WADE L. HUNTLEY
Missile Defense: More May Be Better—for China
WADE L. HUNTLEY1
Dr. Wade L. Huntley is a visiting fellow at the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. His publications on a variety of Asian and global security issues include articles in The Nonproliferation Review, Asian Survey, International Studies Quarterly, and Millennium: Journal of International Affairs. Dr. Huntley, formerly Director of the Peace and Security Program at the Nautilus Institute, is currently researching long-term Asian implications of recent U.S. strategic policy initiatives.
fter President George W. Bush took office in cuses on U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The January 2001, he repeatedly called for the United central argument is straightforward: the U.S. decision to AStates to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic withdraw from the ABM Treaty and pursue aggressive Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow for the development of missile defense development may end up impinging on the types of extensive and advanced missile defenses pro- Chinese foreign policy and national security interests less hibited by that treaty. These calls generated concern dramatically than if the United States had pursued more among arms control advocates worldwide. In the face of modest missile defenses within the framework of the ABM these policy declarations by the Bush administration, the Treaty. The article considers how U.S. pursuit of exten- People’s Republic of China (PRC), among many other sive missile defenses could lead to reactions by other states states, emphasized its opposition to U.S. plans to move that increase Chinese capacity to effectively blunt the aggressively to develop and deploy both advanced the- impact of U.S. missile defense on its security interests. In ater missile defense (TMD) and national missile defense particular, aggressive U.S. missile defenses may not im- (NDM) systems. pinge Chinese security more than modest missile defenses In December 2001, a year into the Bush administra- would, while U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may tion, the United States formally announced its withdrawal offer China opportunities to pursue its interests vis-à-vis from the ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, the Bush administra- the United States (especially through strategic coopera- tion has abandoned the distinction between TMD and NMD tion with Russia) that China might not have had if the in order to “aggressively” pursue “an effective, layered United States had remained a party to the ABM Treaty. missile defense” based on technological “integration of In short, more U.S. missile defense may be better for land-, sea-, air-, and space-based platforms to counter China. The point is not that U.S. missile defense is “good” ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight.”2 for China. Rather, the point is that in certain important ways, more rather than less U.S. missile defense might This article takes a careful look at China’s position re- create outcomes that are less bad for China than they might garding U.S. missile defense planning and particularly fo- otherwise have been.
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This argument is counterintuitive. It flies in the face of these categories are closely linked. The Bush administra- a basic presumption of ardent missile defense advocates tion decision to abandon the distinction between TMD in the United States: missile defense is good for U.S. se- and NMD in favor of “layered missile defense” further curity, and more missile defense is better. This argument integrates these categories.3 also seemingly contradicts the publicly avowed Chinese opposition to U.S. missile defense development of any Taiwan Strait Missile Issues kind. Many in Beijing believe that only Chinese threats to Reality is rarely so simple. Clearly, the United States respond with force deter an overt declaration of indepen- enjoys great asymmetrical advantages in its relationship dence by Taiwan. At the same time, many Western ana- with China. Chinese choices are more sensitive to U.S. lysts doubt China could successfully invade Taiwan to decisions than vice versa, and Chinese options sometimes suppress independence.4 The official U.S. view is that range only between the bad and the worse. However, in Chinese numerical superiority in military aircraft is the current global security environment, unlike in the simple matched for the foreseeable future by the qualitative ad- bilateral structure of the Cold War, U.S. security actions vantages held by the Taiwanese Air Force. Chinese am- create multiple independent reactions that may interact phibious assault capabilities remain very limited, rendering either positively or negatively in shaping ultimate outcomes. a blockade or an invasion as highly risky options that the U.S. missile defense planning affects East Asian security PRC would only pursue as a last resort when faced with relations in a variety of ways, and the interactions of these complete loss of Taiwan.5 effects could lead to unpredictable and unintended long- However, China does maintain one clear capability term consequences adverse to broader U.S. security in- against which Taiwan cannot defend: a short-range mis- terests and foreign policy objectives. sile force. The United States views the expanding Chi- The following argument is based on U.S. and Chinese nese arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles and cruise statements concerning their key foreign policy concerns. missiles as intended for attacking critical Taiwanese fa- However, the argument itself is speculative. It is not in- cilities and undermining Taiwanese ability to conduct mili- tended to present definitive claims to U.S. or Chinese stra- tary operations.6 Reports indicate that as of April 2002, tegic thinking or to make definitive predictions of future China may have as many as 350 improved-accuracy short- outcomes. Rather, the argument is intended to broaden range missiles deployed against Taiwan.7 Many U.S. ana- the current debate over missile defenses by heightening lysts are unconvinced by the Chinese distinction that the awareness of the potential longer-term consequences of missile forces deployed against Taiwan are necessary to missile defense development. deter Taiwanese independence but not intended to com- The article begins by reviewing Chinese concerns about pel reunification. missile defense. It then considers how U.S. withdrawal Deployment of missile defense in or near Taiwan would from the ABM Treaty affects these concerns, and con- be intended to neutralize the Chinese short-range missile cludes with a consideration of how the terrorist attacks threat in two ways. First, by reducing the likely destruc- on the United States on September 11, 2001, affect the tiveness of a Chinese missile attack, missile defense would logic of the preceding argument. render the threat of a Chinese missile attack less intimi- dating politically to Taiwanese leaders.8 Second, any U.S. CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT MISSILE role in deploying missile defenses in Taiwan would signal DEFENSE (to both Taipei and Beijing) greater likelihood of U.S. military support of Taiwan in the event of an overt con- Chinese concerns about missile defenses, while differ- 9 entiated and nuanced, fall generally into three categories: flict. the Taiwan Strait, the East Asia region, and strategic rela- China worries that both these effects would also bol- tions with the United States. Because the development of ster Taiwanese independence sentiments.10 Although dis- Chinese missile capabilities at most ranges is intimately agreements as to the nature of “one China” persist, for driven by Taiwan Strait concerns, and because U.S. pro- decades the PRC and Taiwan shared one central premise: posals to deploy missile defenses at different levels are China includes Taiwan.11 The United States, in the 1972 similarly mindful of potential Taiwan Strait applications, United States-China Shanghai Communiqué, initiating nor-
