assumed the key posts in the new administration, maintaining roughly the same relative positions as they occupied before Stalin died. . Molotov' s ranking after both •• Malenkov and Beriya is the only apparent irre- gularity, and stresses the prominence•of the • latter two. .

(b) They have reorganized the Government so that 'Malenkov and the five Deputy Prime Ministers (Beriya, Molotovj Bulganlnj- Kaganovich and Mikovan)" have more direct control over the -3- MATO SECRET ADLEm

, affairs, defence and trade are under their J immediate supervision; and the other Minis- y tries have also been streamlined so that the h chain of command will bs simpler. The pattern 3 recalls the emergency measures taken by the j USSR early in World War II.

H -(c) They have reorganized the presidium of the ] Party so that discussion of policy will be ^ confined to a small group; it now consists I of fourteen members instead of the thirty- j six agreed "at the 19th Party Congress.

3 (d) They have reorganized the Party Secretariat, from which Malenkov resigned. Khrushchev has 5 , become the chief Party Secretary, but it is , not yet clear whether this means an effective 1 3 . r diminution of Malenkov's power.

km The main gestures listed in detail in- C-M(53)38 have been: 3 H H (a). Internal H 3 ' (i) The popular Marshal Zhukov has been res- d töred to favour and given a post in the 3 Government; (though this may'be a con- ^ cession to the power of the Army).

^ • (ii) They have granted an amnesty on an even, j bigger scale than that granted at the end / of the war {sentences of less than five 3 • years cancelled, as compared with three)'. 1 ) ' (iii) They have released the Moscow doctors J whose, arrest was announced on January 1i+th J and have publicly castigated the methods 3 of the former Ministry of State Security. 3 • , V jH .{iv; The annual, lowering of prices announced on the "Ist April, covers a wider range of goods

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 3 • than in the last two years. ^ . (b) External 5 The more important reflections of the new line ^ " have been: H h (i) Molotov's undertaking to obtain the release ft2 , - . . . of V/esterri civilian internees in Korea. ^ • (ii) The Coimiiunist offers' endorsed by Molotov j to exchange sick and wounded prisoners in ^ • L Korea and to resume the negotiations at PanmunJom; and of a more flexible formula for ttlR TlRriPitriPitirin nf -nrH arm pr>Q nf w/qt»_ • HATO SECRET ADDENDUM to CzML52Hir

(iii) Soviet acceptance of Mr. Hammarskjold as the new Secretary General of the' United Nations.

(iv) Mr. Vyshinskyrs apparently more flexible approach in the United fïations to the question of disarmament.

(v) Minor conciliatory gestures in Germany such as the proposal for air safety talks, the easing of certain restrictions on Berlin communications.

5» None of- the external moves has yet resulted in any real concessions by the Soviet Government on a major political issue» So far, their foreign policy has a new look rather than a new content. internally, their repudiation of the doctors' plot seems.to be' their.most significant act to date since it suggests that they may be prepared to go to considerable lengths to give the impression of safeguarding the liberty of the subject, and that they may wish to dissociate themselves from the more repressive and unpopular of Stalin's methods.

PART II

RECENT- DETOLOPrIENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Almost at once after assuming power the new GovernmerLt in the Soviet Union made a' number of reassuring moves in inter- national, affairs. In,their orations at Stalin's funeral Malenkov., Beriyaand i'£olotov protested their peaceful intentions (though in terms little different from those used by Soviet propaganda in the past) and refrained from provocative attacks on the vVest, Reports of greater courtesy and moderation on the part of Soviet representatives, already, current before.Stalinfs death, have since come in from many quarters,. The moves in question' have been listed in G'-M(53)38 and summarised in Part I.

