From Protest to Power: Mapping the Ideological Evolution of Plaid Cymru and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego

Regional & Federal Studies

ISSN: 1359-7566 (Print) 1743-9434 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frfs20

Anwen Elias

To cite this article: Anwen Elias (2009) From Protest to Power: Mapping the Ideological Evolution of Plaid Cymru and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego , Regional & Federal Studies, 19:4-5, 533-557, DOI: 10.1080/13597560903310253

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Download by: [Aberystwyth University] Date: 16 May 2016, At: 11:25 Regional and Federal Studies Vol. 19, Nos. 4–5, 533–557, October–December 2009

From Protest to Power: Mapping the Ideological Evolution of Plaid Cymru and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego

ANWEN ELIAS

Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, Wales, UK

ABSTRACT Whilst some authors have classified nationalist and regionalist parties as ‘niche’ parties, this contribution argues that such a categorization is of limited usefulness for understanding the ideological nature of this party family. The ideological evolution of two parties—Plaid Cymru in Wales and the Galician Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)—is mapped in order to demonstrate how their core ideology (the territorial re-configuration of political authority) has been moderated and added to over time. As a result of this ideological adaptation, it is argued that these parties can no longer be described accurately as ‘niche’ parties. Ideological adaptation is attributed to the pressures associated with the pursuit of vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking goals. Such pressures come to bear on any political party that seeks to evolve from being a party of protest to being a party in power, and nationalist and regionalist parties are not immune to the dilemmas and risks associated with a change in the status of a political party (for example, as a result of passing the thresholds of representation and/or government). However, it is also necessary to give due consideration to the multi-level political context which is intrinsic to the political and electoral strategies of regionalist and nationalist parties, if the causes and implications of these actors’ ideological evolution are to be fully understood.

KEY WORDS: Plaid Cymru, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, party ideology, party goals

Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 Introduction Whereas the majority of modern political parties are classified according to their position on the left–right ideological spectrum, nationalist and regionalist parties have mobilized around the centre–periphery cleavage. The purpose of this party family is, first and foremost, the defence of ‘national’ territorial integrity vis-a`-vis the centralizing dynamics of the state, and the re-configuration of political authority to reflect this fact of nationality (although the precise nature and degree of such reform varies from party to party; see De Winter, 1998: 204–208, 241). On this basis, some scholars have categorized nationalist and regionalist parties as ‘niche’ parties, along with ecological

Correspondence Address: Anwen Elias, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth SY23 3FE, Wales, UK. Email: [email protected] ISSN 1359-7566 print/1743-9434 online DOI: 10.1080/13597560903310253 # 2009 Taylor & Francis 534 A. Elias and extreme-right parties (Meguid, 2005; Adams et al., 2006). Such parties reject the established dimensions of party competition, and introduce a new but limited set of issues into the electoral arena that cut across traditional partisan alignments. This contribution argues, however, that such a categorization of nationalist and regionalist parties is of limited usefulness for understanding the ideological nature of this party family. It analyses the ideological profiles of two such parties in two different contexts: Plaid Cymru in Wales and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) in Galicia. These two parties are very different in several respects: in their historical origins, in the internal organization of the nationalist movement, and in the political context within which they have evolved.1 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this contribution they are appropriate cases to analyse for two reasons. First, both parties in their early years can be considered ‘niche’ parties that sought to mobilize support for a narrowly defined ‘nationalist’ programme of territorial re-organization, an issue dimension hitherto largely absent from established patterns of political competition in Welsh and Galician politics. Secondly, however, mapping the ideological evolution of both parties since their inception highlights a common pattern of programmatic adaptation that is suggestive of how nationalist and regionalist parties in particular, and ‘niche’ parties more generally, adapt their ideologies in response to ever-changing political and electoral realities. It is argued that over a period of twenty-five years both Plaid Cymru and the BNG strove to moderate their territorial demands, and complement the core business of territorial reform with a broader set of commitments on socio-economic and new politics issues. This process of ideological moderation and expansion has transformed Plaid Cymru and the BNG into more conventional ideological animals. What they stand for can no longer be understood only with reference to the centre–periphery cleavage around which they originally mobilized. The contribution is organized as follows. In the next three sections, different phases in the ideological evolution of Plaid Cymru and the BNG are outlined. First, original attempts at defining the nationalist project in Wales and Galicia are summarized. Then, the context and ways in which both Plaid Cymru and the BNG undertook to moderate their territorial demands, and complement the ‘core business’ of nationalism with other more conventional ideological themes, are sketched out. In Plaid Cymru’s case, the multi-level political and institutional context within which the party operated was particularly important in driving ideological change; for the BNG, the drivers of change Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 emanated mainly from the regional political arena. In both cases, however, ideological adaptation had significant strategic implications, with the pursuit of political representation and new alliances established at the regional, state and European levels becoming a priority. Finally, the contribution demonstrates how, from the late 1990s onwards, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG focused on the task of translating a set of ‘nationalist’ principles into a more pragmatic set of policy proposals, as the basis for a programme of action as potential parties of regional government. The contribution then turns to an examination of the factors driving this process of ideological adaptation. The changing status of both parties within their respective political Welsh and Galician political systems—from being marginal ‘niche’ parties, to being parties in the political mainstream, and finally becoming parties in regional government—is identified as the principal driver of ideological change in both cases. However, this ideological adaptation has not been without its costs. Electoral From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 535 and office success has brought new challenges for these parties’ nationalist projects. It is argued that, to a large degree, these are challenges that any political party faces when it experiences a major change in its political and/or electoral status within a political system. However, these challenges may be particularly acute for ‘niche’ parties that attempt to broaden their programmatic appeal and become central players within a given political context. After summarizing these different challenges, the contribution concludes by assessing what the case studies of Plaid Cymru and the BNG suggest more generally about the changing nature of nationalist and regionalist parties as they attempt to make the transition from being parties of protest to being parties in power.