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 69 WADE L. HUNTLEY malization of relations with China, essentially accepted this mestic difficulties as pushing aside separatist sentiments. position.12 At the same time, however, the United States Indeed, increasing economic interaction between Taiwan was unwilling—for both historical and strategic reasons– and the mainland also reinforces both sides’ stakes in pre- —to abandon its interest in the security and relative au- venting a precipitous decline in relations.17 However, the tonomy of the Taipei government. Thus, the Taiwan underlying political tensions between Taiwan and the Relations Act of 1979, adopted to accompany U.S. for- mainland have not been resolved and could easily flare mal recognition of the PRC, stated that U.S. policy “rests up again as conditions continue to evolve. Stern reactions upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be by China to recent high-level U.S.-Taiwanese defense determined by peaceful means,” and that the United States contacts,18 in the wake of gains by Chen’s Democratic would provide to Taiwan “defensive” arms “as may be Progressive Party (DPP) in the December 2001 Taiwan- necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- ese legislative elections, indicate Beijing’s ongoing sensi- defense capability.”13 tivity to this issue. U.S. policy on Taiwan since has entailed carefully bal- A critical aspect of Chinese concern over the prospect ancing the tension in intentions between the Shanghai of eventual Taiwanese independence is the potential re- Communiqué and the Taiwan Relations Act, and main- percussions it could trigger in the rest of China. Popula- taining a studied ambiguity with respect to U.S. intentions tions in some regions of China, such as Tibet and Xinjiang, to actively support Taiwan in the event of an outbreak of harbor separatist ambitions that Beijing worries would be hostilities.14 China has reluctantly learned to live with this unleashed by actual Taiwanese independence. The Beijing U.S. position, although for many years China has claimed leadership has made Chinese territorial integrity a core that the character of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has vio- principle of its own legitimacy. The fate of Taiwan is there- lated U.S. pledges to limit such support.15 Stability in U.S.- fore embedded in the Beijing leadership’s perceptions of Chinese relations has long depended upon careful its prospects for sustaining its legitimacy to rule China at management of the fragile balances of power across the all. Taiwan Strait on a day-to-day basis, which itself has rested Treating the Taiwan issue as simply a U.S.-Chinese upon the delicate consensus on Taiwan’s formal legal sta- bilateral matter obscures these Chinese domestic factors tus. bolstering the commitment of the Beijing government to China’s rising concern for that delicate consensus is preserve its sovereign title to Taiwan. Military support for driven by its perception that Taiwanese independence sen- Taiwan aimed at deterring Chinese military action must timents have increased dramatically in recent years. So- take into account this resolve. A decision in Beijing to use cial and political changes in Taiwan, including generational force to prevent Taiwanese independence might be based transition and democratization, have diminished popular not on the practical prospects for reclaiming Taiwan mili- identification with China, replaced by the growth of in- tarily, but rather on the core prerequisite of regime sur- digenous Taiwanese nationalism. Some in Beijing perceive vival. In this mindset, Beijing would be undeterred by the that these trends in Taiwan are diminishing desires for improbability of reclaiming Taiwan militarily or by the level reunification and inducing growing sentiments for formal of U.S. support Beijing expects Taiwan to receive. independence. Such perceptions cause increasing concern Keith Payne’s assessment of the applicability of deter- that time is no longer the mainland’s ally with respect to rence to a Taiwan crisis appropriately recognizes the im- reunification. The Taiwanese national election on March portance of these motivations on Chinese resolve and their 18, 2000, in which the victory of Chen Shui-bian cast the impact on the prospects for successful U.S. deterrence of Kuomintang (KMT) out of power for the first time since a Chinese attack on Taiwan. As Payne notes: “Deterrence 1949, particularly alarmed Beijing, reinforcing concern that can fail or not apply when leaders are very highly moti- sentiments in Taiwan favoring independence continue to vated, perceive concession as intolerable, [and] are will- 16 grow. ing to absorb great cost or are unwilling/unable to count The subsequent flagging popularity of the Chen gov- the expected cost…”19 Applying this factor to the likely ernment, combined with difficult economic conditions Chinese view of a Taiwan crisis, Payne observes: (yielding Taiwan’s first negative growth rates in decades), Subduing Taiwan following a declaration of in- have served to induce Beijing to perceive Taiwan’s do- dependence would be a survival interest for Chinese leaders. Doing so would be the prior-
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ity value, and China’s freedom to conciliate on this approach would require that U.S. confidence in its the issue would be very low. Its freedom to pro- deterrence be maintained over the life of the policy. The voke Washington, in contrast, would be high, United States would have to be prepared to continually because Chinese leaders would likely be skep- bolster its deterrent threat to whatever level necessary to tical of a U.S. threat to take decisive military overcome any increases in the Chinese leadership’s own counteraction.20 intensity of commitment. Importantly, Payne attributes this problem to insufficient In short, if China’s leaders are in fact sufficiently moti- demonstration of U.S. resolve, commenting that, “circum- vated by regime legitimacy concerns to use force to pre- spect U.S. support for Taiwan and the conscious policy vent Taiwanese independence—even if the prospects for of ‘strategic ambiguity’ emphasized by the Clinton admin- success are dim—enhanced demonstrations of U.S. re- istration are unlikely to have communicated U.S. resolve solve to “intervene decisively” may have only marginal to Chinese leaders.” Thus, Payne asserts: impact on Chinese decisionmaking. Robust confidence To establish a deterrence policy suited to these that bolstered threats would effectively deter Chinese lead- circumstances, the United States would have to ers across all foreseeable Taiwan Strait encounters would make blatantly clear its will and capability to be virtually unattainable, particularly for U.S. defense plan- defeat Chinese conventional and WMD attacks ners necessarily preparing for pessimistic scenarios. With- against Taiwan and against its own power pro- out this level of confidence, U.S. decisionmakers could jection forces. …The U.S. would need to be, not be sure that bolstered deterrence threats exceed the and to be seen as being, capable of intervening limits of Chinese commitment to prevent Taiwanese in- decisively to prevent China from subduing Tai- dependence. China might still remain undeterred, and U.S. wan before U.S. forces could be brought to decisionmakers would still have to consider the conse- bear.21 quences of that prospect. To achieve a sufficiently bolstered deterrence threat in The kind of bolstered deterrence Payne prescribes could support of Taiwan, Payne calls for U.S. deterrence policy also yield consequences more pernicious than mere inef- to focus on “denial,” requiring “a combination of offen- fectiveness. If missile defense deployment also worked sive and defensive capabilities, including missile defense.” to neutralize Taiwanese fears of possible Chinese reac- Payne concludes that this approach would, “if effective, tions to independence, it could catalyze the very Taiwan- provide the enormous benefit of preventing war in the ese movement toward independence that might incite those Taiwan Strait as envisaged in the scenario.”22 