7.. . These moves appear to- represent a new approach in

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED international affairs. The problem they pose is whether there •is going to be a real change in the Soviet attitude to the Western world, or whether they merely indicate a temporary tactical retreat and if the Iatterj how great the retreat is to be. With the possible exception of the move toward a Korean armistice, these moves have cost.the Soviet Union nothing. • 8» On general grounds it would be unwise to expect a change of basic policy in a Government which has changed so little in . composition. All the present Soviet leaders have been associated with .Stalin for many years, and in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary must be presumed to have shared his basic- assumptions on the relations between the Soviet Union and the • Western Powers, i.e.: that the world has split into the two camps -5- IAT0J3EÇRET ALDENDUM_ to C-^iIliE

of socialism arid capitalism (now headed respectively by the Union of Soviet. Socialist Republics and the United ' States' of America) between which a constant struggle is inevitable. Indeed/ in their public speeches (e.g.'Malenkov's report to the 19th Party Congress last October) all the Soviet leaders . have .subscribed to .this thesis; and according,to it any real and lasting settlement-between"the two worlds is out of the question. In Bpitej therefore-, of the moves by the Soviet Government which have been listed.there can at present be nc grounds for believing. that the ultimate objectives of Soviet policy are in any way changed. They remain: the disruption of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and promotion of ' " revolution in colonial and 11 semi-colonial" territories; and in the longer term, the establishment of a world system of Commu- nist States under Soviet leadership.

9. Though Soviet ultimate objectives and Soviet strategy must be expected to remain constant there is room for considerable fluctuations in Soviet policy on the tactical plane; and it has now become clear that the new administration are deliberately trying to give the appearance of a more flexible approach. The following explanation^ appear the most likely;

.(a)' The Soviet leaders may have been conscious of internal weakness and wish not only to lower the international temperature but to show the Soviet people that under the new Government peace is more secure than it was under the old; and (b.) They may hsve felt that the new situation offered a. suitable opportunity for a more subtle approach in foreign policy which would be better calculated to divide the Governments which were opposed to them and lull their populations into an easy sense of security; and perhaps promote a severe economic recession in the West with obvious repercussions on Western solidarity and unity. (c) There may have been some uneasiness over the possible reactions, of the new American administration and of its Republican supporters if no attempt was made to reduce international tension. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED It is quite possible that the Soviet' leaders have been influenced by all these considerations. 10. The absence of Stalin will obviously make differences ' to Soviet policy in detail but the-rs seems no reason to think that it will radically alter the Soviet threat. One obvious factor will- be missing - Stalin's personal prestige in general and not least his prestige as a supreme- arbiter on doctrinal matters, his positior as the'successor-of Marx. Engels and.Lenin. This may make rela- tions with-China and even with the Satellite States more difficult, though even here it- v/oula be unwise to expect a significant weak- ening of Moscow's authority. The Kremlin will be able, to quote the words of Stalin to support any advice or ruling which they may consider it desirable to ?1vr to other Cnmrnunist Parti rb. MnrR NATO SECRET ADDENDUM to C-M( 52 )116

PART III

THE POST-STALIN REGIME IN THE U.S.S.R.

Il1 The government and party changes carried, through follow- ing Stalin's death on'5th March were rapid, thorough, and on the surface orderly. Malenkov ( see Appendix) headed a small group of former Politbüro members who concentrate^ all power In their hands, Regardless of any potential rivalries^ these leaders were intent upon giving an appearance of unity to the Party and to the Soviet peoples, to the satellite.parties and populations, to Communist China, and to the world outside the Soviet sphere.

12; Concentration of authority and public assignments of responsibilities found expression in the changes announced on 6th March, a few hours after Stalin's death. ' Malenkov took over" the premiership and .first place.in a Party Presidium cut back to 10 members and k candidates, approximately the' size of the old Politburo. State executive power was concentrated in a group of ' five, comprising a new Presidium of the Council of Minister's. Ministries were combined, in the changes announced on 6th March and at the ratifying meeting of the Supreme Soviet on 15th March, and placed directly under top leaders, thus putting in their hands control over the instruments of" power. The measures were similar, both in nature and in the personalities involved, to the•emergency' measures taken during the wer, and were apparently intended to maximise preparedness for any domestic or foreign eventuality.

13. Although Mslenkov received deference as the No. 1 leader, on li+th March he relinquished (according to a.n announcement six days later) his post as secretary of the Central Conrnittee, a position consistently held by Stalin,- (The latter- for the first time.in 19^1 assumed a post at the top of the government apparatus comparable to his post at the head of the Party, apparatus). On the surface, at least, this separation of Malenkov from the Party post appeared to indicate that he was not destined toacquire, at least immediately, the plenitude of power held by Stalin. ; A reversal of an early trend in press, radio and local organizations to build up Malenkov suggested t-hat there is to be no early effort to „make Malenkov into a "new Stalinlr. Instead it appears that stres

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED will be upon collective leadership.