Ideological Origins: Defining the Parameters of Nationalist Politics in Wales and Galicia Meguid (2005: 347–348) defines ‘niche’ parties as ones that “reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics”, “challenge the content of political debate” by raising novel issues that do not coincide with existing lines of political division, and limit themselves to “a restricted set of issues”. According to this definition, Plaid Cymru and the BNG can be considered ‘niche’ parties since both were established with the exclusive goal of defending the historical, cultural and linguistic specificities of the Welsh and Galician nations, respectively. Plaid Cymru was established in 1925, first and foremost as a pressure group for the protection and promotion of the Welsh language. Saunders Lewis, one of the first gen- eration of Plaid Cymru activists and one of its most influential thinkers, articulated a political programme that aimed to mobilize popular support for a “Welsh Wales”, namely a national community where Welsh people would take charge of their own destinies, and do so through the exclusive use of their mother-tongue. Underlying the party’s constitutional goal—‘dominion status’ for Wales within the British Common- wealth—was a rejection of ‘independence’ as the ultimate goal for Welsh nationalism, and a strong commitment to Wales’ heritage and destiny as a European nation (Wyn Jones, 2007: 66–70). Even though the party adopted an economic policy of sorts during the 1930s, however, Lewis was largely uninterested in the pragmatic aspects of organizing a sustainable and profitable national project. This reflected his concep- Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 tualization of nationalism as a complete ideational system that was able to offer a solution to all aspects of organizing a national polity (Wyn Jones, 2007: 87–88). From such a vantage point, Lewis argued that other ideologies—and socialism in particular—were not only different from nationalism, but also opposed to it. Welsh nationalism was conceived as an ideological ‘third way’ that sought, not to provide an alternative to left- and right-wing ideas, but to transcend these conventional labels (Wyn Jones, 2007: 190–191). These ideas continued to define the broad parameters of Plaid Cymru’s nationalist project for several decades. Gwynfor Evans assumed the role of party President in 1945, a post he held until 1981. Under Evans’ leadership, the party sought to broaden its appeal beyond being a pressure group in defence of the Welsh language, and strengthened its commitment to Protestant non-conformism—a clear departure from Lewis’ conservative Catholic values—and pacifist values.2 What is most striking 536 A. Elias about this period in Plaid Cymru’s history, however, is the continuity in the conceptualization of the Welsh nationalist project. This continuity was evident in two respects. First, Plaid Cymru’s constitutional goal remained consistent with Lewis’ rejection of full independence, meaning sovereign statehood, for Wales. Rather, the purpose of the Welsh nationalist movement was to secure freedom for the Welsh nation (Evans, 1964: 61), whether this be in the form of Welsh autonomy within a Britannic Confederation or, by the mid-1960s, within a Europe of the Peoples (Wyn Jones, 2007: 146–164; Elias, 2008: 49–50). Secondly, this territorial dimension continued to define the ideological scope of Plaid Cymru’s nationalism. The party’s leadership still conceived of the Welsh nationalist project as one that sought to transcend the established left–right ideological debate that determined the parameters of party competition in Britain in the post-war period. Gwynfor Evans, like Lewis before him, believed firmly that the distinction between left and right that defined the parameters of party competition in Britain was ‘unhelpful’ for understanding the realities and needs of the Welsh nation (Wyn Jones, 2007: 192). Although Plaid Cymru could not avoid responding to the left–right inspired socio-economic policies of successive British governments, issues to do with the material well-being of the nation were conceived as secondary to the goal of national self-determination (Wyn Jones, 2007: 145–146). The BNG came into existence in 1982, almost sixty years after the creation of Plaid Cymru. Just as Plaid Cymru sought to transcend the established patterns of ideological competition in Welsh and British politics, the BNG also sought to challenge the established political order—in particular the Spanish Constitution approved by referendum in 1979, and the Galician Statute of Autonomy approved by a regional referendum in 1981—by proposing an alternative solution to the question of Galician self-determination. In contrast to Plaid Cymru, however, the BNG positioned itself on the left–right as well as the territorial ideological dimension from the outset (Maı´z, 2003). The party challenged the existing socio-economic values of state-wide political parties and, on the basis of radical Marxist–Leninist values, demanded “national liberation” for Galicia accompanied by “social liberation” at the hands of the Galician working class (Barreiro Rivas, 2003: 116–121). Self-determination would be achieved through a ‘rupture’ from the Spanish state (although little was said about the constitutional architecture that would be put in place once such a rupture had been achieved). Moreover, the party decried the economic injustices Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 arising from Galicia’s status as an internal colony within Spain, and demanded the nationalization (within Galicia) of major industries and the promotion of centralized economic and cultural policy planning (BNG, 1982). In summary, Plaid Cymru and the BNG were created as ideologically driven organ- izations that sought to transcend/transform the established political order as a prerequisite for securing territorial autonomy for the minority nation. However, by the mid-1980s neither Plaid Cymru’s ‘third-way’ nationalism or the BNG’s radical Marxist-inspired nationalism succeeded in making a major electoral or political impact in their respective nations. The BNG adopted an ‘isolationist’ electoral strategy which meant concentrating its vote-seeking efforts almost exclusively at the regional level (Beiras, in Fernań-Vello and Pillado Mayor, 2004: 109–123). The party first competed in elections to the Galician Parliament in 1985, and polled a miserable 1.4% of the Galician vote. Plaid Cymru, in contrast, was electorally marginal for From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 537 the first 40 years of its existence. With no regional tier of government in Wales until 1999, the party’s electoral efforts focused primarily at the state level. By the 1960s, however, the party had only once (in the 1959 general election) managed to poll more than 5% of the Welsh vote. The party’s first MP was elected in 1966, although Plaid Cymru could not retain the seat in the subsequent general election. Represen- tation in the House of Commons was regained in February 1974, when the party polled 10.8% of the Welsh vote and two MPs were elected, increasing to three MPs when a further election was held in October 1974. The Labour Party’s slim majority in the House of Commons after the latter election gave Plaid Cymru (along with the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) 11 MPs) a rare blackmail opportunity, whereby the threat of bringing down the government was used to extract a commitment to hold a referendum on devolving power to Scotland and Wales, through the establishment of directly elected institutions (Elias, 2006). However, the ultimate failure of that referendum in Wales in 19793 constituted a serious blow for Welsh nationalist aspirations for self-determination. This defeat was followed by the landslide win of the Conserva- tive party in the 1979 general election, with Plaid Cymru’s share of the vote declining to 8.1% (and two MPs elected). In the words of Morgan (1998: 407), “the 1979 General election seemed to mark the end of a distinct chapter in Welsh political history, with nationalism in full retreat”. The electoral failures of these early attempts at defining the Welsh and Galician nationalist projects prompted Plaid Cymru and the BNG to re-think how best to carve out a new nationalist political space within their respective party systems. The next section examines how Plaid Cymru and the BNG modified their political programmes in an attempt to make themselves more voter-friendly, in a bid to establish themselves as mainstream political parties in Welsh and Galician politics.