reactions. If, at the same time, China remained prone to The crucial element of this conclusion is the conditional react to such a move militarily, regardless of the prospects clause: “if effective.” Because deterrence takes place in for success of that reaction, the missile defense deploy- the mind of the adversary, the key criterion of deterrence ments would not only have failed to deter Chinese mili- effectiveness is not the clarity and force of one’s demon- tary action against Taiwan, they would also have increased 23 stration of resolve, but the reactions to that demonstra- the likelihood of that action. tion by one’s adversary. Confidence in the effectiveness Moreover, the unequivocal U.S. security guarantees of this “demonstration” approach to deterrence, in this Payne advocates to replace U.S. “strategic ambiguity” with case, would require reliable and precise knowledge of the respect to Taiwan would dramatically increase U.S. com- limits of the Chinese leadership’s willingness to undertake mitments to fulfill those guarantees, regardless of the cir- any means to prevent Taiwanese independence. Yet, cumstances of the moment. In the event of deterrence China’s leaders themselves may not know these limits— failure, U.S. leaders would feel an additional compulsion if they exist at all. This approach also would require U.S. to make good on U.S. commitments to support Taiwan confidence in its anticipations of Chinese actions under in order to ensure the credibility of such threats in other the stress of crisis conditions whose precise configurations future contexts. This factor would intrude upon the exi- are unpredictable. Indeed, U.S. efforts to bolster its de- gencies of the crisis at hand in U.S. decisionmaking, and terrence threat, rather than intimidating China’s leader- perhaps lead the United States into escalatory actions it ship, might instead strengthen its commitment by would not have otherwise taken.24 increasing its perceived costs of backing down. Finally,
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Thus, U.S. deployment of a missile defense system Unfortunately, these protests avoid the point that it is the applicable to Taiwan (let alone missile defense deploy- perceptions of the growth trajectory of the DPRK missile ment in Taiwan itself), as well as other U.S. actions seek- threat that matter to U.S. defense planners. For these rea- ing to bolster deterrence of Chinese military action against sons, the effect of the August 1998 DPRK missile test in Taiwan, could instead both heighten the risks of a war in galvanizing both Japanese and U.S. support for missile the Taiwan Strait and commit the United States to a reac- defense development was entirely predictable. tion that would bring China and the United States into However, elements of the Japanese and U.S. positions direct conflict. lend credibility to Chinese concerns. Many missile defense supporters argue that Japan and the United States should China, Missiles, and Regional Relations proceed with missile defense development in East Asia Chinese concerns over Taiwan are closely linked to its even in the absence of a missile threat from the DPRK. views on regional relations. The sea-based, “upper-tier” Some of these supporters openly assert a U.S. interest in Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense system, un- supporting Taiwan, confirming Chinese suspicions that der collaborative U.S.-Japanese development, has been U.S.-Japanese missile defense collaboration will free these of particular concern to China. The most often stated jus- countries from the constraints imposed by Chinese mis- tification for this system is not the protection of Taiwan sile and nuclear capabilities. The conspicuous absence in from China, but the protection of Japan, and U.S. forces the 1997 revision of the U.S.-Japanese Defense Guide- in Japan, against missile threats from North Korea lines of a definition of the region in which events could (DPRK). For most of the 1990s, Japan was more reluc- lead to joint U.S.-Japanese military operations29 under- tant to pursue missile defense development than the United scores this Chinese perception.30 States. The DPRK missile test over Japan in August 1998 These Chinese concerns are directly linked to the Tai- shifted Japanese thinking on the issue, facilitating an agree- wan issue. The NTW system envisioned in U.S.-Japa- ment with the United States in August 1999 on joint tech- nese missile defense planning would be deployed on Aegis nological research and design of four key NTW cruisers that could be moved near Taiwan in the event of 25 components. a conflict there. Hence, for China, NTW deployment in The U.S. justification for this approach flows from Japan would provide implicit missile defense protection continuing U.S.-Japanese reliance on extended nuclear to Taiwan. Additionally, Chinese leaders worry that such deterrence in upholding Japanese security—the “nuclear a deployment, combined with the open-ended regional umbrella.” Advocates of joint U.S.-Japanese missile de- scope of the U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines, would open fense development often point to its crucial role in reaf- the door to direct Japanese involvement in a Taiwan con- firming the U.S. commitment to this alliance.26 The United flict. States and Japan formally articulated this conception of Thus, China perceives deployment of missile defense the relationship in the 1997 revision of the 1978 Guide- in East Asia as a challenge to its capabilities to pursue its 27 lines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. legitimate interests in its immediate geographic region. This Advocates of this viewpoint often conclude by observ- concern includes reunification with Taiwan, but not ex- ing that, in the absence of this U.S. commitment—includ- clusively; if that issue were in some way resolved, China ing missile defense—Japan would be left to develop would still look upon regional missile defense develop- independent security capabilities, which could entail a ment as a signal that U.S. and Japanese long-term inten- considerable missile program and even a latent nuclear tions in East Asia are confrontational rather than weapons option. However, others have found this logic collaborative, and as a portent of a U.S. “containment” unpersuasive, suggesting instead that U.S. denucleariza- policy aimed at China. tion of its alliance relationship with Japan could induce momentum to denuclearize the region and thereby impede China, Strategic Missiles, and Missile Defense Japan from developing nuclear weapons of its own 28 China currently possesses a small arsenal of interconti- Chinese analysts frequently charge that the United States nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying exaggerates the current DPRK missile threat to justify nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United missile defense plans actually intended to confront China. States.31 U.S. intelligence services note that the current