14. The reduction of the Presidium of the Central Committee from 25 members and 11 candidates emphasised the concentration of power in the hands of the old Politburo members. Of the 10 full membersj 8 were from the old Politburo, and one of the four candidate-members (Shvernik) was an alternate member of the former Politburo. The two non-Politburo members of the new Presidium, Saburov and Perbukhin5 are experienced government industrial ad- ministrators; the three non-Politburo Candidate-members, Pono- marenko, Melnikov, and Bagirov, rose s.s party chiefs.

15. The inner group designated, as the highest executive organ'of the government, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, -1- NATO SECRET ADDENDUM to C-M(52)116 '

Chairmen Beriyas Molotovs-Bulganin, and'Kaganovich. The assumption of key ministerial posts hy Beriya (police), and Bulganin (-armed'forces) added additional weight to their power positions,

16. Ministerial consolidations reduced the number of ministries and quasi-ministriès from 57 to 27f and carried departmental organization back to the pattern of 15 years earlier. In all probability this development is an emergency measure to concentrate administration in the hands of the top leaders themselves and their closest associates. In addition to those mentioned , single ministries were estab- ' lished for various Industriess agriculture, trade and cultural • activities,

17. Changes in the Party Secretariat brought that organ back to its pre-October 1952 sise, with Khrushchev as ranking secretary. He is the only Party Presidium-member with a job in the Secretariats where he has served since 1949.' Suslov.. has been a secretary since 1947. Three new secretaries' were added on ' l4th March: Ignatev , who has g.ppareritly most recently been chief of the security police; Pospelov., a veteran Party ideologist and former editor of Pravda; snd Shatalins a long- time Central Committee worker with special experience in organ- izational matters. Ignatev- was relieved of his post when the "doctors'; plot" was repudiated,

18. Real power now seems-to centre in-a post-revolutionary group of Party leaders rather•than in the group which was identified with the Revolution. Thus Malenkov (51)* Beriya (54) Bulganin (57) and Krushchev (59) seem to have pushed back old- timers like Molotov (63) snd Voroshilov (7?}s who took over the post as titular chief of the Soviet State. Mikoyan (58) and . ' Shvernik (65) have only held their own, the latter returning to the Trade Union chairmanship which he held earlier.

19. There are indications that most of the new figures in the two top Party organs have had specially close relations with Malenkov,. Saburcv and Pervukhin both appeared in high government posts in 1938. when Malenkov was' Chief of the Party Cadres administration of the Central Committee, where in -this capacity and with final authority exercised by Stalin5 he had DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED great power and influence in Party appointments to government and economic positions. The fact that'Ponomarenko, Ignatev, and Shatalin were all sent to trouble spots in 1950 as represent- atives of the Party's Central Committee suggests that they had Malenkov1S trust. Sha talin, moreover , edited in•1947-48'Part^ Construction, -a publication on.Party organisational matters, in which Malenkov would have been interested by virtue of his responsibility for Party cadres at that time.- Of the other new Party Ieaders5 Melnikov probably owes his rise, to his connections with Khrushchev, under'whom he served in 1947-49 -in the Ukraine. Bagirov, Party boss in Azerbaidzhan since 1933 , - is probably associated with Beriya , who was the chief Party official in the Transcaucasus from -1932 to 1938-. NATO SECRET A Dp ENEUM Ao; ofc ( 52)1ilT

PART ;IV ;

THE. AfeiR OP- THE. 'lMlTR1DER DOCTORS"