Ideological Adaptation: From Marginality towards the Political Centre-Ground The failure to make an electoral impact on Welsh and Galician politics drove Plaid Cymru and the BNG to revise their political programmes. First, there is evidence of ideological expansion in both cases. For Plaid Cymru, the primary goal of territorial re-organization was complemented by the party’s self-situation on the conventional Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 left–right ideological axis. This move was a result of a realization that nationalism on its own offered an incomplete political project and had to be completed by more conventional ideological values. Both Plaid Cymru and the BNG also incorporated more explicit new politics values—with an emphasis on ecological protection and sustainable development—into their programmes. Secondly, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG moderated their political programmes along the centre–periphery and left– right ideological dimensions. As a result of these processes of ideological expansion and moderation, by the late 1990s Plaid Cymru and the BNG had evolved into considerably more complex ideological entities than their categorization as ‘niche’ parties would suggest. The rejection of Welsh devolution in the referendum in 1979 not only shattered the dreams of generations of Welsh nationalists, but also left Plaid Cymru a deeply divided and disillusioned political party (Wyn Jones, 2007: 184). However, this defeat also 538 A. Elias prompted the most significant revision of the party’s political programme in its history. An internal enquiry did away, once and for all, with the shibboleth that Welsh nationalism could offer a ‘third way’ beyond the conventional labels of left and right. Instead, from 1979 onwards, Plaid Cymru located itself unambiguously on the left of the political spectrum. The notion of ‘decentralized socialism’ was adopted to reflect a new synthesis between the territorial goals of Welsh nationalists and the economic struggle of the Welsh working class (Elis Thomas, 1979: 3–4). Plaid Cymru’s new aim during the early 1980s became that of creating a Welsh “de-centralised socialist state” and the party committed itself to working alongside Welsh workers in what was referred to as the “national struggle” (Plaid Cymru, 1983: 3). However, this attempt at finding a new ideological synthesis between nationalism and socialism was short-lived. The failed miners’ strike in South Wales in 1985 demonstrated the limits of Plaid Cymru’s strategy of mobilizing different social groups against the centralizing economic and political tendencies of the incumbent Thatcher government (Wyn Jones, 2007: 231–232). Moreover, the party’s programme failed to dent the electoral hegemony of the Labour Party in South Wales. The party’s performance in the 1983 and 1987 general elections declined in comparison to the rela- tive gains made throughout the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, therefore, Plaid Cymru once again found itself devoid of political purpose and marginalized within Welsh politics. The answer to the party’s identity crisis would eventually come from Europe. The party’s better-than-average performance in European elections in 1979 and 1984 had already had an important psychological effect on the party, at a time when it was suf- fering a profound identity crisis (Elias, 2008: 54–55). In addition, during the 1980s developments in European integration convinced the party that a very different kind of Europe was being built, one that promised to provide a new opportunity for historic nations and regions such as Wales to take charge of their national destinies. In 1990, Plaid Cymru formalized its new-found Euro-enthusiasm by adopting the terminology of “full national status for Wales in Europe” as an expression of the party’s desire for an autonomous Welsh nation to assume a full role in a future Europe of the Regions (Elias, 2008: 56–58). European integration also provided a framework for re-conceptualizing Plaid Cymru’s other socio-economic policy commitments, which were no longer expressed in the radical socialist terminology of the early 1980s. The party’s commitments to Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 centralized planning, an expansionist economic policy and higher taxes were gradually replaced by the desire to secure Wales’s place within a “strong economic union based on regional democracies” (Plaid Cymru, 1997: 9). Themes from the party’s economic policy in the 1930s were rediscovered, with new regionalist buzzwords such as “economic regions” and “growth sectors” being employed to convey a vision whereby a shared culture and language would provide the basis for a prosperous political and economic order. The 1990s also saw the ‘greening’ of Plaid Cymru, as the party developed a long-held romantic attachment to the land of Wales into a more substantial agenda based on issues of environmental protection and ecological sustainability (Lynch, 1995; Dafis, 2005: 206). All of these issues were packaged in the terminology of a Europe of the Regions, as the framework within which these constitutional, socio- economic and ecological policy commitments could be achieved (Elias, 2008: 56–59). From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 539 The ideological evolution of the BNG during the 1980s and 1990s was less dra- matic than that of Plaid Cymru, although no less significant in terms of the ways in which core party values were moderated and added to. The first signs of the BNG’s retreat from the revolutionary goals of its early years was the decision, in 1985, to allow the BNG’s representatives to sit in the Galician parliament for the first time.4 The BNG also replaced its strategy of ‘open confrontation’ within the Galician political arena (Beiras, in Fernań-Vello and Pillado Mayor, 2004: 109–123) with a commitment to using the channels offered by political institutions to work towards the advancement of party goals. Doing so required the BNG to adopt a new electoral strategy that, in turn, necessitated the re-packaging of the party’s core beliefs in a more voter-friendly way. The BNG never formally renounced its Marxist–Leninist ideals, or engaged in open debates about party ideology and basic principles. Instead, over the course of two decades the party gradually abandoned its revolutionary rhetoric in favour of a more moderate nationalist project anchored in the twin themes of securing greater autonomy for Galicia and re-organizing the Galician economy and society along social-democratic lines. Barreiro Rivas (2003: 175) refers to this process as the “progressive imprecision” of the BNG’s political message, in reflection of the retreat from the explicit ideological positioning which characterized the party’s earliest years. This process of ideological moderation was accelerated by the results of the 1989 Autonomous Election in Galicia. The results were notable for two reasons. First, the state-wide Partido Popular de Galicia (PPdeG) secured the first of several successive absolute majorities in the Galician Parliament. The establishment of the PPdeG as a hegemonic political force in Galicia served as a further catalyst for the ideological adaptation of the BNG, towards a more moderate political programme that could appeal to a broader spectrum of voters. Secondly, and despite the PPdeG’s electoral dominance, the BNG still polled a respectable 8.0% of the Galician vote, and returned five deputies to the Galician Parliament.5 This result established the BNG as the main nationalist formation within a very fragmented Galician nationalist movement, and created the conditions for the incorporation of several smaller but ideologically hetero- geneous nationalist groups into the BNG (Lago, 2004). The internal expansion of the BNG prompted the definition of a new ‘common project’ based on a basic set of values shared by all of the BNG’s sub-parties (BNG, 1989: 9). The goal of such an endeavour was to ensure that voters viewed the party “more positively and not only as a force Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 which limits itself to protest” (Beiras, in Fernań-Vello and Pillado Mayor, 2004: 122). In the first half of the 1990s, ideological adaptation was most evident along the left–right dimension. The BNG’s nationalist discourse become less explicitly Marxist and more distinctly social-democratic in its rhetoric (Barreiro Rivas, 2003: 179). The terminology of colonialism and exploitation was replaced by the softer notions of Galicia’s ‘marginalization’ and ‘peripheralization’ within the Spanish state and within Europe. The agents of nationalist mobilization were no longer narrowly defined as the Galician working class; a role could also be played by the petit bourgeoisie and the middle classes, these being equally legitimate representatives of a much broader and inclusive notion of the “Galician people” (Maíz, 2003). In its economic model for society, the BNG combined new regionalist themes, such as endogenous sustainable development based on education, innovation and competitiveness, with old commitments to the nationalization of key industries within the 540 A. Elias framework of a planned economy on the Galician level. Just like Plaid Cymru, the BNG also emphasized a commitment to ‘new politics’ issues, such as environmental protection, pacifism, social and gender equality (Van Atta, 2003). These post-materi- alist values complemented the territorial and socio-economic components of the party’s ideological repertoire. With regard to the centre–periphery dimension, by the late 1990s, the party had also adopted a very different set of constitutional aims that sought to contextualize the long-standing demand for Galician autonomy in a broader Spanish and European context. The BNG had always been highly critical of European integration and its negative effects on the Galician economy and society (Elias, 2008: 80–86). Whilst not revising its Euro-scepticism, in 1998 the party nevertheless adopted the goal of securing Galician autonomy within a pluri-national Spain and a Europe of the Peoples. The goal of ‘rupture’ from a Spanish colonial state was replaced by a commitment to a negotiated solution to the issue of Galician autonomy. By the end of the 1990s, therefore, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG had undergone significant processes of ideological moderation, as well as a broadening of their political programmes to incorporate new policy concerns and re-discovered political values. Both parties complemented these programmatic adaptations with significant changes in party strategy. In particular, this entailed pursuing new alliances at different territorial levels with a view to reinforcing and elaborating the re-thought nationalist projects now espoused by both parties. In Wales, Plaid Cymru’s alliance-building efforts initially focused on co-operating with trade unions and social movements (Lynch, 1995). After the collapse of the left’s project, however, many of Plaid Cymru’s left-sympathizers turned to embrace ecological ideas (Wyn Jones, 2007: 255). This led the party to establish an electoral alliance with the Green Party in the contest the Ceredigion constituency in the 1992 General election. The joint Green–Plaid candidate, Cynog Dafis, was elected to the House of Commons, although the formal alliance between the two parties did not last beyond the election.6 Plaid Cymru also sought to co-operate more closely with the SNP at the state level. The two parties signed an electoral pact ahead of the 1987 general election, a move designed as a show of strength and to give the signatories added bargaining leverage in the event of a minority government (McAllister, 2001: 116). However, the poor performance of both Plaid Cymru and the SNP, and the Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 easy victory of the Conservative Party, minimized the incentive for co-operation in Westminster. There nevertheless remained close informal co-operation between the parties throughout the 1990s, with the parties meeting regularly to share information, discuss tactics and agree joint approaches to major policy debates (McAllister, 2001: 117; Wigley, 2001). The BNG was more successful in establishing a formal and stable alliance with like-minded nationalist parties at the state level. The BNG passed the threshold of representation at the state level in the 1995 general election, a significant achievement given the party’s long-held opposition to seeking representation at a higher territorial level (see above). Upon doing so, the party established contacts with the Catalan Converge`ncia i Unio´ (CiU) and the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). This led to the signing of the Declaration of Barcelona on the 17 September 1998, which committed the signatories to work together to advance their common territorial From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 541 goals under the name of ‘Galeusca’ (Elias, 2008: 96–97). CiU and the PNV were very different to the BNG in several ways, including their historical origins, their ideological profile and their political experience.7 However, participating in Galeusca allowed the BNG to enhance its profile and visibility at the state level by aligning itself with the more politically heavyweight CiU and PNV. The alliance also helped to enhance the BNG’s profile within its own political territory, namely as a moderate party of the centre in the eyes of the traditionally conservative Galician electorate (Lago and Maíz, 2004). The fact that the CiU and the PNV also had a much longer tradition of demanding national self-determination within a regional Europe also served the purpose of reaffirming the BNG’s own recent turn towards Europe (Elias, 2008: 97). Both Plaid Cymru and the BNG also sought to reinforce their newly formulated constitutional goals via collaboration with other nationalist and regionalist parties at the European level. This took place through the European Free Alliance (EFA), an alliance established in 1981 to represent interests of historic nations and regions within the EU (Lynch, 1996). Plaid Cymru obtained observer status within the EFA in 1981 and subsequently became a full member in 1984; Plaid Cymru’s MEPs, first elected in 1999, form part of the EFA group in the European Parliament. The BNG’s involvement with the EFA began thirteen years later. The BNG joined the EFA in 1994 and, upon the election of the party’s first MEP in the 1999 European election, the party sat with the EFA group in the European Parliament. For both parties, the sharing of experiences within EFA, and the definition of a shared ‘nationalist’ political agenda, helped develop a more coherent narrative about their long-term aspirations for national self-determination within the EU (Elias, 2008: 64–65, 98–100). Membership of EFA also legitimized the territorial demands of Plaid Cymru and the BNG, by presenting them as part of a much larger movement within the territorial peripheries of the EU for the formal recognition of the rights of nations without a state. The electoral consequences of these ideological and strategic changes were to be witnessed in elections to political institutions at different territorial levels throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. The BNG’s electoral expansion was the most striking. From polling 4.1% of the vote in the 1985 Autonomous Elections, the party secured an impressive 24.8% of the vote in the same elections twelve years later. This gave the party 18 out of the 75 seats available in the Galician Parliament, and established the BNG as the second political force in Galicia, behind the PPdeG but ahead of its Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 main rival on the left of the political spectrum, the state-wide Partido Socialista Obrero Espanõl-Partido Socialista de Galicia (PSOE-PSdeG). The party experienced a similar trajectory of electoral growth in general and European elections, albeit at a lower level of support than in regional elections (see Elias, 2008: 98). Plaid Cymru emulated this success in European and local elections across Wales throughout the late 1980s and 1990s (McAllister, 2001: 84; Elias, 2008: 46). However, the party found it more difficult to boost its representation at the state level. In the 1983 general election, the party polled 7.8% of the Welsh vote and returned two MPs to Westminster. By 1997, the party’s performance was only marginally better, amounting to 9.9% of the Welsh vote and four MPs. Wyn Jones (2007: 260) refers to this electoral performance as the “paradox of the 1990s”, whereby the cause of Welsh nationalism seemed to be gaining credibility, but failed to make an electoral impact due, in large part, to the constraints of the British first-past-the-post electoral system. 542 A. Elias From Opposition to Government: Translating Ideological Principles into Policy Proposals During the 1980s and 1990s, Plaid Cymru and the BNG strove to define the basic tenets of a nationalist political project that would appeal to a broad range of Welsh and Galician voters. By 1997, the BNG had successfully carved out a new nationalist political space in Galician politics. For Plaid Cymru, the creation of the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) in 1999 provided a major new opportunity structure for the party to boost its political representation, shape policy making and possibly even enter regional government. For both parties, the priority became the translation of basic ideological values into more substantial and credible policy programmes, which would serve as a prospective governing agenda for aspiring parties of regional government. Nationalist party programmes in Wales and Galicia changed in two ways as a result of this re-prioritization of party goals. First, ideology became less important in determining the policy goals espoused by Plaid Cymru and the BNG. The explicit ideological positioning of both parties in previous years, as much on the left–right cleavage as on the centre–periphery one, was replaced with an emphasis on more realistic policy priorities that can be achieved in the shorter term. This was manifested in a willingness to seek negotiated solutions to territorial demands, and the adoption of policy programmes that were more subtle in their positioning of the party in the left– right political space. Secondly, valence concerns—whereby voters reward results and competence (Clarke et al., 2004)—tended to predominate over the defence of core policy positions (see also Lynch, 2009 in this issue). A concern with pragmatic politics and valence issues was exacerbated when both parties became parties of regional government (the BNG in 2005 and Plaid Cymru in 2007). This section documents each party’s path towards, and eventual entry into, regional government. It also considers, however, the common challenges that the parties have faced as they have made the transition towards power. Given its marginality within British politics for most of its existence, Plaid Cymru’s campaign for the first Assembly elections was geared towards establishing itself as a major political actor within this new Welsh political arena. With this goal in mind, Plaid Cymru developed the most comprehensive policy document ever pro- duced by the party ahead of the first Assembly elections, held on 1 May 1999. The

Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 manifesto aimed to portray the party as being more Welsh and more left-wing than the Labour Party, its main competitor in the elections (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2003: 129). This positioning of Plaid Cymru within the Welsh political space was based on the claims that it was the only party with its “policy created in Wales, by the people of Wales, to answer the needs of Wales”. The party also claimed to be the only alternative to the “conservative social and economic policies” implemented by New Labour at the state level (Plaid Cymru, 1999). The manifesto spelt out in con- siderable detail how a Plaid Cymru government would act to ensure “economic success, social justice, cultural vitality, democratic renewal and environmental stability” (Plaid Cymru, 1999). This well-prepared political programme was one factor that contributed to Plaid Cymru’s electoral breakthrough in the first Assembly elections in 1999, although there were also others (see Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2000). The party’s near 30% of From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 543 the Welsh vote and 17 out of 60 seats up for grabs meant Plaid Cymru was the main party of opposition within the NAW (see Table 1). During the Assembly’s first term, Plaid Cymru’s priority was to influence policy through the Assembly’s different channels of decision making (Elias, 2009). The party’s long-term territorial demands declined in salience during these four years. This change of focus reflected, on the one hand, a desire to work within the institutional framework of the NAW to promote the institution’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Welsh people. The referendum on devolution had, after all, been won by the narrowest of margins; it was deemed to be Plaid Cymru’s duty to ‘make the Assembly work’, rather than challenge the devolution settlement that it itself had campaigned in favour of. On the other hand, the party sought to cultivate a perception of itself as a governing party able to deliver on a whole range of non-territorial policy issues to do with economic, social and cultural renewal and prosperity.8 To this end, Williams (2003) argues that, “taking the cue from New Labour, a superficial programme of ‘modernization’ was adopted to centrify the party”. In this vein, the party’s manifesto for the 2003 Assembly elections paid lip- service to the eventual goal of full national status within the EU, but was primarily focused on the need for greater powers for the Welsh Assembly, for better management of the Welsh economy, and for a new approach to dealing with the public services in Wales (Plaid Cymru, 2003). Plaid Cymru’s pragmatic politics did not, however, resonate with Welsh voters and, in the 2003 Assembly election, was one factor that contributed to the decline in the party’s number of elected representatives from 17 to 12 (Table 1; see also Wyn Jones and Scully, 2004). A period of bitter in-fighting followed, with divisions over the party’s programme, strategy and leadership. Party traditionalists who favoured a more oppositional style of politics within the NAW and a renewed focus on ‘core’ issues were pitted against pragmatists who favoured continuing down the path of moderate consensual politics with a view to transforming Plaid Cymru into a credible party of government. The territorial dimension to Plaid Cymru’s nationalist project returned to the fore in the party’s annual conference that year. A motion was approved that replaced the constitutional terminology of “full national status in Europe” with a commitment to “independence in Europe”. The election of Dafydd Iwan as the party’s new President—a life-long Plaid activist, language campaigner and major figure on the Welsh cultural scene—also represented a desire by party activists to re-assert the Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 centrality of traditional ‘Plaid’ issues to the Welsh nationalist project.