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Chinese strategic modernization program includes devel- may perceive its coercive influence over the United States opment of mobile, solid-fueled ICBMs to improve sur- diminishing, and the United States, accordingly, may per- vivability, and estimate that “by 2015, the total number ceive an expanding freedom of maneuver.36 Strategic of Chinese strategic warheads will rise several-fold.” How- missile defense may, in particular, moderate U.S. defense ever, “Beijing’s future ICBM force deployed primarily planners’ concerns over escalation in the event of U.S. against the United States…will remain considerably smaller intervention in Taiwan or other U.S.-Chinese regional con- and less capable than the strategic missile forces of Rus- flicts. This capability would add greatly to these planners’ sia and the United States.”32 The United States would perceptions of policy flexibility on Taiwan, and on many retain its massive retaliatory deterrent. Even in the event other issues. Thus, China fears that strategic missile de- of direct U.S.-Chinese military conflict, the prospects of fense deployment would give the United States unfettered China launching nuclear missiles against the United States confidence to intervene in Taiwan, and—perhaps more would remain slim. Accordingly, U.S. government reports importantly—more confidence to behave on an ongoing do not portray Chinese missile and nuclear forces as an basis as though it felt free to intervene. imminent threat to the United States.33 However, U.S. intelligence analysts do perceive Chi- CHINA, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND THE ABM nese ICBMs as a latent and growing threat, observing that TREATY: THE STRATEGIC EQUATION “Chinese strategic nuclear doctrine calls for a survivable For the reasons described above, China finds the pros- long-range missile force that can hold a significant por- pect of the United States free to pursue missile defense tion of the U.S. population at risk in a retaliatory strike.”34 very worrisome, and has opposed this prospect unequivo- In this manner, Chinese nuclear capabilities already pose cally. China sees U.S. missile defense plans as indicating to U.S. analysts a politically meaningful coercive instru- a U.S. effort to rise above Cold War-era mutual deter- ment—however remote the prospect, U.S. war planners rence and establish for itself “absolute security” against must still reckon with the possible use by China of nuclear any threats by any other nations, in order to obtain com- weapons directly against the United States. plete freedom of action in international relations.37 For U.S. deployment of defenses against ICBMs would act China, this ambition signals a reduced U.S. commitment to counteract this political threat. Missile defense capa- to arms control at the global level, a further commitment bility would probably add little to current U.S. deterrence to alliance-based rather than multilateral approach to glo- of a Chinese launch of nuclear weapons against the United bal security evolution, and a continued reliance on the States, not least because of the options available to China political efficacy of nuclear capabilities. to defeat such a system.35 However, just as with regional At the same time, all U.S. missile defense plans do not missile defense, technical calculations of the effectiveness equally affect Chinese core security interests focused on of such strategic missile defense are only loosely related the Taiwan Strait. In particular, many of the grander mis- to the political impacts of the prospects of its effective- sile defense aims that distinguish the Bush administration ness. In this political context, while the United States can- from its predecessor38 may be only marginally more wor- not have complete confidence that strategic missile risome to Beijing because they would have less effect on defenses will work, neither can China have complete con- Taiwan Strait concerns. Chinese strategists already per- fidence that it will be able to defeat or overwhelm those ceive that limited strategic missile defense will undermine defenses. To the extent that missile defense deployment the coercive capabilities of their modest ICBM forces in would inhibit Chinese psychological confidence in the the context of a Taiwan Strait conflict. U.S. development deterrent value of its ICBM forces, even the prospect of of more ambitious strategic missile defense systems is its deployment works to moderate concerns among U.S. unlikely to greatly increase this specific, core concern.39 defense planners considering Taiwan intervention sce- However, more ambitious U.S. missile defense systems narios. will still matter to China insofar as they affect the contex- Hence, even proposals to develop strategic missile de- tual environment within which a U.S.-Chinese conflict fense tend to add to U.S. perceptions of its policy flexibil- over Taiwan would play itself out. Here is where the dis- ity with respect to ongoing diplomacy over the Taiwan position of the ABM Treaty is key. U.S. pursuit of ambi- issue. As missile defense comes closer to reality, China tious missile defense plans coupled with withdrawal from
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 73 WADE L. HUNTLEY the ABM Treaty will shape future East Asian relationships derail the economic modernization of China and reinforce in significantly different ways than U.S. pursuit of more U.S. and Japanese military intentions.41 limited missile defenses within the framework of a U.S.- On the other hand, the prospect of aggressive U.S. Russian agreement retaining the ABM Treaty would have missile defense development has also been worrisome to done. Russia and other states. Although the system proposed For these reasons, the strategic future of China, even by the Clinton administration would not have realistically more than that of Russia, may have hung on the U.S. challenged the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent, the decision to abandon the ABM Treaty entirely. However, aggressive technological development the Bush adminis- the prospective consequences to China of this decision tration envisions could lead to future generations of mis- are not straightforward. To illustrate the possible outcomes, sile defense that genuinely neutralize Russian nuclear it is useful to juxtapose potential consequences of U.S. forces. Russian willingness to accept ABM modifications withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and aggressive missile was driven in part by the desire to limit initial U.S. missile defense development to those consequences that might defense deployment to acceptable levels and circumvent have ensued from a U.S. decision to reach agreement with future development with which Russia could not keep pace. Russia on a more limited missile defense program under Accordingly, Russia threatened to withdraw from the In- the auspices of the treaty. termediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and both Strate- gic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II), U.S. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty if the United States were to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Expressing this concern, Russian Defense Minis- Although U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to ter Igor Sergeyev dramatically warned, “The destruction pursue ambitious missile defense development has been of the ABM Treaty will result in the annihilation of the strenuously opposed by China, some analysts suggest that whole structure of strategic stability.”42 China could neutralize U.S. missile defense simply by in- creasing its strategic missile forces and/or equipping these For reasons discussed below, erosion of U.S.-Russian forces with relatively simple countermeasures. Some U.S. strategic relations has not followed from the U.S. ABM missile defense critics suggest that these options would withdrawal. Should such circumstances come to pass, be less expensive for China than missile defense deploy- however, incentives for Russian-Chinese cooperation on ment would be for the United States. At one point, the a host of strategic issues would be high. Cooperation could Bush administration itself reportedly was considering drop- include technical collaboration on offensive nuclear forces ping objections to a Chinese nuclear buildup, and even (nuclear warhead and missile designs) and on both mis- acquiescing to Chinese resumption of nuclear testing, to sile defenses and missile defense countermeasures, some overcome Chinese opposition to U.S. missile defense of which China might also be able to apply to defeat re- plans.40 gional missile defense systems. Broader military coopera- tion could enable China to enhance its capabilities However, responding to U.S. missile defense deploy- considerably. ment by building up its own nuclear forces—whether by agreement or not—would have several disadvantages for Chinese-Russian political cooperation could include re- China. Strategic force buildup beyond the current mod- sistance to U.S. efforts to stem WMD and missile prolif- ernization already underway would impose absolute costs. eration globally as well as direct opposition to U.S. military Given that China has a smaller and less developed intervention. China and Russia strengthened bilateral ties economy, these costs at the margins might even be rela- under a new “Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and tively greater to China than U.S. missile defense costs. Cooperation” signed during PRC President Jiang Zemin’s Additionally, such a buildup would concern regional neigh- July 2001 visit to Russia. Additionally, the “Shanghai Co- bors, including Russia, Japan, and India, in ways China operation Organization,” bringing together Russia, China, may not wish to encourage and to the detriment of Chi- and four other former Soviet republics over common con- nese regional security interests. Indeed, some Chinese cerns such as regional irredentist turmoil, offers a poten- military strategists are known to have cautioned their lead- tial framework within which more robust Russian-Chinese ership to avoid being goaded into an arms race that would cooperation could blossom.43