20i The .XIXth Congress cf the Ccrmrmniet Party cf the Soviet Union Had developed two therr.es suggesting coming purges! one attacking.misappropriation and other corrupt administrative -. practice s J the other directed at lack of vigilance* It: is note- worthy, top, that-Malenkov1 s\speech hbfpte -'the-,Congtess contained , .a veiled threat levelled at the scientific world, which he acciised of "class-consciousness and an uricOmpi?omising attitude towards crit, ici am"t . Nevertheilessp.thë. ma jority- of the cases of this , kind referred to in the Soviet press appear to have beep at first - comparatively trivial. However, on 29th November, the Kiev military tribunal passed the death sentence on three officials' guiity ofmisappropriation arid accused of anti-Soviet, le'aningsj Thèn) : on 13th January,- the affair of the "murder doctors'' was Revealed to the world» This seemed to herald a new era of severe purges in the USSR,

The ".plot"

21, Nine doctors, including six Jews'> were denounced in a Tass Agency communiqué* ; They wëre all leading figures in the medical world. One the medical direct-or of the Kremlin (Egorov) Clinic itself,

22, The alleged victims were of two kinds: ort the one handf Jdanov and Chterbakov, former members of the Politburo, whose death was attributed to a deliberately mistaken course of medical treatment; on the other, military and naval leaders (Marshal Vassilievsky, Marshal Govyrov, Marshal Konief, General. Chtemenko and Admiral Levtchenko), whose health the doctors were accused of "undermining",

23, Particular stress was laid on the collusion of Jewish doctors and of the International Organization known in Russia as the "Joint". The other members of this "gang•of terrorists" were, however, in some mysterious way supposed to be connected with the "British-Secret Service".

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 2k, The State Security Services were formally charged with "lack of vigilance" and with having allowed themselves to become "dupes", ' Later developments '

25, An anti-Zionist drive was launched in the USSR and, abroad, it was to lead to the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Israel (11th February, 1953)* At home, veiled anti-Semitism became apparent in the press, which, in reporting corruption, focused attention on offences committed by Jews.

26. Both press and radio appeared to make a point of drawing parallels between the current situation and the one obtaining KATO SECRET ADDENDUM to C-M (52 HfET

27. The press tended to minimise defects in the State Security organisation and' nowhere were -the accusations contained • in the Tass communiqué elaborated upon. . 26. It is perhaps noteworthy that the presence of Berlya with Stalin-at the Grand Theatre Moscow, on 12th January, was announced in "Pravda" on the very day of its publication, on page 4, of the Tass communique on the "murder doctors".

The reinstatement of the "murder doctors"

29. Fifteen doctors and "other accused persons'' were •rehabilitated through the medium of a communique from the.Home Office (M.D.V.) dated 3rd April and made public the following day.

30. It was officially established that investigations had been conducted by "inadmissible" means. Those responsible were' arrested and charged with "common law. crimes".

31. The Censor's office allowed it to be understood from an Agency report that the reinstatement of' the doctors was due to the- personal action of Beriya.

32. On 6th April, Pravda publicly- named S. Ignatiev, former Minister for State Security, as the author of these misdemeanours. . He was dismissed on 7th April from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist- Party to which he. had been called after Stalin's death oh 6th March and in which he had been confirmed on 14th March, after it had been vacated by Malenkov. He was said to have given evidence of "political blindness and simple-mindedness". .- 33, According to Pravda, the aim of the guilty, parties was to disrupt the -Soviet Union by fostering "a feeling of animosity towards the -State". The'anti-Zionist campaign was disowned, and renewed tribute was paid to the memory of Mikhoels3' the actor, former President of the Jewish anti-Fascist Committee of the war years who had died a mysterious death in 1948 and who was later accused, in the communiqué of 13th January, of having been the ' tool of the "Joint11 in the USSR. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 34. Pravda commented at length on the rights of the citizens in the Soviet State "as written into the Constitution of the USSR". ' . 35. It is clear that the- rehabilitation of the "murder doctors' is the most important event in the USSR to have come to our knowledge, since the death of Stalin, It is as yet too early to judge of its significance and true scope, out . on the face of it, domestic political problems would appear to lie at the root of the affair, and it seems likely that, up to a certain point, they still- persist. „to- • NATO SECRET ADDENDUM to C-M(52)1 IF"

PART V

BIOGRAPHICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DETAILS

Malenkov the Man •

36. Although .comparatively little is known ah out Malenkov, he has a reputation for energy, efficiency, and considerable . organizational ability and his career shows clearly that he is an opportunist 'who'can be quite unscrupulous in a struggle for power.