Table 1. National Assembly for Wales election results, 1999–2007

Conservative Labour Lib Dem Plaid Cymru Others % % % % % Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

1999 15.8 9 37.6 28 13.5 6 28.4 17 4.7 0 2003 19.9 11 40.0 30 14.1 6 21.2 12 4.8 0 2007 22.4 12 32.2 26 14.8 6 22.4 15 8.3 0

Percentage of votes for constituency seats only. Source: Wyn Jones and Trystan (2000); Scully and Elias (2008). 544 A. Elias However, this retreat to traditional ideological politics was temporary. Despite an equally disappointing performance in the 2005 general election, Plaid Cymru’s leadership renewed its efforts to establish the party as a governing alternative within Welsh politics. In February 2006, Plaid Cymru launched a six-month policy consultation with the Welsh people, the objective of which was to identify a more voter-friendly set of policies ahead of the 2007 Assembly election. In the resultant election manifesto, the new goal of “independence in Europe” hardly featured, although the party did commit itself to the pursuit of greater powers for the Welsh Assembly. Instead, the bulk of the document was taken up by the presentation of the party’s new “practical policies” (Ieuan Wyn Jones, quoted in Western Mail, 2007) that were “radical” as well as “credible and deliverable” (Plaid Cymru, 2007). There was no mistaking the message that Plaid Cymru wanted to deliver to the electorate: realistic and workable solutions, not abstract ideology, were what Plaid Cymru had to offer. Whereas the 1999 Assem- bly election was characterized by Plaid Cymru’s attempt to position itself vis-a`-vis its main state-wide competitors on the territorial and left–right ideological dimensions, by 2007 the party was more preoccupied with pragmatic politics and valence concerns. This was expressed through persistent attacks on Labour’s poor record in government, contrasted with the ambitious but competent alternative that a Plaid Cymru government would provide. Plaid Cymru made moderate gains in the 2007 Assembly election, although its performance fell far short of a serious breakthrough across Wales (see Table 1). However, the failure of the election to produce a majority led to several weeks of discussions on different coalition possibilities. The result was an agreement between Plaid Cymru and the Labour Party to form a ‘One Wales’ coalition within the NAW (Labour/Plaid Cymru 2007).9 The coalition agreement included many of Plaid Cymru’s manifesto policy pledges, including a commitment to holding a referendum on law-making powers for the NAW before the next round of Assembly elections, and new legislation on the Welsh language. The party was also given ministerial portfolios for Rural Affairs, Culture and Heritage, and Economic Development. In government, Plaid Cymru’s ministers have sought to portray an image of competence with a view to decontaminating the common view of the party as “a collection of wild-eyed romantics and language zealots” (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2008). The party has also, however, been forced to prioritize its agenda and focus on those issues that can rea- Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 listically be achieved. This has required taking difficult decisions that have been strongly criticized by party members (Elias, 2009). One such contentious issue was the provision of Assembly funding for a Welsh-language daily newspaper. Even though such a commitment had been included in the coalition on Plaid Cymru’s insistence, once in office Plaid Cymru’s Minister for Culture, Rhodri Glyn Thomas announced that the funding on offer would be substantially less than had been anticipated. Many prominent Plaid Cymru members decried the party’s betrayal of a core commitment to promote the Welsh language through the print media (Elias, 2009). Slow progress on other issues, such as new legislation on the Welsh language, combined with fears that a referendum on increased powers for the NAW may be delayed,10 have further fuelled unease within the party’s rank and file. By failing to deliver on these key policy priorities, Plaid Cymru runs the risk of being punished by its members and supporters at the next Assembly elections for its poor performance in government. From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 545 The changes in the BNG’s political programme as the party shifted from being in opposition to occupying government office were similar in many ways to those identified in the case of Plaid Cymru. The BNG’s electoral breakthrough in 1997 increased the political relevance of the party and its coalition potential in the eyes of its two main state-wide partisan competitors (Barreiro Rivas, 2003: 175). Over the next few years, the BNG focused on consolidating its image as a governing alternative to the PPdeG in Galicia (Barreiro Rivas, 2003: 158–163). As noted above, part of this strategy involved developing alliances with other, more credible, nationalist forces on the state and European levels. Within the Galician political arena, the BNG’s leader, Xose´ Manuel Beiras also sought to improve contacts with the governing PPdeG, in an attempt to reinforce the BNG’s image as a party committed to negotiation and collaboration, rather than radical opposition. The party’s programme for the 2001 Autonomous Elections was presented as a programme of government (Pallare`s, 2002). The manifesto outlined the party’s ambition for Galician autonomy within a pluri-national Spain and a Europe of the Regions, but also stressed the party’s progressive social-democratic profile and concern for ‘quality of life’ issues. In the event, the BNG failed to cross the threshold of governance in the 2001 Autonomous Election as it had hoped. The party’s share of the vote stagnated at 23.5% (compared to 24.0% in 1997) and brought to an end the trajectory of electoral growth experienced since 1985. This disappointing performance was the result of a combination of factors, many of them beyond the party’s control.11 However, it was also the case that the BNG’s programmatic moderation had been insufficient to sway non-nationalist voters to vote for the party. Pallare`s (2002) notes that public opinion data revealed that voters continued to perceive the BNG as an overly radical nationalist party. In contrast to Plaid Cymru, however, this election defeat did not spark internal debates about party ideology or strategy. Rather, far-reaching organizational reform was undertaken and a new leadership was elected in order to streamline the party’s decision-making procedures and marginalize the more radical sub-groups within the party (Go´mez-Reino, 2003). These internal changes were conceived as a completion of the BNG’s evolution into a moderate political party in the mainstream of Galician politics. However, these internal reforms did not succeed in boosting the BNG’s popularity among voters. In the 2004 European election, the party’s vote almost halved from 21.98% in 1999 to 12.32%, and the Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 party lost its first and only MEP, Camilo Nogueira. In the 2005 Autonomous Election, the BNG once again campaigned as a prospective party of government, presenting itself as the only party capable of providing a true political alternative the PP. The party’s programme was consistent with that presented in previous years, with moderate policies that sought to appeal to non- nationalist voters who did not support the idea of a radical overhaul of Galicia’s constitutional or socio-economic structures (Pallare`s et al., 2006). And, yet, the BNG’s re-packaging of its political message once again failed to reverse the party’s electoral decline (see Table 2). However, in spite of this dismal performance, a decline in support for the PPdeG (depriving it of a governing majority) paved the way for the BNG to agree a coalition deal with the PSOE-PSdeG in order to form a governing majority. The deal saw a socialist-nationalist alliance entering into government in Galicia for the first time, with the BNG being responsible for ministerial 546 .Elias A.