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The U.S.-Russian ABM Accord That Wasn’t The United States-Russia-China Triangle The United States and Russia might have agreed to The juxtaposition of these two alternative courses of ABM Treaty modifications allowing the United States to events—one now more likely, the other now merely specu- go forward with more limited missile defense options, while lative—underscores the conflicting implications for China also limiting future missile defense research and develop- of U.S. missile defense development. In particular, Chi- ment, such as prohibiting deployment of weapons in space. nese concerns that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty Yet such an agreement would have been unlikely to serve removes fundamental impediments to U.S. missile defense Chinese direct security interests. Any U.S.-Russian agree- development are muted, and perhaps balanced, by the ment on ABM would not have limited regional missile prospect that the most ambitious U.S. missile defense defense, in which Russia is also interested for its own se- plans will only marginally exacerbate Chinese strategic curity purposes. Such an agreement likely would have lim- security concerns, while those same plans may prove con- ited strategic missile defense only to an extent preserving siderably threatening to Russia and could thereby promote the credibility of the Russian nuclear deterrent—the United Russian-Chinese political and military cooperation. States, particularly under the Bush administration, has been These potential repercussions in Asia of U.S. missile determined to retain at least enough latitude to develop a defense ambitions should be of greater concern to U.S. system capable of undermining the deterrent quality of policymakers than they are at present. So long as the stra- the modest Chinese intercontinental nuclear forces. tegic global role of China in the post-Cold War world con- Thus, although China would have welcomed contin- tinues to grow, Chinese reactions to U.S. actions will ued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty as a signal that increasingly affect U.S. success in achieving the goals it the United States is not yet prepared to scuttle strategic intends by its actions. arms control overtly, a U.S.-Russian agreement to retain In the past, U.S. policymakers have at times not taken the ABM Treaty would not have limited U.S. develop- prospective Chinese reactions sufficiently into account due ment of the missile defense capabilities most threatening to reluctance in some quarters to acknowledge China as a to China. Moreover, the mere fact of such a deal would global strategic actor. For example, some U.S. defense have raised the specter of a U.S.-Russian condominium planners assert that Chinese nuclear force modernization of power, locking in bilateral mutual deterrence and lock- will proceed regardless of U.S. decisions on missile de- ing out China through limited strategic missile defense. fense.46 However, China has long had the capability to China would have found itself both politically and strate- expand its nuclear forces far beyond their current levels, 44 gically isolated. demonstrating that its nuclear weapons decisionmaking is Russia, insofar as it perceives itself as a regional rather guided less by material limitations than by security per- than a global power, had considerable incentives to ac- ceptions. Among the strongest factors shaping China’s cept such a deal. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s perceived security environment are the signals of U.S. acknowledgement that new ballistic missile threats exist intentions and capabilities it receives. Indeed, China’s per- marked a step away from Russian-Chinese solidarity in ceptions of U.S. intentions are likely at least as impor- opposition to missile defenses, and a step toward U.S.- tant in Beijing as perceptions of China’s intentions are in Russian coordination on the issue. With its nuclear deter- Washington. rent capability vis-à-vis the United States stabilized, Russia In the future, Chinese strategic policy choices may come could have more easily focused on regional security con- to have more influence than Russian ones over the out- cerns, among which China ranks notably. Russia could comes the United States seeks to affect by its actions.47 have played on U.S. concerns in East Asia to continue Hence, anticipation of Chinese reactions to U.S. actions building closer ties to NATO and to break new ground in is highly relevant to U.S. success in achieving long-term U.S.-Russian defense cooperation, perhaps securing im- goals. To base U.S. strategic policy on the weak assump- plicit U.S. support for Russian regional objectives and an 45 tion that China is not sensitive to U.S. actions and that independent Russian missile defense capability. Chinese actions are only incidental to core U.S. concerns risks both rendering U.S. actions counterproductive and missing opportunities for mutually beneficial accommo- dation.48 Treating China as an implicit “rogue” state dan-
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 75 WADE L. HUNTLEY gerously overlooks China’s capacities to frustrate U.S. portunities. As “anti-terrorism” shows signs of coming to strategic goals if its security interests so dictate. On the play the same defining role in U.S. foreign policy that anti- missile defense issue alone, the opportunities that coop- communism did during the Cold War era, U.S. eration with China might offer to Russia illustrate this policymakers seem increasingly inclined to measure their potential. Thus, treating China as a strategic actor is a pre- relationships with other countries on their willingness to requisite to ensuring that U.S. strategic decisions do not join the U.S. counter-terrorism campaign. both undermine U.S. interests and increase regional in- Whether anti-terrorism will endure as the defining fo- stability. cus of the U.S. approach to the world remains to be seen. Adopting such a viewpoint would not preclude U.S. However, anti-terrorism likely will shape the Bush missile defense deployment. However, it would require administration’s approach to its international relations for reckoning with issues currently marginal to missile defense the remainder of its current term in office. This fact is debates, and providing strategic reasoning with consider- already having significant effects on U.S. relations with a ably more nuance and long-term perspective than missile host of other major global states and on its views of ma- defense advocates typically offer. jor global issues. The U.S. approach to missile defense and the ABM THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Treaty is an important representative example. Prior to The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States September 11, President Bush had made an ambitious have fundamentally shifted world perspectives on global program of missile defense a cornerstone of his security issues. To be sure, much of the hyperbole of a administration’s defense policy. President Bush’s May 1, “completely changed world” after September 11 reflected 