37. Georgi Maksimilianovich Malenkov .was born in 1902 in Orenburg (now Chkalov) allegedly of bourgeois origin.-He took no part in the revolutionary events of 1917?- although he joined the in 1919. .Malenkov first became a Party. . Member in 1920. In 1922, he was sent to an engineering school in Moscow which was training'young for responsible positions in the economy. His.career in the Central Committee apparatus started as soon as he left school in 1925, snd the "responsible" work that, he engaged in until 1930 was apparently service in Stalin's personal secretariat.

38. Malenkov's work with Party cadres began in 1930., This work he did at first only for the Moscow area, but after 1934 he became Party cadres' chief for the entire USSR. In 1939 he was appointed tc both the Party Secretariat and the Orgburo, and became an alternate member of. the Politburo in 1941.. After the German invasion Malenkov's, high status was signified by his inclusion in the original five-man all-powerful State Defence Committee.

39. Malenkov became a full member of the Politburo in March 1946, while retaining membership in the two other top Party bodies. Soviet sources suggest, however, that he did not function, as a Party Secretary from May 1946 to July .1948, although he was active in founding the Cominform in 1947- Following Tito's defection in, mid-1948 and after the eclipse of Malenkov1s apparent rival, Zhdanov,.Malenkov again- became active as a DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Central Committee Secretary, During the ensuing years, he steadily improved his position among those close tc -Stalin. At the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 he'delivered the Central Corrnitteer s report, traditionally given by Stalin.

Experience

LO, Although Malenkov1e experience has not been confined to Party work alone, it is'clear that his long period of power .over appointments within the Party apparatus is the key to his success. Throughthis appointive authority he has' had the opportunity to build coteries of loyal followers in the Party, . . government, police, and armed forces,. NATO SECRET ADDENDUM to C-M f 52 ) 1

UjI. Although elected, a'member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 193Ö, Malenkov had. no operational responsibility in governmen't until 1941, when he •became a member of' the wartime State Defence Committee. Just prior to the Soviel entry into the war, however, he spurred a drive to rid the industrial bureaucracy of "dead wood" and improve its efficiency, During the war he achieved considerable success in stepping up aircraft production and, in 1943, was appointed head of the Committee for Restoration, of the Economy in Areas Liberated from the . German Occupation. In November 19^4 he became a DeputyChairman 'of'the Council of People ' s. Corami s särs and in 1947 was'reported as being "directly" engaged in agricultural work.

LirZ, Malenkov's primary concern in foreign affairs has evidently been the direction of foreign Communist activities. This is suggested by the testimony at the Canadian atomic spy trial in T94-6 that Malenkov was in charge of the Foreign • Section of the Central Committee, Also, he appears' to have had close contact with the training of Soviet Officials for work abroad.

Personality

43. Malenkov's rise to power has been favoured by an apparent ability to size up a situation and to present his views forcefully. His two electoral addresses in 1946 and I95O had elements-of popular appeal and seem to emphasise points to Vifhich the audience might respond, particularly nationalism. His speeches are simple, clear, show considerable skill in summarising the salient aspects of a problem, and present the solution in unequivocal terms. They are notably • free from theoretical propositions, although when necessary he usually quotes from either Lenin or Stalin. .There is even evident a certain scorn of the administrator for theorists • who hamper the execution of planned programmes or policy. In•addition to demanding absolute loyalty from his subordinates, . îviàlenkov constantly stresses efficiency." Ee declared, for example, in 1941:

"Among non-Party people there arc many honest and good workers who, although not belonging to the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Party, and having no record of long Party member- ship,, work better and more conscientiously than some Communists with long membership,"

Position on Internal Policy

44- Malenkov1 s known views on internal affairs and his long and close association with Stalin suggest that he will not introduce any significant changes in internal policy. The role of the police seems to have assumed greater importance with the advancement of Beriya in published listing to a position directly below that of Malenkov,. Never 2- KATO SECRET ADDEEDUH to c-ivi(Lg) 1 TF"

"before, either in the Soviet Union or in Nazi Germany, has the police chief ranked so high, '

Position on Foreign Policy .