Table 2. Results of Galician Autonomous Elections, 1981–2009 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 Party % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats

AP/CP/PP 36.6 26 47.9 34 50.7 38 57.3 43 56.0 42 53.8 41 46.6 37 46.7 38 UCD 33.8 24 — — ———————————— CG — — 15.5 11 2.7 2 — — ———————— PSdeG-PSOE 22.5 16 31.0 22 37.3 28 25.3 19 17.3 13 22.7 17 34.2 25 31.0 25 UPG/BNG 4.2 3 1.4 1 6.7 5 17.3 13 24.0 18 23.5 17 19.2 13 16.0 12

Source: Rivera Otero (2003); Parlamento de Galicia (2005); Xunta de Galicia (2009). Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 May 2016 16 at 11:25 University] by [Aberystwyth Downloaded From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 547 responsibilities for Rural Affairs, Culture and Sport, Housing, Equality and Well- being, and Innovation and Industry. Once in government, just as with Plaid Cymru, the BNG’s political agenda became even more pragmatic in orientation, as the party has sought to exploit new opportunities for influencing policy making. This is especially evident with regard to the territorial dimension of the party’s political programme. The BNG very quickly demonstrated a willingness to compromise on its long-term constitutional goal in order to agree a more limited re-definition of the Galician Statute of Autonomy (Elias, 2008: 107– 108). The rhetoric of an autonomous Galicia within a pluri-national Spain and a Europe of the Peoples was played down in favour of an emphasis on a negotiated solution to the question of Galician autonomy. Negotiations to agree a revised Statute of Autonomy for Galicia eventually failed. However, the party has skilfully placed the blame for this failure on the refusal of the PPdeG to engage constructively in these deliberations. As a result, the BNG has thus far avoided open censure from its members for failing to deliver on this key aspect of the nationalist political project. With the failure to reach agreement on territorial reform, the BNG switched its attention to policy making in other areas within its governing remit. A potentially difficult area for the party related to the policy portfolios with a strong European policy dimension, especially in the areas of agricultural and fishing policy, and economic and industrial regeneration. The BNG had a long record of vitriolic opposition to European policy making in these areas (Elias, 2008: 80–89). The difficulty of maintaining such a critical position in public office, combined with the limited scope for policy innovation in these areas, could easily have generated a new rift between the party in public office and a persistently Euro-sceptical party membership. Such a tension did not emerge, however. Once again, the party played the blame-game masterfully, to dissolve itself of any responsibility for the limited scope for reforming the Galician agricultural, fishing and industrial sectors. The Spanish government and, to a lesser extent, the EU, were designated as the guilty parties for failing to put in place a regulatory and finan- cial framework sensitive to the real needs of the Galician economy (BeNeGa, 2006: 4). For the same reason, the BNG also argued repeatedly that its hands were tied with regard to the planning and administration of European regional fund monies in Galicia. By making such arguments, the BNG successfully maintained the party’s traditional self-image as opponent to the state-wide and supranational status quo. The Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 party faced greater problems in other areas of policy making. In particular, many decisions relating to the party’s Rural Affairs portfolio were criticized by party sympathizers as betraying the BNG’s environmentalist principles. In this respect, the BNG faced the same dilemma as Plaid Cymru, namely that of having to take decisions in public office that may not always lie easily with key party values. The BNG also experienced the challenge of maintaining its valence rating whilst in office. For example, the party’s Minister for Culture, A´ ngella Bugallo, faced extensive criticism of her handling of the Cidade de Cultura (‘City of Culture’) debacle.12 This issue in particular undermined the BNG’s efforts to portray itself as a competent political party, able to rise to the challenges of regional government. These factors, along with perceptions that the BNG had forgotten its radical roots, contributed to a decline in the party’s electoral performance in the most recent Autonomous Elections on 1 March 2009, with the loss of one seat in the Parliament depriving the BNG and the 548 A. Elias PSOE-PSdeG of the required majority to reconstitute their coalition government (Table 2).