2001, speech at the National Defense University outlined more shock than thought. Indeed, one of the striking fea- a sweeping vision in which U.S. nuclear policy would break tures of the September 11 attacks is in fact how much dramatically from Cold War characteristics: consistency they displayed.49 The attacks themselves, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough to while a wake-up call to many, did not themselves change maintain peace, to protect our citizens and our the world. own allies and friends. We must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we What has changed the world is the character of the U.S. can destroy those who seek to destroy us.51 response to the attacks. The Bush administration has de- clared the United States “at war” not just with the net- The speech expressed the Bush administration’s intent work of agents responsible for the attacks, but with the to break from the Cold War predication of the entire phenomenon of global terrorism. The effect of this inescapability of “mutually assured destruction” through U.S. response on world politics has been transformational, deep U.S. cuts in offensive nuclear weapons in tandem due to two unusual circumstances. First, the rapidity with with expansive missile defense deployment.52 This ambi- which the U.S. government reoriented its core national tion to reformulate U.S. nuclear deterrence policy was interests in reaction to the attacks is rare. Governments, driven by the administration’s fervent desire to escape the especially governments of major states, do not tend to shackles of bilateral and multilateral arms control, particu- overhaul their core foreign policy orientations overnight. larly the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty on ex- Second, the scope of impact of this reorientation is truly pansive missile defense research, development, and global. Current U.S. preeminence is unprecedented his- deployment. torically and means that choices the United States makes Subsequently, the U.S. commitment to abandoning the for its role in world politics define major features of the ABM Treaty overshadowed its evolving relations with both global political environment, becoming “givens” to which Russia and China. Despite considerable activity in U.S.- other states must react as though they were features of Russian relations, U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 50 the international system. was widely regarded as inevitable as the end of 2001 ap- Consequently, the fundamental reorientation of U.S. proached. As noted earlier, Russia and China responded international priorities in the wake of the September 11 by tightening their relationship, strengthening bilateral ties attacks has meant that many other countries now face, to under a new Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and varying degrees, a transformed set of constraints and op- Cooperation and reaffirming their commitment to the
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Some observers per- Second, the Russian bargaining position vis-à-vis the ceived these developments as expressions of other under- United States is much weaker than during the Cold War, lying factors pushing Russia and China closer (such as and continues to decline. The May 2002 nuclear arms leadership initiative, opportunities for defense cooperation, agreement signed in Moscow calls for reductions in U.S. and shared desires to resist U.S. power), and hence as forces already anticipated in the January 2002 Nuclear possible harbingers of an eventual anti-U.S. alliance.53 Posture Review, and will not require the United States to September 11 changed these dynamics. President destroy any of the nuclear warheads or delivery systems Putin’s early decision to allow U.S. planes to use Russian removed from deployment, preserving U.S. flexibility. airspace for military and humanitarian missions in Afghani- President Putin’s willingness to accept U.S. terms on stra- stan, his endorsement of the deployment of U.S. forces tegic relations likely reflects his shift of priorities to secu- at military bases in the former Soviet republics of rity and economic concerns much closer to home, and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and his sharing of Russian in- his recognition that U.S. beneficence is a prerequisite to telligence information garnered during the Soviet presence building Russian links to the West and fostering integra- in Afghanistan, all suggested a fulsome Russian commit- tion into the world community. ment to the U.S. cause. Many U.S. officials came to view At a deeper level, and more ironically, improved U.S.- Russian support after September 11 as a watershed in Russian relations following September 11 may have actu- U.S.-Russian relations. The U.S. decision to postpone an ally facilitated U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, October 2001 missile defense test that could have been rather than impeded it. The war on terrorism provided a interpreted as a violation of the ABM Treaty was, at the basis for U.S.-Russian security cooperation within which time, tangible evidence that the Bush administration was Russia could make meaningful contributions. Crucially, prioritizing its relationship with Russia in the context of as the core of the U.S.-Russian relationship shifted to- the anti-terrorism campaign.54 More tangibly, in May 2002, ward anti-terrorism cooperation, missile defense became the momentum of improving U.S.-Russian relations pro- less of a touchstone for the broader relationship. Russia duced new agreements on nuclear weapons reductions and could have more confidence in the staying power of U.S. Russian-NATO cooperation.55 benevolence, regardless of its missile defense decisions, which in turn freed the Bush administration to pursue its The shifted tenor of U.S.-Russian relations after Sep- missile defense ambitions with less concern about Rus- tember 11 inevitably altered the implications of U.S. with- sian reactions. drawal from the ABM Treaty. However, the character of this effect was counterintuitive. On the surface, one might U.S. relations with China also improved in the post- easily have expected improved U.S.-Russian relations to September 11 world. In exchange for diplomatic support make a U.S.-Russian accord on modifying the ABM Treaty and intelligence sharing, China moved from “strategic more likely. Yet the Bush administration proceeded to competitor” to anti-terrorism “partner” in the Bush announce the U.S. intention to withdraw from the ABM administration’s eyes. However, improvement in U.S.- Treaty. Even more surprisingly, improved U.S.-Russian Chinese relations has not matched the improvement in relations have easily weathered this move. Several fac- U.S.-Russian relations, as was evinced in the differential tors may account for this result. results of President Bush’s meetings with Russian Presi- First, September 11 apparently boosted the Bush dent Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin 56 administration’s missile defense ambitions, while increased at the October 2001 APEC meetings in Shanghai. The U.S. domestic support for greater defense preparedness reason China has risen less than Russia in the post-Sep- constrained domestic opposition to missile defense. In his tember 11 eyes of the United States is simple: China has first post-September 11 press conference, President Bush less to offer in support of the new U.S. prioritization of reiterated his commitment to missile defense, suggesting its anti-terrorism campaign. that the attacks demonstrated the need to increase U.S. Thus, while the United States muted its criticism of security against threats by missiles armed with weapons Chinese suppression of Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang Prov- of mass destruction. The Bush administration may have ince and appeared less likely to provoke Beijing with dra- been so determined to withdraw from the treaty that height- matic new arms sales to Taiwan, in both the U.S. ened need for Russian cooperation was insufficient to administration and on Capitol Hill there remained deep impede this move.
