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The Concept of Freedom: Effects of Ockham's Revolution

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The Concept of Freedom: Effects of Ockham's Revolution View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE The Concept of Freedom: Effects of Ockham’s Revolution Kateryna Rassudina Abstract: In his famous book Sources of Christian Eth- difficult task of freedom consists in choosing the means to ics, fr. Servais Theodore Pinckaers OP described the pro- achieve these goals, i.e. it is represented as a function of cess of transformation that our understanding of the ethi- the will.2 cally right and wrong has undergone for the last two thou- As we see, according to Aquinas, will and intellect sand years. Much of his attention the scientist gave to the follow natural inclinations to good, truth, happiness, problem of human freedom, on the decision of which that’s why he considers these inclinations as sources of largely depend the moral principles of a society. In par- freedom, and not as restrictions for its manifestation. ticular, he clarified and analyzed the transition from the Spontaneity, from which the freedom proceeds, is inher- concept of freedom advocated by Thomas Aquinas to the ent in all people by nature; it ensures the achievement of William Ockham’s concept of freedom. In this article, I happiness as a natural goal. In the realm of morality, this will not only present this transformation, but also point spontaneity is manifested in the sense of truth, good, right out those of its consequences in European thinking, which and love; i.e. they also do not limit, but reveal the free- we still observe in our societies. dom: “We are free, not in spite of them, but because of them. The more we develop them, the more we grow in Keywords: freedom, virtue, indifference, autonomy. freedom”.3 Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the so-understood freedom only on the basis of the attractiveness of the ob- 1. Freedom in the understanding of Thomas Aquinas ject: it spontaneously manifests itself with respect to the things marked by good or truth. The subject can be mis- The problem of free will became one of the important taken and even deliberately strive for a false good – this is topics in medieval Christian philosophy, primarily due to the weakness of freedom or rather of the being endowed the comprehension of the interaction between the absolute with freedom. That’s why a person should cleans his or will of God and the moral choice of man. In this article, I her inclinations of external layers. The naturalness of will mainly refer to the solution proposed by Thomas striving for happiness means that counteraction to this de- Aquinas, but before him about freedom not only Augus- sire cannot be called free. tine Aurelius wrote, but also such apologists as Justin On the other hand, the fact that we cannot choose the Martyr and Clement of Alexandria, such Church Fathers ultimate goal, but only the means to achieve it, also does as Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa. In turn, medi- not mean a limitation of freedom. According to the logic eval solution, early as well as high, is based on the ancient of Thomas Aquinas, the very our ability to unlimited truth philosophy, for example, Aristotle and the Stoics, and, of and good is unlimited. Looking forward them (or loving course, on Holy Scripture. God), we do not experience pressure, because this gravity, Freedom, according to Aquinas, is an ability proceed- and consequently, the will motivated by it is natural for ing from the intellect and the will (“liberum arbitrium us. Thanks to our spiritual abilities, our unlimited free- dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis1, which, in turn, dom, our will becomes free also in relation to all final and are the inclinations to truth and good. The first dimension individual goods, means on the way to the goal. of free choice (the order of entity and specification) de- The virtues help us to advance in the way to the final pends on the intellect: on the object of knowledge, as well goal, to adapt to the true good by developing of our per- as on the analysis of alternatives. Initially, the direction of fect natural abilities. Virtues, according to Aquinas, are judgment is determined by some intuitive comprehension, the perfections of strength, of dynamics in a person (“vir- the ability to choose between good and evil in favor of the tus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat perfectionem poten- first (principle: bonum est faciendum, malum est vitan- tiae”4). We can say that virtue is a property of character, dum), namely by synderesis. The second dimension of or a permanent predisposition to actions that are agreed free choice comes from the subject (the choice between with the good. Virtue is directly connected with the act of action and inaction). Judgments of the intellect, practical making a decision, with a choice: we manifest virtues judgments, give to the choice a conscious motivation, when perpetrate acts of will, but also our acts of will, our however this choice is actualized by will, by effort of the choices are conditioned by character traits. This is the person who strives for the good by means of the action, case with all habitus – predispositions that govern desires and thus it becomes free. It is worth noting that the origi- and behavior in general (virtues are the most perfect of nal movement of the will, according to Thomas, like the them), abilities to act and develop his- or herself (with intuitive knowledge of the first principles, is a sponta- regard to Tomas, habitus should not be confused with neous volition of such goals as good and happiness. The habits as psychological mechanisms). At first glance, such St. Thomas Aquinas Institute of Religious Sciences Philosophical Readings XII.3 (2020), pp. 370-375. Kyiv, Ukraine. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3903494 email: [email protected] THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM: EFFECTS OF OCKHAM’S REVOLUTION a system of habitus and virtues should limit freedom, ments of existence in a particularly excellent way: exist- prompting certain decisions to be made. However, in the ence not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself”7, views of Aquinas, habitus and, especially, virtues, in the which inherent in a person. case of their development, on the contrary, allow freedom to unfold, as they promote progress towards the ultimate goal, i.e. toward happiness. 2. William Ockham’s revolution As I have already noted, virtues can be and must be developed, and the path of such improvement coincides British Franciscan William Ockham was almost a con- with the way of strengthening the will, the intellect and, temporary of Thomas Aquinas. However, his attitude to as a result, the educating of freedom. Surprisingly, this freedom and morality in whole is fundamentally different. education begins from discipline – not as a violent direc- He asserts that freedom is a power to cause, indifferently tion of the will, but as an appeal to natural inclinations, and accidently, different effects, in such a way that a per- spontaneous sense of the good, to a conscience. The task son can bring about an effect or don’t do it. Freedom is is not to inculcate behavioral habits that restrict freedom, postulated by Ockham as the ability to choose between but, on the contrary, to discover the opportunity that it opposites; he reduces it to indifference in relation to those has: the desire of unlimited truth and unlimited good. values that could determine this choice. The indifference At the second stage of that formation, a disciplined to the objects of choice allows the will to proceed when it person takes his or her life – first of all, moral one – in makes a decision solely from itself. own hands and, so to say, develops the taste for values. Such conclusions Ockham reached analyzing the na- Instead of the limitations that characterize discipline, the ture of God. For Ockham, the will of God is so free that it person is motivated by the desire for progress of his or her opposes determination even by His goodness. Good, ac- own virtue for its own sake. cording to Occam, is what God desires, but not contrary. At the third stage of the freedom’s formation Thomas The same can be said about the moral order in the created sees not only moral maturity, but also fruitfulness, as well world: he divine will at any time can change its own pre- as the responsibility of a person: cepts, even the first commandment. Thus, the original freedom inherent in God is indifferent to the objects of Due to the gradual development of his faculties, the human per- choice. Freedom becomes the main property of God; He son is now capable of viewing his life in its entirety. He per- becomes the freedom himself. forms his actions personally according to a plan, a higher goal Since there cannot be two definitions of freedom in which will profit himself and others. This leads him, through one system, Ockham gives a person the same independ- patient acceptance of all trials and obstacles, to the fulfillment of ence from his own nature as God. However, God also is a lift project which gives meaning, value and fruitfulness to ex- istence.5 omnipotent, He can impose His will on man: this is the only difference between divine and human freedom. Ac- As we will see later, in this definition of Pinckaers there cordingly, the relationship between God and man can rest is something from Sartre's attitude, however, he expresses only on the “right of the strong” (first of all, of God); the the thought of Thomas Aquinas.
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