Explaining Ideological Change in Nationalist and Regionalist Parties Thus far, this contribution has mapped the ideological evolution of Plaid Cymru and the BNG as they have transformed themselves from being niche parties to mainstream opposition parties and, finally, to being parties of regional government. In both cases, a nationalist project based on explicit ideological principles was gradually adapted, expanded and moderated in order to secure broader electoral appeal beyond a core nationalist support base. In a subsequent phase of evolution, nationalist party programmes became less ideological and more pragmatically policy-orientated with a view to cultivating the image of being responsible parties of potential government. In this section, it is argued that this trajectory of ideological adaptation is not unique to the two case studies discussed above. Rather, such a trajectory is typical of many political parties who experience significant changes in their political and electoral status within a given institutional setting (Pedersen, 1982; Deschouwer, 2008: 3–4). Thus, major achievements for a political party—such as gaining representation or entering government—generate a new set of opportunities and constraints for political parties, and will modify the way a party prioritizes its goals. The notion of political parties as goal-pursuing entities is well established in the academic literature. Strøm (1990) distinguishes between three types of goals that political parties can pursue: votes, office incumbency and policy influence. Whilst vote-seeking parties aim to maximize their electoral support, office-seeking parties will prioritize the pursuit of public office and policy-seeking parties will aim to maximize their effects on public policy. Whilst political parties may well pursue more than one goal at a time, they will tend to prioritize one goal over another (Strøm, 1990). For example, a party needs to get at least some degree of electoral success before attempting to gain office and to influence policy outcomes (Strøm and Mu¨ller, 1999: 11). Once a certain level of electoral success has been achieved, a party may switch its efforts to achieving public office and policy influence. Similarly, whilst political parties can strive to exercise policy influence without being in government, for example through legislative bargaining or through blackmailing the governing party, policy Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 influence is generally enhanced when a party is in office (Strøm and Mu¨ller, 1999: 6). Moreover, a party’s goals are not static. Rather, they will change depending on the institutional setting in which a party finds itself. Thus, for example, a vote- seeking party that acquires sufficient electoral support to pass the threshold of representation is likely to switch its attention to influencing policy and/or entering into office. Similarly, a party that enters government is likely to focus its attentions on achieving its policy objectives. The ideological evolution of Plaid Cymru and the BNG displays many of the dynamics of adaptation associated with achieving political representation and entering government. Both parties were established as narrow ideologically driven organiz- ations with the aim of transforming the existing political order into a territorially based system of political representation. However, as parties that also accepted the principle of electoral participation as the only means of securing institutional From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 549 change, the failure of these original nationalist projects to make an electoral impact generated a pressure for ideological adaptation. Studies of other niche parties have demonstrated that maximizing vote-share requires a party to broaden its political programmes beyond its ‘core business’ and moderate its political rhetoric; doing so enables these actors to compete with other political parties on a full range of issues and broaden their appeal beyond their traditional support base (Harmel, 1985; Mu¨ller-Rommel, 2002; Heinish, 2003). For Plaid Cymru and the BNG, the goal of vote-maximization led to similar pressures for ideological expansion and moderation. Plaid Cymru responded by renouncing its conceptualization of nationalism as a ‘third way’ beyond left and right, and eventually established itself as a moderate left-wing party in pursuit of Welsh autonomy within a European framework. The BNG moderated its position along the territorial and left–right ideological dimensions, to emerge as a social democratic party committed to Galician autonomy within a pluri-national Spain and a Europe of the Peoples. It is striking that, from quite different ideological starting points, by the late 1990s both parties espoused remarkably similar territorial and socio-economic goals, and this as a result of a shared pressure to make their parties more voter-friendly. Ideological adaptation in the pursuit of votes was most successful in the BNG’s case, as attested by the party’s trajectory of electoral growth throughout the 1990s; this was most pronounced at the regional level but was also emulated at the state and European levels. In Plaid Cymru’s case, the mechanics of the electoral system in place for general and (until 1999) European elections constrained the party’s ability to translate growing levels of electoral support into representatives. It was only with the establishment of the NAW and the adoption of a partially-proportional electoral system for regional elections that Plaid Cymru was able to make a major electoral breakthrough in Welsh politics.13 Nevertheless, in both cases, electoral success enabled Plaid Cymru and the BNG to establish themselves as major political actors in their respective political arenas. With this new status came an incentive to reconsider party goals, with both parties endeavouring to secure policy influence and office incumbency within their respective regional institutions. During the NAW’s first term, Plaid Cymru sought to shape policy making via consensus-based politics between the different parties represented within the institution. The failure of this strategy prompted the party to pursue a more explicit office-seeking strategy, as the Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 prerequisite for exercising policy influence within the NAW. For the BNG, the absolute majorities held by the PPdeG from 1989 to 2005 ruled out any possibility of exercising policy influence through legislative bargaining or co-operation. Instead, the party openly pursued the goal of government incumbency from the late 1990s onwards, as the only means of meeting the goal of policy influence. With both Plaid Cymru and the BNG having secured government office in recent years, an even greater emphasis has been placed on developing pragmatic and achiev- able policy agendas. This is hardly surprising, given that any party that passes the threshold of government comes under pressure to “prioritise their agenda and focus on those issues that can realistically be achieved” (Heinisch, 2003: 101). Both parties have also, however, been increasingly concerned to present themselves as credible and competent parties of government. To some extent, this concern reflects the trend for voters to be primarily concerned with valence when it comes to deciding 550 A. Elias which political party to vote for in an election (Clarke et al., 2004). Such a concern is especially important for governing parties since they are more likely to be held responsible by voters for their achievements in office (Rose and Mackie, 1983). It is arguable, however, that valence concerns will be even more salient among political parties that are in government for the first time (Deschouwer, 2008). As Plaid Cymru and the BNG have found out for themselves, being in government for the first time requires swift adaptation to the new responsibilities, tasks and demands that accompany this role. Parties that fail to meet expectations of professionalism in public office risk damage their image in voters’ eyes, as has recently been experienced by the BNG. Moreover, they may jeopardize their chances of being considered as a potential coalition partner in future governments (Heinish, 2003: 102). There is a particularly strong incentive, therefore, for political parties in government for the first time to be seen to be competent and able. Ideological adaptation was thus an important factor in enabling Plaid Cymru and the BNG to meet their vote-seeking, and latterly office-seeking, objectives. However, ideological adaptation has not been without cost for either party. These risks associated with ideological change are typical of those experienced by many political parties in the pursuit of different party goals (Strøm, 1990; Strøm and Mu¨ller, 1999). First, for parties that want to maximize their vote-share, moderating and broadening their political programmes may make strategic sense, but such a move may not go down well with core supporters who feel the party to be diluting fundamental party principles. This dilemma is likely to be particularly acute for niche parties attempting to make the transition from being single-issue parties to catch-all parties with a broad programmatic repertoire. Moreover, and as the experience of many Green parties demonstrates, this tension will be exacerbated in the case of parties who have to compromise on key party commitments once in government, or in order to secure policy influence through legislative bargaining (Rihoux and Ru¨dig, 2006). The very fact of being in government or engaging in legislative bargaining with established political parties may also be difficult for core supporters to accept, especially if the party has a strong anti-system opposition to the political establishment (Heinisch, 2003: 102). Smith (1989) points out that becoming ‘established’ could well lead to the undermining of the party’s initial electoral appeal. The BNG was recently criticized by its supporters for precisely this reason. Electoral decline has provoked internal demands for Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 ideological, strategic and organizational change, not an uncommon response by political parties to such an ‘external shock’ (Harmel and Janda, 1994; Adams et al., 2006). This last example is not the only way in which the BNG, or Plaid Cymru for that matter, have had to confront the risks associated with making the shift from protest party to party in power. Whilst both parties sought to broaden their programmatic appeal to non-nationalist voters, they also experienced the opposition of their core support base to the dilution of core nationalist principles. Throughout its history, Plaid Cymru has repeatedly experienced internal tensions over the party’s political role, strategy and objectives within the context of state-wide party competition (Elias, 2006). These tensions have re-emerged in recent years as the party seeks to adjust to its new status in post-devolution Welsh politics. Thus, for example, Plaid Cymru has been criticized by some of its members for failing to address ‘traditional’ Plaid Cymru issues, such as the protection of the Welsh language, culture and the From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 551 regeneration of rural Welsh communities (Elias, 2009). New groups such as Cymuned (‘Community’) and, more recently, Llais Gwynedd (‘The Voice of Gwynedd’) have been formed claiming to represent the core values of Welsh nationalism abandoned by Plaid Cymru in the quest for power. The BNG has faced similar internal opposition to its efforts at ideological moderation and expansion. For example, the reversal of the party’s electoral expansion from 2001 onwards can be explained in large part by the disillusionment of the BNG’s core supporters with the party’s new brand of moderate centre-left nationalism (Elias, 2008: 106). The ideological space occupied by the BNG during the 1980s and early 1990s has been occupied by smaller but more radical nationalist parties, such as No´s-Unidade Popular (No´s-UP). Established in 2001, No´s-UP espouses the rupturist, anti-capitalist and anti-European positions jettisoned by the BNG in its transition towards the political centre-round (No´s-UP, 2001). In neither the Welsh nor Galician cases have these new political groupings constituted a serious electoral threat to Plaid Cymru and the BNG. Nevertheless, their existence signifies the presence of a pool of disaffected nationalist voters that have failed to be convinced of the value of ideological adaptation in the quest for public office. As the BNG has already discovered, the challenge of keeping party members and supporters on board is even more acute when in government, when parties must find a balance between delivering on key nationalist commitments and compromising on policy priorities, given the constraints of public office and participating in a coalition. It is not only their own members that may challenge a niche party’s transition from protest to power. Established political parties will also respond to the presence of political actors defending new issues within the party system in one of several ways. They can either ignore the issues raised by the new party, adopt a similar position in an attempt to draw voters away from their competitor, or take a divergent policy position in an attempt to encourage flight from a competing party (Meguid, 2005: 348). The former strategy, in particular, has frequently been adopted by established political parties as a way of undermining niche party ownership of a particular issue (see for example Bale, 2007). In Wales and Galicia, the nationalists have faced a similar challenge for issue ownership as a result of their electoral and political successes. State-wide parties in both places have responded by adopting a position on issues traditionally ‘owned’ by the Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 nationalists, such as constitutional reform. Moreover, state-wide parties have given their programmes a more distinctive territorial slant, by proposing regional solutions for regional problems. In Wales, Plaid Cymru has long fashioned itself as the only party able to defend Welsh interests within British and European politics (Elias, 2008: 70–71). Within post-devolution Wales, however, state-wide parties have taken on the nationalist threat by re-packaging their own political programmes so as to give them more of a ‘Welsh face’. Thus, for example, the Welsh Labour Party re- branded itself in February 2000 as “the true party of Wales”, a move clearly aimed at challenging Plaid Cymru’s political appeal (Osmond, 2000). There have even been voices within the Conservative Party in Wales suggesting that their party should develop a distinctly Welsh political agenda in response to devolution.14 As a result of this issue re-alignment, Plaid Cymru has struggled to retain a distinctive policy agenda and a clear ‘nationalist’ political space (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2004). 552 A. Elias State-wide party responses to the growing electoral and political relevance of the BNG have been of a similar nature. Since the creation of a Galician institutional framework in 1982, state-wide parties like the PPdeG and the PSdeG-PSOE also modified their political programmes to take on a distinctly Galician appeal (Maı´z, 2003). The PPdeG has always espoused an agenda of moderate nationalism, known as “galeguismo” (Lagares Dıéz, 2003). Since the expulsion of the PPdeG from regional government in 2005, however, a new leadership has sought to re-assert the PPdeG’s Galician credentials. The notion of a ‘reformist galeguismo’ has been touted by the party to describe its programme of putting Galician interests first, a direct challenge to the BNG’s claim to be the only political party to have such a priority (Xornal, 2006). In contrast, the PSOE-PsdeG’s political programme lacked a clear Galician dimension (Jimeńez Sańchez, 2003). With the election of Emilio Perez Tourinõas the party’s new leader in 1998, however, the party gradually adapted its socialist programme to give it a more distinct Galician face. This new rhetoric, combined with a stronger and internally united party organization, has seen Tourinõ preside over a decade of electoral expansion in Galicia, directly challenging the BNG for votes within the left-of-centre/nationalist political space in Galician politics. The success of this strategy has been in evidence since the end of the 1990s, with the BNG’s electoral decline coinciding with a new wave of electoral support for the PSOE-PSdeG. Since 2001, the latter has taken over from the BNG as the second political force in Galicia.