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 77 WADE L. HUNTLEY mistrust of Beijing’s intentions, and the Bush administra- tions are unlikely to be limited to military counter-actions. tion seemed unlikely to make significant concessions to China will also likely take advantage of whatever other China on defense issues or modify its commitment to de- diplomatic and political opportunities present themselves. fend Taiwan with the use of force. 57 As one China ex- If an ambitious U.S. pursuit of missile defense serves to pert advocates: alienate the United States in Asia and worldwide, China Beijing hopes that by backing the war against will find those opportunities to be more abundant. terrorism, Washington will be more sympathetic In this context, the future course of U.S.-Russian rela- and accommodating to Chinese aspirations for tions will remain crucial to China. September 11 altered reunifying the Mainland with Taiwan. The Chi- the impact of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by nese would like to see a reduction in U.S. arms providing alternate grounds for sustained U.S.-Russian sales to Taiwan and U.S. pressure on Taiwan political relations, thereby depriving China of the benefits President Chen Shui-bian to accept Beijing’s of Russian antipathy to U.S. strategic plans that it might “one-China principle” and to enter into nego- otherwise have enjoyed. However, the recent sunny cli- tiations with the Mainland. Trade-offs involv- mate in U.S.-Russian relations may darken over time if ing Taiwan’s security must not be entered into. the benefits of post-September 11 cooperation wane while The United States should remain firm in its com- U.S. missile defense development emerges as a true threat mitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining a suffi- to Russian strategic capabilities.60 In these circumstances, 58 cient self-defense capability. the incentives for increased strategic cooperation between Because the post-September 11 improvement in U.S.- China and Russia would reemerge (as would incentives Chinese relations has been more muted, and because for the United States to moderate its missile defense am- Chinese concerns with U.S. missile defense planning are bitions to avoid these negative consequences). more immediate, the post-September 11 displacement of Hence, various outcomes in Asian regional relations, missile defense issues in U.S.-Russian ties has not been and many different long-term dispositions of missile de- replicated in U.S.-Chinese relations. Hence, despite U.S. fense issues, are still plausible. In particular, there remains withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the near-term effects a strong prospect that the U.S. ABM withdrawal and ag- in U.S.-Russian-Chinese triangular relations has been simi- gressive missile defense development may cause political lar to what would have been anticipated had there been a repercussions that will buffer the military impact of mis- U.S.-Russian ABM accord. For example, U.S. enlistment sile defense on Chinese strategic interests, leading to long- of Russian support for a leading U.S. role in global anti- term outcomes more favorable to those interests than terrorism, combined with the military action in Afghani- might have come to pass under a more restrained U.S. stan to depose the Taliban regime, has undercut Chinese approach to missile defense. enlistment of Russian support for similar purposes through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.59 CONCLUSION This outcome is the worst of both worlds for China. For many in Washington, the principal lesson of the However, international politics in the aftermath of Sep- Cold War is that U.S. military power eventually compelled tember 11 are more volatile and unpredictable than be- an odious regime into submission and collapse. Even if fore. Further dramatic events may reverse some of these this diagnosis were true,61 to apply it to the post-Cold War effects of the September 11 attacks, particularly as the era would be to make the classic error of “fighting the Bush administration encounters new obstacles to its in- previous war.” U.S. preeminence makes its position to- tentions to rally the support of principal states for advanc- day fundamentally different than during the Cold War. ing the war on terrorism beyond Afghanistan. Over time, This preeminence is even more evident after September as the impact of the events of September 11 wanes and 11, to the extent that U.S. unilateral policy change funda- aggressive U.S. missile defense development proceeds, mentally shifted the terrain of international politics. missile defense issues may reclaim more of their previous centrality to global strategic relationships. Preeminence confers on the United States an unprec- edented role of world leadership. The United States has Certainly, China will feel a compulsion to react as U.S. overtly assumed this leadership on the issue of terrorism. missile defense plans go forward. However, these reac- However, the United States also exercises this leadership
78 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 WADE L. HUNTLEY on other strategic issues, including nuclear weapons non- sizing the political efficacy of strategic weapons and thereby proliferation and arms control, whether it seeks to do so encouraging other states to respond with strategic build- or not. The United States still has in its hands a host of ups of their own. choices on current strategic issues, and the choices it makes If, on the other hand, the September 11 attacks encour- will decisively influence the reactions of many other states. age U.S. policymakers and analysts to think more com- At the same time, September 11 revealed that the United prehensively about vital strategic choices, such as those States is in some ways more vulnerable than it was at any on missile defense, there is a prospect that this terrible time during the Cold War. Both supporters and critics of tragedy could spark a new era in U.S. global leadership. U.S. foreign policies over the past decade, who often took This new era would be marked by a coupling of the cam- U.S. global power for granted, must now reconsider view- paign against terrorism with a genuine effort push for points built on this premise. improvements in the conditions of repression and pov- Vulnerability has awakened the United States to the erty throughout the world that fuel so many global prob- priority of homeland defense, but this priority does not lems, including terrorist extremism. In this new era, the conflict with responsibility for world leadership. Rather, United States would take the lead not only in a war on September 11 demonstrates that U.S. global actions have terrorism, but also in construction of the peace that must homeland consequences. This tangible link to U.S. do- follow any war. Building this peace would require the mestic security underscores the need for the United States United States to promote new concepts of a global order to build a far-sighted and comprehensive conception of better informed by the multilateral and non-military fea- its global role. tures defining the post-Cold War world. Taking on such a role would not only promote global peace and stability, The “war on terrorism” has opened certain new op- but also serve more effectively than military defense alone portunities in this regard. The need to enlist support of to protect the U.S. domestic population against the new like-minded states—and global civil society—in a cam- threats that the September 11 attacks revealed. paign against terrorism demonstrates the need for and value of multilateral approaches to security issues. Already, the Bush administration has agreed to codify bilateral U.S.