45'< In his public utterances on foreign policy, Malenkov has closely parroted.the line laid down by Stalin. An insight into his attitude toward- foreign nations is supplied by his 1946 speech: "It is no secret that even our' friends respect us because we are strong,,...We do not want to pull chestnuts out of the fire for others. If there are any chestnuts available we will use them for the good of our glorious Soviet people,"

46. As measured by-his speeches, Malenkov ' s attitude, toward the United States is one of considerable hostility.. His attacks on the foreign policies of the "imperialist power" reflect the customary dogmatic assertions of Soviet leaders, ••

47. In his ma jor postwar -speeches, Malenkov has mentioned the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the USSR and capitalist states, following' the typical Soviet pattern. . These statements have been combined with repeated assertions on the superiority of the socialist system over capitalism. As early as 1930 Malenkov spoke of achieving "the final victory over capitalism". His postwar speeches stress that capitalism is a "dying. • syotem" which will "inevitably" succumb in the competition with the Soviet order,

48. Malenkov's statements regarding a new .world war follow the usual line- of the Soviet Government, He stated, for. example, twice in his 1949 speech that "we do not want war and will do everything possible to avoid it". In dis- cussing this subject, however, Malenkovt s principal emphasis has, been on the capability of the Soviet Union to handle successfully any eventuality that might arise, and on the "certainty" that any new war would' end in the death of

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED capitalism. -13- NATO SECRET ADDENBUEto C-M (1+2)1 1F

BERIYA, ' Lavrenti Pavlcvich • Member, Presidium of the Central • Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, .USSR Council of Ministers.

Born 1899. First Secretary, Georgian Party Central Committee, 1931-38) and Transcaucasian Party Territorial Committee (Kraikom) 1932-38); elected member, Party Central Committee, 1934 and at every subsequent Congress; member, Presidium, Ali-Union Central Executive Committee (later Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet) 1935-39; USSR People's Commissar - for Internal Affairs, 1928-36; Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of People's Commissars (now Council of Ministers) 1941-date; Candidate member, Politburo, Party Central Committee, 1939-46, and Member Politburo, 1946-52; Member, Presidium, Party Central Committee, 1952-date; _ Deputy, Council of the Union, 1937~

MOLOTOV; Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Member, Presidium of the Central . Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman USSR Council of Ministers; ÜSSR Minister of Foreign Affairs,.

Born 1890» Candidate Member, Party Central Committee, 1920; Member, Party Central Committee, Elected 1921 and at every subsequent Congress. Candidate Member,. Party Politburo, 1921 -26, and Member, 1926-52; Member, Orgburo, 1926-30. Leading official, Comintern, 1926-34. Chairman, Council of People's Commissars, 193O-41, People's Commissar, later Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1939-40. First Deputy Chairman, Council of People's Commissars, now Council of Ministers, 1941-late. . Deputy, Council of the Union, 1937-date. Deputy, various republican Supreme Soviets, 1938-date. Member, Commission for Revising the Party Programmeelected October 1952, -Member, Presidium/Party Central Committee, 1952-date».

VQROSHILOV, Kihnent Efremovich Member, Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Born 1881. Member, Party Central Committee, elected 1921 and at every subsequent Congress. People's Commissar Military and Naval Affairs . (later Defence}', 1925-39« Member, Party Politburo, 1926-52. Deputy Chairman, Council of People's Commissars (later Council of Ministers 1940-date (?). Commander-in-Chief, Northwest Front, 1941-43. Soviet Member, Allied Control Commission, Hungary, 1945-47. Deputy, Council of the Union, 1937-date» Deputy, various republican Supreme Soviets, 1938-date. Member, Presidium, Party Central Committee, 1952-date. . NATO SECRET .ADDENDUM to C-M(42)1lT" •

KHRUSHCHEV, Nikita Sergeevich Kemher, Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; First Secretary, Moscow Ohlast Party Committee*

Born 1894' Member Party Central Committee, elected 1934 ^nd at every subsequent Congress. . Candidate Member, Party Politburo, 1938-39* and Memberj Politburo, 1939-52; Member, Presidium, USSR and Supreme Soviet, 1 938-47 s - 195C-date. First Secretary, Ukrainian Party Central Committee, 1938-49. Member, later Chairman, Ukrainian SSR Council of People's Conimissars (later Council of Ministers), 1944-47- Member, USSR Council for Collective Farm Affairs,, 1946-date. . Secretary, Ali-Union Party Central Committee, 1949-date. First Secretary, Moscow Party Oblast Committee, 1949-53* Member, Presidium, XIX Party Congrecs,. October 1952. .Member, Presidium, Party Central Committee, 1952- date.