Conclusion This aim of this contribution has been to examine and explain the ideological evolution of two nationalist and regionalist parties, namely Plaid Cymru and the BNG. Both parties originally mobilized in defence of a specific and narrowly defined nationalist project, and sought to transcend or transform the extant political order. Over time, however, both Plaid Cymru and the BNG have evolved into very different ideological animals. The central goal of territorial autonomy has been given increasingly moderate expression; at the same time, this demand has been complemented by a commitment to a much broader set of policy goals. The result is that these nationalist parties are both substantially more ideologically sophisticated and programmatically conventional Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 than their conceptualization as niche parties suggests. Whilst Plaid Cymru and the BNG, of course, remain committed to the goal of constitutional reform, these parties have also realized the necessity of addressing issues about how best to organize the nation politically and socio-economically. Providing convincing answers to such ques- tions are key to nationalist arguments about the viability and feasibility of enhanced territorial autonomy. However, the contributions to this collection aside, scholars of minority nationalism have paid relatively little attention to this additional ideological dimension of nationalist and regionalist politics. The case studies presented here high- light the limitations of conceptualizing nationalist and regionalist parties as parties that are solely interested in territorial and constitutional reform. As Plaid Cymru and the BNG have established themselves as major political players in their respective political arenas, their programmes have become less exclusively nationalist and more conventional in their issue scope. From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 553 These findings suggest that nationalist and regionalist parties are conventional in a second respect, namely in the way in which they behave in a party-competitive context. Many nationalist and regionalist parties in Western Europe have been highly successful electorally and have alternated between government and opposition at the regional—and, in some cases, even the national—level. And, yet, scholars have paid scant attention to the ways in which such changes in status within a political system affect the political projects of these parties. The two cases examined suggest that nationalist and regionalist parties are subject to adaptive pressures that are common to any political party that seeks to make the transition from party of protest to party in power, regardless of its origins or ideological orientation. The evidence from the case studies also suggests that these pressures, and the trade-offs associated with them, are particularly acute for niche parties such as Green, extreme right, nationalist and regionalist parties. Moreover, nationalist and regionalist parties not only respond to the changing political system in which they operate, but also themselves impact upon their operating environment. One of the great successes of nationalist mobilization in Wales and Galicia is that they have succeeded in changing the parameters of debate within regional political arenas. In particular, nationalist and regionalist parties have successfully put issues of territorial reform on the political agenda, and have pushed state-wide political parties into committing themselves to grant more authority to national territories within the state. In this respect, the ideological evolution of nationalist and regionalist parties has gone hand in hand with more far-reaching changes in regional patterns of party competition. However, this contribution also points to an important feature of nationalist and regionalist party politics that is less intrinsic to the political and electoral strategies of other party families: the multi-level political context in which the majority of nationalist and regionalist parties operate. Nationalist and regionalist parties have not always chosen or been able to be present at different territorial levels of government. As the case studies in this contribution show, the BNG in the 1980s chose, for ideological reasons, to focus its efforts on the regional level whilst the absence of such a tier of government in Wales until 1999 meant that competing for representation at the state level was Plaid Cymru’s priority. However, the pursuit of a multi-level political and electoral strategy has increasingly become the norm for Plaid Cymru and the BNG, and this party family more generally, for several reasons. The regional level is the Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 most important level of regionalist and nationalist parties by default, since their goal is to reorganize political authority within the regional/national territory and they seek to mobilize electoral support only within this limited territorial sphere (Deschouwer, 2003: 216). At the same time, however, gaining representation at the state level is important since this is where decisions about the reorganization of political authority across different territorial levels within the state are taken (De Winter, 1998: 211–212). The majority of nationalist and regionalist parties also pursue representation at the European level, not least because many demand greater national self-determination within a European framework where the historic, cultural (and sometimes linguistic) rights of regions and nations are protected (Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2008). As this contribution has demonstrated, taking this multi-level political context into account is necessary if the ideological adaptation of nationalist and regionalist parties 554 A. Elias is to be fully understood, whilst ideological adaptation can also have implications for the ways in which these actors behave strategically at different territorial levels. Of course, party behaviour at one level can have major implications for a party’s office-, policy- and vote-seeking aspirations at other territorial levels. An examination of this aspect of nationalist and regionalist party politics is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, future studies should pay greater attention to the ways in which the opportunities, constraints and dynamics of multi-level politics impact upon, and are shaped by, the evolving ideological preferences of nationalist and regionalist parties.

Notes

1For an overview of the historical origins, evolution and organization of Plaid Cymru and the BNG, see Elias (2008: 44–45, 77–78). 2For a detailed account of Gwynfor Evans’ political thought, and his contribution to the evolution of Plaid Cymru, see Wyn Jones (2007: chapter 3) and Evans (2005). 3The devolution proposals put to the Welsh electorate in a referendum on 1 March 1979 were rejected by an overwhelming 79.74% of voters, on a turnout of 58.8%. 4Even though the UPG (the BNG’s predecessor) had won three seats in the Galician Parliament in the 1981 Autonomous Elections, its elected representatives were expelled for refusing to swear an oath of allegiance to the Spanish Constitution, which the party deemed to be illegitimate due to its failure to recognize the fact of Galician nationality. 5The BNG’s good performance in this election was in large part due to the party’s opposition to the EEC at a time when attempts were being made to restructure the Galician economy to increase Spanish competitiveness within the European common market. See Elias (2008: 90) for a more detailed discussion. 6This has been explained as a consequence of the Green Party’s lack of organization on the ground and the antagonistic attitudes of some party members in Ceredigion (Daﬁs, 2005; Wyn Jones, 2007: 255). 7For a summary of the historical evolution of the PNV and CiU, see Pe´rez-Nievas (2006) and Barbera` and Barrio (2006). The PNV and CiU are broadly centre-right in their value orientation, in contrast to the BNG’s left-wing proﬁle. Moreover, both parties have been more politically and electorally successful than the BNG at the regional and state levels; alone or in coalition, the PNV has been in government in the Basque Country since 1980, and the CiU in Catalonia from 1980 to 2003. Both parties have been represented in the Spanish Congress of Deputies since 1977. 8There were also other reasons why the party’s constitutional aspirations were downplayed. These

Downloaded by [Aberystwyth University] at 11:25 16 May 2016 included the dissonance between the party’s demand for “full national status for Wales in Europe” and developments in European integration that had failed to give legal and institutional recognition of the rights of historic nations without a state of their own, and growing levels of Euro-scepticism among the Welsh electorate (Elias, 2008: 68–69, 72). 9For a detailed overview of the protracted coalition negotiations, see Osmond (2007). 10In December 2008, for example, ex-Plaid Cymru President and current Presiding Officer of the NAW, warned his party not to rush into holding a referendum before there was certainty that the result would be favourable (Western Mail, 2008). 11Pallare`s (2002) notes, for example, that the BNG suffered from the strong anti-nationalist campaign waged by the PP and, to a lesser degree, the PSOE at the state level, and which translated into persistent attacks against the BNG at the Galician level. The BNG was also negatively affected by the terrorist activities of ETA in the Basque Country, and the popular opposition to radical nationalist mobilization among the electorate. 12The Cidade da Cultura was an ambitious architectural project initiated in 1999 by the Galician government, under the then leader of the PPdeG, Manuel Fraga. However, with the election of a new PSOE/BNG government in 2005, investigations into the financing and management of the From Protest to Power: Plaid Cymru and Bloque Nacionalista Galego 555 Cidade da Cultura—overseen by the BNG’s Minister for Culture—were undertaken and revealed extensive irregularities. 13There is also evidence that Plaid Cymru benefited from distinctive voting patterns whereby voters in regional elections give preference to political parties who are deemed to offer the political programme that is best tailored to the political and socio-economic situation of the region/nation in question (Trystan et al., 2003). 14See, for example, Melding (2003).

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