- 1 I am grateful for the innumerable helpful comments and suggestions on early Russian nuclear weapons reductions in the May 2002 drafts of this article from many colleagues, and for the invaluable constructive agreement signed in Moscow. Over time, the administra- critiques from the anonymous reviews. tion may come to see even the missile defense issue as 2 U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, “The Ballistic Missile Defense Sys- tem,”
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8 U.S. defense planners acknowledge this Chinese concern. See U.S. Depart- of Defense Studies, 2000), Chapter 20; Robert Wall, “U.S., Japan Agree on ment of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Re- Cooperative Missile Defense,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Au- public of China,” Report Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization gust 23, 1999; Yukiya Amano, “A Japanese View on Nuclear Disarmament,” Act, Washington, DC, June 2000. Nonproliferation Review 9 (Spring 2002), pp. 143-44. 9 Kenneth W. Allen, et al., “Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Re- 26 National Institute of Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2000. gion,” Henry L. Stimson Center Working Group Report No. 34, Washington, 27 Security Consultative Committee, “Completion of the Review of the Guide- DC, June 2000, pp. 46-47,
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40 See David E. Sanger, “U.S. To Tell China It Will Not Object To Missile 52 Note that Bush’s speech called not to replace deterrence with security Buildup,” New York Times, September 2, 2001; and Mike Allen, “U.S. To Give concepts grounded in eliminating the threat of nuclear war in its entirety, but Details Of Shield Tests To China,” Washington Post, September 2, 2001. Ad- rather to supplement deterrence with “new concepts” including “a broad strat- ministration spokespersons later pulled back somewhat from this public posi- egy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses.” Many of tion. the “new concepts” in fact build on central elements of longstanding U.S. 41 See U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of missile defense ambitions, such as President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Ini- the People’s Republic of China,” Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense tiative of 1983. Authorization Act, June 2000. 53 Sherman Garnett, “Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership,” 42 “Russia Says U.S. Antimissile Plan Means an Arms Race,” New York Times, Washington Quarterly 24:4, Autumn, 2001, p. 41 February 6, 2001. 54 Steven Mufson, “Postponement Shows Shift in Priorities,” Washington 43 See Zhang Mo, “Birth of Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Jiefang Post, October 26, 2001. Daily (Shanghai), June 16, 2001, p. 5; and Vladimir Isachenkov, “China Leader: 55 David E. Sanger, “Bush and Putin to Sign Treaty to Cut Nuclear Warheads,” Security Is Treaty Goal,” The Associated Press (Moscow), July 17, 2001. See The New York Times, May 14, 2002; and Todd S. Purdum, “NATO Countries also Sherman Garnett, “Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership,” Approve Pact Giving Russia Role of a Partner,” The New York Times, May 15, Washington Quarterly 24 (Autumn, 2001). 2002. 44 Isolating China in this manner was also an explicit intention of the original 56 Gerald Baker, “Old Alliances Provide Warmest Enthusiasts for New World ABM Treaty. See Patrick E. Tyler, “Behind the Shield, a 3-Sided Rivalry,” New Order,” Financial Times, October 22, 2001. York Times, May 6, 2001. 57 Gerard Baker and James Kynge, “A recast relationship with Beijing,” Finan- 45 The U.S.-Russian accord to begin direct military collaboration on early cial Times, October 19, 2001. warning is a potential harbinger of such an outcome. 58 Bonnie S. Glaser, “Testimony on U.S. China Relations and the Taiwan Strait 46 For a good review of this issue, see Cordesman, “China and the US: Na- in the Aftermath of September 11,” Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific tional Missile Defenses.” and Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 47 Robert Manning, et al., China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A November 15, 2001. Preliminary Assessment (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), p. 1. 59 Uzbekistan, another country whose relationship with the United States has 48 Ibid., p. 12. improved through cooperation on the war in Afghanistan, failed to send any 49 The destruction of the World Trade Center towers with massive loss of life representative to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s most recent meet- was first attempted in 1993. Osama bin Laden has been a known organizer of ing. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “‘Beijing’s NATO’ Hits Stumbling Block,” CNN.com, anti-U.S. terrorist attacks for nearly as long, and declared “war” on the United May 16, 2002. States several years ago. The potential use of jetliners as missiles had already 60 President Vladimir Putin’s desires for U.S. support in improving Russian come to the attention of Western intelligence agencies, and would not have economic conditions encourages him to downplay security differences with been as shocking if the attacks had not succeeded (if, for example, plans for the United States in order to maintain good relations. However, this position the attacks had been discovered and circumvented). might not be sustainable politically in Russia unless U.S. economic support is 50 Space and context prevent a full consideration of whether, and to what tangible and meaningful, particularly if an aggressive U.S. nuclear weapons extent, “unipolarity” can constitute a structural change in the terms of and missile defense posture is also accompanied by further NATO expansion. “neorealist” theory, as discussed in Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International 61 For an alternative formulation, see Wade Huntley, “Who Won the Cold Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). War?” in Timothy Breen, ed., The Power of Words: Documents in American 51 George W. Bush, Speech at the National Defense University, May 1, 2001. History (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).
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