BU Kj AN IN» Nikolai Aleksandrovich (ivlarshal)

Member, Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; First Deputy. Chairman, 'USSR Council of Ministers.

Born I895. Chairman, Executive Committee, Moscow City Council of Workers* .Deputies, 1931-37; elected Candidate Member Party Central Committeej 1934* and Member 1939 and 1952; Chairman, RSFSR Council of People's Commissars, 1937-38; ' Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of People's Commissars, ' 1938-46; USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defence, 1944~46, and.First Deputy People's Commissar Armed Forces, 1946-47; Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, 1947- date; Candidate Member, Politburo, 1946-48, and Member Politburo, • 1948-52; Member, Orgburo, 1946-52; USSRMinister of Armed Forces, 1947-49; Member, Presidium, Party Central Committee, 1952-date; Deputy, Council of Nationalities, 1937-date; and .Deputy, various republican Supreme Soviets, 1948-date.

KAGANOVICH. Lazar Moiseevlch Member, Presidium of the Central

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; First. Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, Born 1893» Candidate Member, Central Committee, 1923; elected Member, Central Committee, 1924 and at every subsequent Congress. Candidate Member, Politburo, 1926-3O, and Member, Politburo, I93O-52. Secretary, AiI-Union Party, 192Ö-46* Member? Orgburo, USSR People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, 1937-38. Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of People's Commissars (now Council of Ministers) 1938-date* USSR People's Commissar for Fuel Industry, 1939; USSR People's Commissar for Oil'Industry, 1939-40. USSR Minister of Building Materials Industry, 1946-47* First Secretary, -dSS- -NATO SECRET • ADDENDUM to c-M( Wi

MIKQYAK, Anastaa Ivanovich Memhcrj Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unions' First Deputy/ Chairman,. USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign end Domes- tic Trade. Born 1895. Candidate Member, Central Gommittee, 1932; Member, Central Ccmmittee^elected 1923 and at every subsequent Congress. Candidate Member, Party Politburo, 1926-35, and Member, 1935-52. People's Commissar of Foreign and Domestic Trade 1926-30. People's Commissar of Supply? 1930-34* People's Commissar of Food Industry, 1934-38-. Deputy Chairman, Council of People's Commissars (later, • Council of'Ministers), 1937-date; People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, 1938-49- People's Commissar of Agriculture, 1943' Deputy, Council of Nationalities and various republican SUprerrie Soviets, Member5 Presidium, Party Central Committee, 1952-date.

SABUROVa Maksim Zakharovich Member, Presidium of the Central Conmiittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, USSR Minister of Machine Building.

Born 1900. Official of heavy Industry factory, 1933-35* Received US visa to study production at American firms, 1935« Deputy Chairman, USSR State Planning Commission, 1938.- Chairman, USSR State Planning Commission and Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of People's Commissars, 1941-43. Chairman, USSR Economic Council for Defence Industry, 1941-45 C?). Deputy Chairman, USSR Military Administration, G-ermany, 1945* Deputy Chairman, USSR Planning Commission, 1946-47. Deputy Chairmen,•USSR Council of Ministers, 1947-53* Chairman, USSR State Planning Commission, 1949-53. Deputy RSPSR Supremo Soviet, 1947-51* Deputy, Council of the Union,' 1950-date. Elected. Member, Party Centrsl Committee, 1952. Member, Gominission for Revising Party Programme, October 1952-date, Member, Presidium- of the Party Central Committee, 1952-date.

PERVUKHIN, Mikhail Georgievlch Member5 Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Electric Power Stations and Power Industry,

Born 1904. Lt, General, 1944- USSR Deputy People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, 1936., Electad Member Central Committee, 1939 and 1952. People's Commissar for Electric Power-Stations and Electric Industry, 1939-4C'* Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of People's 'Commissars, 194°-46» Chairman, USSR Council for Electricity and Fuel,•194°-43-. USSR People's Comnissar, later Minister, Ghemical Industry, IS43~50. Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers, 1950-1953* Deputy, Council of .Unions 1946-date. Member, Presidium, Party Central Committee, 1952-date. -16- NATO SSCKET ' ADDENDUM to C-M(42 J11T" S EVE RNIK., Nikolai Mikhailovich Candidate Member, Presidium of the Central Committee of- the ' - ' Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairmans Centrcil Council of Trade Unions.

Born -1888. Elected member* Party Central Committee, 1925s and at every subsequent Congress. Secretary, All-Union.Party Central Committee, 1926-27. Candidate Member* later, Member, Orgburos Ali-Union Party Central Committee,. 1929~46* Alternate-Member, Secretariat, AIl-Union Party Central Committee, 1930-3.4' Secre- tary General, Ali-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, 1930-44* Deputy, Council of Nationalities, 1937-date, ah

• PONOMARENKO.. Panteloimon Kondratevich Candidate-MemberPresidium of the Central Committee of the ' Communist Party of the Soviet .Union; USSR Minister of Culture.

Born 1902. Secretary, Belorussian Party Central'Committee, 1938-47. Elected Member, Ali-Union Party Central Committee, 1939 and 1952. Chairman, Belorussian SSR Council of People's Commissars, later Council of Ministers, 1944-48- Secretary, Party Central- Committee, 1948-53- USSR Minister of Agricultural Procurement, 1950-53. Deputy, Council of the Union, 1946-53» and Member, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet, 1950-51. Deputy, various republican Supreme Soviets. Member, Presidium, Party Central Committee and -Secretariat, 1952-53-

MELNIKOV,, Leonid Georgievich Candidate Member, Presidium of the • • Central Committee of the Communist' Party of the Soviet Union; Eirst Secretary, Ukrainian Party Central Committee. USSR Deputy People's Commissar for State Control, 1940-44. Secretary, Stalino Party Oblast Cormmittee, Ukrainian SSR, 1945-(^)-.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Second Secretary, Ukrainian Party Central Committee, 1947-49, and First Secretary, 1949-date. Deputy, Council of the Union, 1946-date, and Member, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet 1950-53- Deputy, and Member Presidium, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, 1947-53. Member, Party Central Committee, 1952-date. Member, Presidium, Party Central Committees 1952-53,

BAGIROY ., Mir .Dzha fa r Abb as 0vlch Candidate Member, Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; First Secretary, Aserbaidzhan Party Central Committee. NATO SEGRET ' « ADDEtCDUM To C-MlV )116 • ^ PAm ORGANIZATION GOVERNMENT OHiANISATION

;cretariat CPSU Presidium Council of Ministers MINISTRIES

îchav-ïc MEMBEBS ; Presidium Malenkov Lov Beriya.^ CHAIRMAN: Lin Molotov f- — - > Malenkov H I I Voroshilov Ist Deputy Chaimen: ,Khrushchav 1 i \ BulganIn-^ — - — - i - 7 Beriya — —— INTERNAL AFFAIRS i L FORElG-N AFFAIRS Kaganovich I Mikoyaii <- - > Bulganin-—- --;• DEFENCE Saburovf - Kaganovich Pervukhin=^ - , _ DEE3UTT CHAIRMAN: entrai Council CANDIDATE MEMBERS: ? Mikoyan 4 DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN of TRADE rade Unions . Shvernik MEMBERS: Ponomarenko f — ,_ Saburov- MACHINE BUILDING- hairman: i Shveraik ' ^Melndkov • - r> Pervukhin— x Electric Power Stations and " -^Bagirov ' - - i Pynomarenky • Power Industry t. \ ian Party Central - / CULTURE Cornrnittee ^ ^ and 20 other Heads of Ministries and :taiy: ^ ^ ^ ' Committees. .ni Icovfe L

idshan Pai-ty Central Committee itaryy: ,- Iirovi-

INTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT, MARCH 15, 1953

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED > DUAL J-EEIffiERSHIP ^ CONTROL

Lso Chainnan of USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (Titular Chief of State)